The 1991 final census count gave India a total population of
846,302,688. However, estimates of India's population vary widely.
According to the Population Division of the United Nations Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs, the population had already
reached 866 million in 1991. The Population Division of the United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
projected 896.5 million by mid-1993 with a 1.9 percent annual growth
rate. The United States Bureau of the Census, assuming an annual
population growth rate of 1.8 percent, put India's population in July
1995 at 936,545,814. These higher projections merit attention in light
of the fact that the Planning Commission had estimated a figure of 844
million for 1991 while preparing the Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY 1992-96;
see Population Projections, this ch.).
India accounts for some 2.4 percent of the world's landmass but is
home to about 16 percent of the global population. The magnitude of the
annual increase in population can be seen in the fact that India adds
almost the total population of Australia or Sri Lanka every year. A 1992
study of India's population notes that India has more people than all of
Africa and also more than North America and South America together.
Between 1947 and 1991, India's population more than doubled.
Throughout the twentieth century, India has been in the midst of a
demographic transition. At the beginning of the century, endemic
disease, periodic epidemics, and famines kept the death rate high enough
to balance out the high birth rate. Between 1911 and 1920, the birth and
death rates were virtually equal--about forty-eight births and
forty-eight deaths per 1,000 population. The increasing impact of
curative and preventive medicine (especially mass inoculations) brought
a steady decline in the death rate. By the mid-1990s, the estimated
birth rate had fallen to twenty-eight per 1,000, and the estimated death
rate had fallen to ten per 1,000. Clearly, the future configuration of
India's population (indeed the future of India itself) depends on what
happens to the birth rate (see fig. 8). Even the most optimistic
projections do not suggest that the birth rate could drop below twenty
per 1,000 before the year 2000. India's population is likely to exceed
the 1 billion mark before the 2001 census.
The upward population spiral began in the 1920s and is reflected in
intercensal growth increments. South Asia's population increased roughly
5 percent between 1901 and 1911 and actually declined slightly in the
next decade. Population increased some 10 percent in the period from
1921 to 1931 and 13 to 14 percent in the 1930s and 1940s. Between 1951
and 1961, the population rose 21.5 percent. Between 1961 and 1971, the
country's population increased by 24.8 percent. Thereafter a slight
slowing of the increase was experienced: from 1971 to 1981, the
population increased by 24.7 percent, and from 1981 to 1991, by 23.9
percent (see table 3, Appendix).
Population density has risen concomitantly with the massive increases
in population. In 1901 India counted some seventy-seven persons per
square kilometer; in 1981 there were 216 persons per square kilometer;
by 1991 there were 267 persons per square kilometer--up almost 25
percent from the 1981 population density (see table 4, Appendix).
India's average population density is higher than that of any other
nation of comparable size. The highest densities are not only in heavily
urbanized regions but also in areas that are mostly agricultural.
Population growth in the years between 1950 and 1970 centered on
areas of new irrigation projects, areas subject to refugee resettlement,
and regions of urban expansion. Areas where population did not increase
at a rate approaching the national average were those facing the most
severe economic hardships, overpopulated rural areas, and regions with
low levels of urbanization.
The 1991 census, which was carried out under the direction of the
Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India (part of the Ministry
of Home Affairs), in keeping with the previous two censuses, used the
term urban agglomerations . An urban agglomeration forms a
continuous urban spread and consists of a city or town and its urban
outgrowth outside the statutory limits. Or, an urban agglomerate may be
two or more adjoining cities or towns and their outgrowths. A university
campus or military base located on the outskirts of a city or town,
which often increases the actual urban area of that city or town, is an
example of an urban agglomeration. In India urban agglomerations with a
population of 1 million or more--there were twenty-four in 1991--are
referred to as metropolitan areas. Places with a population of 100,000
or more are termed "cities" as compared with
"towns," which have a population of less than 100,000.
Including the metropolitan areas, there were 299 urban agglomerations
with more than 100,000 population in 1991. These large urban
agglomerations are designated as Class I urban units. There were five
other classes of urban agglomerations, towns, and villages based on the
size of their populations: Class II (50,000 to 99,999), Class III
(20,000 to 49,999), Class IV (10,000 to 19,999), Class V (5,000 to
9,999), and Class VI (villages of less than 5,000; see table 5,
Appendix).
The results of the 1991 census revealed that around 221 million, or
26.1 percent, of Indian's population lived in urban areas. Of this
total, about 138 million people, or 16 percent, lived in the 299 urban
agglomerations. In 1991 the twenty-four metropolitan cities accounted
for 51 percent of India's total population living in Class I urban
centers, with Bombay and Calcutta the largest at 12.6 million and 10.9
million, respectively (see table 6, Appendix).
In the early 1990s, growth was the most dramatic in the cities of
central and southern India. About twenty cities in those two regions
experienced a growth rate of more than 100 percent between 1981 and
1991. Areas subject to an influx of refugees also experienced noticeable
demographic changes. Refugees from Bangladesh, Burma, and Sri Lanka
contributed substantially to population growth in the regions in which
they settled. Less dramatic population increases occurred in areas where
Tibetan refugee settlements were founded after the Chinese annexation of
Tibet in the 1950s.
The majority of districts had urban populations ranging on average
from 15 to 40 percent in 1991. According to the 1991 census, urban
clusters predominated in the upper part of the Indo-Gangetic Plain; in
the Punjab and Haryana plains, and in part of western Uttar Pradesh. The
lower part of the Indo-Gangetic Plain in southeastern Bihar, southern
West Bengal, and northern Orissa also experienced increased
urbanization. Similar increases occurred in the western coastal state of
Gujarat and the union territory of Daman and Diu. In the Central
Highlands in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, urbanization was most
noticeable in the river basins and adjacent plateau regions of the
Mahanadi, Narmada, and Tapti rivers. The coastal plains and river deltas
of the east and west coasts also showed increased levels of
urbanization.
The hilly, inaccessible regions of the Peninsular Plateau, the
northeast, and the Himalayas remain sparsely settled. As a general rule,
the lower the population density and the more remote the region, the
more likely it is to count a substantial portion of tribal (see
Glossary) people among its population (see Tribes, ch. 4). Urbanization
in some sparsely settled regions is more developed than would seem
warranted at first glance at their limited natural resources. Areas of
western India that were formerly princely states (in Gujarat and the
desert regions of Rajasthan) have substantial urban centers that
originated as political-administrative centers and since independence
have continued to exercise hegemony over their hinterlands.
The vast majority of Indians, nearly 625 million, or 73.9 percent, in
1991 lived in what are called villages of less than 5,000 people or in
scattered hamlets and other rural settlements (see The Village
Community, ch. 5). The states with proportionately the greatest rural
populations in 1991 were the states of Assam (88.9 percent), Sikkim
(90.9 percent) and Himachal Pradesh (91.3 percent), and the tiny union
territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli (91.5 percent). Those with the
smallest rural populations proportionately were the states of Gujarat
(65.5 percent), Maharashtra (61.3 percent), Goa (58.9 percent), and
Mizoram (53.9 percent). Most of the other states and the union territory
of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were near the national average.
Two other categories of population that are closely scrutinized by
the national census are the Scheduled Castes (see Glossary) and
Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary). The greatest concentrations of
Scheduled Caste members in 1991 lived in the states of Andhra Pradesh
(10.5 million, or nearly 16 percent of the state's population), Tamil
Nadu (10.7 million, or 19 percent), Bihar (12.5 million, or 14 percent),
West Bengal (16 million, or 24 percent), and Uttar Pradesh (29.3
million, or 21 percent). Together, these and other Scheduled Caste
members comprised about 139 million people, or more than 16 percent of
the total population of India. Scheduled Tribe members represented only
8 percent of the total population (about 68 million). They were found in
1991 in the greatest numbers in Orissa (7 million, or 23 percent of the
state's population), Maharashtra (7.3 million, or 9 percent), and Madhya
Pradesh (15.3 million, or 23 percent). In proportion, however, the
populations of states in the northeast had the greatest concentrations
of Scheduled Tribe members. For example, 31 percent of the population of
Tripura, 34 percent of Manipur, 64 percent of Arunachal Pradesh, 86
percent of Meghalaya, 88 percent of Nagaland, and 95 percent of Mizoram
were Scheduled Tribe members. Other heavy concentrations were found in
Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 79 percent of which was composed of Scheduled
Tribe members, and Lakshadweep, with 94 percent of its population being
Scheduled Tribe members.
<>Population
Projections
Population growth has long been a concern of the government, and
India has a lengthy history of explicit population policy. In the 1950s,
the government began, in a modest way, one of the earliest national,
government-sponsored family planning efforts in the developing world.
The annual population growth rate in the previous decade (1941 to 1951)
had been below 1.3 percent, and government planners optimistically
believed that the population would continue to grow at roughly the same
rate.
Implicitly, the government believed that India could repeat the
experience of the developed nations where industrialization and a rise
in the standard of living had been accompanied by a drop in the
population growth rate. In the 1950s, existing hospitals and health care
facilities made birth control information available, but there was no
aggressive effort to encourage the use of contraceptives and limitation
of family size. By the late 1960s, many policy makers believed that the
high rate of population growth was the greatest obstacle to economic
development. The government began a massive program to lower the birth
rate from forty-one per 1,000 to a target of twenty to twenty-five per
1,000 by the mid-1970s. The National Population Policy adopted in 1976
reflected the growing consensus among policy makers that family planning
would enjoy only limited success unless it was part of an integrated
program aimed at improving the general welfare of the population. The
policy makers assumed that excessive family size was part and parcel of
poverty and had to be dealt with as integral to a general development
strategy. Education about the population problem became part of school
curriculum under the Fifth Five-Year Plan (FY 1974-78). Cases of
government-enforced sterilization made many question the propriety of
state-sponsored birth control measures, however.
During the 1980s, an increased number of family planning programs
were implemented through the state governments with financial assistance
from the central government. In rural areas, the programs were further
extended through a network of primary health centers and subcenters. By
1991, India had more than 150,000 public health facilities through which
family planning programs were offered (see Health Care, this ch.). Four
special family planning projects were implemented under the Seventh
Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-89). One was the All-India Hospitals Post-partum
Programme at district- and subdistrict-level hospitals. Another program
involved the reorganization of primary health care facilities in urban
slum areas, while another project reserved a specified number of
hospital beds for tubal ligature operations. The final program called
for the renovation or remodelling of intrauterine device (IUD) rooms in
rural family welfare centers attached to primary health care facilities.
Despite these developments in promoting family planning, the 1991
census results showed that India continued to have one of the most
rapidly growing populations in the world. Between 1981 and 1991, the
annual rate of population growth was estimated at about 2 percent. The
crude birth rate in 1992 was thirty per 1,000, only a small change over
the 1981 level of thirty-four per 1,000. However, some demographers
credit this slight lowering of the 1981-91 population growth rate to
moderate successes of the family planning program. In FY 1986, the
number of reproductive-age couples was 132.6 million, of whom only 37.5
percent were estimated to be protected effectively by some form of
contraception. A goal of the seventh plan was to achieve an effective
couple protection rate of 42 percent, requiring an annual increase of 2
percent in effective use of contraceptives.
The heavy centralization of India's family planning programs often
prevents due consideration from being given to regional differences.
Centralization is encouraged to a large extent by reliance on central
government funding. As a result, many of the goals and assumptions of
national population control programs do not correspond exactly with
local attitudes toward birth control. At the Jamkhed Project in
Maharashtra, which has been in operation since the late 1970s and covers
approximately 175 villages, the local project directors noted that it
required three to four years of education through direct contact with a
couple for the idea of family planning to gain acceptance. Such a
timetable was not compatible with targets. However, much was learned
about policy and practice from the Jamkhed Project. The successful use
of women's clubs as a means of involving women in community-wide family
planning activities impressed the state government to the degree that it
set about organizing such clubs in every village in the state. The
project also serves as a pilot to test ideas that the government wants
to incorporate into its programs. Government medical staff members have
been sent to Jamkhed for training, and the government has proposed that
the project assume the task of selecting and training government health
workers for an area of 2.5 million people.
Another important family planning program is the Project for
Community Action in Family Planning. Located in Karnataka, the project
operates in 154 project villages and 255 control villages. All project
villages are of sufficient size to have a health subcenter, although
this advantage is offset by the fact that those villages are the most
distant from the area's primary health centers. As at Jamkhed, the
project is much assisted by local voluntary groups, such as the women's
clubs. The local voluntary groups either provide or secure sites
suitable as distribution depots for condoms and birth control pills and
also make arrangements for the operation of sterilization camps. Data
provided by the Project for Community Action in Family Planning show
that important achievements have been realized in the field of
population control. By the mid-1980s, for example, 43 percent of couples
were using family planning, a full 14 percent above the state average.
The project has significantly improved the status of women, involving
them and empowering them to bring about change in their communities.
This contribution is important because of the way in which the deeply
entrenched inferior status of women in many communities in India negates
official efforts to decrease the fertility rate.
Studies have found that most couples in fact regard family planning
positively. However, the common fertility pattern in India diverges from
the two-child family that policy makers hold as ideal. Women continue to
marry young; in the mid-1990s, they average just over eighteen years of
age at marriage. When women choose to be sterilized, financial
inducements, although helpful, are not the principal incentives. On
average, those accepting sterilization already have four living
children, of whom two are sons.
The strong preference for sons is a deeply held cultural ideal based
on economic roots. Sons not only assist with farm labor as they are
growing up (as do daughters) but they provide labor in times of illness
and unemployment and serve as their parents' only security in old age.
Surveys done by the New Delhi Operations Research Group in 1991
indicated that as many as 72 percent of rural parents continue to have
children until at least two sons are born; the preference for more than
one son among urban parents was tabulated at 53 percent. Once these
goals have been achieved, birth control may be used or, especially in
agricultural areas, it may not if additional child labor, later adult
labor for the family, is deemed desirable.
A significant result of this eagerness for sons is that the Indian
population has a deficiency of females. Slightly higher female infant
mortality rates (seventy-nine per 1,000 versus seventy-eight per 1,000
for males) can be attributed to poor health care, abortions of female
fetuses, and female infanticide. Human rights activists have estimated
that there are at least 10,000 cases of female infanticide annually
throughout India. The cost of theoretically illegal dowries and the loss
of daughters to their in-laws' families are further disincentives for
some parents to have daughters. Sons, of course continue to carry on the
family line (see Family Ideals, ch. 5). The 1991 census revealed that
the national sex ratio had declined from 934 females to 1,000 males in
1981 to 927 to 1,000 in 1991. In only one state--Kerala, a state with
low fertility and mortality rates and the nation's highest literacy--did
females exceed males. The census found, however, that female life
expectancy at birth had for the first time exceeded that for males.
India's high infant mortality and elevated mortality in early
childhood remain significant stumbling blocks to population control (see
Health Conditions, this ch.). India's fertility rate is decreasing,
however, and, at 3.4 in 1994, it is lower than those of its immediate
neighbors (Bangladesh had a rate of 4.5 and Pakistan had 6.7). The rate
is projected to decrease to 3.0 by 2000, 2.6 by 2010, and 2.3 by 2020.
During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the growth rate had formed a sort
of plateau. Some states, such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and, to a lesser
extent, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, had made progress in
lowering their growth rates, but most did not. Under such conditions,
India's population may not stabilize until 2060.
India.
Life Expectancy and Mortality
The average Indian male born in the 1990s can expect to live 58.5
years; women can expect to live only slightly longer (59.6 years),
according to 1995 estimates. Life expectancy has risen dramatically
throughout the century from a scant twenty years in the 1911-20 period.
Although men enjoyed a slightly longer life expectancy throughout the
first part of the twentieth century, by 1990 women had slightly
surpassed men. The death rate declined from 48.6 per 1,000 in the
1910-20 period to fifteen per 1,000 in the 1970s, and improved
thereafter, reaching ten per 1,000 by 1990, a rate that held steady
through the mid-1990s. India's high infant mortality rate was estimated
to exceed 76 per 1,000 live births in 1995 (see table 7, Appendix).
Thirty percent of infants had low birth weights, and the death rate for
children aged one to four years was around ten per 1,000 of the
population.
