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Moldova - GOVERNMENT
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On August 27, 1991, the Republic of Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union and became a sovereign state, an act that consummated the process of escalating political selfassertion under way since 1988. Behind this phenomenon were glasnost and perestroika, the general movement toward reform initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s.
Gorbachev's more permissive approach to political life in the Moldavian SSR enabled Moldovan nationalists to participate in the campaign for election to the Soviet Union's Congress of Peoples' Deputies in 1989 and to form the Moldovan Popular Front. On February 25, 1990, the first democratic elections for the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR resulted in a Popular Front majority.
In May 1991, the country changed its name from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova to the Republic of Moldova. The name of the Supreme Soviet was changed to the Moldovan Parliament. On August 27, 1991 (now Independence Day), it declared Moldova's complete independence. This pursuit of independence by Moldova's government put it increasingly at odds with Moscow and at the same time led to growing tensions between the ethnic Romanian majority and the non-Romanian minorities in the republic.
Those tensions soon led to sporadic violence throughout the first half of 1992 until a cease-fire agreement was negotiated by presidents Snegur and Yeltsin in July. The conditions for withdrawing the Russian 14th Army were negotiated and were dependent on constitutional provisions that were to be made after the parliamentary elections of early 1994.
On February 27, 1994, parliamentary elections were held. In the elections, the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova won a majority, marking a turning point for Moldovan politics. The new Parliament was able to make compromises between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Slavs, thus enabling it to pass legislation and set a more moderate tone for governing the country. Without a majority of Popular Front extreme nationalists in Parliament, a solution to the problem of Transnistria began to be more than just a futile hope.
<>Government System
<>Local Government
<>Political Parties
<>The 1990 Elections
<>Conflict in Transnistria and Gagauzia
<>Lucinschi and Political Realignment
<>The 1994 Elections
<>Human Rights
<>The Media
On July 28, 1994, the Moldovan Parliament approved a new constitution, declaring Moldova a republic, which went into effect August 27, 1994. Moldova's previous constitution was that of the old Moldavian SSR (1979), with amendments. The new document defines Moldova as an independent, democratic, "single" state and declares the country's permanent neutrality. The Moldovan language, written in the Latin script, is designated as the official language, but guarantees are made for the use of Russian and other languages. The new constitution includes a ban on the stationing of foreign troops on Moldova's territory.
Moldova is a democracy with a unicameral legislature, the Moldovan Parliament, previously called the Supreme Soviet. Following the earlier Soviet model, the Moldovan Parliament maintains a Presidium, which performs legislative functions when the larger body is not in session. Parliament has 104 members elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term. Any citizen eligible to vote (eighteen years of age and not prohibited by law) is eligible for election to the Parliament. The next parliamentary elections will be held in 1998.
Parliament ordinarily meets in two sessions per year. The first session starts in February and may not go beyond the end of July. The seocnd session starts in September and may not go beyond the end of December.
Parliamentary leadership consists of a chair and two deputy chairs elected by the delegates. The work of Parliament is carried out by fifteen permanent committees, which have purview in the following areas: agriculture and rural social development, crime prevention, culture and religion, ecology, the economy and the budget, foreign affairs, health and social assistance, human rights and relations among nationalities, law, legislative ethics, local administration and the local economy, public relations and the mass media, science and education, state security and military affairs, and women and family issues.
Moldova's head of state is the president of the republic, who shares executive power with the Council of Ministers. Under constitutional arrangements prevailing at the time of the 1990 national elections, the president was elected by members of the Supreme Soviet, but provisions introduced in 1991 called for the president's direct election by all members of the population over eighteen years of age. The president, who must be over thirtyfive years old, a resident of Moldova for at least ten years, and a speaker of the state language, is elected to a four-year term of office. The next election is set for December 1995. In early 1995, the president was Mircea Snegur, named president by the Supreme Soviet in September 1990 and confirmed by popular election in December 1991.
The president's duties include nominating the prime minister and members of the Council of Ministers, taking part in Parliament's proceedings and debates, dissolving Parliament under certain conditions, negotiating and concluding international treaties, serving as commander in chief of the armed forces, granting political asylum, and iniating national referendums.
The activities of the government are directed by the cabinet, or Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister and the first deputy prime minister. In early 1995, the prime minister was Andrei Sangheli, appointed in July 1992 and reappointed in March 1994. Candidates for the Council of Ministers are nominated by the president (on the prime minister's recommendation) and must be confirmed by Parliament before taking office. In 1995 there were eighteen ministries: agriculture and food, commercial services and housing, culture, defense, economy, education, finance, foreign affairs, health, industry, information and communication, interior, justice, labor and social and family protection, national security, parliamentary relations, privatization and administration of state property, and transportation and road assistance.
In addition to these ministries, the government has state departments subordinate to the Council of Ministers. In 1995 there were nine state departments: architecture and construction; customs control; energy, energy resources, and fuel; environmental protection; national relations; standards, metrology, and technical assistance; statistics; trade; and youth and sports.
