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Venezuela - GOVERNMENT
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A stable, democratic political system in Venezuela after 1958 represents a remarkable accomplishment. Few political scientists and historians in the late 1950s would have predicted that Venezuela would become a democratic model. The nation's turbulent past, which saw numerous regime changes, some of them violent, and its tradition of instability and penchant for repeatedly revamping its constitutions gave few hints of its impending transformation.
At the core of this transformation has been the emergence and the strengthening of a diverse party system that has progressively converged toward the center-left in its ideology and its policy orientation without abandoning pluralism. Elections since 1958 have been vigorously contested on a regular and predictable timetable. Political freedoms have been enjoyed by those in and out of power; presidents have been blessed with the sense that their mandate was legitimate. Perhaps even more extraordinary in the context of Latin American politics, outgoing presidents have peacefully handed over power to incoming presidents from another party of somewhat divergent political orientation.
This transformation from an authoritarian past to a healthy and long-surviving democratic regime cannot be understood in a vacuum, however. The political system evolved from a past fraught with instability and authoritarianism. After the heroic years of independence, Venezuelans suffered under the corruption and brutality of caudillismo (rule by local strongmen, or caudillos); fought a major civil war; and saw the constant redrafting of the constitution and changes in the rules of the political game.
Venezuela's independence began with its liberation by Sim�n Bol�var Palacios, who freed not only his own homeland but much of the rest of South America. In 1830, with the collapse of Bol�var's dream of a larger Gran Colombia, Venezuela was ruled by a patriot caudillo from the llanos, or plains, General Jos� Antonio P�ez. This first postindependence period lasted until about 1858 and was characterized by economic recovery and political stability as the young nation functioned under the reign of a conservative oligarchy. P�ez established the model of strongman rule under which an undisputed caudillo governed for a long period, either on his own or through the selection of handpicked loyal subordinates, thus preserving the appearance of constitutional presidential succession. These traditional caudillos, who preserved constitutional appearances while subverting the constitution's spirit, also elevated the role of Caracas as the political and economic center of the country. Throughout the nineteenth century and to this day, the principal goal of traditional and modern caudillos has been to take hold of and control the capital and, from the center, dominate and overwhelm the periphery.
The discovery and exploration of large oil reserves early in the twentieth century accelerated the demise of old-style caudillo rule. Although change took place, there were important continuities as well, as constitutional ideals constantly competed with political realities. By the time the long-lived dictator Juan Vicente G�mez died in his sleep in 1935, the seeds of democratic transformation were already planted. The short-lived student protest of 1928 was the first manifestation of democratic stirrings that were to flourish decades later.
The Generation of 1928 that sprang from that experience included future Venezuelan presidents and eminent political leaders of diverse political views, such as R�mulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera Rodr�guez, J�vito Villalba, Gustavo Machado, and Ra�l Leoni. For a brief three years, between 1945 and 1948, many of these leaders experienced their first taste of democratic rule; but they were then perhaps too young and too impatient, and their democratic experiment was short-lived. Exile gave these leaders broader perspectives and provided essential links to other democratic forces. The last decade of dictatorship ended in 1958; by then the Generation of 1928 was prepared to implement democratic reforms without being overthrown in the process.
Since 1958 democracy has survived, although its record has not been uncheckered. Coup attempts, especially in the early years, were fomented by extremists of both the right and the left, sometimes in the pay of or under the inspiration of extremists from outside the country. But the constitution of 1961 has not been rewritten or abolished, even if the spirit of the charter has not always been observed. Corruption has existed as well. At times the oil bonanza has led to a disregard for fiscal responsibility and has also enhanced the notion that the government can always afford the luxury of one more panacea.
An oil-rich nation, by 1990 Venezuela enjoyed the highest annual per capita income in Latin America and a politically moderate labor movement. After more than three decades of democracy and a spirited presidential campaign, however, food riots in Caracas and elsewhere in the spring of 1989 shocked Venezuelans and forced them to contemplate the apparent fragility of their socio-political system. The food riots and looting of 1989, in which hundreds of people died violently, presented a stark reminder that Venezuelan democracy, although enviable by Latin American standards, was not without its flaws and its vulnerabilities.
<"37.htm">THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
<"45.htm">POLITICAL DYNAMICS
<"49.htm">The Mass Media
<"50.htm">FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Venezuelan governmental system has been characterized by contradictions in theory and practice. While its constitutions pledged federalism and a separation of powers, political practice and custom gave an undeniable primacy to the government in Caracas and to the president, in particular. Even under the constitution of 1961, which gives extraordinary guarantees and rights to ordinary Venezuelans, the bureaucratic system has continued to favor those with family and political connections. Although the underlying system predates the democratic transition of 1958, it has broadened and became more pluralistic as more individuals and political brokers achieved influence in the drafting and implementation of policies.
The formal constitutional structure is fairly straightforward in its provisions. The pronouncements on individual and group rights, on the other hand, are imaginative, especially those articles dealing with social and welfare rights. This blend of traditional articles and those that reflect commitments toward reform and social justice makes the constitution of 1961 an interesting case study.
Under its twenty-sixth constitution, adopted on January 23, 1961, Venezuela is a federal republic made up of twenty states, two federal territories (Amazonas and Delta Amacuro), and a Federal District (Caracas). In addition, there are seventy-two island dependencies in the Caribbean. The power of the government is divided between the national government and those of the states, districts, and municipalities. Throughout most of its history, however, the national governmental power in Caracas has predominated.
Although the states did have some powers of their own and enjoyed some autonomy, until 1989 they were administered by governors appointed by the president. The first direct popular election of governors took place in July 1989. Even though they gained an independent political base, these governors still depended on the national government for their budgets. In contrast, the states had a much longer history of electing unicameral legislative assemblies. States have also been subdivided historically into county-like districts with popularly elected district councils and municipalities with popularly elected municipal councils. The Federal District and the federal territories similarly had elected councils.
Even though the president has considerable power, the constitution does place specific limitations on who may run for the presidency. Further, a retiring president may not return to the presidency until two terms, or ten years, have elapsed. Carlos Andr�s P�rez, reelected in 1989, became the first president since 1958 to occupy the highest office twice. Former presidents automatically become life members of the Senate (upper house of the Congress). Traditionally, they have also been viewed as elder statesmen. This was particularly true in the case of R�mulo Betancourt (president, 1959-64), who, with his great prestige, continued to exert considerable influence years after he had left the presidency.
The constitution provides for the direct election of the president, who is chosen under universal suffrage for a five-year term. The president appoints and presides over the cabinet and determines the number of ministries. The office of vice president, which had been at times provided for in earlier Venezuelan constitutions, is not mentioned in the 1961 document. One anecdote holds that wily Juan Vicente G�mez (president, 1908- 35) abolished the office of the vice president in a turn-of-the-century constitution, after he, as vice president, had moved to the top office during the absence of president Cipriano Castro. Nearly a century later, the Venezuelan governmental system retained in its constitution traditional ways of protecting the president from the possibly fatal ambitions of a second-in-command.
Unlike the constitution followed in the time of the dictator G�mez, however, the 1961 constitution provides for mandatory voting for all Venezuelan citizens who are at least eighteen years old and who are not convicts or members of the armed forces. Generally, more than 80 percent of those registered voted. Each political party had its own ballot with a distinctive color and symbol, so that even illiterate citizens could recognize their preferred party choice. Elections were supervised by an independent, federally appointed electoral commission. Constitutionally assured elections, universal suffrage, and participation in politics for over three decades have made Venezuela a unique and much admired democratic model in Latin America.
<"38.htm">Constitutional Development
<"39.htm">The President
<"40.htm">The Legislature
<"41.htm">The Judiciary
<"42.htm">Public Administration
<"43.htm">Local Government
<"44.htm">The Electoral System
Until 1961 Venezuela had the unenviable distinction of having been governed by more constitutions than any other Latin American country. This was partly the result of the trauma of a prolonged war of independence that tested the country's fragile social cohesion. Venezuelans are proud of the fact that Bol�var brought freedom to his homeland as well as to the homelands of thousands of other Latin Americans; this epic crusade, however, carried an enormous financial and human burden. The struggle also often pitted the criollo elite, exemplified by Bol�var, against pardos who rightfully felt that they had improved their lot under Spanish rule. In turn, regional elites, resentful of Caracas's ascendancy, refused to join the crusade and often turned to the Spanish side in an effort to curtail Bol�var's power).