According to a 1989 National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau report, less
than 15 percent of the population was adequately nourished, although 96
percent received an adequate number of calories per day. In 1986 daily
average intake was 2,238 calories as compared with 2,630 calories in
China. According to UN findings, caloric intake per day in India had
fallen slightly to 2,229 in 1989, lending credence to the concerns of
some experts who claimed that annual nutritional standards statistics
cannot be relied on to show whether poverty is actually being reduced.
Instead, such studies may actually pick up short-term amelioration of
poverty as the result of a period of good crops rather than a long-term
trend.
Official Indian estimates of the poverty level are based on a
person's income and corresponding access to minimum nutritional needs
(see Growth since 1980, ch. 6). There were 332 million people at or
below the poverty level in FY 1991, most of whom lived in rural areas.
Diseases
A number of endemic communicable diseases present a serious public
health hazard in India. Over the years, the government has set up a
variety of national programs aimed at controlling or eradicating these
diseases, including the National Malaria Eradication Programme and the
National Filaria Control Programme. Other initiatives seek to limit the
incidence of respiratory infections, cholera, diarrheal diseases,
trachoma, goiter, and sexually transmitted diseases.
Smallpox, formerly a significant source of mortality, was eradicated
as part of the worldwide effort to eliminate that disease. India was
declared smallpox-free in 1975. Malaria remains a serious health hazard;
although the incidence of the disease declined sharply in the
postindependence period, India remains one of the most heavily malarial
countries in the world. Only the Himalaya region above 1,500 meters is
spared. In 1965 government sources registered only 150,000 cases, a
notable drop from the 75 million cases in the early postindependence
years. This success was short-lived, however, as the malarial parasites
became increasingly resistant to the insecticides and drugs used to
combat the disease. By the mid-1970s, there were nearly 6.5 million
cases on record. The situation again improved because of more
conscientious efforts; by 1982 the number of cases had fallen by roughly
two-thirds. This downward trend continued, and in 1987 slightly fewer
than 1.7 million cases of malaria were reported.
In the early 1990s, about 389 million people were at risk of
infection from filaria parasites; 19 million showed symptoms of
filariasis, and 25 million were deemed to be hosts to the parasites.
Efforts at control, under the National Filaria Control Programme, which
was established in 1955, have focused on eliminating the filaria larvae
in urban locales, and by the early 1990s there were more than 200
filaria control units in operation.
Leprosy, a major public health and social problem, is endemic, with
all the states and union territories reporting cases. However, the
prevalence of the disease varies. About 3 million leprosy cases are
estimated to exist nationally, of which 15 to 20 percent are infectious.
The National Leprosy Control Programme was started in 1955, but it only
received high priority after 1980. In FY 1982, it was redesignated as
the National Leprosy Eradication Programme. Its goal was to achieve
eradication of the disease by 2000. To that end, 758 leprosy control
units, 900 urban leprosy centers, 291 temporary hospitalization wards,
285 district leprosy units, and some 6,000 lower-level centers had been
established by March 1990. By March 1992, nearly 1.7 million patients
were receiving regular multidrug treatment, which is more effective than
the standard single drug therapy (Dapsone monotherapy).
India is subject to outbreaks of various diseases. Among them is
pneumonic plague, an episode of which spread quickly throughout India in
1994 killing hundreds before being brought under control. Tuberculosis,
trachoma, and goiter are endemic. In the early 1980s, there were an
estimated 10 million cases of tuberculosis, of which about 25 percent
were infectious. During 1991 nearly 1.6 million new tuberculosis cases
were detected. The functions of the Trachoma Control Programme, which
started in 1968, have been subsumed by the National Programme for the
Control of Blindness. Approximately 45 million Indians are
vision-impaired; roughly 12 million are blind. The incidence of goiter
is dominant throughout the sub-Himalayan states from Jammu and Kashmir
to the northeast. There are some 170 million people who are exposed to
iodine deficiency disorders. Starting in the late 1980s, the central
government began a salt iodinization program for all edible salt, and by
1991 record production--2.5 million tons--of iodized salt had been
achieved. There are as well anemias related to poor nutrition, a variety
of diseases caused by vitamin and mineral deficiencies--beriberi,
scurvy, osteomalacia, and rickets--and a high incidence of parasitic
infection.
Diarrheal diseases, the primary cause of early childhood mortality,
are linked to inadequate sewage disposal and lack of safe drinking
water. Roughly 50 percent of all illness is attributed to poor
sanitation; in rural areas, about 80 percent of all children are
infected by parasitic worms. Estimates in the early 1980s suggested that
although more than 80 percent of the urban population had access to
reasonably safe water, fewer than 5 percent of rural dwellers did.
Waterborne sewage systems were woefully overburdened; only around 30
percent of urban populations had adequate sewage disposal, but scarcely
any populations outside cities did. In 1990, according to United States
sources, only 3 percent of the rural population and 44 percent of the
urban population had access to sanitation services, a level relatively
low by developing nation standards. There were better findings for
access to potable water: 69 percent in the rural areas and 86 percent in
urban areas, relatively high percentages by developing nation standards.
In the mid-1990s, about 1 million people die each year of diseases
associated with diarrhea.
India has an estimated 1.5 million to 2 million cases of cancer, with
500,000 new cases added each year. Annual deaths from cancer total
around 300,000. The most common malignancies are cancer of the oral
cavity (mostly relating to tobacco use and pan chewing--about 35 percent
of all cases), cervix, and breast. Cardiovascular diseases are a major
health problem; men and women suffer from them in almost equal numbers
(14 million versus 13 million in FY 1990).
AIDS
The incidence of AIDS cases in India is steadily rising amidst
concerns that the nation faces the prospect of an AIDS epidemic. By June
1991, out of a total of more than 900,000 screened, some 5,130 people
tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). However, the
total number infected with HIV in 1992 was estimated by a New
Delhi-based official of the World Health Organization (WHO) at 500,000,
and more pessimistic estimates by the World Bank in 1995 suggested a
figure of 2 million, the highest in Asia. Confirmed cases of AIDS
numbered only 102 by 1991 but had jumped to 885 by 1994, the second
highest reported number in Asia after Thailand. Suspected AIDS cases,
according to WHO and the Indian government, may be in the area of 80,000
in 1995.
The main factors cited in the spread of the virus are heterosexual
transmission, primarily by urban prostitutes and migrant workers, such
as long-distance truck drivers; the use of unsterilized needles and
syringes by physicians and intravenous drug users; and transfusions of
blood from infected donors. Based on the HIV infection rate in 1991, and
India's position as the second most populated country in the world, it
was projected that by 1995 India would have more HIV and AIDS cases than
any other country in the world. This prediction appeared true. By
mid-1995 India had been labeled by the media as "ground zero"
in the global AIDS epidemic, and new predictions for 2000 were that
India would have 1 million AIDS cases and 5 million HIV-positive.
In 1987 the newly formed National AIDS Control Programme began
limited screening of the blood supply and monitoring of high-risk
groups. A national education program aimed at AIDS prevention and
control began in 1990. The first AIDS prevention television campaign
began in 1991. By the mid-1990s, AIDS awareness signs on public streets,
condoms for sale near brothels, and media announcements were more in
evidence. There was very negative publicity as well. Posters with the
names and photographs of known HIV-positive persons have been seen in
New Delhi, and there have been reports of HIV patients chained in
medical facilities and deprived of treatment.
Fear and ignorance have continued to compound the difficulty of
controlling the spread of the virus, and discrimination against AIDS
sufferers has surfaced. For example, in 1990 the All-India Institute of
Medical Sciences, New Delhi's leading medical facility, reportedly
turned away two people infected with HIV because its staff were too
scared to treat them.
A new program to control the spread of AIDS was launched in 1991 by
the Indian Council of Medical Research. The council looked to ancient
scriptures and religious books for traditional messages that preach
moderation in sex and describe prostitution as a sin. The council
considered that the great extent to which Indian life-styles are shaped
by religion rather than by science would cause many people to be
confused by foreign-modeled educational campaigns relying on television
and printed booklets.
The severity of the growing AIDS crisis in India is clear, according
to statistics compiled during the mid-1990s. In Bombay, a city of 12.6
million inhabitants in 1991, the HIV infection rate among the estimated
80,000 prostitutes jumped from 1 percent in 1987 to 30 percent in 1991
to 53 percent in 1993. Migrant workers engaging in promiscuous and
unprotected sexual relations in the big city carry the infection to
other sexual partners on the road and then to their homes and families.
India's blood supply, despite official blood screening efforts,
continues to become infected. In 1991 donated blood was screened for HIV
in only four major cities: New Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. One
of the leading factors in the contamination of the blood supply is that
30 percent of the blood required comes from private, profit-making banks
whose practices are difficult to regulate. Furthermore, professional
donors are an integral part of the Indian blood supply network,
providing about 30 percent of the annual requirement nationally. These
donors are generally poor and tend to engage in high-risk sex and use
intravenous drugs more than the general population. Professional donors
also tend to donate frequently at different centers and, in many cases,
under different names. Reuse of improperly sterilized needles in health
care and blood-collection facilities also is a factor. India's minister
of health and family welfare reported in 1992 that only 138 out of 608
blood banks were equipped for HIV screening. A 1992 study conducted by
the Indian Health Organisation revealed that 86 percent of commercial
blood donors surveyed were HIV-positive.
India - Health Care
Role of the Government
The Indian constitution charges the states with "the raising of
the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the
improvement of public health" (see The Constitutional Framework,
ch. 8). However, many critics of India's National Health Policy,
endorsed by Parliament in 1983, point out that the policy lacks specific
measures to achieve broad stated goals. Particular problems include the
failure to integrate health services with wider economic and social
development, the lack of nutritional support and sanitation, and the
poor participatory involvement at the local level.
Central government efforts at influencing public health have focused
on the five-year plans, on coordinated planning with the states, and on
sponsoring major health programs. Government expenditures are jointly
shared by the central and state governments. Goals and strategies are
set through central-state government consultations of the Central
Council of Health and Family Welfare. Central government efforts are
administered by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which
provides both administrative and technical services and manages medical
education. States provide public services and health education.
The 1983 National Health Policy is committed to providing health
services to all by 2000 (see table 8, Appendix; The Legislature, ch. 8).
In 1983 health care expenditures varied greatly among the states and
union territories, from Rs13 per capita in Bihar to Rs60 per capita in
Himachal Pradesh (for value of the rupee--see Glossary), and Indian per
capita expenditure was low when compared with other Asian countries
outside of South Asia. Although government health care spending
progressively grew throughout the 1980s, such spending as a percentage
of the gross national product (GNP--see Glossary) remained fairly
constant. In the meantime, health care spending as a share of total
government spending decreased. During the same period, private-sector
spending on health care was about 1.5 times as much as government
spending.
Expenditures
In the mid-1990s, health spending amounts to 6 percent of GDP, one of
the highest levels among developing nations. The established per capita
spending is around Rs320 per year with the major input from private
households (75 percent). State governments contribute 15.2 percent, the
central government 5.2 percent, third-party insurance and employers 3.3
percent, and municipal government and foreign donors about 1.3,
according to a 1995 World Bank study. Of these proportions, 58.7 percent
goes toward primary health care (curative, preventive, and promotive)
and 38.8 percent is spent on secondary and tertiary inpatient care. The
rest goes for nonservice costs.
The fifth and sixth five-year plans (FY 1974-78 and FY 1980-84,
respectively) included programs to assist delivery of preventive
medicine and improve the health status of the rural population.
Supplemental nutrition programs and increasing the supply of safe
drinking water were high priorities. The sixth plan aimed at training
more community health workers and increasing efforts to control
communicable diseases. There were also efforts to improve regional
imbalances in the distribution of health care resources.
The Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-89) budgeted Rs33.9 billion for
health, an amount roughly double the outlay of the sixth plan. Health
spending as a portion of total plan outlays, however, had declined over
the years since the first plan in 1951, from a high of 3.3 percent of
the total plan spending in FY 1951-55 to 1.9 percent of the total for
the seventh plan. Mid-way through the Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY
1992-96), however, health and family welfare was budgeted at Rs20
billion, or 4.3 percent of the total plan spending for FY 1994, with an
additional Rs3.6 billion in the nonplan budget.
Primary Services
Health care facilities and personnel increased substantially between
the early 1950s and early 1980s, but because of fast population growth,
the number of licensed medical practitioners per 10,000 individuals had
fallen by the late 1980s to three per 10,000 from the 1981 level of four
per 10,000. In 1991 there were approximately ten hospital beds per
10,000 individuals.
Primary health centers are the cornerstone of the rural health care
system. By 1991, India had about 22,400 primary health centers, 11,200
hospitals, and 27,400 dispensaries. These facilities are part of a
tiered health care system that funnels more difficult cases into urban
hospitals while attempting to provide routine medical care to the vast
majority in the countryside. Primary health centers and subcenters rely
on trained paramedics to meet most of their needs. The main problems
affecting the success of primary health centers are the predominance of
clinical and curative concerns over the intended emphasis on preventive
work and the reluctance of staff to work in rural areas. In addition,
the integration of health services with family planning programs often
causes the local population to perceive the primary health centers as
hostile to their traditional preference for large families. Therefore,
primary health centers often play an adversarial role in local efforts
to implement national health policies.
According to data provided in 1989 by the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, the total number of civilian hospitals for all states
and union territories combined was 10,157. In 1991 there was a total of
811,000 hospital and health care facilities beds. The geographical
distribution of hospitals varied according to local socioeconomic
conditions. In India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, with a 1991
population of more than 139 million, there were 735 hospitals as of
1990. In Kerala, with a 1991 population of 29 million occupying an area
only one-seventh the size of Uttar Pradesh, there were 2,053 hospitals.
In light of the central government's goal of health care for all by
2000, the uneven distribution of hospitals needs to be reexamined.
Private studies of India's total number of hospitals in the early 1990s
were more conservative than official Indian data, estimating that in
1992 there were 7,300 hospitals. Of this total, nearly 4,000 were owned
and managed by central, state, or local governments. Another 2,000,
owned and managed by charitable trusts, received partial support from
the government, and the remaining 1,300 hospitals, many of which were
relatively small facilities, were owned and managed by the private
sector. The use of state-of-the-art medical equipment, often imported
from Western countries, was primarily limited to urban centers in the
early 1990s. A network of regional cancer diagnostic and treatment
facilities was being established in the early 1990s in major hospitals
that were part of government medical colleges. By 1992 twenty-two such
centers were in operation. Most of the 1,300 private hospitals lacked
sophisticated medical facilities, although in 1992 approximately 12
percent possessed state-of-the-art equipment for diagnosis and treatment
of all major diseases, including cancer. The fast pace of development of
the private medical sector and the burgeoning middle class in the 1990s
have led to the emergence of the new concept in India of establishing
hospitals and health care facilities on a for-profit basis.
By the late 1980s, there were approximately 128 medical
colleges--roughly three times more than in 1950. These medical colleges
in 1987 accepted a combined annual class of 14,166 students. Data for
1987 show that there were 320,000 registered medical practitioners and
219,300 registered nurses. Various studies have shown that in both urban
and rural areas people preferred to pay and seek the more sophisticated
services provided by private physicians rather than use free treatment
at public health centers.
Indigenous or traditional medical practitioners continue to practice
throughout the country. The two main forms of traditional medicine
practiced are the ayurvedic (meaning science of life) system,
which deals with causes, symptoms, diagnoses, and treatment based on all
aspects of well-being (mental, physical, and spiritual), and the unani
(so-called Galenic medicine) herbal medical practice. A vaidya
is a practitioner of the ayurvedic tradition, and a hakim
(Arabic for a Muslim physician) is a practitioner of the unani tradition.
These professions are frequently hereditary. A variety of institutions
offer training in indigenous medical practice. Only in the late 1970s
did official health policy refer to any form of integration between
Western-oriented medical personnel and indigenous medical practitioners.
In the early 1990s, there were ninety-eight ayurvedic colleges
and seventeen unani colleges operating in both the governmental
and nongovernmental sectors.
India - Education
Administration and Funding
Education is divided into preprimary, primary, middle (or
intermediate), secondary (or high school), and higher levels. Primary
school includes children of ages six to eleven, organized into classes
one through five. Middle school pupils aged eleven through fourteen are
organized into classes six through eight, and high school students ages
fourteen through seventeen are enrolled in classes nine through twelve.