Independent Moldova's judicial and legal systems are carryovers from the Soviet period and conform to practices that were standard throughout the former Soviet Union. The most powerful legal institution is the General Prosecution Office, formerly called the Procuracy. Headed by the prosecutor general, the General Prosecution Office directs investigations, orders arrests, and prosecutes criminal cases. It is also charged with administering the judicial system and ensuring the legality of government actions. In the early 1990s, the Procuracy's corruption and political ties to the Communist Party of Moldavia made it the subject of substantial controversy in discussions on constitutional reform. A significant element of political opinion advocated the abolition of or the radical transformation of the Procuracy.
Moldova's judicial system is based on a network of local courts and higher-level appeals courts, with the highest court being the Supreme Court (Curte Suprema). Judges do not have a tradition of political impartiality and independence, and the role of defense attorneys is limited. The government of Moldova has initiated reform efforts, but corruption and a lack of organization continue to plague the legal system. Many former Soviet-era judges and chief prosecutors were replaced in 1990 and 1991 during a parliamentary review, but an independent judiciary was still not realized. The system was being reviewed in 1995.
Below the central government, Moldova is divided administratively into forty raioane (sing., raion; rayon/rayony, in Russian; see Glossary), as in the Soviet period. Each raion is governed by a locally elected council. Raion councils elect executive committees from among their members. The heads of these executive committees are the chief executive officers of the raioane. City and village governments are organized much like the raion- level governments. In addition to the raioane, Chisinau (the national capital), Balti, Bender, and Tiraspol are designated municipalities and are directly subordinate to the national government.
In 1991 the national government began work on an administrative reorganization intended to alter this structure and to reintroduce a system of counties (judete), communes, and villages similar to the one that had been in effect during the interwar period, and one that was still in use in Romania. Under the new system, the counties would consolidate functions carried out by the smaller raioane, and local executives would be elected directly. However, this effort was stalled by the secession of Transnistria and the declaration of sovereignty by the Gagauz region, and the Parliament elected in 1994 put the matter aside.
In 1993 more than twenty political parties and movements were registered in Moldova. Until 1990 the Communist Party of Moldavia (CPM) was the dominant political force in the republic. It had controlled the administrative, economic, and cultural affairs of the Moldavian SSR from its establishment until 1990. During that period, CPM officials monopolized virtually all politically significant government positions. However, once democratic elections were decided upon, the party's power disintegrated swiftly. The CPM was formally banned in August 1991, following the abortive August coup d'�tat against Soviet president Gorbachev, but former communists continue to participate actively in politics through their membership in a variety of successor organizations.
In the wake of the 1990 elections, the Moldovan Popular Front, founded in 1989 and consisting of an association of independent cultural and political groups, moved into a commanding position in the country's political life. It emerged as an advocate of increased autonomy from the Soviet Union and of the rights of the Moldavian SSR's ethnic Romanian population. Popular Front delegates were able to dominate proceedings in the Supreme Soviet and to select a government made up of individuals who supported its agenda. The Popular Front was well organized nationally, with its strongest support in the capital and in areas of the country most heavily populated by ethnic Romanians. Once the organization was in power, however, internal disputes led to a sharp fall in popular support, and it fragmented into several competing factions by early 1993. In February 1993, the Popular Front was reformed as the Christian Democratic Popular Front (CDPF).
Several other parties, primarily composed of ethnic Romanians, were organized after 1990. The largest and most influential of these ethnically based parties is the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, which is a coalition of former communists and moderate to status-quo supporters of Moldovan statehood and closer economic ties with Russia. The party's support comes mainly from the rural populace, economic conservatives, and ethnic minorities opposed to reunification with Romania. The Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova won a majority of the votes in the 1994 parliamentary election.
A much smaller but still influential political group is the Social Democratic Party of Moldova. Most of the Social Democrats' leaders originally participated in the Popular Front but later formed their own organization in response to what they perceived as the increasingly nationalistic position of that party. The Social Democrats are multiethnic, and their constituency consists mainly of educated professional and managerial groups. Their support is strongest in the republic's capital.
Another independent formation committed to promoting a less nationalistic agenda for the republic, the Democratic Party for the Rebirth and Prosperity of Moldova (PDRPM), was formed in late 1990. The PDRPM draws its support primarily from among ethnic Romanian intellectuals and is active primarily in the capital.
At the other extreme of the political spectrum is the National Christian Party (NCP). The NCP is more expressly nationalistic than the Popular Front and its other competitors-- Congress of the Intelligentsia (which is a component of the Congress of Peasants and Intellectuals, a bloc in the 1994 elections), the Democratic Party, and the Democratic Labor Party- -and it campaigned openly for reunification with Romania during the 1994 election. Other parties active in the 1994 campaign for the Parliament were the Reform Party, the Yedinstvo/Socialist Bloc, the Republican Party, the Democratic Labor Party, the Green Alliance, the Women's Association of Moldova, and the Victims of Totalitarian Repression.
In late 1993, former Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi, along with several other leading members of Parliament unhappy with the direction of policy under the existing government, formed yet another party, the Socialist Workers' Party, in order to counter what they saw as the excessively conservative influence of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova. Non-Romanian ethnic communities have also formed political organizations representing their interests. In the early transition period, the most influential of these was the Yedinstvo-Unitatea Intermovement. Yedinstvo, whose members include not only Russians but also Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and other Russian-speaking residents of the republic, is politically conservative in its support of the pre-1990 status quo. Based primarily in Transnistria, it is strongly pro-Russian. In Parliament, its positions are represented by the Conciliere legislative club.