The prolonged war for independence and the subsequent jockeying for power among caudillos, both regional and national, in part accounted for the changes in constitutions and in constitutional provisions to better suit the temper and the realities of the times. Each caudillo scrapped the previous constitution and wrote a basic law that suited him better. Federalism, for example, an ideal in Venezuela since before 1864, was rudely brushed aside whenever a strongman emerged in Caracas who needed to put down opposition from local or regional chieftains. Federalism has enjoyed a more hospitable environment since the promulgation of the 1961 constitution, but no federalist tradition strong enough to challenge the continuing power of the president has yet arisen. Thus, although the possibility of direct election of state governors existed under various constitutions, the actual practice was not implemented until 1989.
The states are considered autonomous and equal as political entities, but their dependence on Caracas for budget allocations ensures that state powers are indeed limited. On the other hand, they do have some symbolic powers. For example, they can change their names, they can organize local governmental entities, and they can perform a few other functions on their own.
Although the division of powers among the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches has been traditional in Venezuelan constitutions, the executive has overshadowed the other two branches throughout the country's history. A greater break with the past came in the 1961 constitution in its painstaking elaboration of individual and collective duties and rights. No fewer than seventy-four articles deal with human rights and freedoms. Freedom of speech, press, and religion are guaranteed. The right of habeas corpus is recognized, and prompt trials are ensured (although the cumbersome judicial system effectively thwarted the latter guarantee). There are also constitutional prohibitions against self-incrimination, torture, capital punishment, double jeopardy, and discrimination on the basis of sex, creed, or social condition. The 1961 constitution also places many social obligations on the state, such as responsibility regarding labor, social welfare, and the national economy. Working hours are specified, minimum wages guaranteed, and there is freedom to strike. Special protection is provided women and minors in the labor force.
The government has many powers and responsibilities in regard to national economic development. Private property and private enterprise are protected so long as they do not conflict with national policies. In turn, the national government is given wide latitude in the areas of industrial development and protection of natural resources, and in provisions for the expropriation of property.
It is fairly easy to amend and even rewrite the constitution. Amendments can be initiated by one-fourth of one of the chambers of Congress or one-fourth of the state legislative assemblies. An amendment requires a simple majority for passage by Congress. If passed by Congress, an amendment still requires certification by two-thirds of the states to become part of the constitution. Provisions for reforming or rewriting the constitution are similar; the process may be put into motion by a one-third vote by the states or a congressional chamber, passage by two-thirds vote in Congress, and approval by a national referendum. Rejected initiatives of amendment or reform may not be reintroduced during the same congressional term. The president may not veto amendments or reforms and is obliged to promulgate them within ten days following their passage.
In practice, the 1961 constitution retained many features of previous constitutions. Federalism, for example, has been the nominal basis of constitutional structuring since 1864. Although the 1961 document calls Venezuela a federal state, it also labels the country as "the Republic of Venezuela," where earlier charters used the term "the United States of Venezuela."
More important, the constitution has served as the basis for expansive government programs that fulfill the mandate for greater social justice and greater use of the central government in all spheres of public policy. Thus, in effect, the 1961 constitution expanded and redefined the central role to be played by government on behalf of the people of Venezuela; it maintained the tradition of powerful presidents and a strong central state.
The 1961 constitution continues the long tradition of a powerful president, who serves as head of state and chief executive. He or she must be a Venezuelan by birth, at least thirty years old, and not a member of the clergy. The president is elected by a plurality vote under direct and universal suffrage, serves for five years, and cannot be reelected until after two intervening terms have passed. President Carlos Andr�s P�rez became the first Venezuelan elected to serve two terms of office under this provision of the 1961 constitution; he won the December 1988 election after having served as president from 1974 to 1979.
The president commands the armed forces, calls special sessions of the Congress, and exercises sole control of foreign policy. He can authorize expenditures outside the budget and can negotiate loans. The constitution provides for a weak form of ministerial responsibility. This is rendered meaningless, however, because while the constitution calls upon the president to consult with his ministers, it allows him to appoint and remove them. In fact, through his ministers, the president can adopt whatever regulations he chooses in order to implement the laws. These regulations are not subject to the approval of Congress, and the courts are not empowered to review them.
The major challenges and limitations to presidential power are found not in constitutional restrictions but in the political system as defined by the major Venezuelan political parties. Limitations placed on presidential initiative by the play of forces within the president's party restricted presidential actions informally but effectively; in practice, therefore, political checks functioned more effectively than constitutional ones to prevent presidential abuses of authority.
The constitutional power to declare a state of siege and temporarily restrict or suspend constitutional guarantees represents the ultimate exercise of presidential authority under the 1961 constitution. During R�mulo Betancourt's elected tenure (president, 1959-64), he felt compelled to use these constitutionally sanctioned limitations in order to prevail over forces that threatened the survival of his legitimately elected government. It should be pointed out, however, that certain guarantees cannot be constitutionally abrogated under any circumstances. The guarantee against perpetual imprisonment and the prohibition against the death penalty represent two such provisions.
Cabinet and noncabinet ministers serve as advisers to the president; they are appointed and removed by the president without input from the Congress. Ministers may introduce bills in Congress, and they must submit an annual report and an accounting of funds to Congress at the beginning of each regular session. The ministers of energy and mines, finance, foreign affairs, interior, and national defense and the head of the Central Office of Coordination and Planning (Oficina Central de Coordinaci�n y Planificaci�n--Cordiplan) traditionally have been considered the most powerful and prestigious in the Council of Ministers, or cabinet.
The president determines the size and composition of the cabinet. Both Betancourt and Ra�l Leoni (president, 1964-69), who succeeded him as the second chief executive in the democratic period, appointed thirteen cabinet ministers. Since then, the number has grown as high as twenty-five. Some observers have noted a correlation between this increase in the number of ministries and the oil bonanza that began in 1973. As the oil money flowed in, the number of ministries also increased. Subsequently, even though the oil boom ended in the early 1980s, presidents have found it difficult to operate with as few ministries as Betancourt and Leoni did.
The growth of the cabinet was not surprising in light of the ambitious list of the government's goals in the 1970s and 1980s. These included preserving democratic institutions, maintaining public order, modernizing the armed forces, managing the external public debt so as to avoid undesirable effects on living standards, and directing the economy and the development of the country's physical infrastructure. All these broad and wide-ranging goals fell within the president's purview and range of legislative initiatives; therefore, when Venezuelans spoke of "the government," almost invariably they meant "the president," or "the executive."
Driven by this mandate, the centralized bureaucracy, under the control of the president, has become by far the largest employer in the country. Commonly cited figures on the number of public servants were inaccurate because they often excluded those employed by the many state corporations, among them those dealing with the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (Petr�leos de Venezuela, S.A.--PDVSA), the Foreign Commerce Institute, the Superintendency of Foreign Investment (Sistema de Inversiones Extranjeras--SIEX), and many others.
The tremendous growth of bureaucracy provoked controversy, especially as oil revenues declined during the 1980s. Many Venezuelans felt that the growth of bureaucracy contributed to corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, and a declining level of services. And yet, a significant number of Venezuelans worked for the government either directly or indirectly or had close relatives so employed. The Venezuelan press had been vigorous in its expos�s of the most flagrant cases of nepotism, but authorities had seldom taken effective action to curtail this practice. The 1989 switch to the direct election of governors lessened the opportunity for presidents to appoint political cronies to these offices. President P�rez's announced policy of privatization of some parts of the public sector could also have an impact on inefficient personnel practices. Through 1990, however, the overall effect of these changes could not be judged.
An early sign of P�rez's intentions toward fulfilling his pledge of greater privatization came with the announced intention to dissolve the Venezuelan Investment Fund (Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela--FIV), once the most visible institutional symbol of the liberal application of oil revenues. Perhaps ironically, the FIV had been created by P�rez in 1974 during his earlier presidency as a channel to direct the additional income generated by rocketing oil prices into the expansion of non-oil sectors of the economy. Allocations by the government to the FIV funded large-scale projects intended to boost the production of steel, aluminum, and electricity. In addition, possibly in an effort to pave the way for an eventual bid by P�rez to become the secretary general of the United Nations, FIV also channeled Venezuelan financial assistance to poor countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andean region.
Early in 1990, the government reallocated FIV's assets among various ministries. This move, however, did not necessarily represent the demise of this powerful bureaucratic entity. Some sources indicated that FIV's technicians would be charged with administering the privatization program. By late 1990, however, the privatization program had yet to sell a single state asset, and some observers questioned the strength of P�rez's commitment to the process.
