Overview: China is a unitary and socialist state whose constitution calls on the nation to “concentrate on socialist modernization by following the road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics” while adhering to the “leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory” as well as “the important thought of the Three Represents,” which are attributed to former CCP general secretary and president of China Jiang Zemin. The political system is led by the 66.4-million-member CCP. Political processes are guided by the CCP constitution and, increasingly, by the state constitution, both promulgated in 1982. The CCP constitution was revised in 2002, and the state constitution was amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. Both constitutions stress the principle of democratic centralism, under which the representative organs of both party and state are elected by lower bodies, and they in turn elect their administrative arms at corresponding levels. Within representative and executive bodies, the minority must abide by decisions of the majority; lower bodies obey orders of higher-level organs. In theory, the National Party Congress is the highest organ of party power, but the real power lies in the CCP Central Committee and its even more exclusive Political Bureau. At the apex of all political power are the members of the elite Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.
In September 2004, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CCP Congress, former party, state, and military leader Jiang Zemin completed his formal handover of responsibilities to Hu Jintao. At the plenum, Jiang gave up his last key position, that of chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission. With Hu holding that position, as well as those of general secretary of the CCP (since November 2002) and president of China (since March 2003), the succession ostensibly was over. However, Jiang confidants and allies were still entrenched in key positions, and Jiang himself, through several high-profile public appearances, gave evidence that he would continue to be influential in central party and state policy making.
Executive Branch: The head of state of China is the president (Hu Jintao, since March 2003, when he succeeded Jiang Zemin). The vice president is Zeng Qinghong (since March 2003; he succeeded Hu Jintao). Articles 79–80 of the constitution provide for a president and vice president of the People’s Republic of China elected by the National People’s Congress (NPC) for five-year terms and no more than two consecutive terms. The president “engages in activities involving State affairs and receives foreign diplomatic represents.” In pursuance of the decisions of the NPC Standing Committee, the president appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and ratifies and abrogates treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states. The vice president assists the president in his work, “may exercise such parts of the functions and powers of the President as the President may entrust to him,” and succeeds to the presidency should the office of president become vacant. Should both offices become vacant, the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee becomes acting president until the NPC elects a new president and vice president.
The government is led by the State Council, the equivalent of a cabinet. The State Council is headed by a premier (Wen Jiabao, since March 2003). There also are four vice premiers and five state councillors (one of whom is the secretary general of the State Council). One of the vice premiers and two of the state councillors double as ministers with such key portfolios as national defense, public security, and public health. In 2005 there were 22 ministries and 4 commissions subordinate to the State Council. In addition, the People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank) and the National Audit Office are part of the State Council system. The five-year terms of office run concurrently with those of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and are limited to no more than two consecutive terms. Executive meetings of the State Council are attended by the premier, vice premiers, state councillors, and secretary general of the State Council. The State Council reports on its work to the NPC and, when the NPC is not in session, to its Standing Committee.
Legislative Branch: According to the constitution, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is “the highest organ of state power” and exercises “the legislative power of the state.” Deputies to the NPC are elected from the provinces, autonomous regions, centrally administered municipalities, special administrative regions, and armed forces. Elections are conducted by the permanent body of the NPC, the Standing Committee, and normally are held at least two months before the end of the current NPC. Deputies serve five-year terms and meet annually for two or three weeks, typically in March or April. The NPC is empowered to amend the constitution; supervise the enforcement of the constitution; and elect the president and vice president of the People’s Republic, the chairman of the state Central Military Commission, the president of the Supreme People’s Court, and the procurator general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. It also has the authority “to decide on” the choice of the premier of the State Council upon nomination of the president and the members of the State Council upon nomination by the premier. Among the other responsibilities of the NPC is to “examine and approve” national economic and social development plans and the state budget and to “decide on questions of war and peace.” The NPC also can alter or annul “inappropriate decisions” of the Standing Committee, approve the establishment of provincial-level units, and decide on the establishment of special administrative regions. The current chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, since March 2003, is Wu Bangguo, a former vice premier and current member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Political Bureau.
When the full NPC is not in session, its Standing Committee, with a chairman, 14 (in 2005) vice chairmen, a secretary general, and members (153 in 2005, including the officers), is in session and holds broad legislative powers. Standing Committee members are not allowed to hold administrative, judicial, or procuratorial posts and, in practice, are often senior CCP and former state leaders and officials. As with the NPC membership, the chairman and vice chairmen serve no more than two consecutive terms. Other committees, which work under the direction of the Standing Committee, include Nationalities; Law; Finance and Economic; Education, Science, Culture, and Public Health; Foreign Affairs; Overseas Chinese; and other special committees.
