Nigeria - Acknowledgments
Nigeria
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the following
individuals who wrote the 1982 edition of Nigeria: A Country Study:
Robert Rinehart, Irving Kaplan, Donald P. Whitaker, Jean R. Tartter, and
Frederick Ehrenreich. Their work provided the basis of the present
volume, as well as substantial portions of the text.
John N. Paden, Robinson Professor of International Studies at George
Mason University, made an extremely useful critique of the entire
manuscript, helping the authors and the editor to focus their efforts
more sharply. Revisions to Chapter 4 were made by Richard Joseph and Amy
Poteete.
The authors are grateful to individuals in various government
agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research
materials, and expertise to the production of this book. These
individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies -
Area Handbook program for the Department of the Army. Special thanks are
owed to the Embassy of Nigeria, which provided numerous photographs as
well as a mounted map of Nigeria with a superimposed head that served as
the basis for the cover art of this volume. Graphics support was
supplied by Greenhorne and O'Mara; Harriet R. Blood, who prepared the
topography and drainage map; Carlyn Dawn Anderson, who designed the
illustrations on the title pages of the chapters; and Wayne Horne, who
designed the cover.
The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal Research
Division who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript.
These people include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and
graphic material and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency;
Timothy Merrill, who assisted in preparing maps; David P. Cabitto, who
provided invaluable graphic assistance and supervised graphics
productions; and Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing and production.
Also involved in preparing the text were editorial assistants Barbara
Edgerton and Izella Watson.
Individual chapters were edited by Barbara Harrison and Vincent
Ercolono. Catherine Schwartzstein performed the final prepublication
review, and Joan C. Cook compiled the index. The Library of Congress
Composing Unit prepared the camera-ready copy, under the supervision of
Peggy Pixley.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Preface
Nigeria
Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a concise
and objective manner the dominant historical, social, political,
economic, and military aspects of contemporary Nigerian society. Sources
of information included scholarly journals and monographs, official
reports of government and international organizations, newspapers, and
numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the
book; brief comments on some of the more valuable sources suggested as
possible further reading appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements
are given in the metric system.
Place names generally have been spelled in accordance with those
established by the United States Board on Geographic Names and the
Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use, known
as the BGN/PCGN system. The spelling of other proper names conforms to
the current usage in the country (where the official language is
English) or to the most authoritative available sources.
The body of the text reflects information available as of December
1990. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been updated.
The Bibliography lists published sources thought to be particularly
helpful to the reader.
Nigeria
Nigeria - History
Nigeria
LIKE SO MANY OTHER MODERN AFRICAN states, Nigeria is the creation of
European imperialism. Its very name--after the great Niger River, the
country's dominating physical feature--was suggested in the 1890s by
British journalist Flora Shaw, who later became the wife of colonial
governor Frederick Lugard. The modern history of Nigeria--as a political
state encompassing 250 to 400 ethnic groups of widely varied cultures
and modes of political organization--dates from the completion of the
British conquest in 1903 and the amalgamation of northern and southern
Nigeria into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. The history
of the Nigerian people extends backward in time for some three
millennia. Archaeological evidence, oral traditions, and written
documentation establish the existence of dynamic societies and
well-developed political systems whose history had an important
influence on colonial rule and has continued to shape independent
Nigeria. Nigerian history is fragmented in the sense that it evolved
from a variety of traditions, but many of the most outstanding features
of modern society reflect the strong influence of the three regionally
dominant ethnic groups--the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west,
and the Igbo in the east.
There are several dominant themes in Nigerian history that are
essential in understanding contemporary Nigerian politics and society.
First, the spread of Islam, predominantly in the north but later in
southwestern Nigeria as well, began a millennium ago. The creation of
the Sokoto Caliphate in the jihad (holy war) of 1804-8 brought most of
the northern region and adjacent parts of Niger and Cameroon under a
single Islamic government. The great extension of Islam within the area
of present-day Nigeria dates from the nineteenth century and the
consolidation of the caliphate. This history helps account for the
dichotomy between north and south and for the divisions within the north
that have been so strong during the colonial and postcolonial eras.
Second, the slave trade, both across the Sahara Desert and the
Atlantic Ocean, had a profound influence on virtually all parts of
Nigeria. The transatlantic trade in particular accounted for the forced
migration of perhaps 3.5 million people between the 1650s and the 1860s,
while a steady stream of slaves flowed north across the Sahara for a
millennium, ending at the beginning of the twentieth century. Within
Nigeria, slavery was widespread, with social implications that are still
evident today. The Sokoto Caliphate, for example, had more slaves than
any other modern country, except the United States in 1860. Slaves were
also numerous among the Igbo, the Yoruba, and many other ethnic groups.
Indeed, many ethnic distinctions, especially in the middle belt--the
area between the north and south--were reinforced because of slave
raiding and defensive measures that were adopted for protection against
enslavement. Conversion to Islam and the spread of Christianity were
intricately associated with issues relating to slavery and with efforts
to promote political and cultural autonomy.
Third, the colonial era was relatively brief, lasting only six
decades or so, depending upon the part of Nigeria, but it unleashed such
rapid change that the full impact was still felt in the contemporary
period. On the one hand, the expansion of agricultural products as the
principal export earner and the corresponding development of
infrastructure resulted in severely distorted economic growth that has
subsequently collapsed. On the other hand, social dislocation associated
with the decline of slavery and the internal movement of population
between regions and to the cities necessitated the reassessment of
ethnic loyalties, which in turn have been reflected in politics and
religion.
In the three decades since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, a
period half as long as the colonial era, Nigeria has experienced a
number of successful and attempted military coups d'�tat and a brutal
civil war, let corrupt civilian governments siphon off the profits from
the oil boom of the 1970s, and faced economic collapse in the 1980s. As
the most populous country in Africa, and one of the ten most populous
countries in the world, Nigeria has a history that is important in its
own right but that also bears scrutiny if for no other reason than to
understand how and why this nation became as it is today.
Nigeria
Nigeria - EARLY HISTORY
Nigeria
All evidence suggests the early settlement of Nigeria millennia
before the spread of agriculture 3,000 years ago, and one day it
probably will be possible to reconstruct the high points of this early
history. Although archaeological research has made great strides in
identifying some major developments, comparatively little archaeological
work has been undertaken. Consequently, it is possible only to outline
some of the early history of Nigeria.
The earliest known example of a fossil skeleton with negroid
features, perhaps 10,000 years old, was found at Iii Ileru in western
Nigeria and attests to the antiquity of habitation in the region. Stone
tools, indicating human settlement, date back another 2,000 years.
Microlithic and ceramic industries were developed by pastoralists in the
savanna from at least the fourth millennium B.C. and were continued by
grain farmers in the stable agricultural communities that subsequently
evolved there. To the south, hunting and gathering gradually gave way to
subsistence farming on the fringe of the forest in the first millennium
B.C. The cultivation of staple foods, such as yams, later was introduced
into forest clearings. The stone ax heads, imported in great quantities
from the north and used in opening the forest for agricultural
development, were venerated by the Yoruba descendants of neolithic
pioneers as "thunderbolts" hurled to earth by the gods.
The primitive iron-smelting furnaces at Taruga dating from the fourth
century B.C. provide the oldest evidence of metalworking in West Africa,
while excavations for the Kainji Dam revealed the presence of
ironworking there by the second century B.C. The transition from
Neolithic times to the Iron Age apparently was achieved without
intermediate bronze production. Some scholars speculate that knowledge
of the smelting process may have been transmitted from the Mediterranean
by Berbers who ventured south. Others suggest that the technology moved
westward across the Sudan from the Nile Valley, although the arrival of the Iron
Age in the Niger River valley and the forest region appears to have
predated the introduction of metallurgy in the upper savanna by more
than 800 years. The usefulness of iron tools was demonstrated in the
south for bush cutting and in the north for well digging and the
construction of irrigation works, contributing in both regions to the
expansion of agriculture.
The earliest culture in Nigeria to be identified by its distinctive
artifacts is that of the Nok people. These skilled artisans and
ironworkers were associated with Taruga and flourished between the
fourth century B.C. and the second century A.D. in a large area above
the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers on the Jos Plateau. The Nok
achieved a level of material development not repeated in the region for
nearly 1,000 years. Their terra-cotta sculpture, abstractly stylized and
geometric in conception, is admired both for its artistic expression and
for the high technical standards of its production.
Information is lacking from the "silent millennium" (first
millennium A.D.) that followed the Nok ascendancy, apart from evidence
of iron smelting on Dala Hill in Kano from about 600 to 700 A.D. It is
assumed, however, that trade linking the Niger region with North Africa
played a key role in the continuing development of the area. Certainly
by the beginning of the second millennium A.D., there was an active
trade along a north-south axis from North Africa through the Sahara to
the forest, with the savanna people acting as intermediaries in
exchanges that involved slaves, ivory, salt, glass beads, coral, cloth,
weapons, brass rods, and other goods.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Early States Before 1500
Nigeria
Long before 1500, much of present-day Nigeria was divided into
states, which can be identified with the modern ethnic groups that trace
their history to the origins of these states. These early states
included the Yoruba kingdoms, the Edo kingdom of Benin, the Hausa
cities, and Nupe. In addition, numerous small states to the west and
south of Lake Chad were absorbed or displaced in the course of the
expansion of Kanem, which was centered to the northeast of Lake Chad.
Borno, initially the western province of Kanem, became independent in
the late fourteenth century. Other states probably existed as well, but
oral traditions and the absence of archaeological data do not permit an
accurate dating of their antiquity.
Yoruba Kingdoms and Benin
As far as historical memory extends, the Yoruba have been the
dominant group on the west bank of the Niger. Of mixed origin, they were
the product of the assimilation of periodic waves of migrants who
evolved a common language and culture. The Yoruba were organized in
patrilineal descent groups that occupied village communities and
subsisted on agriculture, but from about the eleventh century A.D.,
adjacent village compounds, called ile, began to coalesce into
a number of territorial citystates in which loyalties to the clan became
subordinate to allegiance to a dynastic chieftain. This transition
produced an urbanized political and social environment that was
accompanied by a high level of artistic achievement, particularly in
terracotta and ivory sculpture and in the sophisticated metal casting
produced at Ife. The brass and bronze used by Yoruba artisans was a
significant item of trade, made from copper, tin, and zinc either
imported from North Africa or from mines in the Sahara and northern
Nigeria.
The Yoruba placated a luxuriant pantheon headed by an impersonal
deity, Olorun, and included lesser deities, some of them formerly
mortal, who performed a variety of cosmic and practical tasks. One of
them, Oduduwa, was regarded as the creator of the earth and the ancestor
of the Yoruba kings. According to a creation myth, Oduduwa founded the
city of Ife and dispatched his sons to establish other cities, where
they reigned as priest-kings and presided over cult rituals. Formal
traditions of this sort have been interpreted as poetic illustrations of
the historical process by which Ife's ruling dynasty extended its
authority over Yorubaland. The stories were attempts to legitimize the
Yoruba monarchies--after they had supplanted clan loyalties--by claiming
divine origin.
Ife was the center of as many as 400 religious cults whose traditions
were manipulated to political advantage by the oni (king) in
the days of the kingdom's greatness. Ife also lay at the center of a
trading network with the north. The oni supported his court
with tolls levied on trade, tribute exacted from dependencies, and
tithes due him as a religious leader. One of Ife's greatest legacies to
modern Nigeria is its beautiful sculpture associated with this
tradition.
The oni was chosen on a rotating basis from one of several
branches of the ruling dynasty, which was composed of a clan with
several thousand members. Once elected, he went into seclusion in the
palace compound and was not seen again by his people. Below the oni
in the state hierarchy were palace officials, town chiefs, and the
rulers of outlying dependencies. The palace officials were spokesmen for
the oni and the rulers of dependencies who had their own
subordinate officials. All offices, even that of the oni, were
elective and depended on broad support within the community. Each
official was chosen from among the eligible clan members who had
hereditary right to the office. Members of the royal dynasty often were
assigned to govern dependencies, while the sons of palace officials
assumed lesser roles as functionaries, bodyguards to the oni,
and judges.
During the fifteenth century, Oyo and Benin surpassed Ife as
political and economic powers, although Ife preserved its status as a
religious center even after its decline. Respect for the priestly
functions of the oni of Ife and recognition of the common
tradition of origin were crucial factors in the evolution of Yoruba
ethnicity. The oni of Ife was recognized as the senior
political official not only among the Yoruba but also at Benin, and he
invested Benin's rulers with the symbols of temporal power.
The Ife model of government was adapted at Oyo, where a member of its
ruling dynasty consolidated several smaller citystates under his
control. A council of state, the Oyo Mesi, eventually assumed
responsibility for naming the alafin (king) from candidates
proposed from the ruling dynasty and acted as a check on his authority.
Oyo developed as a constitutional monarchy; actual government was in the
hands of the basorun (prime minister), who presided over the
Oyo Mesi. The city was situated 170 kilometers north of Ife, and about
100 kilometers north of present-day Oyo. Unlike the forest-bound Yoruba
kingdoms, Oyo was in the savanna and drew its military strength from its
cavalry forces, which established hegemony over the adjacent Nupe and
the Borgu kingdoms and thereby developed trade routes farther to the
north .
Figure 2. Yorubaland, Eleventh to Nineteenth Centuries
established agricultural community in the Edo-speaking area, east of
Ife, when it became a dependency of Ife at the beginning of the
fourteenth century. By the fifteenth century, it took an independent
course and became a major trading power in its own right, blocking Ife's
access to the coastal ports as Oyo had cut off the mother city from the
savanna. Political power and religious authority resided in the oba
(king), who according to tradition was descended from the Ife dynasty.
The oba was advised by a council of six hereditary chiefs, who
also nominated his successor. Benin, which may have housed 100,000
inhabitants at its height, spread over twenty-five square kilometers
that were enclosed by three concentric rings of earthworks.
Responsibility for administering the urban complex lay with sixty trade
guilds, each with its own quarter, whose membership cut across clan
affiliations and owed its loyalty directly to the oba. At his
wooden, steepled palace, the oba presided over a large court
richly adorned with brass, bronze, and ivory objects. Like Ife and the
other Yoruba states, Benin, too, is famous for its sculpture.
Unlike the Yoruba kingdoms, however, Benin developed a centralized
regime to oversee the administration of its expanding territories. By
the late fifteenth century, Benin was in contact with Portugal. At its
apogee in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Benin even
encompassed parts of southeastern Yorubaland and the small Igbo area on
the western bank of the Niger. Dependencies were governed by members of
the royal family who were assigned several towns or villages scattered
throughout the realm, rather than a block of territory that could be
used as a base for revolt against the oba.
As is evident from this brief survey, Yoruba and Benin history were
interconnected. In fact, areas to the west of Nigeria, in the modern
Republic of Benin, were also closely associated with this history, both
in the period before 1500 and afterward.
The Igbo: A Stateless Society?
Most scholars have argued that Igbo society was "stateless"
and that the Igbo region did not evolve centralized political
institutions before the colonial period. According to this theory, the
relatively egalitarian Igbo lived in small, selfcontained groups of
villages organized according to a lineage system that did not allow
social stratification. An individual's fitness to govern was determined
by his wisdom and his wisdom by his age and experience. Subsistence
farming was the dominant economic activity, and yams were the staple
crop. Land, obtained through inheritance, was the measure of wealth.
Handicrafts and commerce were well developed, and a relatively dense
population characterized the region.
Despite the absence of chiefs, some Igbo relied on an order of
priests, chosen from outsiders on the northern fringe of Igboland, to
ensure impartiality in settling disputes between communities. Igbo gods,
like those of the Yoruba, were numerous, but their relationship to one
another and to human beings was essentially egalitarian, thereby
reflecting Igbo society as a whole. A number of oracles and local cults
attracted devotees, while the central deity, the earth mother and
fertility figure, Ala, was venerated at shrines throughout Igboland.
The weakness of this theory of statelessness rests on the paucity of
historical evidence of precolonial Igbo society. There are huge lacunae
between the archaeological finds of Igbo Ukwu, which reveal a rich
material culture in the heart of the Igbo region in the eighth century
A.D., and the oral traditions of the twentieth century. In particular,
the importance of the Nri Kingdom, which appears to have flourished
before the seventeenth century, often is overlooked. The Nri Kingdom was
relatively small in geographical extent, but it is remembered as the
cradle of Igbo culture. Finally, Benin exercised considerable influence
on the western Igbo, who adopted many of the political structures
familiar to the Yoruba-Benin region.
The Northern Kingdoms of the Savanna
Trade was the key to the emergence of organized communities in the
savanna portions of Nigeria. Prehistoric inhabitants, adjusting to the
encroaching desert, were widely scattered by the third millennium B.C.,
when the desiccation of the Sahara began. Trans-Saharan trade routes
linked the western Sudan with the Mediterranean from the time of
Carthage and with the upper Nile from a much earlier date, also
establishing an avenue of communication and cultural influence that
remained open until the end of the nineteenth century. By these same
routes, Islam made its way south into West Africa after the ninth
century A.D.
By then a string of dynastic states, including the earliest Hausa
states, stretched across the western and central Sudan. The most
powerful of these states were Ghana, Gao, and Kanem, which were not
located within the boundaries of present-day Nigeria but which
nonetheless had an indirect influence on the history of the Nigerian
savanna. Ghana declined in the eleventh century but was succeeded by
Mali, which consolidated much of the western Sudan under its imperial
rule in the thirteenth century. Songhai emerged as an empire out of the
small state of Gao in the fifteenth century. For a century, Songhai paid
homage to Mali, but by the last decade of the fifteenth century it
attained its independence and brought much of the Malian domains under
its imperial sway. Although these western empires had little political
influence on the savanna states of Nigeria before 1500, they had a
strong cultural and economic impact that became more pronounced in the
sixteenth century, especially because these states became associated
with the spread of Islam and trade. In the sixteenth century, moreover,
much of northern Nigeria paid homage to Songhai in the west or to Borno,
a rival empire in the east.
Borno's history is closely associated with Kanem, which had achieved
imperial status in the Lake Chad basin by the thirteenth century. Kanem
expanded westward to include the area that became Borno. Its dynasty,
the Sayfawa, was descended from pastoralists who had settled in the Lake
Chad region in the seventh century. The mai (king) of Kanem
ruled in conjunction with a council of peers as a constitutional
monarch. In the eleventh century, the mai and his court
accepted Islam, as the western empires also had done. Islam was used to
reinforce the political and social structures of the state, although
many established customs were maintained. Women, for example, continued
to exercise considerable political influence.
The mai employed his mounted bodyguard, composed of abid
(slave-soldiers), and an inchoate army of nobles to extend Kanem's
authority into Borno, on the western shore of Lake Chad. By tradition
the territory was conferred on the heir to the throne to govern during
his apprenticeship. In the fourteenth century, however, dynastic
conflict forced the then-ruling group and its followers to relocate in
Borno, where as a result the Kanuri emerged as an ethnic group in the
late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The civil war that disrupted
Kanem in the second half of the fourteenth century resulted in the
independence of Borno.
Borno's prosperity depended on its stake in the trans-Sudanic slave
trade and the desert trade in salt and livestock. The need to protect
its commercial interests compelled Borno to intervene in Kanem, which
continued to be a theater of war throughout the fifteenth and into the
sixteenth centuries. Despite its relative political weakness in this
period, Borno's court and mosques under the patronage of a line of
scholarly kings earned fame as centers of Islamic culture and learning.
By the eleventh century, some of the Hausa states--such as those at
Kano, Katsina, and Gobir--had developed into walled towns that engaged
in trade and serviced caravans as well as manufactured cloth and leather
goods. Millet, sorghum, sugarcane, and cotton were produced in the
surrounding countryside, which also provided grazing land for cattle.
Until the fifteenth century, the small Hausa states were on the
periphery of the major empires of the era.
According to tradition, the Hausa rulers descended from a
"founding hero" named Bayinjida, supposedly of Middle Eastern
origin, who became sarki (king) of Daura after subduing a snake
and marrying the queen of Daura. Their children founded the other Hausa
towns, which traditionally are referred to as the Hausa bakwai
(Hausa seven). Wedged in among the stronger Sudanic kingdoms, each of
the Hausa states acquired special military, economic, or religious
functions. No one state dominated the others, but at various times
different states assumed a leading role. They were under constant
pressure from Songhai to the west and Kanem-Borno to the east, to which
they paid tribute. Armed conflict usually was motivated by economic
concerns, as coalitions of Hausa states mounted wars, against the Jukun
and Nupe in the middle belt to collect slaves, or against one another
for control of important trade routes.
Commerce was in the hands of commoners. Within the cities, trades
were organized through guilds, each of which was selfregulating and
collected taxes from its members to be transmitted to the sarki
as a pledge of loyalty. In return, the king guaranteed the security of
the guild's trade. The surrounding countryside produced grain for local
consumption and cotton and hides for processing.
Islam was introduced to Hausaland along the caravan routes. The
famous Kano Chronicle records the conversion of Kano's ruling dynasty by
clerics from Mali, demonstrating that the imperial influence of Mali
extended far to the east. Acceptance of Islam was gradual and was often
nominal in the countryside, where folk religion continued to exert a
strong influence. Non-Islamic practices also were retained in the court
ceremonies of the Hausa kings. Nonetheless, Kano and Katsina, with their
famous mosques and schools, came to participate fully in the cultural
and intellectual life of the Islamic world.
Fulbe pastoralists, known in Nigeria as Fulani, began to enter the
Hausa country in the thirteenth century, and by the fifteenth century
they were tending cattle, sheep, and goats in Borno as well. The Fulani
came from the Senegal River valley, where their ancestors had developed
a method of livestock management and specialization based on
transhumance. The movement of cattle along north/south corridors in
pursuit of grazing and water followed the climatic pattern of the rainy
and dry seasons. Gradually, the pastoralists moved eastward, first into
the centers of the Mali and Songhai empires and eventually into
Hausaland and Borno. Some Fulbe converted to Islam in the Senegal region
as early as the eleventh century, and one group of Muslim Fulani settled
in the cities and mingled freely with the Hausa, from whom they became
racially indistinguishable. There, they constituted a devoutly
religious, educated elite who made themselves indispensable to the Hausa
kings as government advisers, Islamic judges, and teachers. Other
Fulani, the lighter-skinned pastoral nomads, remained aloof from the
Hausa and in some measure from Islam as well, herding cattle outside the
cities and seeking pastures for their herds.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Savanna States, 1500-1800
Nigeria
The sixteenth century marked a high point in the political history of
northern Nigeria. During this period, the Songhai Empire reached its
greatest limits, stretching from the Senegal and Gambia rivers in the
far west and incorporating part of Hausaland in the east. At the same
time, the Sayfawa Dynasty of Borno asserted itself, conquering Kanem and
extending its control westward to Hausa cities that were not under
Songhai imperial rule. For almost a century, much of northern Nigeria
was part of one or the other of these empires, and after the 1590s Borno
dominated the region for 200 years.
Songhai's sway over western Hausaland included the subordination of
Kebbi, whose kanta (king) controlled the territory along the
Sokoto River. Katsina and Gobir also paid tribute to Songhai, while
Songhai merchants dominated the trade of the Hausa towns. It was at this
time that the overland trade in kola nuts from the Akan forests of
modern Ghana was initiated. Largely because of Songhai's influence,
there was a remarkable blossoming of Islamic learning and culture.
The influence of Songhai collapsed abruptly in 1591, when an army
from Morocco crossed the Sahara and conquered the capital city of Gao
and the commercial center of Timbuktu. Morocco was not able to control
the whole empire, and the various provinces, including the Hausa states,
became independent. The collapse undermined Songhai's commercial and
religious hegemony over the Hausa states and abruptly altered the course
of history in the region.
Borno reached its apogee under mai Idris Aloma (ca.
1569-1600), during whose reign Kanem was reconquered. As a result of his
campaigns, several Hausa cities, including Kano and Katsina, became
tributaries. The destruction of Songhai left Borno uncontested as an
imperial force, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
Borno continued to dominate the political history of northern Nigeria.
Now Borno became the center of Islamic learning and trade. Its capital
at Birni Gazargamu, on the Komadugu Yobe River that flows eastward into
Lake Chad, was well situated in the midst of a prosperous agricultural
district. Textile production was a mainstay of its economy. Borno also
controlled extensive salt deposits, which supplied its most important
export to the west and south. These reserves were located at Bilma and
Fachi in the Sahara, in the districts of Mangari and Muniyo adjacent to
Birni Gazargamu, and on the northeastern shores of Lake Chad.
Despite Borno's hegemony, the Hausa states wrestled for ascendancy
among themselves for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Gobir, Katsina, Zamfara, Kano, Kebbi, and Zaria formed various
alliances, but only Zamfara ceased to exist as an autonomous state,
falling to Gobir in the eighteenth century. Borno collected tribute from
Kano and Katsina, and its merchants dominated the trade routes that
passed through Hausaland. Gradually, however, Borno's position began to
weaken. Its inability to check the political rivalries of the competing
Hausa cities was one example of this decline. Another factor was the
military threat of the Tuareg, whose warriors, centered at Agades in the
center of present-day Nigeria, penetrated the northern districts of
Borno. They even diverted the salt trade of Bilma and Fachi from Birni
Gazargamu. Tuareg military superiority depended upon camels, which also
were used to transport salt and dates to the savanna.
The major cause of Borno's decline was a severe drought and famine
that struck the whole Sahel and savanna from Senegal to Ethiopia in the
middle of the eighteenth century. There had been periodic droughts
before; two serious droughts, one of seven years' duration, hit Borno in
the seventeenth century. But the great drought of the 1740s and 1750s
probably caused the most severe famine that the Sahel has known over the
past several hundred years, including that of the 1970s. As a
consequence of the mid-eighteenth century drought, Borno lost control of
much of its northern territories to the Tuareg, whose mobility allowed
them the flexibility to deal with famine conditions through war and
plunder. Borno regained some of its former might in the succeeding
decades, but another drought occurred in the 1790s, again weakening the
state.
The ecological and political instability of the eighteenth century
provided the background for the momentous events of the first decade of
the nineteenth century, when the jihad of Usman dan Fodio revolutionized
the whole of northern Nigeria. The military rivalries of the Hausa
states and the political weakness of Borno put a severe strain on the
economic resources of the region, just at a time when drought and famine
undermined the prosperity of farmers and herders. Many Fulani moved into
Hausaland and Borno at this time to escape areas where drought
conditions were even worse, and their arrival increased tensions because
they had no loyalty to the political authorities, who saw them as a
source of increased taxation. By the end of the eighteenth century, some
Muslim clerics began to articulate the grievances of the common people.
Political efforts to eliminate or control these clerics only heightened
the tensions. The stage was set for jihad.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Slave Trade
Nigeria
A desire for glory and profit from trade, missionary zeal, and
considerations of global strategy brought Portuguese navigators to the
West African coast in the late fifteenth century. Locked in a seemingly
interminable crusading war with Muslim Morocco, the Portuguese conceived
of a plan whereby maritime expansion might bypass the Islamic world and
open new markets that would result in commercial gain. They hoped to tap
the fabled Saharan gold trade, establish a sea route around Africa to
India, and link up with the mysterious Christian kingdom of Prester
John. The Portuguese achieved all these goals. They obtained access to
the gold trade by trading along the Gulf of Guinea, establishing a base
at Elmina ("the mine") on the Gold Coast (Ghana), and they
made their way into the Indian Ocean, militarily securing a monopoly of
the spice trade. Even the Christian kingdom turned out to be real; it
was Ethiopia, although Portuguese adventures there turned sour very
quickly. Portugal's lasting legacy for Nigeria, however, was its
initiation of the transatlantic slave trade.
By 1471 Portuguese ships had reconnoitered the West African coast
south as far as the Niger Delta, although they did not know that it was
the delta, and in 1481 emissaries from the king of Portugal visited the
court of the oba of Benin. For a time, Portugal and Benin
maintained close relations. Portuguese soldiers aided Benin in its wars;
Portuguese even came to be spoken at the oba's court. Gwatto,
the port of Benin, became the depot to handle the peppers, ivory, and
increasing numbers of slaves offered by the oba in exchange for
coral beads; textile imports from India; European-manufactured articles,
including tools and weapons; and manillas (brass and bronze
bracelets that were used as currency and also were melted down for
objets d'art). Portugal also may have been the first European power to
import cowrie shells, which were the currency of the far interior.
Benin profited from its close ties with the Portuguese and exploited
the firearms bought from them to tighten its hold on the lower Niger
area. Two factors checked the spread of Portuguese influence and the
continued expansion of Benin, however. First, Portugal stopped buying
pepper because of the availability of other spices in the Indian Ocean
region. Second, Benin placed an embargo on the export of slaves, thereby
isolating itself from the growth of what was to become the major export
from the Nigerian coast for 300 years. Benin continued to capture slaves
and to employ them in its domestic economy, but the Edo state remained
unique among Nigerian polities in refusing to participate in the
transatlantic trade. In the long run, Benin remained relatively isolated
from the major changes along the Nigerian coast.
The Portuguese initially bought slaves for resale on the Gold Coast,
where slaves were traded for gold. For this reason, the southwestern
coast of Nigeria and neighboring parts of the present-day Republic of
Benin (not to be confused with the kingdom of Benin) became known as the
"slave coast." When the African coast began to supply slaves
to the Americas in the last third of the sixteenth century, the
Portuguese continued to look to the Bight of Benin as one of its sources
of supply. By then they were concentrating activities on the Angolan
coast, which supplied roughly 40 percent of all slaves shipped to the
Americas throughout the duration of the transatlantic trade, but they
always maintained a presence on the Nigerian coast.
The Portuguese monopoly on West African trade was broken at the end
of the sixteenth century, when Portugal's influence was challenged by
the rising naval power of the Netherlands. The Dutch took over
Portuguese trading stations on the coast that were the source of slaves
for the Americas. French and English competition later undermined the
Dutch position. Although slave ports from Lagos to Calabar would see the
flags of many other European maritime countries (including Denmark,
Sweden, and Brandenburg) and the North American colonies, Britain became
the dominant slaving power in the eighteenth century. Its ships handled
two-fifths of the transatlantic traffic during the century. The
Portuguese and French were responsible for another two-fifths.
Nigeria kept its important position in the slave trade throughout the
great expansion of the transatlantic trade after the middle of the
seventeenth century. Slightly more slaves came from the Nigerian coast
than from Angola in the eighteenth century, while in the nineteenth
century perhaps 30 percent of all slaves sent across the Atlantic came
from Nigeria. Over the period of the whole trade, more than 3.5 million
slaves were shipped from Nigeria to the Americas. Most of these slaves
were Igbo and Yoruba, with significant concentrations of Hausa, Ibibio,
and other ethnic groups. In the eighteenth century, two polities--Oyo
and the Aro confederacy--were responsible for most of the slaves
exported from Nigeria. The Aro confederacy continued to export slaves
through the 1830s, but most slaves in the nineteenth century were a
product of the Yoruba civil wars that followed the collapse of Oyo in
the 1820s.
The expansion of Oyo after the middle of the sixteenth century was
closely associated with the growth of slave exports across the Atlantic.
Oyo's cavalry pushed southward along a natural break in the forests
(known as the Benin Gap, i.e., the opening in the forest where the
savanna stretched to the Bight of Benin), and thereby gained access to
the coastal ports.
Oyo experienced a series of power struggles and constitutional crises
in the eighteenth century that directly related to its success as a
major slave exporter. The powerful Oyo Mesi, the council of warlords
that checked the king, forced a number of kings to commit suicide. In
1754 the head of the Oyo Mesi, basorun Gaha, seized power,
retaining a series of kings as puppets. The rule of this military
oligarchy was overcome in 1789, when King Abiodun successfully staged a
countercoup and forced the suicide of Gaha. Abiodun and his successors
maintained the supremacy of the monarchy until the second decade of the
nineteenth century, primarily because of the reliance of the king on a
cavalry force that was independent of the Oyo Mesi. This force was
recruited largely from Muslim slaves, especially Hausa, from farther
north.
The other major slave-exporting state was a loose confederation under
the leadership of the Aro, an Igbo clan of mixed Igbo and Ibibio
origins, whose home was on the escarpment between the central Igbo
districts and the Cross River. Beginning in the late seventeenth
century, the Aro built a complex network of alliances and treaties with
many of the Igbo clans. They served as arbiters in villages throughout
Igboland, and their famous oracle at Arochukwu, located in a thickly
wooded gorge, was widely regarded as a court of appeal for many kinds of
disputes. By custom the Aro were sacrosanct, allowing them to travel
anywhere with their goods without fear of attack. Alliances with certain
Igbo clans who acted as mercenaries for the Aro guaranteed their safety.
As oracle priests, they also received slaves in payment of fines or
dedicated to the gods by their masters as scapegoats for their own
transgressions. These slaves thereby became the property of the Aro
priests, who were at liberty to sell them.
Besides their religious influence, the Aro established their
ascendancy through a combination of commercial acumen and diplomatic
skill. Their commercial empire was based on a set of twenty-four-day
fairs and periodic markets that dotted the interior. Resident Aro
dominated these markets and collected slaves for export. They had a
virtual monopoly of the slave trade after the collapse of Oyo in the
1820s. Villages suspected of violating treaties with the Aro were
subject to devastating raids that not only produced slaves for export
but also maintained Aro influence. The Aro had treaties with the coastal
ports from which slaves were exported, especially Calabar, Bonny, and
Elem Kalabari. The people of Calabar were Efik, a subsection of Ibibio,
while Bonny and Elem Kalabari were Ijaw towns.
The Ijaw, who occupied the tidal area in proximity to the Igbo, had
wrested a frugal living from the sale of dried fish and sea salt to the
inland communities for centuries before the rise of the slave trade.
Traditionally, they had lived in federated groups of villages with the
head of the ranking village presiding over general assemblies attended
by all the males. During the heyday of the slave trade in the eighteenth
century, the major Ijaw villages grew into cities of 5,000 to 10,000
inhabitants ruled by local strongmen allied with the Aro. Their
economies were based on the facilities they offered to slave traders.
They were entrepreneurial communities, receiving slaves from the Aro for
resale to European agents. Personal wealth rather than status within a
lineage group was the basis for political power and social status.
Government typically was conducted by councils composed of leading
merchants and headed by an amanyanabo (chief executive), an
office that in time became hereditary.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the area that was to become
Nigeria was far from a unified country. Furthermore, the orientation of
the north and the south was entirely different. The savanna states of
Hausaland and Borno had experienced a difficult century of political
insecurity and ecological disaster but otherwise continued in a
centuries-long tradition of slow political and economic change that was
similar to other parts of the savanna. The southern areas near the
coast, by contrast, had been swept up in the transatlantic slave trade.
Political and economic change had been rapid and dramatic. By 1800 Oyo
governed much of southwestern Nigeria and neighboring parts of the
modern Republic of Benin, while the Aro had consolidated southeastern
Nigeria into a confederation that dominated that region. The Oyo and the
Aro confederations were major trading partners of the slave traders from
Europe and North America.
Nigeria
Nigeria - THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Nigeria
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, two unrelated
developments that were to have a major influence on virtually all of the
area that is now Nigeria ushered in a period of radical change. First,
between 1804 and 1808, the Islamic holy war of Usman dan Fodio
established the Sokoto Caliphate, which not only expanded to become the
largest empire in Africa since the fall of Songhai but also had a
profound influence on much of Muslim Africa to the west and to the east.
Second, in 1807 Britain declared the transatlantic slave trade to be
illegal, an action that occurred at a time when Britain was responsible
for shipping more slaves to the Americas than any other country.
Although the transatlantic slave trade did not end until the 1860s, it
was gradually replaced by other commodities, especially palm oil; the
shift in trade had serious economic and political consequences in the
interior, which led to increasing British intervention in the affairs of
Yorubaland and the Niger Delta. The rise of the Sokoto Caliphate and the
economic and political adjustment in the south strongly shaped the
course of the colonial conquest at the end of the nineteenth century.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate
Nigeria
By the late eighteenth century, many Muslim scholars and teachers had
become disenchanted with the insecurity that characterized the Hausa
states and Borno. Some clerics (mallams) continued to reside at
the courts of the Hausa states and Borno, but others, who joined the
Qadiriyah brotherhood, began to think about a revolution that would
overthrow existing authorities. Prominent among these radical mallams
was Usman dan Fodio, who with his brother and son, attracted a following
among the clerical class. Many of his supporters were Fulani, and
because of his ethnicity he was able to appeal to all Fulani,
particularly the clan leaders and wealthy cattle owners whose clients
and dependents provided most of the troops in the jihad that began in
Gobir in 1804. Not all mallams were Fulani, however. The cleric
whose actions actually started the jihad, Abd as Salam, was Hausa;
Jibril, one of Usman dan Fodio's teachers and the first cleric to issue
a call for jihad two decades earlier, was Tuareg. Nonetheless, by the
time the Hausa states were overthrown in 1808, the prominent leaders
were all Fulani.
Simultaneous uprisings confirmed the existence of a vast underground
of Muslim revolutionaries throughout the Hausa states and Borno. By 1808
the Hausa states had been conquered, although the ruling dynasties
retreated to the frontiers and built walled cities that remained
independent. The more important of these independent cities included
Abuja, where the ousted Zaria Dynasty fled; Argungu in the north, the
new home of the Kebbi rulers; and Maradi in present-day Niger, the
retreat of the Katsina Dynasty. Although the Borno mai was
overthrown and Birni Gazargamu destroyed, Borno did not succumb. The
reason, primarily, was that another cleric, Al Kanemi, fashioned a
strong resistance that eventually forced those Fulani in Borno to
retreat west and south. In the end, Al Kanemi overthrew the
centuries-old Sayfawa Dynasty of Borno and established his own lineage
as the new ruling house.
The new state that arose during Usman dan Fodio's jihad came to be
known as the Sokoto Caliphate, named after his capital at Sokoto,
founded in 1809. The caliphate was a loose confederation of emirates
that recognized the suzerainty of the commander of the faithful, the
sultan. When Usman dan Fodio died in 1817, he was succeeded by his son,
Muhammad Bello. A dispute between Bello and his uncle, Abdullahi,
resulted in a nominal division of the caliphate into eastern and western
divisions, although the supreme authority of Bello as caliph was upheld.
The division was institutionalized through the creation of a twin
capital at Gwandu, which was responsible for the western emirates as far
as modern Burkina Faso--formerly Upper Volta--and initially as far west
as Massina in modern Mali. As events turned out, the eastern emirates
were more numerous and larger than the western ones, which reinforced
the primacy of the caliph at Sokoto.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, there were thirty emirates
and the capital district of Sokoto, which itself was a large and
populous territory although not technically an emirate. All the
important Hausa emirates, including Kano, the wealthiest and most
populous, were directly under Sokoto. Adamawa, which was established by
Fulani forced to evacuate Borno, was geographically the biggest,
stretching far to the south and east of its capital at Yola into modern
Cameroon. Ilorin, which became part of the caliphate in the 1830s, was
initially the headquarters of the Oyo cavalry that had provided the
backbone of the king's power. An attempted coup d'�tat by the general
of the cavalry in 1817 backfired when the cavalry itself revolted and
pledged its allegiance to the Sokoto Caliphate. The cavalry was largely
composed of Muslim slaves from farther north, and they saw in the jihad
a justification for rebellion. In the 1820s, Oyo had been torn asunder,
and the defeated king and the warlords of the Oyo Mesi retreated south
to form new cities, including Ibadan, where they carried on their
resistance to the caliphate and fought among themselves as well.
Usman dan Fodio's jihad created the largest empire in Africa since
the fall of Songhai in 1591. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
when the Sokoto Caliphate was at its greatest extent, it stretched 1,500
kilometers from Dori in modern Burkina Faso to southern Adamawa in
Cameroon and included Nupe lands, Ilorin in northern Yorubaland, and
much of the Benue River valley. In addition, Usman dan Fodio's jihad
provided the inspiration for a series of related holy wars in other
parts of the savanna and Sahel far beyond Nigeria's borders that led to
the foundation of Islamic states in Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Chad,
Central African Republic, and Sudan. An analogy has been drawn between
Usman dan Fodio's jihad and the French Revolution in terms of its
widespread impact. Just as the French Revolution affected the course of
European history in the nineteenth century, the Sokoto jihad affected
the course of history throughout the savanna from Senegal to the Red
Sea.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Yoruba Wars
Nigeria
Oyo, the great exporter of slaves in the eighteenth century,
collapsed in a civil war after 1817, and by the middle of the 1830s the
whole of Yorubaland was swept up in these civil wars. New centers of
power--Ibadan, Abeokuta, Owo, and Warri--contested control of the trade
routes and sought access to fresh supplies of slaves, which were
important to repopulate the turbulent countryside. At this time, the
British withdrew from the slave trade and began to blockade the coast. The blockade required some
adjustments in the slave trade along the lagoons that stretched outward
from Lagos, while the domestic market for slaves to be used as farm
laborers and as porters to carry commodities to market easily absorbed
the many captives that were a product of these wars.
War and slave raiding were complementary exercises among the Yoruba,
who needed capital to buy the firearms with which they fought in a
vicious cycle of war and enslavement. Military leaders were well aware
of the connection between guns and enslavement.
Some of the emerging Yoruba states started as war camps during the
period of chaos in which Oyo broke up and the Muslim revolutionaries who
were allied to the caliphate conquered northern Yorubaland. Ibadan,
which became the largest city in black Africa during the nineteenth
century, owed its growth to the role it played in the Oyo civil wars.
Ibadan's omuogun (war boys) raided far afield for slaves and
held off the advance of the Fulani. They also took advantage of Benin's
isolation to seize the roads leading to the flourishing slave port at
Lagos. The threat that Ibadan would dominate Yorubaland alarmed its
rivals and inspired a military alliance led by the Egba city of
Abeokuta. Dahomey, to the west, further contributed to the insecurity by
raiding deep into Yorubaland, the direction of raids depending upon its
current alliances.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Abolition of the Slave Trade
Nigeria
In 1807 the Houses of Parliament in London enacted legislation
prohibiting British subjects from participating in the slave trade.
Indirectly, this legislation was one of the reasons for the collapse of
Oyo. Britain withdrew from the slave trade while it was the major
transporter of slaves to the Americas. Furthermore, the French had been
knocked out of the trade during the French Revolution beginning in 1789
and by the Napoleonic wars of the first fifteen years of the nineteenth
century. Between them, the French and the British had purchased a
majority of the slaves sold from the ports of Oyo. The commercial
uncertainty that followed the disappearance of the major purchasers of
slaves unsettled the economy of Oyo. Ironically, the political troubles
in Oyo came to a head after 1817, when the transatlantic market for
slaves once again boomed. Rather than supplying slaves from other areas,
however, Oyo itself became the source of slaves.
British legislation forbade ships under British registry to engage in
the slave trade, but the restriction was applied generally to all flags
and was intended to shut down all traffic in slaves coming out of West
African ports. Other countries more or less hesitantly followed the
British lead. The United States, for example, also prohibited the slave
trade in 1807 (Denmark actually was the first country to declare the
trade illegal in 1792). Attitudes changed slowly, however, and not all
countries cooperated in controlling the activity of their merchant
ships. American ships, for instance, were notorious for evading the
prohibition and going unpunished under United States law. It should be
noted, moreover, that the abolition movement concentrated on the
transatlantic trade for more than five decades before eventually
becoming a full-fledged attack on slave trading within Africa itself.
The Royal Navy maintained a prevention squadron to blockade the
coast, and a permanent station was established at the Spanish colony of
Fernando Po, off the Nigerian coast, with responsibility for patrolling
the West African coast. For several decades, as much as one-sixth of all
British warships were assigned to this mission, and a squadron was
maintained at Fernando Po from 1827 until 1844. Slaves rescued at sea
were usually taken to Sierra Leone, where they were released. British
naval crews were permitted to divide prize money from the sale of
captured slave ships. Apprehended slave runners were tried by naval
courts and were liable to capital punishment if found guilty.
Still, a lively slave trade to the Americas continued into the 1860s.
The demands of Cuba and Brazil were met by a flood of captives taken in
wars among the Yoruba and shipped from Lagos, while the Aro continued to
supply the delta ports with slave exports through the 1830s. Despite the
British blockade, almost 1 million slaves were exported from Nigeria in
the nineteenth century. The risk involved in running the British
blockade obviously made profits all the greater on delivery.
The campaign to eradicate the slave trade and substitute for it trade
in other commodities increasingly resulted in British intervention in
the internal affairs of the Nigerian region during the nineteenth
century and ultimately led to the decision to assume jurisdiction over
the coastal area. Suppression of the slave trade and issues related to
slavery remained at the forefront of British dealings with local states
and societies for the rest of the nineteenth century and even into the
twentieth century.
Lagos, where the British concentrated activities after 1851, had been
founded as a colony of Benin in about 1700. A long dynastic struggle,
which became entwined with the struggle against the slave trade,
resulted in the overthrow of the reigning oba and the
renunciation of a treaty with Britain to curtail the slave trade.
Britain was determined to halt the traffic in slaves fed by the Yoruba
wars, and responded to this frustration by annexing the port of Lagos in
1861. Thereafter, Britain gradually extended its control along the
coast. British intervention became more insistent in the 1870s and 1880s
as a result of pressure from missionaries and liberated slaves returning
from Sierra Leone. There was also the necessity of protecting commerce
disrupted by the fighting. The method of dealing with these problems was
to dictate treaties that inevitably led to further annexations.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Commodity Trade
Nigeria
The development of "legitimate" trade was the final phase
of private and official British efforts to find a positive alternative
to the traffic in slaves. Earlier aspects of such constructive interest
had included the founding of the colony at Sierra Leone in 1787 as a
refuge for liberated slaves, the missionary movement designed to bring
Christianity to the region, and programs of exploration sponsored by
learned societies and scientific groups, such as the London-based
African Association.
The principal commodities of legitimate trade were palm oil and palm
kernels, which were used in Europe to make soap and as lubricants for
machinery before petroleum products were developed for that purpose.
Although this trade grew to significant proportions--palm oil exports
alone were worth �1 million a year by 1840--it was concentrated near
the coast, where palm trees grew in abundance. Gradually, however, the
trade forced major economic and social changes in the interior, although
it hardly undermined slavery and the slave trade. Quite the contrary,
the incidence of slavery in local societies actually increased.
Initially most palm oil (and later kernels) came from Igboland, where
palm trees formed a canopy over the densely inhabited areas of the Ngwa,
Nri, Awka, and other Igbo peoples. Palm oil was used locally for
cooking, the kernels were a source for food, trees were tapped for palm
wine, and the fronds were used for building material. It was a
relatively simple adjustment for many Igbo families to transport the oil
to rivers and streams that led to the Niger Delta for sale to European
merchants. The rapid expansion in exports, especially after 1830,
occurred precisely at the time slave exports collapsed. Instead, slaves
were redirected into the domestic economy, especially to grow the staple
food crop, yams, in northern Igboland for marketing throughout the
palm-tree belt. As before, Aro merchants dominated trade, including the
sale of slaves within Igboland as well as palm products to the coast.
They maintained their central role in the confederation that governed
the region.
The Niger Delta and Calabar, which once had been known for the export
of slaves, now became famous for the export of palm oil, so much so that
the delta streams were given the name the "oil rivers." The
basic economic units in each town were "houses,"
family-operated entities that were also the focus of loyalty for those
employed in them. A "house" included the extended family of
the trader, both his retainers and slaves. As its head, the master
trader taxed other traders who were members of his "house" and
was obligated to maintain a war vessel, which was a large dugout canoe
that could hold several tons of cargo and dozens of crew, for the
defense of the harbor. Whenever a trader could afford to keep a war
canoe, he was expected to form his own "house". Economic
competition among these "houses" was so fierce that trade
often erupted into armed battle between the large canoes.
Because of the hazards of climate and disease for Europeans and the
absence of any authority responsive to their interests on the mainland,
European merchants ordinarily moored their ships outside harbors or in
the delta and used the ships as trading stations and warehouses. In
time, however, they built depots onshore and eventually moved up the
Niger River to stations established in the interior, like that at
Onitsha, where they could bargain with local suppliers and purchase
products likely to turn a profit. Some European traders switched to
legitimate business only when the commerce in slaves became too
hazardous. Disreputable as many of the traders had been, they often
suffered from the precariousness of their position and were at the mercy
of what they considered to be unpredictable coastal rulers. Accordingly,
as the volume of trade increased, the British government responded to
repeated requests of merchants to appoint a consul to cover the region.
Consequently in 1849, John Beecroft was accredited as consul for the
bights of Benin and Biafra, a jurisdiction stretching from Dahomey to
Cameroon. Beecroft was the British representative to Fernando Po, where
the British navy's prevention squadron was stationed.
Exploration of the Niger Basin had a commercial as well as scientific
motivation, but curiosity about the course and destination of the river
also played a part. The delta masked the mouth of the great river, and
for centuries Nigerians chose not to tell Europeans the secrets of the
interior, initially probably because no one thought to ask but by the
nineteenth century because of the commercial implications. In 1794 the
African Association commissioned Mungo Park, an intrepid Scottish
physician and naturalist, to search for the headwaters of the Niger and
follow the river downstream. Park reached the upper Niger the next year
by traveling inland from the Gambia River. Although he reported on the
eastward flow of the Niger, he was forced to turn back when his
equipment was lost to Muslim slave traders. In 1805 he set out on a
second expedition, sponsored by the British government, to follow the
Niger to the sea. His mission failed, but Park and his party covered
more than 1,500 kilometers, passing through the western portions of the
Sokoto Caliphate, before being drowned in rapids near Bussa.
On a subsequent expedition to the Sokoto Caliphate, Hugh Clapperton
learned where the Niger River flowed to the sea, but Clapperton also
died before he could substantiate his information. It was his servant,
Richard Lander, and Lander's brother, John, who actually demonstrated
that the Niger flowed into the delta. The Lander brothers were seized by
slave traders in the interior and sold down the river to a waiting
European ship.
Initial attempts to open trade with the interior by way of the Niger
could not overcome climate and disease, which took the lives of a third
of a British riverine expedition in 1842. Use of quinine to combat
malaria on similar expeditions in the 1850s enabled a <"http://worldfacts.us/UK-Liverpool.htm"> Liverpool
merchant, Macgregor Laird, to open the river. Laird's efforts were
stimulated by the detailed reports of a pioneer German explorer,
Heinrich Barth, who traveled through much of Borno and the Sokoto
Caliphate and recorded information about the region's geography,
economy, and inhabitants.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Royal Niger Company
Nigeria
The legitimate trade in commodities attracted a number of rough-hewn
British merchants to the Niger River, as well as some men who had been
formerly engaged in the slave trade but who now changed their line of
wares. The large companies that subsequently opened depots in the delta
cities and in Lagos were as ruthlessly competitive as the delta towns
themselves and frequently used force to compel potential suppliers to
agree to contracts and to meet their demands. The most important of
these trading companies, whose activities had far-reaching consequences
for Nigeria, was the United Africa Company, founded by George Goldie in
1879. In 1886 Goldie's consortium was chartered by the British
government as the Royal Niger Company and granted broad concessionary
powers in "all the territory of the basin of the Niger."
Needless to say, these concessions emanated from Britain, not from any
authority in Nigeria.
The terms of the charter specified that trade should be free in the
region--a principle systematically violated as the company strengthened
its monopoly to forestall French and German trade interests. The company
also was supposed to respect local customs "except so far as may be
necessary in the interests of humanity." The qualifying clause was
aimed at slavery and other activities categorized as "barbarous
practices" by British authorities, and it foreshadowed the
qualifications applied to noninterference as a guide to official policy
when Britain assumed formal colonial responsibility in Nigeria.
Meanwhile, the Royal Niger Company established its headquarters far
inland at Lokoja, from where it pretended to assume responsibility for
the administration of areas along the Niger and Benue rivers where it
maintained depots. The company interfered in the territory along the
Niger and the Benue, sometimes becoming embroiled in serious conflicts
when its British-led native constabulary intercepted slave raids or
attempted to protect trade routes. The company negotiated treaties with
Sokoto, Gwandu, and Nupe that were interpreted as guaranteeing exclusive
access to trade in return for the payment of annual tribute. Officials
of the Sokoto Caliphate considered these treaties quite differently;
from their perspective, the British were granted only extraterritorial
rights that did not prevent similar arrangements with the Germans and
the French and certainly did not surrender sovereignty.
Under Goldie's direction, the Royal Niger Company was instrumental in
depriving France and Germany of access to the region. Consequently, he
may well deserve the epithet "father of Nigeria," which
imperialists accorded him. He definitely laid the basis for British
claims.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Influence of the Christian Missions
Nigeria
Christianity was introduced at Benin in the fifteenth century by
Portuguese Roman Catholic priests who accompanied traders and officials
to the West African coast. Several churches were built to serve the
Portuguese community and a small number of African converts. When direct
Portuguese contacts in the region were withdrawn, however, the influence
of the Catholic missionaries waned and by the eighteenth century had
disappeared.