The constitution establishes a bicameral Congress, comprising a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Senators must be at least thirty years of age and deputies at least twenty-one. Both must be native-born Venezuelans. Each body is elected at the same time, with the same congressional ballot, every five years. A party list system of proportional representation is the method of selection for both chambers; voters, therefore, do not cast ballots for individual candidates. The only deviation in the selection of members lies in the fact that the Senate also includes former presidents of the republic. The traditional provision of alternates (suplentes) allows persons so designated to hold the position to which a principal has been elected in the latter's absence.
Many felt that the most important unit within the Congress was the party caucus (fracci�n), made up of members of a party's elected delegation to either chamber. A chairman chosen by its members presided over the caucus. Chairmen were effectively preselected by their party's national central committee; balloting by the congressional delegations merely ratified the choice.
Revenue, budget, and taxation bills must originate in the lower house, which also has the authority to censure ministers. The upper house is responsible for the initiation of bills relating to treaties and international agreements. The Senate also approves certain presidential appointments to diplomatic posts and the promotions of high-ranking military officers.
The Venezuelan constitution provides for parliamentary immunity, but this immunity may be revoked by a member's chamber. In 1963 the Supreme Court upheld the right of the president to ban political parties deemed subversive of democracy. Congress, however, has remained responsible for its own organization and regulation. Each chamber elects its own presiding officer. The president of the Senate serves as the president of Congress; the president of the Chamber of Deputies serves as the vice president of Congress.
The political significance of the Venezuelan Congress has increased throughout the post-1958 democratic era. The staffs of congressional committees handled a heavy legislative workload. Initially, each chamber had the same ten permanent standing committees, but in 1966 the Chamber of Deputies created the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. All other committees have continued as parallel structures in both houses of the Congress. Two committees in each chamber deal with internal affairs and foreign relations, four committees with economic matters, and four others with service issues, such as education, <"35.htm">tourism, and defense.
The most important committee, however, is the Delegated Committee. An interim body created by the 1961 constitution, it includes the president and vice president of Congress and twenty-one other members selected on the basis of party representation in Congress. The delegated committee serves during those periods when Congress is adjourned; it exercises oversight functions and acts for Congress in its relations with the executive. It may convene Congress in extraordinary session if it deems it necessary.
The legislature considers, debates, approves, rejects, or alters legislation. Congress also has the authority to question ministers and to have them explain adopted policies. It can censure executive personnel, with the exception of the president. Moreover, it can impeach the president by agreement between the Senate and the Supreme Court. This has not happened since the adoption of the 1961 constitution, however.
In practice, the legislature does not share equal status with the executive branch. The executive branch, not Congress, introduces most significant legislation. In addition, in certain instances, bills may emanate from the Supreme Court; the constitution also provides that a bill may be initiated directly by the petition of a minimum of 20,000 voters. The president has the authority to veto legislation, although Congress can override that veto. When a veto is overridden, the president may ask Congress to reconsider those parts of the bill he finds objectionable.
Two senators are elected from each state and two from the federal district. Additional members, around five or so, are selected by a system of proportional representation that ensures minority parties a voice in the legislature. Former presidents may serve as senators for life, if they so desire. They are considered elder statesmen and are often consulted by their colleagues on matters of policy and political strategies. All other legislators are elected by universal suffrage for five-year terms concurrent with that of the president. Unlike the president, legislators may be immediately reelected.
Venezuela has no dual organization of national and state courts. Since 1945, all courts have been part of the federal system, even though at one point a parallel organization of state courts existed. Regardless of their form of organization, the courts have never exercised as much influence as the executive or even the legislative branch in Venezuela.
As is the case with the legislature, the judicial branch in Venezuela does not share equal status with the executive. Although the law provides for the process of judicial review and for coequal status among the three branches of government, the reality is quite different. The Venezuelan brand of federalism does not provide for state courts. The law is perceived as the same, unitary, throughout the national territory. Thus, all courts and virtually all legal officers, from those who arrest to those who prosecute, are federal (i.e., central government) officials.
Broader implications stem from the fact that the Venezuelan legal system is essentially a code law system, and thus the legal system is relatively rigid and leaves little room for judicial discretion. In a system of code law, the jurist is seen as a confirmer of the written code rather than the finder or maker of the law, as is the case in common law systems.
The highest body in the judicial system is the fifteen-member Supreme Court of Justice, which is divided into three chambers that handle respectively, politico-administrative, civil, and penal matters. Its members are elected by joint session of the Congress for nine-year terms. One-third of the membership is renewed every three years. Each justice is restricted to a single term of nine years; this short tenure effectively limits how much a Supreme Court justice can accomplish.
Below the Supreme Court are seventeen judicial districts, each district having its own superior court. Lower courts within a judicial district include courts of instruction, district courts, municipal courts, and courts of first instance. The superior courts are composed of either one or three judges, a bailiff, and a secretary. They serve as appellate courts for matters originating in courts of first instance in the areas of civil and criminal law. Some deal exclusively with civil matters, others with criminal matters, and others with all categories of appeals. The courts of first instance are composed of one judge, a bailiff, and a secretary. They have both appellate and original jurisdiction and are divided into civil, mercantile, penal, finance, transit, labor, and juvenile courts. District courts are composed of one judge, one bailiff, and a secretary; they also operate nationwide. They have original jurisdiction in small bankruptcy and boundary suits, and appellate jurisdiction over all cases from the municipal courts. Municipal courts, consisting of a judge, a bailiff, and a secretary, hear small claims cases and also try those accused of minor crimes and misdemeanors. They also perform marriages. Although they do not constitute courts as such, instruction judges issue indictments, oversee investigations to determine whether a case merits the attention of the courts and, if so, issue an arrest warrant. Thus, these judges perform a crucial task in the initial stages of all cases that come before the courts.
In addition to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction, several courts of special jurisdiction operate under the Ministry of Justice. Military tribunals, fiscal tribunals, and juvenile courts all fall into this category. Although they operate independently of the ordinary courts, the Supreme Court also acts as the highest court of appeal for the special courts. Juvenile courts throughout the country try those under eighteen years of age.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Venezuelan judicial system is its carryover of medieval Castilian traditions, such as the fuero militar (military privilege). Under this centuries-old tradition, members of the military cannot be tried by criminal or civilian courts, although the military has at times intruded into the civilian judicial system. For example, the Armed Forces of Cooperation (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperaci�n--FAC)--also known as the National Guard-- was charged with the function of protecting all national territory and highways. Under this broad mandate, it could and did prosecute contraband cases and in effect became involved in the criminal prosecution of many suspected civilian offenders. This power was likely to increase as drug contraband became a greater problem in Venezuela, especially along its borders with Colombia.
Generally speaking, the system for selecting judges tended to limit their independence. The Congress chooses the members of the Supreme Court, and the minister of justice names judges to the lower civilian courts. Neither category of judge enjoyed life tenure. Judges' salaries were submitted to Congress as line items in the Ministry of Justice's annual budget and were therefore not guaranteed. Thus, in a number of ways the judiciary was subordinate to and dependent upon the good will of the executive and the legislative branches. Although Venezuelan jurists occupied a highly regarded position in society, they did not hold nearly as much power as their counterparts in those systems where judicial review and common law are the basic determinants of procedures.
The 1961 Constitution provides for a career civil service and establishes standards for performance, advancement, suspension, and retirement. The ideals, however, have been largely ignored in practice in favor of a system based on patronage. Scholars of public administration agreed that the bureaucracy was bloated, inefficient, and often susceptible to corruption.
The junta that assumed power after the 1958 overthrow of the dictator Marcos P�rez Jim�nez set up a Public Administration Committee that obtained the advice and services of a number of international experts. The committee found the Venezuelan bureaucracy to be unorganized and unprofessional; the experts advised the adoption of a model under which jobs were to be clearly defined, civil service would become divorced from politics, pay scales would be established within accepted guidelines, and the bureaucracy would faithfully follow the directives of government leaders.
Although it became immediately apparent that most, if not all, of the committee's suggestions were unworkable (for example, the notion of a democratic government such as Betancourt's giving life tenure to senior bureaucrats because they had served long years under the P�rez dictatorship), the committee was not totally a failure. As a result of the committee's activities, in 1959 a new Commission on Public Administration undertook the administrative reform of the upper levels of the public service. The commission also established a school in Caracas to train career civil servants, the Graduate Institute of Public Administration (Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administraci�n--IESA). In spite of IESA's excellent faculty and promising graduates, most of the bureaucracy remained filled with political appointees rather than IESA graduates in the late 1980s.