Yedinstvo emerged in 1988 from the mobilization of Russianspeaking workers responding to efforts to alter the republic's language laws and demote the status of the Russian language. During the transition period, Yedinstvo was the most effective and influential minority nationalist organization. Its representatives walked out of the first session of the democratically elected Moldavian Supreme Soviet in 1990. In local elections, its adherents won control over local and raion governments throughout Transnistria.
Gagauz Halk� (Gagauz People) is a second pivotal minority political group, formed to represent Moldova's population of approximately 153,000 Gagauz. Like the Russian-speaking community in Transnistria, with whom they had been close political allies, Gagauz nationalists gained control over local government in the five southern raioane, where their numbers continue to be concentrated. Like the Transnistrians, the Gagauz declared themselves sovereign in 1990.
The first democratic elections for the Supreme Soviet were held in February and March 1990. Delegates were elected for terms of four years in 380 single-member electoral districts (by early 1993 this number had decreased to 332 following removals and resignations). Electoral rules called for candidates to be nominated by electoral districts rather than by "social organizations," as had been the practice previously. Meetings of work collectives of 100 persons and residents' meetings of fifty or more persons were empowered to nominate candidates.
In order to be elected, candidates had to receive more than 50 percent of the votes cast in an electoral district. When there was no victor in the first round of elections, the two candidates with the highest number of votes competed against each other in a second round.
In 1990 the republic was divided by the secession of separatist regions and by the outbreak of widespread fighting in Transnistria. At the same time, economic crisis loomed, a result of the collapse of the economic institutions of the Soviet Union. The Moldovan government pursued reforms to address this crisis, but progress toward a market economy was slow, partly as a result of the government's preoccupation with the conflicts among the ethnic groups and partly because of resistance to reform on the part of those with vested interests in the communist system.
In contrast to the artificial quiescence that characterized previous contests, the 1990 elections saw considerable controversy. While national CPM officials, including then-First Secretary Petru Lucinschi, promoted open access to the political process, local communist officials in many areas used traditional means to retain power. Reformers complained that local electoral commissions were controlled by "enemies of restructuring" and that the administrative apparatus was being used to subvert the nominating process.
Just as important in determining the outcome of the election as bureaucratic resistance, however, was the Popular Front's organizational weakness in many localities outside the capital, especially in comparison with the local strength of the CPM's rural party apparatus. Despite these difficulties, Popular Frontapproved candidates were on the ballot in 219 out of Moldova's 380 electoral districts by the February 25 election date. Meanwhile, the CPM, enjoying a rebound in popularity and effectiveness under Lucinschi's direction, accounted for 86 percent of all candidates.
A high degree of cooperation between the Popular Front and reformers within the CPM hierarchy was also evident during the early transition period. On February 11, 1990, the Popular Front, with the support of government authorities, had organized a "Republic's Voters Meeting" in Chisinau. This was attended by more than 100,000 people and was addressed by Lucinschi and other high-level communist officials.
Among the candidates supported by the Popular Front one could find the names of ranking CPM members such as Mircea Snegur. A Central Committee secretary since 1985, Snegur was appointed chairman of the Presidium of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet by the staunchly antireform CPM leader Simion Grossu in July 1989. By early 1990, however, Snegur had realigned himself with the Popular Front and its political program.
The results of the first round of elections in February confirmed the main trends that had appeared during the nominating process. Competitive races were held in 373 of the 380 districts, and turnout was 84 percent of the electorate. In the 140 contests decided without a runoff, reformers claimed victory for fiftynine of the candidates, although 115 of the total elected were CPM members (some of whom were supported by the Popular Front). As during the nominating phase, reformers alleged that significant violations of the election law had occurred, despite the Central Electoral Commission's finding of no major infractions.
The second round of elections, held on March 10, 1990, filled the bulk of positions in the republic's Supreme Soviet and had a decisive impact on the country's political life. A fall in turnout for the second round, to 75 percent of the electorate, appears to have hurt the performance of the Popular Front, which won in only forty-two out of 237 districts, a considerably weaker showing than in the February contest. With the conclusion of the runoff, 305 of the deputies to the new Supreme Soviet were CPM members; 101 of the Supreme Soviet deputies were selected from the list supported by the Popular Front. With the support of deputies sympathetic to its views, however, the Popular Front could control more than half of the votes in the new Supreme Soviet.
As the political influence of the Popular Front increased in the wake of the elections, the powerful faction of Romanian nationalists within the organization became increasingly vocal in the pursuit of their agenda. The nationalists argued that the Popular Front should immediately use its majority in the Supreme Soviet to attain independence from Russian domination, end migration into the republic, and improve the status of ethnic Romanians.
Yedinstvo and its supporters within the Supreme Soviet argued against independence from the Soviet Union, against implementation of the August 1989 Law on State Language (making Moldovan written in the Latin alphabet the country's official language), and for increased autonomy for minority areas. Hence, clashes occurred almost immediately once the new Supreme Soviet began its inaugural session in April 1990. Popular Front representatives, for example, entered a motion to rename the Supreme Soviet the National Council (Sfatul Tarii, the name of the 1917 legislature), which, they argued was in keeping with national tradition. Although this motion failed, it provoked an acerbic public exchange among the deputies, which made subsequent cooperation difficult at best. A second controversial motion, on establishing a Moldovan flag (three equal vertical stripes of bright blue, yellow, and red, like the Romanian flag, but with Moldova's coat of arms in the center), passed in the Supreme Soviet but was widely and conspicuously disregarded by its opponents.