Although churchmen in Britain had been influential in the drive to
abolish the slave trade, significant missionary activity was renewed
only in the 1840s and was confined for some time to the area between
Lagos and Ibadan. The first missions there were opened by the Church of
England's Church Missionary Society (CMS). They were followed by other
Protestant denominations from Britain, Canada, and the United States and
in the 1860s by Roman Catholic religious orders. Protestant missionaries
tended to divide the country into spheres of activity to avoid
competition with each other, and Catholic missions similarly avoided
duplication of effort among the several religious orders working there.
Catholic missionaries were particularly active among the Igbo, the CMS
among the Yoruba.
The CMS initially promoted Africans to responsible positions in the
mission field, an outstanding example being the appointment of Samuel
Adjai Crowther as the first Anglican bishop of the Niger. Crowther, a
liberated Yoruba slave, had been educated in Sierra Leone and in
Britain, where he was ordained before returning to his homeland with the
first group of missionaries sent there by the CMS. This was part of a
conscious "native church" policy pursued by the Anglicans and
others to create indigenous ecclesiastical institutions that eventually
would be independent of European tutelage. The effort failed in part,
however, because church authorities came to think that religious
discipline had grown too lax during Crowther's episcopate but especially
because of the rise of prejudice. Crowther was succeeded as bishop by a
British cleric. Nevertheless, the acceptance of Christianity by large
numbers of Nigerians depended finally on the various denominations
coming to terms with local conditions and involved participation of an
increasingly high proportion of African clergy in the missions.
In large measure, European missionaries were convinced of the value
of colonial rule, thereby reinforcing colonial policy. In reaction some
African Christian communities formed their own independent churches.
Nigeria
Nigeria - COLONIAL NIGERIA
Nigeria
Prodded by the instability created by the Yoruba wars and by the
activities of other European powers, Britain moved cautiously but
inexorably toward colonial domination of the lower Niger Basin. In the
decades that followed its abolition of the slave trade, British
diplomacy wove a fabric of treaties with kings and chieftains whose
cooperation was sought in suppressing the traffic. British interests
also dictated occasional armed intervention by the Royal Navy and by the
Royal Niger Company Constabulary to staunch the flow of slaves to the
coast, to protect legitimate commerce, and to maintain peace. Moreover,
the missionaries cried out for protection and assistance in stamping out
slavery and other "barbarous practices" associated with
indigenous religions. Finally, the posting of consular officials by the
Foreign Office to service the increasing amount of trade in the ports of
the bights of Benin and Biafra helped project British influence inland.
For many years, official hesitation about adding tropical
dependencies to the British Empire outweighed these factors. The
prevailing sentiment, even after Lagos became a colony in 1861, was
expressed in a parliamentary report in 1865 urging withdrawal from West
Africa. Colonies were regarded as expensive liabilities, especially
where trading concessions could be exercised without resorting to
annexation. Attitudes changed, however, as rival European powers,
especially France and Germany, scurried to develop overseas markets and
annexed territory.
Inevitably, imperial ambitions clashed when the intentions of the
various European countries became obvious. In 1885 at the Berlin
Conference, the European powers attempted to resolve their conflicts of
interest by allotting areas of exploitation. The conferees also
enunciated the principle, known as the dual mandate, that the best
interests of Europe and Africa would be served by maintaining free
access to the continent for trade and by providing Africa with the
benefits of Europe's civilizing mission. Britain's claims to a sphere of
influence in the Niger Basin were acknowledged formally, but it was
stipulated here as elsewhere that only effective occupation would secure
full international recognition. In the end, pressure in the region from
France and Germany hastened the establishment of effective British
occupation.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Extension of British Control
Nigeria
British expansion accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth
century. The early history of Lagos Colony was one of repeated attempts
to end the Yoruba wars. In the face of threats to the divided Yoruba
states from Dahomey and the Sokoto Caliphate, as represented by the
emirate of Ilorin, the British governor--assisted by the CMS--succeeded
in imposing peace settlements on the interior.
Colonial Lagos was a busy, cosmopolitan port, reflecting Victorian
and distinctively Brazilian architecture and the varied backgrounds of a
black elite, composed of English-speakers from Sierra Leone and of
emancipated slaves repatriated from Brazil and Cuba. Its residents were
employed in official capacities and were active in business. Africans
also were represented on the Lagos Legislative Council, a largely
appointed assembly.
After the Berlin Conference, Britain announced formation of the Oil
Rivers Protectorate, which included the Niger Delta and extended
eastward to Calabar, where the British consulate general was relocated
from Fernando Po. The essential purpose of the protectorate was to
control trade coming down the Niger. Vice consuls were assigned to ports
that already had concluded treaties of cooperation with the Foreign
Office. Local rulers continued to administer their territories, but
consular authorities assumed jurisdiction for the equity courts
established earlier by the foreign mercantile communities. A
constabulary force was raised and used to pacify the coastal area. In
1894 the territory was redesignated the Niger Coast Protectorate and was
expanded to include the region from Calabar to Lagos Colony and
Protectorate, including the hinterland, and northward up the Niger River
as far as Lokoja, the headquarters of the Royal Niger Company. As a
protectorate, it did not have the status of a colony but remained under
the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office.
Continued expansion of the protectorate was accomplished largely by
diplomatic means, although military force was employed to bring Ijebu,
Oyo, and Benin into compliance with dictated treaty obligations. The
conquest of Benin in 1897 completed the British occupation of
southwestern Nigeria. The incident that sparked the expedition was the
massacre of a British consul and his party, which was on its way to
investigate reports of ritual human sacrifice in the city of Benin. In
reprisal a marine detachment promptly stormed the city and destroyed the
oba's palace. The reigning oba was sent into exile,
and Benin was administered indirectly under the protectorate through a
council of chiefs.
Although treaties were signed with rulers as far north as Sokoto by
1885, actual British control was confined to the coastal area and the
immediate vicinity of Lokoja until 1900. The Royal Niger Company had
access to the territory from Lokoja extending along the Niger and Benue
rivers above their confluence, but there was no effective control, even
after punitive expeditions against Bida and Ilorin in 1897. The clear
intent was to occupy the Sokoto Caliphate, but for that purpose the
Royal Niger Company was not deemed to be a sufficient instrument of
imperialism. Consequently, on December 31, 1899, Britain terminated the
charter of the company, providing compensation and retention of valuable
mineral rights.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Frederick Lugard
Nigeria
Frederick Lugard, who assumed the position of high commissioner of
the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900, often has been regarded as
the model British colonial administrator. Trained as an army officer, he
had served in India, Egypt, and East Africa, where he expelled Arab
slave traders from Nyasaland and established the British presence in
Uganda. Joining the Royal Niger Company in 1894, Lugard was sent to
Borgu to counter inroads made by the French, and in 1897 he was made
responsible for raising the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF)
from local levies to serve under British officers.
During his six-year tenure as high commissioner, Lugard was occupied
with transforming the commercial sphere of influence inherited from the
Royal Niger Company into a viable territorial unit under effective
British political control. His objective was to conquer the entire
region and to obtain recognition of the British protectorate by its
indigenous rulers, especially the Fulani emirs of the Sokoto Caliphate.
Lugard's campaign systematically subdued local resistance, using armed
force when diplomatic measures failed. Borno capitulated without a
fight, but in 1903 Lugard's RWAFF mounted assaults on Kano and Sokoto.
From Lugard's point of view, clear-cut military victories were necessary
because their surrenders weakened resistance elsewhere.
Lugard's success in northern Nigeria has been attributed to his
policy of indirect rule, which called for governing the protectorate
through the rulers who had been defeated. If the emirs accepted British
authority, abandoned the slave trade, and cooperated with British
officials in modernizing their administrations, the colonial power was
willing to confirm them in office. The emirs retained their caliphate
titles but were responsible to British district officers, who had final
authority. The British high commissiones could depose emirs and other
officials if necessary. Lugard reduced sharply the number of titled fief
holders in the emirates, weakening the rulers' patronage. Under indirect
rule, caliphate officials were transformed into salaried district heads
and became, in effect, agents of the British authorities, responsible
for peacekeeping and tax collection. The old chain of command merely was
capped with a new overlord, the British high commissiones.
The protectorate required only a limited number of colonial officers
scattered throughout the territory as overseers. Depending on local
conditions, they exercised discretion in advising the emirs and local
officials, but all orders from the high commissiones were transmitted
through the emir. Although the high commissiones possessed unlimited
executive and legislative powers in the protectorate, most of the
activities of government were undertaken by the emirs and their local
administrations, subject to British approval. A dual system of law
functioned--the sharia (Islamic law) court continued to deal with
matters affecting the personal status of Muslims, including land
disputes, divorce, debt, and slave emancipation. As a consequence of
indirect rule, Hausa-Fulani domination was confirmed--and in some
instances imposed--on diverse ethnic groups, some of them non-Muslim, in
the so-called middle belt.
The accomplishments of Lugard and his successors in economic
development were limited by the revenues available to the colonial
government. One of Lugard's initial acts was to separate the general
treasury of each emirate from the emir's privy purse. From taxes
collected by local officials, first one-quarter and later one-half was
taken to support services of the colonial regime, which were meager
because of the protectorate's lack of public resources. In the south,
missionaries made up for the lack of government expenditure on services;
in the north, Lugard and his successors limited the activities of
missionaries in order to maintain Muslim domination. Consequently,
educational and medical services in the north lagged behind those in the
south. Progress was made in economic development, however, as railroad
lines were constructed to transport tin from Jos Plateau and
northern-grown peanuts and cotton to ports on the coast.
Efforts to apply indirect rule to the south, which was formally a
protectorate from 1906, in emulation of Lugard's successful policy in
the north set off a search for legitimate indigenous authorities through
whom the policy could be implemented. The task proved relatively easy in
Yorubaland, where the governments and boundaries of traditional kingdoms
were retained or, in some instances, revived. In the southeast, where
Aro hegemony had been crushed, the search for acceptable local
administrators met with frustration. As a result, the tasks of
government initially were left in the hands of colonial officials, who
antagonized many Igbo. The Igbo therefore stressed traditional
egalitarian principles as a justification for their early opposition to
colonial rule; in Yorubaland and in the north, the devolution of
administrative duties to the indigenous ruling elites contained much of
the early opposition. Resistance to colonial rule was mitigated to the
extent that local authorities and courts were able to manage affairs.
The British prohibited the enslavement of free persons and suppressed
slave trading. All children in the north who were born to persons in
bondage on or after April 1, 1900, were declared free. The relations
between existing slaves and their owners, however, were allowed to
continue indefinitely, on the assumption that wholesale liberation would
cause more harm than good by disrupting the agricultural economy. As a
consequence, at least several hundred thousand slaves deserted their
masters in the early years of colonial rule. In 1906 a radical,
allegedly Mahdist, Muslim uprising that received the support of many
fugitive slaves was brutally crushed. In the south, slaves legally could
be forced to return to their owners until 1914. In the north, vagrancy
laws and the enforcement of proprietary rights to land were used to tax
to check the flight of slaves. Slaves in the northern emirates could
secure their freedom upon application to an Islamic court, but
comparatively few used this option. Throughout the colonial period in
the Muslim north, many slaves and their descendants continued to work
for their masters or former masters and often received periodic payments
leading to emancipation.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Unification of Nigeria
Nigeria
After having been assigned for six years as governor of Hong Kong,
Lugard returned to Nigeria in 1912 to set in motion the merger of the
northern and southern protectorates. The task of unification was
achieved two years later on the eve of World War I. The principle of
indirect rule administered by traditional rulers was applied throughout
Nigeria, and colonial officers were instructed to interfere as little as
possible with the existing order. In 1916 Lugard formed the Nigerian
Council, a consultative body that brought together six traditional
leaders--including the sultan of Sokoto, the emir of Kano, and the king
of Oyo--to represent all parts of the colony. The council was promoted
as a device for allowing the expression of opinions that could instruct
the governor. In practice Lugard used the annual sessions to inform the
traditional leaders of British policy, leaving them with no functions at
the council's meetings except to listen and to assent.
Unification meant only the loose affiliation of three distinct
regional administrations into which Nigeria was subdivided--northern,
western, and eastern regions. Each was under a lieutenant governor and
provided independent government services. The governor was, in effect,
the coordinator for virtually autonomous entities that had overlapping
economic interests but little in common politically or socially. In the
Northern Region, the colonial government took careful account of Islam
and avoided any appearance of a challenge to traditional values that
might incite resistance to British rule. This system, in which the
structure of authority focused on the emir to whom obedience was a mark
of religious devotion, did not welcome change. As the emirs settled more
and more into their role as reliable agents of indirect rule, colonial
authorities were content to maintain the status quo, particularly in
religious matters. Christian missionaries were barred, and the limited
government efforts in education were harmonized with Islamic
institutions.
In the south, by contrast, traditional leaders were employed as
vehicles of indirect rule in Yorubaland, but Christianity and Western
education undermined their sacerdotal functions. In some instances,
however, a double allegiance--to the idea of sacred monarchy for its
symbolic value and to modern concepts of law and administration--was
maintained. Out of reverence for traditional kingship, for instance, the
oni of Ife, whose office was closely identified with Yoruba
religion, was accepted as the sponsor of a Yoruba political movement. In
the Eastern Region, appointed officials who were given
"warrants" and hence called warrant chiefs, were vehemently
resisted because they had no claims on tradition.
In practice, however, British administrative procedures under
indirect rule entailed constant interaction between colonial authorities
and local rulers--the system was modified to fit the needs of each
region. In the north, for instance, legislation took the form of a
decree cosigned by the governor and the emir, while in the south, the
governor sought the approval of the Legislative Council. Hausa was
recognized as an official language in the north, and knowledge of it was
expected of colonial officers serving there, whereas only English had
official status in the south. Regional administrations also varied
widely in the quality of local personnel and in the scope of the
operations they were willing to undertake. British staffs in each region
continued to operate according to procedures developed before
unification. Economic links among the regions increased, but indirect
rule tended to discourage political interchange. There was virtually no
pressure for fuller unity until the end of World War II.
Public works, such as harbor dredging and road and railroad
construction, opened Nigeria to economic development. British soap and
cosmetics manufacturers tried to obtain land concessions for growing oil
palms, but these were refused. Instead, the companies had to be content
with a monopoly of the export trade in these products. Other commercial
crops such as cocoa and rubber also were encouraged, and tin was mined
on the Jos Plateau. The only significant interruption in economic
development arose from natural disaster--the great drought of 1913-14.
Recovery came quickly, however, and improvements in port facilities and
the transportation infrastructure during World War I furthered economic
development. Nigerian recruits participated in the war effort as
laborers and soldiers. The Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF, integrating
troops from the north and south, saw action against German colonial
forces in Cameroon and in German East Africa. During the war, the
colonial government earmarked a large portion of the Nigerian budget as
a contribution to imperial defense. To raise additional revenues, Lugard
took steps to institute a uniform tax structure patterned on the
traditional system that he had adopted in the north during his tenure
there. Taxes became a source of discontent in the south, however, and
contributed to disturbances protesting British policy. In 1920 portions
of former German Cameroon were mandated to Britain by the League of
Nations and were administered as part of Nigeria.
Until he stepped down as governor general in 1918, Lugard primarily
was concerned with consolidating British sovereignty and with assuring
local administration through traditional leaders. He was contemptuous of
the educated and Westernized African elite, and he even recommended
transferring the capital from Lagos, the cosmopolitan city where the
influence of these people was most pronounced, to Kaduna in the north.
Although the capital was not moved, Lugard's bias in favor of the Muslim
north was clear at the time. Nevertheless, Lugard was able to bequeath
to his successor a prosperous colony when his term as governor general
expired.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Further Development of Colonial Policy
Nigeria
Lugard's immediate successor, Hugh Clifford (1919-25), was an
aristocratic professional administrator with liberal instincts who had
won recognition for his enlightened governorship of the Gold Coast. The
approaches of the two governors to colonial development were
diametrically opposed. In contrast to Lugard, Clifford argued that it
was the primary responsibility of colonial government to introduce as
quickly as practical the benefits of Western experience. He was aware
that the Muslim north would present problems, but he evinced great hopes
for progress along the lines that he laid down in the south, where he
anticipated "general emancipation" leading to a more
representative form of government. Clifford emphasized economic
development, encouraging enterprises by immigrant southerners in the
north while restricting European participation to capitalintensive
activity.
Uneasy with the amount of latitude allowed traditional leaders under
indirect rule, Clifford opposed further extension of the judicial
authority held by the northern emirs, stating bluntly that he did
"not consider that their past traditions and their present backward
cultural conditions afford to any such experiment a reasonable chance of
success." He did not apply this rationale in the south, however,
where he saw the possibility of building an elite educated in schools
modeled on a European method. These schools would teach "the basic
principles that would and should regulate character and conduct."
In line with this attitude, he rejected Lugard's proposal for moving the
capital from Lagos, the stronghold of the elite in whom he placed so
much confidence for the future.
Clifford also believed that indirect rule encouraged centripetal
tendencies, and he argued that the division into two separate colonies
was advisable unless a stronger central government could bind Nigeria
into more than just an administrative convenience for the three regions.
Whereas Lugard had applied lessons learned in the north to the
administration of the south, Clifford was prepared to extend to the
north practices that had been successful in the south. The Colonial
Office, where Lugard was still held in high regard, accepted that
changes might be due in the south, but it forbade fundamental alteration
of procedures in the north. A.J. Harding, director of Nigerian affairs
at the Colonial Office, defined the official position of the British
government in its continued support of indirect rule when he commented
that "direct government by impartial and honest men of alien race .
. . never yet satisfied a nation long and . . . under such a form of
government, as wealth and education increase, so do political discontent
and sedition."
Clifford's recommendations, as modified by the Colonial Office, were
embodied in the 1922 constitution (known as the Clifford Constitution).
While administration in the north was left untouched, a new legislative
council was established in common for the two southern regions,
replacing the Lagos Legislative Council and the moribund Nigerian
Council. For the first time, direct elections took place outside Lagos,
although only four of the council's forty-six members were elected.
Moreover, the introduction of the legislative principle encouraged the
emergence of political parties and ultimately the growth of nationalism
in Nigeria. By 1931 strong sentiments had emerged in the north in
reaction to Clifford's reforms.
Nigeria
Nigeria - EMERGENCE OF NIGERIAN NATIONALISM
Nigeria
British colonialism created Nigeria, joining diverse peoples and
regions in an artificial political entity. It was not unusual that the
nationalism that became a political factor in Nigeria during the
interwar period derived both from an older political particularism and
broad pan-Africanism rather than from any sense of a common Nigerian
nationality. Its goal initially was not self-determination, but rather
increased participation in the governmental process on a regional level.
Inconsistencies in British policy reinforced cleavages based on regional
animosities by attempting simultaneously to preserve the indigenous
cultures of each area and to introduce modern technology and Western
political and social concepts. In the north, appeals to Islamic
legitimacy upheld the rule of the emirs, so that nationalist sentiments
there were decidedly anti-Western. Modern nationalists in the south,
whose thinking was shaped by European ideas, opposed indirect rule,
which had entrenched what was considered to be an anachronistic ruling
class in power and shut out the Westernized elite.
The ideological inspiration for southern nationalists came from a
variety of sources, including prominent American-based activists such as
Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois. Nigerian students abroad joined those
from other colonies in pan-African groups, such as the West African
Students Union, founded in London in 1925. Early nationalists tended to
ignore Nigeria as the focus of patriotism; rather, the common
denominator was based on a newly assertive ethnic consciousness,
particularly Yoruba and Igbo. Despite their acceptance of European and
North American influences, the nationalists were critical of colonialism
for its failure to appreciate the antiquity of indigenous cultures. They
wanted self-government, charging that only colonial rule prevented the
unshackling of progressive forces in Africa.
Political opposition to colonial rule often assumed religious
dimensions. Independent Christian churches had emerged at the end of the
nineteenth century because many European missionaries were racist and
blocked the advancement of a Nigerian clergy. European interpretations
of Christian orthodoxy also refused to allow the incorporation of local
customs and practices, even though the various mission denominations
themselves interpreted Christianity very differently. It was acceptable
for the established missions to differ, but most Europeans were
surprised and shocked that Nigerians would develop new denominations
independent of European control. Christianity long had experienced
"protestant" schisms; the emergence of independent Christian
churches in Nigeria was another phase of this history. The pulpits of
the independent congregations provided one of the few available avenues
for the free expression of attitudes critical of colonial rule.
In the 1920s, there were several types of associations that were
ostensibly nonpolitical. One group consisted of professional and
business associations, such as the Nigerian Union of Teachers, which
provided trained leadership for political groups; the Nigerian Law
Association, which brought together lawyers, many of whom had been
educated in Britain; and the Nigerian Produce Traders' Association, led
by Obafemi Awolowo.
Ethnic and kinship organizations that often took the form of a tribal
union also emerged in the 1920s. These organizations were primarily
urban phenomena that arose after large numbers of rural migrants moved
to the cities. Alienated by the anonymity of the urban environment and
drawn together by ties to their ethnic homelands--as well as by the need
for mutual aid--the new city dwellers formed local clubs that later
expanded into federations covering whole regions. By the mid-1940s, the
major ethnic groups had formed such associations as the Igbo Federal
Union and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa),
a Yoruba cultural movement, in which Awolowo played a leading role.
A third type of organization that was more pointedly political was
the youth or student group, which became the vehicle of intellectuals
and professionals. They were the most politically conscious segment of
the population and stood in the vanguard of the nationalist movement.
Newspapers, some of which were published before World War I, provided
coverage of nationalist views.
The opportunity afforded by the 1922 constitution to elect a handful
of representatives to the Legislative Council gave politically conscious
Nigerians something concrete to work on. The principal figure in the
political activity that ensued was Herbert Macauley, often referred to
as the father of Nigerian nationalism. He aroused political awareness
through his newspaper, the Lagos Daily News, while leading the
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), which dominated elections in
Lagos from its founding in 1922 until the ascendancy of the National
Youth Movement (NYM) in 1938. His political platform called for economic
and educational development, Africanization of the civil service, and
self-government for Lagos. Significantly, however, Macauley's NNDP
remained almost entirely a Lagos party, popular only in the area with
experience in elective politics.
The NYM first used nationalist rhetoric to agitate for improvements
in education. The movement brought to public notice a long list of
future leaders, including H.O. Davies and Nnamdi Azikiwe. Although
Azikiwe later came to be recognized as the leading spokesman for
national unity, his orientation on return from university training in
the United States was pan-African rather than nationalist, emphasizing
the common African struggle against European colonialism. He betrayed
much less consciousness of purely Nigerian goals than Davies, a student
of Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, whose political
orientation was considered left-wing.
By 1938 the NYM was agitating for dominion status within the British
Commonwealth of Nations, so that Nigeria would have the same status as
Canada and Australia. In elections that year, the NYM ended the
domination of the NNDP in the Legislative Council and moved to establish
a genuinely national network of affiliates. This promising start was
stopped short three years later by internal divisions in which ethnic
loyalties emerged triumphant. The departure of Azikiwe and other Igbo
members of the NYM left the organization in Yoruba hands; during World
War II, it was reorganized into a predominantly Yoruba political party,
the Action Group, by Awolowo. Yoruba-Igbo rivalry had become a major
factor in Nigerian politics.
During World War II, three battalions of the Nigeria Regiment fought
in the Ethiopian campaign. Nigerian units also contributed to two
divisions serving with British forces in Palestine, Morocco, Sicily, and
Burma, where they won many honors. Wartime experiences provided a new
frame of reference for many soldiers, who interacted across ethnic
boundaries in ways that were unusual in Nigeria. The war also made the
British reappraise Nigeria's political future. The war years, moreover,
witnessed a polarization between the older, more parochial leaders
inclined toward gradualism and the younger intellectuals, who thought in
more immediate terms.
The rapid growth of organized labor in the 1940s also brought new
political forces into play. During the war, union membership increased
sixfold to 30,000. The proliferation of labor organizations, however,
fragmented the movement, and potential leaders lacked the experience and
skill to draw workers together.
In the postwar period, party lines were sharply drawn on the basis of
ethnicity and regionalism. After the demise of the NYM, the nationalist
movement splintered into the Hausa- and Fulani- backed Northern People's
Congress (NPC), the Yoruba-supported Action Group, and the
Igbo-dominated National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC,
later the National Council of Nigerian Citizens). These parties
negotiated with the British government over constitutional changes, but
cooperation among them was the result of expediency rather than an
emerging sense of national identity. Because of the essentially regional
political alignments of the parties, the British government decided to
impose a political solution for Nigeria based on a federally structured
constitution.
Nigeria's first political party to have nationwide appeal was the
NCNC, founded in 1944 when Azikiwe encouraged activists in the National
Youth Movement to call a conference in Lagos of all major Nigerian
organizations to "weld the heterogeneous masses of Nigeria into one
solid bloc." The aged Macauley was elected president of the new
group, and Azikiwe became its secretary general. The party platform
renewed the National Youth Movement's appeal for Nigerian
self-government within the Commonwealth under a democratic constitution.
At its inception, party membership was based on affiliated
organizations that included labor unions, social groups, political
clubs, professional associations, and more than 100 ethnic
organizations. These bodies afforded unusual opportunities for political
education in existing constituencies, but the NYM, which was fading out,
was absent from the list of NCNC affiliates. Leadership of the NCNC
rested firmly with Azikiwe, in large part because of his commanding
personality but also because of the string of newspapers he operated and
through which he argued the nationalist cause. In the late 1940s, the
NCNC captured a majority of the votes in the predominantly Yoruba
Western Region, but increasingly it came to rely on Igbo support,
supplemented by alliances with minority parties in the Northern Region.
The NCNC backed the creation of new regions, where minorities would be
ensured a larger voice, as a step toward the formation of a strong
unitary national government.
The Action Group arose in 1951 as a response to Igbo control of the
NCNC and as a vehicle for Yoruba regionalism that resisted the concept
of unitary government. The party was structured democratically and
benefited from political spadework done by the NCNC in the Western
Region in the late 1940s. As a movement designed essentially to exploit
the federal arrangement to attain regional power, however, the Action
Group became the NCNC's competitor for votes in the south at the
national level and at the local level in the Western Region.
The Action Group was largely the creation of Awolowo, general
secretary of Egbe Omo Oduduwa and leader of the Nigerian Produce
Traders' Association. The Action Group was thus the heir of a generation
of flourishing cultural consciousness among the Yoruba and also had
valuable connections with commercial interests that were representative
of the comparative economic advancement of the Western Region. Awolowo
had little difficulty in appealing to broad segments of the Yoruba
population, but he strove to prevent the Action Group from being
stigmatized as a "tribal" group. Despite his somewhat
successful efforts to enlist non-Yoruba support, the regionalist
sentiment that had stimulated the party initially could hardly be
concealed.
Another obstacle to the development of the Action Group was the
animosity between segments of the Yoruba community--for example, many
people in Ibadan opposed Awolowo on personal grounds because of his
identification with the Ijebu Yoruba. Despite these difficulties, the
Action Group rapidly built an effective organization. Its program
reflected greater planning and was more ideologically oriented than that
of the NCNC. Although he did not have Azikiwe's compelling personality,
Awolowo was a formidable debater as well as a vigorous and tenacious
political campaigner. He used for the first time in Nigeria modern,
sometimes flamboyant, electioneering techniques. Among his leading
lieutenants were Samuel Akintola of Ibadan and the oni of Ife.
The Action Group was a consistent supporter of minority-group demands
for autonomous states within a federal structure, and it even supported
the severance of a midwest state from the Western Region. This move
assumed that comparable alterations would be made elsewhere, an attitude
that won the party minority voting support in the other regions. It also
backed Yoruba irredentism in the Fulani-ruled emirate of Ilorin in the
Northern Region and separatist movements among non-Igbo in the Eastern
Region.
The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was organized in the late 1940s
by a small group of Western-educated northern Muslims who obtained the
assent of the emirs to form a political party capable of
counterbalancing the activities of the southern-based parties. It
represented a substantial element of reformism in the Muslim north. The
most powerful figure in the party was Ahmadu Bello, the sardauna
(war leader) of Sokoto, a controversial figure who aspired to become the
sultan of Sokoto, still the most important political and religious
position in the north. Often described by opponents as a
"feudal" conservative, Bello had a consuming interest in the
protection of northern social and political institutions from southern
influence. He also insisted on maintaining the territorial integrity of
the Northern Region, including those areas with non-Muslim populations.
He was prepared to introduce educational and economic changes to
strengthen the north. Although his own ambitions were limited to the
Northern Region, Bello backed the NPC's successful efforts to mobilize
the north's large voting strength so as to win control of the national
government.
The NPC platform emphasized the integrity of the north, its
traditions, religion, and social order. Support for broad Nigerian
concerns occupied a clear second place. A lack of interest in extending
the NPC beyond the Northern Region corresponded to this strictly
regional orientation. Its activist membership was drawn from local
government and emirate officials who had access to means of
communication and to repressive traditional authority that could keep
the opposition in line.
The small contingent of northerners who had been educated abroad--a
group that included Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Aminu Kano--was allied
with British-backed efforts to introduce gradual change to the emirates.
The support given by the emirs to limited modernization was motivated
largely by fear of the unsettling presence of southerners in the north
and by the equally unsettling example of improving conditions in the
south. Those northern leaders who were committed to modernization were
firmly connected to the traditional power structure. Most internal
problems within the north--peasant disaffection or rivalry among Muslim
factions--were concealed, and open opposition to the domination of the
Muslim aristocracy was not tolerated. Critics, including representatives
of the middle belt who plainly resented Muslim domination, were
relegated to small, peripheral parties or to inconsequential separatist
movements.
In 1950 Aminu Kano, who had been instrumental in founding the NPC,
broke away to form one such party, the Northern Elements Progressive
Union (NEPU), in protest against the NPC's limited objectives and what
he regarded as a vain hope that traditional rulers would accept
modernization. NEPU formed a parliamentary alliance with the NCNC.
The NPC continued to represent the interests of the traditional order
in the preindependence deliberations. After the defection of Kano, the
only significant disagreement within the NPC related to the awareness of
moderates, such as Balewa, that only by overcoming political and
economic backwardness could the NPC protect the foundations of
traditional northern authority against the influence of the more
advanced south.
In all three regions, minority parties represented the special
interests of ethnic groups, especially as they were affected by the
majority. The size of their legislative delegations, when successful in
electing anyone to the regional assemblies, was never large enough to be
effective, but they served as a means of public expression for minority
concerns. They received attention from major parties before elections,
at which time either a dominant party from another region or the
opposition party in their region sought their alliance.
The political parties jockeyed for positions of power in anticipation
of the independence of Nigeria. Three constitutions were enacted from
1946 to 1954 that were subjects of considerable political controversy in
themselves but inevitably moved the country toward greater internal
autonomy, with an increasing role for the political parties. The trend
was toward the establishment of a parliamentary system of government,
with regional assemblies and a federal House of Representatives.
In 1946 a new constitution was approved by the British Parliament and
promulgated in Nigeria. Although it reserved effective power in the
hands of the governor and his appointed executive council, the so-called
Richards Constitution (after Governor Arthur Richards, who was
responsible for its formulation) provided for an expanded Legislative
Council empowered to deliberate on matters affecting the whole country.
Separate legislative bodies, the houses of assembly, were established in
each of the three regions to consider local questions and to advise the
lieutenant governors. The introduction of the federal principle, with
deliberative authority devolved on the regions, signaled recognition of
the country's diversity. Although realistic in its assessment of the
situation in Nigeria, the Richards Constitution undoubtedly intensified
regionalism as an alternative to political unification.
The pace of constitutional change accelerated after the promulgation
of the Richards Constitution, which was suspended in 1950. The call for
greater autonomy resulted in an interparliamentary conference at Ibadan
in 1950, when the terms of a new constitution were drafted. The
so-called Macpherson Constitution, after the incumbent governor, went
into effect the following year.
The most important innovations in the new charter reinforced the dual
course of constitutional evolution, allowing for both regional autonomy
and federal union. By extending the elective principle and by providing
for a central government with a Council of Ministers, the Macpherson
Constitution gave renewed impetus to party activity and to political
participation at the national level. But by providing for comparable
regional governments exercising broad legislative powers, which could
not be overridden by the newly established 185-seat federal House of
Representatives, the Macpherson Constitution also gave a significant
boost to regionalism. Subsequent revisions contained in a new
constitution the Lyttleton Constitution, enacted in 1954, firmly
established the federal principle and paved the way for independence.
In 1957 the Western and the Eastern regions became formally
self-governing under the parliamentary system. Similar status was
acquired by the Northern Region two years later. There were numerous
differences of detail among the regional systems, but all adhered to
parliamentary forms and were equally autonomous in relation to the
federal government at Lagos. The federal government retained specified
powers, including responsibility for banking, currency, external
affairs, defense, shipping and navigation, and communications, but real
political power was centered in the regions. Significantly, the regional
governments controlled public expenditures derived from revenues raised
within each region.
Ethnic cleavages intensified in the 1950s. Political activists in the
southern areas spoke of self-government in terms of educational
opportunities and economic development. Because of the spread of mission
schools and wealth derived from export crops, the southern parties were
committed to policies that would benefit the south of the country. In
the north, the emirs intended to maintain firm control on economic and
political change. Any activity in the north that might include
participation by the federal government (and consequently by southern
civil servants) was regarded as a challenge to the primacy of the
emirates. Broadening political participation and expanding educational
opportunities and other social services also were viewed as threats to
the status quo. Already there was an extensive immigrant population of
southerners, especially Igbo, in the north; they dominated clerical
positions and were active in many trades.
The cleavage between the Yoruba and the Igbo was accentuated by their
competition for control of the political machinery. The receding British
presence enabled, local officials and politicians to gain access to
patronage over government jobs, funds for local development, market
permits, trade licenses, government contracts, and even scholarships for
higher education. In an economy with many qualified applicants for every
post, great resentment was generated by any favoritism authorities
showed to members of their own ethnic group.
In the immediate post-World War II period, Nigeria benefited from a
favorable trade balance. The principal exports were agricultural
commodities--peanuts and cotton from the Northern Region, palm products
from the Eastern Region, and cocoa from the Western Region. Marketing
boards, again regionally based, were established to handle these exports
and to react to price fluctuations on the world market. During the
1950s, the marketing boards accumulated considerable surpluses.
Initially, imports lagged behind exports, although by the mid-1950s
imports began to catch up with exports, and the surpluses decreased.
Expansion in the nonagricultural sectors required large imports of
machinery, transport equipment and, eventually, intermediate materials
for industry. In time there also were increased administrative costs to
be met. Although per capita income in the country as a whole remained
low by international standards, rising incomes among salaried personnel
and burgeoning urbanization expanded consumer demand for imported goods.
In the meantime, public sector spending increased even more
dramatically than export earnings. It was supported not only by the
income from huge agricultural surpluses but also by a new range of
direct and indirect taxes imposed during the 1950s. The transfer of
responsibility for budgetary management from the central to the regional
governments in 1954 accelerated the pace of public spending on services
and on development projects. Total revenues of central and regional
governments nearly doubled in relation to the gross domestic product (GDP) during the decade.
The most dramatic event, having a long-term effect on Nigeria's
economic development, was the discovery and exploitation of petroleum
deposits. The search for oil, begun in 1908 and abandoned a few years
later, was revived in 1937 by Shell and British Petroleum. Exploration
was intensified in 1946, but the first commercial discovery did not
occur until 1956, at Olobiri in the Niger Delta. In 1958 exportation of
Nigerian oil was initiated at facilities constructed at Port Harcourt.
Oil income was still marginal, but the prospects for continued economic
expansion appeared bright and further accentuated political rivalries on
the eve of independence.
The election of the House of Representatives after the adoption of
the 1954 constitution gave the NPC a total of seventy-nine seats, all
from the Northern Region. Among the other major parties, the NCNC took
fifty-six seats, winning a majority in both the Eastern and the Western
regions, while the Action Group captured only twenty-seven seats. The
NPC was called on to form a government, but the NCNC received six of the
ten ministerial posts. Three of these posts were assigned to
representatives from each region, and one was reserved for a delegate
from the Northern Cameroons.
As a further step toward independence, the governor's Executive
Council was merged with the Council of Ministers in 1957 to form the
all-Nigerian Federal Executive Council. NPC federal parliamentary leader
Balewa was appointed prime minister. Balewa formed a coalition
government that included the Action Group as well as the NCNC to prepare
the country for the final British withdrawal. His government guided the
country for the next three years, operating with almost complete
autonomy in internal affairs.
The preparation of a new federal constitution for an independent
Nigeria was carried out at conferences held at Lancaster House in London
in 1957 and 1958 and presided over by the British colonial secretary.
Nigerian delegates were selected to represent each region and to reflect
various shades of opinion. The delegation was led by Balewa of the NPC
and included party leaders Awolowo of the Action Group, Azikiwe of the
NCNC, and Bello of the NPC; they were also the premiers of the Western,
Eastern, and Northern regions, respectively. Independence was achieved
on October 1, 1960.
Elections were held for a new and greatly enlarged House of
Representatives in December 1959; 174 of the 312 seats were allocated to
the Northern Region on the basis of its larger population. The NPC,
entering candidates only in the Northern Region, confined campaigning
largely to local issues but opposed the addition of new regimes. The
NCNC backed creation of a midwest state and proposed federal control of
education and health services. The Action Group, which staged a lively
campaign, favored stronger government and the establishment of three new
states, while advocating creation of a West Africa Federation that would
unite Nigeria with Ghana and Sierra Leone. The NPC captured 142 seats in
the new legislature. Balewa was called on to head a NPC-NCNC coalition
government, and Awolowo became official leader of the opposition.
Nigeria
Nigeria - INDEPENDENT NIGERIA
Nigeria
During the first three years after independence, the federal
government was an NPC-NCNC coalition, despite the conflicting natures of
the two partners. The former was regionalist, Muslim, and aristocratic;
the latter was nationalist, Christian, and populist. Moreover, the NCNC
supported opponents of the NPC in regional elections in the Northern
Region. Although a more natural ideological alignment of the Action
Group and the NCNC was called for by some Action Group leaders, it held
no attraction for the NCNC as long as the NPC was assured of a
parliamentary majority.
Domination of the Northern Region by the NPC and NCNC control of the
Eastern Region were assured. Action Group control of the Western Region,
however, was weakened and then collapsed because of divisions within the
party that reflected cleavages within Yoruba society. This loss of
stability in one region gradually undermined the political structure of
the whole country.
The leadership of the Action Group, which formed the official
opposition in the federal parliament, split in 1962 as a result of a
rift between Awolowo and Akintola, prime minister of the Western Region.
Awolowo favored the adoption of democratic socialism as party policy,
following the lead of Kwame Nkrumah's regime in Ghana. The radical
ideology that Awolowo expressed was at variance with his earlier
positions, however, and was seen as a bid to make the Action Group an
interregional party that drew support across the country from educated
younger voters, whose expectations were frustrated by unemployment and
the rising cost of living. Akintola, in reaction, attempted to retain
the support of conservative party elements who were disturbed by
Awolowo's rhetoric. He called for better relations with the NPC and an
allparty federal coalition that would remove the Action Group from
opposition and give its leaders greater access to power.
Awolowo's radical majority staged the expulsion of Akintola from the
party. The governor of the Western Region demanded Akintola's
resignation as prime minister (although he had not lost a vote of
confidence in the regional legislature) and named a successor
recommended by the Action Group to head the government. Akintola
immediately organized a new party, the United People's Party, which
pursued a policy of collaboration with the NPC-NCNC government in the
federal parliament.
Akintola's resignation in May 1962 sparked bloody rioting in the
Western Region and brought effective government to an end as rival
legislators, following the example in the streets, introduced violence
to the floor of the regional legislature. The federal government
declared a state of emergency, dissolved the legislature, and named a
federal administrator for the Western Region. One of his first acts was
to place many Action Group leaders under house arrest.
Investigations by the federal administrator led to accusations of
criminal misuse of public funds against Awolowo and other Action Group
leaders. A special commission found that Awolowo had funneled several
million pounds from public development corporations to the Action Group
through a private investment corporation when he was prime minister of
the Western Region in the 1950s. The regional government seized the
corporation's assets and pressed legal claims against the Action Group.
In the course of the financial investigation, police uncovered
evidence linking Awolowo with a conspiracy to overthrow the government.
With a number of other Action Group leaders, he was arrested and put on
trial for treason. Authorities charged that 200 activists had received
military training in Ghana and had smuggled arms into Nigeria in
preparation for a coup d'�tat. Awolowo was found guilty, along with
seventeen others, and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Anthony
Enahoro, Awolowo's chief lieutenant who had been abroad at the time of
the coup, was extradited from Britain and also was convicted of treason
and imprisoned.
In the meantime, the state of emergency was lifted and Balewa,
determining that Akintola had been improperly dismissed, obtained his
reinstatement as prime minister of the Western Region at the head of a
coalition between the NCNC and the United People's Party. The Action
Group successfully contested the legality of this action in the courts,
but a retroactive amendment to the Western Region's constitution that
validated Akintola's reappointment was quickly enacted. As Balewa told
parliament, the legalities of the case "had been overtaken by
events."
Later in 1963, Nigeria became a republic within the Commonwealth. The
change in status called for no practical alteration of the
constitutional system. The president, elected to a five-year term by a
joint session of the parliament, replaced the crown as the symbol of
national sovereignty and the British monarchy as head of state. Azikiwe,
who had been governor general, became the republic's first president.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Politics in the Crisis Years
Nigeria
After independence the attitudes of the major parties toward the
formation of new states that could accommodate minority aspirations
varied widely. The NCNC espoused self-determination for ethnic
minorities but only in accordance with its advocacy of a unitary state.
The Action Group also supported such movements, including the
restoration of the northern Yoruba area (Ilorin) to the Western Region,
but as part of a multistate, federal Nigeria. The NPC steadfastly
opposed separatism in the Northern Region and attempted with some
success to win over disaffected minorities in the middle belt.
Proposals were introduced for the creation of three states as a means
of restructuring the regions along ethnic lines. The most extensive
revision sought the separation of the middle belt from the Northern
Region, a move the United Middle Belt Congress promoted. Serious riots
in Tivland in 1960 and 1964 were related to this agitation. Another plan
was put forward by the Edo and western Igbo to create the Midwestern
Region by separating the whole tract adjacent to the Niger River from
the Yoruba-dominated Western Region. At the same time, Ijaw and
Efik-Ibibio ethnic groups proposed that the coast between the Niger
Delta and Calabar become a new region in order to end Igbo dominance in
that area. At this time, however, only the Midwestern Region achieved
formal approval, despite opposition of the Action Group. The creation of
the region was confirmed by plebiscite in 1963.
The creation of the Midwestern Region reopened the question of the
internal restructuring of Nigeria. One motive for a more drastic
restructuring was the desire to break up the Northern Region. That
region, having more than half the country's population, controlled a
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. There was also
the fear that the Igbo-dominated NCNC would gain control of the
Midwestern legislature and thereby become even more powerful. A new
political coalition, the Midwest Democratic Front (MDF), was formed by
leaders of the Action Group and the United People's Party to contest the
Midwestern Region election with the NCNC. During the campaign, the
conservative United People's Party accepted support from the NPC, a fact
that NCNC candidates stressed in their call to keep northern influence
out of the region. Many Action Group workers withdrew support from the
MDF in protest, and some allied themselves with the NCNC. In the 1964
elections, the NCNC won by a landslide.
New State Movements
After independence the attitudes of the major parties toward the
formation of new states that could accommodate minority aspirations
varied widely. The NCNC espoused self-determination for ethnic
minorities but only in accordance with its advocacy of a unitary state.
The Action Group also supported such movements, including the
restoration of the northern Yoruba area (Ilorin) to the Western Region,
but as part of a multistate, federal Nigeria. The NPC steadfastly
opposed separatism in the Northern Region and attempted with some
success to win over disaffected minorities in the middle belt.
Proposals were introduced for the creation of three states as a means
of restructuring the regions along ethnic lines. The most extensive
revision sought the separation of the middle belt from the Northern
Region, a move the United Middle Belt Congress promoted. Serious riots
in Tivland in 1960 and 1964 were related to this agitation. Another plan
was put forward by the Edo and western Igbo to create the Midwestern
Region by separating the whole tract adjacent to the Niger River from
the Yoruba-dominated Western Region. At the same time, Ijaw and
Efik-Ibibio ethnic groups proposed that the coast between the Niger
Delta and Calabar become a new region in order to end Igbo dominance in
that area. At this time, however, only the Midwestern Region achieved
formal approval, despite opposition of the Action Group. The creation of
the region was confirmed by plebiscite in 1963.
The creation of the Midwestern Region reopened the question of the
internal restructuring of Nigeria. One motive for a more drastic
restructuring was the desire to break up the Northern Region. That
region, having more than half the country's population, controlled a
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. There was also
the fear that the Igbo-dominated NCNC would gain control of the
Midwestern legislature and thereby become even more powerful. A new
political coalition, the Midwest Democratic Front (MDF), was formed by
leaders of the Action Group and the United People's Party to contest the
Midwestern Region election with the NCNC. During the campaign, the
conservative United People's Party accepted support from the NPC, a fact
that NCNC candidates stressed in their call to keep northern influence
out of the region. Many Action Group workers withdrew support from the
MDF in protest, and some allied themselves with the NCNC. In the 1964
elections, the NCNC won by a landslide.
The Census Controversy
Because seats in the House of Representatives were apportioned on the
basis of population, the constitutionally mandated decennial census had
important political implications. The Northern Region's political
strength, marshaled by the NPC, had arisen in large measure from the
results of the 1952-53 census, which had identified 54 percent of the
country's population in that area. A national campaign early in 1962
addressed the significance of the forthcoming census. Politicians
stressed the connection between the census and parliamentary
representation on the one hand, and the amount of financial support for
regional development on the other. The 1962 census was taken by head
count, but there was evidence that many enumerators obtained their
figures from heads of families, and many persons managed to be counted
more than once.
Southern hopes for a favorable reapportionment of legislative seats
were buoyed by preliminary results, which gave the south a clear
majority. A supplementary count was immediately taken in the Northern
Region that turned up an additional 9 million persons reportedly missed
in the first count. Charges of falsification were voiced on all sides
and led to an agreement among federal and regional governments to
nullify the count and to conduct a new census.
The second nationwide census reported a population of 60.5 million,
which census officials considered impossibly high. A scaled-down figure
of 55.6 million, including 29.8 million in the Northern Region, finally
was submitted and adopted by the federal government, leaving legislative
apportionment virtually unchanged.
Demographers generally rejected the results of the 1963 census as
inflated, arguing that the actual figure was as much as 10 million
lower. Controversy over the census remained a lively political issue.
NCNC leaders publicly charged the Northern Region's government with
fraud, a claim that was denied by Balewa and by Bello, the regional
prime minister.
Popular Disillusionment and Political Realignment
The conspiracy trials that led to the conviction of two of the
country's most dynamic politicians, Awolowo and Enahoro, severely
weakened public confidence in the political and judicial systems. Abuses
were widespread, including intimidation of opponents by threats of
criminal investigation, manipulation of the constitution and the courts,
diversion of public funds to party and private use, rigging of
elections, and corruption of public officials whose political patrons
expected them to put party interests ahead of their legal
responsibilities. Popular disillusion also intensified because
politicians failed to produce benefits commensurate with constituents'
expectations.
The volatile political scene leading up to elections in 1964 was
ominous. The Action Group virtually disappeared from the federal
parliament as a result of the Awolowo affair, thereby fundamentally
altering political alignments at the national level. By early 1964,
therefore, the federal parliament no longer had a recognized opposition.
Akintola's party, which was renamed the Nigerian National Democratic
Party in an effort to attract more support, now dominated the Western
Region. The federal government nominally consisted of a consensus of the
ruling parties of all four regions, but it was a fragile alliance at
best and had emerged as a result of heavy-handed tactics. The NCNC had
strengthened its position by gaining firm control of the Midwestern
Region, so that it dominated two of the four regions. Akintola managed
to undermine the NCNC in the Western Region, even though nationally he
was pledged to an alliance with the NCNC. For its part, the NCNC
denounced Akintola's party as a "tool of the NPC" and allied
itself with remnants of the Action Group.
Political realignment was deceptive, however, because the basic
divisions within the country remained unaltered. The NPC was reasonably
secure in the Northern Region, despite the presence of minor parties,
but it could not govern Nigeria alone, and alliances with any of the
southern parties were ideologically incompatible and very tenuous. The
NPC continued its dominance because of the inability of the other
parties to find common ground among themselves and with northern
progressives. Awolowo's pointed remarks in 1963 that democracy could be
secured only if the Action Group and the NCNC could reach an
accommodation that would remove the deadweight of the NPC from power
fueled NPC concerns. The detention of Awolowo prevented that alliance
from maturing, but it did not result in greater political stability.
Indeed the alliance between the NPC and NCNC, which had dominated
federal politics and destroyed the Action Group, now fell apart.
The 1964-65 Elections
The federal parliamentary election campaign in December 1964--the
first since independence--was contested by two political alliances
incorporating all the major parties. The Nigerian National Alliance
(NNA) was composed of the NPC, Akintola's Western-based Nigerian
National Democratic Party, and opposition parties representing ethnic
minorities in the Midwestern and Eastern regions. It was opposed by the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), which joined the NCNC and the
remnants of the Action Group with two minority-based northern allies,
the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the United Middle Belt
Congress.
Not surprisingly, the NNA adopted a platform that reflected the views
of the northern political elite and, hence, was an attempt by the NPC to
gain firmer control of federal politics through an alliance with the
Western Region. Its appeal to voters outside the north was based
essentially on the advantages to be gained from associating with the
party in power. The NNA preyed on Yoruba fears of Igbo domination of the
federal government. The UPGA was employed in an attempt by the NCNC to
use the two regional governments that it controlled as a springboard to
domination of the federal government. Strategically it offered a
reformist program, combining a planned economy that endorsed increased
public spending while also encouraging private enterprise. The UPGA
proposed to divide the country into states that reflected ethnicity. Its
proposals were intended to undermine the existing regional basis of
political power by creating a sufficient number of states in each region
so that none of the mayor ethnic groups--Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo--could
dominate region. The UPGA presented itself as an alternative to northern
and, more specifically, to Hausa-Fulani domination of the federal
government. Convinced that it would win if the election were held in an
atmosphere free from interference by ruling parties in the Northern
Region and the Western Region, the UPGA spent most of its efforts
denouncing what it regarded as NNA intentions to rig the election in
those regions.
The election was postponed for several weeks because of discrepancies
between the number of names on voting rolls and on census returns. Even
then the UPGA was not satisfied and called on its supporters to boycott
the election. The boycott was effective in the Eastern Region, where
polling places did not open in fifty-one constituencies that had more
than one candidate running for office. In other constituencies in the
region, UPGA candidates ran unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million voters
cast ballots, out of 15 million who were eligible. The NNA elected 198
candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies
returning results. After an embarrassing delay, President Azikiwe agreed
to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. The boycott
had failed to stop the election, and in March 1965 supplementary
elections were held in those areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos
where the boycott had been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all
these constituencies, bringing the NCNC-dominated coalition a total of
108 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPGA became the official
opposition.
After this decisive defeat, the UPGA prepared for the November 1965
legislative election in the Western Region in an attempt to gain control
of the three southern regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos, the
region surrounding the capital. If successful, the NPC-dominated NNA
still would have controlled the House of Representatives, but it would
have given the predominantly southern UPGA a majority in the Senate,
whose members were chosen by the regional legislatures.
Once more NCNC strategy failed. Amid widespread charges of voting
irregularities, Akintola's NNDP, supported by its NPC ally, scored an
impressive victory in November. There were extensive protests, including
considerable grumbling among senior army officials, at the apparent
perversion of the democratic process. In the six months after the
election, an estimated 2,000 people died in violence that erupted in the
Western Region. In the face of the disorders, the beleaguered Balewa
delegated extraordinary powers to the regional governments to deal with
the situation. By this time, Azikiwe and the prime minister were
scarcely on speaking terms, and there were suggestions that Nigeria's
armed forces should restore order.
In January 1966, army officers attempted to seize power. In a
well-coordinated action, the conspirators, most of whom were Igbo,
assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, and Bello in Kaduna,
as well as senior officers of northern origin. In a public proclamation,
the coup leaders pledged to establish a strong and efficient government
committed to a progressive program and eventually to new elections. They
vowed to stamp out corruption and to suppress violence. Despite the
bloody and calculated character of the coup, these sentiments appealed
directly to younger, educated Nigerians in all parts of the country.
The army's commander in chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi,
quickly intervened to restore discipline within the army. In the absence
of Azikiwe, who was undergoing treatment in a London hospital, Balewa's
shaken cabinet resigned, leaving the reins of authority to the armed
forces. Ironsi, also an Igbo, suspended the constitution, dissolved all
legislative bodies, banned political parties, and as an interim measure
formed a Federal Military Government (FMG) to prepare the country for a
return to civilian rule at an unspecified date. He appointed military
governors in each region and assigned officers to ministerial positions,
instructing them to implement sweeping institutional reforms.