Cordiplan, in the Office of the President, also was created in 1958. Cordiplan was envisaged as a central agency that would allocate resources within the government and handle budgetary and administrative planning, all on a nationwide basis. Although Cordiplan has been highly regarded and its four- and five-year plans have served as general guides, many of its detailed and imaginative goals for national development have been undercut by a bureaucracy resentful of Cordiplan's clout in budgetary matters.
In 1969 President Caldera charged the Commission on Public Administration with drafting an overall reform plan. The commission submitted a detailed report and plan to the president in 1972, but its sweeping recommendations were never fully implemented. The effort did have some positive results, however. By the end of the 1960s, concepts of regular personnel procedures and civil service tenure had begun to take hold. During the Caldera government, the Central Office of Personnel branched off from the commission and became a force in promoting the professionalization of civil servants.
Carlos Andr�s P�rez, during his campaign for the presidency in 1973, promised to further streamline and professionalize the bureaucracy. During the preceding Christian Democratic Party (Comit� de Organizaci�n Pol�tica Electoral Independiente--COPEI) administration of Rafael Caldera, the bureaucracy had grown and many state enterprises had mushroomed. P�rez reacted by creating a separate reform commission to deal solely with state enterprises; the original reform commission became a subsection of Cordiplan in 1977.
Ministerial and regional reorganization plans also have been enacted into law, but their implementation has been minimal at best. Another strain was added when the oil industry was nationalized in 1976, and a whole new bloc of private workers and managers became government employees. This initiated a highly political process, as players within the political system sought to exploit the potential of the state-owned oil industry to provide money, patronage, and jobs to the well connected. Whatever the incentives for reform, the incentives for continued corruption almost invariably have proved stronger.
In spite of its many failings, Venezuelans saw the bureaucracy as an integral part of a system in which service and perquisites went hand in hand. Politicians promised services and appointed bureaucrats to provide those services; the appointees themselves, however, more often than not owed their first allegiance to the politicians rather than to the public. Furthermore, the bureaucracy, like everything else, was concentrated in Caracas; therefore it responded more to the needs of the center than to the demands of the periphery.
The 1961 constitution provides for a federal republic of twenty states, two federal territories, the federal district, and seventy-two island dependencies. Each state contains two levels of government, the district and the municipal level. There are 202 districts in the country, between 6 and 16 in each state. Districts are divided into municipalities and are constitutionally independent of the state in economic and administrative matters, subject only to national laws and regulations.
Local government was not strong in Venezuela, and it can be argued that Venezuelans gave greater loyalty to their states than to their local government bodies. The 1961 constitution delegates the establishment of municipalities and other local entities to the states. The municipalities elect their own officials and may collect certain revenues, but they are subject to numerous legal, financial, and political limitations imposed by national officials.
The powers of the states are restricted to those areas not granted to the nation or the municipalities. The states are permitted to merge, cede territory, or change their boundaries with the consent of the Senate. Although it had not done so through 1990, the national Congress may, by a two-thirds vote, expand the powers of the states to include matters previously limited to the consideration of the central government. The states have also remained dependent on the national government for most of their revenue.
In 1990 the direct election of governors was still too recent to indicate to what extent the state executives, now with their own political basis, would be able to exert greater authority than they did as appointed officials. In any case, the governor's powers derive from his or her control of the state's law enforcement machinery, the drafting of the state's budget (which is submitted to the state legislature), and the execution of the directives of the national executive. Unicameral state legislative assemblies are popularly elected and exercise limited powers.
States are divided into districts, the number of districts depending on the size of the state. Districts are governed by popularly elected councils; elections for council members take place at the same time as those for national officials. Like all popularly elected officials, council members serve five-year terms. The number of council members varies, but all councils are presided over by a chairman, who serves in that position for a one-year term. The district councils have limited decision-making powers regarding such matters as the distribution of national funds channeled through the state executives. The councils are charged with providing the local services not provided by the national government.
The districts are divided into municipalities, which are also governed by elected councils. The municipal councils have no decision-making powers and serve as administrative units in charge of garbage collection, sewer construction, and other municipal services. The councils also provide information about local politics to the district council and serve as advocates for local citizens with the national bureaucracy. In Venezuela, however, links between local citizens and the national government have often been more effectively established by the political parties and informally rather than by the local bureaucracy.
These links between local citizens and the national government might have to be redefined, however, after the Democratic Action (Acci�n Democr�tica--AD) party's major defeat in the December 1989 local elections. These elections were particularly significant because, for the first time, they involved the elections of mayors (a position that previously did not exist) as well as 20 state governors. Another innovation in these elections allowed voters to cast their ballots directly for the municipal councilors of their choice if they preferred this to the traditional system of voting according to party slates.
President P�rez's AD lost gubernatorial elections in nine key states, including oil-producing Zulia, the industrial state of Carabobo, and the state of Miranda. The opposition made similar inroads at the municipal level, with 95 of the mayoral posts won by COPEI and 24 by other parties, as compared with AD's 150. The immediate result of these electoral setbacks was a renewed and more vocal discussion about the degree to which states should be able to manage their own financial resources.
The 1947 constitution guaranteed universal suffrage and direct elections by secret ballot, but the P�rez Jim�nez dictatorship abrogated these guarantees. Free and fair elections have been held regularly since 1958; voter turnout has been high, especially for national offices.
Voter registration and participation in elections are compulsory for all eligible citizens. Penalties exist for failing to vote, but they were seldom enforced as of 1990. All citizens over eighteen years of age, except members of the armed forces on active duty and persons serving prison sentences, are eligible to vote. There are no literacy, property, or gender requirements for voting.
With the exception of the president, all candidates for national and local offices run on lists as members of a party. Each party issues a party list with its more prominent members at the top. Candidates are elected on a proportional basis according to the number of colored ballots cast for their party and their position on the list.
Elections are supervised and directed by the Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral--CSE), which consists of thirteen members chosen every two years by Congress. The CSE heads an electoral system composed of state, district, and municipal electoral boards. The CSE is responsible for registering eligible voters, operating the polling places, counting the votes, ruling on appeals from lower electoral boards, settling controversies between parties, and other electoral matters. No political party may have a majority on the CSE or any of the lower boards.
Presidential, legislative, district, and municipal elections are held once every five years. The president is elected by a simple plurality, and congressional representatives are selected on the basis of a system of proportional representation for the major parties. The minor party representation is determined by dividing the total number of votes cast by the total number of persons directly elected to calculate the number of votes necessary to award a seat to a party. In the 1973 elections, minority parties gained one seat in the Senate for each 98,491 votes they received. In this way three parties that did not win Senate seats through the direct elections nevertheless gained a total of five seats in the upper house. In addition to the six parties that won seats in the Chamber of Deputies by direct election, six other parties were awarded seats under the quotient system.
Despite efforts, such as the quotient system, that sought to accommodate minority parties, the Venezuelan electorate remained loyal to the two major political groups that have dominated the system since 1958, AD and COPEI. In the congressional elections of December 4, 1988, AD received 43.3 percent of the total, COPEI 31.1 percent. The closest competitor at the polls was the leftist coalition that united the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo--MAS) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria--MIR), which obtained 10.2 percent of the total. Small groupings of rightist and personalistic orientations garnered a combined total of only 7.6 percent. The balance went to a variety of very small parties; the Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Venezuela--PCV), attracted only 0.9 percent of the vote.
The elections held since 1958, as a whole, have been noteworthy not only for their high voter turnout, but also for the increasing sense of legitimacy they have conferred upon the winners. Domestic and foreign observers alike have praised Venezuelan elections as fair and highly competitive. Over the years, as AD and COPEI have become the dominant political parties, a return to the traditional fragmentation of the Venezuelan political system has become increasingly unlikely. The fact that on four occasions before the 1990s a president from one party handed over the mantle to the president-elect of another party seemed to augur well for a general acceptance of the democratic system. Increased legitimacy at home has also provided Venezuelan presidents with an international clout they would otherwise lack.
The December 1989 gubernatorial and mayoral elections, however, might presage a certain undermining of this sense of legitimacy. Abstention reached a record level, with estimates suggesting that some 60 percent of the nearly 10 million registered voters did not cast ballots--substantially greater than the 41 percent abstention rate recorded in the previous municipal elections held in 1984. This sense of apathy and alienation may have been heightened by a decline in the quality of life during 1989, by an unprecedented crime wave, and by a deterioration of public services.