The selection of a new legislative leadership also provoked political confrontation. Those appointed to high-level posts were overwhelmingly ethnic Romanians, a situation that left minority activists little hope that their interests would be effectively represented in deliberations on key issues. Ethnic Romanians accounted for only 70 percent of the Supreme Soviet as a whole but for 83 percent of the leadership. All five of the top positions in the Supreme Soviet were held by ethnic Romanians, as were eighteen of twenty positions in the new Council of Ministers.
Faced with what they considered a concerted effort by ethnic Romanian nationalists to dominate the republic, conservatives and minority activists banded together and began to resist majority initiatives. Organized in the Supreme Soviet as the Soviet Moldavia (Sovetskaya Moldaviya) faction, the antireformers became increasingly inflexible.
As confrontation grew among legislative leaders, initiatives undertaken at the local level drew the republic into worsening interethnic conflict. In the minority regions, local forces actively resisted what they considered to be discriminatory legislation from Chisinau. May Day celebrations in Tiraspol became mass protests against the republic's Supreme Soviet. The Tiraspol, Bender, and R�bnita city councils, as well as the R�bnita raion council, each passed measures suspending application of the flag law in their territories.
Deputies from Tiraspol and Bender, unable to block legislation they considered inimical to their interests, announced their intention to withdraw from the Supreme Soviet. Pro-Popular Front demonstrators outside the Supreme Soviet responded to what they perceived as the obstructionism of minority legislators by becoming increasingly hostile. Following a series of confrontations in the capital, a leading legislative representative of Yedinstvo was badly beaten; 100 deputies associated with the Russian-speaking Soviet Moldavia faction withdrew from the Supreme Soviet on May 24, 1990.
A new reformist government, with Mircea Druc as chairman of the Council of Ministers, took over that same day after the previous government suffered a vote of no confidence. The many changes wrought by this government included a ban on the CPM, a ban on political parties becoming in effect synonymous with the government, and the outlawing of government censorship. In June 1990, the country changed its name from the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova and declared its sovereignty.
Increasing strain between nationalists and their opponents had become apparent since the opening session of the Supreme Soviet. In the culmination of this trend, delegates to the second congress of the Popular Front passed measures signaling a clear break with the CPM and took an openly nationalistic direction. The Popular Front's new program called for the country to be renamed the Romanian Republic of Moldova, for its citizens to be called "Romanians," and for the Romanian language to be designated the language of the republic. The program also called for the return of ethnic Romanian-inhabited areas transferred to Ukraine when the Moldavian SSR was formed and for the withdrawal of Soviet forces.
The Popular Front's promotion of this agenda, which was perceived by minority populations to be expressly nationalistic in character, inexorably fractionalized the population. Many of Moldova's ethnic Romanians also perceived the Popular Front as extremist, excessively pro-Romanian, and ineffectual. The opposition was able to bring the public's general dissatisfaction with the Popular Front into focus and eventually bring about a reversal in the political fortunes of the Popular Front.
As the summer of 1990 advanced, the country's initially inchoate political divisions transformed themselves into competing governmental authorities. Delegates to city and raion councils in Transnistria and in the Gagauz region met independently with their Supreme Soviet delegates and called for regional autonomy. Republic-level officials denounced these efforts as separatist and treasonable.
As efforts to reach some form of accord foundered, more decisive measures were taken. On August 21, 1990, the Gagauz announced the formation of the "Gagauz Republic" in the five southern raioane where their population was concentrated, separate from the Moldavian SSR and part of the Soviet Union. The Transnistrians followed suit on September 2, proclaiming the formation of the "Dnestr Moldavian Republic," with its capital at Tiraspol, as a part of the Soviet Union.
It was under these circumstances that violence broke out in the fall of 1990. A decision by Gagauz leaders to hold a referendum on the question of local sovereignty was intensely opposed by the republic's government and by the Popular Front. Rival political forces mobilized volunteer detachments to defend their competing interests by force. Adding to the volatility of the conflict between the Gagauz and the ethnic Romanians, militia forces from Transnistria entered the Gagauz region to support the sovereignty movement there.
In the Transnistrian city of Dubasari, the militia seized the city council building as part of its preparations for a referendum on autonomy in the region. When the republic's police sought to retake the building, new forces were mobilized from ethnic Romanian regions as well as from Russian-speaking regions. In the ensuing conflict, three persons were killed and dozens more wounded.
Relations between the separatists and the republic's government were characterized by mutual denunciations and sporadic violence from late 1990 until early 1992, when conditions took a sharp turn for the worse. As efforts among Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Romania to mediate the conflict floundered and as the Transnistrian separatists consolidated their position with the support of Russia's 14th Army, pressure built on President Snegur to take decisive action to resolve the conflict.
In late March 1992, Snegur declared a state of emergency across the republic, and soon afterward the government made an effort to disarm the separatists' militia. These efforts were met by armed resistance, which, by May 1992, had escalated into a full-scale civil war as weapons released to the Transnistrians by the 14th Army were used against Moldovan military units.