Another quasi-constitutional consultative body that provides an institutional framework for interaction among the CCP, state organizations, and other social and political organizations is the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Members are distinguished scholars, educators, and intellectuals, key representatives of religious and minority nationality groups, leading members of political parties loyal to the CCP during the anti-Guomindang years, and representatives of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Chinese overseas. The CPPCC typically meets once a year and has a standing committee that convenes when needed between sessions. The current chairman of the CPPCC is Jia Qinglin, a member of the CCP Political Bureau Standing Committee and ally of former CCP secretary general Jiang Zemin.
Judicial Branch: China’s highest court is the Supreme People’s Court. There also are people’s courts at provincial, local, municipal, and lower levels, as well as military courts and other special people’s courts. Constitutionally, the court system exercises judicial power independently and is technically free of interference from administrative organs, public organizations, and individuals. The Supreme People’s Court supervises the administration of justice by local courts and special courts, and courts at higher levels supervise the administration of courts at lower levels. At each level, the courts are “responsible to the organs of state power which created them.” Judges are limited to two consecutive terms running concurrently with the National People’s Congress or local people’s congresses.
Citizens have a constitutional guarantee of the right to use their own spoken and written language in court proceedings. Courts and procuratorates are told by the constitution that they “should provide translations for any party to the court proceedings who is not familiar with the spoken or written languages in common use in the locality.”
The procuratorates are “state organs for legal supervision” and operate at the same levels as the people’s courts. The highest organ is the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The procurators serve as prosecutors or district attorneys and are limited to two consecutive terms running concurrently with the NPC or local people’s congresses.
Administrative Divisions: China has 22 provinces (sheng), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu), and 4 municipalities (shi). The provinces are, in the northeast: Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning; in the north: Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi; in central China: Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and Zhejiang; in the south: Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan (an island in the South China Sea); in the southwest: Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan; and in the northwest: Gansu and Qinghai. The autonomous regions—Guangxi Zhuang, Tibet (Xizang), Xinjiang Uygur, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia Hui—are in border areas with large non-Han ethnic minority populations from which they take their names or part of their names. The four municipalities—Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing—are controlled directly by the central government. China also has two special administrative regions (SARs), Hong Kong, which reverted from British control in 1997, and Macau, which reverted from Portuguese control in 1999. Beijing also claims Taiwan as a province.
Provincial and Local Government: The governors of China’s provinces and autonomous regions and mayors of its centrally controlled municipalities are appointed by the central government in Beijing with the nominal consent of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions (SARs) have some local autonomy, with separate governments, legal systems, and basic constitutional laws, but they come under Beijing’s control in matters of foreign affairs and national security, and their chief executives are hand-picked by the central government. Below the provincial level in 2001 there were 67 rural prefectures, 265 prefecture-level cities, 393 county-level cities, and 1,600 counties. There were 662 cities (including those incorporated into the four centrally controlled municipalities) and 808 urban districts. Counties are divided into townships and villages. While most have appointed officials running them, some lower-level jurisdictions have popular direct elections. The organs of self-government of ethnic autonomous areas (regions, prefectures, and counties)—people’s congresses and people’s governments—exercise the same powers as their provincial-level counterparts but are guided additionally by the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and require NPC Standing Committee approval for regulations they enact “in the exercise of autonomy” and “in light of the political, economic, and cultural characteristics of the ethnic group or ethnic groups in the areas.”
Special Administrative Regions: China has two special administrative regions, Hong Kong (Xianggang in Putonghua) and Macau (Aomen in Putonghua). As a result of the First Anglo-Chinese War (1842), China ceded Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom under the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. In 1860 the British acquired in perpetuity the Kowloon (Jiulong) Peninsula under the Convention of Beijing. The remaining area, the New Territories, was leased for 99 years in 1898. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong was signed between the Chinese and British Governments in 1984. The entire colony was returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). Although originally the 1,098-square-kilometer area was part of Guangdong Province, the Hong Kong SAR reports directly to the State Council in Beijing. The head of state of Hong Kong is the president of China, Hu Jintao. The head of government is a Beijing appointee, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. Hong Kong, with 6.7 million people, has a partly popularly elected legislature and operates under the Basic Law, which embodies the principle of “one country, two systems” and states that the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in Hong Kong; Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and life-style are to remain unchanged until 2047. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR was adopted on April 4, 1990, by the National People’s Congress (NPC) and came into effect on July 1, 1997. Chinese and English are the official languages of Hong Kong.