Venezuelan political dynamics since 1958 have centered on a strong commitment to the democratic "rules of the game." Although Venezuelans--and foreigners alike--have pointed out that this democratic commitment was not without its blemishes, few Venezuelans still spoke about the days of dictatorship as the golden days of their country. In general, most felt that Venezuela's democracy was strong and robust, but that democracy alone had not brought about social justice or narrowed the gap between the very rich and the very poor. Indeed, the practice of democracy, in and of itself, was perhaps not even capable of achieving such goals.
Both AD and COPEI administrations have committed themselves to developing coherent, overall economic and social development policies. Such agencies as Cordiplan were established to coordinate planning and contributed to rapid social and economic mobilization. Reform rather than revolution has been a goal of both major political parties. By the same token, the policies of sembrar el petr�leo, "sowing the oil," revenues served as a link uniting different factions within and between the two major parties. Even in the less affluent 1980s, large revenues produced by the petroleum industry continued to contribute to the government's ability to finance and develop ambitious programs in agriculture, education, industrial diversification, and health.
The nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1976, a long-sought goal by both major parties and practically all groups within Venezuela, was accomplished in a measured and tempered manner. Although not all parties to the nationalization accords agreed with every provision, most would admit that nationalization has worked better than many expected. Overall, it has worked well enough to serve as a successful model for other countries with some of the same developmental dilemmas as Venezuela. By ensuring that nationalization did not result in the drying up of foreign investment and, in turn, by ensuring that petroleum revenues served to some extent to underwrite reform programs, Venezuela created a financial cushion that enabled democratic governments to exert primary control over the exploitation of the nation's resources.
AD captured the presidency and both houses of Congress in 1973. Although it lost the presidency in 1978, AD remained the largest political party represented in the Senate and secured the same number of seats as the second largest party (and the winner of the presidency), COPEI, in the Chamber of Deputies. Lesser political parties such as National Opinion (Opini�n Nacional-- Opina) have won a few seats (usually under ten in the Chamber of Deputies) in various elections since 1958. Since the reestablishment of democracy in 1958, however, the major blocs of senators and deputies have consistently belonged to either AD or COPEI. Possibly because their parties have either held the presidency or have been considered potential winners of the presidency, AD and COPEI legislators have, in general, displayed responsibility in adhering to the political and legislative process and have not gone to extremes to destabilize the executive.
Although P�rez's victory in the December 1988 elections broke the pattern of alternating victories for AD and COPEI, his party lost absolute control of Congress in the legislative vote. AD's share of the legislative vote fell to 43.8 percent, while COPEI obtained 31.4 percent and the leftist MAS doubled its representation. Of a total 253 congressional seats--204 in the Chamber of Deputies and 49 in the Senate--AD won with 121 seats (98 deputies and 23 senators), COPEI 89 seats (67 deputies and 22 senators), and MAS 22 seats (19 deputies and 3 senators). A center-right group, the New Democratic Generation (Nueva Generaci�n Democr�tica), won seven seats (six deputies and one senator). Small left-wing parties obtained seven deputies and small center-right factions also elected seven deputies. Although the loss of absolute control of Congress might restrict some of the president's initiatives, overall it should represent only a minor impediment to the primacy of the executive.
The most outstanding political trend evidenced by six administrations since 1959 has been a commitment to and promotion of representative democracy. To many observers, the elections of 1988 assumed particular significance because they marked thirty years of democracy in Venezuela and indicated that pluralist democracy had a strong chance to survive. The food riots in Caracas in early 1989, which took place in spite of the overwhelming popular vote for the then recently inaugurated president P�rez revealed a certain popular dissatisfaction. Opinion polls have shown that many Venezuelans felt as though they had little impact on their leaders and the way that policies were drafted and implemented. The alternatives on either the right or left of the political spectrum, however, seemed to hold little appeal, and almost no one desired a return to an authoritarian regime.
AD and COPEI reforms have dramatically benefited large segments of the population. Education and health reforms have opened job opportunities and improved the quality of life. Both literacy and life expectancy figures were among the highest in Latin America. Some other reforms, however well intentioned, have not succeeded. Most Venezuelans admitted that their costly agrarian reform programs had neither provided much land to poor farmers nor managed to feed the nation, which continued to import significant levels of foodstuffs.
Venezuela's mixed economic picture in many ways served to shape its foreign policy. Venezuela was a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This brought Venezuela into high-level contact with a number of African countries, such as Nigeria, and with Middle Eastern oil producers. With the downturn of oil prices, Venezuela, like other once revenue-rich countries, had to face a continuing struggle to maintain foreign investment.
Jaime Lusinchi (president, 1984-89) sought to retain Venezuela's creditworthiness by paying the interest on its US$32 billion foreign debt, but was sadly disappointed when his gestures were not tangibly rewarded by foreign bankers. Bankers praised Venezuela's political courage and agreed on the country's long-term prospects, but they declined to approve new loans to Lusinchi's government. The ensuing economic crisis forced the government to devalue the currency; as inflation and unemployment soared, Venezuelans again felt vulnerable at the hands of the "multinationals."
When President P�rez assumed office in 1989, he, too, imposed austerity measures in an attempt to persuade foreign bankers to restructure the old debt and make new loans available to Venezuela. He achieved some initial success; austerity programs, however, have always proven difficult to sustain in the face of political and electoral pressure.
<"46.htm">Interest Groups
<"47.htm">Political Parties
<"48.htm">Dynamics of Public Policy
Historically, the decisive arbiters of Venezuelan national politics have been the armed forces. Three governments since the death of G�mez in 1935 have been overthrown by military coups. Mini-coups, barracks revolts, and discontent--not always fully reported--have also served as constant reminders to civilian politicians of the fragility of democracy. The armed forces have refrained from partisan political matters, especially since the early 1970s and throughout the 1980s; they have continued, however, their involvement in resolving national crises and in implementing antisubversive campaigns.
Although the balance of power among contending factions since 1958 has favored groups committed to upholding the elected government, a few officers from time to time have contended that they are the best guardians of the integrity of the constitution and the nation. These officers, however, have always represented a distinct minority and have posed no real threat to the increasing supremacy of the civilian leadership. In addition, democratically elected presidents have exploited interservice rivalries to survive attempted coups. This proved particularly true in the years immediately following 1958. Both Betancourt and Leoni survived coup attempts through the loyalty of military factions that failed to rally to the cry of revolt from other factions or branches.
A successful strategy toward the military practiced by both AD and COPEI governments has been that of coaptation. Liberal defense budgets and generous benefits have been the norm. Potential troublemakers were identified and sent to distant outposts or abroad. Generally, the military enjoyed free rein to deal with actual and potential subversives. Presidents have discreetly but deliberately sought the advice of military leaders in drafting and implementing major policies, especially those that affect areas that the military considered as "their" special prerogative, such as control and delineation of borders.
Unlike the military, the Roman Catholic Church has not been a major political force in Venezuelan politics. The church was never as prominent in Venezuela as it was in neighboring Colombia. In addition, the fact that the Spanish clergy, in general, sided with their mother country rather than with the forces of independence, did not endear the church to the early Venezuelan patriots.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the ranking clergy had close ties with the governing conservative oligarchy, and the church played a dominant role in the educational system. The rise to power of the Liberals in the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, ushered in a period of anticlericalism. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that, under the influence of the Christian social movement that began to criticize the maldistribution of wealth, the church regained some of its former influence.
Roman Catholic laymen played a prominent role in the founding of COPEI in 1946, and the announced disapproval of the church contributed to the fall of the dictator P�rez Jim�nez in 1958. In the 1960s, the involvement of the church in education and welfare increased and, although the church had no formal ties with COPEI, many believed that the support of clergymen and church-affiliated institutions contributed to the electoral successes of COPEI in 1968 and 1978.
The church in Venezuela has been weakened, however, by a traditional lack of vocations. Many priests serving in Venezuela were foreign-born. Charismatic Protestant churches, on the other hand, were beginning to proselyte successfully, especially among the urban poor. The Roman Catholic Church did not have the funds, the personnel, or the enthusiasm to stem effectively this new challenge to its hegemony.