By the close of the summer, more than 300 people had been killed in the conflict, and more than 1,000 had been wounded. A large part of the city of Bender, which had become a focal point of the conflict, had been devastated; thousands of refugees flooded out of the region.
While combat in the civil war remained at a bloody stalemate into mid-1992, the political situation in Moldova changed dramatically, at least partly as a consequence of popular dissatisfaction with the conflict. In the first stage of the realignment, former CPM First Secretary Lucinschi was named ambassador to Russia. Lucinschi, the highest-ranking "Moldavian" outside of the country during the communist era, was able to use his connections with the Moscow political elite to promote accommodation.
Soon afterward, in July 1992, Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi (who had replaced Mircea Druc) was replaced by Andrei Sangheli of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova. Sangheli was a former CPM raion committee first secretary and member of the Council of Ministers. Sangheli's new government included significantly improved minority representation and promised a more efficient economic reform program, as well as a more moderate approach to the ethnic conflict.
By taking this more flexible approach, Moldova was able to reduce the level of violence involved in the separatist dispute, if not to bring the conflict to an end. But the shift in policy direction precipitated a strong backlash from the more extreme elements of the Popular Front, which felt that it was slipping from power. This and popular dissatisfaction with the failing economy forced a fundamental political reorientation.
In December 1992, President Snegur, who clearly supported the more conciliatory course, touched off a crisis by delivering a speech to Parliament in which he laid out a course of foreign policy based on the pursuit of national independence. Snegur warned against the extremes of either unification with Romania or reintegration into some form of alliance with Russia. His public position against efforts to promote unification further soured relations between himself and the Popular Front and at the same time sharpened divisions between moderates and more extreme nationalists within the Popular Front itself.
Fallout from Snegur's speech was almost immediate. In early January 1993, Alexandru Mosanu, chair of the Moldovan Parliament, offered his resignation, citing the differences between himself and the president of the republic and complaining about tendencies within the government favoring the previous political system.
If, as some suggest, Mosanu's resignation was intended to rally support in an effort to undermine President Snegur, it failed miserably. Not only was the resignation accepted, but Parliament voted overwhelmingly to replace Mosanu with Petru Lucinschi, a leader of those very forces about which Mosanu had warned.
Lucinschi's election on February 4, 1993, to the leading position in Parliament marked the peak of a process of political realignment in Moldova. By early 1993, the Popular Front, now named the Christian Democratic Popular Front (CDPF) was in neartotal disarray. Moderate intellectuals (such as Mosanu), who had added tremendously to the prestige of the Popular Front during its early years, organized the "Congress of Intellectuals" in order to promote a nationalistic, but less extreme, agenda. As a result, they were expelled from the CDPF in mid-May.
As a consequence of factionalism and defection, the CDPF's voting strength in Parliament was reduced to approximately twenty-five deputies. With the CDPF in decline, power shifted to the bloc of Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova deputies (the Viata Satului legislative club), which, with support from independent deputies, was able to play a dominant role in Parliament.
Lucinschi's election and the realignment of forces among the deputies brought Parliament into much closer alignment with President Snegur and Prime Minister Sangheli's government on the ethnic conflict. As a consequence, Moldova was better positioned than it had been in the previous two years to end the infighting that had characterized its political life during that time. There was hope that Moldova's leaders would be able to resolve the ongoing civil conflict, which had, of necessity, been the dominant issue in the republic since its inception, and to proceed with the reforms that Moldova so desperately needed.
At the same time, the realignment moved Moldova's government into a more conservative position with respect to economic and political reform, marginalizing legislators who were elected as opposition candidates and vesting more power in the hands of those who were originally elected as representatives of the CPM. In particular, the realignment gave near-veto power to the bloc of Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova deputies, many of whom were state and collective farm presidents. Although the great majority of these individuals supported democratic politics, the strength of their commitment to the transition to a market economy was questionable.
Despite the powerful combination of government, the presidency, and Lucinschi's parliamentary leadership working in harmony, the hopelessly tangled web of factions and rivalries within Parliament could not be overcome, and legislation ground to a halt. The pro-Romanian faction objected, but a vote was taken to dissolve parliament and hold early Parliamentary elections.
Campaigning for the February 27, 1994, parliamentary elections revolved around economic reform, competing strategies for resolving the separatist crises, and relations with both the CIS and Romania. Debate on the issues of moving to a market economy, privatization, land reform, and foreign policy was polarized.
The results of the election quickly changed the course of Moldovan politics and stood in sharp contrast to the results of the 1990 election. Nationalist and pro-Romanian forces were rejected overwhelmingly in favor of those backing Moldova's independence and in favor of accommodating ethnic minorities.
Under laws passed in preparation for the February 27, 1994, elections, the Parliament was reduced from 380 seats to a more manageable 104. Fifty of these delegates were selected from fifty newly drawn single-member districts, and the remainder were elected from larger multimember districts on the basis of proportional representation. Candidates were nominated by voters (independent candidates had to submit petitions with at least 1,000 signatures), political parties, or "sociopolitical organizations"; parties had to receive at least 4 percent of the vote to be accorded seats.
The Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova won a majority of fifty-six of the 104 seats, followed by the Yedinstvo/Socialist Bloc with twenty-eight seats. Two pro-Romanian unification parties did not do well: the Congress of Peasants and Intellectuals won eleven seats, and the CPDF won nine seats. A number of other parties did not get a high enough percentage of the popular vote to be represented in the new Parliament.
In March the chair of Parliament, Petru Lucinschi, was elected to his post, and the prime minister, Andrei Sangheli, was reappointed to his post. In April Parliament approved a new Council of Ministers, Moldova's membership in the CIS, and Moldova's signing of a CIS charter on economic union (although the country would not participate in political or military integration within the CIS). A referendum on March 6, 1994, confirmed the country's course of political independence for the future: the Moldovan electorate voted overwhelmingly for Moldova to maintain its territorial integrity.
Now that the legislative logjam was broken, Parliament was able to work on a new constitution, which it ratified on July 28 and implemented August 27, 1994. The new constitution granted substantial autonomy to Transnistria and the "Gagauz Republic" while reasserting Moldovan national identity and sovereignty. Gagauzia (in Romanian; Gagauz-Yeri, in Gagauz) would have cultural, administrative, and economic (but not territorial) autonomy and would elect a regional legislative assembly, which in turn would elect a guvernator (in Romanian; baskan, in Gagauz), who would also be a member of the Moldovan government. This was ratified by Parliament in January 1995.
Members of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova held a cautious attitude toward marketization and privatization, leading experts to believe that progress in economic reform would be slow, but would be more consistent and better implemented than previously. The hard-line nationalists and the former communists could not vote as a majority to block progress.
The adoption of Moldova's constitution of August 27, 1994, codified certain basic human rights (including the rights to private property, individual freedom and personal security, freedom of movement, privacy of correspondence, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of assembly), which were observed more in the breach during the Soviet era. However, the constitution still contains language that could limit the activities of political parties and the press.
Although there is not government censorship of Moldova's independent periodicals and its radio stations and cable television stations, journalists complain that editors encourage them to soften their criticisms of government officials for fear of confrontation and possible retribution. This seems to be a well-grounded fear in Transnistria, where the authorities have cut off funding for two newspapers for occasionally criticizing some government policies and have physically attacked a cable television station for broadcasting reports critical of the authorities.
In 1994 Parliament considered a new law on the press, which journalists criticized strongly because it limited their right to criticize government policies. After reviewing recommendations from the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Parliament liberalized the law but left some restrictions that appear to be aimed at writings favoring reunification with Romania and those questioning Moldova's right to exist.
The Moldovan Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Security were investigated on several occasions in 1994 as to whether they had exceeded their legislated authority. They were accused of monitoring political opposition members and using unauthorized wiretaps. There were also claims of interference with opposition activities during the campaign preceding the 1994 elections, but there was no public investigation of those charges. The police, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, are known to use beatings in their dealings with some detainees and prisoners.
Reform of the judiciary (to bring it more into line with Western practices) was approved, but Parliament had not passed the laws needed to implement it by the end of 1994. For example, prosecutors rather than judges issue search and arrest warrants, there is no judicial review of search warrants, and courts do not exclude evidence obtained illegally. There are also reports that local prosecutors have brought unjustified charges against individuals in retaliation for accusations of official corruption or for political reasons.
Trials in Moldova are generally open to the public, and the accused has the right to appeal. Bail does not exist, but release usually may be arranged by obtaining a written guarantee by a friend or family member that the accused will appear in court.
Because the security forces and the government of the "Dnestr Republic" are so closely connected, human rights abuses in Transnistria are more flagrant. The worst of the abuses in Transnistria occurred in 1992, during the height of the fighting. There were reports of beatings, ill treatment, abduction, torture, and even the murder of civilians by members of the police and the so-called Republic Guard. Requests for visits by Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross were routinely refused.
In Transnistria four of the six ethnic Romanians of the "Tiraspol Six" remain in prison following their conviction in 1993 for allegedly assassinating two Transnistrian officials. The fairness of the trial was seriously questioned by international human rights groups, and there were allegations that the defendants were prosecuted solely because of their membership in the CDPF.
Moldova has several local human rights groups, which maintain contacts with international organizations, including Helsinki Watch and Helsinki Citizens Assembly. The government does not interfere with human rights groups' operations.
The main daily newspaper in the republic, Moldova Suverana, is published by the government. Sfatul Tarii is published by Parliament, which also publishes the daily Nezavisimaya Moldova in Russian. Other principal newspapers include Rabochiy Tiraspol' (in Russian, the main newspaper of the Slavs in Transnistria), Tara, Tineretul Moldovei/Molod�zh Moldovy (in Romanian and Russian), and Viata satului (published by the government). The main cultural publication in Moldova is the weekly journal Literatura si arts, published by the Union of Writers of Moldova. Other principal periodicals include Basarabia (also published by the writers' union), Chiparus, Alunelul, Femeie Moldovei, Lanterna Magica, Moldova, Noi, and SudEst . Kishin�vskiye novosti, Kodry, and Russkoye slovo are Russian-language periodicals. Other minority-language periodicals include Prosvita and Homin in Ukrainian, Ana s�zu and C�rlangaci in Gagauz, Rodno slovo in Bulgarian, and Undzer col/Nash golos in Yiddish and Russian. In all, 240 newspapers (ninety-seven in Romanian) and sixty-eight magazines (thirty-five in Romanian) were being published in the republic in 1990. Basa Press, an independent news service, was established in November 1992.