Ironsi and his advisers favored a unitary form of government, which
they thought would eliminate the intransigent regionalism that had been
the stumbling block to political and economic progress. A decree issued
in March abolished the federation and unified the federal and regional
civil services. Civilian experts, largely Igbo, set to work on a new
constitution that would provide for a centralized unitary government
such as the NCNC had favored since the 1950s.
Although the decree contained a number of concessions to regional
interests, including protection of northerners from southern competition
in the civil service, Ironsi's action showed dangerous disregard for the
nuances of regional politics and badly misjudged the intensity of ethnic
sensitivities in the aftermath of the bloody coup. The failure of the
military government to prosecute Igbo officers responsible for murdering
northern leaders stirred animosities further. Igbo civil servants and
merchants residing in the north made the situation even worse through
their triumphant support for the coup. Furthermore, Ironsi was
vulnerable to accusations of favoritism toward the Igbo. The coup was
perceived not so much as an effort to impose a unitary government as a
plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria. Likewise, many Muslims saw the
military decrees as Christianinspired attempts to undermine emirate
government.
Troops of northern origin, who made up the bulk of the infantry,
became increasingly restive. Fighting broke out between them and Igbo
soldiers in garrisons in the south. In June mobs in the northern cities,
abetted by local officials, carried out a pogrom against resident Igbo,
massacring several hundred people and destroying Igbo-owned property.
Some northern leaders spoke seriously of secession. Many northerners
feared that Ironsi intended to deprive them of power and to consolidate
further an Igbo-dominated centralized state.
In July northern officers and army units staged a countercoup, during
which Ironsi and a number of other Igbo officers were killed. The Muslim
officers named thirty-one-year- old Lieutenant Colonel (later Major
General) Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, a Christian from a small ethnic
group (the Anga) in the middle belt, as a compromise candidate to head
the FMG. A young and relatively obscure officer serving as army chief of
staff, Gowon had not been involved in the coup, but he enjoyed wide
support among northern troops who subsequently insisted that he be given
a position in the ruling body. His first act was to repeal the Ironsi
decree and to restore federalism, a step followed by the release of
Awolowo and Enahoro from prison.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Civil War
Nigeria
Throughout the remainder of 1966 and into 1967, the FMG sought to
convene a constituent assembly for revision of the constitution that
might enable an early return to civilian rule. Nonetheless, the tempo of
violence increased. In September attacks on Igbo in the north were
renewed with unprecedented ferocity, stirred up by Muslim
traditionalists with the connivance, Eastern Region leaders believed, of
northern political leaders. The army was sharply divided along regional
lines. Reports circulated that troops from the Northern Region had
participated in the mayhem. The estimated number of deaths ranged as
high as 30,000, although the figure was probably closer to 8,000 to
10,000. More than 1 million Igbo returned to the Eastern Region. In
retaliation, some northerners were massacred in Port Harcourt and other
eastern cities, and a counterexodus of non-Igbo was under way.
The Eastern Region's military governor, Lieutenant Colonel
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, was under pressure from Igbo officers to
assert greater independence from the FMG. Indeed, the eastern military
government refused to recognize Gowon's legitimacy on the ground that he
was not the most senior officer in the chain of command. Some of
Ojukwu's colleagues questioned whether the country could be reunited
amicably after the outrages committed against the Igbo in the Northern
Region. Ironically, many responsible easterners who had advocated a
unitary state now called for looser ties with the other regions.
The military commanders and governors, including Ojukwu, met in Lagos
to consider solutions to the regional strife. But they failed to reach a
settlement, despite concessions offered by the northerners, because it
proved impossible to guarantee the security of Igbo outside the Eastern
Region. The military conferees reached a consensus only in the contempt
they expressed for civilian politicians. Fearing for his safety, Ojukwu
refused invitations to attend subsequent meetings in Lagos.
In January 1967, the military leaders and senior police officials met
at Aburi, Ghana, at the invitation of the Ghanaian military government.
By now the Eastern Region was threatening secession. In a last-minute
effort to hold Nigeria together, the military reached an accord that
provided for a loose confederation of regions. The federal civil service
vigorously opposed the Aburi Agreement, however. Awolowo, regrouping his
supporters, demanded the removal of all northern troops garrisoned in
the Western Region and warned that if the Eastern Region left the
federation, the Western Region would follow. The FMG agreed to the troop
withdrawal.
In May Gowon issued a decree implementing the Aburi Agreement. Even
the Northern Region leaders, who had been the first to threaten
secession, now favored the formation of a multistate federation.
Meanwhile, the military governor of the Midwestern Region announced that
his region must be considered neutral in the event of civil war.
The Ojukwu government rejected the plan for reconciliation and made
known its intention to retain all revenues collected in the Eastern
Region in reparation for the cost of resettling Igbo refugees. The
eastern leaders had reached the point of ruptive in their relations with
Lagos and the rest of Nigeria. Despite offers made by the FMG that met
many of Ojukwu's demands, the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly voted
May 26 to secede from Nigeria. In Lagos Gowon proclaimed a state of
emergency and unveiled plans for abolition of the regions and for
redivision of the country into twelve states. This provision broke up
the Northern Region, undermining the possibility of continued northern
domination and offering a major concession to the Eastern Region. It was
also a strategic move, which won over eastern minorities and deprived
the rebellious Igbo heartland of its control over the oil fields and
access to the sea. Gowon also appointed prominent civilians, including
Awolowo, as commissioners in the federal and new state governments, thus
broadening his political support.
On May 30, Ojukwu answered the federal decree with the proclamation
of the independent Republic of Biafra, named after the Bight of Biafra.
He cited as the principal cause for this action the Nigerian
government's inability to protect the lives of easterners and suggested
its culpability in genocide, depicting secession as a measure taken
reluctantly after all efforts to safeguard the Igbo people in other
regions had failed.
Initially the FMG launched "police measures" to restore the
authority of Lagos in the Eastern Region. Army units attempted to
advance into secessionist territory in July, but rebel troops easily
stopped them. The Biafrans retaliated with a surprise thrust into the
Midwestern Region, where they seized strategic points. However,
effective control of the delta region remained under federal control
despite several rebel attempts to take the non-Igbo area. The federal
government began to mobilize large numbers of recruits to supplement its
10,000-member army.
By the end of 1967, federal forces had regained the Midwestern Region
and secured the delta region, which was reorganized as the Rivers State
and Southeastern State, cutting off Biafra from direct access to the
sea. But a proposed invasion of the rebel-held territory, now confined
to the Igbo heartland, stalled along the stiffened Biafran defense
perimeter.
A stalemate developed as federal attacks on key towns broke down in
the face of stubborn Biafran resistance. Ill-armed and trained under
fire, rebel troops nonetheless had the benefit of superior leadership
and superb morale. Although vastly outnumbered and outgunned, the
Biafrans probed weak points in the federal lines, making lightning
tactical gains, cutting off and encircling advancing columns, and
launching commando raids behind federal lines. Biafran strikes across
the Niger managed to pin down large concentrations of federal troops on
the west bank.
In September 1968, Owerri was captured by federal troops advancing
from the south, and early in 1969 the federal army, expanded to nearly
250,000 men, opened three fronts in what Gowon touted as the "final
offensive." Although federal forces flanked the rebels by crossing
the Niger at Onitsha, they failed to break through. The Biafrans
subsequently retook Owerri in fierce fighting and threatened to push on
to Port Harcourt until thwarted by a renewed federal offensive in the
south. That offensive tightened the noose around the rebel enclave
without choking it into submission.
Biafran propaganda, which stressed the threat of genocide to the Igbo
people, was extremely effective abroad in winning sympathy for the
secessionist movement. Food and medical supplies were scarce in Biafra.
Humanitarian aid, as well as arms and munitions, reached the embattled
region from international relief organizations and from private and
religious groups in the United States and Western Europe by way of
nighttime airlifts over the war zone. The bulk of Biafra's military
supplies was purchased on the international arms market with unofficial
assistance provided by France through former West African colonies. In
one of the most dramatic episodes of the civil war, Carl Gustav von
Rosen, a Swedish count who at one time commanded the Ethiopian air
force, and several other Swedish pilots flew five jet trainers modified
for combat in successful strikes against Nigerian military
installations.
Biafra's independence was recognized by Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, and
the Ivory Coast, but it was compromised in the eyes of most African
states by the approval of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal.
Britain extended diplomatic support and limited military assistance to
the federal government. The Soviet Union became an important source of
military equipment for Nigeria. Modern Soviet-built warplanes, flown by
Egyptian and British pilots, interdicted supply flights and inflicted
heavy casualties during raids on Biafran urban centers. In line with its
policy of noninvolvement, the United States prohibited the sale of
military goods to either side while continuing to recognize the FMG.
In October 1969, Ojukwu appealed for United Nations (UN) mediation
for a cease-fire as a prelude to peace negotiations. But the federal
government insisted on Biafra's surrender, and Gowon observed that
"rebel leaders had made it clear that this is a fight to the finish
and that no concession will ever satisfy them." In December federal
forces opened a four-pronged offensive, involving 120,000 troops, that
sliced Biafra in half. When Owerri fell on January 6, 1970, Biafran
resistance collapsed. Ojukwu fled to the Ivory Coast, leaving his chief
of staff, Philip Effiong, behind as "officer administering the
government." Effiong called for an immediate, unconditional
cease-fire January 12 and submitted to the authority of the federal
government at ceremonies in Lagos.
Estimates in the former Eastern Region of the number of dead from
hostilities, disease, and starvation during the thirty-month civil war
are estimated at between 1 million and 3 million. The end of the
fighting found more than 3 million Igbo refugees crowded into a
2,500-square-kilometer enclave. Prospects for the survival of many of
them and for the future of the region were dim. There were severe
shortages of food, medicine, clothing, and housing. The economy of the
region was shattered. Cities were in ruins; schools, hospitals,
utilities, and transportation facilities were destroyed or inoperative.
Overseas groups instituted a major relief effort, but the FMG insisted
on directing all assistance and recovery operations and barred some
agencies that had supplied aid to Biafra.
Because charges of genocide had fueled international sympathy for
Biafra, the FMG allowed a team of international experts to observe the
surrender and to look for evidence. Subsequently, the observers
testified that they found no evidence of genocide or systematic
destruction of property, although there was considerable evidence of
famine and death as a result of the war. Furthermore, under Gowon's
close supervision, the federal government ensured that Igbo civilians
would not be treated as defeated enemies. A program was launched to
reintegrate the Biafran rebels into a unified Nigeria. A number of
public officials who had "actively counselled, aided, or
abetted" secession were dismissed, but a clear distinction was made
between them and those who had simply carried out their duties. Igbo
personnel soon were being reenlisted in the federal armed forces. There
were no trials and few people were imprisoned. Ojukwu, in exile, was
made the scapegoat, but efforts to have him extradited failed.
An Igbo official, Ukapi "Tony" Asika, was named
administrator of the new East Central State, comprising the Igbo
heartland. Asika had remained loyal to the federal government during the
civil war, but as a further act of conciliation, his all-Igbo cabinet
included members who had served under the secessionist regime. Asika was
unpopular with many Igbo, who considered him a traitor, and his
administration was characterized as inept and corrupt. In three years
under his direction, however, the state government achieved the
rehabilitation of 70 percent of the industry incapacitated during the
war. The federal government granted funds to cover the state's operating
expenses for an interim period, and much of the war damage was repaired.
Social services and public utilities slowly were reinstituted, although
not to the prewar levels.
Nigeria
Nigeria - MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE POSTWAR ERA
Nigeria
In the postwar period, all significant political power remained
concentrated in the FMG. None of the three major ethnic groups had a
powerful voice in its executive element, which was disproportionately
composed of representatives of middle belt minorities and to a lesser
extent of Muslim Yoruba and of Ijaw and Ibibio from the Eastern Region.
The Northern Region had been divided into six states in 1967, which left
the area without its former power base in the federation. The decision
was accepted by northerners in part because of the military government's
relative strength in comparison with earlier civilian governments.
Acceptance also was motivated by the fact that northerners were less
fearful of the Igbo or a southern coalition. Only the Yoruba power base
in the west retained its prewar characteristics. The 1967 administrative
structure also made national unity attractive to the westerners because,
with the creation of a Yoruba state (Kwara) in the north, their position
seemed stronger relative to the northerners. Remaining points of
conflict included the number of civil service posts to be allotted to
each ethnic group and the assignment of civil servants from former
regional services to states other than their own.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Gowon Regime
Nigeria
Gowon's influence depended upon his position as chairman of the
Supreme Military Council, which had come into existence in March 1967.
The council included top-ranking staff officers, service and police
heads, state military governors, and the civilian administrator of the
East Central State. Gowon also chaired the Federal Executive Council,
the cabinet of ministers composed of military officers and civilian
technocrats. The regime ruled by decree, although the concurrence of
state military governors was sought before decrees were issued.
In October 1970, Gowon announced his intention to stay in power until
1976, which was set as the target year for completion of the military's
political program and the return to an elected civilian government.
Gowon outlined a nine-point program that would enable the military to
relinquish control. Included in the package were reorganization of the
armed forces; implementation of a national economic development plan,
including reconstruction of war damaged areas, eradication of
corruption; establishment of more states; adoption of a new
constitution; introduction of a formula for allocating revenue;
completion of a national census; organization of national political
parties; and elections at federal and state levels. Criticism of the
six-year plan was widespread because the agenda was so broad. Many
Nigerians feared that the military planned to retain power indefinitely.
The reaction of civilian politicians was particularly negative. Muslim
traditionalists also expressed concerns that military rule, with its
modernizing tendencies, would erode the authority of the emirates.
Foreign Policy
Gowon reaffirmed the priorities in foreign policy established at
independence. These included active participation in the UN, advocacy of
pan-African solidarity through the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
regional cooperation, support for anticolonial and liberation
movements--particularly those in southern Africa--and nonalignment in
the East-West conflict. The role of Nigeria in world affairs, outside
its African concerns, was insignificant, however.
Nigeria was admitted to the UN within a week of independence in 1960.
It was represented on the committees of specialized agencies and took
its turn as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council. One of
Nigeria's earliest and most significant contributions to the UN was to
furnish troops for the peacekeeping operation in Zaire in the early
1960s. By 1964 Nigerian army units, under Ironsi's command, formed the
backbone of the UN force. The FMG was committed to eliminating
whiteminority rule in Africa, and it channeled financial and military
aid to liberation movements through the OAU.
Although there was considerable African criticism of Nigeria during
the civil war, the military government resisted this pressure as
interference in the country's internal affairs. An OAU statement in 1967
backing the federal position on national unity assuaged Nigerian
feelings to some extent, but Lagos protested subsequent OAU efforts to
bring about a cease-fire. When the war ended, Nigeria's participation in
OAU activities returned to normal.
There were minor problems relating to border demarcations with
neighboring countries, but these were resolved to the satisfaction of
the parties involved. Relations also were mended with African states
that had recognized Biafra. Particularly close ties were developed with
the military regime in Ghana, which gave full support to the federal
government during the civil war. In 1975 Nigeria joined other West
African countries in creating the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), whose mandate was the reduction of trade barriers among
countries in the region. Sponsored by Gowon, the agreement was
indicative of the government's concern with improving intraregional
economic ties.
Nigeria played an active role in the Commonwealth, which linked
Nigeria to developing countries outside Africa and complemented regional
ties through ECOWAS and the OAU. Financial and technical assistance was
channeled to Nigeria through the Commonwealth. The aid came from
Britain, Canada, and Australia, with which Nigeria had advantageous
trade relations. Nigeria's interaction with Britain continued to be
cooperative, although the renewal of arms sales to South Africa,
permitted by the Conservative British government in the early 1970s,
caused some strain in Nigeria. Relations cooled even more because of
Nigeria's apprehension over Britain's application for entry into the
European Economic Community (EEC). Nigeria feared that it would suffer
economically as a result of British membership in the EEC.
The FMG was committed to the principle of nonalignment, a policy
initially established in the early years of independence. Acceptance of
Western aid--including US$225 million from the United States in the
early years of independence--tended to undermine this position. Nigeria
had begun to move toward a more autonomous position in 1962, when the
Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact was abrogated. With this step, Nigeria
affirmed its independence of British foreign policy to which it had
adhered since achieving nationhood. The abrogation of the pact was a
clear message of nonalignment. During the war, the federal government
accepted assistance from both East and West. Aircraft and heavy
equipment were purchased from the Soviet Union, for example, because
Britain and the United States refused to supply heavy armaments.
Nigeria's relations with the United States were good, largely because
the United States provided financial aid and recognized the FMG during
the civil war. United States ties with South Africa and Portugal caused
some friction on the official level, and there was considerable
criticism in the Nigerian press. The Nigerian version of nonalignment
had a slightly pro-Western tilt.
Economic Development
After the civil war, the FMG moved to resurrect the six-year
development plan inaugurated in 1962. The First National Development
Plan charted Nigeria's transition from an essentially agricultural
economy to a mixed economy based on agricultural expansion and limited
industrial growth. Government was heavily involved in the economy
because locally generated private investment was unable to generate
sufficient capital for development. New development plans were
instituted in 1970 and 1975, but the goals set in all three plans proved
unrealistic.
By the late 1960s, oil had replaced cocoa, peanuts, and palm products
as the country's biggest foreign exchange earner. In 1971 Nigeria--by
then the world's seventh-largest petroleum producer--became a member of
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The
dramatic rise in world oil prices in 1974 caused a sudden flood of
wealth that can be described as "dynamic chaos." Much of the
revenue was intended for investment to diversify the economy, but it
also spurred inflation and, coming in the midst of widespread
unemployment, underscored inequities in distribution. In 1975 production
fell sharply as a result of the sudden decrease in world demand, and
prices moved downward until late in the year when OPEC intervened to
raise prices. Nigeria fully supported OPEC policies.
In 1972 the government issued an indigenization decree, the first of
a number of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decrees, that barred aliens
from investing in specified enterprises and reserved participation in
certain trades to Nigerians. At the time, about 70 percent of commercial
firms operating in Nigeria were foreign-owned. In 1975 the federal
government bought 60 percent of the equity in the marketing operations
of the major oil companies in Nigeria, but full nationalization was
rejected as a means of furthering its program of indigenization.
Unemployment constituted an increasingly serious problem. Large
numbers of farm workers, who had gone to urban areas in search of higher
wages, remained in the cities even if they failed to find jobs, while
school graduates and dropouts flooded the labor market at a rate of
600,000 a year in the mid-1970s. Unemployment reached its highest levels
in the crowded Igbo areas in the east, where the economy still was
recovering from the effects of the war. Skilled workers were reluctant
to leave the east in search of work, although eventually the shortage of
skilled workers in other parts of the country began to have its effect
in overcoming Igbo fears. The dangers involved in discharging large
numbers of soldiers who had no job prospects made demobilization of the
costly military establishment undesirable. Substantial increases in
public-sector employment promised to absorb some of the soldiers, but
they lacked training. These economic problems assumed an imposing
political dimension. To some extent, they reflected a pattern in the
world economic situation, but the popular imagination blamed corruption
and mismanagement and held the Gowon regime responsible.
The regime also had to deal with a severe drought that struck the
northern states between 1972 and 1974. The drought was the most serious
since that of 1913-14. The drought and resulting famine affected the
Sahel countries to the west, north, and east far more than Nigeria, but
considerable numbers of refugees poured into Nigeria from Niger. Famine
conditions also prevailed in some parts of the north of Nigeria. In the
long run, however, Nigerian agriculture benefited from the rise in
prices that resulted from crop failures in other parts of the Sahel. In
the short run, the drought influenced policy decisions about the
necessity of promoting irrigation schemes and reforestation.
Crime, Corruption, and Political Turbulence
In 1972 Gowon partially lifted the ban on political activity that had
been in force since 1966 in order to permit a discussion of a new
constitution that would prepare the way for civilian rule. The debate
that followed was ideologically charged. Awolowo's call for a transition
to "democratic socialism" made the military particularly
nervous. The press, trade unions, and universities demanded a quick
return to the democratic process. The call for new states was loud, but
there was no agreement over how many there should be. Gowon abruptly
ended public discussion, explaining that "peace is more important
than politics."
The decennial census was scheduled for 1973. Under the banner
"Prepare to be Counted," the military government conducted a
public campaign that emphasized the technical rather than political
dimensions of the exercise. The procedure was to be supervised by a
committee whose members were selected carefully for geographical and
ethnic balance, and computers were to be used for processing the
returns. Despite measures taken to ensure a more accurate count than had
been possible before, the results once again confounded demographers:
the census found that Nigeria's population had increased by nearly 44
percent in 10 years, a rate of growth unprecedented in any developing
country. According to the returns submitted, the north contained 64
percent of the total population, compared with 53.7 percent in 1963, a
figure even then believed to be exaggerated. The 1973 census, on which
representation in a new, elected parliament would be based, revived
fears that one ethnic group would permanently dominate the others. It
also meant that a considerable share of oil revenues would flow to the
northern states under the existing system of allocation. The government
failed in its efforts to sell the census as a technical exercise because
the political implications were widely understood and hotly debated,
despite the ban on political discussion.
The Gowon regime came under fire because of widespread and obvious
corruption at every level of national life. Graft, bribery, and nepotism
were an integral part of a complex system of patronage and
"gift" giving through which influence and authority were
asserted. Although the military had pledged to rid the government of
corruption, the public became increasingly aware of abuses, primarily
because of daily expos�s in the press. In 1973 the federal government
established a special anticorruption police force--the
"X-Squad"--whose subsequent investigations revealed ingenious
forms of extortion and fraud-- not only in government and public
corporations but in private business and in the professions as well.
A major scandal that had international implications and reached the
highest levels of government and the business community took place in
the mid-1970s; it involved the purchase abroad of construction materials
by state agents at prices well above market values. Rake-offs were
pocketed by public officials and private contractors. Other scandals in
hospitals and orphanages shocked the populace, while corruption in
importing medical drugs whose effective dates long since had expired
revealed that even the health of Nigerians was at risk.
Inefficiencies compounded the impact of corruption. In mid1975 , 400
cargo ships--250 of them carrying 1.5 million tons of cement--clogged
the harbor of Lagos, which had been paralyzed for fifteen months with
vessels waiting to be unloaded. To compound the error, spoiled and
inferior-grade cement was concealed by mixing it with acceptable
material for use in public building projects. Later, buildings collapsed
or had to be dismantled because of the inferior product. New roads
washed away because of bad construction and inadequate controls. In
these scandals, as in others, the culprits were a combination of
Nigerian businessmen, government officials, and foreign companies. Few
people and few projects seemed exempt from the scourge.
Crime posed a threat to internal security and had a seriously
negative impact on efforts to bring about economic development. Armed
gangs, often composed of former soldiers, roamed the countryside
engaging in robbery, extortion, and kidnapping. The gangs sometimes
operated with the connivance of the police or included moonlighting
soldiers. Pirates raided cargo ships awaiting entry to ports or unloaded
them at the piers ahead of the stevedores. Drug trafficking and
smuggling were prevalent. Punishment was meted out to large batches of
convicted and suspected criminals, who were dispatched by firing squads
in public executions meant to impress spectators with the seriousness of
the offenses and with the government's concern to curb crime. These
measures had no noticeable effect on the crime rate, however, but seemed
rather to provoke a callous public attitude toward violence.
In January 1975, Gowon revamped the membership of the Federal
Executive Council, increasing the number of military ministers. He
depended more and more on a small group of advisers and became
increasingly inaccessible to his military colleagues. Without broad
consultation, he backed off from the 1976 date set for a return to
civilian rule, explaining that to adhere rigidly to it would
"amount to a betrayal of a trust" and "certainly throw
the nation back into confusion." Public employees staged protest
strikes in May and June that brought essential services to a standstill.
The government responded by granting retroactive wage increases that
averaged 30 percent, which fed inflation and led to industrial strikes
as union members demanded parallel raises.
The political atmosphere deteriorated to the point that Gowon was
deposed in a bloodless coup d'�tat July 29, 1975--the ninth anniversary
of the revolt that had brought him to power. At the time, Gowon was at
an OAU summit meeting in Kampala, Uganda. The perpetrators of the coup
included many of the officers who had participated in the July 1966
coup. Even the officers responsible for Gowon's security were involved.
Gowon pledged his full loyalty to the new regime and left for exile in
Britain, where he received a pension from the Nigerian government.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Regime of Murtala Muhammad
Nigeria
The armed forces chose thirty-eight-year-old Brigadier (later
General) Murtala Ramat Muhammad, a Muslim northerner, to succeed Gowon.
A Hausa, trained at the British military academy at Sandhurst, Murtala
Muhammad had command of federal field forces in the final phase of the
civil war, including being responsible for the abortive efforts to cross
the Niger River. He was not directly involved in the coup d'�tat that
brought him to power, but he had played a prominent role in rallying
northern officers behind the July 1966 coup that felled Ironsi. In a
short time, Murtala Muhammad's policies won him broad popular support,
and his decisiveness elevated him to the status of a national hero.
One of his first acts was to scrap the 1973 census, which was
weighted in favor of the north, and to revert to the 1963 count for
official purposes. Murtala Muhammad removed top federal and state
officials to break links with the Gowon regime and to restore public
confidence in the federal government. More than 10,000 public officials
and employees were dismissed without benefits, on account of age,
health, incompetence, or malpractice. The purge affected the civil
service, judiciary, police and armed forces, diplomatic service, public
corporations, and universities. Some officials were brought to trial on
charges of corruption, and one former military state governor was
executed for gross misconduct in office. Murtala Muhammad also began the
demobilization of 100,000 troops from the swollen ranks of the armed
forces.
Twelve of the twenty-five ministerial posts on the new Federal
Executive Council went to civilians, but the cabinet was secondary to
the executive Supreme Military Council. Murtala Muhammad imposed the
authority of the federal government in areas formerly reserved for the
states, restricting the latitude exercised by state governments and
their governors in determining and executing policy. Newly appointed
military governors of the states were not given seats on the Supreme
Military Coucil, but instead were expected to administer federal
policies handed down by Murtala Muhammad through the military coucil.
The federal government took over the operation of the country's two
largest newspapers, made broadcasting a federal monopoly, and brought
remaining state-run universities under federal control.
Murtala Muhammad initiated a comprehensive review of the Third
National Development Plan. Singling out inflation as the greatest danger
to the economy, he was determined to reduce the money supply that had
been swollen by government expenditures on public works. Murtala
Muhammad also announced that his government would encourage the rapid
expansion of the private sector into areas dominated by public
corporations. He reappraised foreign policy, stressing a "Nigeria
first" orientation in line with OPEC price guidelines that was to
the disadvantage of other African countries. Nigeria became
"neutral" rather than "nonaligned" in international
affairs. The shift in orientation became apparent with respect to
Angola. Nigeria had worked with the OAU to bring about a negotiated
reconciliation of the warring factions in the former Portuguese colony,
but late in 1975 Murtala Muhammad announced Nigeria's support for the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento
Popular de Liberta��o de Angola--MPLA), citing South Africa's armed
intervention on the side of the rival National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (Uni�o Nacional para a Indep�ndencia Total de
Angola--UNITA). The realignment strained relations with the United
States, which argued for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and Soviet
advisers from Angola. In October the Nigerian air force took delivery of
Soviet-built aircraft that had been ordered under Gowon.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Preparations for the Return to Civilian Rule
Nigeria
Murtala Muhammad set in motion the stalled machinery of devolution to
civilian rule with a commitment to hand over power to a democratically
elected government by October 1979. The transition, as outlined by
Murtala Muhammad, would take place in successive stages. In August 1975,
he appointed a five-member panel to study Gowon's plan for a
nineteen-state federation that would "help to erase memories of
past political ties and emotional attachments." The plan,
reaffirmed by the panel, assaulted ethnic power by recommending that the
predominantly Yoruba Western State be divided into three states, the
Igbo East Central State into two, and the six states of the north into
nine states, only three of which would be predominantly Hausa-Fulani.
Murtala Muhammad claimed that he wanted to avoid the "proliferation
of states" that would highlight the problems of minorities and
warned petitioners that no further demands for new states would be
tolerated. In the end, seven more states were created. In 1976 Nigeria
came to have nineteen states.
In October 1975, Murtala Muhammad named a blue-ribbon committee,
drawn from business, the professions, universities, and the civil
service, as well as from prominent civilian political leaders, to draft
a constitution that would be put before a constituent assembly for
approval. Awolowo, the spokesman for the Nigerian left, was excluded
from the committee. Murtala Muhammad cautioned the drafting committee
against opening old wounds. He favored consensus politics that avoided
the institutionalized opposition of the former constitution. Rather than
a British parliamentary system, he wanted executive and legislative
functions clearly defined, preferring a strong executive on the United
States model. In his instructions to the committee, Murtala Muhammad
said he preferred the elimination of all political parties, and failing
that, he suggested that parties be limited in number to those with a
genuinely national constituency.
Murtala Muhammad was assassinated during an unsuccessful coup d'�tat
in February 1976, and the country went into deep mourning. In less than
a year, this man had captured the hearts of many Nigerians. The
political shake-up and the decisive leadership in the midst of rapid
economic growth seemed to promise a bright future. In fact, there was
considerable opposition to Murtala Muhammad that would have become more
pronounced in the succeeding months, but this opposition was stifled
under the outpouring of national loss.
The attempted coup reflected dissatisfaction within the military that
was unconnected with the larger currents of opposition in the country.
Two groups of conspirators were involved in the coup. The first,
composed of middle-grade officers, was led by Lieutenant Colonel Bukar
Dimka, who was related to Gowon by marriage. Dimka's opposition to
Murtala Muhammad was both professional and political. Dimka's group
protested demobilization and alleged that the FMG was "going
communist." A group of colonels answering to Major General I.D.
Bisalla, the minister of defense, waited in the wings for Dimka's group
to overthrow the government, and then planned to seize power. Dimka,
Bisalla, and thirty-eight other conspirators were convicted after a
secret trial before a military tribunal and were executed publicly by a
firing squad. Evidence published by the FMG implied that both groups of
conspirators had been in communication with Gowon, who was accused of
complicity in the plot against Murtala Muhammad. The British government
refused to accede to Nigerian demands for Gowon's extradition, however,
and protests against the decision forced Britain to recall its high
commissioner from Lagos.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Obasanjo Regime
Nigeria
Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, succeeded Murtala
Muhammad. As chief of staff of Supreme Headquarters, Obasanjo was
Murtala Muhammad's deputy and had the support of the military. He had
commanded the federal division that took Owerri, effectively bringing an
end to the civil war. Keeping the chain of command established by
Murtala Muhammad in place, Obasanjo pledged to continue the program for
the restoration of civilian government in 1979 and to carry forward the
reform program to improve the quality of public service.
The draft constitution was published in October 1976, anticipating
the seating of a constituent assembly in 1977. Debates during sessions
of the drafting committee were frequently ideological in nature, but
divisive proposals, such as the attempt to define Nigeria as a
"socialist" state, were decisively rejected. Committee members
discarded Murtala Muhammad's recommendations for a nonparty system, but
they insisted that parties applying for registration had to have
national objectives and executive boards whose members represented at
least twothirds of the states. The model for the constitution, which was
adopted in 1979, was based on the Constitution of the United States,
with provision for a president, Senate, and House of Representatives.
The country was now ready for local elections, to be followed by
national elections, that would return Nigeria to civilian rule.
The military regimes of Murtala Muhammad and Obasanjo benefited from
a tremendous influx of oil revenue that increased 350 percent between
1973 and 1974, when oil prices skyrocketed, to 1979, when the military
stepped down. Increased revenues permitted massive spending that
unfortunately, was poorly planned and concentrated in urban areas. The
oil boom was marred by a minor recession in 1978-79, but revenues
rebounded until mid1981 . The increase in revenues made possible a rapid
rise in income, especially for the urban middle class. There was a
corresponding inflation, particularly in the price of food, that
promoted both industrialization and the expansion of agricultural
production. As a result of the shift to food crops, the traditional
export earners--peanuts, cotton, cocoa, and palm products--declined in
significance and then ceased to be important at all. Nigeria's exports
became dominated by oil.
Industrialization, which had grown slowly after World War II through
the civil war, boomed in the 1970s, despite many infrastructure
constraints. Growth was particularly pronounced in the production and
assembly of consumer goods, including vehicle assembly and the
manufacture of soap and detergents, soft drinks, pharmaceuticals, beer,
paint, and building materials. Furthermore, there was extensive
investment in infrastructure from 1975 to 1980, and the number of
parastatals--jointly government- and privately owned
companies--proliferated. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decrees of
1972 and 1977 further encouraged the growth of an indigenous middle
class.
Plans were undertaken for the movement of the federal capital from
Lagos to a more central location in the interior at Abuja. Such a step
was seen as a means of encouraging the spread of industrial development
inland and of relieving the congestion that threatened to choke Lagos.
Abuja also was chosen because it was not identified with any particular
ethnic group.
Heavy investment was planned in steel production. With Soviet
assistance, a steel mill was developed at Ajaokuta in Kwara State, not
far from Abuja. The most significant negative sign was the decline of
industry associated with agriculture, but largescale irrigation projects
were launched in the states of Borno, Kano, Sokoto, and Bauchi under
World Bank (see Glossary) auspices.
Education also expanded rapidly. At the start of the civil war, there
were only five universities, but by 1975 the number had increased to
thirteen, with seven more established over the next several years. In
1975 there were 53,000 university students. There were similar advances
in primary and secondary school education, particularly in those
northern states that had lagged behind.
Nigeria
Nigeria - THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1979-83
Nigeria
The first elections under the 1979 constitution were held on schedule
in July and August 1979, and the FMG handed over power to a new civilian
government under President Shehu Shagari on October 1, 1979. Nigeria's
Second Republic was born amid great expectations. Oil prices were high
and revenues were on the increase. It appeared that unlimited
development was possible. Unfortunately, the euphoria was short-lived,
and the Second Republic did not survive its infancy.
Five major parties competed for power in the first elections in 1979.
As might be expected, there was some continuity between the old parties
of the First Republic and the new parties of the Second Republic. The
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), for example, inherited the mantle of
the Northern People's Congress, although the NPN differed from the NPC
in that it obtained significant support in the non-Igbo states of
southeastern Nigeria. The United Party of Nigeria (UPN) was the
successor to the Action Group, with Awolowo as its head. Its support was
almost entirely in the Yoruba states. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP),
the successor to the NCNC, was predominantly Igbo and had Azikiwe as its
leader. An attempt to forge an alliance with nonHausa -Fulani northern
elements collapsed in the end, and a breakaway party with strong support
in parts of the north emerged from the failed alliance. This northern
party was known as the Great Nigerian People's Party under the
leadership of Waziri Ibrahim of Borno. Finally, the People's Redemption
Party was the successor to the Northern Elements Progressive Union and
had Aminu Kano as its head.
Just as the NPC dominated the First Republic, its successor, the NPN,
dominated the Second Republic. Shagari won the presidency, defeating
Azikiwe in a close and controversial vote. The NPN also took 36 of 95
Senate seats, 165 of 443 House of Representatives seats and won control
of seven states (Sokoto, Niger, Bauchi, Benue, Cross River, Kwara, and
Rivers). The NPN lost the governorship of Kaduna State but secured
control of the Kaduna legislature. The NPN failed to take Kano and
lacked a majority in either the Senate or House of Representatives. It
was forced to form a shaky coalition with the NPP, the successor of the
NCNC, the old coalition partner of the NPC. The NPP took three states
(Anambra, Imo, and Plateau), sixteen Senate seats and seventy-eight
House of Representatives seats, so that in combination with the NPN the
coalition had a majority in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. Nonetheless, the interests of the two parties were often in
conflict, which forced the NPN to operate alone in most situations. Even
though the presidential form of constitution was intended to create a
stronger central government, the weakness of the coalition undermined
effective central authority.
The UPN came in with the second largest number of seats and
effectively formed the official opposition, just as the Action Group had
done in the First Republic. The UPN took five states (Lagos, Oyo, Ogun,
Ondo, and Bendel), 28 Senate seats, and 111 House seats. Awolowo
continued as spokesman for the left of center. The Great Nigerian
People's Party managed to win two states (Borno and Gongola), eight
Senate seats, and forty-three House of Representatives seats. The
People's Redemption Party, which was the most radical of the parties,
won Kano and the governorship of Kaduna, seven Senate seats, and
forty-nine House of Representatives seats.
A number of weaknesses beset the Second Republic. First, the
coalition that dominated federal politics was not strong, and in effect
the NPN governed as a minority because no coalition formed to challenge
its supremacy. Second, there was lack of cooperation between the
NPN-dominated federal government and the twelve states controlled by
opposition parties. Third, and perhaps most important, the oil boom
ended in mid-1981, precisely when expectations of continuous growth and
prosperity were at a height.
There were many signs of tension in the country. The Bakalori
Project, an irrigation scheme in Sokoto, for example, became the focus
of serious unrest in the late 1970s when thousands of farmers protested
the loss of their land, and police retaliated by burning villages and
killing or wounding hundreds of people. Widespread dissatisfaction
became apparent with the Maitatsine, or Yan Tatsine (followers of the
Maitatsine), a quasi-Muslim fringe group that who sparked religious
riots in Kano in 1980, and Kaduna, and Maiduguri in 1982 after police
tried to control this activities. The disturbance in Kano alone resulted
in the deaths of 4,177 people between December 18 and 29, 1980. In 1981
teachers staged a strike because they had not been paid. As the
political situation deteriorated, the federal government looked for
scapegoats and found them in the large number of foreign workers who had
come to Nigeria in response to the jobs created by the oil boom. In the
crackdown on illegal immigration, an estimated 2 million foreigners were
expelled in January and February 1983, of whom 1 million were from Ghana
and 150,000 to 200,000 from Niger.
The recession that set in with the fall in oil prices after the
middle of 1981 put severe strains on the Second Republic. For political
reasons, government spending continued to accelerate, and the frictions
among the political parties and between the federal government and the
states only reinforced financial irresponsibility. Nigeria's foreign
debt increased from N3.3 billion in 1978 to N14.7 billion in 1982. By
1983 the nineteen state governments had run up a combined debt of N13.3
billion. Heavy investment in economic development continued unabated. In
addition to finishing a steel mill at Ajaokuta in Kwara State, for
example, a second plant opened at Aladje, near Warri, in 1982.
Steel-rolling mills also were built at Jos, Oshogbo, and Katsina--sites
chosen for political reasons. By 1987 N5 billion had been spent on the
steel industry alone, most of this committed under the Second Republic,
even although the economics of steel development were questionable.
Corruption once again was rampant under the Second Republic. It had
been a serious problem since the civil war, when wartime contracts often
were awarded under dubious circumstances. Corruption became more serious
after the war, most notably in connection with the cement scandal of the
early 1970s, the Festival of African Culture (FESTAC) in Lagos, and the
development of Abuja as the new federal capital. Corruption under the
Second Republic was even greater. Major scandals involved the Federal
Housing Scheme, the National Youth Service Corps, the Nigerian External
Telecommunications, the Federal Mortgage Bank, the Federal Capital
Territory Administration, the Central Bank of Nigeria, and the Nigerian
National Supply Company. In addition, the halfhearted attempts to
license imports and to control inflation encouraged smuggling, which
became a major crime that went virtually unchecked. Umaru Dikko came to
the attention of the international community because of an abortive plot
to kidnap him in London and return him to Nigeria to stand trial for
corruption. British authorities found him in a shipping crate on a
runway moments before he was to be sent to Nigeria. Dikko was involved
in many scandals, including the issuance of licenses to import
rice--rice imports had risen from 50,000 tons in 1976 to 651,000 tons in
1982.
As elections approached in August 1983, economic decline that
reflected low oil prices, widespread corruption, and continued
government spending at record levels was proof to many that the Second
Republic was in sad shape. The lack of confidence was evident in the
massive flight of capital--estimated at US$14 billion between 1979 and
1983. The second elections under the Second Republic were to be its
last. When the results were tallied in 1983, it was clear that there had
been fraud. The NPN increased its control of states from seven to
twelve, including Kano and Kaduna. Shagari was reelected president, and
the NPN gained 61 of 95 Senate seats and 307 of 450 House of
Representatives seats. Not even the supporters of the NPN expected such
results. Considering the state of the economy and the public outcry over
the rigged election, the Shagari government stayed in power for a
surgprisingly long time.
Nigeria
Nigeria - RETURN TO MILITARY RULE
Nigeria
On December 31, 1983, the military seized power once again, primarily
because there was virtually no confidence in the civilian regime. The
fraudulent election was used as an excuse for the takeover, although the
military was in fact closely associated with the ousted government. More
serious still, the economy was in chaos. The true cost of the failure to
use earlier revenues and foreign reserves to good effect now became
apparent.
The leader of the coup d'�tat was Major General Muhammadu Buhari of
Katsina, whose background and political loyalties tied him closely to
the Muslim north and the deposed government. Buhari had been director of
supply and services in the early 1970s, military governor of Northeast
State at the time it was divided into three states, and federal
commissioner for petroleum and mines (1976-78) during the height of the
oil boom. At the time of the coup, he was commander of the Third Armored
Division in Jos.
Buhari tried to restore public accountability and to reestablish a
dynamic economy without altering the basic power structure of the
country. The military had become impatient with the civilian government.
Corruption in particular was out of control, and the fraudulent election
had been too obvious. Because the civilians in the NPN could not control
the situation, the military would try its hand. Nonetheless, Buhari's
political and economic aims were almost identical to those of the NPN.
The military regime conducted tribunals to curb corruption, and many
scandals were revealed. Once again the civil service was cleansed,
although on a smaller scale than the purge of 1975. This time, however,
the military tried to achieve two aims. First, it attempted to secure
public support by reducing the level of corruption; second, it
demonstrated its commitment to austerity by trimming the federal budget.
As a further attempt to mobilize the country, Buhari launched a War
Against Indiscipline in spring 1984. This national campaign, which
lasted fifteen months, preached the work ethic, emphasized patriotism,
decried corruption, and promoted environmental sanitation.
The campaign was a military program for reform and mobilization that
achieved few of its aims. In practice, unemployment was on the rise as
the recession worsened, so that speeches about working hard seemed out
of place. The appeal to Nigerian nationalism had the negative effect of
restricting the flexibility of the government in international
negotiations over the debt. The campaign was enforced haphazardly; some
people were executed or given long jail terms while others were allowed
off if they were well-connected. Environmental sanitation meant that the
state capitals had to be cleaned up, and the principal target was the
petty bourgeoisie that eked a living out of selling services or
retailing commodities on a small scale. Their "illegal
structures"--market stalls and workshops along the streets--were
destroyed, and widespread resentment resulted among the small traders,
repairmen, and others in the self-employed service sector.
The regime attempted to stifle criticism. Journalists were harassed,
and many critics were arrested. Symbolically, the arrest of the popular
musician, Fela Ransome-Kuti, personified the crackdown. Ransome-Kuti's
lyrics sharply mocked the government's inability to deal with national
problems. The National Security Organisation (NSO) became the principal
instrument of repression. The NSO, created in 1976, had played only a
marginal role in Nigerian politics until the Buhari regime. Buhari
appointed Rafindadi, a civilian, as head of the NSO, and under
Rafindadi, Nigeria experienced the harassment and insecurity of a secret
police force for the first time. Fortunately, the NSO proved to be
inefficient, and subsequent reaction to its operations led to its
reorganization.
Buhari's biggest problem was Nigeria's foreign debt. Negotiations
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) dragged on, and in the end
efforts to reschedule the debt failed. Although Buhari was committed to
austerity, the IMF insisted on even more drastic measures to cut
spending, devalue the currency, and otherwise restructure the economy
than most Nigerians were willing to accept. Buhari had to accede to the
strong and vocal opposition to the IMF terms. Nigerian nationalism won
out over economic necessity, at least in the short run. Furthermore, by
the end of 1985 there was considerable frustration within the army. The
army had been reduced in size steadily since the end of the civil war,
from a total of about 275,000 in 1969 to about 80,000 by the end of the
1980s. The economic crisis, the campaign against corruption, and
civilian criticism of the military undermined Buhari's position, and in
August 1985 a group of officers under Major General Ibrahim Babangida
removed Buhari from power.
The officers who staged the coup were mostly from the north, but
unlike Buhari (of Hausa origin), they were mostly from minority ethnic
groups. Babangida, for example, was of Gwari origin from Niger state. He
was a member of the Supreme Military Council under the Murtala Muhammad,
Obasanjo, and Buhari regimes and had been involved in the 1975 and 1984
coups. Lieutenant General Domkat Bali became chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Armed Forces Ruling Council (which succeeded the
Supreme Military Council) was dominated by minority groups from the
north. Some radicals and technocrats were appointed to ministerial
positions.
The new regime was committed to a return to civilian rule and
supported the 1979 constitution. Babangida assumed the title of
president, which he justified in terms of the Constitution. Furthermore,
he tried to assuage the unrest in the country by correcting the excesses
of the Buhari regime. The NSO was abolished in 1986, and its duties were
reassigned to less threatening bodies. The freewheeling press was
allowed fuller rein again, although there was still occasional
harassment. Trials of former politicians were ended, and many former
officials who had been convicted were released from jail. In 1987 the
regime decreed that all politicians who had held office since 1960 and
who had been convicted of criminal offenses were banned from politics.
The Babangida regime had a rocky start. A countercoup in December
1985 failed but made it clear that not everyone in the military sided
with the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The most serious opposition
centered in the labor movement and on the university campuses. In May
1986, students at Ahmadu Bello University and Kaduna Polytechnic staged
demonstrations that led to military occupation of those campuses and to
the deaths of a number of students. The student movement had
considerable support at other universities. On June 4, 1986, the
Nigerian Labour Congress in alliance with students and university
teachers organized a national day of sympathy, which led to the arrest
of many union leaders. There was also considerable controversy over
Nigeria's entry into the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an
international body of Muslim states, in 1986. Buhari's regime had made
the application, which Babangida allowed to stand. The strong reaction
among many Christians, led by the Christian Association of Nigeria
(formed in 1976), proved to be an embarrassment to the regime.
Babangida addressed the worsening recession through the structural
adjustment program of 1986. By 1986, 44 percent of export earnings was
being used to service the foreign debt. Austerity was not enough;
rescheduling the foreign debt was essential, but public opinion was
against an IMF loan. The government already was committed to many of the
conditions for the IMF loan, including even more austere measures.
However, it resisted pressures to reduce the petroleum subsidy, to allow
trade liberalization, and to devalue the naira. Although negotiations
with the IMF were suspended, the federal budget of 1986 still imposed
many of the IMF conditions. On October 1, 1986, the government declared
a National Economic Emergency, which lasted for fifteen months. Under
the emergency, the government de-emphasized large-scale agricultural
projects and introduced salary and wage reductions for armed forces and
for public- and private-sector employees. Import restrictions were
intensified, including a 30-percent surcharge on imports. Officially,
the government now encouraged foreign investment and promoted
privatization. Finally, the petroleum subsidy was cut back. Despite
these drastic moves, efforts to reschedule the foreign debt without an
IMF loan failed, and a drop in world oil prices further compounded
Nigeria's situation.
Eventually the World Bank stepped into the breach and provided US$4.2
billion over three years to support the structural adjustment program.
The eligible debt finally was rescheduled in early 1988. There was heavy
devaluation of the naira in 1986, followed by even more drastic
reductions in 1989 and early 1990. As a result of the recession, there
was a drop in real income, especially for urban dwellers, while
unemployment rose steadily from a low in 1980 to almost 12 percent in
1986. The situation in the second half of the 1980s was even worse, with
per capita income falling below US$300 in 1988.
The Babangida regime appointed a new body, the Political Bureau, in
January 1986 to make recommendations on the return to civilian rule. Its
report, submitted in March 1987, was decidedly at odds with the
government's structural adjustment program. The Political Bureau,
composed of academics and civil servants, wanted to maintain a strong
state presence in the economy, while the military regime was steadily
moving away from that position. The bureau also favored creation of a
two-party political system that would be broadly social democratic in
ideology, as a means of escaping from the ethnic-based political parties
of the past. The Political Bureau also recommended creation of at least
two new states, Katsina and Akwa Ibom, this was accomplished in 1987.
Although the Babangida regime did not like many of the Political
Bureau's recommendations, a Constitution Review Committee was formed in
September 1987.
This process of review and discussion convinced the military regime
that the transition to civilian rule should be gradual. The perceived
mistakes of 1979 and the creation of the Second Republic would not be
repeated, it was hoped. The military would stay in power through 1989 to
oversee the transition. The first stage was local elections, held in
December 1987. No political parties were allowed, and in many districts,
especially in Lagos, the results were overturned and new elections held.
In 1990 the military continued in power but still promised a return to
civilian rule.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Society and Its Environment
Nigeria
NIGERIA, THE MOST POPULOUS country in Africa and the tenth largest
country by population in the world, is located at the eastern terminus
of the bulge of West Africa. As with many of the other nations of
Africa, Nigeria's national boundaries result from its colonial history
and cut across a number of cultural and physical boundaries. Nigeria has
a total area of 923,768 square kilometers, about 60 percent the size of
the state of Alaska, and the greatest area of the nations along the
coast of West Africa (although in Africa as a whole, it is only the
fourteenth largest country by area). The maximum north-south distance
within the country is about 1,040 kilometers, while the maximum
east-west distance is about 1,120 kilometers. Although it represents
only about 3 percent of the surface area of Africa, Nigeria contains
about 20 percent of total African population. In this and other
respects, it is arguably the single most important country on the
continent.
Nigeria
Nigeria - GEOGRAPHY
Nigeria
Relief and Main Physical Features
Much of Nigeria's surface consists of ancient crystalline rocks of
the African Shield. Having been subject to weathering and erosion for
long periods, the characteristic landscape of this area is extensive
level plains interrupted by occasional granite mountains. These features
form a major landscape type of Nigeria and of West Africa as a whole.
There are also smaller areas of younger granites found, for example, on
the Jos Plateau.
Sedimentary strata dating from various periods overlay the older
rocks in many areas. The sedimentary areas typically consist of
flat-topped ridges and dissected plateaus and a characteristic landscape
of extensive plains and no major rocky outcrops. This landscape is
generally true of the basins of the Niger and Benue rivers as well as
the depressions of the Chad and Sokoto basins in the far northeast and
northwest of the country, respectively. The most dramatic of the
sedimentary landscapes are in southeastern Nigeria, where thick
sedimentary beds from the Abakaliki Uplift to the Anambra Basin have
been tilted and eroded. This process has resulted in a rugged scarp land
topography with east-facing cliffs at in the Udi Hills, north of Enugu,
and in the area around Nanka and Agulu.
Although relatively little of the Nigerian landscape has been shaped
by volcanic episodes, there are two main areas of volcanic rock. They
are found on the Biu Plateau in the northeast, extending into some
localized volcanic areas along the eastern border with Cameroon, and on
the Jos Plateau in the northern center of the country.
The elevational pattern of most of Nigeria consists of a gradual rise
from the coastal plains to the northern savanna regions, generally
reaching an elevation of 600 to 700 meters. Higher altitudes, reaching
more than 1,200 meters in elevation, are found only in isolated areas of
the Jos Plateau and in parts of the eastern highlands along the Cameroon
border. The coastal plain extends inland for about ten kilometers and
rises to an elevation of forty to fifty meters above sea level at its
northern boundary. The eastern and western sections of the coastal plain
are separated by the Niger Delta, which extends over an area of about
10,000 square kilometers. Much of this is swampland, separated by
numerous islands. The coastal plain region penetrates inland about
seventy-five kilometers in the west but extends farther in the east.
This region is gently undulating with elevation increasing northward and
a mean elevation of about 150 meters above sea level. Much of the
population of southern Nigeria is located in these eastern and western
coastal plains and in some of the contiguous areas of the coast and the
lower Niger Basin.
Separating the two segments of the coastal plain and extending to the
northeast and northwest are the broad river basins of the Niger and
Benue rivers. The upper reaches of these rivers form narrow valleys and
contain falls and rapids. Most of the lower portions, however, are free
from rapids and have extensive floodplains and braided stream channels.
To the north of the Niger and Benue basins are the broad, stepped
plateau and granite mountains that characterize much of northern
Nigeria. Such mountains are also found in the southwest, in the region
between the western coastal plains and the upper Niger Basin. The
western wedge between Abeokuta and Ibadan and the Niger Basin reaches
elevations of 600 meters or more, while the extensive northern savanna
region, stretching from Kontagora to Gombe and east to the border,
includes extensive areas with elevations of more than 1,200 meters or
more at its center. The mountainous zone along the middle part of the
eastern border, the Cameroon Highlands, includes the country's highest
point (2,042 meters). In the far northeast and northwest, elevation
falls again to below 300 meters in the Chad Basin in the far northeast
and the Sokoto Basin in the northwest.