In addition to the military and the church, Venezuela's bureaucracy can be regarded as a major interest group and political power in its own right. The adoption of far-reaching reformist goals since 1958 has generated a proliferation of government agencies and a greatly enlarged bureaucracy. Such entities as Cordiplan, the Venezuelan Development Corporation, PDVSA, the National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario--INA), and the Office of Integrated Educational Planning acquired institutional objectives that they actively promoted in their dealings with legislators and other policy makers. Overlapping authority among such entities and competing demands on limited resources often led to discord.
According to estimates, the government created an average of about eight new state-owned enterprises each year between 1968 and 1970. That number grew to eleven in 1971, sixteen in 1972, fourteen in 1973, seventeen in 1974, and nearly fifty in 1975. With the explosion of state-financed enterprises came an explosion of bureaucracy and a growing lack of accountability. Scandals were routinely exposed in the freewheeling Venezuelan press. By the end of the 1970s, few doubted that the bloated state sector was a major problem, and all the major presidential candidates in the 1978 campaign promised bureaucratic reform, privatization of inefficient enterprise, and greater efficiency and accountability. Once elected, however, candidates did not pursue their campaign promises with the same vigor with which they were uttered in the heat of the electoral campaign.
The inefficiency and bureaucratization of the economy left it vulnerable in the early 1980s to the downturn in oil prices and the maturation of the significant Venezuelan short-term foreign debt. Fiscal shortfalls threatened the financial viability of many state enterprises; close to 40 percent of the country's foreign debt consisted of short-term obligations incurred by state-owned entities. Again, the government initially temporized and conducted protracted negotiations with international banks and financial institutions rather than actually beginning the painful process of reining in the bureaucracy. It was not until 1989, perhaps as a result of the shock of the food riots and looting in Caracas that resulted in hundreds killed, that the government of Carlos Andr�s P�rez began to make a concerted effort to move toward a leaner and more accountable bureaucracy. The P�rez administration adopted privatization as its new motto; implementation, however, remained a slow, uncertain, and difficult process.
Few disputed that the power of patronage was an important resource for cementing party loyalty and interparty relations. The allocation of available posts for political appointees has been an important factor in forming coalition governments. Furthermore, government employees have played a significant role in electoral campaigns. Although a number of individual ministries set up internal administrative systems, and despite the numerous proposals set forth since 1958 for general standardization of government personnel policies, the bureaucracy still functioned largely on the basis of personal contacts.
Along with the persistence of a powerful and large bureaucracy, commercial and industrial forces have shown a great capacity to adapt to the democratic rules of the game and, at the same time, to use the government system to further their interests. These forces have steadily moved up to replace the traditionally dominant landowning class and have transposed economic power into effective political power. The informal means of exerting pressure through family networks and social clubs have been complemented by linkages forged with the various associational interest groups. Most of the business groups, for example, belonged to the Federation of Chambers and Associations of Commerce and Production (Federaci�n de C�maras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producci�n--Fedec�maras). It represented a great number of interests in the fields of petroleum, agriculture, banking, industry, commerce, and services. Many of its member groups, such as the Bankers' Association, the Ranchers' and Livestock Association, the Chamber of the Petroleum Industry, and the Caracas Chamber of Industry, carried on large-scale lobbying of their own. In 1966, for example, Fedec�maras persuaded President Leoni to allow leaders of the business community to participate in the formulation of economic development policy. It has also been much involved in setting the terms under which Venezuela has entered into various integration and other economic pacts in the region.
In 1962 a group of financiers and industrialists who wanted to participate more directly in electoral politics organized the Independent Venezuelan Association, whose objective was to slow the pace of economic reform. Another group of businessmen joined in a group called Pro-Venezuela, an entity opposed to foreign participation in the exploitation of national resources; it suggested instead the use of foreign experts to train Venezuelans.
Organized labor was the largest and most cohesive of the mass-based political pressure groups that had emerged since the mid-twentieth century. Effectively stifled under military and dictatorial rule, labor did not begin to affect the political balance until the early 1940s. Labor backed the October 1945 coup and benefited much from the short-lived AD government (1945-48). Unionization proceeded apace then, but labor failed to avert the November 1948 coup that brought P�rez Jim�nez to power.
P�rez Jim�nez further alienated labor by allowing the immigration of thousands of workers from Southern Europe. With the return to democracy in 1958, however, organized labor returned to political prominence. All political parties vied to obtain links to labor. By the late 1960s, more than half of the labor force was unionized. The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (Confederaci�n de Trabajadores de Venezuela--CTV), organized by AD militants, remained the most powerful of the labor confederations. Some of the more militant CTV-affiliated unions who favored severing links to the government split from the CTV to form the United Workers' Confederation of Venezuela. This group never challenged the strength of the CTV. Similarly, the Roman Catholic labor organization, the Committee of Autonomous Unions, remained small and wielded little political clout.
Because of the close links between AD and the CTV, the CTV has suffered corresponding splits when AD has been divided. In the 1960s, divisions in AD were reflected in contests for CTV leadership. From time to time, members of COPEI have won certain important leadership posts in the CTV, but AD has remained the major political force.
Students and universities traditionally have been involved in the political process in the twentieth century. Betancourt, Leoni, Villalba, Machado, and other members of the Generation of 1928 were student leaders who dared to openly challenge the dictatorship of G�mez. COPEI itself traced its origins to the National Students Union, created in 1946 to defend the Roman Catholic Church and to oppose the Marxist-oriented Venezuelan Student Federation (Federaci�n Estudiantil de Venezuela--FEV). FEV leaders took part in the protests against P�rez Jim�nez and worked closely with the underground Patriotic Junta in the final push against the dictator in January 1958.
When Betancourt assumed the presidency in 1959, student groups participated actively in the establishment of a democratic government. Shortly thereafter, however, many of them became disillusioned with what they perceived as the slow pace of reforms and moved toward the left politically. Some, attracted by the Cuban model, took up arms in abortive attempts to wrest control of the government from Betancourt and the AD reformers.
Of all the national universities, the Central University of Venezuela, in Caracas, has been the major focus of student political activity. Most of the student groups at the university were linked with national political parties, but often the student branches functioned quite independently in their actions and took much more radical stands than did the parties. Students made up a considerable proportion of the membership of MIR, which split off from the AD in 1960, and its militant revolutionary band of irregulars, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci�n Nacional--FALN).
The middle class has had a significant impact on government policies in the democratic era. The middle-class origins of most AD and COPEI leaders helped generate support for their party programs. Many of the new economic elites that have grown up as a result of the benefits produced by the petroleum bonanza had their origins in the middle sectors and generally advocated liberal democracy and public-sector involvement in the economy. With the downturn of oil revenues in the mid-1980s, this mentality began to change somewhat as the government, as well as the middle sectors, considered the potential advantages of privatization.
Contemporary Venezuelan political parties evolved from the student groups formed at the Central University of Venezuela in the capital during the long years of the Juan Vicente G�mez dictatorship. The most prominent of these groups was the FEV. Not surprisingly, the aging dictator swiftly dispatched into exile some of the young leaders of these protests. Abroad, they formed links with activists of similarly democratic inclinations. Other leaders who avoided exile established the bases of clandestine partisan organizations, the most important of which was the Republican National Union (Uni�n Nacional Republicana--UNR). Shortly after G�mez's death in 1935, these exiled leaders returned, and a spate of new political groups emerged.
Many of the former student leaders helped launch the Venezuelan Organization (Organizaci�n Venezolana--Orve); the more radical elements coalesced around the Progressive Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progresista--PRP), a Marxist group. The UNR mostly attracted young businessmen, while the Democratic National Bloc (Bloque Democr�tico Nacional--BDN) was primarily a regional organization centered in Maracaibo. The Orve, the PRP, and the BDN decided to join forces and, with the remnants of the old FEV, formed the National Democratic Party (Partido Democr�tico Nacional--PDN). Novelist R�mulo Gallegos ran under the PDN banner in the 1941 presidential election against government candidate Isa�as Medina Angarita. Although Medina's victory was a foregone conclusion, as president he did open up the system somewhat, enabling the opposition, under the banner of AD, to make common cause with a reformist faction of the military to launch a crucial experiment in democracy between 1945 and 1948.
The trienio was a time of great political ferment during which two former leaders of the Generation of 1928 came to the fore. J�vito Villalba called his political group the Democratic Republican Union (Uni�n Republicana Democr�tica--URD) and Rafael Caldera founded COPEI. AD also began organizing labor and peasant leagues during this period. Although Betancourt was the undisputed AD leader, he and others felt compelled to put forward Gallegos as their presidential candidate in the late 1947 elections.