In the wake of its proclamation of sovereignty in 1990, Moldova's main diplomatic efforts were directed toward establishing new relationships with the Soviet Union's successor states, establishing diplomatic links with other national governments and international bodies, gaining international recognition, and enlisting international support to resolve the conflict in Transnistria. Although substantial gains have been made in each of these areas, Moldova's foreign policy efforts have been complicated by its geographic position, its history, and the ongoing ethnic conflict within its borders.
After it declared independence, Moldova made significant progress in international relations in a relatively short period of time. The first state to recognize Moldova's independence was neighboring Romania. By early 1995, Moldova had been recognized by more than 170 states, including the United States (which extended recognition on December 25, 1991), although foreign diplomatic presence in Chisinau remains limited.
As of early 1995, Moldova had been admitted to several international organizations, including the CSCE (renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, in January 1995), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Community of Riparian Countries of the Black Sea. It also had observer status at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to GATT.
By mid-1994 Moldova had accepted all relevant arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union. It had ratified the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (with its comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment). Even though Moldova had not acceded to the provisions of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it had indicated that it intended to do so.
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The domestic political ramifications of Moldova's civil conflict in Transnistria were matched by its effect on foreign relations. Domestic sentiments limited the foreign policy flexibility of the government in dealing with the former Soviet Union. Although President Snegur signed the Minsk Agreement (which created the CIS; see Appendix C) on December 8, 1991, and the Alma-Ata Declaration (which expanded the membership of the CIS; see Appendix D) on December 21, 1991, Moldova's Parliament, strongly influenced by the Popular Front bloc of delegates, refused to ratify the agreements.
Further, along with Ukraine and Turkmenistan, Moldova refused to sign a January 1993 agreement that would have strengthened political and economic integration among CIS members. It thus embarked upon a difficult course of independence, maneuvering between Russia and Romania, both of which have strong interests in the region, and each of which is more powerful than the young republic. It was only in April 1994 that the new Parliament finally approved Moldova's membership in the CIS and signed a CIS charter on economic union.
The relationship between Moldova and Romania, while generally good, is far from trouble free. Although Romania was the first state to recognize Moldova and has provided substantial support to the new republic in relation to Bucharest's means, ties between the two Romanian-speaking states are fraught with political difficulties for both countries.
The relationship between Romania and Moldova began to deteriorate shortly after Moldova's independence. Because of their different histories, with Moldova part of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, Moldovans and Romanians have different attitudes about basic social and political issues, such as the extent of social payments (i.e. welfare). Many Romanians see the Moldovans as "Russified" and hold the condescending view that they are in need of assistance to overcome their cultural disabilities. This has been a source of growing resentment among the majority of Moldovans.
For his part, Romania's president, Ion Iliescu, worked consistently to maintain a positive relationship with Russia. On the one hand, moves on his part that could be seen as destabilizing the interethnic balance in Moldova and tipping it toward civil war would be potentially disastrous for his country, both in the limited sense of setting back Russian-Romanian relations and in the more serious sense of potentially drawing Russia into a regional conflict. On the other hand, any precipitous move on the part of Moldova in the direction of Romania would immediately raise fears of imminent unification with Romania among the Russian-speaking population and among the Gagauz and would feed interethnic hostility in the republic. The March 6, 1994, referendum confirmed to all interested parties, in no uncertain terms, that the populace of Moldova is not in favor of reuniting with any country.
In late 1994, President Iliescu made comments questioning Moldova's independent status. Although relations between the two countries remain cordial, these comments reflected the Romanian nationalistic parties' greater influence in national politics and in the parliament.
In the case of Russia, interethnic conflict in Moldova produced results similar to those that followed outbreaks of violence in other former republics of the Soviet Union soon after they had proclaimed their independence. Intrinsically, Moldova was probably of little interest to Moscow, but the presence of an ethnic Russian minority in Moldova altered Moscow's perspective. Moldova's ethnic Russians found the prospect of Moldova's reunification with Romania alarming, because it would alter their status from that of a large and politically powerful force to that of a small and politically powerless minority. Moldova was geographically important to both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union because it formed part of the border of both. In this way, it formed a barrier between Russia itself (in both cases, the ruling entity) and the outside world.
Although officially neutral, the Russian 14th Army (stationed in Transnistria) played a vital role in the conflict between the government of Moldova and the "Dnestr Republic." Its commanders permitted the transfer of weapons from their stockpiles in Moldova to the Transnistrian militia and volunteered the services of "Cossack" forces that entered the region once fighting broke out (there were approximately 1,000 "Cossacks" in Transnistria in 1994). Furthermore, strong indications suggested that elements of the 14th Army actively intervened on the side of the separatists during the fighting, using their heavy weapons to turn the tide in the fighting when necessary.
Eventually, however, it became evident that the Transnistria conflict was not about ethnic issues (especially once implementation of the language law of 1989 was delayed, and the Popular Front extremists lost much of their power), but about political systems. The Transnistrian leadership wanted to return to the days of the Soviet Union and was wary of the Yeltsin government (it never repudiated its support of the August 1991 coup d'�tat) and the reformists.