<>Climate
Nigeria
Nigeria - Climate
Nigeria
As in most of West Africa, Nigeria's climate is characterized by
strong latitudinal zones, becoming progressively drier as one moves
north from the coast. Rainfall is the key climatic variable, and there
is a marked alternation of wet and dry seasons in most areas. Two air
masses control rainfall--moist northward-moving maritime air coming from
the Atlantic Ocean and dry continental air coming south from the African
landmass. Topographic relief plays a significant role in local climate
only around the Jos Plateau and along the eastern border highlands.
In the coastal and southeastern portions of Nigeria, the rainy season
usually begins in February or March as moist Atlantic air, known as the
southwest monsoon, invades the country. The beginning of the rains is
usually marked by the incidence of high winds and heavy but scattered
squalls. The scattered quality of this storm rainfall is especially
noticeable in the north in dry years, when rain may be abundant in some
small areas while other contiguous places are completely dry. By April
or early May in most years, the rainy season is under way throughout
most of the area south of the Niger and Benue river valleys. Farther
north, it is usually June or July before the rains really commence. The
peak of the rainy season occurs through most of northern Nigeria in
August, when air from the Atlantic covers the entire country. In
southern regions, this period marks the August dip in precipitation.
Although rarely completely dry, this dip in rainfall, which is
especially marked in the southwest, can be useful agriculturally,
because it allows a brief dry period for grain harvesting.
From September through November, the northeast trade winds generally
bring a season of clear skies, moderate temperatures, and lower humidity
for most of the country. From December through February, however, the
northeast trade winds blow strongly and often bring with them a load of
fine dust from the Sahara. These dust-laden winds, known locally as the
harmattan, often appear as a dense fog and cover everything with a layer
of fine particles. The harmattan is more common in the north but affects
the entire country except for a narrow strip along the southwest coast.
An occasional strong harmattan, however, can sweep as far south as
Lagos, providing relief from high humidities in the capital and pushing
clouds of dust out to sea.
Given this climatological cycle and the size of the country, there is
a considerable range in total annual rainfall across Nigeria, both from
south to north and, in some regions, from east to west. The greatest
total precipitation is generally in the southeast, along the coast
around Bonny (south of Port Harcourt) and east of Calabar, where mean
annual rainfall is more than 4,000 millimeters. Most of the rest of the
southeast receives between 2,000 and 3,000 millimeters of rain per year,
and the southwest (lying farther north) receives lower total rainfall,
generally between 1,250 and 2,500 millimeters per year. Mean annual
precipitation at Lagos is about 1,900 millimeters; at Ibadan, only about
140 kilometers north of Lagos, mean annual rainfall drops to around
1,250 millimeters. Moving north from Ibadan, mean annual rainfall in the
west is in the range of 1,200 to 1,300 millimeters.
North of Kaduna, through the northern Guinea savanna and then the Sudan savanna zones, the total rainfall and the length of the
rainy season decline steadily. The Guinea savanna starts in the middle
belt, or southern part of northern Nigeria. It is distinguished from the
Sudan savanna because it has more trees whereas the Sudan few trees.
Rainy seasons decline correspondingly in length as one moves north, with
Kano having an average rainy period of 120 to 130 days, and Katsina and
Sokoto having rainy seasons 10 to 20 days shorter. Average annual
rainfall in the north is in the range of 500 to 750 millimeters.
The regularity of drought periods has been among the most notable
aspects of Nigerian climate in recent years, particularly in the drier
regions in the north. Experts regard the twentieth century as having
been among the driest periods of the last several centuries; the well
publicized droughts of the 1970s and 1980s were only the latest of
several significant such episodes to affect West Africa in this century.
At least two of these droughts have severely affected large areas of
northern Nigeria and the Sahel region farther north. These drought
periods are indications of the great variability of climate across
tropical Africa, the most serious effects of which are usually felt at
the drier margins of agricultural zones or in the regions occupied
primarily by pastoral groups.
Temperatures throughout Nigeria are generally high; diurnal
variations are more pronounced than seasonal ones. Highest temperatures
occur during the dry season; rains moderate afternoon highs during the
wet season. Average highs and lows for Lagos are 31� C and 23� C in
January and 28� C and 23� C in June. Although average temperatures
vary little from coastal to inland areas, inland areas, especially in
the northeast, have greater extremes. There, temperatures reach as high
as 44� C before the onset of the rains or drop as low as 6� C during
an intrusion of cool air from the north from December to February.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Population
Nigeria
The size of its population is one of Nigeria's most significant and
distinctive features. With probably more than 100 million people in
1990--the precise figure is uncertain because there has been no accepted
census since 1963, although a census was scheduled for the fall of
1991--Nigeria's population is about twice the size of that of the next
largest country in Africa, Egypt, which had an estimated mid-1989
population of 52 million. Nigeria represents about 20 percent of the
total population of sub-Saharan Africa. The population is unevenly
distributed, however; a large percentage of the total number live within
several hundred kilometers of the coast but population is also dense
along the northern river basin areas such as Kano and Sokoto. Population
densities, especially in the southwest near Lagos and the rich
agricultural regions around Enugu and Owerri, exceed 400 inhabitants per
kilometer. None of the neighboring states of West or Central Africa
approaches the total level of Nigerian population or the densities found
in the areas of greatest concentration in Nigeria. Several of Nigeria's
twenty-one states have more people than a number of other countries in
West Africa, and some of the Igbo areas of the southeast have the
highest rural densities in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, other areas
of Nigeria are sparsely populated and have apparently remained so for a
considerable time. This pattern of population distribution has major
implications for the country's development and has had great impact on
the nation's postindependence history.
Migration from rural to urban areas has accelerated in recent
decades. Estimates of urban dwellers reveal this shift--in 1952, 11
percent of the total population was classified as urban; in 1985, 28
percent. One-sixth of the urban population, or approximately 6 million
people, lived in Lagos, and in 1985 eight other cities had populations
of more than 500,000.
<>Census History
<>Population Growth Rate
<>Ethnicity
Updated population figures for Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Census History
Nigeria
Although numerous estimates of the Nigerian population were made
during the colonial period, the first attempt at a nationwide census was
during 1952-53. This attempt yielded a total population figure of 31.6
million within the current boundaries of the country. This census has
usually been considered an undercount for a number of reasons:
apprehension that the census was related to tax collection; political
tension at the time in eastern Nigeria; logistical difficulties in
reaching many remote areas; and inadequate training of enumerators in
some areas. The extent of undercounting has been estimated at 10 percent
or less, although accuracy probably varied among the regions. Despite
its difficulties, the 1952-53 census has generally been seen as less
problematic than any of its successors.
Subsequent attempts to conduct a reliable postindependence census
have been mired in controversy, and only one was officially accepted.
The first attempt, in mid-1962, was canceled after much controversy and
allegations of overcounting in many areas. A second attempt in 1963,
which was officially accepted, also was encumbered with charges of
inaccuracy and manipulation for regional and local political purposes.
Indeed, the official 1963 figure of 55.6 million as total national
population is inconsistent with the census of a decade earlier because
it implies a virtually impossible annual growth rate of 5.8 percent. In
addition to likely inflation of the aggregate figure, significant
intraregional anomalies emerge from a close comparison of the 1953 and
1963 figures. In portions of the southeast, for example, the two sets of
data imply that some nonurban local government areas (LGAs) had
increased at a rate of almost 13 percent per year, while other
neighboring areas experienced a minute growth rate of 0.5 percent per
year. Despite the controversy, the results of the 1963 census were
eventually accepted.
After the civil war of 1967-70, an attempt was made to hold a census
in 1973, but the results were canceled in the face of repeated
controversy. No subsequent nationwide census had been held as of 1990,
although there have been various attempts to derive population estimates
at a state or local level. Most official national population estimates
are based on projections from the 1963 census.
The great improvements in transport and accessibility of most areas,
in technological capability, and in the level of education throughout
the country, as well as the generalized acceptance of national coherence
and legitimacy, favored the success of the fall 1991 census. It was to
be conducted in about 250,000 enumeration areas by the National
Population Commission, with offices in each of the country's LGAs. To
reduce possible controversy, religious and ethnic identification would
be excluded from the census forms, and verification of state results
would be handled by supervisors from outside the state. Some analysts
believe that the effort to carry out a reliable census with perceived
legitimacy might become an unexpectedly positive exercise, reinforcing a
sense of shared nationhood and providing a model for the attempt to
overcome regional and ethnic differences.
Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Population Growth Rate
Nigeria
The absence of virtually any reliable current demographic data has
not prevented national and international bodies from generating
estimates and projections of population and population growth in
Nigeria. The World
Bank estimate of Nigeria's 1990 population was 119
million, with an estimated annual growth rate of 3.3 percent. Although
other sources differed on the exact figure, virtually all sources agreed
that the annual rate of population growth in the country had increased
from the 1950s through most of the 1980s. The government estimated a 2
percent rate of population growth for most of the country between 1953
and 1962. For the period between 1965 and 1973, the World Bank estimated
Nigeria's growth rate at 2.5 percent, increasing to 2.7 percent between
1973 and 1983. Projections about the population growth rate were
uncertain, however, in view of questions concerning the accuracy of
Nigerian census statistics.
This increase was typical of most of sub-Saharan Africa, where growth
rates increased steadily throughout the post-World War II period. The
key to decelerating the rate of population growth would be a sharp
decline in the fertility rate, which is defined as the average number of
children a woman will bear in her lifetime. Considered the second stage
of the demographic transition process, it was well under way in 1990 in
most other developing regions of the world, except for the Islamic
nations of the Middle East. Few African countries, however, had
experienced any substantial fertility decline, and the overall fertility
rate for sub-Saharan Africa was estimated as 6.5 in 1983.
Any decline in the population growth rate in Nigeria or the rest of
sub-Saharan Africa was expected to depend on the balance between the
demand for smaller families and the supply of birth control technology.
Urbanization (especially when full households, rather than just males,
are involved) was likely to be the most powerful factor leading to a
decline in fertility, because it induced the most radical shifts in the
relative costs and benefits of having large numbers of children. Other
important factors were likely to include the availability of health care
and of birth control information and equipment in both rural and urban
areas, the rate of expansion of education, and the general pace of
economic development. If the pattern of change in Africa were to follow
that in other parts of the world, urbanization, economic development,
education, improved health care, increased availability of birth
control, and declining infant mortality would eventually lead to a
marked decline in fertility rates.
Between 1970 and 1987, life expectancy in Nigeria was estimated to
have increased from forty to fifty-one years. Much of this rise resulted
from a sharp decline in mortality among infants younger than one year
and children ages one to four. Infant mortality was estimated to have
declined 25 percent from 152 per 1,000 live births in 1965 to 113 in
1983, while child mortality declined almost 50 percent from 33 to 17 per
1,000 in the same period. These levels were likely to continue to fall,
thereby exerting continuing upward pressure on the population growth
rate. As of 1990, maternity deaths exceeded 75,000 per year, excluding
deaths resulting from illegal abortions, and both were estimated to have
risen during the 1980s.
Despite the probable decline in fertility in the 1990s, given the
country's age structure, Nigeria's 1990 population was expected at least
to double before the middle of the next century. Somewhat less than half
of Nigeria's 1990 population was younger than fifteen. As a result, even
if population growth were to drop immediately to a replacement rate and
remain there, the 1990 population would double before stabilizing.
Nigeria, thus, could expect to deal with a population of more than 200
million probably within the next twenty-five years.
These projections suggested that population growth would be an issue
of central concern for Nigeria for some time to come. Merely to remain
at current per capita levels, agricultural production, industrial and
other economic output, and provision of health and other social services
would all need to double within twenty-five years. This situation was a
challenge of historic proportions for Nigeria, one faced by many other
nations of Africa.
Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Ethnicity
Nigeria
Ethnicity is one of the keys to understanding Nigeria's pluralistic
society. It distinguishes groupings of peoples who for historical
reasons have come to be seen as distinctive--by themselves and
others--on the basis of locational origins and a series of other
cultural markers. Experience in the postindependence period fostered a
widespread belief that modern ethnicity affects members' life chances.
In Nigerian colloquial usage, these collectivities were commonly called
"tribes." In the emergent Nigerian national culture, this
topic was discussed widely as "tribalism," a morally
reprehensible term whose connotations were similar to American terms,
such as "discrimination," "racism," or
"prejudice." Nigerian national policies have usually fostered
tolerance and appreciation for cultural differences, while trying at the
same time to suppress unfair treatment based on ethnic prejudice. This
long-term campaign involved widespread support in educated circles to
replace the term "tribe" or "tribal" with the more
universally applicable concept of ethnicity. Nevertheless, older beliefs
died slowly, and ethnic identities were still a vital part of national
life in 1990.
The ethnic variety was dazzling and confusing. Estimates of the
number of distinct ethnic groupings varied from 250 to as many as 400.
The most widely used marker was that of language. In most cases, people
who spoke a distinct language having a separate term for the language
and/or its speakers saw themselves, or were viewed by others, as
ethnically different. Language groupings were numbered in the 1970s at
nearly 400, depending upon disagreements over whether or not closely
related languages were mutually intelligible. Language groupings
sometimes shifted their distinctiveness rather than displaying clear
boundaries. Manga and Kanuri speakers in northeastern Nigeria spoke
easily to one another. But in the major Kanuri city of Maiduguri, 160
kilometers south of Manga-speaking areas, Manga was considered a
separate language. Kanuri and Manga who lived near each other saw
themselves as members of the same ethnic group; others farther away did
not.
Markers other than language were also used to define ethnicity.
Speakers of Bura (a Chadic language closely related to Marghi) saw
themselves traditionally as two ethnic groups, Bura and Pabir, a view
not necessarily shared by others. Bura mostly adhered to Christianity or
to a local indigenous religion, and a few were Muslims. They lived
originally in small, autonomous villages of 100 to 500 persons that and
expanded split as the population grew. The Pabir had the same local
economy as the Bura, but they were Muslim, they lived in larger
(originally walled) villages of 400 to 3,000 with more northerly
architectural styles, they resisted splitting up into subgroups, and
they recognized a central ruler (emir) in a capital town (Biu). There
was a strong movement in the 1980s among many Bura speakers to unite the
two groups based on their common language, location, and interests in
the wider society. Given long-standing conflicts that separated them as
late as 1990, however, their common ethnicity was open to question.
The official language of the country is English, which is taught in
primary schools and used for instruction in secondary schools and
universities. All officials with education to secondary school level or
beyond spoke English and used it across language barriers formed by
Nigeria's ethnic diversity. Many in the university-trained elite used
English as one of the languages in their homes and/or sent their
children to preschools that provided a head start in English-language
instruction. In addition to English, pidgin has been used as a lingua
franca in the south (and in adjoining Cameroon) for more than a century
among the nonschool population. In 1990 it was used in popular songs,
radio and television dramas, novels, and even newspaper cartoons. In the
north, southerners spoke pidgin to one another, but Hausa was the lingua
franca of the region and was spreading rapidly as communications and
travel provided a need for increased intelligibility. Counting English,
the use of which was expanding as rapidly as Hausa, many Nigerians were
at least trilingual. This language facility usually included a local
vernacular, a wider African lingua franca, and English. Given the long
history of trade and markets that stimulated contacts across local
ethnic units, multilingualism was a very old and established adaptation.
Such multilingualism enabled communication among different ethnic groups
in the century.
Regional Groupings
The broadest groupings of linked ethnic units are regional. Britain
ruled most of the area of present-day Nigeria as two protectorates from
1900 to 1914, the southern and northern protectorates each having
separate regional administrations. These portions were joined finally
under a single Nigerian colonial government in 1914. But they retained
their regionally based authorities, divided after 1914 into three
regional units. The announcement of their imminent demise by the first
postcoup military government in 1966 helped to set off violent reactions
in the north against southerners who had settled in their midst,
contributing to the outbreak of civil war.
Within each of the major northern and southern regions, there were
significant subregions that combined ethnicity, geography, and history.
What is generally referred to historically as the south included a
western Yoruba-speaking area, an eastern Igbo area (the "g" is
softly pronounced), a midsection of related but different groups, and a
set of Niger Delta peoples on the eastern and central coastal areas. The
north was widely associated with the Hausa-speaking groups that occupied
most of the region, but the Kanuri predominated in the northeast, with a
belt of peoples between the two; there were also important pastoral
nomadic groups (mostly Fulani) that lived throughout the same region. In
the middle belt were congeries of peoples in an area running east-west
in the hills, along the southern rim of the north, dividing it from the
larger region of Nigeria's south. On its northern side, the middle belt
shaded culturally into the Muslim north. In contrast, on the southern
side, its peoples were more similar to those of the south.
<>The Northern Area
<>The Southern Area
<>Ethnic Relations
Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Northern Area
Nigeria
The best known of the northern peoples, often spoken of as
coterminous with the north, are the Hausa. The term refers also to a
language spoken indigenously by savanna peoples spread across the far
north from Nigeria's western boundary eastward to Borno State and into
much of the territory of southern Niger. The core area lies in the
region in the north and northwest where about 30 percent of all Hausa
could be found. It also includes a common set of cultural practices and,
with some notable exceptions, Islamic emirates that originally comprised
a series of centralized governments and their surrounding subject towns
and villages.
These precolonial emirates were still major features of local
government in 1990. Each had a central citadel town that housed its
ruling group of nobles and royalty served as the administrative,
judicial, and military organization of these states. Traditionally, the
major towns were also trading centers; some such as Kano, Zaria, or
Katsina were urban conglomerations with populations of 25,000 to 100,000
in the nineteenth century. They had central markets, special wards for
foreign traders, complex organizations of craft specialists, and
religious leaders and organizations. They administered a hinterland of
subject settlements through a hierarchy of officials, and they
interacted with other states and ethnic groups in the region by links of
warfare, raiding, trade, tribute, and alliances.
The rural areas remained in 1990 fundamentally small to medium-sized
settlements of farmers ranging from 2,000 to 12,000 persons. Both within
and spread outward from the settlements, one-third to one-half the
population lived in hamlet-sized farm settlements of patrilocal extended
families, or gandu, an economic kin-based unit under the
authority and direction of the household head. Farm production was used
for both cash and subsistence, and as many as two-thirds of the adults
also engaged in off-farm occupations.
Throughout the north, but especially in the Hausa areas, over the
past several centuries Fulani cattle-raising nomads have migrated
westward, sometimes settling into semisedentary villages. Their
relations with local agriculturalists generally involved the symbiotic
trading of cattle for agricultural products and access to pasturage.
Conflicts arose, however, especially in times of drought or when
population built up and interethnic relations created pressures on
resources. These pressures peaked at the beginning of the nineteenth
century and were contributing factors in a Fulani-led intra-Muslim holy
war and the founding of the Sokoto Caliphate. Fulani leaders took power
over the Hausa states, intermarried with the ruling families and settled
into the ruling households of Hausaland and many adjacent societies. By
the twentieth century, the ruling elements of Hausaland were often
referred to as Hausa-Fulani. Thoroughly assimilated into urban Hausa
culture and language but intensely proud of their Fulani heritage, many
of the leading "Hausa" families in 1990 claimed such mixed
origins. In terms of local traditions, this inheritance was expressed as
a link to the conquering founders of Sokoto and a zealous commitment to
Islamic law and custom.
Centralized government in the urban citadels along the southern rim
of the desert has encouraged long-distance trade over the centuries,
both across the Sahara and into coastal West Africa after colonial rule
moved forcefully to cut the trans-Saharan trade, forcing the north to
use Nigerian ports. Ultimately, this action resulted in enclaves of
Hausa traders in all major cities of West Africa, linked socially and
economically to their home areas.
In summary, Hausa become primarily a language, linked culturally to
Islam, a background of centralized emirate governments, Fulani rulers
since the early nineteenth century, extended households and agricultural
villages, trade and markets, and strong assimilative capacities so that
Hausa cultural borders were constantly expanding. Given modern
communications, transportation, and the accelerating need for a lingua
franca, Hausa was rapidly becoming either the first or second language
of the entire northern area of the country.
The other major ethnic grouping of the north is that of the Kanuri of
Borno. They entered Nigeria from the central Sahara as Muslim conquerors
in the fifteenth century, set up a capital, and subdued and assimilated
the local Chadic speakers. By the sixteenth century, they had developed
a great empire that at times included many of the Hausa states and large
areas of the central Sahara. Attacked in the nineteenth century by the
Fulani, they resisted successfully, although the conflict resulted in a
new capital closer to Lake Chad, a new ruling dynasty, and a balance of
power between the Hausa-Fulani of the more westerly areas and the Kanuri
speakers of the central sub-Saharan rim.
Even though Kanuri language, culture, and history are distinctive,
other elements are similar to the Hausa. They include the general
ecology of the area, Islamic law and politics, the extended households,
and rural-urban distinctions. There was, however, a distinctive Kanuri
tradition of a U-shaped town plan open to the west, housing the
political leader or founder at the head of the plaza formed by the arms
of the U. The people remained intensely proud of their ancient
traditions of Islamic statehood. Among many ancient traits were included
their long chronicles of kings, wars, and hegemony in the region, and
their specific Kanuri cultural identity seen in the hairstyles of the
women, the complex cuisine, and the identification with ruling dynasties
whose names and exploits were still fresh.
Things have been changing, however. Maiduguri, the central city of
Kanuri influence in the twentieth century, was chosen as the capital of
an enlarged Northeast State during the civil war. Because this state
encompassed large sections of Hausa-Fulani areas, many of these ethnic
groups came to the capital. This sudden incorporation, together with
mass communications, interstate commerce, and intensification of travel
and regional contacts brought increased contacts with Hausa culture. By
the 1970s, and increasingly during the 1980s and into the 1990s, Kanuri
speakers found it best to get along in Hausa, certainly outside their
home region and even inside Borno State. By 1990 women were adopting
Hausa dress and hairstyles, and all schoolchildren learned to speak
Hausa. Almost all Bornoans in the larger towns could speak Hausa, and
many Hausa administrators and businesspeople were settling in Borno.
Just as Hausa had incorporated its Fulani conquerors 175 years earlier,
in 1990 it was spreading into Borno, assimilating as it went. Its
probable eventual triumph as the universal northern language was
reinforced by its utility, although the ethnically proud Kanuri would
retain much of their language and culture for many years.
Along the border, dividing northern from southern Nigeria lies an
east-west belt of peoples and languages, generally known as the middle
belt. The area runs from the Cameroon Highlands on the east to the Niger
River valley on the west and contains 50 to 100 separate language and
ethnic groups. These groups varied from the Nupe and Tiv, comprising
more than half a million each, to a few hundred speakers of a distinct
language in small highland valleys in the Jos Plateau. On the east,
languages were of the Chadic group, out of which Hausa differentiated,
and the Niger-Congo family, indicating links to eastern and central
African languages. In the west, the language groupings indicated
historical relations to Mende-speaking peoples farther west. Cultural
and historical evidence supports the conclusion that these western
groups were marginal remnants of an earlier substratum of cultures that
occupied the entire north before the emergence of large centralized
Islamic emirates.
In time three distinct kinds of organized groups emerged. The largest
and most centralized groups, such as the Nupe, under colonial
administration became smaller versions of the emirates. A few of these
peoples, such as the Tiv, were of the classic "segmentary"
variety, in which strongly organized patrilineages link large portions
of the ethnic group into named nonlocal segments based on real and
putative concepts of descent. Local organization, land tenure,
inheritance, religious beliefs, law, and allegiances are all related to
this sense of segmentary lineage relationship. During the 1960s, some
Tiv segments allied with the southern political parties, and others
linked with the northern parties. Like the larger groups, they demanded,
and by 1960 had been granted, a central "chief" and local
administration of their own.
The most common groupings in the middle belt were small localized
villages and their outlying hamlets and households; they were autonomous
in precolonial times but were absorbed into wider administrative units
under British rule. Most often they were patrilineal, with in-marrying
wives, sons, unmarried daughters, and possibly parents or parents'
siblings living together. Crops separated this residence grouping from
similar ones spread out over a small area. They cultivated local fields
and prayed to local spirits and the ghosts of departed lineage elders.
Descendants of founders were often village heads or priests of the
village shrine, whereas leading members of the other lineages formed an
eldership that governed the place and a few outlying areas, consisting
of those who were moving toward open lands as the population increased.
The missionaries and party politics influenced, but did not
obliterate, these older units. Missionaries arrived in the 1910s and
1920s and were allowed into non-Muslim areas. They set up schools using
United States or British staff to teach English and helped to create a
sense of separateness and educational disparity between the
Christianized groups and Muslim ones. From the 1920s to current times
both religions competed for adherents. Political parties representing
both southern and the northern interests have always found supporters in
this border area, making its participation in national life more
unpredictable. Attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to create a separate
region, or develop a political party representing middle belt peoples,
were quickly cauterized by northern Muslim-based political parties whose
dominance at the national level could have been weakened by losing
administrative control over the middle belt.
At the same time, possibly the greatest influence on the area was
that of Hausaization. The emergent dominance of the Hausa language,
dress patterns, residential arrangements, and other cultural features
was clear as one traveled from the far north into the middle belt area.
Local councils that only a few years previously dressed differently and
spoke in local vernaculars looked and acted as if they were parts of
more northerly areas in 1990. Although this diffusion was weaker in the
more remote areas and in Jos, the largest middle belt city, it was
progressing rapidly everywhere else, constituting a unifying factor
throughout the region.
Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Southern Area
Nigeria
In general, the southern groups of peoples have a fragmented quality.
In 1990 the two most important groupings were the Igbo and the
Yoruba--both linguistic communities rather than single ethnic units.
History, language, and membership in the modern nation-state, however,
had led to their identity as ethnic groups. In addition, although not as
clearly differentiated, two subunits had strong traditions of ethnic
separateness. These were the peoples of the Niger River delta area and
those on the border between the Igbo and Yoruba.
Yorubaland takes in most of southwestern Nigeria and the peoples
directly west of the Nigerian border in the independent country of
Benin. In Nigeria alone, Yorubaland included 20 million to 30 million
people in 1990 (i.e., about double the 1963 census figures). Each of its
subunits was originally a small to medium-sized state whose major town
provided the name of the subgrouping. Over time seven subareas--Oyo,
Kabba, Ekiti, Egba, Ife, Ondo, and Ijebu--became separate hegemonies
that differentiated culturally and competed for dominance in Yorubaland.
Early nineteenth-century travelers noted that northern Oyo people had
difficulty understanding the southern Ijebu, and these dialect
differences remained in 1990. The language is that of the Kwa group of
the Niger-Congo family, related to the Idoma and Igala of the southern
grouping of middle belt chieftaincies south of the Benue River. The
population has expanded in a generally westerly and southwesterly
direction over the past several centuries. In the twentieth century,
this migration brought Yoruba into countries to the west and northwest
as far as northern Ghana.
The Yoruba kingdoms were essentially unstable, even when defended by
Portuguese guns and later by cavalry (in Ilorin and Kabba), because the
central government had insufficient power constitutionally or militarily
to stabilize the subordinate chiefs in the outlying centers. This
fissiparous tendency has governed Yoruba contemporary history and has
weakened traditional rulers and strengthened the hands of local chiefs
and elected councils. Ilorin, like Nupe to the north, was an exception,
an extension of Fulani imperial expansion; in 1990 it was ethnically
Yoruba, yet more closely allied through its traditional rulers to the
Islamic societies to the north. It thus formed a bridge between north
and south.
The region has had the longest and most penetrating contacts with the
outside world. Returned Yoruba slaves, the early nineteenth-century
establishment of the Anglican Church, and Yoruba churchmen, such as
Bishop Samuel Adjai Crowther (in the 1820s), made its religious life,
its formal education, and its elites among the most Westernized in the
country. The first university, founded in 1948, was at Ibadan in the
heart of Yorubaland, as were the first elite secondary schools; the
first research institutes for agriculture, economics, African studies,
and foreign affairs; the first publishing houses; and the first radio
and television stations. Wole Soyinka, Africa's first Nobel prizewinner
in literature, claims Yoruba ethnicity. The entry port of Lagos,
predominantly Yoruba, is the largest and economically dominant city in
the country (and its first capital).
In relation to others, the Yoruba had a strong sense of ethnic
identity and of region, history, and leadership among Nigeria's peoples.
In relation to each other, the seven subgroups used inherited prejudices
of character and behavior that could exacerbate animosities, should
other factors such as access to education or prominent positions create
conflict among the subdivisions. At the same time, the Yorubas' longer
contact with Westernizing influences had created some dedicated
nationalists who saw their Yoruba identity as a contributing factor in
their loyalty to the wider concept of a Nigerian nation-state.
The other major group of the south was the Igbo. They were found
primarily in the southeast and spoke a Kwa language of the Niger-Congo
family. This language tied them, historically, to regions east and south
of their contemporary locations. In 1990 it was hard to find any major
town in Nigeria without an Igbo minority, often in an ethnic enclave. As
communities they had traditionally been segmented into more than 200
named groupings, each originally a locally autonomous polity. These
groupings varied from a single village to as many as two or three dozen
nucleated settlements that over time expanded outward from an original
core town. Most of these central villages ranged from 1,000 to 3,000
persons in the nineteenth century. In 1990 they were as much as five to
ten times larger, making severe land shortages and overused farmland a
widespread problem. Precolonial trade up the Niger River from the coast
stimulated the early development of a few larger towns, such as Onitsha,
that in 1990 contained a population of several hundred thousand. Igbo
culture, however, unlike the emirates and the Yoruba city-states, did
not count urban living among the traditional ways of life.
For the Igbo as an ethnic group, personal advancement and
participation in local affairs were matters of individual initiative and
skill. Villages were run by a council of the most respected elders of
the locality. Colonial administration created local headmen, or
"warrant chiefs," who were never fully accepted and were
finally replaced by locally elected councils.
This development does not mean that Igbo culture is exclusively
dedicated to egalitarianism. Rank and wealth differences have been part
of the society from early times and were highly prized. Success,
eldership, wealth, a good modern education political power, and
influence were all recognized as ways by which people, especially adult
males, could distinguish themselves. As with all Nigerian societies,
Igbo life was complex, and the organization of local and regional
society was stratified into more and less affluent and successful
groups, families, individuals, and even neighborhoods. Graduates of
secondary schools formed "old boy associations," some of which
had as members wealthy men linked to one another as local boosters and
mutual supporters. Comparatively speaking, Igbo were most unlike other
Nigerians in their strong positive evaluation of open competition for
success. Children were encouraged to succeed; if they did so skillfully,
rewards of high status awaited them. It was no accident that the first
American-style land-grant university, linked for guidance during its
founding to Michigan State University, was at Nsukka in Igboland,
whereas the first universities in Yorubaland and in the north looked to
Britain and its elitist traditions of higher education for their models
of university life.
Psychological tests of "achievement motivation" that
measure American-style individual competitiveness against standards of
excellence given to comparable Nigerian groups resulted in Igbo people
placing highest, followed by Yoruba, and then Hausa. This stress on
individual achievement made Igbo people seem "pushy" to fellow
Nigerians, whose own ethnic traditions fostered individual contributions
to collective achievements within close-knit kin and patron-client
groups that were more hierarchically arranged. In these latter groups,
achievements were obtained through loyalty, disciplined membership in a
large organization, and social skills that employed such memberships for
personal advancement.
The impressive openness of Igbo culture is what first strikes the
outsider, but closer inspection produces several caveats. Besides
differences of wealth and rank achieved in one's lifetime or inherited,
there was a much older tendency for people who traced their descent from
the original settler-founders of a village to have higher status as
"owners of the land." Generally, they provided the men who
acted as priests of the local shrines, and often they provided more
local leaders than descendants of later arrivals. At the other end of
the scale were known descendants of people, especially women, who were
originally slaves. They were akin to Indian "untouchables,"
low in status and avoided as marriage partners.
As with all Nigerian ethnic groups, there were internal divisions.
Generally, these had to do with town area of origin. More northerly
areas had a feeling of separateness, as did larger towns along the Niger
River. Beyond Igboland, people from the region were treated as a single
unit, lived in separate enclaves and even faced restrictions against
ownership of local property in some northern towns. Once they suffered
and fought together in the civil war of Biafran secession in the 1960s,
these people developed a much stronger sense of Igbo identity that has
since been expressed politically. Nevertheless, localized distinctions
remained and in 1990 were significant internally.
The peoples of the Atlantic Coast and the Niger River delta are
linguistically and culturally related to the Igbo. But the ecological
demands of coastal life, and the separate history of contact with
coastal trade and its effects produced ethnic differences that were
strong enough to have made these people resist the Biafra secession
movement when it was promulgated by Igbo leadership. Ijaw, Ibibio,
Anang, and Efik lived partly from agriculture and partly from fishing
and shrimping in the coastal waters. Religion, social organization,
village life, local leadership, and gender relations were deeply
affected by this ecology-based differentiation. Although there was a
natural and historical pull of migration to Lagos, especially by young
Ijaw men who went to the city to find work and send home remittances,
the area boasted its own coastal town of Port Harcourt in Efik country
that was, in a sense, the headquarters of this subgrouping.
To a lesser extent, the peoples of the western bank of the Niger
River--and the western delta--especially the Bini speakers and
Urhobo--were culturally close to those around them but had a sufficient
sense of linguistic and historical separateness to see themselves as
unique. These differences were partly buttressed by the past glory of
the kingdom of Benin, of which a much diminished remnant survived in
1990, and had been used to provide the south first with an extra region,
then with extra states when the regional level of government was
abandoned in 1967.
Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Ethnic Relations
Nigeria
Relations between ethnic groups remained a major problem for such a
large and pluralistic society in 1990. In precolonial times, interethnic
relations were often mistrustful, or discriminatory, and sometimes
violent. At the same time, there were relationships, such as trade, that
required peaceful communications. The most widespread communication was
in the north between pastoral and agricultural peoples who traded cattle
for farm products, and pasturage rights for manuring. Farmers might also
buy a few cattle and have them cared for by pastoralists. Emirate rulers
who normally raided and pillaged among non-Muslim village groups often
established peaceful "trust" relations with residents of one
or two villages; those residents then acted as hosts and guides for the
raiders, in exchange for immunity for themselves. More subtle and
peaceful exchanges involved smaller ethnic groups in the middle belt,
each of which specialized in one or more commodities. In towns and along
trade routes, occupations such as smithing, producing cotton, selling
cattle, weaving, house building, and beer making were often confined to,
or correlated with, ethnically defined units. Thus, ecological and
economic specializations promoted peaceful interethnic relations.
Conversely, promulgating conflict, mistrust, and stereotypes in ethnic
relations were droughts; competition for control over trade routes or
allies; resistance to, or the creation and maintenance of, exploitative
relations; and other factors.
The civil war taught Nigerians that ethnic conflicts were among the
most destructive forces in the life of the nation. By 1990 ethnic
conflict was suppressed and carefully controlled so that any outbreak or
seriously publicized discrimination on ethnic grounds was considered a
matter of national security. In the few outbreaks that occurred since
the war, the federal government acted swiftly to gain control and stop
the conflict. Nevertheless, the way in which ethnic relations might
threaten the security of individuals and groups was among the most
serious issues in national life, especially for the millions of
Nigerians who had to live and work in interethnic contexts.
Even in the more cosmopolitan cities, more than 90 percent of
marriages were within rather than between ethnic units, or at least
within identical regions and language groups. Marriages between
subgroups of Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, or Kanuri occurred without
stigma and had done so for many decades. But in the south, Yoruba-Igbo
unions were uncommon, and north-south marriages were even rarer,
especially between Hausa-Fulani or Kanuri and any person from southern
Nigeria. Northern Muslim intermarriage was not uncommon, nor was
intermarriage among peoples of the middle belt. But unions between
middle belters and Muslims from emirates farther north remained rare.
Migrants who could not find a spouse from their own ethnic group within
the local enclave obtained a mate from the home community. Social
pressure for ethnic endogamy was intense and persisted even among elites
in business, universities, the military, religion, and politics. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, however, it appeared that marriages within
the Christian and Muslim communities were increasingly transethnic.
The conjunction of location, language, religion, and common and
differentiating customs created a strong sense of shared fate among
coethnics and formed a constant basis for organizing ethnically related
groupings into political constituencies. Thus, when political parties
emerged, they represented the northern Muslim peoples, the Yoruba, and
the Igbo; middle belters and others in between were courted from several
directions. Given the shortage of government jobs and the expanding
numbers of qualified applicants coming out of the education system,
ethnic rivalry for government posts exacerbated ethnic competition. It
was also a driving force in the establishment of more states, with more
state capitals and more locally controlled jobs. Such jobs were likely
to be less competitive ethnically because the boundaries of local
governments tended to correlate with ethnic units. Under such
conditions, would-be leaders stimulated the fears of their ethnic
constituents. Ethnic organizations and university students wrote letters
to newspapers pressuring for greater representation, more development
resources, and separate states or districts for their particular group.
Countering this practice, after the civil war the new constitution of
1979 provided that no political party could be legalized unless it
obtained support in all parts of the country. This attempt to crosscut
ethnicity with rules of political party competition has gone far toward
alleviating the problem.
People first looked for relatives when migrating into one of the
country's many large cities, as an increasing number of Nigerians were
doing. If they found none, they looked for coethnics from their own
rural area who shared a network of friends, neighbors, and relations.
They spoke the same language, went to the same church or mosque and
helped one another to find a job and housing and to join ethnic
associations. In the textile mills of Kaduna in the north, studies of
"class formation" among workers indicated that ethnic
groupings were far stronger and used more frequently by workers than
were trade unions, unless working conditions became extremely bad. It
was only then that union membership, interaction, strength, and unity
rose. Otherwise, ethnicity was the primary dimension for worker
relations and mutual aid. Studies elsewhere in the country produced
similar results. The trade union movement in Nigeria was well
established and strong, especially at times of severe economic downturn,
such as the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the structural adjustment
program (SAP) severely decreased real wages. Rivalry within unions,
however, and worker associations for mutual aid, as well as normal
social life at work and afterward, were strongly influenced by formal
and informal ethnic affiliations.
Ethnic stereotypes remained strong. Each of the main groups had
disparaging stories and sayings about the others that were discussed
openly when a foreigner was alone with members of a single ethnic group.
Such prejudices died slowly, especially when ethnic groups lived in
enclaves, knew little of each other's customs, and often attended
different schools. It was official policy, however, to protect the
rights of minorities, and in several instances the will to do so was
ably demonstrated. Thus, Igbo property abandoned in the north at the
time of the civil war was maintained by local governments and later
returned. Although there were problems, this property restitution, the
attempt to ensure that Igbo were accepted at all major universities, and
the placement of Igbo in civil service posts helped create a sense of
nationhood and trust in the rule of law and in the good intentions of
the federal government.
Nigeria.
Nigeria
Nigeria - CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
Nigeria
Nigerian history has provided an extraordinary set of pressures and
events as a context for modern nation building. Under such
circumstances--the imposition of colonial rule, independence,
interethnic and interregional competition or even violence, military
coups, a civil war, an oil boom that had government and individuals
spending recklessly and often with corrupt intentions, droughts, and a
debt crisis that led to a drastic recession and lowered standards of
living--people tended to cleave to what they knew. That is to say, they
adhered to regional loyalties, ethnicity, kin, and to patron-client
relations that protected them in an unstable and insecure environment.
Meanwhile, other factors and processes stimulated by education, jobs,
politics, and urban and industrial development created crosscutting ties
that linked people in new, more broadly national ways.
By 1990 both sets of distinctions operated at once and gave no sign
of weakening. For example, from time to time labor unions were able to
call widespread, even general, strikes. At other times, unorganized
workers or farmers rioted over long-held or sudden grievances.
Nevertheless, attempts to create national movements or political parties
out of such momentary flare-ups failed. Instead, once the outburst was
over, older linkages reasserted themselves. In effect, the structure of
society in 1990 was the result of these two processes--historical,
locational, and ethnic on the one hand and socioeconomic on the other.
In Nigeria the latter contact referred primarily to occupation,
rural-urban residence, and formal education. Together these factors
accounted for similarities and differences that were common across
ethnic and regional groupings.
<>Social Structure
<>Women
Nigeria
Nigeria - Social Structure
Nigeria
About 70 percent of all Nigerians were still living in farming
villages in 1990, although the rural dwellers formed a shrinking
proportion of the later force. It was among these people that ways of
life remained deeply consistent with the past. People lived in small,
modest households whose members farmed, sold some cash crops, and
performed various kinds of nonfarm work for cash income. With the steady
decline of export crop prices since the 1960s and the price rise in
locally grown foods after the early 1970s, farmers shifted from export
crops to local foods for their own subsistence and for sale to city
consumers through middlemen. Most farmers used traditional hand tools in
smallholdings outside the rural village. Houses in 1990 might have tin
roofs instead of grass, and the village water supply might be a
standpipe, or a hand pump. New practices included the widespread
acceptance of fertilizers; a few new crops, especially corn; the use of
rented tractors; the increased dependence on paid labor; and the
development of larger commercial farms. Absentee city-based farmers also
had started to buy up agricultural land.
Paved roads, better marketing procedures, and increased extension
services in 1990 were producing a change in the rural areas that was
missing during the first decades of independence. Surveys indicated that
improved transportation (paved or dirt roads and cheap, private minibus
services) was felt to be the most important change, bringing almost all
rural areas into touch with nearby cities and larger market towns.
Still, for most of the 70 to 80 percent of the people who remained
involved in agriculture, life was hard, and income levels averaged among
the lowest in the country.
Western-style education was a necessary, albeit not always
sufficient, means to gain better income and rank. Under colonial rule,
literacy and educational qualifications were required for access to more
powerful, better paying jobs. Education in 1990 was one of the most
widely accepted criteria for job recruitment. Older education systems,
especially in the Islamic north, had always produced clerics and judges,
and some training for the populace. Long years of Quranic learning
continued to give high status in religious occupations; this remained
the case in religious work, but to qualify for secular jobs in the upper
salary scale required at least secondary and, increasingly,
postsecondary schooling. Most rural families tried to get at least one
child through six years of elementary school and into secondary school,
if possible. In the cities, if a family had any stable income, all of
the children attended school, tried for secondary level and even went on
to university or other postsecondary education if the youngsters could
successfully compete for places. For the wealthy, there were private
preschools in all major cities that provided a head start in academic
work, and private boarding schools that generally followed the British
model.
By the 1980s, the education system was turning out an increasing
surplus of graduates. Dozens of university graduates lined up for a
single opening, and many more for less specialized positions. Under such
conditions, nepotism, ethnic favoritism, and bribery flourished in
employment decisions.
Education requirements for work were known and widely discussed. Job
descriptions for government posts, commercial companies, and even
factory work required set levels of schooling for applicants. Large
factories and international corporations had training programs for
future managers. In the 1980s, however, the vast majority of workers
still learned their skills from the family or on the job. Outside the
home, systems of apprenticeship produced cheap labor for the teacher and
gave the trainee skills, along with a potential future network of
customers or employers. Thus, truck drivers took on trainees, who worked
as apprentice-assistants and general laborers for several years before
they took a license test and hired out as drivers themselves. During
that time, they learned about roads, maps, truck parks, markets, and
vehicle servicing; they became acquainted with customers and vehicle
owners, who in turn learned about their trustworthiness and efficiency.
In contemporary Nigeria as elsewhere, occupation differentiated
people, incomes, and life-styles. In rural areas, smallholder farmers
were the rule, but farmers often had a nonfarm occupation to produce
income during the nongrowing season. The size of the farm was a function
of family size, farming skills, inherited wealth, and nonfarm income to
provide money for laborers. Some nonfarm work, such as trade, was
prestigious; some, such as butchering, was less so. The most prestigious
work in rural areas was that of public administration, either as local
traditional headmen and chiefs or as rural representatives of government
departments--such as teachers, district officers, veterinarians,
extension workers, public works foremen, postal officials, and the like.
Such offices required formal educational qualifications. The offices
offered steady salaries; the possibility of government housing, or
housing and vehicle allowances. Unlike farming, such work also meant
protection against the vagaries of climate and economic conditions. This
situation lasted well into the late 1980s until inflation, recession,
and government cutbacks destroyed these advantages.
In 1990 a growing number of medium-sized towns (with more than 10,000
people) were spreading out across the country. They contained branch
banks; branches of larger urban-based trading companies; smaller stores;
and trade, building, and transport enterprises whose owner-managers
formed a rural middle class of semiurbanized households. Often such
individuals owned and operated nearby commercial farms as part of their
diversified business interests. Their incomes were higher than those of
usual farm families; their education level was quite low, ranging up to
completion of primary school; and they were often active as local
political party representatives with links to more important men and
organizations in nearby cities.
In a number of special situations, government had invested in a rural
area, creating peri-urban conditions surrounding a large town.
Government involvement might result in a state university or a large
irrigation project, for example, or on a smaller scale, where a
secondary school had been sited with appropriate housing,
electrification, and transportation links to a nearby urban center. In
some instances, such as the Tiga Dam in Kano State or the massive
irrigation project on Lake Chad, entire communities had sprung up to
provide housing for the technical staff; new schools and markets also
were built to meet the increased consumer needs of the farmers whose
incomes rose as the project went into production.
Because of high inflation and sluggish salary increases throughout
the 1980s and into 1990, rural officials were obliged to moonlight,
usually by farming, to maintain real wage levels. Extension workers had
been observed spending their days in a nearby city on a second job and
carrying out visits to farmers in the evenings and on weekends. The
wives of officials set up poultry sheds behind their houses and raised
chickens and eggs for local and nearby city markets. By contrast,
traditional chiefs, who had less formal education and often received
much lower salaries than government representatives, were able to sell
services, especially access to land purchases; to adjudicate disputes;
and to keep a small portion of taxes. This shadowy income allowed them
to maintain or even increase consumption levels more easily and set the
pattern for the sale of public services that was quickly picked up by
other officials living in rural areas. In the late 1980s, these
well-established "corrupt" practices were viewed widely as
essential for rural officials because real incomes had fallen so
drastically.
In the cities, occupations were highly differentiated. Unskilled
traditional work was more common in the northern cities but not yet
extinct in southern areas. Such workers included water carriers,
servants, women and young girls selling cooked foods on the streets, and
hawkers of all kinds linked to patrons who supplied them and took part
of the proceeds. The move to cities involved vast numbers of unemployed,
who sought any type of work. In the modern sector, the unskilled were
taken on by manufacturing plants, wholesale or retail establishments,
hotels, and government departments. Such people lived in crowded rented
rooms, often several families in a room with a curtain down the middle.
They cooked in a common courtyard and used a latrine that might serve a
number of families; the compound might or might not have a source of
water. They barely managed even when their wives and children also
sought work daily.
Lower-level skilled workers in the traditional sector were employed
in house building, and a variety of crafts from pottery to iron and
brass smithing, leather work, tanning, and butchery. They generally had
better incomes, lived in several rooms or even a small house or
compound, practiced their craft in the household itself, and sent
children to school. Their counterparts in the modern sector were clerks,
store attendants, mechanics, carpenters, and factory workers who had
some schooling and had managed to get into the lower levels of the wage
system. The two groups often lived in the same neighborhoods, although
the education of those in the modern sector set them somewhat apart.
Their incomes, however, provided them with similar amenities: a
standpipe for household water; electricity; a latrine or even a flush
toilet; a bicycle or motor scooter, or a motorcycle for the slightly
better off; a radio; and, for a few, a small black and white television
set, and a bank account. Such households often had an extra kin member
or two from the country who had come to seek their fortunes.
The middle-level income groups in traditional jobs consisted of
higher-level skilled workers and entrepreneurs. They included dye pit
owners with a small work force, middlemen who with financing from larger
traders bought food and export crops in rural areas for sale and storage
in the cities, and wholesalers and retailers of traditional goods and
services, as well as transporters of such items as kola nuts, craft
goods, specialty crops, and cattle for sale in southern markets. This
group was larger in the north than the south because of the larger
traditional economic sector in the region. Modern-sector skilled jobs
ranged from machine operators and skilled craftsmen to accountants;
teachers; lower-level managers of service stations; small to
medium-sized storekeepers, who owned or rented and operated a canteen;
owners of a truck or two, or of a small minibus used as transport for
people and goods; and the middle ranks of the vast public services that,
until the shrinkage of the 1980s, made up more than half of the salaried
jobs in Nigeria.
This group lived in small to medium-sized houses with Western-style
furniture, a refrigerator, and electronic receivers; the better-off had
color television sets. Housing was sometimes owned by the worker but
more often rented. Younger members had motorcycles; more mature ones,
cars; and entrepreneurs, a pickup truck. Modern-sector middle-level
people generally had some secondary education, which allowed them to
spend time filling out applications and to dream of someday attending a
university or other postsecondary institution to qualify for higher paid
jobs.
At the middle-income level, a number of factors began to separate
traditional and modern households. Traditional work did not demand
literacy in English, but most jobs at the modern middle level did. The
amount of Western-style education and acculturation to more
international tastes affected the life- styles of modern-sector workers,
although ethnicity, kin, and possible patrons in the more traditional
sector meant that connections were not severed. At the same time, both
groups had connections upward and downward in both the city and rural
areas. For members of the traditional middle group, this meant the
possibility of someday becoming wealthier and diversifying their
economic activities; for members of the modern group, it most often
meant more education, better jobs, and, ideally, entry into the elite
level of society in either the public or the private sector. By the late
1980s, a number of middle-income workers and small businessmen in both
north and south were putting greater effort into farming in natal or
nearby villages, as food prices escalated in the cities and as
government policies favored the private acquisition of land and provided
farm credits to would-be commercial farmers.
Above the middle rank were the elites. Traditional chiefs in the
south had been losing power to business and government leaders for
decades. In 1990 they still received respect and officiated at
ceremonial occasions, but unless they had taken positions in business or
government, their status declined. This situation was less true in the
north, where emirs and other titled officials continued to have
considerable power and authority. Even there, however, the modern sector
produced city and township governments that were eroding the power of
local officials. State governments were becoming more important as
centralized federal functions carried out by parastatals were being sold
off to the private business sector during the 1980s. In the rural areas
of the north, however, traditional district and village chiefs remained
influential. In the modern sector, public service jobs and incoming top
management in corporations required university degrees. Wealthy business
leaders might lack formal education, although more and more business
leaders, especially in the south, were university graduates. Entry-level
salaries for elite jobs were fifteen to twenty times those of the bottom
salary scale (compared with two to three times in more developed
economies). Added to the basic salary was hidden income in the form of
car loans and allowances, often with housing subsidized to such an
extent that only 7 percent of salary was charged for rents, and
maintenance was free. Housing for holders of elite jobs was generally of
the standard of the middle class in a developed country, ranging up to
huge mansions in exclusive housing estates for the very rich.
In the late 1980s, inflation and wage controls had drastically eroded
the incomes of the salaried elites and, in most cases, they had to
moonlight in the private sector through farming, trade, consultancy, or
business. It was not unusual to find a professor's campus garage used as
a warehouse for his trucks and the equipment in his construction
business, and behind the house pens, where his wife conducted a poultry
business. Others sought to emigrate, especially highly skilled people,
such as doctors, lawyers, and professors, who realized they could do
much better abroad. The sudden decline in the income of the elites
resulted from Nigeria's belt-tightening policies. Business people,
especially those in trade, were less affected by inflation, but the
recessionary effects of the SAP had cut into their incomes as well, by
lowering demand or by controlling imports and exports more tightly. By
the late 1980s, however, many of the elite and even the middle classes
were being obliged to adjust to a lower standard of living.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Women
Nigeria
As with other aspects of society, women's roles were primarily
governed by regional and ethnic differences. In the north, Islamic
practices were still common. This process meant, generally, less formal
education; early teenage marriages, especially in rural areas; and
confinement to the household, which was often polygynous, except for
visits to kin, ceremonies, and the workplace, if employment were
available and permitted by a girl's family or husband. For the most
part, Hausa women did not work in the fields, whereas Kanuri women did;
both helped with harvesting and were responsible for all household food
processing. Urban women sold cooked foods, usually by sending young
girls out onto the streets or operating small stands. Research indicated
that this practice was one of the main reasons city women gave for
opposing schooling for their daughters. Even in elite houses with
educated wives, women's presence at social gatherings was either
nonexistent or very restricted. In the modern sector, a few women were
appearing at all levels in offices, banks, social services, nursing,
radio, television, and the professions (teaching, engineering,
environmental design, law, pharmacy, medicine, and even agriculture and
veterinary medicine). This trend resulted from women's secondary
schools, teachers' colleges, and in the 1980s women holding
approximately one-fifth of university places--double the proportion of
the 1970s. Research in the 1980s indicated that, for the Muslim north,
education beyond primary school was restricted to the daughters of the
business and professional elites, and in almost all cases, courses and
professions were chosen by the family, not the woman themselves.