Gallegos won overwhelmingly, but his political inexperience contributed to his overthrow less than a year later. During the reign of P�rez Jim�nez (president, 1948-58), political activities were banned, political groups once again had to go underground, and political leaders such as Betancourt once more went into exile. The ten-year hiatus, however, allowed the Generation of 1928 to mature and to deepen its understanding of Venezuelan political and economic problems and realities. After 1958 many of the old organizations revived and reestablished themselves. AD and COPEI went on to hold the presidency a number of times, while Villalba made several runs for the office.
Several other political parties and organizations also were active in 1990. National Opinion, formed in 1958, won three seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1983 and placed fifth in the presidential elections. New Democratic Generation, a small conservative group formed in 1979, managed to elect one senator and six deputies in 1988. In January 1989, it merged with two smaller groups, Formula One and the Authentic Renovating Organization, under the name of the Venezuelan Emergent Right. The Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Venezuela-- PCV), probably the oldest political party in the country, had functioned under the same name since 1931. Accused of involvement in subversive movements that threatened the new democracy, the PCV was banned for several years beginning in 1962. MAS originated as a radical left-wing faction that split off from the PCV in 1971. In the 1970s, MAS became the Venezuelan counterpart of "Eurocommunist" parties. In the 1988 presidential election, the MAS's nominee, Teodoro Petkoff, came in third, after the AD and the COPEI candidates. Still smaller organizations, most of them former factions of the major political parties, included New Alternative, the United Vanguard, the Revolutionary Action Group, the Radical Cause, the People's Electoral Movement (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo--MEP), the Independent Moral Movement, the People's Advance, the Socialist League, and the Party of the Venezuelan Revolution.
The most noteworthy aspect of Venezuelan party politics, however, was not the proliferation of small parties, but rather the fact that two parties, AD and COPEI, have been the major contenders for power for over three decades. The competition between these two democratic and pragmatically reformist parties gave the Venezuelan political system a great deal of stability; and although the other contenders contributed fresh ideas and at times brilliant leaders, AD and COPEI managed to occupy the broad center, where most Venezuelan voters felt most comfortable.
Venezuelan public policies reflected the strong contrasts between the goals expounded by practically all major political parties and policy actors and the reality of their implementation. The constitution provides for access of the people to the government, principally via elections; but in its daily operation those with links to powerful groups, such as labor unions and business groups, enjoyed an undeniable advantage in influencing policy formulation. These groups therefore benefited more often and more directly from government policies.
It was not so much that a limited number of families controlled the system. Venezuela long ago ceased to be a rural society in which a few landowners could pick the president and run the country. Rather, through the sophisticated use of the system, certain politicians and political groups achieved a greater say in policy making. Through their various branches, the political parties served as conduits for both policy demands and implementation. Thus, when agrarian reform policies figured prominently in AD's programs, peasant leagues affiliated with the party exercised considerable influence in the formulation and implementation of reforms. These groups also benefited inordinately from these reforms.
This was not to say, however, that certain groups held exclusive access to government and to policy makers. Under the Venezuelan democratic system, various groups participated in the overall process. The system was less than totally open, however, in that certain groups had greater input in the policy-making process, depending on the issues or the status of the group. Thus, even in the modern era of civilian governments, the military would hold veto power in certain policy areas, such as border control or the pursuit of terrorists. In the formulation of economic policy, both the major labor unions and the major business groups affected would be heard at the highest levels of government, where compromises and deals were struck and the political parties and leaders would attempt to preserve their influence among competing constituencies.
The caution and political moderation resulting from the trienio and the harsh decade of dictatorship that followed served as a backdrop to the dynamics of policy-making in Venezuela. The high hopes and radical reforms of the trienio came to naught because too many groups felt threatened; the memory of that period served to deter political actors from pushing too far in one or another public policy area. Both AD and COPEI reinforced this moderating influence by according each other a certain level of participation in policymaking and policy implementation.
The country's first newspaper, the Gaceta de Caracas, appeared in 1808, shortly after the arrival of the first printing press and just before the war of independence. The Gaceta de Caracas, published by a small group of young intellectuals who advocated a complete break with Spain, presented lively and well-informed discussions of the new political theories emanating from Europe as well as of local news. Around the time of independence and shortly thereafter, a number of newspapers appeared in Caracas, and by 1821 the Correo Nacional was being published in Zulia.
These papers emphasized serious political discussions, establishing a tradition that continued during the ConservativeLiberal controversies of the mid-nineteenth century. The literate population of the time, however, was small. With extremely limited readership and often extremely small budgets, many of these newspapers disappeared after a few initial, enthusiastic issues. An exception was La Religi�n, founded in 1890 and still published in 1990.
From early on, Caracas was the undisputed center of influence and the home base of the most significant newspapers. Maracaibo was a strong center for publication of newspapers, but their circulation and impact were still regional in scope. Whether in Caracas, Maracaibo, or the provinces, newspapers depended heavily on direct and indirect government and/or partisan subsidies. Government advertising, in addition, represented a substantial part of the papers' income.
Only a few families owned and controlled the largest dailies. Family members usually held top administrative positions and often contributed articles. Perhaps the most prominent of these families were the Capriles, who owned a chain of morning and afternoon dailies, in addition to magazines and radio and television interests.
All the major parties maintained official party newspapers, most of them weeklies. Some parties, especially those of the extreme right and extreme left, published newspapers without necessarily identifying their true ownership and control. Organized labor, business, and other major political and economic groups all traditionally produced their own weekly or monthly publications.
Most observers agreed that the Venezuelan media were often sensationalist, and that they exhibited a healthy dose of skepticism toward grandiose government plans. Newspapers and journalists assiduously pursued corruption stories and exposed cases of unbridled nepotism, corruption, and incompetence. Venezuela's press was subject to censorship in times of emergency but was otherwise among the freest in Latin America. About the only consistent taboo was the publication of cartoons or other graphics that denigrated the national hero, Sim�n Bol�var Palacios.
The major Caracas newspapers in 1990 included �ltimas Noticias, an independent newspaper with a daily run of 320,000 copies; Meridiano, with 300,000 copies; and El Mundo, El Nacional, and Diario 2001, all independent dailies with a circulation of approximately 150,000. El Universal, which used to be among the top Caracas dailies, had fallen to a circulation of 140,000 by 1990. Still influential, though of much smaller circulation, were Panorama and La Cr�tica of Maracaibo and El Diario de Caracas. The Daily Journal, an Englishlanguage newspaper in Caracas, had a print run of about 20,000 copies.
Venezuela had no domestic news agency, but several foreign agencies maintained offices in Caracas, among them the Italian News Agency (ANSA), Associated Press (AP) and United Press International from the United States, Reuters from Britain, and TASS from the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Transport and Communications regulated broadcasting; the Venezuelan Chamber of the Broadcasting Industry (C�mara Venezolana de la Industria de Radiodifusi�n) exercised oversight functions. Most of the country's approximately 180 radio stations were commercial, but the government did operate the Radio Nacional network. The country had 6.7 million radio receivers in 1986 and approximately 2.8 million television sets. Both government and commercial companies operated television stations. The Venezuelan government took advantage of this extensive radio and media network to inform its people, particularly those who lived far away from major urban centers, on educational, agricultural, and civic matters. Stations were concentrated in Caracas, but transmitter were found throughout the country.
Probably more so than elsewhere in Latin America, television was an established medium. The country had five television stations: two owned by the government, two commercial, and one directed by the Roman Catholic Church. Telecasts began in 1953 on the government-owned Televisora Nacional. The first private commercial station, Venevisi�n, opened a few months later, followed by another private station, Radio Caracas Television. These two became national networks and were soon joined by the government-owned Venezuelan Television Network and a station directed by the Roman Catholic Church. All had excellent facilities and generally broadcast programs of high quality. Television continued to be extremely popular at all social levels and to represent a status symbol for the rural and urban poor.
Former President Luis Herrera Campins effectively described Venezuela's position in the world when he stated that, "Effective action by Venezuela in the area of international affairs must take key facts into account: economics--we are a producer- exporter of oil; politics--we have a stable, consolidated democracy; and geopolitics--we are at one and the same time a Caribbean, Andean, Atlantic, and Amazonian country." After the emergence of a democratic system in 1958, a number of Venezuelan presidents have stated the basic principles that guided their foreign policy. These principles included respect for human rights, the right of all peoples to self-determination, nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations, the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations, the right of all peoples to peace and security, support for the elimination of colonialism, and a call for significantly higher export prices for developing countries' primary products, especially oil. Throughout its history, Venezuela's foreign policy also has been infused with Sim�n Bol�var's ideal of promoting the political and economic integration of Latin America.