Higher education includes technical schools, colleges, and universities.
Article 42 of the constitution, an amendment added in 1976,
transferred education from the state list of responsibilities to the
central government. Prior to this assumption of direct responsibility
for promoting educational facilities for all parts of society, the
central government had responsibility only for the education of
minorities. Article 43 of the constitution set the goal of free and
compulsory education for all children through age fourteen and gave the
states the power to set standards for education within their
jurisdictions. Despite this joint responsibility for education by state
and central governments, the central government has the preponderant
role because it drafts the five-year plans, which include education
policy and some funding for education. Moreover, in 1986 the
implementation of the National Policy on Education initiated a long-term
series of programs aimed at improving India's education system by
ensuring that all children through the primary level have access to
education of comparable quality irrespective of caste, creed, location,
or sex. The 1986 policy set a goal that, by 1990, all children by age
eleven were to have five years of schooling or its equivalent in
nonformal education. By 1995 all children up to age fourteen were to
have been provided free and compulsory education. The 1990 target was
not achieved, but by setting such goals, the central government was seen
as expressing its commitment to the ideal of universal education.
The Department of Education, part of the Ministry of Human Resource
Development, implements the central government's responsibilities in
educational matters. The ministry coordinates planning with the states,
provides funding for experimental programs, and acts through the
University Grants Commission and the National Council of Educational
Research and Training. These organizations seek to improve education
standards, develop and introduce instructional materials, and design
textbooks in the country's numerous languages (see The Social Context of
Language, ch. 4). The National Council of Educational Research and
Training collects data about education and conducts educational
research.
State-level ministries of education coordinate education programs at
local levels. City school boards are under the supervision of both the
state education ministry and the municipal government. In rural areas,
either the district board or the panchayat (village
council--see Glossary) oversees the school board (see Local Government,
ch. 8). The significant role the panchayats play in education
often means the politicization of elementary education because the
appointment and transfer of teachers often become emotional political
issues.
State governments provide most educational funding, although since
independence the central government increasingly has assumed the cost of
educational development as outlined under the five-year plans. India
spends an average 3 percent of its GNP on education. Spending for
education ranged between 4.6 and 7.7 percent of total central government
expenditures from the 1950s through the 1970s. In the early 1980s, about
10 percent of central and state funds went to education, a proportion
well below the average of seventy-nine other developing countries. More
than 90 percent of the expenditure was for teachers' salaries and
administration. Per capita budget expenditures increased from Rs36.5 in
FY 1977 to Rs112.7 in FY 1986, with highest expenditures found in the
union territories. Nevertheless, total expenditure per student per year
by the central and state governments declined in real terms.
Primary and Secondary Education
Several factors work against universal education in India. Although
Indian law prohibits the employment of children in factories, the law
allows them to work in cottage industries, family households,
restaurants, or in agriculture. Primary and middle school education is
compulsory. However, only slightly more than 50 percent of children
between the ages of six and fourteen actually attend school, although a
far higher percentage is enrolled. School attendance patterns for
children vary from region to region and according to gender. But it is
noteworthy that national literacy rates increased from 43.7 percent in
1981 to 52.2 percent in 1991 (male 63.9 percent, female 39.4 percent),
passing the 50 percent mark for the first time. There are wide regional
and gender variations in the literacy rates, however; for example, the
southern state of Kerala, with a 1991 literacy rate of about 89.8
percent, ranked first in India in terms of both male and female
literacy. Bihar, a northern state, ranked lowest with a literacy rate of
only 39 percent (53 percent for males and 23 percent for females).
School enrollment rates also vary greatly according to age (see table 9,
Appendix).
To improve national literacy, the central government launched a
wide-reaching literacy campaign in July 1993. Using a volunteer teaching
force of some 10 million people, the government hoped to have reached
around 100 million Indians by 1997. A special focus was placed on
improving literacy among women.
A report in 1985 by the Ministry of Education, entitled Challenge
of Education: A Policy Perspective , showed that nearly 60 percent
of children dropped out between grades one and five. (The Ministry of
Education was incorporated into the Ministry of Human Resources in 1985
as the Department of Education. In 1988 the Ministry of Human Resources
was renamed the Ministry of Human Resource Development.) Of 100 children
enrolled in grade one, only twenty-three reached grade eight. Although
many children lived within one kilometer of a primary school, nearly 20
percent of all habitations did not have schools nearby. Forty percent of
primary schools were not of masonry construction. Sixty percent had no
drinking water facilities, 70 percent had no library facilities, and 89
percent lacked toilet facilities. Single-teacher primary schools were
commonplace, and it was not unusual for the teacher to be absent or even
to subcontract the teaching work to unqualified substitutes (see table
10, Appendix).
The improvements that India has made in education since independence
are nevertheless substantial. From the first plan until the beginning of
the sixth (1951-80), the percentage of the primary school-age population
attending classes more than doubled. The number of schools and teachers
increased dramatically. Middle schools and high schools registered the
steepest rates of growth. The number of primary schools increased by
more than 230 percent between 1951 and 1980. During the same period,
however, the number of middle schools increased about tenfold. The
numbers of teachers showed similar rates of increase. The proportion of
trained teachers among those working in primary and middle schools,
fewer than 60 percent in 1950, was more than 90 percent in 1987 (see
table 11, Appendix). However, there was considerable variation in the
geographical distribution of trained teachers in the states and union
territories in the 1986-87 school year. Arunachal Pradesh had the
highest percentage (60 percent) of untrained teachers in primary
schools, and Assam had the highest percentage (72 percent) of untrained
teachers in middle schools. Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Chandigarh, and
Pondicherry (Puduchcheri) reportedly had no untrained teachers at either
kind of school.
Various forms of private schooling are common; many schools are
strictly private, whereas others enjoy government grants-in-aid but are
run privately. Schools run by church and missionary societies are common
forms of private schools. Among India's Muslim population, the madrasa
, a school attached to a mosque, plays an important role in education
(see Islamic Traditions in South Asia, ch. 3). Some 10 percent of all
children who enter the first grade are enrolled in private schools. The
dropout rate in these schools is practically nonexistent.
Traditional notions of social rank and hierarchy have greatly
influenced India's primary school system. A dual system existed in the
early 1990s, in which middle-class families sent their children to
private schools while lower-class families sent their children to
underfinanced and underequipped municipal and village schools. Evolving
middle-class values have made even nursery school education in the
private sector a stressful event for children and parents alike. Tough
entrance interviews for admission, long classroom hours, heavy homework
assignments, and high tuition rates in the mid-1990s led to charges of
"lost childhood" for preschool children and acknowledgment of
both the social costs and enhanced social benefits for the families
involved.
The government encourages the study of classical, modern, and tribal
languages with a view toward the gradual switch from English to regional
languages and to teaching Hindi in non-Hindi speaking states. As a
result, there are schools conducted in various languages at all levels.
Classical and foreign language training most commonly occurs at the
postsecondary level, although English is also taught at the lower levels
(see Diversity, Use, and Policy; Hindi and English, ch. 4).
Colleges and Universities
Receiving higher education, once the nearly exclusive domain of the
wealthy and privileged, since independence has become the aspiration of
almost every student completing high school. In the 1950-51 school year,
there were some 360,000 students enrolled in colleges and universities;
by the 1990-91 school year, the number had risen to nearly 4 million, a
more than tenfold increase in four decades. At that time, there were 177
universities and university-level institutions (more than six times the
number at independence), some 500 teacher training colleges, and several
thousand other colleges.
There are three kinds of colleges in India. The first type,
government colleges, are found only in those states where private
enterprise is weak or which were at one time controlled by princes (see
Company Rule, 1757-1857, ch. 1). The second kind are colleges managed by
religious organizations and the private sector. Many of the latter
institutions were founded after 1947 by wealthy business owners and
politicians wishing to gain local fame and importance. Professional
colleges comprise the third kind and consist mostly of medical,
teacher-training, engineering, law, and agricultural colleges. More than
50 percent of them are sponsored and managed by the government. However,
about 5 percent of these colleges are privately run without government
grant support. They charge fees of ten to twelve times the amount of the
government-run colleges. The profusion of new engineering colleges in
India in the late 1980s and early 1990s caused concern in official
education circles that the overall quality and reputation of India's
higher education system would be threatened by these new schools, which
operated mainly on a for-profit basis. As the government tightened its
support to higher education in the early 1990s, colleges and
universities came under considerable financial stress.
The All-India Council of Technical Education is empowered to regulate
the establishment of any new private professional colleges to limit
their proliferation. In 1992 the Karnataka High Court directed the state
government to rescind permission to nine organizations to start new
engineering and medical colleges in the state.
Gaining admission to a nonprofessional college is not unduly
difficult except in the case of some select colleges that are
particularly competitive. Students encounter greater difficulties in
gaining admission to professional colleges in such fields as
architecture, business, medicine, and dentistry.
There are four categories of universities. The largest number are
teaching universities that maintain and run a large number of colleges.
Unitary institutions, such as Allahabad University and Lucknow
University, make up the second kind. The third kind are the twenty-six
agricultural universities, each managed by the state in which it is
located. Technical universities constitute the fourth kind. In the late
1980s, more technical universities, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru
Technological University in the state of Hyderabad, were founded. There
were also proposals to found medical universities in some states. By
1990 Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu already had established such
universities. Out of the 177 universities in the country, only ten are
funded by the central government. The majority of universities are
managed by the states, which establish them and provide funding.
There was a high rate of attrition among students in higher education
in the 1980s. A substantial portion failed their examinations more than
once, and large numbers dropped out; only about one out of four students
successfully completed the full course of studies. Even those students
who were successful could not count on a university degree to assure
them employment. In the early postindependence years, a bachelor's
degree often provided entrance to the elite, but in contemporary India,
it provides a chance to become a white-collar worker at a relatively
modest salary. The government traditionally has been the principal
employer of educated manpower.
State governments play a powerful role in the running of all but the
national universities. Political considerations, if not outright
political patronage, play a significant part in appointments. The state
governor is usually the university chancellor, and the vice chancellor,
who actually runs the institution, is usually a political appointee.
Appointments are subject to political jockeying, and state governments
have control over grants and other forms of recognition. Caste
affiliation and regional background are recognized criteria for
admission and appointments in many colleges. To offset the inequities
implicit in such practices, a certain number of places are reserved for
members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Education and Society
Historically, Indian education has been elitist. Traditional Hindu
education was tailored to the needs of Brahman (see Glossary) boys who
were taught to read and write by a Brahman teacher (see The Roots of
Indian Religion, ch. 3). During Mughal rule (1526-1858), Muslim
education was similarly elitist, although its orientation reflected
economic factors rather than those of caste background. Under British
company and crown rule (1757-1947), official education policies
reinforced the preexisting elitist tendencies of South Asian education.
By tying entrance and advancement in government service to academic
education, colonial rule contributed to the legacy of an education
system geared to preserving the position and prerogatives of the more
privileged. Education served as a "gatekeeper," permitting an
avenue of upward mobility to those few able to muster sufficient
resources.
Even the efforts of the nationalistic Indian National Congress (the
Congress--see Glossary) faltered in the face of the entrenched interests
defending the existing system of education (see Origins of the Congress
and the Muslim League, ch. 1). Early in the 1900s, the Congress called
for national education, placing an emphasis on technical and vocational
training. In 1920 the Congress initiated a boycott of government-aided
and government-controlled schools; it founded several
"national" schools and colleges, but to little avail. The
rewards of British-style education were so great that the boycott was
largely ignored, and the Congress schools temporarily disappeared.
Postprimary education has traditionally catered to the interests of
the higher and upwardly mobile castes (see Changes in the Caste System,
ch. 5). Despite substantial increases in the spread of middle schools
and high schools' growth in enrollment, secondary schooling is necessary
for those bent on social status and mobility through acquisition of an
office job.
In the nineteenth century, postprimary students were
disproportionately Brahmans; their traditional concern with learning
gave them an advantage under British education policies. By the early
twentieth century, several powerful cultivator castes had realized the
advantages of education as a passport to political power and had
organized to acquire formal learning. "Backward" castes
(usually economically disadvantaged Shudras) who had acquired some
wealth took advantage of their status to secure educational privilege.
In the mid-1980s, the vast majority of students making it through middle
school to high school continued to be from high-level castes and middle-
to upper-class families living in urban areas (see Varna, Caste, and
Other Divisions, ch. 5). A region's three or four most powerful castes
typically dominated the school system. In addition, the widespread role
of private education and the payment of fees even at government-run
schools discriminated against the poor.
The goals of the 1986 National Policy on Education demanded vastly
increased enrollment. In order to have attained universal elementary
education in 1995, the 1981 enrollment level of 72.7 million would have
had to increase to 160 million in 1995. Although the seventh plan
suggested the adoption of new education methods to meet these goals,
such as the promotion of television and correspondence courses (often
referred to as "distance learning") and open school systems,
the actual extended coverage of children was not very great. Many
critics of India's education policy argue that total school enrollment
is not actually a goal of the government considering the extent of
society's vested interest in child labor. In this context, education can
be seen as a tool that one social class uses to prevent the rise of
another. Middle-class Indians frequently distinguish between the
children of the poor as "hands," or children who must be
taught to work, and their own children as "minds," or children
who must be taught to learn. The upgraded curriculum with increased
requirements in English and in the sciences appears to be causing
difficulties for many children. Although all the states have recognized
that curriculum reform is needed, no comprehensive plan to link
curricular changes with new ways of teaching, learning, teacher
training, and examination methods has been implemented.
The government instituted an important program for improving physical
facilities through a phased drive in all primary schools in the country
called Operation Blackboard. Under Operation Blackboard, Rs1 billion was
allocated--but not spent--in 1987 to pay for basic amenities for village
schools, such as toys and games, classroom materials, blackboards, and
maps. This financial allotment averaged Rs2,200 for each government-run
primary school. Additional goals of Operation Blackboard included
construction of classrooms that would be usable in all weather, and an
additional teacher, preferably a woman, in all single-teacher schools.
The nonformal education system implemented in 1979 was the major
government effort to educate dropouts and other unenrolled children.
Special emphasis was given to the nonformal education system in the nine
states regarded by the government as having deficient education systems:
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa,
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. A large number of children
who resided in these states could not attend formal schools because they
were employed, either with or without wages. Seventy-five percent of the
country's children who were not enrolled in school resided in these
states in the 1980s.
The 1986 National Policy on Education gave new impetus to the
nonformal education system. Revised and expanded programs focused on
involving voluntary organizations and training talented and dedicated
young men and women in local communities as instructors. The results of
a late 1980s integrated pilot project for nonformal and adult education
for women and girls in the Lucknow district of Uttar Pradesh provide
important data for analyzing recent implementation trends and initial
results of both the nonformal education system and adult education in
India. Under this project, 300 centers were opened in rural parts of the
district with the approval of the Department of Education, the central
government, and the state government of Uttar Pradesh with financial and
advisory support from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Because of the shortage of women teachers in rural areas of Uttar
Pradesh, in the pilot project nonformal education for girls aged six to
fourteen was integrated with the adult education program for women aged
fifteen to thirty-five, so that the same staff and infrastructure could
be used. Most of the families of the project participants were in
subsistence farming or engaged as farmhands, clerical workers, and petty
merchants. Often the brothers of female participants attended a formal
school situated about one or two kilometers from their homes. Most of
the 300 instructors for the 300 centers were young women between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Each center averaged twenty-five women
and twenty girl participants. The physical facilities of the centers
varied from village to village. Classes might be held on the balcony of
a brick house, within a temple, in a room of a mud-walled house, or
under open thatch-roof structures. Besides focusing on the acquisition
of literacy skills, the project increased participant motivation by also
offering instruction in household work, such as sewing, knitting, and
preserving food. In 1987 a UNESCO mission to evaluate progress in this
project in the areas of functional literacy, vocational skills, and
civic awareness observed that randomly chosen participants in both
nonformal and adult education classes effectively demonstrated their
reading and writing skills at appropriate levels. As a result of many
such local programs, literacy rates improved between 1981 and 1991. Male
literacy increased from 56.5 percent in 1981 to 64.2 percent in 1991
while women's literacy rate increased from 29.9 percent in 1981 to 39.2
percent in 1991.