In the south, women traditionally had economically important
positions in interregional trade and the markets, worked on farms as
major labor sources, and had influential positions in traditional
systems of local organization. The south, like the north, however, had
been polygynous; in 1990 it still was for many households, including
those professing Christianity. Women in the south, especially among the
Yoruba peoples, had received Western-style education since the
nineteenth century, so they occupied positions in the professions and to
some extent in politics. In addition, women headed households, something
not seriously considered in Nigeria's development plans. Such households
were more numerous in the south, but they were on the rise everywhere.
Generally, Nigerian development planning referred to "adult
males," "households," or "families". Women were
included in such units but not as a separate category. Up until the
1980s, the term "farmer" was assumed to be exclusively male,
even though in some areas of the south women did most of the farm work.
In Nigerian terms, a woman was almost always defined as someone's
daughter, wife, mother, or widow. Single women were suspect, although
they constituted a large category, especially in the cities, because of
the high divorce rate. Traditionally, and to some extent this remained
true in popular culture, single adult women were seen as available
sexual partners should they try for some independence and as easy
victims for economic exploitation. In Kaduna State, for example,
investigations into illegal land expropriations noted that women's farms
were confiscated almost unthinkingly by local chiefs wishing to sell to
urban-based speculators and would-be commercial farmers.
A national feminist movement was inaugurated in 1982, and a national
conference held at Ahmadu Bello University. The papers presented there
indicated a growing awareness by Nigeria's university-educated women
that the place of women in society required a concerted effort and a
place on the national agenda; the public perception, however, remained
far behind. For example, a feminist meeting in Ibadan came out against
polygyny and then was soundly criticized by market women, who said they
supported the practice because it allowed them to pursue their trading
activities and have the household looked after at the same time.
Research in the north, however, indicated that many women opposed the
practice, and tried to keep bearing children to stave off a second
wife's entry into the household. Although women's status would
undoubtedly rise, for the foreseeable future Nigerian women lacked the
opportunities of men.
Nigeria
Nigeria - RELIGION
Nigeria
Several religions coexisted in Nigeria, helping to accentuate
regional and ethnic distinctions. All religions represented in Nigeria
were practiced in every major city in 1990. But Islam dominated in the
north, Protestantism and local syncretic Christianity were most in
evidence in Yoruba areas, and Catholicism predominated in the Igbo and
closely related areas. The 1963 census indicated that 47 percent of
Nigerians were Muslim, 35 percent Christian, and 18 percent members of
local indigenous congregations. If accurate, this indicated a sharp
increase in the number of Christians (up 13 percent); a slight decline
among those professing indigenous beliefs, compared with 20 percent in
1953; and only a modest (4 percent) rise of Muslims. This surge was
partly a result of the recognized value of education provided by the
missions, especially in the previously non-Christian middle belt. It
also resulted from 1963 census irregularities that artificially
increased the proportion of southern Christians to northern Muslims.
Since then two more forces have been operating. There has been the
growth of the Aladura Church, an Africanized Christian sect that was
especially strong in the Yoruba areas, and of evangelical churches in
general, spilling over into adjacent and southern areas of the middle
belt. At the same time, Islam was spreading southward into the northern
reaches of the middle belt, especially among the upwardly mobile, who
saw it as a necessary attribute for full acceptance in northern business
and political circles. In general, however, the country should be seen
as having a predominantly Muslim north and a non-Muslim, primarily
Christian south, with each as a minority faith in the other's region;
the middle belt was more heterogeneous.
<>Indigenous Beliefs
<>Islam
<>Christianity
Nigeria
Nigeria - Indigenous Beliefs
Nigeria
Alongside most Nigerian religious adherence were systems of belief
with ancient roots in the area. These beliefs combined family ghosts
with relations to the primordial spirits of a particular site. In effect
the rights of a group defined by common genealogical descent were linked
to a particular place and the settlements within it. The primary
function of such beliefs was to provide supernatural sanctions and
legitimacy to the relationship between, and the regulations governing,
claims on resources, especially agricultural land and house sites.
Access rights to resources, political offices, economic activities, or
social relations were defined and legitimized by these same religious
beliefs.
The theology expressing and protecting these relationships centered,
first, on the souls of the recently dead, ghosts who continued their
interest in the living as they had when they were alive. That is to say,
authoritative elders demanded conformity to rules governing access to,
and inheritance of, rights to resources. Indigenous theology also
comprised all of the duties of the living to one another and to their
customs, including their obligations to the dead ancestors whose spirits
demanded adherence to the moral rules governing all human actions. The
second pantheon were the supernatural residents of the land. These
spirits of place (trees, rock outcroppings, a river, snakes, or other
animals and objects) were discovered and placated by the original
founders, who had migrated to the new site from a previous one. Spirits
of the land might vary with each place or be so closely identified with
a group's welfare that they were carried to a new place as part of the
continuity of a group to its former home. In the new place, these
spiritual migrants joined the local spirit population. Such deities
developed from an original covenant created by the founders of a
settlement between themselves and the local spirits. This covenant
legitimized their arrival. In return for regular rites and prayers to
these spirits, the founders could claim perpetual access to local
resources. In doing so, they became the lineage in charge of the
hereditary local priesthood and village headship and were recognized as
"owners of the place" by later human arrivals. Both sets of
spirits, those of family and those of place, demanded loyalty to
communal virtues and to the authority of the elders in defending ancient
beliefs and practices.
In addition to ensuring access to, and the continual fertility of,
both land and people, the spiritual entities protected their adherents
from misfortune, adjudicated disputes through trials by ordeal or
through messages divined by special seers, and punished personal or
communal immorality through personal and group failures, sickness,
drought, fires, and other catastrophes. Special practitioners were in
control of supernatural forces to heal illnesses, counter malevolent
intentions by others and/or the ghostly entities, and diagnose
witchcraft--the effects of malefactors whose personal spirits might
cause harm, sometimes without the actual knowledge of the evildoer.
Protection against misfortune was strengthened by charms, amulets, and
medicinal products sold by the practitioners. In everyday life,
misfortune, sickness, political rivalries, inheritance disputes, and
even marital choices or the clearing of a new field could be
incorporated and explained within this religious framework. Given these
beliefs, causal relations were stipulated and explained through the
actions of supernatural entities, whose relations to the living involved
interventions that enforced morality and traditional values.
As with many peoples around the world, especially in Africa, the
adult men were organized into secret societies that imitated the
activity of the spirits in maintaining the moral order. In the 1980s in
Igboland and in similar societies in neighboring areas, social control
and conformity to moral order was still enforced by secret societies. In
the 1970s, this pattern was observed spreading into small, originally
autonomous communities of the southern middle belt at the northern rim
of Igboland. Generally, adult men received some training and were then
initiated into membership. In 1990 memberships were more selective, and
in some places such organizations had died out. Specifically, these
societies enforced community morality through rituals and masked dances.
During these performances, secret society members imitated the spirits.
They preached and expressed displeasure with and gave warnings about
individual and communal morality, attributing accusations and threats to
spirits of place and family who were displeased with their human
charges.
Sorcery and even witchcraft beliefs persisted and were discussed as
forms of medicine, or as coming from "bad people" whose
spirits or souls were diagnosed as the cause of misfortune. There also
were special ways in which the outcomes of stressful future activity,
long trips, lingering illnesses, family and other problems could be
examined. Soothsayers provided both therapy and divinatory foreknowledge
in stressful situations.
In the city-states of Yorubaland and its neighbors, a more complex
religion evolved that expressed the subjugation of village life within
larger polities. These city-states produced a theology that linked local
beliefs to a central citadel government and its sovereignty over a
hinterland of villages through the monarch. The king (oba) and
his ancestors were responsible for the welfare of the entire state, in
return for confirmation of the legitimacy of the oba's rule
over his subjects. In Oyo, for example, there were a number of national
cults, each with its own priests who performed rituals under the
authority of the king (alafin) in the public interest. Shango,
god of thunder, symbolized the power of the king and of central
government; Ogboni represented the fertility of the land and the
monarch's role in ensuring the well-being of the kingdom.
In 1990 these indigenous beliefs were more or less openly practiced
and adhered to among many Christians and Muslims in various parts of the
country. Thus, in a number of the northern Muslim emirates, the emir led
prayers for the welfare of the state at the graves of royal ancestors.
In many Muslim and Christian households and villages, a number of the
older religious practices and beliefs also survived. On the other hand,
research indicated that many, especially younger people, believed the
older traditions to be apostasy so that it was common, particularly in
rural areas, to see mixtures of local beliefs with either Christianity
or Islam. And in some instances, although the overall trend was away
from indigenous religions and toward monotheism, older people suffered
such mental and physical anguish over denouncing inherited beliefs that
they abandoned the newer one.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Islam
Nigeria
Islam is a traditional religion in West Africa. It came to northern
Nigeria as early as the eleventh century and was well established in the
state capitals of the region by the sixteenth century, spreading into
the countryside and toward the middle belt uplands. There, Islam's
advance was stopped by the resistance of local peoples to incorporation
into the emirate states. The Fulani-led jihad in the nineteenth century
pushed Islam into Nupe and across the Niger River into northern Yoruba-
speaking areas. The colonial conquest established a rule that active
Christian proselytizing could not occur in the northern Muslim region,
although in 1990 the two religions continued to compete for converts in
the middle belt, where ethnic groups and even families had adherents of
each persuasion.
The origins of Islam date to Muhammad (the Prophet), a prosperous
merchant of the town of Mecca in Arabia. He began in A.D. 610 to preach
the first of a series of revelations granted him by God (Allah) through
the agency of the archangel Gabriel. The divine messages, received
during solitary visits into the desert, continued during the remainder
of his life.
Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow Meccans;
his vigorous and continuing censure ultimately earned him their bitter
enmity. In 622 he and a group of followers accepted an invitation to
settle in Yathrib, which became known as Medina (the city) through its
association with him. The hijra, (known in the West as the hegira), or
journey to Medina, marked the beginning of the Islamic calendar in the
year 622. In Medina Muhammad continued his preaching, ultimately
defeated his detractors in battle, and had consolidated the temporal as
well as spiritual leadership of most Arabs before his death in 632.
After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled his words that were
regarded as coming directly from God in a document known as the Quran,
the holy scripture of Islam. Other sayings and teachings of the Prophet,
as well as the precedents of his personal behavior as recalled by those
who had known him, became the hadith ("sayings"). From these
sources, the faithful have constructed the Prophet's customary practice,
or sunna, which they endeavor to emulate. Together, these documents form
a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the
faithful in most Muslim countries.
The shahada (profession of faith, or testimony) states
succinctly the central belief, "There is no God but Allah, and
Muhammad is his Prophet." The faithful repeat this simple
profession on ritual occasions, and its recital designates the speaker
as a Muslim. The term Islam means submission to God, and the
one who submits is a Muslim.
The God preached by Muhammad was previously known to his countrymen,
for Allah is the general Arabic term for the supreme being
rather than the name of a particular deity. Rather than introducing a
new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the pantheon of gods and
spirits worshipped before his prophethood and declared the omnipotence
of God, the unique creator. Muhammad is the "Seal of the
Prophets," the last of the prophetic line. His revelations are said
to complete for all time the series of revelations that had been given
earlier to Jews and Christians. God is believed to have remained one and
the same throughout time, but humans are seen as having misunderstood or
strayed from God's true teachings until set aright by Muhammad. Prophets
and sages of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus,
are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however,
reveres as sacred only the message. It accepts the concepts of guardian
angels, the Day of Judgment, resurrection, and the eternal life of the
soul.
The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of the
faith. These are shahada, salat (daily prayer), zakat
(almsgiving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage). The
believer prays facing Mecca at five specified times during the day.
Whenever possible, men observe their prayers in congregation at a mosque
under direction of an imam, or prayer leader, and on Fridays are obliged
to do so. Women are permitted to attend public worship at the mosque,
where they are segregated from men, but their attendance tends to be
discouraged, and more frequently they pray in the seclusion of their
homes.
In the early days of Islam, a tax for charitable purposes was imposed
on personal property in proportion to the owner's wealth. The collection
of this tax and its distribution to the needy were originally functions
of the state. But with the breakdown of Muslim religiopolitical
authority, alms became an individual responsibility.
The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period of
obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt of God's
revelation. Throughout the month, all but the sick and the weak,
pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary
journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, drinking,
smoking, or sexual intercourse during daylight hours. Those adults
excused are obliged to endure an equivalent fast at their earliest
opportunity. A festive meal breaks the daily fast and inaugurates a
night of feasting and celebration. Well-to-do believers usually do
little or no work during this period, and some businesses close for all
or part of the day. Because the months of the lunar year revolve through
the solar year, Ramadan falls at various seasons in different years. A
considerable test of discipline at any time of the year, a fast that
falls in summertime imposes severe hardship on those who must do
physical work.
Finally, at least once during their lifetime all Muslims should make
the hajj, or pilgrimage, to the holy city of Mecca to participate in the
special rites that occur during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar.
For most well-to-do Nigerian traders and business people, the trip was
so common that the honorific "hajji" (fem., hajjia),
signifying a pilgrim, was routinely used to refer to successful traders.
Two features of Islam are essential to understanding its place in
Nigerian society. They are the degree to which Islam permeates other
institutions in the society, and its contribution to Nigerian pluralism.
As an institution in emirate society, Islam includes daily and annual
ritual obligations; the pilgrimage to Mecca; sharia, or religious law;
and an establishment view of politics, family life, communal order, and
appropriate modes of personal conduct in most situations. Thus, even in
1990, Islam pervaded daily life. Public meetings began and ended with
Muslim prayer, and everyone knew at least the minimum Arabic prayers and
the five pillars of the religion required for full participation. Public
adjudication (by local leaders with the help of religious experts, or
Alkali courts) provided widespread knowledge of the basic tenets of
sharia law-- the Sunni school of law according to Malik ibn Anas, the
jurist from Medina, was that primarily followed. Sunni (from sunna), or
orthodox Islam, is the dominant sect in Nigeria and most of the Muslim
world. The other sect is Shia Islam, which holds that the caliphs or
successors to the Prophet should have been his relatives rather than
elected individuals.
Every settlement had at least one place set aside for communal
prayers. In the larger settlements, mosques were well attended,
especially on Fridays when the local administrative and chiefly elites
led the way, and the populace prayed with its leaders in a demonstration
of communal and religious solidarity. Gaining increased knowledge of the
religion, one or more pilgrimages to Mecca for oneself or one's wife,
and a reputation as a devout and honorable Muslim all provided prestige.
Those able to suffuse their everyday lives with the beliefs and
practices of Islam were deeply respected.
Air transport had made the hajj more widely available, and the red
cap wound with a white cloth, signifying its wearer's pilgrimage, was
much more common in 1990 than twenty years previously. Upper-income
groups went several times and sent or took their wives as well. The
ancient custom of spending years walking across Africa to reach Mecca
was still practiced, however, and groups of such pilgrims could be seen
receiving charity at Friday prayers outside major mosques in the north.
Nigerian Islam was not highly organized. Reflecting the aristocratic
nature of the traditional ruling groups, there were families of clerics
whose male heirs trained locally and abroad in theology and
jurisprudence and filled major positions in the mosques and the
judiciary. These ulama, or learned scholars, had for centuries been the
religious and legal advisers of emirs, the titled nobility, and the
wealthy trading families in the major cities. Ordinary people could
consult the myriads of would-be and practicing clerics in various stages
of training, who studied with local experts, functioned at rites of
passage, or simply used their religious education to gain increased
"blessedness" for their efforts. Sufi brotherhoods, (from suf,
or wool; the wearing of a woolen robe indicated devotion to a mystic
life), a form of religious order based on more personal or mystical
relations to the supernatural, were widespread, especially in the major
cities. There the two predominant ones, Qadiriyah and Tijaniyah, had
separate mosques and, in a number of instances, a parochial school
system receiving grants from the state. The brotherhoods played a major
role in the spread of Islam in the northern area and the middle belt.
Islam both united and divided. It provided a rallying force in the
north and into the middle belt, where it was spreading. The wide scope
of Islamic beliefs and practices created a leveling force that caused
Muslims in the north to feel that they were part of a common set of
cultural traditions affecting family life, dress, food, manners, and
personal qualities linking them to one another and a wider Islamic
world. At the constitutional conference of 1978, Muslim delegates walked
out as a unit over the issue of a separate Islamic supreme court, a
demand they lost but which in 1990 remained a Muslim goal. To adapt
fully to northern life, non-Muslims had to remain in an enclave, living
quasi-segregated lives in their churches, their social clubs, and even
their work. In contrast, becoming a convert to Islam was the doorway to
full participation in the society. Middle belt people, especially those
with ambitions in politics and business, generally adopted Islam. The
main exception to this rule was Plateau State, where the capital, Jos,
was as much a Christian as a Muslim community, and a greater
accommodation between the two sets of beliefs and their adherents had
occurred.
Divisions within the Muslim community existed, however. The
nineteenth-century jihad that founded the Sokoto Caliphate was a
regenerative and proselytizing movement within the community of the
faithful. In major centers in 1990, the Sufi brotherhoods supported
their own candidates for both religious and traditional emirate offices.
These differences were generally not disruptive. Islamic activist
preachers and student leaders who spread ideas about a return to extreme
orthodoxy also existed. In addition, a fringe Islamic cult, known as the
Maitatsine, started in the late 1970s and operated throughout the 1980s,
springing up in Kano around a mystical leader (since deceased) from
Cameroon who claimed to have had divine revelations superseding those of
the Prophet. The cult had its own mosques and preached a doctrine
antagonistic to established Islamic and societal leadership. Its main
appeal was to marginal and poverty-stricken urban in-migrants, whose
rejection by the more established urban groups fostered this religious
opposition. These disaffected adherents ultimately lashed out at the
more traditional mosques and congregations, resulting in violent
outbreaks in several cities of the north.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Christianity
Nigeria
The majority of Christians were found in the south. A few isolated
mission stations and mission bookstores, along with churches serving
southern enclaves in the northern cities and larger towns, dotted the
Muslim north. The Yoruba area traditionally has been Protestant and
Anglican, whereas Igboland has always been the area of greatest activity
by the Roman Catholic Church. Other denominations abounded as well.
Presbyterians arrived in the early twentieth century in the Ibibio Niger
Delta area and had missions in the middle belt as well. This latter area
was an open one. Small missionary movements were allowed to start up,
generally in the 1920s, after the middle belt was considered pacified.
Each denomination set up rural networks by providing schooling and
health facilities. Most such facilities remained in 1990, although in
many cases schools had been taken over by the local state government in
order to standardize curricula and indigenize the teaching staff.
Pentecostals arrived mostly as indigenous workers in the
postindependence period and in 1990 Perte costalism was spreading
rapidly throughout the middle belt, having some success in Roman
Catholic and Protestant towns of the south as well. There were also
breakaway, or Africanized churches that blended traditional Christian
symbols with indigenous symbols. Among these was the Aladura movement
that was spreading rapidly throughout Yorubaland and into the non-Muslim
middle belt areas.
Apart from Benin and Warri, which had come in contact with
Christianity through the Portuguese as early as the fifteenth century,
most missionaries arrived by sea in the nineteenth century. As with
other areas in Africa, Roman Catholics and Anglicans each tended to
establish areas of hegemony in southern Nigeria. After World War I,
smaller sects such as the Brethren, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's
Witnesses, and others worked in interstitial areas, trying not to
compete. Although less well-known, African-American churches entered the
missionary field in the nineteenth century and created contacts with
Nigeria that lasted well into the colonial period.
African churches were founded by small groups breaking off from the
European denominations, especially in Yorubaland, where such
independence movements started as early as the late nineteenth century.
They were for the most part ritually and doctrinally identical to the
pavent church, although more African music, and later dance, entered and
mixed with the imported church services. A number also used biblical
references to support polygyny. With political independence came African
priests in both Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations, although
ritual and forms of worship were strictly those of the home country of
the original missionaries. By the 1980s, however, African music and even
dancing were being introduced quietly into church services, albeit
altered to fit into rituals of European origin. Southern Christians
living in the north, especially in larger cities, had congregations and
churches founded as early as the 1920s. Even medium-sized towns (20,000
persons or more) with an established southern enclave had local
churches, especially in the middle belt, where both major religions had
a strong foothold. The exodus of Igbo from the north in the late 1960s
left Roman Catholic churches poorly attended, but by the 1980s adherents
were back in even greater numbers, and a number of new churches had been
built.
The Aladura, like several other breakaway churches, stress healing
and fulfillment of life goals for oneself and one's family. African
beliefs that sorcery and witchcraft are malevolent forces against which
protection is required are accepted; rituals are warm and emotional,
stressing personal involvement and acceptance of spirit possession.
Theology is biblical, but some sects add costumed processions and some
accept polygyny.
Major congregations of the larger Anglican and Roman Catholic
missions represented elite families of their respective areas, although
each of these churches had members from all levels and many quite humble
church buildings. Nevertheless, a wedding in the Anglican cathedral in
Lagos was usually a gathering of the elite of the entire country, and of
Lagos and Yorubaland in particular. Such families had connections to
their churches going back to the nineteenth century and were generally
not attracted to the breakaway churches. All major urban centers, all
universities, and the new capital of Abuja had areas set aside for the
major religions to build mosques and churches and for burial grounds.
Interethnic conflict generally has had a religious element. Riots
against Igbo in 1953 and in the 1960s in the north were said to be fired
by religious conflict. The riots against Igbo in the north in 1966 were
said to have been inspired by radio reports of mistreatment of Muslims
in the south. In the 1980s, serious outbreaks between Christians and
Muslims occurred in Kafanchan in southern Kaduna State in a border area
between the two religions.
Nigeria
Nigeria - URBANIZATION
Nigeria
Throughout Africa societies that had been predominantly rural for
most of their history were experiencing a rapid and profound
reorientation of their social and economic lives toward cities and
urbanism. As ever greater numbers of people moved to a small number of
rapidly expanding cities (or, as was often the case, a single main
city), the fabric of life in both urban and rural areas changed in
massive, often unforeseen ways. With the largest and one of the most
rapidly growing cities in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has experienced
the phenomenon of urbanization as thoroughly as any African nation, but
its experience has also been unique--in scale, in pervasiveness, and in
historical antecedents.
Modern urbanization in most African countries has been dominated by
the growth of a single primate city, the political and commercial center
of the nation; its emergence was, more often than not, linked to the
shaping of the country during the colonial era. In countries with a
coastline, this was often a coastal port, and in Nigeria, Lagos fitted
well into this pattern. Unlike most other nations, however, Nigeria had
not just one or two but several other cities of major size and
importance, a number of which were larger than most other national
capitals in Africa. In two areas, the Yoruba region in the southwest and
the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri areas of the north, there were numbers of
cities with historical roots stretching back considerably before the
advent of British colonizers, giving them distinctive physical and
cultural identities. Moreover, in areas such as the Igbo region in the
southeast, which had few urban centers before the colonial period and
was not highly urbanized even at independence, there has been a massive
growth of newer cities since the 1970s, so that these areas in 1990 were
also highly urban.
Cities are not only independent centers of concentrated human
population and activity; they also exert a potent influence on the rural
landscape. What is distinctive about the growth of cities in Nigeria is
the length of its historical extension and the geographic pervasiveness
of its coverage.
Historical Development of Urban Centers
Nigerian urbanism, as in other parts of the world, is a function
primarily of trade and politics. In the north, the great urban centers
of Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Sokoto, the early Borno capitals (Gazargamo and
Kuka), and other cities served as entrep�ts to the Saharan and
trans-Saharan trade, and as central citadels and political capitals for
the expanding states of the northern savanna. They attracted large
numbers of traders and migrants from their own hinterlands and generally
also included "stranger quarters" for migrants of other
regions and nations. In the south, the rise of the Yoruba expansionist
city-states and of Benin and others was stimulated by trade to the
coast, and by competition among these growing urban centers for the
control of their hinterlands and of the trade from the interior to the
Atlantic (including the slave trade). The activities of European traders
also attracted people to such coastal cities as Lagos, Badagri, Brass,
and Bonny, and later Calabar and Port Harcourt. Overlying the original
features of the earlier cities were those generated by colonial and
postcolonial rule, which created new urban centers while also
drastically altering the older ones. All these cities and peri-urban
areas generally tended to have high population densities.
The northern savanna cities grew within city walls, at the center of
which were the main market, government buildings, and the central
mosque. Around them clustered the houses of the rich and powerful.
Smaller markets and denser housing were found away from this core, along
with little markets at the gates and some cleared land within the gates
that was needed especially for siege agriculture. Groups of specialized
craft manufacturers (cloth dyers, weavers, potters, and the like) were
organized into special quarters, the enterprises often being
family-based and inherited. Roads from the gates ran into the central
market and the administrative headquarters. Cemeteries were outside the
city gates.
The concentration of wealth, prestige, political power, and religious
learning in the cities attracted large numbers of migrants, both from
the neighboring countryside and from distant regions. This influx
occasioned the building of additional sections of the city to
accommodate these strangers. In many of the northern cities, these areas
were separated between sections for the distant, often non-Muslim
migrants not subject to the religious and other prohibitions of the
emir, and for those who came from the local region and were subjects of
the emir. The former area was designated the "Sabon Gari," or
new town (which in southern cities, such as Ibadan, has often been
shortened to "Sabo"), while the latter was often known as the
"Tudun Wada," an area often quite wealthy and elaborately laid
out. To the precolonial sections of the town was often added a
government area for expatriate administrators. The result was that many
of the northern cities have grown from a single centralized core to
being polynucleated cities, with areas whose distinctive character
reflected their origins, and the roles and position of their
inhabitants.
Surrounding many of the large, older northern cities, including Kano,
Sokoto, and Katsina, there developed regions of relatively dense rural
settlement where increasingly intensive agriculture was practiced to
supply food and other products to the urban population. These areas have
come to be known as close settled zones, and they were of major
importance to the agricultural economies of the north. By 1990 the inner
close settled zone around Kano, and the largest of its kind, extended to
a radius of about thirty kilometers, essentially the limit of a day trip
to the city on foot or by donkey. Within this inner zone, there has long
been a tradition of intensive interaction between the rural and urban
populations, involving not just food but also wood for fuel, manure, and
a range of trade goods. There has also been much land investment and
speculation in this zone. The full range of Kano's outer close settled
zone in 1990 was considered to extend sixty-five to ninety-five
kilometers from the city, and the rural-urban interactions had extended
in distance and increased in intensity because of the great improvements
in roads and in the availability of motorized transport. Within this
zone, the great majority of usable land was under annual rainy season or
continuous irrigated cultivation, making it one of the most intensively
cultivated regions in sub-Saharan Africa.
In the south, there were some similarities of origin and design in
the forest and southern savanna cities of Yorubaland, but culture,
landscape, and history generated a very different character for most of
these cities. As in the north, the earlier Yoruba towns often centered
around the palace of a ruler, or afin, which was surrounded by
a large open space and a market. This arrangement was still evident in
older cities such as Ife. However, many of the most important
contemporary Yoruba cities, including the largest, Ibadan, were founded
during the period of the Yoruba wars in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Reflecting their origins as war camps, they usually contained
multiple centers of power without a single central palace. Instead, the
main market often assumed the central position in the original town, and
there were several separate areas of important compounds established by
the major original factions. Abeokuta, for example, had three main
chiefly families from the Egba clan who had broken away from and become
important rivals of Ibadan. Besides these divisions were the separate
areas built for stranger migrants, such as Sabo in Ibadan, where many of
the Hausa migrants resided; the sections added during the colonial era,
often as government reserve areas (GRAs); and the numerous areas of
postcolonial expansion, generally having little or no planning.
The high population densities typically found in Yoruba cities--and
even in rural villages in Yorubaland--were among the striking features
of the region. This culturally based pattern was probably reinforced
during the period of intense intercity warfare, but it persisted in most
areas through the colonial and independence periods. The distinctive
Yoruba pattern of densification involved filling in compounds with
additional rooms, then adding a second, third, or sometimes even a
fourth story. Eventually, hundreds of people might live in a space that
had been occupied by only one extended family two or three generations
earlier. Fueling this process of densification were the close
connections between rural and urban dwellers, and the tendency for any
Yoruba who could afford it to maintain both urban and rural residences.
The colonial government, in addition to adding sections to existing
cities, also created important new urban centers in areas where there
previously had been none. Among the most important were Kaduna, the
colonial capital of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and Jos in the
central highlands, which was the center of the tin mining industry on
the plateau and a recreational town for expatriates and the Nigerian
elite. These new cities lacked walls but had centrally located
administrative buildings and major road and rail transport routes, along
which the main markets developed. These routes became one of the main
forces for the cities' growth. The result was usually a basically linear
city, rather than the circular pattern largely based on defensive needs,
which characterized the earlier indigenous urban centers.
The other ubiquitous colonial addition was the segregated GRA,
consisting of European-style housing, a hospital or nursing station, and
educational, recreational, and religious facilities for the British
colonials and the more prominent European trading community. The whole
formed an expatriate enclave, which was deliberately separated from the
indigenous Nigerian areas, ostensibly to control sanitation and limit
the spread of diseases such as malaria. After independence, these areas
generally became upper income suburbs, which sometimes spread outward
into surrounding farmlands as well as inward to fill in the space that
formerly separated the GRA from the rest of the city. New institutions,
such as university campuses, government office complexes, hospitals, and
hotels, were often located outside or on the fringes of the city in the
1980s. The space that originally separated them from the denser areas
was then filled in as further growth occurred.
Urbanization Since Independence
Spurred by the oil boom prosperity of the 1970s and the massive
improvements in roads and the availability of vehicles, Nigeria since
independence has become an increasingly urbanized and urban-oriented
society. During the 1970s Nigeria had possibly the fastest urbanization
growth rate in the world. Because of the great influx of people into
urban areas, the growth rate of urban population in Nigeria in 1986 was
estimated to be close to 6 percent per year, more than twice that of the
rural population. Between 1970 and 1980, the proportion of Nigerians
living in urban areas was estimated to have grown from 16 to more than
20 percent, and by 2010, urban population was expected to be more than
40 percent of the nation's total. Although Nigeria did not have the
highest proportion of urban population in sub-Saharan Africa (in several
of the countries of francophone Central Africa, for example, close to 50
percent of the population was in the major city or cities), it had more
large cities and the highest total urban population of any sub-Saharan
African country.
In 1990 there were twenty-one state capitals in Nigeria, each
estimated to have more than 100,000 inhabitants; fifteen of these, plus
a number of other cities, probably had populations exceeding 200,000.
Virtually all of these were growing at a rate that doubled their size
every fifteen years. These statistics did not include the new national
capital, Abuja, which was planned to have more than 1 million
inhabitants by early in the twenty-first century, although that
milestone might be delayed as construction there stretched out. In 1990
the government was still in the process of moving from Lagos, the
historical capital, to Abuja in the middle belt, and most sections of
the government were still operating from Lagos. Since 1976 there had
been dual capitals in both Lagos and Abuja. If one added the hundreds of
smaller towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants, which resembled the
larger centers more than the many smaller villages throughout the
country, the extent of Nigerian urbanization was probably more
widespread than anywhere else in sub-Saharan Africa.
Many of the major cities had growing manufacturing sectors,
including, for example, textile mills, steel plants, car assembly
plants, large construction companies, trading corporations, and
financial institutions. They also included government-service centers,
large office and apartment complexes, along with a great variety of
small business enterprises, many in the "informal sector," and
vast slum areas. All postsecondary education installations were in urban
centers, and the vast majority of salaried jobs remained urban rather
than rural.
Although cities varied, there was a typical Third World urban
approach that distinguished life in the city from that in the
countryside. It emerged from the density and variety of
housing--enormous poverty and overcrowding for most, and exorbitantly
wealthy suburbs and guarded enclaves for the upper classes. It also
emerged from the rhythm of life set by masses of people going to work
each day; the teeming central market areas; the large trading and
department stores; the traffic, especially at rush hours; the filth that
resulted from inadequate housing and public services; the destitution
indicated by myriads of beggars and unemployed; the fear of rising
crime; and the excitement of night life that was nonexistent in most
rural areas. All these factors, plus the increased opportunity to
connect with the rich and powerful through chains of patron-client
relations, made the city attractive, lively, and dangerous. Urban people
might farm, indeed many were trying to do so as food prices soared in
the 1980s, but urban life differed vastly from the slow and seasonally
defined rhythm of life in rural areas. Generally, even with all its
drawbacks, it was seen as more desirable, especially by young people
with more than a primary education.
The most notorious example of urban growth in Nigeria has undoubtedly
been Lagos, its most important commercial center. The city has shot up
in size since the 1960s; its annual growth rate was estimated at almost
14 percent during the 1970s, when the massive extent of new construction
was exceeded only by the influx of migrants attracted by the booming
prosperity. Acknowledged to be the largest city in sub-Saharan Africa
(although an accurate count of its population must await census
results), Lagos has become legendary for its congestion and other urban
problems. Essentially built on poorly drained marshlands, the city
commonly had flooding during the rainy season, and there was frequent
sewage backup, especially in the poorer lowland sections. As in other
Nigerian cities, there was a constant problem of garbage and waste
disposal. Housing construction had boomed but rarely seemed to keep pace
with demand. The city's main fame, however, came from the scale of its
traffic jams. Spanning several islands as well as a large and expanding
mainland area, the city never seemed to have enough bridges or arteries.
The profusion of vehicles that came with the prosperity of the 1970s
seemed often to be arranged in a massive standstill, which became the
site for urban peddling of an amazing variety of goods, as well as for
entertainment, exasperation, innovation, and occasionally crime. By 1990
Lagos had made some progress in managing its traffic problems both
through road and bridge construction and traffic control regulations.
This progress was aided by the economic downturn of the late 1980s,
which slowed urban migration and even led some to people return to rural
areas.
Aside from Lagos, the most rapid recent rates of urbanization in the
1980s were around Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta region, which was at
the heart of the oil boom, and generally throughout the Igbo and other
areas of the southeast. These regions historically had few urban
centers, but numerous large cities, including Onitsha, Owerri, Enugu,
Aba, and Calabar, grew very rapidly as commercial and administrative
centers. The Yoruba southwest was by 1990 still the most highly
urbanized part of the country, while the middle belt was the least
urbanized. The problems of Lagos, as well as the desire for a more
centrally located capital that would be more of a force for national
unity, led to the designation in 1976 of a site for a new national
capital at Abuja.
Rural-Urban Linkages
Cities in Nigeria, as elsewhere, have historically exerted potent
influences on the countryside. The northern city-states played a major
role in the distribution of human population and economic activity
throughout the savanna region. As citadels and centers of power and
conquest, they caused depopulation in some regions, notably those
subject to conquest and raiding, and population concentration in other
areas. The low populations of the middle belt savanna probably resulted
from the raiding and the conquests of the Hausa and Fulani city-states.
The subsequent regrowth of bush land is thought to have led to a
resurgence of tsetse flies and other disease vectors, which inhibited
attempts to repopulate the region. The complementary effect was to
increase population in zones of relative security, either areas under
the protection of the dominant political states or areas of refuge, such
as hill masses, which were difficult for armed horsemen to conquer.
The areas under the control or influence of major city-states would
have been economically oriented toward those centers, both through the
coercive exaction of taxes or tribute and through the production of food
and manufactured products for the court and urban population. Many of
these economic factors were replicated in the modern experience of
urbanization, although one major change, dating from the imposition of
British colonialism in the north, was the removal of the insecurity
caused by warring polities.
Although there are similarities to this northern savanna pattern in
the historical impact of Yoruba urbanization, the very different nature
of the Yoruba cities led to a distinctive pattern of rural interaction.
Yoruba cities traditionally had attached to them satellite villages or
hamlets, the inhabitants of which considered themselves as belonging to
that city, although most of their lives were spent outside the cities
and their livelihoods derived from farming or other rural activities.
The resulting close connection between urban dwellers and the
surrounding farmers, indeed the fact that they were often identical in
that urban dwellers also had farms in which they lived for much of the
year, was noted by early European travelers to Yorubaland. Even in 1990,
many Yoruba urban dwellers owned farms within a reasonable distance from
the city and worked them regularly. Moreover, many villagers owned
houses, rooms, or partly completed structures in nearby towns or cities
and divided their time, investments, and activities between urban and
rural settings. Thus, the traditional pattern of urban-rural
interconnections continued to be a deeply rooted facet of Yoruba
culture.
Among the most important interactions between rural and urban areas
through the 1980s in Nigeria and most other parts of Africa were the
demographic impacts of urban migration on rural areas. Because the great
majority of migrants were men of working age, the rural areas from which
they came were left with a demographically unbalanced population of
women, younger children, and older people. This phenomenon was not new
to Nigeria and had been evident in parts of the country since long
before independence. The 1953 census showed that the crowded rural
regions of Igboland, among other areas, had already experienced a
substantial migration of men, leaving a large preponderance of women in
the prime working ages. In what is today Imo State, for example, the sex
ratio (i.e., the ratio of men to women, multiplied by 100) for the zero
to fourteen age-group in 1953 was 100.2, but for ages fifteen to
forty-nine, it fell to 79.1, indicating a large surplus of females. Many
of the male Igbo migrants left to work in the cities of the north and
southwest. Although the civil war subsequently caused many Igbos to
return to the southeast, the overall scale and geographic extent of
rural-urban migration in the country had increased steadily after the
war. Migration was strongly stimulated by the oil boom of the 1970s,
with all of the opportunities that era brought for making one's fortune
in cities such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Warri, as well as others
that were indirectly affected by the oil economy. Since then, migration
has waxed and waned with the state of the economy. In the late 1980s,
many young people were compelled by the sharp downturn of the economy
and the shortage of urban employment to return to their home villages.
As a longer-term phenomenon, however, migration from the rural areas,
especially by young men, was expected to be an accelerating and largely
irreversible social process.
This process affected the rural economy in the areas of migration by
creating marked changes in the gender division of labor. In most of
Africa, agricultural labor was traditionally specified by gender: men
had certain tasks and women had others, although the specific divisions
varied by culture and ethnic group. As working-age men left the rural
areas, the resulting labor gap was met by others, usually wives or
children, or by hired labor--or the tasks were modified or not
performed. The departure of men helped to generate a lively market for
rural wage labor. In many areas in 1990, male and female laborers were
commonly hired to perform agricultural tasks such as land preparation,
weeding, and harvesting, which in the past were done either by household
labor or traditional work parties. In turn, the growth in demand for
hired labor fostered an increase of seasonal and longer term intrarural
migration. The improvement of roads was also extremely important in
stimulating the scale of seasonal labor migration. It became feasible,
for example, for Hausa and other northern workers to come south to work
as hired laborers in the cocoa belt and elsewhere at the onset of the
rains and later return to their home villages in time to plant their own
crops.
In more remote areas, however, finding hired workers was often
difficult. The absence of men led to neglect of such tasks as land
clearing and heavy soil conservation work, which they generally
performed. Thus, in forest areas from which there was much male
migration, thickly overgrown land that had been left fallow for extended
periods would not be cleared for cultivation; instead, the same parcels
were used repeatedly, leading to rapid declines in soil fertility and
yields. As a result, land degradation also occurred in these low density
areas.
Some of the most profound impacts of urban areas on the rural economy
derived from the vast increase in food demand generated by the growth of
cities. Both the amounts and types of foods consumed by urban
populations helped to transform agricultural systems and practices.
Cassava, corn, and fresh vegetable production especially benefited from
the expansion of urban demand. Cassava tubers can be processed by
fermenting, grating, and drying to produce a powdered product known as gari,
which can be stored and is very suitable for cooking in urban settings.
Especially throughout the southern parts of the country, gari
demand grew rapidly with the expansion of urban populations, causing a
large increase in cassava planting and processing, largely done by women
as a cottage industry. Demand for and production of corn also increased
significantly. In the early portion of the harvest season, fresh corn
sold as roadside "fast food" became a highly profitable
endeavor, especially in cities. Throughout the northern areas of the
country, corn production for dried grain--most of which was grown for
sale to urban areas--also expanded rapidly through the 1980s,
supplementing or replacing some of the traditional sorghum and millet
production. The expansion of commercial chicken and egg production, also
largely for the urban market, further raised demand for corn as feed.
The expansion and improvement of the transport network in the 1970s
and 1980s played a key role in tying urban markets to rural producing
regions. This linkage was most critical for fresh vegetable production,
which previously was very limited in geographical extent but became
feasible and profitable in many areas once efficient transport
connections to urban areas were established. The continued growth of
urbanization and expansion of transport capacity were likely to be the
major driving forces of agricultural production and modernization
through the 1990s.
Nigeria
Nigeria - EDUCATION
Nigeria
There were three fundamentally distinct education systems in Nigeria
in 1990: the indigenous system, Quranic schools, and formal
European-style education institutions. In the rural areas where the
majority lived, children learned the skills of farming and other work,
as well as the duties of adulthood, from participation in the community.
This process was often supplemented by age-based schools in which groups
of young boys were instructed in community responsibilities by mature
men. Apprentice systems were widespread throughout all occupations; the
trainee provided service to the teacher over a period of years and
eventually struck out on his own. Truck driving, building trades, and
all indigenous crafts and services from leather work to medicine were
passed down in families and acquired through apprenticeship training as
well. In 1990 this indigenous system included more than 50 percent of
the school-age population and operated almost entirely in the private
sector; there was virtually no regulation by the government unless
training included the need for a license. By the 1970s, education
experts were asking how the system could be integrated into the more
formal schooling of the young, but the question remained unresolved by
1990.
Islamic education was part of religious duty. Children learned up to
one or two chapters of the Quran by rote from a local mallam,
or religious teacher, before they were five or six years old. Religious
learning included the Arabic alphabet and the ability to read and copy
texts in the language, along with those texts required for daily
prayers. Any Islamic community provided such instruction in a mallam's
house, under a tree on a thoroughfare, or in a local mosque. This
primary level was the most widespread. A smaller number of those young
Muslims who wished, or who came from wealthier or more educated homes,
went on to examine the meanings of the Arabic texts. Later, grammar,
syntax, arithmetic, algebra, logic, rhetoric, jurisprudence, and
theology were added; these subjects required specialist teachers at the
advanced level. After this level, students traditionally went on to one
of the famous Islamic centers of learning.
For the vast majority, Muslim education was delivered informally
under the tutelage of mallams or ulama, scholars who
specialized in religious learning and teaching. Throughout the colonial
period, a series of formal Muslim schools were set up and run on
European lines. These schools were established in almost all major
Nigerian cities but were notable in Kano, where Islamic brotherhoods
developed an impressive number of schools. They catered to the children
of the devout and the well-to-do who wished to have their children
educated in the new and necessary European learning, but within a firmly
religious context. Such schools were influential as a form of local
private school that retained the predominance of religious values within
a modernized school system. Because the government took over all private
and parochial schools in the mid-1970s and only allowed such schools to
exist again independently in 1990, data are lacking concerning numbers
of students enrolled.
Western-style education came to Nigeria with the missionaries in the
mid-nineteenth century. Although the first mission school was founded in
1843 by Methodists, it was the Anglican Church Missionary Society that
pushed forward in the early 1850s to found a chain of missions and
schools, followed quickly in the late 1850s by the Roman Catholics. In
1887 in what is now southern Nigeria, an education department was
founded that began setting curricula requirements and administered
grants to the mission societies. By 1914, when north and south were
united into one colony, there were fifty-nine government and ninety-one
mission primary schools in the south; all eleven secondary schools,
except for King's College in Lagos, were run by the missions. The
missions got a foothold in the middle belt; a mission school for the
sons of chiefs was opened in Zaria in 1907 but lasted only two years. In
1909 Hans Vischer, an ex-Anglican missionary, was asked to organize the
education system of the Protectorate Northern Nigeria. Schools were set
up and grants given to missions in the middle belt. In 1914 there were
1,100 primary school pupils in the north, compared with 35,700 in the
south; the north had no secondary schools, compared with eleven in the
south. By the 1920s, the pressure for school places in the south led to
increased numbers of independent schools financed by local efforts and
to the sending of favorite sons overseas for more advanced training.
The education system focused strongly on examinations. In 1916
Frederick Lugard, first governor of the unified colony, set up a school
inspectorate. Discipline, buildings, and adequacy of teaching staff were
to be inspected, but the most points given to a school's performance
went to the numbers and rankings of its examination results. This stress
on examinations was still used in 1990 to judge educational results and
to obtain qualifications for jobs in government and the private sector.
Progress in education was slow but steady throughout the colonial era
until the end of World War II. By 1950 the country had developed a
three-tiered system of primary, secondary, and higher education based on
the British model of wide participation at the bottom, sorting into
academic and vocational training at the secondary level, and higher
education for a small elite destined for leadership. On the eve of
independence in the late 1950s, Nigeria had gone through a decade of
exceptional educational growth leading to a movement for universal
primary education in the Western Region. In the north, primary school
enrollments went from 66,000 in 1947 to 206,000 in 1957, in the west
(mostly Yoruba areas) from 240,000 to 983,000 in the same period, and in
the east from 320,000 to 1,209,000. Secondary level enrollments went
from 10,000 for the country as a whole in 1947 to 36,000 in 1957; 90
percent of these, however, were in the south.
Given the central importance of formal education, it soon became
"the largest social programme of all governments of the
federation," absorbing as much as 40 percent of the budgets of some
state governments. Thus, by 1984-85 more than 13 million pupils attended
almost 35,000 public primary schools. At the secondary level,
approximately 3.7 million students were attending 6,500 schools (these
numbers probably included enrollment in private schools), and about
125,000 postsecondary level students were attending 35 colleges and
universities. The pressure on the system remained intense in 1990, so
much so that one education researcher predicted 800,000 higher level
students by the end of the 1990s, with a correlated growth in numbers
and size of all education institutions to match this estimate.
Universal primary education became official policy for the federation
in the 1970s. The goal has not been reached despite pressure throughout
the 1980s to do so. In percentage terms, accomplishments have been
impressive. Given an approximate population of 49.3 million in 1957 with
23 percent in the primary school age-group (ages five to fourteen), the
country had 21 percent of its school-age population attending in the
period just prior to independence, after what was probably a tripling of
the age-group in the preceding decade. By 1985 with an estimated
population of 23 million between ages five and fourteen, approximately
47 percent of the age-group attended school. Although growth slowed and
actually decreased in some rural areas in the late 1980s, it was
projected that by the early part of the next century universal primary
education would be achieved.
Secondary and postsecondary level growth was much more dramatic. The
secondary level age-group (ages fifteen to twenty- four) represented
approximately 16 percent of the entire population in 1985. Secondary
level education was available for approximately 0.5 percent of the
age-group in 1957, and for 22 percent of the age-group in 1985. In the
early 1960s, there were approximately 4,000 students at six institutions
(Ibadan, Ife, Lagos, Ahmadu Bello University, the University of Nigeria
at Nsukka, and the Institute of Technology at Benin), rising to 19,000
by 1971 and to 30,000 by 1975. In 1990 there were thirty-five
polytechnic institutes, military colleges, and state and federal
universities, plus colleges of education and of agriculture; they had an
estimated enrollment of 150,000 to 200,000, representing less than 1
percent of the twenty-one to twenty-nine-year-old age-group.
Such growth was impossible without incurring a host of problems,
several of which were so severe as to endanger the entire system of
education. As long as the country was growing apace in terms of jobs for
the educated minority through investment in expanded government agencies
and services and the private sector, the growing numbers of graduates
could be absorbed. But the criterion of examination results as the
primary sorting device for access to schools and universities led to
widespread corruption and cheating among faculty and students at all
levels, but especially secondary and postsecondary. Most Nigerian
universities had followed the British higher education system of
"final examinations" as the basis for granting degrees, but by
1990 many were shifting to the United States system of course credits.
Economic hardship among teaching staffs produced increased engagement in
nonacademic moonlighting activities. Added to these difficulties were
such factors as the lack of books and materials, no incentive for
research and writing, the use of outdated notes and materials, and the
deficiency of replacement laboratory equipment. One researcher noted
that in the 1980s Nigeria had the lowest number of indigenous engineers
per capita of any Third World country. Unfortunately, nothing was done
to rectify the situation. The teaching of English, which was the
language of instruction beyond primary school, had reached such poor
levels that university faculty complained they could not understand the
written work of their students. By 1990 the crisis in education was such
that it was predicted that by the end of the decade, there would be
insufficient personnel to run essential services of the country. It was
hoped that the publication of critical works and international attention
to this crisis might reverse the situation before Nigeria lost an entire
generation or more of its skilled labor force.
Nigeria
Nigeria - HEALTH
Nigeria
Whereas traditional medicine continued to play an important role in
Nigeria in 1990, the country made great strides in the provision of
modern health care to its population in the years since World War II,
particularly in the period after independence. Among the most notable
accomplishments were the expansion of medical education, the improvement
of public health care, the control of many contagious diseases and
disease vectors, and the provision of primary health care in many urban
and rural areas. In the late 1980s, a large increase in vaccination
against major childhood diseases and a significant expansion of primary
health care became the cornerstones of the government's health policies.
Nonetheless, many problems remained in 1990. Sharp disparities
persisted in the availability of medical facilities among the regions,
rural and urban areas, and socioeconomic classes. The severe economic
stresses of the late 1980s had serious impacts throughout the country on
the availability of medical supplies, drugs, equipment, and personnel.
In the rapidly growing cities, inadequate sanitation and water supply
increased the threat of infectious disease, while health care facilities
were generally not able to keep pace with the rate of urban population
growth. There were several serious outbreaks of infectious diseases
during the 1980s, including cerebrospinal meningitis and yellow fever,
for which, especially in rural areas, treatment or preventive
immunization was often difficult to obtain. Chronic diseases, such as
malaria and guinea worm, continued to resist efforts to reduce their
incidence in many areas. The presence of acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS) in Nigeria was confirmed by 1987 and appeared to be
growing.
History of Modern Medical Services
Western medicine was not formally introduced into Nigeria until the
1860s, when the Sacred Heart Hospital was established by Roman Catholic
missionaries in Abeokuta. Throughout the ensuing colonial period, the
religious missions played a major role in the supply of modern health
care facilities in Nigeria. The Roman Catholic missions predominanted,
accounting for about 40 percent of the total number of mission-based
hospital beds by 1960. By that time, mission hospitals somewhat exceeded
government hospitals in number: 118 mission hospitals, compared with 101
government hospitals.
Mission-based facilities were concentrated in certain areas,
depending on the religious and other activities of the missions. Roman
Catholic hospitals in particular were concentrated in the southeastern
and midwestern areas. By 1954 almost all the hospitals in the midwestern
part of the country were operated by Roman Catholic missions. The next
largest sponsors of mission hospitals were, respectively, the Sudan
United Mission, which concentrated on middle belt areas, and the Sudan
Interior Mission, which worked in the Islamic north. Together they
operated twenty-five hospitals or other facilities in the northern half
of the country. Many of the mission hospitals remained important
components of the health care network in the north in 1990.
The missions also played an important role in medical training and
education, providing training for nurses and paramedical personnel and
sponsoring basic education as well as advanced medical training, often
in Europe, for many of the first generation of Western-educated Nigerian
doctors. In addition, the general education provided by the missions for
many Nigerians helped to lay the groundwork for a wider distribution and
acceptance of modern medical care.
The British colonial government began providing formal medical
services with the construction of several clinics and hospitals in
Lagos, Calabar, and other coastal trading centers in the 1870s. Unlike
the missionary facilities, these were, at least initially, solely for
the use of Europeans. Services were later extended to African employees
of European concerns. Government hospitals and clinics expanded to other
areas of the country as European activity increased there. The hospital
in Jos, for example, was founded in 1912 after the initiation there of
tin mining.
World War I had a strong detrimental effect on medical services in
Nigeria because of the large number of medical personnel, both European
and African, who were pulled out to serve in Europe. After the war,
medical facilities were expanded substantially, and a number of
government-sponsored schools for the training of Nigerian medical
assistants were established. Nigerian physicians, even if trained in
Europe, were, however, generally prohibited from practicing in
government hospitals unless they were serving African patients. This
practice led to protests and to frequent involvement by doctors and
other medical personnel in the nationalist movements of the period.
After World War II, partly in response to nationalist agitation, the
colonial government tried to extend modern health and education
facilities to much of the Nigerian population. A ten-year health
development plan was announced in 1946. The University of Ibadan was
founded in 1948; it included the country's first full faculty of
medicine and university hospital, still known as University College
Hospital. A number of nursing schools were established, as were two
schools of pharmacy; by 1960 there were sixty-five government nursing or
midwifery training schools. The 1946 health plan established the
Ministry of Health to coordinate health services throughout the country,
including those provided by the government, by private companies, and by
the missions. The plan also budgeted funds for hospitals and clinics,
most of which were concentrated in the main cities; little funding was
allocated for rural health centers. There was also a strong imbalance
between the appropriation of facilities to southern areas, compared with
those in the north.
By 1979 there were 562 general hospitals, supplemented by 16
maternity and/or pediatric hospitals, 11 armed forces hospitals, 6
teaching hospitals, and 3 prison hospitals. Altogether they accounted
for about 44,600 hospital beds. In addition, general health centers were
estimated to total slightly less than 600; general clinics 2,740;
maternity homes 930; and maternal health centers 1,240.