In the democratic era, Venezuela has attempted to fulfill these principles through a variety of means. It maintained active membership in the United Nations (UN) and its related agencies, OPEC, the Organization of American States (OAS) and its related entities, the Latin American Integration Association, and a host of other world and hemispheric organizations. In all these forums, Venezuela consistently aligned itself with other democracies. Although Venezuela has been particularly active in the circum-Caribbean area, its foreign policy also has global dimensions.
The first two presidents of the democratic era, R�mulo Betancourt and Ra�l Leoni, took courageous stands against tyrannies of the right and the left. Although motivated in part by idealism, these foreign policy positions also responded to the pragmatic need to defend the nascent democracy from foreign intervention. Both presidents saw their country repeatedly subjected to propaganda attacks and actual armed incursions directed or inspired by Cuban leader Fidel Castro Ruz. Although Betancourt and Leoni took a particularly harsh line against Cuba, they expressed equal criticism of the right-wing dictator Rafael Le�nidas Trujillo Molina of the Dominican Republic, who nearly succeeded in engineering Betancourt's assassination in June 1960. The Betancourt Doctrine, whereby Venezuela refused to maintain diplomatic relations with governments formed as a result of military coups, was adhered to by both administrations. Although the doctrine was much praised, it gradually isolated Venezuela as most other Latin American nations became dominated by nonelected regimes. Slowly but surely, the doctrine was modified in the late 1960s and early 1970s, allowing for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Argentina, Panama, Peru, and most communist countries. In December 1974, President Rafael Caldera announced the normalization of relations with Cuba.
Relations with neighboring Guyana have been strained for decades by Venezuela's claim to all territory west of the Essequibo River, more than half the present size of Guyana. A 1966 tripartite agreement in Geneva established a Guyana-Venezuela commission to discuss the dispute. In 1970 President Caldera agreed to a twelve-year moratorium on the issue. The dispute was, with the concurrence of both parties, referred to the UN Secretary General in March 1983 for a determination of an appropriate means for settlement.
There appeared to be some prospect for improved relations between the two countries during the 1990s. One auspicious indication of this was the talks between the foreign ministers, held both in Venezuela and Guyana, in early 1990. The ministers not only discussed the lingering territorial question, but also committed their governments to greater cooperation in a number of fields, including energy and health. Guyana has expressed interest in importing electricity from Venezuela's mammoth Guri Dam; both countries shared concern over the control of tropical diseases.
Relations with Colombia have also been intermittently tense during the last half of the twentieth century. Caracas and Bogot� have been engaged in a long dispute regarding sovereignty over the Golfo de Venezuela (or the Golfo de Guajira, as the Colombians refer to it). Tensions arising from the dispute contributed to a high-level military alert following the intrusion of a Colombian ship into Venezuelan territorial waters in August 1988. Both countries managed to back away from the brink of open conflict over the incident; in March 1989, the two presidents met at the border to discuss this and other points of contention, most of which arose from the closely linked frontier economies along the vast land border. Venezuelans consistently assumed that most Colombians living in their country were indocumentados (undocumented or illegal aliens) and routinely accused them of a variety of crimes, real or imagined.
A constructive outcome of the presidents' meeting at the border in 1989 was the creation of a five-member international conciliation commission, headed by Adolfo Su�rez Gonz�lez, the former Spanish prime minister, and including, among others, two former Latin American presidents. Three bilateral commissions were also established to study specific issues. The intensification of drug trafficking added a new urgency to better cooperation between the two countries. Most observers believed that relations improved after 1989 and that intergovernmental cooperation in controlling narcotics trafficking and guerrilla activities along the border expanded. Colombian president Cesar Gaviria used the occasion of his August 1990 inauguration to meet with President P�rez and to reconfirm Colombia's commitment to the agreements signed by the border commissions. For his part, P�rez stressed the need to continue regular meetings between the two heads of state in order to maintain coordinated efforts not only on the resolution of border issues but also in the formulation of regional foreign policy and economic integration efforts.
Under the first P�rez administration (1974-79), Venezuela provided mat�riel, support, and advice to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci�n Nacional--FSLN) during its struggle to oust the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua. President Herrera, who subsequently led the Andean Common Market ( Ancom) efforts for a peaceful transition of government in that Central American nation, became increasingly disenchanted with mounting political repression under the Sandinistas. In 1983 Venezuela joined with Colombia, Mexico, and Panama to seek a regional solution to Central America's problems through the Contadora Group process. In his second administration, P�rez helped to push the Sandinistas into allowing the democratic elections of February 1990, in which opposition candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro defeated Daniel Ortega of the FSLN and became Nicaragua's president.
Venezuela bolstered its commitment to Chamorro's government by sending nearly 1,000 soldiers to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Nicaragua. This was the first time that Venezuela had sent troops outside the country to demobilize warring factions. In a more traditional vein, Venezuela also cancelled Nicaragua's US$143 million oil debt and resumed oil shipments to the Central American country. Venezuela had suspended its oil trade with Nicaragua in 1982 as a result of that nation's default in paying its oil import bill; the cutoff was also intended to signal Venezuela's disappointment with the lack of progress toward democratic government in Nicaragua at the time.
Apart from their differences in relation to Nicaragua and Venezuela's strong support of Argentina during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict, relations with the United States have been generally close. The minor tensions between the two countries have been exacerbated by trade issues; Venezuela's main objections in this regard concerned United States import policies, which, in the Venezuelans' opinion, raised excessive barriers to Venezuelan products. Also in the economic sphere, the fact that most of Venezuela's foreign debt was owed to United States banks represented a major point of continuing contention between the two countries.
From the United States perspective, Venezuelan efforts at economic reform under President P�rez provided opportunities for an expansion of ties, particularly in the area of foreign investment. To the surprise of many analysts, P�rez, who in his first administration (1974-79) assumed a cool, almost hostile stance toward foreign investment, proved much more favorably disposed to foreign capital in his second term. His administration removed previous limitations on the remittance and reinvestment of profits by foreign companies. The government also approved majority foreign control of companies in several sectors previously closed to foreign investment, such as public services, domestic transportation, and export services. Although the administration hinted at the possibility of foreign participation in oil exploration and refining, it did not immediately enact such measures. After decades of restrictions, however, the new regulations generally opened the local capital market to foreign companies and promised a reduction in the government's discretionary interference in foreign investment decisions.
Because of its long democratic tradition, as well as its support for democratic institutions in other countries, Venezuela was respected and considered a leader among the Latin American nations. It maintained good relations in the Third World, although it had few commercial or other close ties with Third World nations. Venezuela also maintained relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and strongly supported the political openings there beginning in the late 1980s. In many ways, Venezuela often felt as close to Western Europe as it did to the United States, but the nature of these relations changed according to who held power in Caracas: AD administrations tended to pursue close ties with the socialist and social-democratic parties and governments in Europe; COPEI governments established close ties with the Christian democratic and more centrist parties and governments of Europe.
Venezuela's domestic breakthrough in 1958 to a functioning democratic system was soon reflected in the conduct of its foreign policy. As that system grew stronger, and as the nation's economic status improved along with rising oil prices in the 1970s, Venezuela's role on the world stage became a more prominent one. Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC, and has exercised a responsible role within that organization. Outside of OPEC, Venezuela acted during the 1980s to supply oil to the emerging democracies in the Caribbean in an effort to ease the burden of these often heavily indebted nations. Venezuelan diplomacy also vigorously supported the establishment and strengthening of democracy in the Dominican Republic and in Central America. As a member of the Contadora group of nations dealing with the Central American crisis of the mid-1980s, Venezuela advocated the establishment of democratic systems and procedures in the region as the most beneficial solution both for the countries involved as well as for Venezuela's own political and economic interests in the region. In the UN, the OAS, and other Third World forums, Venezuela has consistently sought to advance the same basic goals, namely democracy and development.
The future course of Venezuela's foreign policy, regardless of its direction, will undoubtedly depend upon the status of these two factors: the stability of the governmental system and the state of the national economy. The nation's commitment to the overarching principle of representative democracy appeared to be unalterable.
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