India - Religion
Buddhism began with the life of Siddhartha Gautama (ca. 563-483
B.C.), a prince from the small Shakya Kingdom located in the foothills
of the Himalayas in Nepal. Brought up in luxury, the prince abandoned
his home and wandered forth as a religious beggar, searching for the
meaning of existence. The stories of his search presuppose the Jain
tradition, as Gautama was for a time a practitioner of intense
austerity, at one point almost starving himself to death. He decided,
however, that self-torture weakened his mind while failing to advance
him to enlightenment and therefore turned to a milder style of
renunciation and concentrated on advanced meditation techniques.
Eventually, under a tree in the forests of Gaya (in modern Bihar), he
resolved to stir no farther until he had solved the mystery of
existence. Breaking through the final barriers, he achieved the
knowledge that he later expressed as the Four Noble Truths: all of life
is suffering; the cause of suffering is desire; the end of desire leads
to the end of suffering; and the means to end desire is a path of
discipline and meditation. Gautama was now the Buddha, or the awakened
one, and he spent the remainder of his life traveling about northeast
India converting large numbers of disciples. At the age of eighty, the
Buddha achieved his final passing away (parinirvana ) and died,
leaving a thriving monastic order and a dedicated lay community to
continue his work.
By the third century B.C., the still-young religion based on the
Buddha's teachings was being spread throughout South Asia through the
agency of the Mauryan Empire (ca. 326-184 B.C.; see The Mauryan Empire,
ch. 1). By the seventh century A.D., having spread throughout East Asia
and Southeast Asia, Buddhism probably had the largest religious
following in the world.
For centuries Indian royalty and merchants patronized Buddhist
monasteries and raised beautiful, hemispherical stone structures called
stupas over the relics of the Buddha in reverence to his memory. Since
the 1840s, archaeology has revealed the huge impact of Buddhist art,
iconography, and architecture in India. The monastery complex at Nalanda
in Bihar, in ruins in 1993, was a world center for Buddhist philosophy
and religion until the thirteenth century. But by the thirteenth
century, when Turkic invaders destroyed the remaining monasteries on the
plains, Buddhism as an organized religion had practically disappeared
from India. It survived only in Bhutan and Sikkim, both of which were
then independent Himalayan kingdoms; among tribal groups in the
mountains of northeast India; and in Sri Lanka. The reasons for this
disappearance are unclear, and they are many: shifts in royal patronage
from Buddhist to Hindu religious institutions; a constant intellectual
struggle with dynamic Hindu intellectual schools, which eventually
triumphed; and slow adoption of popular religious forms by Buddhists
while Hindu monastic communities grew up with the same style of
discipline as the Buddhists, leading to the slow but steady amalgamation
of ideas and trends in the two religions.
Buddhism began a steady and dramatic comeback in India during the
early twentieth century, spurred on originally by a combination of
European antiquarian and philosophical interest and the dedicated
activities of a few Indian devotees. The foundation of the Mahabodhi
Society (Society of Great Enlightenment) in 1891, originally as a force
to wrest control of the Buddhist shrine at Gaya from the hands of Hindu
managers, gave a large stimulus to the popularization of Buddhist
philosophy and the importance of the religion in India's past.
A major breakthrough occurred in 1956 after some thirty years of
Untouchable, or Dalit (see Glossary), agitation when Bhimrao Ramji
(B.R.) Ambedkar, leader of the Untouchable wing within the Congress (see
Glossary), announced that he was converting to Buddhism as a way to
escape from the impediments of the Hindu caste system (see Varna, Caste,
and Other Divisions, ch. 5). He brought with him masses of
Untouchables--also known as Harijans (see Glossary) or Dalits--and
members of Scheduled Castes (see Glossary), who mostly came from
Maharashtra and border areas of neighboring states and from the Agra
area in Uttar Pradesh. By the early 1990s, there were more than 5
million Buddhists in Maharashtra, or 79 percent of the entire Buddhist
community in India, almost all recent converts from low castes. When
added to longtime Buddhist populations in hill areas of northeast India
(West Bengal, Assam, Sikkim, Mizoram, and Tripura) and high Himalayan
valleys (Ladakh District in Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and
northern Uttar Pradesh), and to the influx of Tibetan Buddhist refugees
who fled from Tibet with the Dalai Lama in 1959 and thereafter, the
recent converts raised the number of Buddhists in India to 6.4 million
by 1991. This was a 35.9 percent increase since 1981 and made Buddhism
the fifth largest religious group in the country.
The forms of Buddhism practiced by Himalayan communities and Tibetan
refugees are part of the Vajrayana, or "Way of the Lightning
Bolt," that developed after the seventh century A.D. as part of
Mahayana (Great Path) Buddhism. Although retaining the fundamental
importance of individual spiritual advancement, the Vajrayana stresses
the intercession of bodhisattvas, or enlightened beings, who remain in
this world to aid others on the path. Until the twentieth century, the
Himalayan kingdoms supported a hierarchy in which Buddhist monks, some
identified from birth as bodhisattvas, occupied the highest positions in
society.
Most other Buddhists in India follow Theravada Buddhism, the
"Doctrine of the Elders," which traces its origin through Sri
Lankan and Burmese traditions to scriptures in the Pali language, a
Sanskritic dialect in eastern India. Although replete with miraculous
events and legends, these scriptures stress a more human Buddha and a
democratic path toward enlightenment for everyone. Ambedkar's plan for
the expanding Buddhist congregation in India visualized Buddhist monks
and nuns developing themselves through service to others. Convert
communities, by embracing Buddhism, have embarked on social
transformations, including a decline in alcoholism, a simplification of
marriage ceremonies and abolition of ruinous marriage expenses, a
greater emphasis on education, and a heightened sense of identity and
self-worth.
The Tradition of the Enlightened Master
A number of avowedly Hindu monastic communities have grown up over
time and adopted some of the characteristics associated with early
Buddhism and Jainism, while remaining dedicated to the Hindu
philosophical traditions. One of the oldest and most respected of the
Hindu orders traces its origin to the teacher Shankara (788-820),
believed by many devotees to have lived hundreds of years earlier.
Shankara's philosophy is a primary source of Vedanta, or the "End
of the Veda," the final commentary on revealed truth, which is one
of the most influential trends in modern Hinduism. His interpretation of
the Upanishads portrays brahman as absolutely one and without
qualities. The phenomenal world is illusion (maya ), which the
embodied soul must transcend in order to achieve oneness with brahman
. As a wandering monk, Shankara traveled throughout India, combating
Buddhist atheism and founding five seats of learning at Badrinath (Uttar
Pradesh), Dwaraka (Gujarat), Puri (Orissa), Sringeri (Karnataka), and
Kanchipuram (Tamil Nadu). In the 1990s, those seats are still held by
successors to Shankara's philosophy (Shankara Acharyas), who head an
order of orange-clad monks that is highly respected by the Hindu
community throughout India. Activities of the acharyas ,
including their periodic trips away from their home monasteries to visit
and preach to devotees, receive exposure in regional and national media.
Their conservative viewpoints and pronouncements on a variety of topics,
although not binding on most believers, attract considerable public
attention.
The initiation of a renunciant usually depends on the judgment of an acharya
who determines whether a candidate is dedicated and prepared or not; he
then gives to the disciple training and instructions including the
initiate's own secret formula or mantra. After initiation, the disciple
may remain with his teacher or in a monastery for an indefinite period
or may wander forth in a variety of careers. The Ramanandi order in
North India, for example, includes holy men (sadhus) who practice
ascetic disciplines, militant members of fortified temples, and priests
in charge of temple administration and ritual.
There are other orders of renunciants who lead still more austere
existences, including naked ascetics who wander begging for their food
and assemble for spectacular parades at major festivals. A few dedicated
seekers still withdraw to the fastness of the Himalayas or other remote
spots and work on their meditation and yoga in total obscurity. Others
beg in populated areas, sometimes engaging in fierce austerities such as
piercing their bodies with pins and knives. They are a reminder to all
people that the path of renunciation waits for anyone who has the
dedication and the courage to leave the world behind.
Another kind of renunciation appears in the cult of Sai Baba, who
achieved national and international fame in the twentieth century. The
first person known by this name was a holy man--Sai Baba (died
1918)--who appeared in 1872 in Maharashtra and lived a humble life that
blended meditation and devotional techniques from a variety of sources.
This saint has a small but dedicated following throughout India. A later
incarnation was Satya Sai Baba (satya means true), born in 1926
in Andhra Pradesh. At age thirteen, he experienced the first of several
seizures that resulted in a changed personality and intense devotional
activity, leading to his statement that he is the second incarnation of
Sai Baba. By 1950 he had set up a retreat at Puttaparti in what later
became Andhra Pradesh and was accepting disciples. His fame spread along
with numerous apocryphal stories of his ability to perform miracles,
including the manifestation of sacred ash and, according to some
accounts, watches or other objects, from thin air or from his own body.
The cult has expanded to include publishing, social service, and
education institutions and includes an international association of
thousands of believers. Devotion to Satya Sai Baba does not preclude
attachment to other religious observances but concentrates instead on
worship and veneration of the holy man himself, often in the form of a
photograph. Thousands of pilgrims have traveled to his retreat annually
to participate in group activities, obtain mementos, and perhaps a view
of the teacher himself.
India - The Worship of Personal Gods
Islam is India's largest minority religion, with Muslims officially
comprising 12.1 percent of the country's population, or 101.6 million
people as of the 1991 census. The largest concentrations--about 52
percent of all Muslims in India--live in the states of Bihar (12
million), West Bengal (16 million), and Uttar Pradesh (24 million),
according to the 1991 census. Muslims represent a majority of the local
populations only in Jammu and Kashmir (not tabulated in 1991 but 65
percent in 1981) and Lakshadweep (94 percent). As a faith with its roots
outside South Asia, Islam also offers some striking contrasts to those
religions that originated in India.
Origins and Tenets
Islam began with the ministry of the Prophet Muhammad (570-632), who
belonged to a merchant family in the trading town of Mecca in Arabia. In
his middle age, Muhammad received visions in which the Archangel Gabriel
revealed the word of God to him. After 620 he publicly preached the
message of these visions, stressing the oneness of God (Allah),
denouncing the polytheism of his fellow Arabs, and calling for moral
uplift of the population. He attracted a dedicated band of followers,
but there was intense opposition from the leaders of the city, who
profited from pilgrimage trade to the shrine called the Kaaba. In 622
Muhammad and his closest supporters migrated to the town of Yathrib (now
renamed Medina) to the north and set up a new center of preaching and
opposition to the leadership of Mecca. This move, the hijrah or hegira,
marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar and the origin of the new
religion of Islam. After a series of military engagements, Muhammad and
his followers were able to defeat the authorities in Mecca and return to
take control of the city. Before his death in 632, Muhammad was able to
bring most of the tribes of Arabia into the fold of Islam. Soon after
his death, the united Arabs conquered present-day Syria, Iraq, Egypt,
and Iran, making Islam into a world religion by the end of the seventh
century.
Islam means submission to God, and a Muslim is one who has submitted
to the will of God. At the center of the religion is an intense
concentration on the unity of God and the separation between God and his
creatures. No physical representation of God is allowed. There are no
other gods. The duty of humanity is to profess the simple testimony:
"There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his
Prophet." Obedience to God's will rests on following the example of
the Prophet in one's own life and faithfulness to the revelations
collected into the most sacred text, the Quran. The Five Pillars of
Islam are reciting the profession of faith; praying five times a day;
almsgiving to the poor; fasting (abstaining from dawn to dusk from food,
drink, sexual relations, and smoking) during the month of Ramazan (the
ninth month of the Islamic calendar, known as Ramadan in Arab
countries), the holy month when God's revelations were received by
Muhammad; and making the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at least once during
one's life if possible. People who obey God's commandments and live a
good life will go to heaven after death; those who disobey will go to
hell. All souls will be resurrected for a last judgment at the end of
the world. Muslims view themselves as followers of the same tradition
preserved in the Judaic and Christian scriptures, accept the prophetic
roles of Ibrahim (Abraham), Musa (Moses), and Isa (Jesus), and view
Islam as the final statement of revealed truth for the entire world.
Regulation of the Muslim community rests primarily on rules in the
Quran, then on authenticated tales of the conduct (sunna ) of
the Prophet Muhammad, then on reasoning, and finally on the consensus of
opinion. By the end of the eighth century, four main schools of Muslim
jurisprudence had emerged in Sunni (see Glossary) Islam to interpret the
sharia (Islamic law). Prominent among these groups was the Hanafi
school, which dominated most of India, and the Shafii school, which was
more prevalent in South India. Because Islam has no ordained priesthood,
direction of the Muslim community rests on the learning of religious
scholars (ulama) who are expert in understanding the Quran and its
appended body of commentaries.
Early leadership controversies within the Muslim community led to
divisions that still have an impact on the body of believers. When
Muhammad died, leadership fell to his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, who
became the first caliph (khalifa , or successor), a position
that combined spiritual and secular power. A separate group advocated
the leadership of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, who had
married his daughter Fatima. Leadership could have fallen to Ali's son
Husayn, but, in the power struggle that followed, in 680 Husayn and
seventy-two followers were murdered at Karbala (now in modern Iraq).
This leadership dispute formed the most crucial dividing point in
Islamic history: the victorious party went on to found the Umayyad
Dynasty (661-750), which had its headquarters at Damascus, leading the
majority of Muslims in the Sunni path. The disaffected Shiat Ali (or
Party of Ali) viewed only his line as legitimate and continued to follow
descendants of Husayn as their leader (imam--see Glossary). Among the
followers of this Shia (see Glossary) path, there is a party of
"Seveners" who trace the lineage of imams down to Ismail (d.
762), the Seventh Imam and eldest son of the Sixth Imam. The Ismailis
are the largest Shia group in India, and are concentrated in Maharashtra
and Gujarat. A second group, the "Twelvers" (the most numerous
Shia group worldwide), traces the lineage of imams through twelve
generations, believing that the last or Twelfth Imam became
"hidden" and will reappear in the world as a savior, or Mahdi,
at some time in the future.
The division between Sunni and Shia dates back to purely political
struggles in the seventh century, but over time between the two major
communities many divisive differences in ritual and legal
interpretations have evolved. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni,
and in contemporary India 90 percent of Muslims follow this path. Sunnis
have recognized no legitimate caliph after the position was abolished in
Turkey in 1924, placing the direction of the community clearly with the
ulama.
Public worship for the average Muslim consists of going to a mosque (masjid
)--normally on Fridays, although mosques are well attended throughout
the week--for congregational prayers led by a local imam, following the
public call to prayer, which may be intoned from the top of a minaret (minar
) at the mosque. After leaving their footwear at the door, men and women
separate; men usually sit in front, women in back, either inside the
mosque or in an open courtyard. The prayer leader gives a sermon in the
local regional language, perhaps interspersed with Arabic or Farsi
(sometimes called Persian or Parsi) quotations, depending on his
learning and the sophistication of the audience. Announcements of events
of interest that may include political commentary are often included.
Then follow common prayers that involve responses from the worshipers
who stand, bow, and kneel in unison during devotions.
Islamic Traditions in South Asia
Muslims practice a series of life-cycle rituals that differ from
those of Hindus, Jains, or Buddhists. The newborn baby has the call to
prayer whispered into the left ear, the profession of faith whispered
into the right ear, honey or date paste placed in the mouth, and a name
selected. On the sixth day after birth, the first bath occurs. On the
seventh day or a multiple of the seventh, the head is shaved, and alms
are distributed, ideally in silver weighing as much as the hair; a
sacrifice of animals imitates the sheep sacrificed instead of Ishmael
(Ismail) in biblical times. Religious instruction starts at age four
years, four months, and four days, beginning with the standard phrase:
"In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful." Male
circumcision takes place between the ages of seven and twelve. Marriage
requires a payment by the husband to the wife and the solemnization of a
marital contract in a social gathering. Marriage ceremonies include the
donning of a nose ring by the bride, or in South India a wedding
necklace, and the procession of the bridegroom. In a traditional
wedding, males and females attend ceremonies in different rooms, in
keeping with the segregation of sexes in most social settings. After
death the family members wash and enshroud the body, after which it is
buried as prayers from the Quran are recited. On the third day, friends
and relatives come to console the bereaved, read the Quran, and pray for
the soul of the deceased. The family observe a mourning period of up to
forty days.