The area that has come to be called Macau was long a maritime way station between China and India and regions farther west. Portugal first obtained a leasehold on the area from the Qing court in 1557, an arrangement through which China retained sovereignty. In 1844, without Beijing’s concurrence, Lisbon made Macau an overseas province of Portugal. Although China recognized Macau as a Portuguese colony in an 1862 treaty signed with Portugal, the treaty was never ratified by China, and Macau was never officially ceded to Portugal. A protocol dealing with relations between China and Portugal was signed in Lisbon in 1887 confirming the “perpetual occupation and government” of Macau by Portugal (with Portugal’s promise “never to alienate Macau and dependencies without agreement with China”). The islands of Taipa and Coloane also were ceded to Portugal, but the border of the Macau Peninsula with the mainland was not delimited. The Treaty of Commerce and Friendship (1888) recognized Portuguese sovereignty over Macau but was never ratified by China. In 1974 the new Portuguese government granted independence to all overseas colonies and recognized Macau as part of China's territory. In 1979 China and Portugal exchanged diplomatic recognition, and Beijing acknowledged Macau as “Chinese territory under Portuguese administration.” A joint communiqué signed in 1986 called for negotiations on the Macau question, and four rounds of talks followed between June 30, 1986, and March 26, 1987. The Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau was signed in Beijing on April 13, 1987, setting the stage for the return of Macau to full Chinese sovereignty as a special administrative region on December 20, 1999.
Although originally the 26.8-square-kilometer area was part of Guangdong Province, the Macau SAR reports directly to the State Council in Beijing. The head of state of Macau is the president of China, Hu Jintao. The head of government is a Beijing appointee, Chief Executive Edmund H.W. Ho. Macau, with 443,000 people, has a partly popularly elected legislature and operates under the Basic Law of the Macau SAR, adopted by the NPC in 1993 and taking effect on December 20, 1999. Like the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, Macau’s basic law covers the relationship between the central government and Macau; the fundamental rights and duties of the residents; the political structure; the economy and cultural and social affairs; external affairs; and the amendment process. Chinese and Portuguese are the official languages of Macau.
Cross-Strait Relations with Taiwan: China considers Taiwan a province and an inalienable part of China, which has been separated from China since 1949 when the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kei-shek) fled there in the face of defeat by communist forces. Taiwan still controls one island that appertains to the mainland—Jinmen (Kinmen or Quemoy), which is part of Fujian Province. In Beijing matters dealing with Taiwan are handled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s Taiwan Work Office and the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Beijing is adamantly opposed to independence or any quasi-state status for Taiwan and has alternated since the late 1970s between overtures for peaceful reunification and statements of resolution to use force to take back Taiwan if necessary. Beijing has called for resuming cross-strait negotiations, formally ending the state of hostility that has persisted since 1949, and addressing cross-strait problems through timely negotiations. During the reform period, China and Taiwan have allowed economic and trade exchanges, travel, tourism, and other activities. A breakthrough was made in January 2005 when Beijing agreed to launch two-way, round-trip, and non-stop charter flights across the Taiwan Strait starting in February 2005.
Judicial and Legal System: China has a four-level court system. At the top is the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing. Lower courts are the higher people’s courts in provinces, autonomous regions and special municipalities; intermediate people’s courts at the prefecture level and also in parts of provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities; and basic people’s courts in counties, towns, and municipal districts. Special courts handle matters affecting the military, railroad transportation, water transportation, and forestry. The court system is paralleled by a hierarchy of prosecuting organs called people’s procuratorates; at the apex stands the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
In 2004 the National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the constitution so that, for the first time, the protection of the individual was a constitutional requirement. Specifically, articles 37 and 38 recognize the “freedom of the person” and the “personal dignity of citizens” as “inviolable.” Although the 1997 Criminal Procedure Law allows the police to detain a person for up to 37 days before releasing or formally arresting him, more vigorous court reviews have led to the release of thousands of unlawfully detained individuals. However, although the law stipulates that the authorities must notify a detainee’s family or work unit of his detention within 24 hours, in practice, timely notification is often ignored, especially in sensitive political cases. Police sometimes hold individuals without granting access to family members or lawyers, and trials are sometimes conducted in secret. Detained criminal suspects, defendants, their legal representatives, and close relatives are entitled to apply for bail, but, in practice, few suspects are released pending trial. The reeducation-through-labor system allows nonjudicial panels of police and local civil authorities to sentence individuals to up to three years in prison-like facilities. It has been reported that some detainees, usually political activists or dissidents, have been incarcerated in high-security psychiatric facilities for the criminally insane. Police and prosecutorial officials have been accused of ignoring due process provisions of the law and of the constitution.