Ownership of health establishments was divided among federal, state,
and local governments, and there were privately owned facilities.
Whereas the great majority of health establishments were government
owned, there was a growing number of private institutions through the
1980s. By 1985 there were 84 health establishments owned by the federal
government (accounting for 13 percent of hospital beds); 3,023 owned by
state governments (47 percent of hospital beds); 6,331 owned by local
governments (11 percent of hospital beds); and 1,436 privately owned
establishments (providing 14 percent of hospital beds).
The problems of geographic maldistribution of medical facilities
among the regions and of the inadequacy of rural facilities persisted.
By 1980 the ratios were an estimated 3,800 people per hospital bed in
the north (Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, and Sokoto states); 2,200 per bed
in the middle belt (Bauchi, Benue, Gongola, Kwara, and Plateau states);
1,300 per bed in the southeast (Anambra, Cross River, Imo, and Rivers
states); and 800 per bed in the southwest (Bendel, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
and Oyo states). There were also significant disparities within each of
the regions. For example, in 1980 there were an estimated 2,600 people
per physician in Lagos State, compared with 38,000 per physician in the
much more rural Ondo State.
In a comparison of the distribution of hospitals between urban and
rural areas in 1980, Dennis Ityavyar found that whereas approximately 80
percent of the population of those states lived in rural regions, only
42 percent of hospitals were located in those areas. The maldistribution
of physicians was even more marked because few trained doctors who had a
choice wanted to live in rural areas. Many of the doctors who did work
in rural areas were there as part of their required service in the
National Youth Service Corps, established in 1973. Few, however,
remained in remote areas beyond their required term.
Hospitals were divided into general wards, which provided both
outpatient and inpatient care for a small fee, and amenity wards, which
charged higher fees but provided better conditions. The general wards
were usually very crowded, and there were long waits for registration as
well as for treatment. Patients frequently did not see a doctor, but
only a nurse or other practitioner. Many types of drugs were not
available at the hospital pharmacy; those that were available were
usually dispensed without containers, meaning the patients had to
provide their own. The inpatient wards were extremely crowded; beds were
in corridors and even consisted of mattresses on floors. Food was free
for very poor patients who had no one to provide for them. Most,
however, had relatives or friends present, who prepared or brought food
and often stayed in the hospital with the patient. By contrast, in the
amenity wards available to wealthier or elite patients, food and better
care were provided, and drug availability was greater. The highest level
of the Nigerian elite frequently traveled abroad for medical care,
particularly when a serious medical problem existed.
In the early 1980s, because of shortages of fuel and spare parts,
much expensive medical equipment could not be operated. Currency
devaluation and structural adjustment beginning in 1986 exacerbated
these conditions. Imported goods of all types doubled or tripled in
price, and government and public health care facilities were severely
affected by rising costs, government budget cuts, and materials
shortages of the late 1980s. Partly as a result of these problems,
privately owned health care facilities became increasingly important in
the late 1980s. The demand for modern medical care far outstripped its
availability. Medical personnel, drugs, and equipment were increasingly
diverted to the private sector as government hospitals deteriorated.
Government health policies increasingly had become an issue of policy
debate and public contention in the late 1980s. The issue emerged during
the Constituent Assembly held in 1989 to draft a proposed constitution.
The original draft reported by the assembly included a clause specifying
that free and adequate health care was to be available as a matter of
right to all Nigerians within certain categories. The categories
included all children younger than eighteen; all people sixty-five and
older; and all those physically disabled or handicapped. This provision
was, however, deleted by the president and the governing council when
they reviewed the draft constitution.
Primary Health Care Policies
In August 1987, the federal government launched its Primary Health
Care plan (PHC), which President Ibrahim Babangida announced as the
cornerstone of health policy. Intended to affect the entire national
population, its main stated objectives included accelerated health care
personnel development; improved collection and monitoring of health
data; ensured availability of essential drugs in all areas of the
country; implementation of an Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI);
improved nutrition throughout the country; promotion of health
awareness; development of a national family health program; and
widespread promotion of oral rehydration therapy for treatment of
diarrheal disease in infants and children. Implementation of these
programs was intended to take place mainly through collaboration between
the Ministry of Health and participating local government councils,
which received direct grants from the federal government.
Of these objectives, the EPI was the most concrete and probably made
the greatest progress initially. The immunization program focused on
four major childhood diseases: pertussis, diphtheria, measles, and
polio, and tetanus and tuberculosis. Its aim was to increase
dramatically the proportion of immunized children younger than two from
about 20 percent to 50 percent initially, and to 90 percent by the end
of 1990. Launched in March 1988, the program by August 1989 was said to
have been established in more than 300 of 449 LGAs. Although the program
was said to have made much progress, its goal of 90 percent coverage was
probably excessively ambitious, especially in view of the economic
strains of structural adjustment that permeated the Nigerian economy
throughout the late 1980s.
The government's population control program also came partially under
the PHC. By the late 1980s, the official policy was strongly to
encourage women to have no more than four children, which would
represent a substantial reduction from the estimated fertility rate of
almost seven children per woman in 1987. No official sanctions were
attached to the government's population policy, but birth control
information and contraceptive supplies were available in many health
facilities.
The federal government also sought to improve the availability of
pharmaceutical drugs. Foreign exchange had to be released for essential
drug imports, so the government attempted to encourage local drug
manufacture; because raw materials for local drug manufacture had to be
imported, however, costs were reduced only partially. For Nigeria both
to limit its foreign exchange expenditures and simultaneously to
implement massive expansion in primary health care, foreign assistance
would probably be needed. Despite advances against many infectious
diseases, Nigeria's population continued through the 1980s to be subject
to several major diseases, some of which occurred in acute outbreaks
causing hundreds or thousands of deaths, while others recurred
chronically, causing large-scale infection and debilitation. Among the
former were cerebrospinal meningitis, yellow fever, Lassa fever and,
most recently, AIDS; the latter included malaria, guinea worm,
schistosomiasis (bilharzia), and onchocerciasis (river blindness).
Malnutrition and its attendant diseases also continued to be a
refractory problem among infants and children in many areas, despite the
nation's economic and agricultural advances.
Among the worst of the acute diseases was cerebrospinal meningitis, a
potentially fatal inflammation of the membranes of the brain and spinal
cord, which can recur in periodic epidemic outbreaks. Northern Nigeria
is one of the most heavily populated regions in what is considered the
meningitis belt of Africa, stretching from Senegal to Sudan and all
areas having a long dry season and low humidity between December and
April. The disease plagued the northern and middle belt areas in 1986
and 1989, generally appearing during the cool, dry harmattan season when
people spend more time indoors, promoting contagious spread. Paralysis,
and often death, can occur within forty-eight hours of the first
symptoms.
In response to the outbreaks, the federal and state governments in
1989 attempted mass immunization in the affected regions. Authorities
pointed, however, to the difficulty of storing vaccines in the harsh
conditions of northern areas, many of which also had poor roads and
inadequate medical facilities.
Beginning in November 1986 and for several months thereafter, a large
outbreak of yellow fever occurred in scattered areas. The most heavily
affected were the states of Oyo, Imo, Anambra, and Cross River in the
south, Benue and Niger in the middle belt, and Kaduna and Sokoto in the
north. There were at least several hundred deaths. Fourteen million
doses of vaccine were distributed with international assistance, and the
outbreak was brought under control.
Lassa fever, a highly contagious and virulent viral disease, appeared
periodically in the 1980s in various areas. The disease was first
identified in 1969 in the northeast Nigerian town of Lassa. It is
believed that rats and other rodents are reservoirs of the virus, and
that transmission to humans can occur through droppings or food
contamination in and around homes. Mortality rates can be high, and
there is no known treatment.
The presence of AIDS in Nigeria was officially confirmed in 1987,
considerably later than its appearance and wide dispersion in much of
East and Central Africa. In March 1987, the minister of health announced
that tests of a pool of blood samples collected from high risk groups
had turned up two confirmed cases of AIDS, both HIV Type-1 strains.
Subsequently, HIV-2, a somewhat less virulent strain found mainly in
West Africa, was also confirmed. In 1990 the infection rate for either
virus in Nigeria was thought to be below 1 percent of the population.
Less dramatic than the acute infectious diseases but often equally
destructive were a host of chronic diseases that were serious and
widespread but only occasionally resulted in death. Of these the most
common was malaria, including cerebral malaria, which can be fatal. The
guinea worm parasite, which is spread through ingestion of contaminated
water, is endemic in many rural areas, causing recurring illness and
occasionally permanently crippling its victims. The World Health
Organization (WHO) in 1987 estimated that there were 3 million cases of
guinea worm in Nigeria--about 2 percent of the world total of 140
million cases- -making Nigeria the nation with the highest number of
guinea worm cases. In affected areas, guinea worm and related
complications were estimated to be the major cause of work and school
absenteeism.
Virtually all affected states had campaigns under way to eradicate
the disease through education and provision of pure drinking water
supplies to rural villages. The government has set an ambitious target
of full eradication by 1995, with extensive assistance from the Japanese
government, Global 2000, and numerous other international donors.
The parasitic diseases onchocerciasis and schistosomiasis, both
associated with bodies of water, were found in parts of Nigeria.
Onchocerciasis is caused by filarial worms transmitted by small black
flies that typically live and breed near rapidly flowing water. The
worms can damage the eyes and optic nerve and can cause blindness by
young adulthood or later. In some villages near the Volta River
tributaries where the disease is endemic, up to 20 percent of adults
older than thirty are blind because of the disease. Most control efforts
have focused on a dual strategy of treating the sufferers and trying to
eliminate the flies, usually with insecticide sprays. The flies and the
disease are most common in the lowland savanna areas of the middle belt.
Schistosomiasis is caused by blood flukes, which use freshwater
snails as an intermediate host and invade humans when the larvae
penetrate the skin of people entering a pond, lake, or stream in which
the snails live. Most often, schistosomiasis results in chronic
debilitation rather than acute illness.
Nigeria
Nigeria - WELFARE
Nigeria
Welfare concerns in Nigeria were primarily related to its general
lack of development and the effects on the society of the economic
stringency of the 1980s. Given the steady population growth and the
decline in urban services and incomes since 1980, it was difficult not
to conclude that for the mass of the people at the lower income level,
malnutrition, poor health, and overcrowded housing were perpetual
problems.
Nigeria had no social security system. Less than 1 percent of the
population older than sixty years received pensions. Because of the
younger age of urban migrants, there were fewer older people per family
unit in urban areas. Official statistics were questionable, however,
because at least one survey indicated a number of elderly living alone
in northern cities or homeless persons living on the streets and
begging. There was some evidence that the traditional practice of caring
for parents was beginning to erode under harsh conditions of scarcity in
urban areas. In rural Nigeria, it was still the rule that older people
were cared for by their children, grandchildren, spouses, siblings, or
even ex-spouses. The ubiquity of this tradition left open, however, the
possibility of real hardship for urban elderly whose families had moved
away or abandoned them.
Traditionally, family problems with spouses or children were handled
by extended kinship groups and local authorities. For the most part,
this practice continued in the rural areas. In urban settings, social
services were either absent or rare for family conflict, for abandoned
or runaway children, for foster children, or for children under the care
of religious instructors.
As with many other Third World nations, Nigeria had many social
welfare problems that needed attention. The existence of a relatively
free press combined with a history of self-criticism-- in journalism,
the arts, the social sciences, and by religious and political leaders
were promising indications of the awareness and public debate required
for change and adaptive response to its social problems.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Economy
Nigeria
A MAJOR FEATURE of Nigeria's economy in the 1980s, as in the 1970s,
was its dependence on petroleum, which accounted for 87 percent of
export receipts and 77 percent of the federal government's current
revenue in 1988. Falling oil output and prices contributed to another
noteworthy aspect of the economy in the 1980s--the decline in per capita
real gross national product (GNP), which persisted until oil prices
began to rise in 1990. Indeed, GNP per capita per year decreased 4.8
percent from 1980 to 1987, which led in 1989 to Nigeria's classification
by the World Bank as a low-income country (based on 1987 data) for the
first time since the annual World Development Report was
instituted in 1978. In 1989 the World Bank also declared Nigeria poor
enough to be eligible (along with countries such as Bangladesh,
Ethiopia, Chad, and Mali) for concessional aid from an affiliate, the
International Development Association (IDA).
Another relevant feature of the Nigerian economy was a series of
abrupt changes in the government's share of expenditures. As a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), national government
expenditures rose from 9 percent in 1962 to 44 percent in 1979, but fell
to 17 percent in 1988. In the aftermath of the 1967-70 civil war,
Nigeria's government became more centralized. The oil boom of the 1970s
provided the tax revenue to strengthen the central government further.
Expansion of the government's share of the economy did little to enhance
its political and administrative capacity, but did increase incomes and
the number of jobs that the governing elites could distribute to their
clients.
The economic collapse in the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed
to substantial discontent and conflict between ethnic communities and
nationalities, adding to the political pressure to expel more than 2
million illegal workers (mostly from Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad)
in early 1983 and May 1985.
The lower spending of the 1980s was partly the result of the
structural adjustment program (SAP) in effect from 1986 to 1990, first
mooted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and carried out under
the auspices of the World Bank, which emphasized privatization, market
prices, and reduced government expenditures. This program was based on
the principle that, as GDP per capita falls, people demand relatively
fewer social goods (produced in the government sector) and relatively
more private goods, which tend to be essential items such as food,
clothing, and shelter.
<>THE COLONIAL ECONOMIC LEGACY
<>THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
<>LABOR
<>AGRICULTURE
<>MANUFACTURING
<>MINING, OIL, AND ENERGY
<>BANKING AND FINANCE
Nigeria
Nigeria - THE COLONIAL ECONOMIC LEGACY
Nigeria
Early British Imperialism
The European struggle to establish forts and trading posts on the
West African coast from about the mid-1600s to the mid-1700s was part of
the wider competition for trade and empire in the Atlantic. The British,
like other newcomers to the slave trade, found they could compete with
the Dutch in West Africa only by forming national trading companies. The
first such effective English enterprise was the Company of the Royal
Adventurers, chartered in 1660 and succeeded in 1672 by the Royal
African Company. Only a monopoly company could afford to build and
maintain the forts considered essential to hold stocks of slaves and
trade goods. In the early eighteenth century, Britain and France
destroyed the Dutch hold on West African trade; and by the end of the
French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815),
Britain had become the dominant commercial power in West Africa.
The slave trade was one of the major causes of the devastating
internecine strife in southern Nigeria during the three centuries to the
mid-1800s, when actually abolition occurred. In the nineteenth century,
Britain was interested primarily in opening markets for its manufactured
goods in West Africa and expanding commerce in palm oil. Securing the
oil and ivory trade required that Britain usurp the power of coastal
chiefs in what became Nigeria.
Formal "protection" and--eventually--colonization of
Nigeria resulted not only from the desire to safeguard Britain's
expanding trade interests in the Nigerian hinterland, but also from an
interest in forestalling formal claims by other colonial powers, such as
France and Germany. By 1850 British trading interests were concentrating
in Lagos and the Niger River delta. British administration in Nigeria
formally began in 1861, when Lagos became a crown colony, a step taken
in response to factors such as the now-illegal activities of slave
traders, the disruption of trade by the Yoruba civil wars, and fears
that the French would take over Lagos. Through a series of steps
designed to facilitate trade, by 1906 present-day Nigeria was under
British control.
The Colonial Period
Colonies such as Nigeria became part of British imperial expansion
that focused on exploiting raw materials, minerals, and foodstuffs
important to Western industrial development. Britain tried to encourage
tropical export crops in Nigeria and to stimulate demand there for
British manufactured goods. The colonies built a railroad network
between the 1890s and World War II, and constructed roads at an
accelerating rate after the 1930s. These developments, along with the
introduction of the pound sterling as the universal medium of exchange,
encouraged export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil.
Britain maintained its economic hegemony over the colonies through
military power, strategic alliances, and the collaboration of indigenous
rulers.
Development of National Economic Interests to World War II
British rule exacerbated differences of class, region, and community
in Nigeria. The emergent nationalist movement in the 19300s was
spearheaded by a new elite of business people and professionals and
promoted mainly by persons who expected to gain economically and
politically from independence. The movement first became
multiethnic--although limited to the south--between 1930 and 1944, when
the real incomes of many participants in Nigeria's money economy fell as
a result of a deterioration in the net barter terms of trade (the ratio
between average export and import prices). During the same period, the
Great Depression and, later, World War II, reduced Britain's investment,
imports, and government spending in Nigeria.
Once the wartime colonial government assumed complete control of the
local economy, it would issue trade licenses only to established firms,
a practice that formalized the competitive advantage of foreign
companies. Also, wartime marketing boards pegged the prices of
agricultural commodities below the world market rate, workers faced wage
ceilings, traders encountered price controls, and Nigerian consumers
experienced shortages of import goods.
Labor activity grew during the war in reaction to the heavyhanded
policies of the colonial government. Among the expressions of labor
unrest was a strike by 43,000 workers in mid-1945 that lasted more than
forty days. Aspiring Nigerian entrepreneurs, deprived of new economic
opportunities, and union leaders, politicized by the strike's eventual
success, channeled their sense of grievance into nationalist agitation.
Educated persons, whose economic opportunities were limited largely to
private business and professional activity, began to demand more
participation in the colonial government.
National Economic Interests in the Postwar Period
Starting in 1949, when Nigerian's recently emergent labor,
commercial, and professional elites were first consulted by the British
as part of a constitutional review, the peoples of Nigeria engaged in
ongoing debate over the pressure of decolonization, independence, and
modernization. The two coups d'�tat of 1966 and the civil war of
1967-70 reflected economic as well as political elements.
Between 1951 and 1960, the major political parties played leading
roles in unifying and locally mobilizing the economic elite. Elites from
majority parties in the regional assemblies who cooperated with the
ruling federal coalition dispensed a wide range of rewards and
sanctions, thus retaining their own positions and power and keeping the
masses subordinated. Positions in government services and public
corporations, licenses for market stalls, permits for agricultural
export production, rights to establish enterprises, roads, electrical
service, running water, and scholarships were allocated by the governing
group to its supporters. Each major party was backed by a bank, which
assisted in the transfer of substantial public funds to the party.
At all levels--local and regional after 1951 and federal after
1954--political leaders could use a range of controls, extending over
local councils, district administration, police, and courts, to subdue
any dissident minority, especially in the far north, where clientage was
the social adhesive of the emirate system. Political superiors offered
protection, patronage, and economic security in exchange for loyalty and
the obedience of inferiors.
The elites attracted clients and socially inferior groups not only in
the far north, where Islam legitimized the traditional hierarchy, but
even in Igboland, an area of southeastern Nigeria where power had been
widely dispersed before the twentieth century. The elites of the three
regions preferred to close ranks to share the fruits of office and to
prevent challenges to their positions, but by the time independence was
achieved in 1960, policies designed to enhance the security of one
regional elite threatened the security of others.
Nigeria
Nigeria - THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY
Nigeria
Some of Nigeria's political leaders have advocated African socialism,
an ideology that does not necessarily coincide with the Western
socialist concept of the ownership of most capital and land by the
state. Instead, the African variety usually has included the following:
a substantial level of state ownership in modern industry,
transportation, and commerce; a penchant for public control of resource
allocation in key sectors; a priority on production for domestic
consumption; and an emphasis on the rapid Africanization of high-level
jobs. Despite the socialist rhetoric of some politicians, in practice
Nigeria worked toward a mixed economy, with the directly productive
sector dominated by private enterprise, the state investing in
infrastructure as a foundation for private activity, and government
providing programs and policies to stimulate private (especially
indigenous) enterprise.
None of the major Nigerian political parties controlling national or
regional governments from 1951 to 1966 (or 1979 to 1983) was a socialist
party or a party strongly committed to egalitarianism. Even the Action
Group, led during the first republic by the ostensibly anticapitalist
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, had as its foundation the rising new class of
professionals, businesspeople, and traders.
After Nigeria's 1967-70 civil war, petroleum output and prices
increased rapidly. The government's control of the extraction, refining,
and distribution of oil meant that, the state became the dominant source
of capital. By the mid-1970s, petroleum accounted for about
three-fourths of total federal revenue. To the most vigorous,
resourceful, and well-connected venture capitalists (often politicians,
bureaucrats, army officers, and their clients), productive economic
activity lost appeal. Manipulating government spending became the means
to fortune. Because of the rapid growth of the state bureaucracy and the
establishment of numerous federally funded parastatals, the size of the
government sector relative to the rest of the national economy hit a
peak in the late 1970s.
In an effort that culminated in the 1970s, the Nigerian government
gradually expanded its controls over the private sector, levying
differential taxes and subsidies, increasing industrial prices relative
to farm prices, favoring investment in key sectors, providing tariff and
tax incentives to vital sectors, protecting favored industrial
establishments from foreign competition, awarding import licenses to
selected firms and industries, and providing foreign exchange to
priority enterprises at below-market exchange rates. While the
ostensible reasons for this policy of favoritism were to transfer
resources to modern industry, expand high-priority businesses and
sectors, encourage profitable enterprises, and discourage unprofitable
ones, in practice the government often favored urban areas by promoting
production that used socially expensive inputs of capital, foreign
exchange, and high technology. Market intervention helped political and
bureaucratic leaders protect their positions, expand their power, and
implement their policies. Project- or enterprise-based policies (unlike
reliance on the market) allowed benefits to be apportioned selectively,
for maximum political advantage. Government made it in the private
interest of numerous individuals to cooperate in programs that were
harmful to the interests of producers as a whole. However,
market-clearing prices (for farm commodities or foreign exchange), whose
benefits were distributed indiscriminately, inspired little or no
political support among farmers and businesspeople.
Beginning in 1979, the policy prescription of the World Bank (and
IMF) was for African countries to refrain from interfering in foreign
exchange and interest rates, wages, and farm prices; to privatize
state-owned enterprises (especially agro-processing, farm input
distribution, insurance, and retail and wholesale trade); to relax
restrictions on foreign capital; and to encourage indigenous business
ventures. By the early 1980s, Nigeria faced substantial international
payments deficits in the midst of declining export prices and rising
import prices, rising external debt payments, and negative economic
growth. The government consequently undertook an its own SAP that was
patterned along World Bank guidelines in 1986, with World Bank
conditions including devaluation of the naira, reductions in real
government spending, abolition of official agricultural marketing
boards, the sale of public enterprises, liberalized trade, and reduced
quotas and licenses.
Planning
Before 1945 the colonial government undertook no serious
comprehensive planning. Nigeria's earliest national plans, the 1946-55
Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare (with plan revisions, 1951-55)
and the 1955-60 plan (later extended to 1962), were framed by colonial
administrators. As the authors of the First National Development Plan,
1962-68 (henceforth, first plan) wrote, these "were not `plans,' in
the truest sense of the word . . . [but] a series of projects which had
not been coordinated or related to any overall economic target."
After 1960, however, development planning had a broad scope,
encompassing government policies to achieve national economic
objectives, such as accelerated growth and higher levels of average
material welfare. This planning affected the policies of such agencies
as the central bank, state-owned enterprises, the Ministry of Education,
marketing boards, state-level departments, and extension services.
Nigerian plans included economic forecasts, policies toward the
private sector, and a list of proposed public expenditures. Plans did
not constitute commitments by public departments to spend funds.
Although Nigerian political leaders made decisions about general
objectives and priorities for the first plan, foreign economists were
the main authors of the actual document. Its authors favored
decentralized decision making by private units, disregard of major
discrepancies between financial and social profitability, and high
economic payoffs from directly productive investments (as opposed to
indirect returns from social overheads). They discouraged increased
taxes on the wealthy (out of a fear of dampening private incentive), and
advocated a conservative monetary and fiscal policy emphasizing a
relatively small plan, openness to foreign trade and investment, and
reliance on overseas assistance. Foreign aid was set at onehalf of
public sector investment.
Nobel economist W. Arthur Lewis has suggested that the main
weaknesses of the 1962-68 plan were incomplete feasibility studies and
inadequate evaluation of projects, accompanied by meager public
participation, followed by excessive political intervention in economic
decisions. Moreover, insufficient attention was paid to the small
indigenous sector, and the machinery for implementing developments in
the public sector was unsatisfactory. Lewis noted that the most
important aspects of Nigeria's 1962-68 plan were "how the
government proposes to raise the money and to recruit the personnel to
carry out its objectives."
Postwar reconstruction, restoring productive capacity, overcoming
critical bottlenecks, and achieving self-reliance were major goals of
the Second National Development Plan (1970-74). The replacement cost of
physical assets damaged and destroyed in the civil war with the
secessionist Igbo area in the southeast, then known as Biafra, was
estimated to exceed N600 million (then about US$900 million).
The United Nations (UN) Center for Development Planning, Projections,
and Policies observed that Nigeria's real growth in GDP between 1970 and
1974 was 12.3 percent per year. The annual target had been only 6.2
percent. Nigerian growth could be explained by factors largely outside
the planners' purview--rapid oil industry growth and sharply increasing
oil prices.
Announced in March 1975, the Third National Development Plan
(1975-80) envisioned a twelvefold increase in the annual rate of public
capital expenditures over the previous plan period. This document
included the statement, "There will be no savings and foreign
exchange constraints during the third plan period and beyond." The
document outlined ambitious plans to expand agriculture, industry,
transport, housing, water supplies, health facilities, education, rural
electrification, community development, and state programs. The third
plan also designated substantial funds for prestige projects, such as
Festival of African Culture (FESTAC) in Lagos.
Amid the euphoria of the 1974 oil price boom, the Ministry of
Economic Development approved and added numerous projects for other
ministries not supported by a proper appraisal of technical feasibility,
costs and benefits, or the technical and administrative arrangements
required to establish and operate the projects. According to Sayre P.
Schatz, who advised the Ministry of Transport while it prepared
feasibility studies for the plan in 1974,
"Economic reasoning gave way before economic enthusiasm,"
and the necessary coordination and implementation were ignored.
Inflationary minimum wage and administrative salary increases after
October 1974, in combination with the slowing of the economy, made
budget shortfalls inevitable. In June 1975, several state and local
governments did not receive their monthly subsidies from the federal
government. Just before the July 29, 1975, coup in which head of state
General Yakubu Gowon was toppled, government workers in several areas
threatened to impair vital services unless their June wages were paid.
In March 1976, in response to an economy overheated by demands for
new programs and higher wages, General Olusegun Obasanjo, then head of
state, pointed out that petroleum revenue was not a cure-all. Many
projects had to be postponed, scaled down, or canceled when
oil-revenue-based projections made in 1974-75 later proved too
optimistic. Projects tended to be retained for political reasons, not
because they were considered socially or economically useful by the
Central Planning Office of the Supreme Military Council.
The civilian government that tack office on October 1, 1979,
postponed the beginning of the fourth plan (1981-85) for nine months.
Whereas the plan's guidelines indicated that local governments were to
be involved in planning and execution, such involvement was not feasible
because local governments lacked the staff and expertise to accept this
responsibility. The plan was also threatened by falling oil revenues and
an increased need for imported food that had resulted from delays in
agricultural modernization. Projected to rise 12.1 percent annually,
exports actually fell 5.9 percent yearly during the plan, as a recession
among the nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development reduced demand for Third World imports. As exports declined,
the capacity to import construction materials and related capital goods
also fell, reducing growth in the construction, transport,
communications, utilities, and housing sectors.
Nigeria was heavily dependent on agriculture, with the sector
accounting for more than 40 percent of pre-1973 GDP. But in the decade
up to 1983, agricultural output in Nigeria declined 1.9 percent and
exports fell 7.9 percent. Agricultural imports as a share of total
imports rose from 3 percent in the late 1960s to 7 percent in the early
1980s. Nigeria's unfavorable agricultural development resulted from the
loss of competitiveness among farm exports as the real value of the
Nigerian naira appreciated substantially from 1970 to 1972 and from 1982
to 1983.
Thanks in large part to the overthrow of Nigeria's second civilian
administration, the Second Republic headed by President Shehu Shagari,
at the end of 1983 and of the military government of General Muhammadu
Buhari in 1985, the Fifth National Development Plan was postponed until
1988-92. Continuing the emphases of the SAP, the fifth plan's objectives
were to devalue the naira, remove import licenses, reduce tariffs, open
the economy to foreign trade, promote nonoil exports through incentives,
and achieve national self-sufficiency in food production. The drafters
of the fifth plan sought to improve labor productivity through
incentives, privatization of many public enterprises, and various
government measures to create employment opportunities.
In late 1989, the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida
abandoned the concept of a fixed five-year plan. Instead, a three-year
"rolling plan" was introduced for 1990-92 in the context of
more comprehensive fifteen- to twenty-year plans. A rolling plan,
considered more suitable for an economy facing uncertainty and rapid
change, is revised at the end of each year, at which point estimates,
targets, and projects are added for an additional year. Thus, planners
would revise the 1990-92 threeyear rolling plan at the end of 1990,
issuing a new plan for 1991-93. In effect, a plan is renewed at the end
of each year, but the number of years remains the same as the plan rolls
forward. In Nigeria, the objectives of the rolling plan were to reduce
inflation and exchange rate instability, maintain infrastructure,
achieve agricultural self-sufficiency, and reduce the burden of
structural adjustment on the most vulnerable social groups.
Government Finance
A major cause of political conflict in Nigeria since independence has
been the changing formula for allocating revenue by region or state.
Before 1959 all revenues from mineral and agricultural products were
retained by the producing region. But after 1959, the region retained
only a fraction of the revenue from mineral production. This policy was
a major source of dissatisfaction in the Eastern Region, which seceded
in May 1967 as the would-be state of Biafra. By contrast, the revenue
from agricultural exports was retained by regional marketing boards
after 1959, but the agricultural exports of eastern Nigeria were smaller
than those of the other major regions.
The rapid growth of petroleum revenue in the 1970s removed most of
the severe constraints placed on federal and regional or state budgets
in the 1960s. Total federal revenue grew from N306.4 million in 1966 to
N7,791.0 million in 1977, a twentyfivefold increase in current income in
eleven years. Petroleum revenue as a percentage of the total went from
26.3 percent in 1970 to more than 70 percent by 1974-77.
During the civil war, most of the twelve new states created in 1967
faced a revenue crisis. But a 1970 decree brought the states closer to
fiscal parity by decreasing the producing state's share of export,
import, and excise duties, and of mining rents and royalties, and by
increasing the share allocated to all states and the federal government.
Also, in 1973 the commodity export marketing boards, which had been a
source of political power for the states, were brought under federal
control. Other changes later in the 1970s further reduced claims to
revenue based on place of origin. In the 1970s, the federal government
was freed to distribute more to the states, thus strengthening federal
power as well as the states' fiscal positions. Statutory appropriations
from the federal government to the states, only about N128 million in
FY1966, increased to N1,040 million in 1975 with the oil boom, but
dropped to N502.2 million in 1976, as oil revenues declined.
The burgeoning revenues of the oil boom had encouraged profligacy
among the federal ministries. Government deficits were a major factor in
accelerated inflation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In 1978 the
federal government, compelled to cut spending for the third plan,
returned much of the financial responsibility for housing and primary
education to state and local governments. Federal government finances
especially drifted into acute disequilibrium between 1981 and 1983, at
the end of President Shagari's civilian administration, with the 1983
federal government deficit rising to N5.3 billion (9.5 percent of GDP)
at the same time that external debt was increasing rapidly. The state
governments' deficit compounded the problem, with the states
collectively budgeting for a deficit of N6.8 billion in 1983.
Falling export prices caused the military governments between 1983
and 1988 to continue cutting real spending, especially for capital,
imports, civil service and armed forces salaries and consumer subsidies.
Many parastatals also had their subsidies cut, while others were sold
off entirely. The result of these actions was a substantial reduction in
the federal deficit. The announcement of the spending reductions that
would be part of the fifth plan coincided with the military coup of
August 1985. Unlike earlier plans, the fifth plan (put back to 1988-92
party because of the coup) allocated the largest amounts of capital to
agriculture and stressed the importance of private investment.
In 1988 the federal budget was still highly dependent on oil revenues
(taxes on petroleum profits, mining rents and royalties, and Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation earnings). Altogether, oil receipts
accounted for 77 percent of total federal current revenue in 1988. The
federal government retained 62 percent of the revenue it collected in
1988, while the rest of the funds were distributed to the state and
local governments by a formula based on population, need, and, to a very
limited extent, derivation.
International aid designated for domestic Nigerian development
constituted a minor source of government revenue. In 1988 such official
assistance amounted to US$408 million, or US$1.1 per capita, which
placed Nigeria lowest among low-income and lower-middle-income aid
recipients. This aid represented 0.4 percent of Nigeria's GNP, far less
than the average of 2.4 percent received by all low-income countries, a
group that included much states as China, India, and Zambia.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Income Distribution
Nigeria
The reliability of Nigeria's national income statistics was limited
by meager industry-wide information (especially for domestically
consumed commodities), the questionable validity of data, and
quantification based on subjective judgments by state officials. Despite
deficiencies in aggregate economic statistics, a few general tendencies
concerning growth, income distribution, prices, wages, and the
employment rate could be discerned. The Office of Statistics indicated
that GDP grew 6.0 percent annually (adjusted for inflation) between FY (fiscal
year) 1959 and FY 1967. GDP shrank at an
inflation-adjusted annual rate of 1.1 percent between FY 1967 (which
ended two months before the secession of the Eastern Region) and FY 1970
(which ended three months after the war). However, because capital
destruction such as occurs during wartime is not reflected in annual
measures of GDP, the decline in net domestic production was probably
severely understated.
Annual population growth estimates very considerably, but it is
generally held that growth was roughly 2 percent in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, 2.5 to 3.0 percent from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s,
and 3.0 to 3.5 percent in the 1980s. Accordingly, annual GDP growth per person can be estimated at
4.0 percent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 3.0 to 3.5 percent in the
mid 1960s, -3.5 to -4.0 percent during the civil war, roughly 7 percent
in the early to late 1970s, -6.0 percent from the late 1970s to the
early 1980s, and -2.5 percent for the balance of the 1980s.
Nigeria's decline in real GNP per capita by 1988, to US$290,
relegated the nation to low-income status below India, Pakistan, and
Ghana. Other indicators of development--life expectancy, for which
Nigeria ranked 155th out of the world's 177 countries, and infant
mortality, for which Nigeria ranked 148th among 173 countries--were
consistent with Nigeria's low ranking in income per capita.
The authors of the first plan had argued that a "very good case
can be made that premature preoccupation with equity problems will
backfire and prevent any development from taking place." Thus,
Nigeria's first plan stressed production and profitability, not
distribution. Yet people who already own property, hold influential
positions, and have good educations are best situated to profit once
growth begins. Thus, a society with initial income inequality that
begins to expand economically is likely to remain unequal, or even
become more so.
Although wealth appeared to be highly concentrated in Nigeria, the
government had no comprehensive income-distribution estimates. From 1960
to 1978, the number of rural poor remained constant, but the rural
poverty rate declined. During the same period, the urban poor roughly
doubled in number, although the rate of urban poverty also probably
declined. Federal civil service studies indicating a substantial
increase in income concentration from 1969 to 1976 may have reflected a
trend toward overall income inequality, exacerbated perhaps by the large
raises given to high-ranking administrators by the Udoji Commission on
wages and salaries in 1975. But this inequality probably eased from 1976
to the end of the decade, thanks to increased salaries for low-income
workers, the abolition of subsidized automobile allowances for the
wealthy, and a decline in economic activity, especially in the oil
sector.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria's degree of income concentration
was average for sub-Saharan Africa, which, after Latin America, had the
highest income inequality of any region in the world. Income
concentration in Nigeria was probably higher than in Niger or Ivory
Coast, about the same as in Tanzania, and lower than in Kenya and
Cameroon.
Because the rural masses were politically weak, official income
distribution policies focused on interurban redistribution. More than 80
percent of Nigeria's second plan (1970-74) investment was in urban
areas. The third plan (1975-80) emphasized more even distribution, but
did not mention urbanrural imbalances.
The ratio of industrial to agricultural labor productivity, 2.5:1 in
1966, increased to 2.7:1 in 1970 and 7.2:1 in 1975. (Urban-rural per
capita income ratios showed greater differentials for succeeding years,
largely because incomes from capital, property, and entrepreneurial
activity were far larger for city dwellers than for rural residents.)
The sharp rise in industrial productivity between 1970 and 1975 was due
largely to phenomenal increases in oil output, prices, and tax revenues
rather than to technical changes or improved skills. Without oil, 1975's
labor productivity ratio would have been 3.0:1, as the terms of trade
shifted away from agriculture. Moreover, emigration drained the rural
areas of the most able young people, attracted by the Udoji commission's
doubling of government minimum wages. The loss of the superior education
and skills of these rural-to-urban migrants resulted in a decline in
inflationadjusted agricultural productivity between 1970 and 1975.
Average rural income was so low by 1975 that the richest rural quartile
was poor by urban standards.
Rising debt and falling average income in the 1980s had a
particularly severe effect on the poor. Consumption per capita fell 7
percent annually during that decade, material standards of living were
lower in the mid-1980s than in the 1950s, and calorie and protein intake
per capita were no greater in 1985 than in 1952. In effect, the economic
crisis of the 1980s canceled out the progress of the previous two
decades.
Urban real wages fell rapidly between 1982 and 1989 as a result of a
minimum wage freeze in the formal sector. Rural real wages also fell,
but more slowly because few employers had previously paid as much as the
minimum wage on the farm. Beginning in 1986, the liberalizing effect of
the SAP on agricultural prices and the exchange rate also redistributed
income from urban to rural areas, especially in the agricultural export
sector. In the 1980s, the urban self-employed, a group which included
many in the low-income informal sector (e.g., cottage industries,
crafts, petty trade, and repair work), had lower incomes than urban wage
earners. Even the rural selfemployed (smallholder farmers,
sharecroppers, and tenants, as well as a few commercial farmers) had
lower incomes than rural wage earners, who ranged from unskilled,
landless workers to plantation workers.
During the 1980s, the urban-rural gap narrowed--a result of rising
urban poverty rather than of growing rural affluence. A World
Bank/International Finance Corporation study estimated that 64 percent
of urban households and 61 percent of rural households were in poverty
in FY 1984. Because 70 percent of Nigeria's population was rural, most
of the poor were to be found in rural areas. By the late 1980s, with
structural adjustment and agricultural price decontrol, the average
income of all rural households exceeded the average for urban
households. Ironically, rural household income levels in the late 1980s
only improved relative to levels for city households, as real income in
both urban and rural areas had fallen throughout the 1980s. The result
was that, for the first time since independence, more Nigerians migrated
to the country than to urban areas.
Rapid inflation, 20 percent yearly between 1973 and 1980 and more
than 20 percent per year between 1980 and 1984 (as measured by the
consumer price index), dropped to 5.5 percent in 1985, 5.4 percent in
1986 (years of good harvests), and 10.2 percent in 1987, before rising
to 38.3 percent in 1988 and 47.5 percent in 1989. Under a World Bank
SAP, 1986 and 1987 were years of tightmoney financial policy. But a poor
harvest in 1987 put pressure on 1988 food prices, and authorities lifted
the wage freeze and eased fiscal policies in 1988 in the face of rising
political opposition to austerity. Inflation abated somewhat in late
1989, as food supplies grew and the Central Bank of Nigeria tightened
monetary policy.
Real wages fell significantly in the l980s following a statutory wage
freeze (1982-88), salary cuts in the public sector in 1985, and a
constant nominal minimum wage that started in 1981. From 1986 to 1989,
real wages fell almost 60 percent.
Nigeria
Nigeria - LABOR
Nigeria
The size of Nigeria's labor force was difficult to calculate because
of the absence of accurate census data. The labor force increased from
18.3 million in 1963 to 29.4 million in 1983. Census data apparently
understated the number of self-employed peasants and farmers, but
estimated that the proportion of Nigerians employed in agriculture,
livestock, forestry, and fishing fell from 56.8 percent in 1963 to 33.5
percent in 1983. The percentage of the labor force employed in mining
rose from 0.1 percent in 1963 to 0.4 percent in 1983. Exactly comparable
data were lacking on manufacturing, but from 1965 to 1980 industry's
share of the labor force rose from 10 percent to 12 percent whereas the
services sector grew from 18 percent to 20 percent of the labor force.
Unemployment
The national unemployment rate, estimated by the Office of Statistics
as 4.3 percent of the labor force in 1985, increased to 5.3 percent in
1986 and 7.0 percent in 1987, before falling to 5.1 percent in 1988 as a
result of measures taken under the SAP. Most of the unemployed were city
dwellers, as indicated by urban jobless rates of 8.7 percent in 1985,
9.1 percent in 1986, 9.8 percent in 1987, and 7.3 percent in 1988.
Underemployed farm labor, often referred to as disguised unemployed,
continued to be supported by the family or village, and therefore rural
unemployment figures were less accurate than those for urban
unemployment. Among the openly unemployed rural population, almost
two-thirds were secondary-school graduates.
The largest proportion of the unemployed (consistently 35 to 50
percent) were secondary-school graduates. There was also a 40- percent
unemployment rate among urban youth aged twenty to twenty-four, and a
31-percent rate among those aged fifteen to nineteen. Two-thirds of the
urban unemployed were fifteen to twenty-four years old. Moreover, the
educated unemployed tended to be young males with few dependents. There
were relatively few secondary-school graduates and the lowered job
expectations of primary-school graduates in the urban formal sector kept
the urban unemployment rate for these groups to 3 to 6 percent in the
1980s.
Labor Unions
Labor unions have been a part of Nigerian industry since 1912, when
government employees formed a civil service union. In 1914 this
organization became the Nigerian Union of Civil Servants after the
merger of the protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria. In
1931 two other major unions were founded--the Nigerian Railway Workers
Union and the Nigerian Union of Teachers (which included private-school
teachers). Legalization of unions in 1938 was followed by rapid labor
organization during World War II as a result of passage by the British
government of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which
encouraged the establishment of unions in the colonies. The defense
regulation of October 1942 made strikes and lockouts illegal for the
duration of the war and denied African workers the cost-of-living
allowances that European civil servants received. In addition, the
colonial government increased wages only modestly, although the cost of
living rose 74 percent from September 1939 to October 1943. In June and
July of 1945, 43,000 workers, most of whom were performing services
indispensable to the country's economic and administrative life, went on
a strike that lasted more than forty days. In large part as a result of
the strike's success, the labor movement grew steadily and by 1950 there
were 144 unions with more than 144,000 members.
Although the labor movement was federated in 1941, the period from
the end of World War II to 1964 was characterized by numerous splits,
regroupings, and further fragmentation. Factionalism was rampant,
engendered by the reluctance of the Colonial Office to strengthen union
rights, dependence on foreign financial support, the thwarting of
labor's political objectives by nationalist leaders, and intramural
ideological differences. The most visible manifestation of labor
problems was the dispute over whether to affiliate with the East
European socialistoriented World Federation of Trade Unions, based in
Prague, or the more capitalist-oriented International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions, headquartered in Brussels.
In 1963 union members numbered 300,000, or 1.6 percent of the labor
force. Despite this low level of organization, labor discontent worsened
as the gap widened between the wages of white-collar and those of
blue-collar workers. In FY 1964, supervisors were paid thirty-three
times as much as daily-wage workers and semiskilled workers in public
service. After independence, many workers had begun to feel that the
political leadership was making no effort to reduce the inequalities of
the colonial wage and benefit structure. Corruption and conspicuous
consumption were perceived to be widespread among politicians. An April
1963 pay raise for ministers and members of parliament further fueled
labor resentment because rank-and-file civil servants had been doing
without raises since 1960. The five superordinate central labor
organizations consequently formed the Joint Action Committee (JAC) to
pressure the government to raise wages. Numerous delays in the
publication of a government commission report on wages and salaries
provided partial impetus for a JAC-mobilized general strike of 800,000
supporters, most of them nonunionists, which lasted twelve days in June
1964. Although the strike demonstrated the government's fragility, the
JAC could not translate its victory into permanent political strength;
labor unity disintegrated in the face of overtures by political parties
to segments of organized labor as the federal elections of December 1964
neared.
Political parties and communal associations were banned during the
military rule of the late 1960s, so labor unions posed a potential
organized threat to the government. The military government's decree in
1969 forbidding strikes was repeatedly defied during the next four
years, most notably in 1973, when the regime gave in to demands by
striking postal and telecommunications workers, about one-fifth of the
federal civil service. Labor activities and internal strife among four
central labor organizations continued up to 1975, when the military
government attempted, unsuccessfully at first, to merge the four bodies
into one unit, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). The government
dissolved the four central unions, prohibited union affiliations with
international labor organizations, and in 1977 banned eleven labor
leaders from further union activity. Under terms of a 1978 labor decree
amendment, the more than 1,000 previously existing unions were
reorganized into 70 registered industrial unions under the NLC, now the
sole central labor organization.
In the early 1980s, the civilian government found itself losing
control of organized labor. Numerous wildcat strikes occurred in
1980-81, and in May 1981, the NLC mobilized 700,000 of 1 million
unionized Nigerian workers for a two-day strike, despite the opposition
of a government-supported faction.
Working days lost through strikes declined from 9.6 million in 1982
to 200,000 in 1985 in the midst of a decline in national income that had
begun in 1983. Industrial unrest resulted, however, in demands by larger
number of workers for payments of salary arrears and fringe benefits as
real wages fell by almost 60 percent. The causes of the decline in real
wages were the World Bank-advised SAP and the unfavorable terms of trade
that resulted from the collapse of the world oil market between 1986 and
1989.
Nigeria
Nigeria - AGRICULTURE
Nigeria
As economic development occurs, the relative size of the agricultural
sector usually decreases. Accordingly, Nigerian GDP originating in the
agricultural sector shrank from 65.7 percent in FY 1959 to 30.9 percent
by 1976. The overall economic decline reversed this trend, and by 1988,
39.1 percent of GDP was derived from agricultural activity.
The contribution of the agricultural sector increased 3.8 percent
yearly between 1983 and 1988, and the percentage of export value in
agriculture grew from 3 percent in 1983 to 9 percent in 1988, although
much of this growth resulted from the fall in oil export receipts. Food
production also increased rapidly during the 1980s, especially after
exchange-rate reform restricted food imports in 1986.
Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure
In 1990, estimates indicated that 82 million hectares out of
Nigeria's total land area of about 91 million hectares were arable.
However, only about 34 million hectares (or 42 percent of the cultivable
area) were being cultivated at the time. Much of this land was farmed
under bush fallow, a technique whereby an area much larger than that
under cultivation is left idle for varying periods to allow natural
regeneration of soil fertility. Another 18 million hectares were
classified as permanent pasture, but much of this land had the potential
to support crops. About 20 million hectares were covered by forests and
woodlands. Most of this land also had agricultural potential. The
country's remaining 19 million hectares were covered by buildings or
roads, or were considered wasteland.
Nigeria's soil is rated from low to medium in productivity. However,
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
concluded that most of the country's soil would have medium to good
productivity if this resource were managed properly.
Traditional land tenure throughout Nigeria was based on customary
laws under which land was considered community property. An individual
had usufructuary rights to the land he farmed in his lineage or
community area. He could possess the land as long as he used it to his
family's or society's benefit, and could pass the land on to heirs and
pledge its use to satisfy a debt, but could not sell or mortgage it. The
right of disposal belonged only to the community, which, acting through
traditional authorities, exercised this right in accordance with
customary law.
The Fulani conquest of much of northern Nigeria in the early 1800s
brought a change in land tenure in areas under Fulani control. The
conquerors bestowed fiefs on certain individuals, who sometimes
appointed overseers with the power to allocate unused land without
regard for local community interests. One result was a growing number of
grants to strangers during the nineteenth century because overseers
sought to increase the revenue from their landlords' holdings. This
practice gradually reduced the extent of bush land and encouraged the
migration of farmers to urban areas that began toward the end of the
nineteenth century.
In the early 1900s, the British established hopemony over the Fulani
and declared all land in the former Fulani fiefs to be public property.
Subsequently, in contrast to southern Nigeria, where the community owned
land in the north the government required occupancy permits. However, at
the same time the northern authorities were charged with supervision and
protection of the indigenous population's traditional rights, and a
general reversion to customary land-tenure practices occurred. In
predominantly Muslim areas, traditional land inheritance laws were
allowed to remain in force. As a result of the government's support of
local customary laws, encroachment by outsiders appears largely to have
been halted. In 1962 the government of the Northern Region placed formal
restrictions on landholding by individuals who were not members of a
northern community.
In the south, colonial authorities introduced the concept of
individual ownership of property and authorized the legal conveyance of
land that could be registered with the government. Various laws and
ordinances gave government the power to expropriate statutory
landholdings in return for compensation. Expansion of the money economy
and the resulting emphasis on commercial crops encouraged farmers to
seek private ownership of land. Nonetheless, customary tenure remained
the principal form of landholding throughout Nigeria as late as the
early 1970s. During the 1970s, however, individuals and business
enterprises drove up land prices, especially in newly urbanized areas,
by investing heavily in real estate. In the south, customary owners
turned from land sales to more profitable high-rent leasing
arrangements. In the north, where land was held only by permit, farmers
on the outskirts of cities became victims of developmental rezoning.
Their permits were revoked, and, only minimally compensated, they moved
to other areas. The land was then subdivided and sold at high prices.
In response to a potential crisis in land distribution, the Federal
Military Government promulgated the Land Use Decree of March 1978,
establishing a uniform tenure system for all of Nigeria. Subsequently
incorporated in the constitution of 1979, the decree effectively
nationalized all land by requiring certificates of occupancy from the
government for land held under customary and statutory rights and the
payment of rent to the government. However, the decree stipulated that
anyone in a rural or urban area who normally occupied land and developed
it would continue to enjoy the right of occupancy, and could sell or
transfer his interest in the development of the land.
The main purpose of the 1978 decree was to open land to development
by individuals, corporations, institutions, and governments. The decree
gave state and local governments authority to take over and assign any
undeveloped land. Occupancy or possession of undeveloped land by
individuals was restricted. To prevent fragmentation, the statutory
right of occupancy could be passed on only to one person or heir.
<>Crops
<>Irrigation
<>Livestock
<>Forestry
<>Fisheries
Nigeria
Nigeria - Crops
Nigeria
Nigeria's climate permits the cultivation of a variety of crops in a
pattern that emerged in earlier centuries in response to local
conditions. As in other West Africa states, rainfall is heaviest in the
south, where the forests and savannas benefit from abundant
precipitation and relatively short dry seasons. The staples are root
crops, including cassava, yams, taro (cocoyams), and sweet
potatoes. Tree crops--cacao, oil palm, and rubber--constitute the area's
main commercial produce. Cacao, from which cocoa is made, grows mostly
in the southwest. Oil palms (whose kernels can be made into palm wine)
predominate in the southeast and are numerous in the south-central area.
Rubber stands are common in south-central and southeastern Nigeria.
Smallholder farmers, who use simple production techniques and
bush-fallow cultivation and cultivate areas of one-half to two hectares
each, contribute two-thirds of farm production. In most areas, some
noncash crops are grown, such as sorghum, yams, cassava, cowpeas,
millet, corn, cocyams, sweet potatoes, and rice.
The northern third of Nigeria, which experiences a dry season of five
to seven months, during which less than twenty-five millimeters of rain
falls, lies mostly in the Sudan savanna and the arid Sahel zone. There, the staples are millet, cowpeas, and a
drought-resistant variety of sorghum known as guinea corn. Corn is also
cultivated, as well as rice in suitable lowland areas. The north's
principal commercial crops are cotton and groundnuts.
Between the arid north and the moist south lies a Guinea savanna
region sometimes referred to as the middle
belt. This area produces staples such as yams,
sorghum, millet, cassava, cowpeas, and corn, with rice an important crop
in some places. The middle belt's southern edge represents the lower
limits of the northern grain-dominated economy. The most significant
commercial crop of the middle belt is sesame (or benniseed).
Most Nigerians eat grains, but the production and consumption of
sorghum (guinea corn) and millet are heavily concentrated in the savanna
north. In 1980 the two grains accounted for 80 percent of Nigeria's
total grain production. Corn production in the savanna middle belt
benefits from heavier rainfall, which frequently permits two crops a
year. The demand for rice, much of it imported, increased dramatically
during the affluent 1970s, but had to be cut back during the foreign
exchange shortages of the 1980s.
Cocoa and groundnuts were Nigeria's two major exports until petroleum
surpassed both in 1965. Cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, oil palm products,
and rubber were the principal export crops in the 1960s and early 1970s,
but with export reorientation, only cocoa remained of any importance
after 1975. Although Nigeria was the world's largest exporter of
groundnuts in the early 1970s, groundnuts fell from the export list by
the end of the 1970s as a result of the severe Sahel drought of 1972-74
and a viral disease in 1975. With assistance from the World Bank, the
government restored cocoa production in the late 1970s and 1980s through
replanting programs and producer price supports. The resulting increase
in cocoa output (to 200,000 tons in 1988) kept Nigeria in third place
among world cocoa producers, after Ivory Coast and Ghana.