The annual festivals of Islam are based on a lunar calendar of 354
days, which makes the Islamic holy year independent of the Gregorian
calendar. Muslim festivals make a complete circuit of the solar year
every thirty-three years.
The beginning of the Islamic calendar is the month of Muharram, the
tenth day of which is Ashura, the anniversary of the death of Husayn,
the son of Ali. Ashura, a major holiday, is of supreme importance for
the Shia. Devotees engage in ritualized mourning that may include
processions of colorful replicas of Husayn's tomb at Karbala and
standards with palms on top, which are carried by barefoot mourners and
buried at an imitation Karbala. In many areas of India, these parades
provide a dramatic spectacle that draws large numbers of non-Muslim
onlookers. Demonstrations of grief may include bouts of
self-flagellation that can draw blood and may take place in public
streets, although many families retain personal mourning houses. Sunni
Muslims may also commemorate Husayn's death but in a less demonstrative
manner, concentrating instead on the redemptive aspect of his martyrdom.
The last day of Ramazan is Id al Fitr (Feast of Breaking the Fast),
another national holiday, which ends the month of fasting with
almsgiving, services in mosques, and visits to friends and neighbors.
Bakr Id, or Id al Zuha (Feast of Sacrifice), begins on the tenth day of
the Islamic month of Dhul Hijjah and is a major holiday. Prescribed in
the Quran, Id al Zuha commemorates Ibrahim's willingness to sacrifice
Ishmael (rather than Ishaq--Isaac--as in the Judeo-Christian tradition)
according to God's command, but it is also the high point of the
pilgrim's ritual cycle while on the hajj in Mecca. All of these
festivals involve large feasts, gifts given to family and neighbors, and
the distribution of food for charitable purposes.
A significant aspect of Islam in India is the importance of shrines
attached to the memory of great Sufi saints. Sufism is a mystical path (tariqat
) as distinct from the path of the sharia. A Sufi attains a direct
vision of oneness with God, often on the edges of orthodox behavior, and
can thus become a pir (living saint) who may take on disciples
(murids ) and set up a spiritual lineage that can last for
generations. Orders of Sufis became important in India during the
thirteenth century following the ministry of Muinuddin Chishti
(1142-1236), who settled in Ajmer, Rajasthan, and attracted large
numbers of converts to Islam because of his holiness. His Chishtiyya
order went on to become the most influential Sufi lineage in India,
although other orders from Central Asia and Southwest Asia also reached
to India and played a large role in the spread of Islam. Many Sufis were
well known for weaving music, dance, intoxicants, and local folktales
into their songs and lectures. In this way, they created a large
literature in regional languages that embedded Islamic culture deeply
into older South Asian traditions.
In the case of many great teachers, the memory of their holiness has
been so intense that they are still viewed as active intercessors with
God, and their tombs have become the site of rites and prayers by
disciples and lay people alike. Tales of miraculous deeds associated
with the tombs of great saints have attracted large numbers of pilgrims
attempting to gain cures for physical maladies or solutions to personal
problems. The tomb of the pir thus becomes a dargah
(gateway) to God and the focus for a wide range of rituals, such as
daily washing and decoration by professional attendants, touching or
kissing the tomb or contact with the water that has washed it, hanging
petitions on the walls of the shrine surrounding the tomb, lighting
incense, and giving money.
The descendants of the original pir are sometimes seen as
inheritors of his spiritual energy, and, as pirs in their own
right, they might dispense amulets sanctified by contact with them or
with the tomb. The annual celebration of the pir 's death is a
major event at important shrines, attracting hundreds of thousands of
devotees for celebrations that may last for days. Free communal kitchens
and distribution of sweets are also big attractions of these festivals,
at which Muslim fakirs, or wandering ascetics, sometimes appear and
where public demonstrations of self-mortification, such as miraculous
piercing of the body and spiritual possession of devotees, sometimes
occur. Every region of India can boast of at least one major Sufi shrine
that attracts expressive devotion, which remains important, especially
for Muslim women.
The leadership of the Muslim community has pursued various directions
in the evolution of Indian Islam during the twentieth century. The most
conservative wing has typically rested on the education system provided
by the hundreds of religious training institutes (madrasa )
throughout the country, which have tended to stress the study of the
Quran and Islamic texts in Arabic and Persian, and have focused little
on modern managerial and technical skills (see Education and Society,
ch. 2). Several national movements have emerged from this sector of the
Muslim community. The Jamaati Islami (Islamic Party), founded in 1941,
advocates the establishment of an overtly Islamic government through
peaceful, democratic, and nonmissionary activities. It had about 3,000
active members and 40,000 sympathizers in the mid-1980s. The Tablighi
Jamaat (Outreach Society) became active after the 1940s as a movement,
primarily among the ulama, stressing personal renewal, prayer, a
missionary and cooperative spirit, and attention to orthodoxy. It has
been highly critical of the kind of activities that occur in and around
Sufi shrines and remains a minor if respected force in the training of
the ulama. Other ulama have upheld the legitimacy of mass religion,
including exaltation of pirs and the memory of the Prophet. A
powerful secularizing drive led to the founding of Aligarh Muslim
University (founded in 1875 as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental
College)--with its modern curriculum--and other major Muslim
universities. This educational drive has remained the most dominant
force in guiding the Muslim community.
India - Sikhism
Sikhism has about 20 million believers worldwide but has an
importance far beyond those numbers because Sikhs have played a
disproportionately large role in the armed forces and public affairs in
India for the last 400 years. Although most Indian Sikhs (79 percent)
remain concentrated in the state of Punjab, nearly 3.5 million Sikhs
live outside the state, while about 4 million live abroad. This Sikh
diaspora, driven by ambition and economic success, has made Sikhism a
world religion as well as a significant minority force within the
country.
Early History and Tenets
Sikhism began with Guru Nanak (1469-1539), a member of a trading
caste in Punjab who seems to have been employed for some time as a
government servant, was married and had two sons, and at age forty-five
became a religious teacher. At the heart of his message was a philosophy
of universal love, devotion to God, and the equality of all men and
women before God. He set up congregations of believers who ate together
in free communal kitchens in an overt attempt to break down caste
boundaries based on food prohibitions. As a poet, musician, and
enlightened master, Nanak's reputation spread, and by the time he died
he had founded a new religion of "disciples" (shiksha
or sikh) that followed his example.
Nanak's son, Baba Sri Chand, founded the Udasi sect of celibate
ascetics, which continued in the 1990s. However, Nanak chose as his
successor not his son but Angad (1504-52), his chief disciple, to carry
on the work as the second guru. Thus began a lineage of teachers that
lasted until 1708 and amounted to ten gurus in the Sikh tradition, each
of whom is viewed as an enlightened master who propounded directly the
word of God. The third guru, Amar Das (1479-1574), established
missionary centers to spread the message and was so well respected that
the Mughal emperor Akbar visited him (see The Mughals, ch. 1). Amar Das
appointed his son-in-law Ram Das (1534-81) to succeed him, establishing
a hereditary succession for the position of guru. He also built a tank
for water at Amritsar in Punjab, which, after his death, became the
holiest center of Sikhism.
By the late sixteenth century, the influence of the Sikh religion on
Punjabi society was coming to the notice of political authorities. The
fifth guru, Arjun Das (1563-1606), was executed in Lahore by the Mughal
emperor Jahangir (r. 1605-27) for alleged complicity in a rebellion. In
response, the next guru, Hargobind (d. 1644), militarized and
politicized his position and fought three battles with Mughal forces.
Hargobind established a militant tradition of resistance to persecution
by the central government in Delhi that remains an important motif in
Sikh consciousness. Hargobind also established at Amritsar, in front of
the Golden Temple, the central shrine devoted to Sikhism, the Throne of
the Eternal God (Akal Takht) from which the guru dispensed justice and
administered the secular affairs of the community, clearly establishing
the tradition of a religious state that remains a major issue. The ninth
guru, Tegh Bahadur (1621-75), because he refused Mughal emperor
Aurangzeb's order to convert to Islam, was brought to Delhi and beheaded
on a site that later became an important gurdwara (abode of the
guru, a Sikh temple) on Chandni Chauk, one of the old city's main
thoroughfares.
These events led the tenth guru, Gobind Singh (1666-1708), to
transform the Sikhs into a militant brotherhood dedicated to defense of
their faith at all times. He instituted a baptism ceremony involving the
immersion of a sword in sugared water that initiates Sikhs into the
Khalsa (khalsa , from the Persian term for "the king's
own," often taken to mean army of the pure) of dedicated devotion.
The outward signs of this new order were the "Five Ks" to be
observed at all times: uncut hair (kesh ), a long knife (kirpan
), a comb (kangha ), a steel bangle (kara ), and a
special kind of breeches not reaching below the knee (kachha ).
Male Sikhs took on the surname Singh (meaning lion), and women took the
surname Kaur (princess). All made vows to purify their personal behavior
by avoiding intoxicants, including alcohol and tobacco. In modern India,
male Sikhs who have dedicated themselves to the Khalsa do not cut their
beards and keep their long hair tied up under turbans, preserving a
distinctive personal appearance recognized throughout the world.
Much of Guru Gobind Singh's later life was spent on the move, in
guerrilla campaigns against the Mughal Empire, which was entering the
last days of its effective authority under Aurangzeb (1658-1707). After
Gobind Singh's death, the line of gurus ended, and their message
continued through the Adi Granth (Original Book), which dates
from 1604 and later became known as the Guru Granth Sahib (Holy
Book of the Gurus). The Guru Granth Sahib is revered as a
continuation of the line of gurus and as the living word of God by all
Sikhs and stands at the heart of all ceremonies.
Most of the Sikh gurus were excellent musicians, who composed songs
that conveyed their message to the masses in the saints' own language,
which combined variants of Punjabi with Hindi and Braj and also
contained Arabic and Persian vocabulary. Written in Gurmukhi script,
these songs are one of the main sources of early Punjabi language and
literature. There are 5,894 hymns in all, arranged according to the
musical measure in which they are sung. An interesting feature of this
literature is that 937 songs and poems are by well-known bhakti
saints who were not members of the lineage of Sikh gurus, including the
North Indian saint Kabir and five Muslim devotees. In the Guru
Granth Sahib , God is called by all the Hindu names and by Allah as
well. From its beginnings, then, Sikhism was an inclusive faith that
attempted to encompass and enrich other Indian religious traditions.
The belief system propounded by the gurus has its origins in the
philosophy and devotions of Hinduism and Islam, but the formulation of
Sikhism is unique. God is the creator of the universe and is without
qualities or differentiation in himself. The universe (samsar )
is not sinful in its origin but is covered with impurities; it is not
suffering, but a transitory opportunity for the soul to recognize its
true nature and break the cycle of rebirth. The unregenerate person is
dominated by self-interest and remains immersed in illusion (maya
), leading to bad karma. Meanwhile, God desires that his creatures
escape and achieve enlightenment (nirvana) by recognizing his order in
the universe. He does this by manifesting his grace as a holy word,
attainable through recognition and recitation of God's holy name (nam
). The role of the guru, who is the manifestation of God in the world,
is to teach the means for prayer through the Guru Granth Sahib
and the community of believers. The guru in this system, and by
extension the Guru Granth Sahib , are coexistent with the
divine and play a decisive role in saving the world.
Where the Guru Granth Sahib is present, that place becomes a
gurdwara . Many Sikh homes contain separate rooms or designated
areas where a copy of the book stands as the center of devotional
ceremonies. Throughout Punjab, or anywhere there is a substantial body
of believers, there are special shrines where the Guru Granth Sahib
is displayed permanently or is installed daily in a ceremonial manner.
These public gurdwaras are the centers of Sikh community life
and the scene of periodic assemblies for worship. The typical assembly
involves group singing from the Guru Granth Sahib , led by
distinguished believers or professional singers attached to the shrine,
distribution of holy food, and perhaps a sermon delivered by the
custodian of the shrine.
As for domestic and life-cycle rituals, well into the twentieth
century many Sikhs followed Hindu customs for birth, marriage, and death
ceremonies, including readings from Hindu scriptures and the employment
of Brahmans as officiants. Reform movements within the Sikh community
have purged many of these customs, substituting instead readings from
the Guru Granth Sahib as the focus for rituals and the
employment of Sikh ritual specialists. At major public events--weddings,
funerals, or opening a new business--patrons may fund a reading of the
entire Guru Granth Sahib by special reciters.
Twentieth-Century Developments
The existence of the Khalsa creates a potential division within the
Sikh community between those who have undergone the baptism ceremony and
those who practice the system laid down in the Guru Granth Sahib
but who do not adopt the distinctive life-style of the Khalsa. Among the
latter is a sect of believers founded by Baba Dayal (d. 1853) named the
Nirankaris, who concentrate on the formless quality of God and his
revelation purely through the guru and the Guru Granth Sahib ,
and who accept the existence of a living, enlightened teacher as
essential for spiritual development. The dominant tendency among the
Sikhs since the late nineteenth century has been to stress the
importance of the Khalsa and its outward signs.
Revivalist movements of the late nineteenth century centered on the
activities of the Singh Sabha (Assembly of Lions), who successfully
moved much of the Sikh community toward their own ritual systems and
away from Hindu customs, and culminated in the Akali (eternal) mass
movement in the 1920s to take control of gurdwaras away from
Hindu managers and invest it in an organization representing the Sikhs.
The result was passage of the Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925, which
established the Central Gurdwara Management Committee to manage all Sikh
shrines in Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh through an assembly of
elected Sikhs. The combined revenues of hundreds of shrines, which
collected regular contributions and income from endowments, gave the
committee a large operating budget and considerable authority over the
religious life of the community. A simultaneous process led to the Akali
Dal (Eternal Party), a political organization that originally
coordinated nonviolent agitations to gain control over gurdwaras
, then participated in the independence struggle, and since 1947 has
competed for control over the Punjab state government. The ideology of
the Akali Dal is simple--single-minded devotion to the guru and
preservation of the Sikh faith through political power--and the party
has served to mobilize a majority of Sikhs in Punjab around issues that
stress Sikh separatism.
There is no official priesthood within Sikhism or any widely accepted
institutional mechanism for policy making for the entire faith. Instead,
decisions are made by communities of believers (sangat ) based
on the Guru Granth Sahib --a tradition dating back to the
eighteenth century when scattered bodies of believers had to fight
against persecution and manage their own affairs. Anyone may study the
scriptures intensively and become a "knower" (giani )
who is recognized by fellow believers, and there is a variety of
training institutes with full-time students and teachers.
Leaders of sects and sectarian training institutions may feel free to
issue their own orders. When these orders are combined with the prestige
and power of the Central Gurdwara Management Committee and the Akali
Dal, which have explicitly narrow administrative goals and are often
faction-ridden, a mixture of images and authority emerges that often
leaves the religion as a whole without clear leadership. Thus it became
possible for Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, head of a training
institution, to stand forth as a leading authority on the direction of
Sikhism; initiate reforms of personal morality; participate in the
persecution of Nirankaris; and take effective control of the holiest
Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, in the early 1980s.
His takeover of the Golden Temple led to a violent siege and culminated
in the devastation of the shrine by the army in 1984 (see The Rise of
Indira Gandhi, ch. 1; Insurgent Movements and External Subversion, ch.
10). Later terrorist activities in Punjab, carried out in the name of
Sikhism, were performed by a wide range of organizations claiming to
represent an authoritative vision of the nature and direction of the
community as a whole.
India - Tribal Religions
Diversity, Use, and Policy
The languages of India belong to four major families: Indo-Aryan (a
branch of the Indo-European family), Dravidian, Austroasiatic (Austric),
and Sino-Tibetan, with the overwhelming majority of the population
speaking languages belonging to the first two families. (A fifth family,
Andamanese, is spoken by at most a few hundred among the indigenous
tribal peoples in the Andaman Islands, and has no agreed upon
connections with families outside them.) The four major families are as
different in their form and construction as are, for example, the
Indo-European and Semitic families. A variety of scripts are employed in
writing the different languages. Furthermore, most of the more widely
used Indian languages exist in a number of different forms or dialects
influenced by complex geographic and social patterns.