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the courts are subjected to party and government policy guidance that influences the outcome of verdicts and sentences. Conviction rates in criminal cases in the early 2000s were approximately 90 percent, and trials generally were little more than sentencing hearings. Although most suspects in criminal cases are legally guaranteed the right to counsel, they often meet their appointed attorney only when the case is first brought to court, and the best that a defense attorney can achieve is to obtain a reduction in the sentence. In many politically sensitive trials, which rarely last more than several hours, the courts hand down guilty verdicts immediately following proceedings. Death sentences are often carried out within days of the rejection of an appeal.
Electoral System: Under the Organic Law of the Village Committees, all of China’s approximately 1 million villages are expected to hold competitive, direct elections for subgovernmental village committees. A 1998 revision to the law called for improvements in the nominating process and improved transparency in village committee administration. The revised law also explicitly transferred the power to nominate candidates to the villagers themselves, as opposed to village groups or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) branches. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, as of 2003 the majority of provinces had carried out at least four or five rounds of village elections. Deputies to local people’s congresses of provinces, centrally administered municipalities, and cities divided into districts are elected by the people’s congress at the next lower level. Deputies to people’s congresses of counties, cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, townships, ethnic townships, and towns are elected directly by their constituencies to five-year terms. The local congresses each have corresponding standing committees that exercise legislative authority when the full congresses are not in session. Some townships and urban areas also have experimented with direct elections of local government leaders, and local people’s congress have the constitutional authority to recall the heads and deputy heads of government at the provincial level and below. The constitution does not specify how deputies to the people’s congresses of the autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties are chosen. Elected leaders, however, remain subordinate to the corresponding CCP secretary, and most are appointed by higher-level party organizations. Although China’s constitution guarantees suffrage for citizens age 18 and older, the CCP maintains a close watch on electoral democracy at the grassroots levels and controls the outcome of elections at other levels.
Politics and Political Parties: After its founding in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had only 57 members and no influence. By June 2002, the CCP had 66.4 million members and maintained control of all political, governmental, and military organs. Although political reform was not among the Four Modernizations promulgated in earnest after 1978, the CCP has allowed greater participation by nonparty members in economic and social developments. Within the party, the CCP practices what it calls “democratic centralism,” which, in effect, means the minority follows the decisions of the majority, each level follows the directives of the next highest level, and all follow the lead of the party center. The CCP’s national congress constitutionally is the party’s highest body. It is held every five years and usually prior to the National People’s Congress. However, to operate, it elects a Central Committee, which in turn elects (or approves) the members of the Political Bureau and that organ’s even more elite Standing Committee. The current Central Committee has 198 members and 158 alternate members. The Political Bureau has 24 members, and its Standing Committee has nine members, including Hu Jintao, who became CCP general secretary in November 2002, succeeding Jiang Zemin. Of its 66.4 million members, 25 percent are women, only 6.1 percent are members of minority nationalities, and 23.1 percent are under age 35. Unlike the largely peasant, worker, and military veteran party of the past, 29.2 percent are high-school graduates, 17.8 percent of CCP members have college degrees, and 0.5 percent have graduate degrees.
When Mao Zedong led the party, from 1935 to his death in 1976, he held the position of CCP chairman. His immediate and short-term successor, Hua Guofeng, also held the title of chairman, as did Hua’s successor in 1981, Hu Yaobang, who held the title for a short time until the position was abolished at the CCP Twelfth Party Congress in September1982, and the general secretary became the most powerful position in the party. Deng Xiaoping, despite being the paramount leader in China in the post-Mao era, never held the top party or state positions. Instead, he allowed more junior leaders to hold these positions. When Deng’s longest-term successor, Jiang Zemin, retired in stages between 2002 and 2004, he appeared to have assumed a similar behind-the-throne position of influence.
Day-to-day management of the CCP is carried out by a central secretariat and various functional departments. The departments are the International Liaison Department, United Front Work Department, Organization Department, Propaganda Department, and Party Central Academy. Party secretaries are found at all levels of government and the military, and in industries, academia, and other parts of society. In 2004 the CCP reported it had more 3.3 million party branches throughout the nation. Its main organs are the daily newspaper Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) and the theoretical semimonthly journal Qiu Shi (Seeking Truth, formerly titled Hongqi, or Red Flag).