Although the devaluation of the naira and the abolition of
agricultural marketing boards in FY 1986 were intended to increase
cash-crop output, the results were disappointing. The failure to
significantly increase output was caused partly by the lack of
incentives for producers to invest in maintenance.
In the late 1980s, Nigeria reduced the structural bias against
agricultural activity by decontrolling farm prices, maintaining
subsidies on fertilizer and farm exports, and maintaining import bans on
some food items. Despite the granting of increased incentives to the
domestic farming industry, agricultural output rose slowly because of
inadequate transportation and power networks, a lack of appropriate
technology, and the ineffective application of rural credit. Although
the domestic production of food did not decline, on a per capita basis
food became less available during this period.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Irrigation
Nigeria
Traditional cultivators throughout Nigeria used elemental irrigation
systems long before the colonial period. These systems included
seasonally inundated depressions in upland areas of the south and parts
of the middle belt that received heavy rainfall, shallow swamps, and
seasonally flooded riverine land. In the north, shadoof irrigation was
also used along rivers, and some use was made of wells. Smallholders
were using traditional methods to irrigate about 120,000 hectares in the
1950s and about 800,000 hectares in the late 1970s.
In 1949 the Northern Region established the first government
irrigation agency. By the end of the 1960s, government projects-- all
relatively small--brought 9,000 hectares under irrigation. The severe
Sahel drought of 1972-74 resulted in the expenditure of large sums for
irrigation development by the federal government and by some state
governments during the third plan, 1975-80. In 1975 the federal
government established the Ministry of Water Resources and in 1976
created eleven river basin development authorities with responsibility
for irrigation and the comprehensive development of water resources.
Major irrigation projects after the mid-1970s included the South Chad
Irrigation Project in Borno State, the Bakolori Project in Sokoto State,
and the Kano River Project.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Livestock
Nigeria
Reliable statistics on livestock holdings did not exist, but careful
estimates suggested a total of 10 to 11 million cattle in the early
1970s and, after the severe drought, 8.5 million in the late 1970s.
Although an epidemic of rinderpest killed more than a million cattle in
1983, production recovered by the end of the 1980s. The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization estimated that in 1987 there were 12.2 million
cattle, 13.2 million sheep, 26.0 million goats, 1.3 million pigs,
700,000 donkeys, 250,000 horses, 18,0000 camels found mostly in the
Sahel savanna around Lake Chad, and 175 million poultry nationally,
owned mostly by villages rather than by commercial operators. The
livestock subsector accounted for about 2 percent of GDP in the 1980s
Until the 1990s, cattle-raising was limited largely to the northern
fifth of the country that was free of the tsetse fly. A program of
tsetse-fly research and eradication was somewhat successful during the
1970s and 1980s, but 90 percent of the national cattle herd was still
found in the northern states in 1990. About 96 percent of these animals
were zebu-type cattle, most of which were tended by Fulani pastoralists.
Traditionally, the Fulani moved their herds during the dry season to
pasture in the moister Guinea savanna, returning northward when the
rains began and danger from the tsetse fly increased. During the 1970s
and 1980s, the expansion of cultivated areas and irrigation seriously
obstructed this migration by cutting off access to usual travel routes.
Most of Nigeria's remaining cattle, 3 to 4 percent, are smaller than
the zebu type and less valuable as draft animals. However, they possess
a resistance to trypanosomiasis that makes it possible to raise them in
the tsetse-infested humid forest zone. The government improved these
herds in early 1980 by importing breeding stock of a particularly
disease-resistant strain from The Gambia.
By the early 1970s, as the general standard of living improved, the
demand for meat in Nigeria exceeded the domestic supply. As a result, 30
to 40 percent of the beef consumed in Nigeria was imported from Niger,
Chad, and other neighboring countries. In the mid-1970s, Nigeria began
importing frozen beef in response to export restrictions initiated by
its neighbors. The National Livestock Production Company established
domestic commercial cattle ranches in the late 1970s, but with poor
results.
Most of Nigeria's sheep and goats are in the north, where the Fulani
maintained an approximate ratio of 30 percent sheep and goats to 70
percent cattle. About 40 percent of northern nonFulani farming
households are estimated to keep sheep and goats. Most pigs are raised
in the south, where the Muslim proscription against eating pork is not a
significant factor.
Almost all rural households raise poultry as a subsistence meat.
Chickens are predominantly of indigenous origin, and there is some
crossbreeding with foreign stock. Egg production is low. Private
commercial poultry operations increased rapidly during the 1970s and
1980s near urban areas, providing a growing source of eggs for the
cities. But commercial operations remained largely dependent on corn and
other feeds imported from the United States.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Forestry
Nigeria
Nigeria's forests can be divided into two principal categories:
woodlands and forests of the savanna regions (fourfifths of the
country's forest area) that are sources of fuel and poles, and
rainforests of the southern humid zone that supply almost all domestic
timber and lumber, with fuelwood as a byproduct. Nigeria's forests have
gradually shrunk over the centuries, especially in the north, where
uncontrolled commercial exploitation of privately owned forests began in
the late nineteenth century. Toward the end of the 1800s, the colonial
government began establishing forest reserves. By 1900 more than 970
square kilometers had been set aside. By 1930 this reserve had grown to
almost 30,000 square kilometers, and by 1970 to 93,420 square
kilometers, mostly in the savanna regions.
Through the 1950s, forest regeneration was largely by natural
reseeding, although the government established some small plantations
near larger towns for fuelwood and poles. In the early 1960s, the
government began emphasizing the development of forest plantations,
especially ones planted with fast-growing, exotic species, such as teak
and gmelina (an Australian hardwood). By 1976 about 115,000 hectares had
been planted. During the late 1970s and 1980s, state plantations became
an important source of timber, paper pulp, poles, and fuelwood. Despite
these developments, forestry's share of Nigeria's expanding GDP declined
from 6 percent in the late 1950s to 2 percent in the late 1970s and
1980s. Earnings from the export of timber and wood products--6 percent
of export income in 1960-- declined to 1 percent of export income in
1970 and virtually nothing in the late 1970s and 1980s, as domestic
needs increased rapidly. The oil boom of the 1970s slowed exports
further, as more and more wood was diverted to the domestic construction
industry.
In the 1980s, Nigeria's demand for commercial wood products
(excluding paper pulp and paper) threatened to exhaust reserves before
the year 2000. To reverse this process, especially in the northern
savanna, the government needed to double the rate of annual plantings it
set in the 1980s. In June 1989, the government announced receipt of a
World Bank loan for afforestation to stabilize wood product output and
forest reserves.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Fisheries
Nigeria
Data on fisheries output were meager in 1990. In the mid1960s ,
estimates indicated that Nigerian fisheries brought in 120,000 tons of
fish per year and imported 180,000 tons, mostly air-dried fish. Domestic
production through the 1970s ranged from 600,000 to 700,000 tons
annually.
Nigeria has declared an exclusive economic zone extending 200
nautical miles from its coast. These waters include the continental
shelf along more than 800 kilometers of coastline, a large area of
brackish lagoons and creeks, and freshwater rivers and inland lakes,
including fish-rich Lake Chad and Kainji Reservoir, among other
artificial bodies of water. In the early 1980s, the bulk of the catch
was taken by small businesses using large canoes (some motorized) along
the coast, smaller canoes in the creeks and lagoons, and similar small
boats in freshwater areas. The modern commercial fishing fleet consisted
of about 300 licensed craft ranging in size from 20 tons to more than
6,000 tons; about one-third were vessels under 265 tons that engaged in
inshore fishing and shrimping. In the mid-1970s, the government set up
the Nigerian National Fish Company jointly with foreign interests to
operate a deep-sea fishing fleet. In 1975 the Nigerian National Shrimp
Company was established in partnership with a North American firm. But
deep-sea fisheries were, and in 1990 continued to be, dominated by
foreign-owned trawlers, despite substantial investment in fisheries
development, including the provision of fishing supplies and outboard'
motors to small local enterprises in the late 1970s.
Nigeria
Nigeria - MANUFACTURING
Nigeria
While agriculture's relative share of GDP was falling,
manufacturing's contribution rose from 4.4 percent in FY 1959 to 9.4
percent in 1970, before falling during the oil boom to 7.0 percent in
1973, increasing to 11.4 percent in 1981, and declining to 10.0 percent
in 1988. Whereas manufacturing increased rapidly during the 1970s,
tariff manipulations encouraged the expansion of assembly activities
dependent on imported inputs; these activities contributed little to
indigenous value added or to employment, and reduced subsequent
industrial growth. The manufacturing sector produced a range of goods
that included milled grain, vegetable oil, meat products, dairy
products, sugar refined, soft drinks, beer, cigarettes, textiles,
footwear, wood, paper products, soap, paint, pharmaceutical goods,
ceramics, chemical products, tires, tubes, plastics, cement, glass,
bricks, tiles, metal goods, agricultural machinery, household electrical
appliances, radios, motor vehicles, and jewelry.
From 1982 to 1986, Nigeria's value added in manufacturing fell 25
percent, partly as a result of inefficient resource allocation caused by
distorted prices (especially for exports and import substitutes) and
prohibitive import restrictions. Between 1986 and 1988, World Bank
structural adjustment program (SAP) measures contributed to larger
increases in manufacturing's contribution to GDP, which grew 8 percent
in 1988. These measures included liberalized regulations governing the
import of capital, raw materials, and components; the creation of
importsubstitution industries; and, beginning in 1988, privatization.
The SAP increased production efficiency, cut into the black market, and
reduced factory closures resulting from import bans on essential inputs.
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decrees of 1972, 1977, and 1981,
by limiting foreign ownership shares in various industries, shifted the
manufacturing sector from foreign majority ownership in the 1960s to
indigenous majority ownership in the mid-1970s and late 1970s.
Businesspeople participated in economic policymaking, influencing the
government's implementation of indigenization.
"Nigerianization," in which foreigners were obligated to sell
ownership shares to Nigerians, became an instrument by which a few civil
servants, military leaders, businesspeople, and professionals amassed
considerable wealth. In 1985 the government selectively relaxed the
indigenization decrees to encourage foreign investment in neglected
areas, such as large-scale agrobusiness and manufacturing that used
local resources. After March 1988, foreign investors were allowed to
increase their holdings in a number of other sectors.
Nigeria
Nigeria - MINING, OIL, AND ENERGY
Nigeria
Petroleum products accounted for two-thirds of the energy consumed in
1990, but Nigeria also had substantial resources in the form of
hydroelectricity, wood, subbituminous coal, charcoal, and lignite. In
the 1980s, most cooking was done with wood fuels, although in urban
areas petroleum use increased. Coal, originally mined as fuel for
railroads, largely had been replaced by diesel oil except in a few
industrial establishments. Coal production fell from 940,000 tons in
1958 to 73,000 tons in 1986, only a fraction of 1 percent of Nigeria's
commercially produced energy.
Tin and columbite output fell from the 1960s through the 1980s as
high-grade ore reserves became exhausted. A fraction of the extensive
deposits of iron ore began to be mined in the mid1980s , and uranium was
discovered but not exploited. Almost none of these minerals left the
country, however, as petroleum continued to account for virtually all of
Nigeria's mineral exports.
Mining contributed 1.0 percent of GDP in FY 1959, on the eve of
independence. This sector's share (including petroleum) stood at more
than 14 percent in 1988. Mining's general upward trend since l959, as
well as the fluctuations in the size of its contribution to GDP, can be
attributed to the expansion and instability of the world oil market
since 1973.
<>Oil and Gas
Nigeria
Nigeria - Oil and Gas
Nigeria
Nigeria's first oil refinery, at Alesa Eleme near Port Harcourt,
began operations in late 1965 with a capacity of 38,000 barrels per day,
enough to meet domestic requirements at the time. The refinery expanded
production to 60,000 barrels per day after the civil war but failed to
satisfy the demands of a rapidly growing economy. An additional
refinery, delayed by political maneuvering over its location, was
constructed at Warri, opening in 1978 with a capacity of 100,000 barrels
per day. This plant was entirely owned by a parastatal, the Nigerian
National Petroleum Company (NNPC), which starting in 1979 also held an
80 percent interest in the earlier plant. Technical problems and
shutdowns for routine maintenance reduced production, and the combined
total of petroleum processed by the two plants in 1979 averaged 89,000
barrels per day--about 83 percent of the domestic requirement.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the NNPC had substantial amounts
of oil refined abroad (mostly by Shell) to make up the shortfall, and
some oil was also processed in Cameroon, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. In
October 1980, a third refinery, with a capacity of 100,000 barrels per
day, began operations at Kaduna, but did not become fully productive
until the mid-1980s. A fourth refinery was completed in March 1989 at
Alesa Eleme, increasing Nigeria's refining capacity to 445,000 barrels
per day. Domestic petroleum demand stood at 250,000 barrels per day, so
a portion of the output of the four refineries could now be exported.
However, by the early 1990s gasoline output was sufficiently short of
the growing domestic demand to require that the NNPC still refine some
gasoline abroad.
In 1988, about 96 percent of the oil Nigeria produced came from
companies in which the NNPC held at least 60 percent of the equity. The
NNPC also was responsible for 75 percent of total investment in
petroleum. In the late 1980s, the major Western oil companies exploring
oil resources in Nigeria (primarily in midwestern, southeastern, and
nearby offshore wells) were (in descending order of importance) Shell,
Chevron, Mobil, Agip, Elf Aquitaine, Phillips, Texaco, and Ashland. In
1985-88, 11 percent of all extracted oil (about 66 percent of domestic
requirements) was refined in Nigerian refineries, where the NNPC owned
majority equity shares.
From 1974 to 1981, while real oil prices remained high, lending to
major oil exporting countries, such as Nigeria, was considered very
safe. Indeed, Nigeria did not borrow extensively abroad until 1978, when
a fall in the price of oil required Lagos to borrow US$16 million on
world capital markets. Thereafter, Nigeria continued international
borrowing for an ambitious investment program, anticipating an oil-price
recovery. The world's sixth largest oil exporter and the leader in oil
exports in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria nonetheless experienced an
external trade surplus only from 1973 to 1975 and 1979 to 1980, during
two oil price peaks, and in the late 1980s, when debtservicing burdens
forced import reductions, especially in services.
Besides oil, Nigeria had substantial reserves of natural gas.
Although the consumption of natural gas increased steadily in the late
1970s and 1980s, and in 1990 constituted more than 20 percent of
Nigeria's total energy from commercial sources, the quantity of gas used
was only a fraction of what was available. In 1988, with the largest
natural gas reserves in Africa, Nigeria produced 21.2 billion cubic
meters per day, with 2.9 billion cubic meters used by the National
Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and other domestic customers, 2.6
billion cubic meters used by foreign oil companies, and 15.7 billion
cubic meters (77 percent) wasted through flaring. Small amounts of gas
were also consumed by petroleum producers to furnish power for their own
operations and as fuel for some equipment. Domestically, there remained
a large potential market for bottled liquid petroleum gas (LPG), which
was produced primarily at the Kaduna refinery.
In the early 19900, Nigeria was undertaking a major project to market
liquefied natural gas (LNG) (instead of flaring gas produced in the oil
fields) by building a gas liquefaction plant on the Bonny River. Four
companies signed an agreement in May 1989 to implementthis plan: NNPC
(60 percent share)), Shell (20 percent), Agip (Azienda generale italiana
dei petroli--10 percent), and Elf Aquitaine (10 percent), with plant
construction scheduled to begin in 1991. Other aspects of the project
involved Nigerian government construction of gas pipelines for
distribution to domestic, residential, and commercial users and a supply
of gas to the NNPC chemical complex at Port Harcourt. Much of the gas
was intended for export, however, and the first LNG tanker was launched
in October 19900 through the cooperative efforts of Nigeria and Japan.
Nigeria
Nigeria - BANKING AND FINANCE
Nigeria
In 1892 Nigeria's first bank, the African Banking Corporation, was
established. No banking legislation existed until 1952, at which point
Nigeria had three foreign banks (the Bank of British West Africa,
Barclays Bank, and the British and French Bank) and two indigenous banks
(the National Bank of Nigeria and the African Continental Bank) with a
collective total of forty branches. A 1952 ordinance set standards,
required reserve funds, established bank examinations, and provided for
assistance to indigenous banks. Yet for decades after 1952, the growth
of demand deposits was slowed by the Nigerian propensity to prefer cash
and to distrust checks for debt settlements.
British colonial officials established the West African Currency
Board in 1912 to help finance the export trade of foreign firms in West
Africa and to issue a West African currency convertible to British
pounds sterling. But colonial policies barred local investment of
reserves, discouraged deposit expansion, precluded discretion for
monetary management, and did nothing to train Africans in developing
indigenous financial institutions. In 1952 several Nigerian members of
the federal House of Assembly called for the establishment of a central
bank to facilitate economic development. Although the motion was
defeated, the colonial administration appointed a Bank of England
official to study the issue. He advised against a central bank,
questioning such a bank's effectiveness in an undeveloped capital
market. In 1957 the Colonial Office sponsored another study that
resulted in the establishment of a Nigerian central bank and the
introduction of a Nigerian currency. The Nigerian
pound, on a par with the pound sterling until the
British currency's devaluation in 1967, was converted in 1973 to a
decimal currency, the naira (N), equivalent to two old Nigerian pounds.
The smallest unit of the new currency was the kobo, 100 of which equaled
1 naira. The naira, which exchanged for US$1.52 in January 1973 and
again in March 1982 (or N0.67 = US$1), despite the floating exchange
rate, depreciated relative to the United States dollar in the 1980s. The
average exchange rate in 1990 was N8.004 = US$1. Depreciation
accelerated after the creation of a second-tier foreign exchange market
under World Bank structural adjustment in September 1986.
The Central Bank of Nigeria, which was statutorily independent of the
federal government until 1968, began operations on July 1, 1959.
Following a decade of struggle over the relationship between the
government and the Central Bank, a 1968 military decree granted
authority over banking and monetary policy to the Federal Executive
Council. The role of the Central Bank, similar to that of central banks
in North America and Western Europe, was to establish the Nigerian
currency, control and regulate the banking system, serve as banker to
other banks in Nigeria, and carry out the government's economic policy
in the monetary field. This policy included control of bank credit
growth, credit distribution by sector, cash reserve requirements for
commercial banks, discount rates--interest rates the Central Bank
charged commercial and merchant banks--and the ratio of banks' long-term
assets to deposits. Changes in Central Bank restrictions on credit and
monetary expansion affected total demand and income. For example, in
1988, as inflation accelerated, the Central Bank tried to restrain
monetary growth.
During the civil war, the government limited and later suspended
repatriation of dividends and profits, reduced foreign travel allowances
for Nigerian citizens, limited the size of allowances to overseas public
offices, required official permission for all foreign payments, and, in
January 1968, issued new currency notes to replace those in circulation.
Although in 1970 the Central Bank advised against dismantling of import
and financial constraints too soon after the war, the oil boom soon
permitted Nigeria to relax restrictions.
The three largest commercial banks held about one-third of total bank
deposits. In 1973 the federal government undertook to acquire a
40-percent equity ownership of the three largest foreign banks. In 1976,
under the second Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree requiring
60-percent indigenous holdings, the federal government acquired an
additional 20-percent holding in the three largest foreign banks and
60-percent ownership in the other foreign banks. Yet indigenization did
not change the management, control, and lending orientation toward
international trade, particularly of foreign companies and their
Nigerian subsidiaries of foreign banks.
At the end of 1988, the banking system consisted of the Central Bank
of Nigeria, forty-two commercial banks, and twentyfour merchant banks, a
substantial increase since 1986. Merchant banks were allowed to open
checking accounts for corporations only and could not accept deposits
below N50,000. Commercial and merchant banks together had 1,500 branches
in 1988, up from 1,000 in 1984. In 1988 commercial banks had assets of
N52.2 billion compared to N12.6 billion for merchant banks in early
1988. In FY 1990 the government put N503 million into establishing
community banks to encourage community development associations,
cooperative societies, farmers' groups, patriotic unions, trade groups,
and other local organizations, especially in rural areas.
Other financial institutions included government-owned specialized
development banks: the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, the
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, and the Nigerian Agricultural
Bank, as well as the Federal Savings Banks and the Federal Mortgage
Bank. Also active in Nigeria were numerous insurance companies, pension
funds, and finance and leasing companies. Nigeria also had a stock
exchange (established in Lagos in 1961) and a number of stockbrokerage
firms. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Decree of 1988 gave
the Nigerian SEC powers to regulate and supervise the capital market.
These powers included the right to revoke stockbroker registrations and
approve or disapprove any new stock exchange. Established in 1988, the
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation increased confidence in the banks
by protecting depositors against bank failures in licensed banks up to
N50,000 in return for an annual bank premium of nearly 1 percent of
total deposit liabilities.
Finance and insurance services represented more than 3 percent of
Nigeria's GDP in 1988. Economists agree that services, consisting
disproportionately of nonessential items, tend to expand as a share of
national income as a national economy grows. However, Nigeria, lacked
comparable statistics over an extended period, preventing
generalizations about the service sector. Statistics indicate,
nevertheless, that services went from 28.9 percent of GDP in 1981 to
31.1 percent in 1988, a period of no economic growth. In 1988 services
comprised the following percentages of GDP: wholesale and retail trade,
17.1 percent; hotels and restaurants, less than 1 percent; housing, 2.0
percent; government services, 6. percent; real estate and business
services, less than 1 percent; and other services, less than 1 percent.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Government
Nigeria
THE STORY OF NIGERIA during the postcolonial era has been one of a
search for the constitutional and political arrangement that, while
allowing for the self-expression of its socially and culturally diverse
peoples, would not hinder the construction of a nation out of this
mosaic. In this search, the country has experienced cycles of military
and civilian rule, civil war, and peaceful reconstruction.
If any nation typified political scientist Richard Sklar's
characterization of the African continent as a "workshop of
democracy," it would certainly be Nigeria. The country has
experimented with different federal, state, and local government
systems, learning more about its needs, resources, and constraints with
each experiment. Despite the predominance of military regimes during the
three postcolonial decades, Nigerian society has retained many of the
fundamental building blocks of a democratic polity: vigorous
entrepreneurial classes, a broad intelligentsia and numerous centers of
higher education, a dynamic legal community and judiciary, diverse and
often outspoken media, and, increasingly, courageous human rights
organizations.
Despite the differences in character and composition of the
successive governments, it is still possible to identify the major
threads of Nigeria's institutional evolution. As the nation finds itself
once more on the threshold of transition from military to civilian rule,
promised for 1992, examination of these threads is essential for
understanding the Nigeria that will become the Third Republic.
Nigeria is essentially an artificial creation, which, like most other
African states, is a product of colonialism. This fact is central to
understanding the country's government and politics, which have been
conditioned and bedeviled by the problems of accommodating several
diversities: ethnic, linguistic (there are between 250 and 400 distinct
languages), geopolitical, religious (there is a deepening cleavage
between Christians and Muslims), and class.
Nigeria became politically independent on October 1, 1960, after
about seven decades of colonial rule by the British. Prior to colonial
rule, most of the groups that today make up the country were often
distinguished by differences in history, culture, political development,
and religion. The major differences among these precolonial groups
pertained to their sociopolitical organization: anthropological and
historical studies usually distinguish between societies that were
centralized ("state") and those that were noncentralized
("stateless"). To the former category belonged the Sokoto
Caliphate and the emirates of the north that, together with the
Kanem-Bornu Empire, were advanced Islamic theocracies. Also included in
this category were the Benin, Oyo, and other western kingdoms, as well
as the Igala Kingdom in the middle
belt or lower north. In these centralized systems,
there were clear divisions between the rulers and the ruled, usually
based on wealth and ascribed status. Institutions of a distinctly
political nature, as well as taxation systems, were already established.
Of all the centralized systems, the Sokoto Caliphate with its vassal
emirates had the most advanced form of state organization. Not
surprisingly, it provided the model for the British colonial policy of
indirect rule, i.e., the governance of indigenous peoples through their
own institutions and rulers.
By contrast, in noncentralized systems such as those of the Igbo and
other eastern and middle-belt groups, there was a diffusion of
political, economic, and religious institutions and practices. Also to
be found was a large measure of egalitarianism, democracy, and
decentralized authority. Under the colonial policy of indirect rule,
"traditional" rulers (known as warrant chiefs) were imposed on
these stateless societies.
In the immediate precolonial period, a pronounced religious gulf
separated the northern from the southern peoples. Islam had been
introduced to the Hausa states and other northern parts in the fifteenth
century, but it did not dominate until the jihad of 1804, which extended
Islamic influence to most parts of the north and even to towns on the
southern fringe, such as Oyo and Auchi. The southern peoples were
devotees mainly of traditional religions who underwent increasing
contact with, and exposure to, Europeans and Christianity. In some areas
of the south, such as Benin and Warri, the penetration of Christianity
dates to the fifteenth century. When the north experienced contact with
Europeans much later, the spread of Christianity and other Western
influences was slowed by the strong attachment to Islam. This fact
explains in part the uneven rates of economic and educational
development between the northern and southern peoples that have
persisted to this day, with important consequences for government and
politics.
It should not be assumed that the various population groups in
precolonial Nigeria were completely separated from one another.
Historians have established evidence of various forms of interaction
among the peoples, the major ones being trade and
superordinate-subordinate relationships. Powerful centralized systems,
such as the Sokoto Caliphate and the Benin Empire, dominated several
neighboring groups. Where no established group held sway over the
others, as was the case among the Yoruba-speaking people in the
nineteenth century, a pattern of conflicts and wars prevailed. On
balance, there were pronounced differences among the people who later
came to comprise Nigeria, especially when we consider the major regional
groups. British rule did much to accentuate these differences and, in
some cases, created new divisive sentiments. Even the nature of British
conquest and the process by which its rule was established encouraged
separate identities.
The conquest and colonization of the coastal area of Lagos and its
hinterlands took place between 1861 and 1897. The conquest of the
eastern region and the declaration of the Niger Coast Protectorate
occurred in 1894. Finally, a third wave of penetration led to the
declaration of a protectorate over the northern areas in 1900. In 1906
the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (which
included the former Niger Coast Protectorate) were joined together to
become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1914
the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated to become the
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, although both parts continued to be
administered separately.
During the period extending from amalgamation in 1914 to independence
from colonial rule in 1960, Nigeria had four major constitutions, each
named after the colonial governor who formulated it: the Clifford
Constitution (1922), Richards Constitution (1946), Macpherson
Constitution (1951), and Lyttleton Constitution (1954). Although the
first two constitutions were virtually imposed on the country, the
latter two involved some consultations with representatives of the
people through constitutional conferences. At the Ibadan General
Conference of 1950, Nigerian leaders agreed that only a federal system
that allowed each of the three regions (north, west, and east as created
by the Richards Constitution) to progress at its own pace would be
acceptable. Until that point, the constitutions had a unitary
orientation. In creating three regions and delegating some powers to
them, the Richards Constitution was a forerunner of the later federal
constitutions.
Although the regional leaders at the Ibadan conference had
unequivocally declared their preference for federalism, the subsequent
Macpherson Constitution was essentially unitary. It went farther than
the Richards Constitution in devolving power to the regions but left the
regions subordinate and closely tied to the central government. Because
many Nigerian political leaders favored a federal system in which the
regions enjoyed wide autonomy, the Macpherson Constitution engendered
continuing opposition. Finally, in 1953, this constitution became
unworkable.
Rather than self-government for the whole nation, the northerners
wanted self-government as soon as practicable and only for any region
that was ready for it. They believed that each region should progress
politically at its own pace. When a constitutional conference was
convened in London in 1953, a federal constitution that gave the regions
significant autonomy eventually emerged. This Lyttleton Constitution was
the one that remained in force, with slight amendments, until
independence in 1960. It enabled the regions to become self-governing at
their own pace: the two southern regions in 1956 and the northern region
in 1959.
Several important developments that have continued to affect
Nigeria's government and politics in the postcolonial period marked the
period of colonial rule. First, British colonial rule nurtured
north-south separation, which has remained the classic cleavage in the
country. In particular, after Lord Frederick Lugard's pact with northern
emirs to protect Islamic civilization, the north was shut off from much
of the Westernizing influences to which the south was exposed. This
protection gave the southern peoples a head start, especially in Western
education. During the struggle for independence, northern leaders were
afflicted by a constant fear of southern domination. Many of the
northern responses to national politics to this day can be attributed to
this fear. At the same time, with the creation of three regions that saw
the northern region larger in size and population than the two southern
regions, there was also a southern fear of northern domination. The
image of a homogenous north, although contradicted by the cultural
diversity of that region, continued in 1990 to feature prominently in
most southerners' perception of national politics.
Second, in creating largely artificial regions, the British fostered
the cleavage between ethnic majority and minority groups. Each region
contained the nucleus of a majority group that dominated in its
respective region: the Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the
west, and the Igbo in the east. The major political parties that emerged
in the regions and controlled them were based on these groups. With
regional autonomy, the major groups became the major
"shareholders" of the federation. Power-sharing and political
calculations have consequently centered on ensuring a balance of power
among these groups. The minorities, feeling oppressed and dominated,
agitated for separate states in the regions. Although a panel was
appointed in 1956 to inquire into the fears of the minorities and to
explore ways of allaying them, their requests were not met until after
independence.
Third, the uneven rates of development among the groups, which
generally coincided with regional boundaries, strengthened the forces of
regionalism. The creed became north for northerners, west for
westerners, and east for easterners. Despite the periodic creation of
more states during the postcolonial period, these regionalist feelings
continued to affect national politics, especially in the distribution of
national resources. One manifestation of this tendency was the ceaseless
disagreements and rancor over revenue allocation.
Another consequence of these regional and ethnic divisions was the
fragmentation of the national elite. Unlike a few other African
countries, Nigeria had no fully national leaders at independence. Nnamdi
Azikiwe, an Igbo, who had the greatest potential for becoming a national
leader, was forced by regionalist pressures to become a sectional
leader. The other leaders during the postindependence period--Ahmadu
Bello, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Obafemi Awolowo, Michael Okpara, Samuel
Akintola, and Aminu Kano--are best remembered as sectional leaders, even
though they are usually called nationalists. This fractionalization of
the political elite in turn reinforced ethnicity, regionalism, and
religious conflicts, as these sentiments were often aroused in the
competition for power, material resources, and privileges.
The colonial heritage, therefore, produced a country that was only
weakly united. At some points, the regional leaders threatened to secede
from the federation: in the early to mid- 1950s northern leaders
contemplated separation after their humiliation by southerners because
of their refusal to support a motion for achieving self-government in
1956; in 1954 the Western Region threatened to separate itself if the
colony of Lagos were not made a part of that region. There were strong
countervailing factors that prevented breakup of the federation. First,
British colonial rule had held the country together as one unit. Second,
the regions had economic complementarity. In particular, given the
export orientation of the colonial economy, the landlocked northern
region depended greatly on the southern regions that had access to the
sea. Third, in the final days of colonial rule, Nigerian leaders
recognized the advantages conferred by the country's large size and
population.
<>THE FIRST REPUBLIC
<>MILITARY INTERVENTION AND RULE
<>POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
<>FEDERALISM
<>THE CIVIL SERVICE
<>INTEREST GROUPS
<>FOREIGN RELATIONS
Nigeria
Nigeria - THE FIRST REPUBLIC
Nigeria
Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. The period between
this date and January 15, 1966, when the first military coup d'�tat
took place, is generally referred to as the First Republic, although the
country only became a republic on October 1, 1963. After a plebiscite in
February 1961, the Northern Cameroons, which before then was
administered separately within Nigeria, voted to join Nigeria.
At independence Nigeria had all the trappings of a democratic state
and was indeed regarded as a beacon of hope for democracy. It had a
federal constitution that guaranteed a large measure of autonomy to
three (later four) regions; it operated a parliamentary democracy
modeled along British lines that emphasized majority rule; the
constitution included an elaborate bill of rights; and, unlike other
African states that adopted one-party systems immediately after
independence, the country had a functional, albeit regionally based,
multiparty system.
These democratic trappings were not enough to guarantee the survival
of the republic because of certain fundamental and structural
weaknesses. Perhaps the most significant weakness was the
disproportionate power of the north in the federation. The departing
colonial authority had hoped that the development of national politics
would forestall any sectional domination of power, but it underestimated
the effects of a regionalized party system in a country where political
power depended on population. The major political parties in the
republic had emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as regional
parties whose main aim was to control power in their regions. The
Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG), which
controlled the Northern Region and the Western Region, respectively,
clearly emerged in this way. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens
(NCNC), which controlled the Eastern Region and the Midwestern Region
(created in 1963), began as a nationalist party but was forced by the
pressures of regionalism to become primarily an eastern party, albeit
with strong pockets of support elsewhere in the federation. These
regional parties were based upon, and derived their main support from,
the major groups in their regions: NPC (Hausa/Fulani), AG (Yoruba), and
NCNC (Igbo). A notable and more ideologically-based political party that
never achieved significant power was Aminu Kano's radical Northern
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which opposed the NPC in the north
from its Kano base.
There were also several political movements formed by minority groups
to press their demands for separate states. These minority parties also
doubled as opposition parties in the regions and usually aligned
themselves with the party in power in another region that supported
their demands for a separate state. Ethnic minorities therefore enabled
the regional parties to extend their influence beyond their regions.
In the general election of 1959 to determine which parties would rule
in the immediate postcolonial period, the major ones won a majority of
seats in their regions, but none emerged powerful enough to constitute a
national government. A coalition government was formed by the NPC and
NCNC, the former having been greatly favored by the departing colonial
authority. The coalition provided a measure of north-south consensus
that would not have been the case if the NCNC and AG had formed a
coalition. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) became the governor general (and
president after the country became a republic in 1963), Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa (NPC) was named prime minister, and Obafemi Awolowo (AG) had to
settle for leader of the opposition. The regional premiers were Ahmadu
Bello (Northern Region, NPC), Samuel Akintola (Western Region, AG),
Michael Okpara (Eastern Region, NCNC), and Dennis Osadebey (Midwestern
Region, NCNC).
Among the difficulties of the republic were efforts of the NPC, the
senior partner in the coalition government, to use the federal
government's increasing power in favor of the Northern Region. The
balance rested on the premise that the Northern Region had the political
advantage deriving from its preponderant size and population, and the
two southern regions (initially the Eastern Region and the Western
Region) had the economic advantage as sources of most of the exported
agricultural products, in addition to their control of the federal
bureaucracy. The NPC sought to redress northern economic and
bureaucratic disadvantages. Under the First National Development Plan,
many of the federal government's projects and military establishments
were allocated to the north. There was an "affirmative action"
program by the government to recruit and train northerners, resulting in
the appointment of less qualified northerners to federal public service
positions, many replacing more qualified southerners. Actions such as
these served to estrange the NCNC from its coalition partner. The
reactions to the fear of northern dominance, and especially the steps
taken by the NCNC to counter the political dominance of the north,
accelerated the collapse of the young republic.
The southern parties, especially the embittered NCNC, had hoped that
the regional power balance could be shifted if the 1962 census favored
the south. Population determined the allocation of parliamentary seats
on which the power of every region was based. Because population figures
were also used in allocating revenue to the regions and in determining
the viability of any proposed new region, the 1962 census was approached
by all regions as a key contest for control of the federation. This
contest led to various illegalities: inflated figures, electoral
violence, falsification of results, manipulation of population figures,
and the like. Although the chief census officer found evidence of more
inflated figures in the southern regions, the northern region retained
its numerical superiority. As could be expected, southern leaders
rejected the results, leading to a cancellation of the census and to the
holding of a fresh census in 1963. This population count was finally
accepted after a protracted legal battle by the NCNC and gave the
Northern Region a population of 29,758,975 out of the total of
55,620,268. These figures eliminated whatever hope the southerners had
of ruling the federation.
Since the 1962-63 exercise, the size and distribution of the
population have remained volatile political issues. In fact, the importance and sensitivity of a census count have
increased because of the expanded use of population figures for revenue
allocations, constituency delineation, allocations under the quota
system of admissions into schools and employment, and the siting of
industries and social amenities such as schools, hospitals, and post
offices. Another census in 1973 failed, even though it was conducted by
a military government that was less politicized than its civilian
predecessor. What made the 1973 census particularly volatile was the
fact that it was part of a transition plan by the military to hand over
power to civilians. The provisional figures showed an increase for the
states that were carved out of the former Northern Region with a
combined 51.4 million people out of a total 79.8 million people. Old
fears of domination were resurrected, and the stability of the
federation was again seriously threatened. The provisional results were
finally canceled in 1975. As of late 1990, no other census had been
undertaken, although one was scheduled for 1991 as part of the
transition to civilian rule. In the interim, Nigeria has relied on
population projections based on 1963 census figures.
Other events also contributed to the collapse of the First Republic.
In 1962, after a split in the leadership of the AG that led to a crisis
in the Western Region, a state of emergency was declared in the region,
and the federal government invoked its emergency powers to administer
the region directly. These actions resulted in removing the AG from
regional power. Awolowo, its leader, along with other AG leaders, was
convicted of treasonable felony. Awolowo's former deputy and premier of
the Western Region formed a new party--the Nigerian National Democratic
Party (NNDP)--that took over the government. The federal coalition
government also supported agitation of minority groups for a separate
state to be excised from the Western Region. In 1963 the Midwestern
Region was created.
By the time of the 1964 general elections, the first to be conducted
solely by Nigerians, the country's politics had become polarized into a
competition between two opposing alliances. One was the Nigerian
National Alliance made up of the NPC and NNDC; the other was the United
Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, the AG, and
their allies. Each of the regional parties openly intimidated its
opponents in the campaigns. When it became clear that the neutrality of
the Federal Electoral Commission could not be guaranteed, calls were
made for the army to supervise the elections. The UPGA resolved to
boycott the elections. When elections were finally held under conditions
that were not free and were unfair to opponents of the regional parties,
the NCNC was returned to power in the east and midwest, while the NPC
kept control of the north and was also in a position to form a federal
government on its own. The Western Region became the "theater of
war" between the NNDP (and the NPC) and the AG-UPGA. The
rescheduled regional elections late in 1965 were violent. The federal
government refused to declare a state of emergency, and the military
seized power on January 15, 1966. The First Republic had collapsed.
Scholars have made several attempts to explain the collapse. Some
attribute it to the inappropriateness of the political institutions and
processes and to their not being adequately entrenched under colonial
rule, whereas others hold the elite responsible. Lacking a political
culture to sustain democracy, politicians failed to play the political
game according to established rules. The failure of the elite appears to
have been a symptom rather than the cause of the problem. Because
members of the elite lacked a material base for their aspirations, they
resorted to control of state offices and resources. At the same time,
the uneven rates of development among the various groups and regions
invested the struggle for state power with a group character. These
factors gave importance to group, ethnic, and regional conflicts that
eventually contributed to the collapse of the republic.
The final explanation is closely related to all the foregoing. It
holds that the regionalization of politics and, in particular, of party
politics made the stability of the republic dependent on each party
retaining control of its regional base. As long as this was so, there
was a rough balance between the parties, as well as their respective
regions. Once the federal government invoked its emergency powers in
1962 and removed the AG from power in the Western Region, the fragile
balance on which the federation rested was disturbed. Attempts by the AG
and NCNC to create a new equilibrium, or at least to return the status
quo ante, only generated stronger opposition and hastened the collapse
of the republic.
Nigeria
Nigeria - MILITARY INTERVENTION AND RULE
Nigeria
In most developing countries, there is a disruption of the
civil-military equilibrium usually assumed in liberal democracies. In
liberal tradition, the military is insulated from politics and subject
to civilian control. In several developing countries, however, the
military has not only intervened in the political process and overthrown
the constitutional civilian authority, but it also often has established
its supremacy over elected politicians. Even in those countries where
the military has become almost a permanent feature of politics, military
rule is still considered an aberration and symptomatic of a
malfunctioning political system. In Nigeria, which typifies the scenario
just presented, military rule was usually seen as a "rescue"
operation necessary to save the country from civilian ineptitude.
Military rule was not expected to last long; once the rescue operation
was complete, the military should return to the barracks where they
belonged and leave the governing to civilian politicians. The problem,
however, was that although military officers accepted this rationale,
military rule usually became self-sustaining.
From the onset of independent government in Nigeria in 1960 to the
end of 1990, the military had ruled for twenty-one years. Altogether
there were five coups d'�tat involving changes of government: those of
January 15, 1966; July 29, 1966; July 29, 1975; December 31, 1983; and
August 27, 1985. There was also an unsuccessful coup in which the head
of state, General Murtala Muhammad, was killed in February 1976, and
another was nipped in the bud in December 1985. An attempt to overthrow
General Ibrahim Babangida was made in April 1990. Of these coups, only
those of January 1966 and December 1983 were against civilian
governments. Several explanations of military intervention have been
added to those given by the coup plotters themselves. Whereas the latter
have cited economic mismanagement and corruption, other explanations
have ranged from the continuation of ethnoregional politics by military
means to the personal ambitions of officers.
<>The 1966 Coups, Civil War, and Gowon's Government
<>The Muhammad and Obasanjo Government
<>The Buhari Regime
<>The Babangida Government
Nigeria
Nigeria - The 1966 Coups, Civil War, and Gowon's Government
Nigeria
By the time a disparate group of junior officers struck first in
January 1966, the officers were still politically naive and had yet to
master the art of coup planning and execution. This inexperience partly
explains why Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and others who masterminded the coup,
failed to take over state power. Instead, Major General Johnson Aguiyi
Ironsi, commander in chief of the army, became Nigeria's first military
ruler. Some of the remote causes of the coup included the use of
soldiers to quell unrest, such as the riots among the Tiv people of the
lower northern region, and calls on the military to supervise the 1964
elections. Whereas the latter involvement gave the soldiers a feeling of
political efficacy, the beginnings of what came to be known as the
"federal character" principle that sought to give each area
some parity of representation, gave military personnel a sense of being
sectional representatives. The coup of January 1966 was seen by many
northerners as an attempt by the Igbo people of the east to dominate the
federation. A successful countercoup six months later led by northern
soldiers demonstrated the degree to which soldiers had become
politicians in uniform.
The immediate reasons for the first-coup, however, concerned the
nationwide disillusionment with the corrupt and selfish politicians, as
well as with their inability to maintain law and order and guarantee the
safety of lives and property. During the initial stages, Nzeogwu and his
collaborators were hailed as national heroes. But the pattern of
killings in the coup gave it a partisan appearance: killed were the
prime minister, a northerner, the premier of the Northern Region, and
the highest ranking northern army officers; only one Igbo officer lost
his life. Also killed was the premier of the Western Region who was
closely allied with the NPC.
General Ironsi, an Igbo, emerged as the head of state. In his
policies and actions, Ironsi did little to allay the fears of Igbo
domination. He failed to place the coup plotters on trial as northern
leaders demanded, and he appointed Igbos to sensitive governmental
positions. Against all advice, Ironsi promulgated Decree Number 34 of
1966, which abrogated the federal system of government and substituted a
unitary system; he argued that the military could only govern in this
way. Given the already charged atmosphere, this action reinforced
northern fears. As the north was less developed than the south, a
unitary system could easily lead to southerners "taking over
control of everything," as a northern spokesperson put it. It was
at the height of northern opposition to unitarism that the countercoup
of July 1966 took place. Most top-ranking Igbo officers, including
Ironsi, lost their lives; the "status quo" of northern
dominance was restored.
Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from the
middle belt, became the head of state after the coup. His first act was
to reinstate the federal system, along with the four regions and their
allotted functions. But relations between the federal government and the
Eastern Region, led by military governor Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu
Ojukwu, were very strained. In addition to the elimination of many Igbo
officers during the July coup, a massive pogrom against Igbos occurred
in the Northern Region. In September Colonel Gowon summoned an ad hoc
constitutional conference to deliberate on the country's political
future. Most regional delegates to the conference, with the exception of
those from the midwest, recommended a confederal system to replace the
federal system. The delegates from the Eastern Region insisted that any
region wishing to secede from the federation should be allowed to do so.
The conference was ended abruptly by increased killings of Igbos in the
north and the heightening of tensions between the federal government and
the Eastern Region. A summit of military leaders at Aburi, Ghana, in
January 1967 attempted to resolve the disagreements and recommended the
establishment of a base confederation of regions. The Aburi Agreement
became a source of contention, however.
In anticipation of eastern secession, Gowon moved quickly to weaken
the support base of the region by decreeing the creation of twelve new
states to replace the four regions. Six of these states contained
minority groups that had demanded state creation since the 1950s. Gowon
rightly calculated that the eastern minorities would not actively
support the Igbos, given the prospect of having their own states if the
secession effort were defeated. Many of the federal troops who fought
the civil war, known as the Biafran War, to bring the Eastern Region
back to the federation, were members of minority groups.
The war lasted thirty months and ended in January 1970. In accepting
Biafra' unconditional cease-fire, Gowon declared that there would be no
victor and no vanquished. In this spirit, the years afterward were
declared to be a period of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
reconciliation. The oil-price boom, which began as a result of the high
price of crude oil (the country's major revenue earner) in the world
market in 1973, increased the federal government's ability to undertake
these tasks.
The postwar Gowon government issued a nine-point transition program
that was to culminate in the handing over of power to a civilian
government on October 1, 1976. The agenda of the transition included the
reorganization of the armed forces, the completion of the establishment
of the twelve states announced in 1967, a census, a new constitution,
and elections.
Gowon initiated several nation-building policies, the most notable of
which was the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), a community service
institution that required one year of service by each Nigerian
immediately after graduation from university or other institution of
higher learning. Each member of the corps had to serve in a state other
than his or her home state. More than 1 million graduates had served in
this program by 1990.
The Gowon years also saw the oil boom and a buoyant economy. The
federal government was encouraged to take on some responsibilities
formally allocated to the states, especially in the area of education.
It embarked on major infrastructural projects to transfer control of the
economy from foreigners to Nigerians. The Nigerian Entreprises Promotion
decree of 1972, which was expanded in 1977, stipulated that only
Nigerians could participate in certain categories of business. In those
in which foreign involvement was permitted, controlling shares had to be
owned by Nigerians.
The structure of government under Gowon was basically unitarian. At
the apex of government was the all-military Supreme Military Council
(SMC), which was the lawmaking body for the entire federation. Its
decrees could not be challenged in any law court. Most members of the
SMC under Gowon were state governors. There was also a Federal Executive
Council composed of military and civilian commissioners. The states also
had commissioners appointed by the governor. The states were practically
reduced to administrative units of the federal government, which in
several domains made uniform laws for the country. This basic structure
of military federalism has, with amendments, remained the same during
all military governments in the country.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Muhammad and Obasanjo Government
Nigeria
General Gowon was overthrown in a palace coup in July 1975 and
succeeded by General Murtala Muhammad, who was in turn assassinated in
an abortive coup on February 13, 1976. He was replaced by Olusegun
Obasanjo, formerly his second in command. General Obasanjo basically
continued the policies and plans of the Muhammad regime.
Murtala Muhammad, a Hausa from the north (Kano State), ruled for only
seven months. Within that short period, he endeared himself to most
Nigerians because of his strong leadership and the radical reforms he
introduced in domestic and foreign policies. He "purged" the
public-service ministries, universities, parastatals, and other
government agencies at the federal and state levels of individuals
accused of being corrupt, indolent, or inefficient. He set up a panel
headed by Justice Ayo Irikefe to advise on the creation of more states.
Its report led to the creation of seven additional states in 1976.
Murtala Muhammad also set up a panel under Justice Akintola Aguda to
consider whether a new federal capital should be created because of the
congestion in Lagos. The panel recommended Abuja in the southern part of
the former Northern Region as the site of a new capital. In economic
matters, Murtala Muhammad introduced the "low-profile" policy,
a radical departure from the ostentation of the Gowon era.
Although he retained the framework of military federalism, Murtala
Muhammad removed state governors from membership in the SMC and created
a new body in which they were included at the center, the National
Council of States. Because this body was chaired by the head of state
and subordinate to the SMC, its creation underscored the subordinate
position of the state governments. This arrangement enabled the head of
state to exert greater control over the state governors than had been
the case under Gowon. In the area of foreign policy, Murtala Muhammad
pursued a vigorous policy that placed Africa at the center and that
involved active support for liberation movements in the continent.
Of all Murtala Muhammad's actions, however, the one that had the most
lasting consequences was a program of transition to civilian rule that
he initiated before his death. The program was carried through as
planned by his successor, Obasanjo. The stages of the transition agenda
included the creation of more states, the reform of the local government
system, the making of a new constitution, the formation of parties and,
finally, the election of a new government. The transition process was to
culminate in the handing over of power to civilians on October 1, 1979.
In February 1976, Murtala Muhammad was killed in an unsuccessful coup
led by Colonel Bukar Dimka and officers from the middle belt; the coup
appeared to be an attempt by middle-belt officers to bring back Gowon
from his self-imposed exile and reinstate him as head of state.
Obasanjo, a Yoruba and southerner, became head of state. Although
unfavorably compared with Murtala Muhammad initially, he succeeded in
many areas of his administration where the more intransigent Murtala
Muhammad might have failed. Obasanjo became an adept political ruler,
determined not to exacerbate north-south and Muslim-Christian schisms in
the country.
In addition to its methodical conduct of all the stages of the
transition to civilian government in 1979, the Obasanjo government
initiated numerous reforms in public life. Attempts were made to
introduce greater probity in the activities of civil servants and other
public officials. The main vehicle for this process was the
establishment of public complaints commissions in all states of the
federation and in the capital. Despite the publicizing of particular
cases of abuse of office and corruption, little progress was made in
stopping the spread of this cancer in the society and economy.
The Obasanjo administration expanded the economic indigenization
program started under Gowon. It also used the Land Use Decree of 1978 to
rationalize the country's haphazard tenurial systems, to reduce the
crippling land speculation and curb the frequent litigation over
individual and communal property rights. It was hoped that these reforms
would facilitate the acquisition of land for modern agricultural
purposes. In a similar vein, the Obasanjo regime launched Operation Feed
the Nation to counter the rapid rise in food exports. None of these
efforts was successful, but the programs indicated the kind of
strategies that Nigeria would have to adopt to alter its economic
imbalances.
In view of the complex process of transition to civilian rule and the
many reforms introduced in the four years of the Muhammad/Obasanjo
governments, those regimes seemed in retrospect to have tried to do too
much too soon. In the final year he was in power, Obasanjo introduced
many austerity measures and insisted on a "low profile" for
all government officials. He was aware that Nigeria, despite its oil
wealth, was still largely an underdeveloped country and its
businesspersons mainly agents or intermediaries for foreign businesses.
Such a salutary attitude was soon forgotten, however, as the successor
regime rode the crest of a renewed upsurge in oil prices, spent
resources faster than they could be realized and left the country deeply
in debt and its economy nearly in shambles when it ended in 1983.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Buhari Regime
Nigeria
On December 31, 1983, the army struck again. This time the brazen
corruption, the economic mismanagement, and the inept leadership of
civilians provided the grounds for military intervention. Indeed,
conditions had deteriorated so much in the Second Republic that when the
coup came, it was widely acclaimed. Major General Muhammadu Buhari, a
Hausa/Fulani northerner from Katsina State and a former member of the
SMC in the Muhammad/Obasanjo governments, became the head of state.
Because of the great powers that his second in command, Major General
Tunde Idiagbon, chief of staff at Supreme Headquarters, was believed to
wield, many commentators refer to this government as the Buhari/Idiagbon
regime. In broad outline, the structure of government remained
essentially the same as it was under Muhammad and Obasanjo. At the apex
was the SMC, and the subordinate bodies were the Federal Executive
Council and the National Council of States.
The urgent task before the government was to salvage the country's
economy, which had suffered from the mismanagement of the Second
Republic and from the rapid drop in the price of crude oil. Nigeria had
become heavily indebted to several foreign monetary agencies, and the
price of crude oil had begun to slide. Buhari believed that urgent
economic problems required equally urgent solutions. He also thought
that it was not a pressing issue to prepare to hand power over to
civilians; in fact, all of Nigeria's military regimes have ruled without
the benefit of democratic checks and balances.
The Buhari government investigated and detained the top political
leaders of the Second Republic, holding them responsible for economic
excesses of the previous regime. Constraints were placed on various
groups, including the Nigerian Medical Association, which was outlawed,
and the National Association of Nigerian Students, and it promulgated
two decrees that restricted freedom of the press and suppressed
criticism of the government. Decree Number 4 forbade any journalist from
reporting information considered embarrassing to any government
official. Two journalists, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, were
convicted under the decree. Decree Number 2 gave the chief of staff at
Supreme Headquarters the power to detain for up to six months without
trial anyone considered a security risk. Special military tribunals
increasingly replaced law courts while the state security agency, the
National Security Organisation, was given greater powers.