Sir George Grierson's twelve-volume Linguistic Survey of India
, published between 1903 and 1923, identified 179 languages and 544
dialects. The 1921 census listed 188 languages and forty-nine dialects.
The 1961 census listed 184 "mother tongues," including those
with fewer than 10,000 speakers. This census also gave a list of all the
names of mother tongues provided by the respondents themselves; the list
totals 1,652 names. The 1981 census--the last census to tabulate
languages--reported 112 mother tongues with more than 10,000 speakers
and almost 1 million people speaking other languages. The encyclopedic People
of India series, published by the government's Anthropological
Survey of India in the 1980s and early 1990s, identified seventy-five
"major languages" within a total of 325 languages used in
Indian households. In the early 1990s, there were thirty-two languages
with 1 million or more speakers (see table 15, Appendix).
The Indian constitution recognizes official languages (see The
Constitutional Framework, ch. 8). Articles 343 through 351 address the
use of Hindi, English, and regional languages for official purposes,
with the aim of a nationwide use of Hindi while guaranteeing the use of
minority languages at the state and local levels. Hindi has been
designated India's official language, although many impediments to its
official use exist.
The constitution's Eighth Schedule, as amended by Parliament in 1992,
lists eighteen official or Scheduled Languages (see Glossary). They are
Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani,
Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi,
Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. (Precise numbers of speakers of these languages
are not known. They were not reported in the 1991 census, and estimates
are subject to considerable variation because of the use of multiple
languages by individual speakers.) Of the official languages,
approximately 403 million people, or about 43 percent of the estimated
total 1995 population, speak Hindi as their mother tongue. Telugu,
Bengali, Marathi, and Tamil rank next, each the mother tongue of about 4
to 5 percent (about 37 million to 47 million people); Urdu, Gujarati,
Malayalam, Kannada, and Oriya are claimed by between 2 and 3 percent
(roughly 19 million to 28 million people); Bhojpuri, Punjabi, and
Assamese by 1 to 2 percent (9 million to 19 million people); and all
other languages by less than 1 percent (less than 9 million speakers)
each.
Since independence in 1947, linguistic affinity has served as a basis
for organizing interest groups; the "language question" itself
has become an increasingly sensitive political issue. Efforts to reach a
consensus on a single national language that transcends the myriad
linguistic regions and is acceptable to diverse language communities
have been largely unsuccessful.
Many Indian nationalists originally intended that Hindi would replace
English--the language of British rule (1757-1947)--as a medium of common
communication. Both Hindi and English are extensively used, and each has
its own supporters. Native speakers of Hindi, who are concentrated in
North India, contend that English, as a relic from the colonial past and
spoken by only a small fraction of the population, is hopelessly elitist
and unsuitable as the nation's official language. Proponents of English
argue, in contrast, that the use of Hindi is unfair because it is a
liability for those Indians who do not speak it as their native tongue.
English, they say, at least represents an equal handicap for Indians of
every region.
English continues to serve as the language of prestige. Efforts to
switch to Hindi or other regional tongues encounter stiff opposition
both from those who know English well and whose privileged position
requires proficiency in that tongue and from those who see it as a means
of upward mobility. Partisans of English also maintain it is useful and
indeed necessary as a link to the rest of the world, that India is lucky
that the colonial period left a language that is now the world's
predominant international language in the fields of culture, science,
technology, and commerce. They hold, too, that widespread knowledge of
English is necessary for technological and economic progress and that
reducing its role would leave India a backwater in world affairs.
Linguistic diversity is apparent on a variety of levels. Major
regional languages have stylized literary forms, often with an extensive
body of literature, which may date back from a few centuries to two
millennia ago. These literary languages differ markedly from the spoken
forms and village dialects that coexist with a plethora of caste idioms
and regional lingua francas (see Village Unity and Divisiveness, ch. 5).
Part of the reason for such linguistic diversity lies in the complex
social realities of South Asia. India's languages reflect the intricate
levels of social hierarchy and caste. Individuals have in their speech
repertoire a variety of styles and dialects appropriate to various
social situations. In general, the higher the speaker's status, the more
speech forms there are at his or her disposal. Speech is adapted in
countless ways to reflect the specific social context and the relative
standing of the speakers.
Determining what should be called a language or a dialect is more a
political than a linguistic question. Sometimes the word language
is applied to a standardized and prestigious form, recognized as such
over a large geographic area, whereas the word dialect is used
for the various forms of speech that lack prestige or that are
restricted to certain regions or castes but are still regarded as forms
of the same language. Sometimes mutual intelligibility is the criterion:
if the speakers can understand each other, even though with some
difficulty, they are speaking the same language, although they may speak
different dialects. However, speakers of Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi can
often understand each other, yet they are regarded as speakers of
different languages. Whether or not one thinks Konkani--spoken in Goa,
Karnataka, and the Konkan region of Maharashtra--is a distinct language
or a dialect of Marathi has tended to be linked with whether or not one
thinks Goa ought to be merged with Maharashtra. The question has been
settled from the central government's point of view by making Goa a
state and Konkani a Scheduled Language. Moreover, the fact that the
Latin script is predominantly used for Konkani separates it further from
Marathi, which uses the Devanagari (see Glossary) script. However,
Konkani is also sometimes written in Devanagari and Kannada scripts.
Regional languages are an issue in the politically charged atmosphere
surrounding language policy. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, attempts
were made to redraw state boundaries to coincide with linguistic usage.
Such efforts have had mixed results. Linguistic affinity has often
failed to overcome other social and economic differences. In addition,
most states have linguistic minorities, and questions surrounding the
definition and use of the official language in those regions are fraught
with controversy.
States have been accused of failure to fulfill their obligations
under the national constitution to provide for the education of
linguistic minorities in their mother tongues, even when the minority
language is a Scheduled Language. Although the constitution requires
that legal documents and petitions may be submitted in any of the
Scheduled Languages to any government authority, this right is rarely
exercised. Under such circumstances, members of linguistic minorities
may feel they and their language are oppressed by the majority, while
people who are among linguistic majorities may feel threatened by what
some might consider minor concessions. Thus, attempts to make seemingly
minor accommodations for social diversity may have extensive and
volatile ramifications. For example, in 1994 a proposal in Bangalore to
introduce an Urdu-language television news segment (aimed primarily at
Muslim viewers) led to a week of urban riots that left dozens dead and
millions of dollars in property damage.
India - Languages of India
Composition and Location
Tribal peoples constitute roughly 8 percent of the nation's total
population, nearly 68 million people according to the 1991 census. One
concentration lives in a belt along the Himalayas stretching through
Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh in the west, to
Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and
Nagaland in the northeast (see fig. 1). Another concentration lives in
the hilly areas of central India (Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and, to a
lesser extent, Andhra Pradesh); in this belt, which is bounded by the
Narmada River to the north and the Godavari River to the southeast,
tribal peoples occupy the slopes of the region's mountains. Other
tribals, the Santals, live in Bihar and West Bengal. There are smaller
numbers of tribal people in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala, in
western India in Gujarat and Rajasthan, and in the union territories of
Lakshadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
The extent to which a state's population is tribal varies
considerably. In the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, upward of 90 percent of the population
is tribal. However, in the remaining northeast states of Assam, Manipur,
Sikkim, and Tripura, tribal peoples form between 20 and 30 percent of
the population. The largest tribes are found in central India, although
the tribal population there accounts for only around 10 percent of the
region's total population. Major concentrations of tribal people live in
Maharashtra, Orissa, and West Bengal. In the south, about 1 percent of
the populations of Kerala and Tamil Nadu are tribal, whereas about 6
percent in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are members of tribes.
There are some 573 communities recognized by the government as
Scheduled Tribes and therefore eligible to receive special benefits and
to compete for reserved seats in legislatures and schools. They range in
size from the Gonds (roughly 7.4 million) and the Santals (approximately
4.2 million) to only eighteen Chaimals in the Andaman Islands. Central
Indian states have the country's largest tribes, and, taken as a whole,
roughly 75 percent of the total tribal population live there.
Apart from the use of strictly legal criteria, however, the problem
of determining which groups and individuals are tribal is both subtle
and complex. Because it concerns economic interests and the size and
location of voting blocs, the question of who are members of Scheduled
Tribes rather than Backward Classes (see Glossary) or Scheduled Castes
(see Glossary) is often controversial (see The Fringes of Society, ch.
5). The apparently wide fluctuation in estimates of South Asia's tribal
population through the twentieth century gives a sense of how unclear
the distinction between tribal and nontribal can be. India's 1931 census
enumerated 22 million tribal people, in 1941 only 10 million were
counted, but by 1961 some 30 million and in 1991 nearly 68 million
tribal members were included. The differences among the figures reflect
changing census criteria and the economic incentives individuals have to
maintain or reject classification as a tribal member.
These gyrations of census data serve to underline the complex
relationship between caste and tribe. Although, in theory, these terms
represent different ways of life and ideal types, in reality they stand
for a continuum of social groups. In areas of substantial contact
between tribes and castes, social and cultural pressures have often
tended to move tribes in the direction of becoming castes over a period
of years. Tribal peoples with ambitions for social advancement in Indian
society at large have tried to gain the classification of caste for
their tribes; such efforts conform to the ancient Indian traditions of
caste mobility (see Caste and Class, ch. 5). Where tribal leaders
prospered, they could hire Brahman priests to construct credible
pedigrees and thereby join reasonably high-status castes. On occasion,
an entire tribe or part of a tribe joined a Hindu sect and thus entered
the caste system en masse. If a specific tribe engaged in practices that
Hindus deemed polluting, the tribe's status when it was assimilated into
the caste hierarchy would be affected.
Since independence, however, the special benefits available to
Scheduled Tribes have convinced many groups, even Hindus and Muslims,
that they will enjoy greater advantages if so designated. The schedule
gives tribal people incentives to maintain their identity. By the same
token, the schedule also includes a number of groups whose
"tribal" status, in cultural terms, is dubious at best; in
various districts, the list includes Muslims and a congeries of Hindu
castes whose main claim seems to be their ability to deliver votes to
the party that arranges their listing among the Scheduled Tribes.
A number of traits have customarily been seen as establishing tribal
rather than caste identity. These include language, social organization,
religious affiliation, economic patterns, geographic location, and
self-identification. Recognized tribes typically live in hilly regions
somewhat remote from caste settlements; they generally speak a language
recognized as tribal.
Unlike castes, which are part of a complex and interrelated local
economic exchange system, tribes tend to form self-sufficient economic
units. Often they practice swidden farming--clearing a field by
slash-and-burn methods, planting it for a number of seasons, and then
abandoning it for a lengthy fallow period--rather than the intensive
farming typical of most of rural India (see Land Use, ch. 7). For most
tribal people, land-use rights traditionally derive simply from tribal
membership. Tribal society tends to be egalitarian, its leadership being
based on ties of kinship and personality rather than on hereditary
status. Tribes typically consist of segmentary lineages whose extended
families provide the basis for social organization and control. Unlike
caste religion, which recognizes the hegemony of Brahman priests, tribal
religion recognizes no authority outside the tribe.
Any of these criteria can be called into question in specific
instances. Language is not always an accurate indicator of tribal or
caste status. Especially in regions of mixed population, many tribal
groups have lost their mother tongues and simply speak local or regional
languages. Linguistic assimilation is an ongoing process of considerable
complexity. In the highlands of Orissa, for example, the Bondos--a
Munda-language-speaking tribe--use their own tongue among themselves.
Oriya, however, serves as a lingua franca in dealings with Hindu
neighbors. Oriya as a prestige language (in the Bondo view), however,
has also supplanted the native tongue as the language of ritual. In
parts of Assam, historically divided into warring tribes and villages,
increased contact among villagers began during the colonial period and
has accelerated since independence. A pidgin Assamese developed while
educated tribal members learned Hindi and, in the late twentieth
century, English.
Self-identification and group loyalty are not unfailing markers of
tribal identity either. In the case of stratified tribes, the loyalties
of clan, kin, and family may well predominate over those of tribe. In
addition, tribes cannot always be viewed as people living apart; the
degree of isolation of various tribes has varied tremendously. The
Gonds, Santals, and Bhils traditionally have dominated the regions in
which they have lived. Moreover, tribal society is not always more
egalitarian than the rest of the rural populace; some of the larger
tribes, such as the Gonds, are highly stratified.
Economic and Political Conditions
Most tribes are concentrated in heavily forested areas that combine
inaccessibility with limited political or economic significance.
Historically, the economy of most tribes was subsistence agriculture or
hunting and gathering. Tribal members traded with outsiders for the few
necessities they lacked, such as salt and iron. A few local Hindu
craftsmen might provide such items as cooking utensils. The twentieth
century, however, has seen far-reaching changes in the relationship
between tribals and the larger society and, by extension, traditional
tribal economies. Improved transportation and communications have
brought ever deeper intrusions into tribal lands; merchants and a
variety of government policies have involved tribal peoples more
thoroughly in the cash economy, although by no means on the most
favorable of terms. Large areas fell into the hands of nontribals around
1900, when many regions were opened by the government to homestead-style
settlement. Immigrants received free land in return for cultivating it.
Tribal people, too, could apply for land titles, although even title to
the portion of land they happened to be planting that season could not
guarantee their ability to continue swidden cultivation. More important,
the notion of permanent, individual ownership of land was foreign to
most tribals. Land, if seen in terms of ownership at all, was viewed as
a communal resource, free to whoever needed it. By the time tribals
accepted the necessity of obtaining formal land titles, they had lost
the opportunity to lay claim to lands that might rightfully have been
considered theirs. Generally, tribals were severely disadvantaged in
dealing with government officials who granted land titles. Albeit
belatedly, the colonial regime realized the necessity of protecting
tribals from the predations of outsiders and prohibited the sale of
tribal lands. Although an important loophole in the form of land leases
was left open, tribes made some gains in the mid-twentieth century.
Despite considerable obstruction by local police and land officials, who
were slow to delineate tribal holdings and slower still to offer police
protection, some land was returned to tribal peoples.
In the 1970s, the gains tribal peoples had made in earlier decades
were eroded in many regions, especially in central India. Migration into
tribal lands increased dramatically, and the deadly combination of
constabulary and revenue officers uninterested in tribal welfare and
sophisticated nontribals willing and able to bribe local officials was
sufficient to deprive many tribals of their landholdings. The means of
subverting protective legislation were legion: local officials could be
persuaded to ignore land acquisition by nontribal people, alter land
registry records, lease plots of land for short periods and then simply
refuse to relinquish them, or induce tribal members to become indebted
and attach their lands. Whatever the means, the result was that many
tribal members became landless laborers in the 1960s and 1970s, and
regions that a few years earlier had been the exclusive domain of tribes
had an increasingly heterogeneous population. Unlike previous eras in
which tribal people were shunted into more remote forests, by the 1960s
relatively little unoccupied land was available. Government efforts to
evict nontribal members from illegal occupation have proceeded slowly;
when evictions occur at all, those ejected are usually members of poor,
lower castes. In a 1985 publication, anthropologist Christoph von F�rer-Haimendorf
describes this process in Andhra Pradesh: on average only 25 to 33
percent of the tribal families in such villages had managed to keep even
a portion of their holdings. Outsiders had paid about 5 percent of the
market value of the lands they took.
Improved communications, roads with motorized traffic, and more
frequent government intervention figured in the increased contact that
tribal peoples had with outsiders. Tribes fared best where there was
little to induce nontribals to settle; cash crops and commercial
highways frequently signaled the dismemberment of the tribes. Merchants
have long been a link to the outside world, but in the past they were
generally petty traders, and the contact they had with tribal people was
transient. By the 1960s and 1970s, the resident nontribal shopkeeper was
a permanent feature of many villages. Shopkeepers often sold liquor on
credit, enticing tribal members into debt and into mortgaging their
land. In the past, tribes made up shortages before harvest by foraging
from the surrounding forest. More recently shopkeepers have offered
ready credit--with the proviso that loans be repaid in kind with 50 to
100 percent interest after harvest. Repaying one bag of millet with two
bags has set up a cycle of indebtedness from which many have been unable
to break loose.