China also has so-called democratic parties, those parties that were loyal to the CCP in the pre-1949 period and continued to function within the structure of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). These parties are the China Association for Promoting Democracy, China Democratic League, China Democratic National Construction Association, China Zhigongdang (Party for Public Interest), Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party, Jiusan (September Third, a reference to the defeat of Japan in 1945) Society, Guomindang Revolutionary Committee, and Taiwan Self-Government League. An independent opposition party, the China Democracy Party, has been banned since 1998 and its leaders arrested.
Mass Media: China’s electronic mass media are regulated by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, a subordinate agency of the Ministry of Information Industry. The Chinese Communist Propaganda Department traditionally has played a large role as arbiter of what is appropriate and allowed to be broadcast. The People’s Broadcasting Station transmits radio broadcasts in standard Chinese (Putonghua) and various dialects and minority languages throughout China. In 2001 there were 265 FM and 680 AM domestic radio stations in operation throughout China. Many stations had Internet access to some broadcasts. China National Radio, headquartered in Beijing, broadcasts in Chinese, Kazakh, Korean, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uygur. China Radio International, also headquartered in Beijing with branches in major cities for domestic service, broadcasts in 43 foreign languages and Chinese dialects. Television service is provided by China Central Television (CCTV) in Beijing. It has extensive local daily programming and Internet access to scheduling, reviews, and programming. In 2001 CCTV had 33 local affiliates, along provincial lines, with areas such as Fujian and Shanghai having two stations. China Education Television (CETV) is used for distance learning.
The government has been active in regulating newspapers in the twenty-first century. Although foreign investment in local news media was allowed in 2002, the government closed down 673 unprofitable state-run newspapers in 2003, and in 2004 it banned all newspapers and periodicals selling subscriptions. The major newspaper is Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). It was established in 1948 as the main organ of the Chinese Communist Party and has a print circulation of nearly 2.2 million and offers overseas editions and Internet access. Other major newspapers, published in Beijing unless otherwise noted, include Gongren Ribao (Workers’ Daily), Nongmin Ribao (Farmers’ Daily), Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth News), Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily, published in Shanghai), Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily, published in Guangzhou), Guangming Ribao (Bright Daily), Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), and Zhongguo Ribao (China Daily). These newspapers have circulations of between 300,000 and 2.5 million and also offer Internet access.
China produced 170,962 book titles and 6.8 million books in 2002 and published 2,137 newspapers with a total average circulation of 187.2 million. Even more widely distributed were China’s 9,029 magazines, which in 2002 experienced an average circulation of 204 million copies. Both newspapers and magazines typically are read by multiple readers, and newspapers often are posted on bulletin boards in public places were hundreds may read the same copy each day.
The Ministry of Information Industry regulates access to the Internet while the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security monitor its use. A broad range of activities that authorities interpret as subversive or as slanderous to the state, including the dissemination of any information that might harm unification of the country or endanger national security, are prohibited by various laws and regulations. Promoting “evil cults” (a term used for Falun Gong) is banned, as is providing information that “disturbs social order or undermines social stability.” Internet service providers (ISPs) are allowed to use only domestic media news postings. But they also record information useful for tracking users and their viewing habits, install software capable of copying e-mails, and immediately end transmission of material considered subversive. As a result, many ISPs practice self-censorship to avoid violations of the broadly worded regulations.
Foreign Relations: At a national meeting on diplomatic work in August 2004, China’s president, Hu Jintao, reiterated that China will continue its “independent foreign policy of peaceful development.” He stressed the need for a peaceful and stable international environment, especially among China’s neighbors, that will foster “mutually beneficial cooperation” and “common development.” This policy line was more or the less the same as it had been since the People’s Republic was established in 1949, with rhetoric varying during periods of more strident domestic political upheaval.
At its inception, the People’s Republic had a close relationship with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations. Among other agreements, the China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed in 1950. The United States and the West were its chief antagonist. The 1950–53 Korean War waged by China and its North Korea ally against the United States, South Korea, and the United Nations forces, has long been a reason for bitter feelings. By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become divisive, and in 1960 the Soviets unilaterally withdrew their advisers from China. The two then began to vie for allegiances among the developing world nations, of which China saw itself as a natural champion through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and the numerous bilateral and bi-party relations it developed. By 1969 Beijing was so at odds with Moscow that fighting broke out along their common border. China lessened its anti-Western rhetoric and began developing formal diplomatic relations with West Europan nations.