In July 1992, an agreement negotiated by presidents Snegur and Yeltsin established a cease-fire in Transnistria, which brought an end to the worst of the fighting in Moldova. Transnistria was given special status within Moldova and was granted the right to determine its future should Moldova reunite with Romania. Russian, Transnistrian, and Moldovan peacekeeping troops subsequently were introduced into Transnistria.
Maintaining the agreement was, however, complicated by the instability of Russia's central government and by the implications of the 14th Army's involvement for Russia's domestic politics. The 14th Army's commander, Lieutenant General Aleksandr V. Lebed', was politically extremely conservative and, despite repeated warnings from his superiors to restrain himself, had stated publicly that he would not "abandon" Transnistria's ethnic Russians. Like Lebed', Russia's conservatives generally considered abandonment of the ethnic Russian minority to be an anathema. In 1995 nationalists in Russia (whose strength was growing) were ready to protect the "rights" of Russians in the "near abroad" and would, no doubt, politically attack moderates who might be willing to end the conflict through compromise.
By 1994, however, relations between the Transnistrian leadership and the 14th Army had deteriorated to the point that both sides were accusing each other of corruption (including arms trafficking, drug running, and money laundering) and political provocation. General Lebed' also saw many in the Transnistrian leadership as not cooperating with Russian efforts to mediate the conflict and as actively hampering the peace process.
After the 1994 change in Moldova's government, compromises were made by both the Moldovan and the Russian governments to improve relations over the issue of Transnistria. The status of the 14th Army was scheduled to be reduced to that of an "operational group," General Lebed' was to be released from his position, and the number of officers was to be reduced. The two countries signed an agreement in October on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria within three years. Moldova accepted a linkage between withdrawing Russian troops and achieving a political solution to the conflict in Transnistria. Transnistrian observers, who had feared that the Yeltsin government would strike a deal without their consent, saw the agreement as a blow to their existence as a Russian entity (and also to their illegal money-making activities) and walked out of the negotiations.
However, peace was not to come so easily to Transnistria. The October 1994 agreement was a "gentlemen's agreement" that was signed by the two prime ministers and was to be approved by the two governments, but would not be submitted to the countries' parliaments. The Moldovan government approved the agreement immediately, but the Russian government did not, citing the need to submit it to the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), although it still had not submitted the agreement in mid-1995.
According to General Lebed', three years was not enough time to withdraw the 14th Army and its mat�riel (although an American company working in Belarus offered to buy the 14th Army's ordnance and destroy it). Some members of Russia's Duma flatly refused to consider withdrawing the 14th Army. Under these circumstances, there was little hope for the agreement to be implemented.
In mid-1995 General Lebed' resigned in protest over the still-scheduled downgrading of the 14th Army. He was believed to be a likely candidate in the 1996 Russian presidential elections.
Moldova's relationship with Ukraine, another important player in the Transnistrian conflict, is also complicated. Historically, areas that were traditionally part of the region of Moldova or Romania (northern Bukovina, Herta, and southern Bessarabia), and that continue to be inhabited in part by ethnic Romanians, were annexed by Ukraine when the Moldavian SSR was formed. The potential claims on these territories created tension between the two neighbors in the early years of Moldova's independence, when the Popular Front made public demands for restitution.
Another potential problem is the presence of a large ethnic Ukrainian minority in Moldova. Ethnic Ukrainians have sided with the local ethnic Russians in the dispute over Moldova's language law, and many ethnic Ukrainians have supported the separatist effort in Transnistria. However, the government of Moldova took significant measures to meet the demands of the Ukrainian minority for cultural autonomy and appears to have met with substantial success in defusing opposition to Moldova's Language Law.
In 1995 potential problems between Ukraine and Moldova were subordinate to what had emerged as a strong common interest in containing the Transnistrian conflict. Given their own dispute with Russia concerning the status of Crimea, Ukrainians had little interest in supporting the presence of Russian military units outside Russia.
As a more practical question, it was not in Ukraine's interest to have a large and well-equipped Russian military formation based in neighboring Transnistria. The 14th Army could reach Russia only by traversing Ukrainian territory or airspace, so its presence could only be seen as a potential source of danger and instability. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ukrainian president Leonid M. Kravchuk made several statements supporting Moldova's position in the Transnistrian conflict, protested the movement of "Cossack" volunteers across Ukrainian territory to Transnistria, and refused to recognize Transnistrian claims to sovereignty.
Politically moderate Gagauz received support from Turkey, which urged the leadership of the "Gagauz Republic" to negotiate with the Moldovan government rather than resort to violence, as had been the case in Transnistria. Turkish president S�leyman Demirel visited the "Gagauz Republic" in mid-1994, urging the Gagauz to accept regional autonomy and to be loyal citizens of Moldova. Turkey pledged to invest US$35 million in the Gagauz region via Chisinau.
Moldova has pursued cooperation with, and has strived to maintain good relations with, the West. It has joined a number of international organizations and has been responsive to foreign concerns about the pace of its conversion to capitalism. A January 1995 trip by President Snegur to the United States was the setting for an announcement by President William J. Clinton of additional assistance to Moldova for its privatization program and for economic restructuring. Moldova has also signed bilateral treaties with European Union (EU) members.
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