The possibility of cultivators growing a profitable cash crop, such
as cotton or castor-oil plants, continues to draw merchants into tribal
areas. Nontribal traders frequently establish an extensive network of
relatives and associates as shopkeepers to serve as agents in a number
of villages. Cultivators who grow a cash crop often sell to the same
merchants, who provide consumption credit throughout the year. The
credit carries a high-interest price tag, whereas the tribal peoples'
crops are bought at a fraction of the market rate. Cash crops offer a
further disadvantage in that they decrease the supply of available
foodstuffs and increase tribal dependence on economic forces beyond
their control. This transformation has meant a decline in both the
tribes' security and their standard of living.
In previous generations, families might have purchased silver jewelry
as a form of security; contemporary tribal people are more likely to buy
minor consumer goods. Whereas jewelry could serve as collateral in
critical emergencies, current purchases simply increase indebtedness. In
areas where gathering forest products is remunerative, merchants
exchange their products for tribal labor. Indebtedness is so extensive
that although such transactions are illegal, traders sometimes
"sell" their debtors to other merchants, much like indentured
servants.
In some instances, tribes have managed to hold their own in contacts
with outsiders. Some Chenchus, a hunting and gathering tribe of the
central hill regions of Andhra Pradesh, have continued to specialize in
collecting forest products for sale. Caste Hindus living among them rent
land from the Chenchus and pay a portion of the harvest. The Chenchus
themselves have responded unenthusiastically to government efforts to
induce them to take up farming. Their relationship to nontribal people
has been one of symbiosis, although there were indications in the early
1980s that other groups were beginning to compete with the Chenchus in
gathering forest products. A large paper mill was cutting bamboo in
their territory in a manner that did not allow regeneration, and two
groups had begun to collect for sale the same products the Chenchus
sell. Dalits settled among them with the help of the Chenchus and
learned agriculture from them. The nomadic Banjara herders who graze
their cattle in the forest also have been allotted land there. The
Chenchus have a certain advantage in dealing with caste Hindus; because
of their long association with Hindu hermits and their refusal to eat
beef, they are considered an unpolluted caste. Other tribes,
particularly in South India, have cultural practices that are offensive
to Hindus and, when they are assimilated, are often considered Dalits.
The final blow for some tribes has come when nontribals, through
political jockeying, have managed to gain legal tribal status, that is,
to be listed as a Scheduled Tribe. The Gonds of Andhra Pradesh
effectively lost their only advantage in trying to protect their lands
when the Banjaras, a group that had been settling in Gond territory,
were classified as a Scheduled Tribe in 1977. Their newly acquired
tribal status made the Banjaras eligible to acquire Gond land
"legally" and to compete with Gonds for reserved political
seats, places in education institutions, and other benefits. Because the
Banjaras are not scheduled in neighboring Maharashtra, there has been an
influx of Banjara emigrants from that state into Andhra Pradesh in
search of better opportunities.
Tribes in the Himalayan foothills have not been as hard-pressed by
the intrusions of nontribals. Historically, their political status was
always distinct from the rest of India. Until the British colonial
period, there was little effective control by any of the empires
centered in peninsular India; the region was populated by autonomous
feuding tribes. The British, in efforts to protect the sensitive
northeast frontier, followed a policy dubbed the "Inner Line";
nontribal people were allowed into the areas only with special
permission. Postindependence governments have continued the policy,
protecting the Himalayan tribes as part of the strategy to secure the
border with China (see Principal Regions, ch. 2).
This policy has generally saved the northern tribes from the kind of
exploitation that those elsewhere in South Asia have suffered. In
Arunachal Pradesh (formerly part of the North-East Frontier Agency), for
example, tribal members control commerce and most lower-level
administrative posts. Government construction projects in the region
have provided tribes with a significant source of cash--both for setting
up businesses and for providing paying customers. Some tribes have made
rapid progress through the education system. Instruction was begun in
Assamese but was eventually changed to Hindi; by the early 1980s,
English was taught at most levels. Both education and the increase in
ready cash from government spending have permitted tribal people a
significant measure of social mobility. The role of early missionaries
in providing education was also crucial in Assam.
Government policies on forest reserves have affected tribal peoples
profoundly. Wherever the state has chosen to exploit forests, it has
seriously undermined the tribes' way of life. Government efforts to
reserve forests have precipitated armed (if futile) resistance on the
part of the tribal peoples involved. Intensive exploitation of forests
has often meant allowing outsiders to cut large areas of trees (while
the original tribal inhabitants were restricted from cutting), and
ultimately replacing mixed forests capable of sustaining tribal life
with single-product plantations. Where forests are reserved, nontribals
have proved far more sophisticated than their forest counterparts at
bribing the necessary local officials to secure effective (if
extralegal) use of forestlands. The system of bribing local officials
charged with enforcing the reserves is so well established that the
rates of bribery are reasonably fixed (by the number of plows a farmer
uses or the amount of grain harvested). Tribal people often end up doing
unpaid work for Hindus simply because a caste Hindu, who has paid the
requisite bribe, can at least ensure a tribal member that he or she will
not be evicted from forestlands. The final irony, notes von F�rer-Haimendorf,
is that the swidden cultivation many tribes practiced had maintained
South Asia's forests, whereas the intensive cultivating and commercial
interests that replaced the tribal way of life have destroyed the
forests (see Forestry, ch. 7).
Extending the system of primary education into tribal areas and
reserving places for tribal children in middle and high schools and
higher education institutions are central to government policy, but
efforts to improve a tribe's educational status have had mixed results
(see Education, ch. 2). Recruitment of qualified teachers and
determination of the appropriate language of instruction also remain
troublesome. Commission after commission on the "language
question" has called for instruction, at least at the primary
level, in the students' native tongue. In some regions, tribal children
entering school must begin by learning the official regional language,
often one completely unrelated to their tribal tongue. The experiences
of the Gonds of Andhra Pradesh provide an example. Primary schooling
began there in the 1940s and 1950s. The government selected a group of
Gonds who had managed to become semiliterate in Telugu and taught them
the basics of written script. These individuals became teachers who
taught in Gondi, and their efforts enjoyed a measure of success until
the 1970s, when state policy demanded instruction in Telugu. The switch
in the language of instruction both made the Gond teachers superfluous
because they could not teach in Telugu and also presented the government
with the problem of finding reasonably qualified teachers willing to
teach in outlying tribal schools.
The commitment of tribes to acquiring a formal education for their
children varies considerably. Tribes differ in the extent to which they
view education positively. Gonds and Pardhans, two groups in the central
hill region, are a case in point. The Gonds are cultivators, and they
frequently are reluctant to send their children to school, needing them,
they say, to work in the fields. The Pardhans were traditionally bards
and ritual specialists, and they have taken to education with
enthusiasm. The effectiveness of educational policy likewise varies by
region. In those parts of the northeast where tribes have generally been
spared the wholesale onslaught of outsiders, schooling has helped tribal
people to secure political and economic benefits. The education system
there has provided a corps of highly trained tribal members in the
professions and high-ranking administrative posts.
Many tribal schools are plagued by high dropout rates. Children
attend for the first three to four years of primary school and gain a
smattering of knowledge, only to lapse into illiteracy later. Few who
enter continue up to the tenth grade; of those who do, few manage to
finish high school. Therefore, very few are eligible to attend
institutions of higher education, where the high rate of attrition
continues.
Practices
The influx of newcomers disinclined to follow tribal ways has had a
massive impact on social relations and tribal belief systems. In many
communities, the immigrants have brought on nothing less than the total
disintegration of the communities they entered. Even where outsiders are
not residents in villages, traditional forms of social control and
authority are less effective because tribal people are patently
dependent on politico-economic forces beyond their control. In general,
traditional headmen no longer have official backing for their role in
village affairs, although many continue to exercise considerable
influence. Headmen can no longer control the allocation of land or
decide who has the right to settle in the village, a loss of power that
has had an insidious effect on village solidarity.
Some headmen have taken to leasing village land to outsiders, thus
enriching themselves at the expense of the rest of the tribes. Conflict
over land rights has introduced a point of cleavage into village social
relations; increased factional conflict has seriously eroded the ability
of tribes to ward off the intrusion of outsiders. In some villages,
tribal schoolteachers have emerged as a new political force, a
counterbalance to the traditional headman. Changes in landholding
patterns have also altered the role of the joint family. More and more
couples set up separate households as soon as they marry. Because land
is no longer held and farmed in common and has grown more scarce,
inheritance disputes have increased.
Hunters and gatherers are particularly vulnerable to these
far-reaching changes. The lack of strong authority figures in most
hunting and gathering groups handicaps these tribes in organizing to
negotiate with the government. In addition, these tribes are too small
to have much political leverage. Forced settlement schemes also have had
a deleterious impact on the tribes and their environment.
Government-organized villages are typically larger than traditional
hunting and gathering settlements. Forest reserves limit the amount of
territory over which tribes can range freely. Larger villages and
smaller territories have led, in some instances, to an increase in crime
and violence. Traditionally, hunters and gatherers "settled"
their disputes by arranging for the antagonists simply to avoid one
another; new, more circumscribed villages preclude this arrangement.
Tribal beliefs and rituals have altered in the face of increased
contact with Hindus and missionaries of a variety of persuasions (see
Tribal Religions, ch. 3). Among groups in more intense contact with the
Hindu majority, there have been various transformations. The Gonds, for
example, traditionally worshiped clan gods through elaborate rites, with
Pardhans organizing and performing the necessary rituals. The increasing
impoverishment of large sections of the Gond tribe has made it
difficult, if not impossible, to support the Pardhans as a class of
ritual specialists. At the same time, many Gonds have concluded that the
tribal gods were losing their power and efficacy. Gonds have tended to
seek the assistance of other deities, and thus there has been widespread
Hinduization of Gondi belief and practice. Some tribes have adopted the
Hindu practice of having costly elaborate weddings--a custom that
contributes to indebtedness (as it has in many rural Indian families)
and subjects them to the cash economy on the most deleterious of terms.
Some families have adapted a traditional marriage pattern--that of
capturing a bride--to modern conditions, using the custom to avoid the
costly outlays associated with a formal wedding.
Christian missionaries have been active among sundry tribes since the
mid-nineteenth century. Conversion to Christianity offers a number of
advantages, not the least of which is education. It was through the
efforts of various Christian sects to translate the Bible into tribal
languages that those tongues acquired a written script. Christian
proselytizing has served to preserve tribal lore and language in written
form at the same time that it has tended to change drastically the
tribe's cultural heritage and belief systems. In some instances, the
introduction of Christianity has driven a wedge between converts and
their fellow tribal members who continue to adhere to traditional
beliefs and practices.
<>Jews and Parsis
The formation of states along linguistic and ethnic lines has
occurred in India in numerous instances since independence in 1947 (see
Linguistic States, this ch.). There have been demands, however, to form
units within states based not only along linguistic, ethnic, and
religious lines but also, in some cases, on a feeling of the
distinctness of a geographical region and its culture and economic
interests. The most volatile movements are those ongoing in Jammu and
Kashmir and Punjab (see Political Issues, ch. 8; Insurgent Movements and
External Subversion, ch. 9). How the central government responds to
these demands will be an area of scrutiny through the late 1990s and
beyond. It is believed by some officials that conceding regional
autonomy is less arduous and takes less time and fewer resources than
does meeting agitation, violence, and demands for concessions.
Telangana Movement
An early manifestation of regionalism was the Telangana movement in
what became the state of Andhra Pradesh. The princely ruler of
Hyderabad, the nizam, had attempted unsuccessfully to maintain Hyderabad
as an independent state separate from India in 1947. His efforts were
simultaneous with the largest agrarian armed rebellion in modern Indian
history. Starting in July 1946, communist-led guerrilla squads began
overthrowing local feudal village regimes and organizing land reform in
Telugu-speaking areas of Hyderabad, collectively known as Telangana (an
ancient name for the region dating from the Vijayanagar period). In
time, about 3,000 villages and some 41,000 square kilometers of
territory were involved in the revolt. Faced with the refusal of the
nizam of Hyderabad to accede his territory to India and the violence of
the communist-led rebellion, the central government sent in the army in
September 1948. By November 1949, Hyderabad had been forced to accede to
the Indian union, and, by October 1951, the violent phase of the
Telangana movement had been suppressed. The effect of the 1946-51
rebellion and communist electoral victories in 1952 had led to the
destruction of Hyderabad and set the scene for the establishment of a
new state along linguistic lines. In 1953, based on the recommendation
of the States Reorganisation Commission, Telugu-speaking areas were
separated from the former Madras States to form Andhra, India's first
state established along linguistic lines. The commission also
contemplated establishing Telangana as a separate state, but instead
Telangana was merged with Andhra to form the new state of Andhra Pradesh
in 1956.
The concerns about Telangana were manifold. The region had a less
developed economy than Andhra, but a larger revenue base (mostly because
it taxed rather than prohibited alcoholic beverages), which Telanganas
feared might be diverted for use in Andhra. They also feared that
planned dam projects on the Krishna and Godavari rivers would not
benefit Telangana proportionately even though Telanganas controlled the
headwaters of the rivers. Telanganas feared too that the people of
Andhra would have the advantage in jobs, particularly in government and
education.
The central government decided to ignore the recommendation to
establish a separate Telangana state and, instead, merged the two
regions into a unified Andhra Pradesh. However, a "gentlemen's
agreement" provided reassurances to the Telangana people. For at
least five years, revenue was to be spent in the regions proportionately
to the amount they contributed. Education institutions in Telangana were
to be expanded and reserved for local students. Recruitment to the civil
service and other areas of government employment such as education and
medicine was to be proportional. The use of Urdu was to continue in the
administration and the judiciary for five years. The state cabinet was
to have proportional membership from both regions and a deputy chief
minister from Telangana if the chief minister was from Andhra and vice
versa. Finally, the Regional Council for Telangana was to be responsible
for economic development, and its members were to be elected by the
members of the state legislative assembly from the region.
In the following years, however, the Telangana people had a number of
complaints about how the agreements and guarantees were implemented. The
deputy chief minister position was never filled. Education institutions
in the region were greatly expanded, but Telanganas felt that their
enrollment was not proportionate to their numbers. The selection of the
city of Hyderabad as the state capital led to massive migration of
people from Andhra into Telangana. Telanganas felt discriminated against
in education employment but were told by the state government that most
non-Telanganas had been hired on the grounds that qualified local people
were unavailable. In addition, the unification of pay scales between the
two regions appeared to disadvantage Telangana civil servants. In the
atmosphere of discontent, professional associations that earlier had
amalgamated broke apart by region.
Discontent with the 1956 gentlemen's agreement intensified in January
1969 when the guarantees that had been agreed on were supposed to lapse.
Student agitation for the continuation of the agreement began at Osmania
University in Hyderabad and spread to other parts of the region.
Government employees and opposition members of the state legislative
assembly swiftly threatened "direct action" in support of the
students. The Congress-controlled state and central governments offered
assurances that non-Telangana civil servants in the region would be
replaced by Mulkis, disadvantaged local people, and that revenue
surpluses from Telangana would be returned to the region. The
protestors, however, were dissatisfied, and severe violence, including
mob attacks on railroads, road transport, and government facilities,
spread over the region. In addition, seventy-nine police firings
resulted in twenty-three deaths according to official figures, the
education system was shut down, and examinations were cancelled. Calls
for a separate Telangana state came in the midst of counter violence in
Andhra areas bordering Telangana. In the meantime, the Andhra Pradesh
High Court decreed that a central government law mandating replacement
of non-Telangana government employees with Mulkis was beyond
Parliament's constitutional powers.
Although the Congress faced dissension within its ranks, its
leadership stood against additional linguistic states, which were
regarded as "antinational." As a result, defectors from the
Congress, led by M. Chenna Reddy, founded the Telangana People's
Association (Telangana Praja Samithi). Despite electoral successes,
however, some of the new party leaders gave up their agitation in
September 1971 and, much to the disgust of many separatists, rejoined
the safer political haven of the Congress ranks.
In 1972 the Supreme Court reversed the Andhra Pradesh High Court's
ruling that the Mulki rules were unconstitutional. This decision
triggered agitation in the Andhra region that produced six months of
violence.