Around the same time that Beijing succeeded in gaining China’s seat in the United Nations (thus ousting the Republic of China on Taiwan) in 1971, relations with the United States began to thaw. In 1973 the president of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, visited China. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1978, and the two nations have experienced more than a quarter century of varying degrees of sometimes amiable and often wary relations over such contentious issues as Taiwan, trade balances, intellectual property rights, nuclear proliferation, and human rights.
China’s relations with its Asian neighbors have become stable during the last decades of the twentieth century. Despite a border war with India in 1962 and general distrust between the two (mostly over China’s close relationship with Pakistan and India’s with the former Soviet Union), in the early 2000s relations between the world’s two largest nations have never been better. China had long been a close ally of North Korea but also found a valuable trading partner in South Korea and eventually took a role in the early 2000s as a proponent of “six-party talks” (North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the United States, and China) to resolve tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Japan, with its large economic and cultural influences in Asia, is seen by China as its most important opponent and partner in regional diplomacy. The two sides established diplomatic relations in 1972, and Japanese investment in China was important in the early years of China’s economic reforms and ever since. Having fought two wars against Japan (1894–95 and 1936–45), China’s long-standing concern about the level of Japan’s military strength surfaces periodically, and criticism of Japan’s refusal to present a full version of the atrocities of World War II in its textbooks is a perennial issue. China has stable relations with its neighbors to the south. A border war was fought with its one-time close friend Vietnam in 1979, but relations have improved since then. A territorial dispute with its Southeast Asian neighbors over islands in the South China Sea remains unresolved as does one in the East China with Japan.
The end of the long-held animosity between Moscow and Beijing was marked by the visit to China by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989. After the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, China’s relations with the Russian Federation and the former states of the Soviet Union became friendly. A new round of bilateral agreements was signed during reciprocal head of state visits. As it was in the 1950s with the Soviet Union, Russia has become an important source of military matériel for China, as well as for raw materials and trade. Friendly relations with Russia have been an important offset for China in its often uneasy relations with the United States. Relations with Europe, both Eastern and Western, generally have been friendly in the early twenty-first century, and, indeed, close political and trade relations with the European Union (EU) nations has been a major thrust in China’s foreign policy in the 2000s.
Although committed to good relations with the nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, in the twenty-first century China finds perhaps the greatest value in these areas as markets and sources of raw materials. The years of solidarity with revolutionary movements in these regions have long been replaced by efforts to cultivate normal diplomatic and economic relations.
Membership in International Organizations: China holds a permanent seat, which affords it veto power, on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). Prior to 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan held China’s UN seat, but, as of that date, the People’s Republic of China successfully lobbied for Taiwan’s removal from the UN and took control of the seat. China is an active member of numerous UN system organizations, including the UN General Assembly and Security Council; Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN; UN Conference on Trade and Development; UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees; UN Industrial Development Organization; UN Institute for Training and Research; UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission; and UN Truce Supervision Organization. China also holds memberships in the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (dialogue partner), Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, Bank for International Settlements, Caribbean Development Bank, Group of 77, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Chamber of Commerce, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Criminal Police Organization, International Development Association, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Finance Corporation, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Hydrographic Organization, International Labour Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Migration (observer), International Organization for Standardization, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, International Telecommunication Union, Latin American Integration Association (observer), Non-Aligned Movement (observer), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Universal Postal Union, World Customs Organization, World Health Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World Tourism Organization, World Trade Organization, and Zangger Committee.
Major International Treaties: The People’s Republic of China has signed numerous international conventions and treaties. Treaties signed on behalf of China before 1949 are applicable only to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Conventions signed by Beijing include: Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Convention; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons Convention; Conventional Weapons Convention; Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Convention; Inhumane Weapons Convention; Nuclear Dumping Convention (London Convention); Nuclear Safety Convention; Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention; Rights of the Child and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography Convention (signed Optional Protocol); and Status of Refugees (and the 1967 Protocol) Convention. Treaties include the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed but not ratified); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol); Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba, signed protocols 1 and 2); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Treaty on Outer Space; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed Protocol 2); Treaty on Seabed Arms Control; and Treaty on the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga, signed and ratified protocols 2 and 3). China also is a party to the following international environmental conventions: Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, and Whaling.