Buhari's controls also extended to his efforts to deal with the
problems of "indiscipline" in the areas of environmental
sanitation, public decorum, corruption, smuggling, and disloyalty to
national symbols such as the flag and the anthem. He declared a War
Against Indiscipline and specified acceptable forms of public behavior,
such as a requirement to form lines at bus stops. The main concern,
however, remained the economy. The government introduced a comprehensive
package of austerity measures. It closed the country's land borders for
a period to identify and expel illegal alien workers and placed severe
restrictions on imports and heavy penalties on smuggling and foreign
exchange offenses. The austerity measures made it difficult for local
industries to procure essential imported raw materials, leading many of
them to close or to operate at greatly reduced capacity. Many workers
were laid off, and government itself retrenched many workers to increase
its "cost effectiveness." All of these actions were
accompanied by high inflation. The price of basic food items rose, and
life became increasingly difficult, even for the affluent.
Despite the increased efficiency with which Buhari and his associates
tackled the multifaceted national crisis, the regime's inflexibility
caused discontent. The latter was the main justification given for the
overthrow of Buhari by General Babangida in a palace coup on August 27,
1985, although the personal ambition of Babangida was an important
contributing factor.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Babangida Government
Nigeria
Babangida, of Gwari origins and a middle belt Muslim, was Nigeria's
sixth military ruler and, as of 1990, the most powerful. Compared with
Buhari, Babangida was a somewhat more methodical ruler, and his style
was different. Whereas Buhari was stern and resolute, Babangida was deft
and tactical. Babangida was reported to have taken part in all coups in
Nigeria, which may explain his confident handling of national affairs.
He was, however, unpredictable.
Although Babangida came to power as a champion of human rights, his
record in this area deteriorated over time. He gradually released most
of the politicians incarcerated by Buhari. Yet, he often hounded
opposition interest groups, especially those of labor and students, and
detained many radical and anti-establishment persons for various
offenses. The infamous Decree Number 2 remained in force in 1990 to
facilitate these oppressive acts.
The year after seizing power, the Babangida regime declared a
National Economic Emergency. The options open to the country, Babangida
said, were either to accept an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan
and the conditions attached or to embark on more austere economic
measures that would require great sacrifices. Although the people
favored a non-IMF option, they soon discovered the hardships eventually
imposed differed little from the IMF's conditions. The economic recovery
program recommended by the World Bank was instituted as a self-imposed
structural adjustment program (SAP) that involved a drastic
restructuring of the country's economy. Under SAP, unemployment rates
soared, food prices increased significantly, and numerous user fees for
education and health services were imposed. These hardships did not
dissuade the government from SAP, which it believed to be the only
approach to the country's social and economic problems. The benefits of
SAP, such as longer inflation and more balanced budget, began to be seen
but SAP was adhered to less stringently in the late 1980s.
Babangida's government adopted other economic reforms leading to a
market system and political reforms leading to democratic processes.
Important changes were made in the basic structures of military
federalism. For the first time, a military leader was called president,
presumably to emphasize the executive power he wielded. The name of the
supreme lawmaking body was changed from Supreme Military Council to the
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). There was also a new Armed Forces
Consultative Assembly, formed in 1989, which functioned as an
intermediate legislative chamber between the AFRC and the rest of the
military. In spite of these elaborate structural changes, Babangida
adroitly increased the powers of his office. He changed his ministers
and state governors frequently. Even supposedly powerful members of the
government were not spared, as was demonstrated in 1986 when he dropped
his second in command, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe. In his place, he appointed
Rear Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, former chief of the naval staff. The most
dramatic of these changes were made at the end of 1989, when Babangida
reassigned several ministers, including General Domkat Bali, the
powerful minister of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The changes were perceived by
southerners and Christians as resulting in an AFRC that consisted mainly
of northern Muslims. The service chiefs of the army, navy, and police
were Muslims; only the chief of the air staff was a southerner. The
ministries of external affairs, petroleum resources, internal affairs,
and defense, considered the most powerful cabinet posts, were held by
northern Muslims (the minister of defense being the president himself).
These changes generated heated controversy and antigovernment
demonstrations by Christians in some northern cities. Babangida emerged
from the changes more powerful than before.
Babangida also introduced far-reaching changes in the civil service,
the police, the armed and security forces, and the political system.
Certain actions of his government exacerbated religious tensions. The
religious cleavage in the country had become increasingly politicized,
beginning in the debates in 1977 when Muslims began pressing for the
extension of sharia law (Muslim religious law) from state courts in the
north to the federal courts. In the Second Republic, activist Islamic groups emerged in the
north, demanding the Islamization of the country. After coming to power
in 1985, Babangida adopted several measures that were considered to
favor Muslims and to threaten the secular nature of the Nigerian state.
In 1986 Nigeria became a member of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), an international association of Islamic states in
which Nigeria had long held observer status; this action was very
controversial. In apparent contradiction, Babangida survived several
religious crises by reiterating that the federation remained secular. At
one point, he set up a religious advisory panel to mediate in the
religious crises.
On April 22, 1990, a coup attempt led by Major Gideon Orkar almost
toppled the Babangida regime. The presidential residence in Dodan
Barracks was extensively damaged by the rebellious soldiers, but the
head of state escaped. A unique feature of this coup attempt was the
level of involvement of Nigerian civilians, who allegedly helped finance
the operation. During the hours when the rebels controlled the radio
station in Lagos, they broadcast a critique of the regime that combined
attacks on its dictatorial nature and pervasive corruption with threats
to expel the far northern states from the federation.
The survival of Babangida and all senior members of the regime
enabled the government to continue its policies, especially the planned
transition to civilian rule in 1992. The detention of several
journalists and other critics of the military regime and the temporary
closure of some newspapers, however, indicated the government's
awareness that it had overstayed its welcome and would have to govern
with even stricter controls than before. The state congresses of the two
government-sponsored political parties, the only legal parties, the
National Republican Convention and the Social Democratic Party, were
held in the summer of 1990 and campaigning began in earnest thereafter.
Nigeria
Nigeria - POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
Nigeria
Political transition in Nigeria has been based not only on the
military ruler's conviction that civil rule was desirable but also on
the expectation of the people that, after the military performed its
rescue operation, it should turn power over to civilians. Gowon and
Buhari failed to meet this expectation, reducing their popular support
and resulting in their overthrows. In accepting demilitarization as a
necessary process, political transition has been on the agenda of every
military government since Ironsi's, with the probable exception of that
of Buhari. Ironsi set up a Constitution Review Committee, whose task was
overtaken by the promulgation of the unitary decree; Gowon designed a
transition plan, which he later aborted; the Muhammad/Obasanjo
governments successfully executed a transition program and handed power
over to civilians; and Babangida in 1990 was implementing a transition
program, designed to culminate in civilian rule in 1992.
<>The Second Republic
<>The Third Republic
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Second Republic
Nigeria
In the program of transition to the Second Republic, the military
leaders' primary concern was to prevent the recurrence of the mistakes
of the First Republic. They believed that if the structures and
processes of government and politics that had proved inappropriate in
the First Republic could be changed, a stable and effective civilian
government would emerge. The transition was therefore designed to
address those fundamental issues, which were historically divisive, and
to establish new political institutions, processes, and orientations.
Except for the census, which remained problematic, most issues that
threatened the stability and survival of the federation were addressed.
The revenue allocation process was altered based on the recommendation
of a technical committee, despite the politicians' rejection of its
recommendation. Local governments were also streamlined and made more
powerful by the 1976 reforms.
The second aspect of the transition involved the making of a new
constitution and appropriate institutions. A Constitution Drafting
Committee (CDC) was appointed in 1975 under the chairmanship of a
leading lawyer, Rotimi Williams, and, in 1977, a Constituent Assembly
(CA) composed of both elected and appointed officials examined and
ratified the draft constitution. After final ratification by the SMC,
the Constitution was promulgated in 1979. Political parties were formed,
and new corrective national bodies, such as the Code of Conduct Bureau,
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, and Public Complaints
Commission, were established. The most far-reaching changes of the
transition were made in the area of institutionalizing a new
constitutional and political system.
At the inauguration of the CDC, Murtala Muhammad outlined the
objectives of transition as the continuation of a federal system of
government with constitutional law guaranteeing fundamental human
rights, maximum participation, and orderly succession to political
power. To avoid the pitfalls of the First Republic, the new constitution
was designed to eliminate political competition based on a system of
winner-takes-all, broaden consensus politics to a national base,
eliminate overcentralization of power, and ensure free and fair
elections. The SMC suggested that these objectives could be met by
recognition of national rather than sectional parties, controls on the
proliferation of parties and on the creation of more states, and an
executive presidential system similar to that in the United States. In
addition, the federal character of the country was to be reflected in
the cabinet; an independent judiciary was to be established as well as
corrective institutions.
The draft constitution incorporated these elements. When the CA met
to ratify the constitution, a few issues were highly volatile. The most
notable was the matter of sharia law, which Muslims argued should be
given appellate jurisdiction at the federal level. Most Christian
members of the assembly vehemently opposed this. Only the intervention
of the head of state resolved the situation. Although the sharia clause
was deleted from the constitution, the cleavage between Christian and
Muslim groups persisted. Other controversial issues included the
creation of more states, the determination of an age limit for
participation in politics (intended to eliminate most discredited
politicians who had actively participated in politics in the First
Republic), and the scope of the executive president's powers. After the
CA completed its work, the SMC added a few amendments, including use of
Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba as additional official languages in the National
Assembly and applying the federal-character principle to the composition
of the armed forces' officer corps.
By Decree Number 25 of 1978, the 1979 constitution was enacted. The
constitution differed from that of the First Republic in 1963 in that it
introduced a United States-type presidential system in place of the
parliamentary system. Previously, the executive branch of government
derived its powers from the legislature. Under the 1979 constitution,
the president and vice president, as well as state governors and their
deputies, were elected in separate elections. The elections had the
federation and the state, respectively, as constituencies. Furthermore,
while the Senate was largely a ceremonial body in the First Republic,
the new constitution gave the Senate and House of Representatives
coequal powers.
There were other provisions in the 1979 constitution that aimed at
eliminating past loopholes. The first was the federal- character
principle, which sought to prevent the domination of power by one or a
few states, ethnic groups, or sections at the federal center, and by one
or more groups in the states and local government areas. The principle
required that the composition of the cabinet, boards, and other
executive bodies, as well as appointments to top government positions,
should reflect the federal character or diversity of the country at the
particular level of government. This principle also applied to the
composition of the armed forces. The principle was extended to the
distribution of national resources, such as the siting of schools and
industries.
The question of party politics became a constitutional matter. In
view of the need for a limited number of national political parties, the
constitution specified certain criteria that parties had to meet in
order to be registered: the name, emblem, or motto of the party could
not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the party the
image of a sectional party; membership in the party should be open to
all Nigerians irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation; the party
headquarters must be in the federal capital; and the executive committee
of the party should reflect the federal character of the country. The
task of registering political parties and conducting elections was given
to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO). The necessity for national
parties resulted from the conviction that the disunity of the First
Republic was engendered by the regional parties then operating. When the
ban placed on political activities in 1966 was lifted in September 1978,
at least fifty-three political associations were formed. Seventeen of
them applied for registration, but only five were registered: the
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the
United Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP),
and the People's Redemption Party (PRP). In 1981 a sixth party, the
Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), was registered.
Contrary to the expectations of the drafters of the constitution and
the military rulers, most of these parties resembled the ethnoregional
ones of the pre-1966 period although legally parties were required to
transcend ethnoregional bases. The only exceptions were the NAP, which
proclaimed itself a "new breed" party, and the NPN, which
despite its regional antecedents, was probably the only national party
in Nigeria. The UPN was a resurrection of the AG with its Yoruba core;
the NPP was a rejuvenation of the NCNC with its Igbo core and strands of
middle-belt support; the PRP recalled Kano's NEPU; and the GNPP, which
appeared initially to be a new minorities formation, had its strength
within the Kanuri section of the north. Apart from the PRP, which
flickered as a radical party, and the populist NAP, the other parties
appeared to be parties of the wealthy class or those who aspired to join
it, for whom politics was a means of enriching themselves and
consolidating their material base. Given this character of the
registered parties, it can be argued that the perceived need to balance
the power groups in the country rather than the constitutional
requirements decided which parties were registered.
In the 1979 presidential election, NPN candidate Shehu Shagari was
declared the winner, even though many people thought he did not meet the
full requirements. He obtained a simple majority of the total votes cast
in the federation but failed to get 25 percent of the total votes cast
in thirteen states of the federation. The latter was the generally
accepted interpretation of the constitutional requirement that the
winner of the presidential election should obtain 25 percent of the
total votes cast in two-thirds of the nineteen states of the federation.
Shagari obtained 25 percent of the votes in twelve states but got only
19 percent in the thirteenth state. When FEDECO declared Shagari the
winner "in the absence of any legal explanation or guidance in the
electoral decree," Awolowo, the presidential candidate and leader
of the UPN, led other defeated candidates and their parties to challenge
the declaration in the electoral tribunal and later in the Supreme
Court. But the challenge was to no avail. The controversy led to strong
anti-NPN, anti-Shagari sentiments in several states controlled by the
other parties. Once the NPN succeeded in consolidating power at the
center, the attraction it held was strong enough to tear the other
parties asunder. Consequently, the history of the Second Republic is
replete with interparty and intraparty schisms and federal-state
conflicts.
At the domestic level, the NPN-controlled federal government embarked
on politically expedient but uneconomic projects, such as establishing a
federal university in every state, commissioning iron and steel plants
that remain unfinished in 1990, and indiscriminately awarding contracts
to build the new federal capital at Abuja. To finance these projects,
the government relied heavily on foreign loans and aid. While the
external debt of the country increased, the lot of the common citizen
worsened. The global economic recession in the early 1980s and the
collapse of crude oil prices in the world market accelerated the
economic decline of the Second Republic. By the time Shagari decided to
initiate IMF-inspired austerity measures under the Economic
Stabilization Act (1982), the problems of the economy required more
drastic measures. This act, however, provided the blueprint for the
austerity measures subsequently introduced by Buhari and by Babangida.
The demise of the Second Republic was accelerated by the tension
generated by the 1983 general elections, which were similar to those of
1964-65. As in the earlier elections, two major political camps were
involved in the contest: the NPN and the Progressive Parties Alliance,
comprising the UPN, the NPP, and factions of the PRP and the GNPP. The
NPN won landslide victories even in states considered traditional
strongholds of the other parties. In several places, violence erupted,
and every election was contested in court. A number of the electoral
verdicts were rescinded in view of evidence that results were falsified.
Under these circumstances the military intervened in December 1983.
Nigeria
Nigeria - The Third Republic
Nigeria
The transition program of the military rulers toward the
establishment of civilian rule as the Third Republic was more elaborate
and deliberate than was that toward the Second Republic. The goal was to
prevent a recurrence of past mistakes. It was recognized that
far-reaching changes involving more than the constitution and political
institutions must be introduced. Consequently, as much attention was
paid to restructuring the economy through the SAP as to fostering a new
social order and a political culture through a program of social
mobilization. In 1990 the transition program was tightly controlled,
based on the assumption that desirable changes must occur through
government intervention. It was also the most extended transition thus
far, and this protracted schedule contributed to frequent changes in the
agenda. The date of the final handing over of power was shifted from
1990 to 1992, state gubernatorial and assembly elections from 1990 to
1991, and the census from 1990 to 1991. Apart from these changes, major
decisions frequently were reversed. Although President Babangida claimed
that the transition was "sequential and methodical," it was
actually responsive and ad hoc.
The transition to the Third Republic began with the setting up of a
seventeen-member Political Bureau in 1986 to formulate a blueprint for
the transition, based on ideas collated during a nationwide debate. In
its report, the bureau recommended that a socialist ideology be
introduced through a process of social mobilization, that local
governments be strengthened as an effective third tier of government,
and that a two-party system be created. The government accepted the
recommendations except for the proposal advocating socialism. Most
knowledgeable observers believed, however, that the Political Bureau was
largely a facade created by the military, who had little intention of
following the advice of the young intellectuals who composed the bureau.
Of all the recommendations, the two-party system was the most
significant because it marked a departure from the multiparty system of
the past. A majority in the bureau thought that a two-party system was
the best way to ensure that the parties would be national and that they
be financed largely by the state, as recommended. The bureau argued that
in the First Republic and the Second Republic, the electoral alliances
pointed to a two-party system. The north-versus-south character of these
alliances led many to fear that a two-party system would function along
similar lines, especially given the increasing sensitivity of the
Muslim-Christian division. The government decreed the formation of two
new parties in October 1989, requiring that the parties draw from a
national, as opposed to a regional, constituency to prevent such a
dichotomy.
Other aspects of the transition included a new Constitution Review
Committee, a National Electoral Commission (NEC), strengthened local
governments, the creation of local councils through nonpartisan
elections, and the setting up of a Constituent Assembly (CA) to ratify
the draft constitution, subject to final approval by the AFRC. The
government, however, forbade the CA to deliberate on sensitive matters
on which decisions had already been made or were to be made by the AFRC:
the creation of more states and local government areas, the census,
revenue allocation, the two-party system, and sharia (the latter, after
the issue again threatened to tear the assembly apart, as it did in
1978).
In May 1989, after introducing eleven amendments, the AFRC
promulgated the new constitution by Decree Number 12. The amendment
covered the deletion of Section 15 of the new constitution that
pronounced the country a welfare state and of Sections 42 and 43 that
provided for free education to age eighteen and free medical care for
persons up to age eighteen or older than sixty-five, the handicapped,
and the disabled. The second amendment provided for streamlining the
jurisdiction of sharia and customary courts of appeal to make them apply
at the state level only to matters relating to the personal status of
Muslims. Amendment three described civil service reforms. Amendment four
reduced the minimum age requirements for federal and state elective
offices from forty to thirty-five for the president, thirty-five to
thirty for senators and governors, twenty-five for members of the House
of Representatives, and twenty-one for members of state houses of
assembly and local government councillors. The fifth amendment replaced
the six-year, single-term tenure for the president and governors with a
four-year, maximum two-term tenure. Amendment six removed from the
National Assembly control over matters of national security because, in
the view of the AFRC, it "exposes the chief executives and the
nation to clear impotence in the face of threats to security". The
seventh amendment made the federal Judicial Service Commission
accountable in the hope that this would enhance the independence of the
judiciary. Amendment eight eliminated provisions establishing an armed
forces service commission to supervise compliance with provisions of the
federal-character principle, i.e., that government-bodies such as the
military, the civil service, and university faculties reflect the
various elements of the population. Amendment nine covered the reduction
of the number of special advisers to the president from seven to three
and alteration of the provisions for gubernatorial advisers. Amendment
ten eliminated Section 1 (4) of the draft constitution outlawing coups
and making them a criminal offense. The eleventh amendment deleted the
provisions forbidding the federal government to obtain external loans
without the approval of the National Assembly.
These amendments ensured that some of the changes introduced by the
Babangida government would remain binding after the government had
handed over power. In spite of those amendments, the 1989 constitution
is similar to that of 1979; the presidential system is retained with
minor amendments, such as the reduction in the number of senators from
each state from five to three. The major difference in the new political
arrangement is the two-party system.
Two unique aspects of the transition program since 1989 require
emphasis. One was the blanket ban placed on all former politicians and
top political officeholders, especially those found guilty of abuse of
office. In effect, the new political order was to be built around the
"new breed" politicians, namely, those who supposedly had not
been affected by corruption, ethnicity, religious fanaticism, and other
vices that characterized the "old brigade." A corollary of
this was the government's opposition to the participation of ideological
and religious "radicals" and "extremists." To
participate in the Third Republic, each prospective politician needed a
clearance certificate from the Federal Electoral Commission.
The second important factor was the decision to create in October
1989 two parties wholly run and financed by the state. After the ban on
political activities was lifted in May 1989, a number of political
associations were formed, and thirteen applied for registration. The
requirements for registration were very strict and almost impossible to
fulfill in the time allotted: the submission of the names, addresses,
and passport photographs of all members of the association in
the federation was required to facilitate physical confirmation of the
claims by the NEC. In its report to the AFRC, the NEC gave low scores to
the associations, including the "big four" that were the
strongest--the People's Solidarity Party, the Nigerian National
Convention, the Patriotic Front of Nigeria, and the Liberal Convention.
The report stated that most of the membership claims were found to be
false, their manifestos and organization were very weak, and most of the
associations were affiliated with banned politicians.
The AFRC's reaction to the report was unanticipated. It dissolved all
the political associations and decreed two new parties--the National
Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). It
arranged for constitutions and manifestos of these two parties to be
written by the NEC and by specially constituted panels based on a
synthesis of those of the dissolved associations. The difference between
the two parties was made a supposed ideological divide: "a little
to the right" and "a little to the left." The finances of
the parties, their secretariats in every local government area of the
country, the appointment of their administrative secretaries, and their
membership drives were now the responsibility of the federal government.
The government described this new system as a "grass- roots
democratic model" anchored in the rural and local groups rather
than the "moneybags" and city elites that had allegedly
hijacked the political process in the past.
A connection has also been made between these political changes and
attempts to alter the economic and social realms. The economic
transition centered on the SAP, while the social component included the
process of social mobilization aimed at fostering a new social order and
political culture. The general process was coordinated by the
Directorate of Social Mobilization; the declared goals were social
justice, economic recovery, mass mobilization, and political education
under the acronym MAMSER (Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance). MAMSER
has been popularized, but time will be needed to gauge how far its goals
have been realized. An emphasis has also been placed on rural
development through strengthening of local governments, the Directorate
of Rural Development, and improving facilities for the rural women's
program.
The transition program toward the establishment of the Third Republic
was the most ambitious undertaken in Nigeria. The success and stability
of the republic, however, depended on the degree to which inherent
structural problems could be overcome. Much depended on the orientations
and on the actions of the politicians themselves, as well as on the
dispositions of the military. Above all, its success depended on the
accompanying economic and social transformations. The stability of the
Third Republic, therefore, would rest not only on the operation of the
new two-party system but also on the effectiveness of the SAP and
MAMSER. The 1989 constitution provided for more than twenty ministers in
the executive branch, in addition to various councils and commissions.
The names and numbers of these ministries and commissions, which,
geneally speaking, were responsible directly to the president, have
changed occasionally since early 1990. Reportedly, Babangida was
considering reducing the number of ministries to economize.
Nigeria
Nigeria - FEDERALISM
Nigeria
Given the territorially delineated cleavages abounding in Nigeria and
the historical legacy of divisions among ethnic groups, regions, and
sections, the federal imperative was so fundamental that even military
governments--characteristically unitarian, hierarchical, and
centralist--attached importance to the continuation of a federal system
of government. The federation began as a unitarian colonial state but
disaggregated into three and later four regions. In 1967 the regions
were abrogated and twelve states created in their place. The number of
states increased to nineteen in 1976, and to twenty-one in 1987. In
addition, in 1990 there were 449 local government areas that had
functioned as a third tier of government since the late 1980s.
In 1990 the Federal Military Government (FMG) included the president,
the AFRC, the Federal Executive Council, the civil service, and a
federal judiciary made up of federal high courts, courts of appeal, and
the Supreme Court. The locus of power was the president and the AFRC,
which possessed all law-making powers that could not normally be
challenged in any court of law. The Federal Executive Council was an
enlarged instrument of the president. The federal judiciary had
appellate jurisdiction in appeals emanating from the state judiciaries.
It did not have much independence because the government was directly
involved in the appointment of judges and in the finances of the federal
Judicial Service Commission. The integrity of the judiciary was
constantly weakened by the setting up of special tribunals. Some of
these tribunals were responsible for conducting trials of politicians of
the Second Republic, while a few tried "miscellaneous" cases
involving drug, smuggling, or foreign exchange offenses.
The state governments consisted of the military governor, a cabinet,
the civil service, and the state judiciary. In most policy matters and
in matters of finance, the state governments had to abide by federal
directives and were subject to coordination by the National Council of
States. The local governments had elected management councils comprising
a chairman and councillors until June 1989, when these councils were
dissolved. They were replaced by sole administrators, state civil
servants appointed by the state governors. New local government
elections were held in December 1989. In spite of the increasing powers
of local governments, they remained subordinate to the state and federal
governments and could be described as administrative agencies of these
two higher levels of government.
"Civilian federalism" and "military federalism"
corresponded to civilian government and to military government,
respectively. According to federal theory, civilian federalism was the
true form of federalism. It entailed government based on a
constitutional sharing of power between the federal and state
governments (and local government as well), using the principle of
decentralization of powers. It was marked by party politics, which
determined the nature of the federation, the configuration of powers,
and the prevalence of the rule of law. The major elements of military
federalism included the suspension and modification of the constitution;
the omnipotence of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) at the center, and
therefore the existence of only one decision-making level of government;
and the ban on all (civilian) political activities. Because military
federalism had been more common than civilian federalism, this model
made the federal government the "master" in relation to the
"dependent" state governments.
At independence largely autonomous regions possessed the residual
powers in the federation and functioned almost independently. Even
before the First Republic collapsed, the federal government was
asserting greater powers. In particular, it controlled the national
economy and possessed emergency powers to intervene in any region where
law and order had broken down, as it did in the Western Region in 1962.
Relative to the powers of the states in 1990, however, the regions were
very powerful; they had separate constitutions, foreign missions, and
independent revenue bases. All this changed under military rule.
The FMG expanded its control over the economy to the extent that in
1990 the states depended on it for up to 90 percent of their revenues.
The federal government also took over such matters as education, which
formerly belonged to the states. Because state governors were appointed
on military assignment by the president, the states had little autonomy,
except in deciding how to implement policies formulated by the federal
government. Attempts by state governments to reassert their autonomy
during the Second Republic were aborted by the return of military rule.
Some state governments that were controlled by parties other than the
NPN took the NPN-controlled federal government to court on many
occasions over matters of jurisdictional competence. This trend was
likely to recur during the Third Republic, when the states would seek to
regain powers lost under military rule.
Another area in which successive military governments had changed
intragovernmental relations was in the bolstering of local governments
as a third tier of government. This process began with the 1976 local
government reforms, which introduced a uniform local government system;
gave local governments jurisdictional competence in matters such as
markets, automobile parks, and collection of local taxes; and made it
statutory for both the federal and state governments to give specified
percentages of their revenues to local governments. Although these
reforms were embodied in the 1979 constitution, state governments in the
Second Republic refused to allow local governments any measure of
autonomy, partly because they were themselves struggling to reclaim
their autonomy. With the return of military rule, and as part of the
transition toward the Third Republic, local governments were further
strengthened.
Because the federal government accepted the recommendation of the
Political Bureau that local governments should be made an effective tier
of government, efforts had been made to reduce their control by state
governments. In 1988 state ministries of local government, the major
instrument of control, were replaced by directorates of local government
in the governors' offices. All local government funds were paid directly
to the local governments by the federal government rather than through
the state governments. The functions and jurisdiction of local
governments were streamlined, and state governments were asked to stay
out of local affairs.
These measures increased the importance of local governments and
infused in their civilian-elected functionaries a certain stubbornness
that led to open conflicts with state governments over matters of
jurisdiction. In several cases, these conflicts became the subject of
litigation. State governments resisted the loss of jurisdiction, and
many underscored the subordinate status of local governments at every
opportunity. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that local
governments were sufficiently autonomous to be an effective tier of
government.
The allocation of federal revenues was a problematic aspect of fiscal
federalism because the states were unequally endowed and were virtually
dependent on allocations from the federal government. Several revenue
allocation commissions were set up, among them the National Revenue
Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission established during the
1980s. The major problem arose from disagreements over the criteria that
should be used in allocations--derivation, population, need, equality,
or minimum government responsibility.
The federal-character principle emerged as a balancing formula in the
1979 constitution to forestall the domination of the government or any
of its agenciesor resources by persons from one or a few states, ethnic
groups, or sections. The uneven rates of development among the states
and sections was largely responsible for the tension and controversy
associated with the application of this principle, complicated by the
pattern of distribution of the major ethnic groups.
The issue of state creation derived from the very nature of the
federation. From three regions in 1960, the number of constituent units
had increased to the present twenty-one states and the Federal Capital
Territory. It was likely that a few more would be created. The
increasing number of states was a direct response to the demands and
agitations of groups that were not satisfied with their positions in the
federation. Initially, it was the minorities who agitated for more
states, but in 1990 the need for states had changed. They were no longer
needed to protect group identity and autonomy. Any group that sought a
share of the "national cake" or that wanted to maximize its
share of the cake demanded more states, although states were not
designed to have an ethnic basis. An example of the latter was the Igbo,
who constituted the majority in only two states, Anambra and Imo; the
other major groups, the Hausa/Fulani and the Yoruba, represented
majorities in about five states each. The Igbo had persistently pressed
for equality with other major groups by demanding new states. Realizing
that the creation of states could go on endlessly, the federal
government tried to bolster local governments as another way of meeting
the demands. The subordinate status of local governments, however,
coupled with the continued use of the states as units for distributing
national resources, made demands for more states a recurrent theme in
Nigerian federalism.
According to the 1989 constitution, representation in the legislative
branch was based both on population (the House of Representatives, with
453 members) and on states (the Senate with 64 members, 3 from each of
the 21 states and 1 from the Federal Capital Territory), which together
composed the National Assembly. These figures were subject to change to
reflect a possible increase in the number of states and the
redistribution of population. The judicial branch consisted of the
Federal High Court, the Court of Appeal, and, at the top, the Supreme
Court with a chief justice and up to fifteen other justices.
Nigeria
Nigeria - THE CIVIL SERVICE
Nigeria
The civil service in 1990 consisted of the federal civil service, the
twenty-one autonomous state civil services, the unified local government
service, and several federal and state government agencies, including
parastatals and corporations. The federal and state civil services were
organized around government departments, or ministries, and
extraministerial departments headed by ministers (federal) and
commissioners (state), who were appointed by the president and
governors, respectively. These political heads were responsible for
policy matters. The administrative heads of the ministry were the
directors general, formerly called permanent secretaries. The
"chief" director general was the secretary to the government
and until the Second Republic also doubled as head of the civil service.
As chief adviser to the government, the secretary conducted liaison
between the government and the civil service.
The major function of the director general, as of all senior civil
servants, was to advise the minister or the commissioner directly. In
doing so, the director general was expected to be neutral. In the
initial periods of military rule, these administrative heads wielded
enormous powers. For some time, the military rulers refused to appoint
civilian political heads. Even after political heads were appointed, it
was years before the era of "superpermanent secretaries" to
end. That happened in 1975 when, after Gowon's fall, the civil service
was purged to increase its efficiency. Many of the superpermanent
secretaries lost their jobs, and the subordinate status of permanent
secretaries to their political bosses was reiterated. Another
consequence of the purge, reinforced subsequently, was the destruction
of the civil service tradition of security of tenure. The destruction
was achieved by the retirement or dismissal of many who had not attained
retirement age.
Until the 1988 reforms, the civil service was organized strictly
according to British traditions: it was apolitical, civil servants were
expected to serve every government in a nonpartisan way, and the norms
of impersonality and hierarchical authority were well entrenched. As the
needs of the society became more complex and the public sector expanded
rapidly, there was a corresponding need to reform the civil service. The
Adebo Commission (1970) and the Udoji Commission (1972) reviewed the
structure and orientations of the civil service to make it more
efficient. Although these commissions recommended ways of rationalizing
the civil service, the greatest problems of the service remained
inefficiency and red tape. Again in 1985, a study group headed by Dotun
Phillips looked into the problems. It was believed that the 1988
reforms, the most current measures aimed at dealing with the problems of
the service as of 1990, were based on this report.
Compared with the 1960s and 1970s, the civil service by 1990 had
changed dramatically. It had been politicized to the extent that most
top officials openly supported the government of the day. The
introduction of the quota system of recruitment and promotion, adherence
to the federal-character principle, and the constant interference of the
government in the day-to-day operation of the civil service--especially
through frequent changes in top officials and massive purges--meant that
political factors rather than merit alone played a major role in the
civil service.
The 1988 reforms formally recognized the politicization of the upper
echelons of the civil service and brought about major changes in other
areas. The main stated objective of the reforms was "to ensure a
virile, dynamic and result-oriented civil service." As a result,
ministers or commissioners vested with full executive powers were fully
accountable for their ministries or commissions. The director general
had become a political appointee whose length of tenure was dependent on
that of the government of the day; in practice, this meant that
directors general need not be career civil servants, thereby reducing
the latter's career prospects. Each ministry had been professionalized
so that every official, whether specialist or generalist, made his
career entirely in one ministry, whereas previously an official could
move among ministries. A new department--the Presidency--comprising top
government officials was created at the federal level to coordinate the
formulation of policies and monitor their execution, thus making it a
clearinghouse between the president and all federal ministries and
departments.
The reforms created a new style of civil service, but the structure
might change under later governments with different priorities. In the
past, the attempt by every government to effect changes in the civil
service produced many discontinuities. Ministries have been constantly
restructured, new ones created, and existing ones abolished.
Nevertheless, the 1988 reforms might solve some of the problems of the
civil service, because most civil servants tended to remain in their
jobs despite reorganizations. Also, the move of the capital from Lagos
to Abuja the early 1990s will provide new opportunities to apply the
federal-character principle in replacing Lagosian civil servants
unwilling to move.
Nigeria
Nigeria - INTEREST GROUPS
Nigeria
Organized interest groups played a crucial role in national politics,
especially under military regimes when other forms of direct political
participation were prohibited.
Professional Associations
These associations were the most established interest groups in the
country and included the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the Nigerian
Medical Association (NMA), the Nigerian Society of Engineers, the
Nigerian Economic Society, and the Nigerian Political Science
Association. Many of these associations were mainly concerned with
matters relating to the professional interests of their members. In
pursuing professional concerns, however, they articulated and demanded
important political actions. Between 1983 and 1985, for example, the NMA
called a strike of medical doctors to demand an improvement in health
care delivery. Its leaders were detained and the union banned until
1986. The NBA has been at the forefront of the movement for the
observance of the rule of law and human rights in Nigeria. Most other
associations held annual conferences at which positions were taken on
national issues. The most distinguishing characteristics of professional
associations were their elitist and urban base, and the nonviolent
pursuit of their interests.
Trade Unions
The central trade union in the country was the Nigerian Labour
Congress (NLC), which was formed in 1975 as the umbrella trade union and
recognized by Decree Number 44 of 1976 as the sole representative of all
trade unions in the country. The NLC had a national executive and
secretariat, as well as state councils in all states. It had more than
100 affiliated unions. Although most labor matters were channeled
through the NLC, the affiliate unions had engaged individually in union
activities, such as strikes and lockouts. In the 1980s, the NLC was torn
apart by leadership struggles, ideological differences, and
ethnoregional conflicts. The NLC nearly broke up in 1988 after
disagreements over elections of its leadership, resulting in the federal
government's appointing an administrator for several months. The NLC
organized a nationwide workers' strike in 1986 to demand the retention
of government subsidies on petroleum products and continued to
articulate workers' demands on matters such as minimum wages and
improved welfare conditions. Several other trade unions were also
active. A few, such as the Academic Staff Union of Universities, were
proscribed for alleged antigovernment activities.
The Media
The press was a specialized interest group in Nigeria. As the fourth
estate or the "societal watchdog," it was the most vocal and
effective interest group in the country, especially because other
interest groups channeled their demands and support through the press.
The media could act as a watchdog because of the large number of
newspapers and radio and television stations, and because of the wide
degree of press freedom.
In the 19__s, Nigeria had more than thirty national and provincial
newspapers, more than twenty general magazines and journals, and more
than twenty television and radio stations. Although the radio and
television stations were owned by the federal and state governments,
most of the newspapers and magazines were privately owned and were, in
general, seen as instruments of partisan political interests. Thus, the
latter could afford to be critical of the government. At some points,
newspapers and magazines have been proscribed, as happened to Newbreed
in 1977, the Tribune in 1984, and Newswatch in 1988.
Individual journalists have been harassed and intimidated by government
security agents. In 1971 Minere Amakiri, a Nigerian Observer
correspondent, was detained and his hair shaved. Since then, numerous
editors and reporters have been detained.
The organized interest groups representing the press included the
Nigeria Union of Journalists, the Newspaper Proprietors Association, and
the Nigerian Guild of Editors. These associations mainly pursued the
professional interests of their members but also played active roles on
broader social issues.
Student Associations
Since 1962, when students prevented the government from signing the
Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, they have played an active role in
influencing government actions. From the 1970s on, they have engaged in
violent protests and riots that have sometimes resulted in fatalities.
The grounds for these riots have ranged from narrow concerns, such as
unacceptable dining facilities and boarding conditions, to broader
national issues, such as the removal of government subsidies on
petroleum products, the SAP, and repressive government. Since 1977 no
year has passed without one university or other institution of higher
learning being closed because of violent student protests. The most
dramatic were the 1978 "Ali must go" riots, in which all
universities in the country protested a rise in the costs of university
education; and the 1989 anti-SAP riots, which claimed many lives.
Student activities were coordinated nationally by the National
Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), which has operated underground
since its proscription in 1986. Every institution of higher learning had
a student union. Until 1986, when the Justice Mohammad panel recommended
voluntary membership as a way to check student protests, membership in
student unions was compulsory. There were several other student
associations, such as voluntary groups and religious associations, which
also articulated students' interests.
Women's Organizations
Nigeria had several women's organizations, most of them professional
and social clubs. The umbrella organization, recognized as the voice of
women on national issues, was the National Council of Women's Societies
(NCWS). Many of the women's groups were affiliated with the NCWS, which
tended to be elitist in organization, membership, and orientation.
Another major women's association was Women in Nigeria, composed
primarily of university women and inclined toward Western feminist
views. Conservative Nigerian Muslim women in the late 1970s began to
indicate discontent with the liberal trends of these two organizations
and in the mid-1980s created the Federation of Muslim Women's
Associations of Nigeria, which had about 400 member bodies throughout
the country. In the 1980s, women from lower social strata in the towns,
represented mainly by the market women's associations, became militant
and organized mass protests and demonstrations in several states. Their
major grievances ranged from narrow concerns such as allocation of
market stalls to broader issues such as increased school fees.
Other Interest Groups
Other notable interest groups included social clubs and fraternities,
old boys' and alumni associations, and various voluntary associations.
On the whole, the activities of interest groups and the roles they
played in national politics depended on how narrow or broad the group's
interests were, the resources available to it, its ties with those in
authority, its affiliation with other groups, and the ideological
character of its membership. The major interest groups were elitist, but
other groups were also active at times.
Nigeria
Nigeria - FOREIGN RELATIONS
Nigeria
A 1989 publication by the Federal Military Government, Four Years
of the Babangida Administration, summarized the priority issues of
Nigerian foreign policy: the abolition of apartheid in South Africa; the
enhancement of Nigeria's relations with member countries of the European
Economic Community (EEC), the United States, the Soviet Union, and with
other major industrialized countries to increase the flow of foreign
investments and capital into Nigeria; and continued support for
international organizations, such as the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Relations with other African states
constituted the cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy.
The Ministry of External Affairs was directly responsible for foreign
policy formulation and implementation. Because matters were usually left
in the hands of the minister and his officials, foreign policy positions
could change radically from one minister to another, depending on the
minister's orientation. In addition to the minister's immediate staff,
there was a small foreign policy elite comprising other top government
officials, interest group leaders, academicians, top military officers,
religious leaders, and journalists. This elite exerted indirect
influence through communiqu�s and press releases, as well as direct
pressure on the government. In 1986 a conference--to which every stratum
of this elite was invited--was held to review Nigeria's foreign policy
and recommend broad policy frameworks for the 1990s and beyond.
Several factors conditioned Nigeria's foreign policy positions.
First, the ethnic and religious mix of the country required cautious
positions on some issues, such as policy toward Israel. Nigeria found it
difficult to restore diplomatic ties with Israel and had not done so as
of 1990 because of Muslim opposition and sympathy with the rest of the
Arab Muslim world. Second, Nigeria's legacy as an ex-British colony,
combined with its energy-producing role in the global economy,
predisposed Nigeria to be pro-Western on most issues despite the desire
to maintain a nonaligned status to avoid neocolonialism. In 1990 this
pro-Western posture was reinforced by Nigeria's "economic
diplomacy," which involved negotiating trade concessions,
attracting foreign investors, and rescheduling debt repayment to Western
creditors. Third, the country's membership in and
commitment to several international organizations, such as the United
Nations and bodies mentioned earlier, also affected foreign policy
positions. Fourth, and most important, as the most populous country in
Africa and the entire black world, Nigeria perceived itself as the
"giant" of Africa and the potential leader of the black race.
Thus, Nigerian external relations have emphasized African issues, which
have become the avowed cornerstone of foreign policy.
These factors have caused certain issues to dominate Nigerian foreign
policy across various governments, but each government has had
distinctive priorities and style. During the 1950s and early 1960s,
foreign policy aimed at proper behavior in the international system, and
British authorities played a major role in Nigerian foreign relations.
Consequently, the Balewa government stressed world peace, respected
sovereign equality, and maintained nonalignment based on friendship with
any country that took a reciprocal position. After the fall of the First
Republic, critics asserted that the government had been too proWestern
and not strong enough on decolonization or integration, and that the low
profile had been embarrassing. Nonetheless, Gowon continued to keep a
low profile by operating within the consensus of the OAU and by
following routes of quiet diplomacy.
The civil war marked a distinct break in Nigerian foreign policy. The
actions of various countries and international bodies during the war
increased awareness of the alignments within Africa and appreciation of
the positive role that the OAU could play in African affairs. Whereas
white-dominated African countries had supported Biafra, the OAU sided
with the federation by voting for unity. The OAU stance proved helpful
for Nigerian diplomacy. Nigeria first turned to the Soviet Union for
support after the West refused to provide arms to the federation, and
after the war, a less pro-Western stance was maintained. At the same
time, Africa remained Nigeria's top priority. In the mid- to late 1970s,
attention focused on the liberation of southern Africa, on the
integration of ECOWAS, and on the need for complete economic
independence throughout Africa. These goals were included in the 1979
constitution: promotion of African unity; political, economic, social,
and cultural liberation of Africa; international cooperation; and
elimination of racial discrimination.
Relations with Neighboring States
Nigeria had cordial relations with all its neighbors--Benin, Niger,
Chad, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea--as well as with other countries
in the West African subregion, with most of which it had bilateral
agreements. There had been occasional border disputes with Chad and
Cameroon, and military action against these neighbors was contemplated
by the civilian government in 1982 and 1983. Another problem arose in
the early 1980s, when Nigeria decided to expel many illegal immigrants,
mainly Ghanaians, but this dispute also was resolved amicably. The
guiding principle of Nigeria's regional foreign policy was that of good
neighborliness and friendship. In this spirit, it helped to resolve
conflicts between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, and
Togo and Ghana. Nigeria also tried to make its neighbors
"safe" friends, partly to reenforce boundary claims and
protect human rights of Nigerian citizens who were migrantworkers and
partly to stabilize relations between the immediate neighboring
countries. For example, since 1988 it has established a strong presence
in Equatorial Guinea.
To pursue the economic interests through of foreign relations within
West Africa, Nigeria championed the formation of ECOWAS and, in spite of
competing allegiances to rival organizations within the subcontinent,
continued to support the organization's objectives. Strengthening ECOWAS
promoted Nigeria's national interests through encouraging development of
the region's economy and discouraging its neighbors' reliance on
extra-African countries for military, political, and economic survival,
thus serving such security interests as weakening colonial divisions
within West Africa, ending border disputes, contributing to African
unity, and strengthening West Africa's bargaining positions vis-�-vis
the EEC.
Relations with the Rest of Africa
The prevailing perception in Nigeria's foreign policy was that, as
predominant the African leader, it should play a bigbrother role in
relations with African states. Nigeria was a founding member of the OAU
and often channeled major policy initiatives through that organization.
Most of its relations with other African states took place outside the
OAU framework but were guided by OAU principles. Nigeria's primary
African commitment was to liberate the continent from the last vestiges
of colonialism and to eradicate apartheid in South Africa. Promoting
liberation had grown from a weak and conservative stance during the
1960s to an increasingly firm push after the civil war. This commitment
was pursued most actively after Murtala Muhammad successfully backed the
Movimento Popular de Liberta��o de Angola's ascent to power in Angola
in 1975 by providing the swing vote in the OAU decision to recognize the
MPLA. Nigeria had played a role in the independence of Zimbabwe and in
the late 1980s was active in assisting Nambibia to achieve independence
of Namibia. In the latter case, it contributed about US$20 million to
assist the South West Africa People's Organization in the 1989 elections
and other preparations for Namibian independence. The country also
contributed financially to liberation movements in South Africa and to
the front line states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe,
which were constantly harassed by South Africa. Although Nigeria's armed
forces were among the largest in black Africa in the early 1990s,
sizable military might has rarely been used in foreign policy. The army
participated in peacekeeping forces, either alone or through the OAU and
contributed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions. In line
with its ECOWAS comunitment, Nigeria was one of the main contributors of
troops to the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) sent to
Liberia August 23, 1990 after the peace talks there failed. Additional
forces were sent in late September 1990 under a Nigerian field
commander, General Doganyaro. Threats to fight for southern African
liberation were made but not acted on, but Nigeria did give military and
financial aid to the African National Congress for its efforts against
the apartheid regime in South Africa and provided military equipments to
Mozambique to help its struggle South African-backed guerrillas.
In addition, Nigeria gave aid and technical assistance to several
African states, often through the African Development Bank of which it
was a major benefactor. In 1987 a Technical Aid Corps, operating along
the lines of the United States Peace Corps, was established. Under it,
young Nigerian professionals served in other African, Caribbean, and
Pacific countries where their expertise was needed. Nigeria also
provided scholarships and fellowships, training facilities, grants,
equipment, and medical supplies, and subsidized oil during the 1970s'
oil crisis to African countries under certain conditions.
In July 1974, the Gowon government decided to sell crude oil at
concessionary rates to African countries on condition that they had
their own refineries and would not re-export to third countries. The
decision came despite Nigeria's role as an Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) member generally in favor of higher prices
and after more than two years of deliberations. Nigeria acted largely in
response to external pressures: international actors attempted to divide
Third World countries into OPEC members and nonoil producers; various
African countries, especially Liberia, begged for less expensive oil;
and both the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries had established programs to aid
poor countries while encouraging other oil producers, especially African
nations, to follow suit. Providing subsidies for African countries was a
safe move for Nigeria because Africa comprised only a small portion of
the country's total oil export market, it enhanced Nigeria's position
and influence in Africa while building African solidarity, and it
protected security interests by preventing economic decline. Moreover,
this example of generosity aided Nigeria in its efforts to create
ECOWAS. In November 1990, Babangida suggested that Nigeria might again
offer concessionary prices to other African countries as the Middle East
crises pushed oil prices upward.
Relations with Major Powers
During the Gulf crisis that began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
the summer of 1990 and that marked the end of the Cold War and the
beginning of a coalition, Nigeria kept a low profile. It did not send
troops to engage in the Persian Gulf war but continued to be an active
supporter of UN policy. Buying the bulk of Nigeria's crude oil, the
United States was Nigeria's most important trading partner. Until the
civil war, Nigeria had had no significant relationship with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Since then, ties with the Soviet Union had
increased, although they remained minimal in comparison with ties to the
West. Nigeria's other major trading partners were Japan and the EEC,
from which it continued to obtain loans and aid.
Although Nigeria has always leaned toward the West, the closeness of
the relationship has varied. Nigeria's Western ties were originally
strongest with Britain, its former colonial ruler. The special
relationship, which lasted until the 1966 coup, led Nigeria to side with
Britain on most issues. After the coup and the civil war, the new
Nigerian leaders were less favorable toward Britain, especially after
Britain took a position of neutrality in the civil war, refused to sell
arms to the federation and ignored the blockade against Biafra. Nigerian
leaders also were rankled by Britain's support of white-dominated
governments in southern Africa. Several Nigerian groups pressured the
new government to weaken ties with Britain as the only way to true
independence. At times, more verbal and symbolic damage was done to
Nigerian-British relations for Nigerian popular consumption than was
true in reality.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were
interested in Nigeria because of its size, population, economic and
military potential, and, especially for the United States, its oil. From
1966 to 1977, Nigeria was very cool toward the United States. The two
countries took opposing positions over southern African liberation.
Nigerians were angered by proBiafran propaganda in the United States and
by America's refusal to sell arms to the federation during the civil
war. United States involvement was even suspected by Nigeria in the
assassination of Murtala Muhammad. In 1977 Jimmy Carter became
president, and Nigerian relations with the United States suddenly
changed. The United States recognized Nigeria as a stabilizing force in
Africa and was willing to consult with Nigeria on African issues. The
two governments appeared to have similar interests in southern Africa.
The special relationship had a weak basis, however, depending mostly
upon continuing agreement and cooperation over southern African issues.
Once Ronald Reagan replaced Carter as president (1981-88), the countries
again had divergent interests in southern Africa.
Just as the balance of trade was not expected to shift dramatically
with the opening of Eastern Europe so, too, Nigeria's political position
was not expected to change greatly. In a time of shifting world
coalitions, a position of nonalignment with a leaning toward the West
provided more options for Nigeria than ever. Events in southern Africa,
including Namibia's independence and the opening of debate for
eliminating apartheid in South Africa, removed the largest obstacles to
closer relations with the United States without excluding the Soviet
Union or other leading powers.
Relations with International Organizations
Nigeria played active roles in various international organizations
and vied for positions in them. For example, Joseph Garba, Nigeria's
former permanent representative to the UN, was elected in 1989 to a
one-year term as president of the UN General Assembly; Adebayo Adeedji
was executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, a UN
affiliate; and Emeka Anyaoku became secretary general of the
Commonwealth of Nations in 1989. Former military head of state Obasanjo
also had become a recognized world statesman and spokesman on African
issues. Nigeria contributed personnel to many UN peacekeeping missions,
including operations in Congo, Tanzania, and the UN India/Pakistan
Observer Mission in the 1960s, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 1978,
and UN forces observing the Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the AngolaNamibian
accords in 1988.
The importance that Nigeria placed on international organizations
grew out of a striving for peace and international cooperation. In the
cases of the OAU and ECOWAS, these organizations also served to increase
African unity, another important Nigerian goal. Nigeria played an
initiating role in the creation of both organizations and was active in
both thereafter. Although Nigeria's positions on various issues have
changed over the years, its level of activity in international
organizations has increased.
In 1987 Nigeria initiated a Concert of Medium Powers, more widely
known as the Lagos Forum, to facilitate multilateral cooperation and to
enable member states to exert greater collective influence on world
affairs. Forum members included Sweden, Austria, Zimbabwe, and Egypt.
The initiative, which could be seen as an effort preceding the end of
the Cold War, seemed to collapse, however, after its initiator, Boleji
Akenyemi, was removed as minister for external affairs in 1987.
Nigeria
Nigeria - Bibliography
Nigeria
Adamu, Mahdi. The Hausa Factor in West Africa. Zaria,
Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1978.
Afigbo, A. Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and
Culture. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Ajayi, J.F. Ade, and Michael Crowder (eds.). History of West
Africa. (3d ed.) (2 vols.) London: Longman, 1988.
Ayandele, E.A. The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842-
1914. London: Longman, 1966.
John de St. Jorre. The Nigerian Civil War. London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1972.
Dusgate, Richard H. The Conquest of Northern Nigeria.
London: Cass, 1985.
Falola, Toyin, and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere. The Rise and
Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-1983. London:
Zed Books, 1985.
Fika, Adamu. The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule.
London: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Flint, John. Sir George Goldie and the Making of
Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Forrest, Thomas. Politics, Policy, and Capitalist Development
in Nigeria, 1970-1990. Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1992.
Ikime, Obaro. The Fall of Nigeria. London: Heinemann,
1977.
Ikime, Obaro (ed.). Groundwork of Nigerian History.
Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books for Historical Society
of Nigeria, 1980.
Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of the Igbo People.
London: Macmillan, 1976.
Lovejoy, Paul E. Transformations in Slavery: A History of
Slavery in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983.
Lovejoy, Paul E., and Jan S. Hogendorn. Slavery in Muslim
Nigeria. The Abolition of Slavery under British Rule.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1992.
Nicolson, I.F. The Administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960: Men,
Methods, and Myths. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Paden, John N. Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and
Leadership in Nigeria. London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1986.
Phillips, Anne. The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in
West Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1989.
Smith, Robert S. Kingdoms of the Yoruba. (3d ed.)
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
Stremlau, John J. The International Politics of the Nigerian
Civil War, 1967-1970. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977.
Tumano, Tekena N. The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The
Southern Phase, 1898-1914. London: Longman, 1972.
------. Nigeria and Elected Representation, 1923-1947.
London: Heinemann, 1966.
Usman, Yusufu Bala (ed.). Studies in the History of the
Sokoto Caliphate. Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello
University Press, 1979.
Watts, Michael. Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry
in Northern Nigeria. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983.
Nigeria