Throughout the 1970s, Andhra Pradesh settled into a pattern of
continuous domination by Congress (R) and later Congress (I), with much
instability and dissidence within the state party and constant
interference from Indira Gandhi and the national party. Chenna Reddy,
the erstwhile opposition leader, was for a time the Congress (I) state
chief minister. Congress domination was only ended by the founding of
the Telugu National Party by N.T. Rama Rao in 1982 and its overwhelming
victory in the state elections in 1983.
Polls taken after the end of the Telangana movement showed a certain
lack of enthusiasm for it, and for the idea of a separate state.
Although urban groups (students and civil servants) had been most active
in the movement, its support was stronger in rural areas. Its supporters
were mixed: low and middle castes, the young and the not so young,
women, illiterates and the poorly educated, and rural gentry. Speakers
of several other languages than Telugu were heavily involved. The
movement had no element of religious communalism, but some observers
thought Muslims were particularly involved in the movement. Other
researchers found the Muslims were unenthusiastic about the movement and
noted a feeling that migration from Andhra to Telangana was creating
opportunities that were helping non-Telanganas. On the other hand, of
the two locally prominent Muslim political groups, only one supported a
separate state; the other opposed the idea while demanding full
implementation of the regional safeguards. Although Urdu speakers were
appealed to in the agitation (e.g., speeches were given in Urdu as well
as Telugu), in the aftermath Urdu disappeared from the schools and the
administration.
The Telangana movement grew out of a sense of regional identity as
such, rather than out of a sense of ethnic identity, language, religion,
or caste. The movement demanded redress for economic grievances, the
writing of a separate history, and establishment of a sense of cultural
distinctness. The emotions and forces generated by the movement were not
strong enough, however, for a continuing drive for a separate state. In
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the People's War Group, an element of
the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), renewed violence in
Andhra Pradesh but was dealt with by state police forces. The Telangana
movement was never directed against the territorial integrity of India,
unlike the insurrections in Jammu and Kashmir and some of the unrest in
northeastern India.
<>Jharkhand Movement
India is a hierarchical society. Within Indian culture, whether in
the north or the south, Hindu or Muslim, urban or village, virtually all
things, people, and groups of people are ranked according to various
essential qualities. If one is attuned to the theme of hierarchy in
India, one can discern it everywhere. Although India is a political
democracy, in daily life there is little advocacy of or adherence to
notions of equality.
Castes and castelike groups--those quintessential groups with which
almost all Indians are associated--are ranked. Within most villages or
towns, everyone knows the relative rankings of each locally represented
caste, and people's behavior toward one another is constantly shaped by
this knowledge. Between the extremes of the very high and very low
castes, however, there is sometimes disagreement on the exact relative
ranking of castes clustered in the middle.
Castes are primarily associated with Hinduism but also exist among
other Indian religious groups. Muslims sometimes expressly deny that
they have castes--they state that all Muslims are brothers under
God--but observation of Muslim life in various parts of India reveals
the existence of castelike groups and clear concern with social
hierarchy. Among Indian Christians, too, differences in caste are
acknowledged and maintained.
Throughout India, individuals are also ranked according to their
wealth and power. For example, there are "big men" (bare
admi , in Hindi) and "little men" (chhote admi )
everywhere. "Big men" sit confidently on chairs, while
"little men" come before them to make requests, either
standing or crouching down on their haunches, certainly not presuming to
sit beside a man of high status as an equal. Even men of nearly equal
status who might share a string cot to sit on take their places
carefully--the higher-ranking man at the head of the cot, the
lower-ranking man at the foot.
Within families and kinship groupings, there are many distinctions of
hierarchy. Men outrank women of the same or similar age, and senior
relatives outrank junior relatives. Several other kinship relations
involve formal respect. For example, in northern India, a
daughter-in-law of a household shows deference to a daughter of a
household. Even among young siblings in a household, there is constant
acknowledgment of age differences: younger siblings never address an
older sibling by name, but rather by respectful terms for elder brother
or elder sister. However, an older sibling may address the younger by
name (see Linguistic Relations, ch. 4).
Even in a business or academic setting, where colleagues may not
openly espouse traditional observance of caste or class ranking
behavior, they may set up fictive kinship relations, addressing one
another by kinship terms reflecting family or village-style hierarchy.
For example, a younger colleague might respectfully address an older
colleague as chachaji (respected father's younger brother),
gracefully acknowledging the superior position of the older colleague.
Purity and Pollution
Many status differences in Indian society are expressed in terms of
ritual purity and pollution. Notions of purity and pollution are
extremely complex and vary greatly among different castes, religious
groups, and regions. However, broadly speaking, high status is
associated with purity and low status with pollution. Some kinds of
purity are inherent, or inborn; for example, gold is purer than copper
by its very nature, and, similarly, a member of a high-ranking Brahman
(see Glossary), or priestly, caste is born with more inherent purity
than a member of a low-ranking Sweeper (Mehtar, in Hindi) caste. Unless
the Brahman defiles himself in some extraordinary way, throughout his
life he will always be purer than a Sweeper. Other kinds of purity are
more transitory--a Brahman who has just taken a bath is more ritually
pure than a Brahman who has not bathed for a day. This situation could
easily reverse itself temporarily, depending on bath schedules,
participation in polluting activities, or contact with temporarily
polluting substances.
Purity is associated with ritual cleanliness--daily bathing in
flowing water, dressing in properly laundered clothes of approved
materials, eating only the foods appropriate for one's caste, refraining
from physical contact with people of lower rank, and avoiding
involvement with ritually impure substances. The latter include body
wastes and excretions, most especially those of another adult person.
Contact with the products of death or violence are typically polluting
and threatening to ritual purity.
During her menstrual period, a woman is considered polluted and
refrains from cooking, worshiping, or touching anyone older than an
infant. In much of the south, a woman spends this time "sitting
outside," resting in an isolated room or shed. During her period, a
Muslim woman does not touch the Quran. At the end of the period, purity
is restored with a complete bath. Pollution also attaches to birth, both
for the mother and the infant's close kin, and to death, for close
relatives of the deceased (see The Ceremonies of Hinduism; Islam, ch.
3).
Members of the highest priestly castes, the Brahmans, are generally
vegetarians (although some Bengali and Maharashtrian Brahmans eat fish)
and avoid eating meat, the product of violence and death. High-ranking
Warrior castes (Kshatriyas), however, typically consume nonvegetarian
diets, considered appropriate for their traditions of valor and physical
strength.
A Brahman born of proper Brahman parents retains his inherent purity
if he bathes and dresses himself properly, adheres to a vegetarian diet,
eats meals prepared only by persons of appropriate rank, and keeps his
person away from the bodily exuviae of others (except for necessary
contact with the secretions of family infants and small children).
If a Brahman happens to come into bodily contact with a polluting
substance, he can remove this pollution by bathing and changing his
clothing. However, if he were to eat meat or commit other transgressions
of the rigid dietary codes of his particular caste, he would be
considered more deeply polluted and would have to undergo various
purifying rites and payment of fines imposed by his caste council in
order to restore his inherent purity.
In sharp contrast to the purity of a Brahman, a Sweeper born of
Sweeper parents is considered to be born inherently polluted. The touch
of his body is polluting to those higher on the caste hierarchy than he,
and they will shrink from his touch, whether or not he has bathed
recently. Sweepers are associated with the traditional occupation of
cleaning human feces from latrines and sweeping public lanes of all
kinds of dirt. Traditionally, Sweepers remove these polluting materials
in baskets carried atop the head and dumped out in a garbage pile at the
edge of the village or neighborhood. The involvement of Sweepers with
such filth accords with their low-status position at the bottom of the
Hindu caste hierarchy, even as their services allow high-status people,
such as Brahmans, to maintain their ritual purity.
Members of the Leatherworker (Chamar) caste are ascribed a very low
status consonant with their association with the caste occupation of
skinning dead animals and tanning the leather. Butchers (Khatiks, in
Hindi), who kill and cut up the bodies of animals, also rank low on the
caste hierarchy because of their association with violence and death.
However, castes associated with ruling and warfare--and the killing
and deaths of human beings--are typically accorded high rank on the
caste hierarchy. In these instances, political power and wealth outrank
association with violence as the key determinant of caste rank.
Maintenance of purity is associated with the intake of food and
drink, not only in terms of the nature of the food itself, but also in
terms of who has prepared it or touched it. This requirement is
especially true for Hindus, but other religious groups hold to these
principles to varying degrees. Generally, a person risks pollution--and
lowering his own status--if he accepts beverages or cooked foods from
the hands of people of lower caste status than his own. His status will
remain intact if he accepts food or beverages from people of higher
caste rank. Usually, for an observant Hindu of any but the very lowest
castes to accept cooked food from a Muslim or Christian is regarded as
highly polluting.
In a clear example of pollution associated with dining, a Brahman who
consumed a drink of water and a meal of wheat bread with boiled
vegetables from the hands of a Sweeper would immediately become polluted
and could expect social rejection by his caste fellows. From that
moment, fellow Brahmans following traditional pollution rules would
refuse food touched by him and would abstain from the usual social
interaction with him. He would not be welcome inside Brahman homes--most
especially in the ritually pure kitchens--nor would he or his close
relatives be considered eligible marriage partners for other Brahmans.
Generally, the acceptance of water and ordinary foods cooked in water
from members of lower-ranking castes incurs the greatest pollution. In
North India, such foods are known as kaccha khana , as
contrasted with fine foods cooked in butter or oils, which are known as pakka
khana . Fine foods can be accepted from members of a few castes
slightly lower than one's own. Local hierarchies differ on the specific
details of these rules.
Completely raw foods, such as uncooked grains, fresh unpeeled
bananas, mangoes, and uncooked vegetables can be accepted by anyone from
anyone else, regardless of relative status. Toasted or parched foods,
such as roasted peanuts, can also be accepted from anyone without ritual
or social repercussions. (Thus, a Brahman may accept gifts of grain from
lower-caste patrons for eventual preparation by members of his own
caste, or he may purchase and consume roasted peanuts or tangerines from
street vendors of unknown caste without worry.)
Water served from an earthen pot may be accepted only from the hands
of someone of higher or equal caste ranking, but water served from a
brass pot may be accepted even from someone slightly lower on the caste
scale. Exceptions to this rule are members of the Waterbearer (Bhoi, in
Hindi) caste, who are employed to carry water from wells to the homes of
the prosperous and from whose hands members of all castes may drink
water without becoming polluted, even though Waterbearers are not ranked
high on the caste scale.
These and a great many other traditional rules pertaining to purity
and pollution constantly impinge upon interaction between people of
different castes and ranks in India. Although to the non-Indian these
rules may seem irrational and bizarre, to most of the people of India
they are a ubiquitous and accepted part of life. Thinking about and
following purity and pollution rules make it necessary for people to be
constantly aware of differences in status. With every drink of water,
with every meal, and with every contact with another person, people must
ratify the social hierarchy of which they are a part and within which
their every act is carried out. The fact that expressions of social
status are intricately bound up with events that happen to everyone
every day--eating, drinking, bathing, touching, talking--and that
transgressions of these rules, whether deliberate or accidental, are
seen as having immediately polluting effects on the person of the
transgressor, means that every ordinary act of human life serves as a
constant reminder of the importance of hierarchy in Indian society.
There are many Indians, particularly among the educated urban elite,
who do not follow traditional purity and pollution practices. Dining in
each others' homes and in restaurants is common among well-educated
people of diverse backgrounds, particularly when they belong to the same
economic class. For these people, guarding the family's earthen water
pot from inadvertent touch by a low-ranking servant is not the concern
it is for a more traditional villager. However, even among those people
whose words and actions denigrate traditional purity rules, there is
often a reluctance to completely abolish consciousness of purity and
pollution from their thinking. It is surely rare for a Sweeper, however
well-educated, to invite a Brahman to dinner in his home and have his
invitation unself-consciously accepted. It is less rare, however, for
educated urban colleagues of vastly different caste and religious
heritage to enjoy a cup of tea together. Some high-caste liberals pride
themselves on being free of "casteism" and seek to accept food
from the hands of very low-caste people, or even deliberately set out to
marry someone from a significantly lower caste or a different religion.
Thus, even as they deny it, these progressives affirm the continuing
significance of traditional rules of purity, pollution, and hierarchy in
Indian society.
Social Interdependence
One of the great themes pervading Indian life is social
interdependence. People are born into groups--families, clans,
subcastes, castes, and religious communities--and live with a constant
sense of being part of and inseparable from these groups. A corollary is
the notion that everything a person does properly involves interaction
with other people. A person's greatest dread, perhaps, is the
possibility of being left alone, without social support, to face the
necessary challenges of life. This sense of interdependence is extended
into the theological realm: the very shape of a person's life is seen as
being greatly influenced by divine beings with whom an ongoing
relationship must be maintained.
Social interaction is regarded as being of the highest priority, and
social bonds are expected to be long lasting. Even economic activities
that might in Western culture involve impersonal interactions are in
India deeply imbedded in a social nexus. All social interaction involves
constant attention to hierarchy, respect, honor, the feelings of others,
rights and obligations, hospitality, and gifts of food, clothing, and
other desirable items. Finely tuned rules of etiquette help facilitate
each individual's many social relationships.
Western visitors to India are sometimes startled to find that
important government and business officials have left their posts--often
for many days at a time--to attend a cousin's wedding or participate in
religious activities in a distant part of the country. "He is out
of station and will be back in a week or two," the absent
official's officemates blandly explain to the frustrated visitor. What
is going on is not laziness or hedonistic recreation, but is the
official's proper recognition of his need to continually maintain his
social ties with relatives, caste fellows, other associates, and God.
Without being enmeshed in such ties throughout life, a person cannot
hope to maintain long-term efficacy in either economic or social
endeavors. Social bonds with relatives must be reinforced at family
events or at rites crucial to the religious community. If this is not
done, people who could offer vital support in many phases of life would
be alienated.
In every activity, there is an assumption that social ties can help a
person and that their absence can bring failure. Seldom do people carry
out even the simplest task on their own. From birth onward, a child
learns that his "fate" has been "written" by divine
forces and that his life will be shaped by a plan decided by more
powerful beings. When a small child eats, his mother puts the mouthfuls
of food into his mouth with her own hand. When a boy climbs a tree to
pluck mangoes, another stands below with a basket to receive them. When
a girl fetches water from the well in pots on her head, someone at her
home helps her unload the pots. When a farmer stacks sheaves of grain
onto his bullock cart, he stands atop the cart, catching the sheaves
tossed up to him by his son.
A student applying to a college hopes that he has an influential
relative or family friend who can put in a good word for him with the
director of admissions. At the age of marriage, a young person expects
that parents will take care of finding the appropriate bride or groom
and arranging all the formalities. At the birth of a child, the new
mother is assured that the child's kin will help her attend to the
infant's needs. A businessman seeking to arrange a contract relies not
only on his own abilities but also on the assistance of well-connected
friends and relatives to help finalize the deal. And finally, when
facing death, a person is confident that offspring and other relatives
will carry out the appropriate funeral rites, including a commemorative
feast when, through gifts of clothing and food, continuing social ties
are reaffirmed by all in attendance.
India - Family
Family Ideals
In India, people learn the essential themes of cultural life within
the bosom of a family. In most of the country, the basic units of
society are the patrilineal family unit and wider kinship groupings. The
most widely desired residential unit is the joint family, ideally
consisting of three or four patrilineally related generations, all
living under one roof, working, eating, worshiping, and cooperating
together in mutually beneficial social and economic activities.
Patrilineal joint families include men related through the male line,
along with their wives and children. Most young women expect to live
with their husband's relatives after marriage, but they retain important
bonds with their natal families.
Despite the continuous and growing impact of urbanization,
secularization, and Westernization, the traditional joint household,
both in ideal and in practice, remains the primary social force in the
lives of most Indians. Loyalty to family is a deeply held ideal for
almost everyone.
Large families tend to be flexible and well-suited to modern Indian
life, especially for the 67 percent of Indians who are farmers or
agricultural workers or work in related activities (see Size and
Composition of the Workforce, ch. 6). As in most primarily agricultural
societies, few individuals can hope to achieve economic security without
being part of a cooperating group of kinsmen. The joint family is also
common in cities, where kinship ties can be crucial to obtaining scarce
jobs or financial assistance. Numerous prominent Indian families, such
as the Tatas, Birlas, and Sarabhais, retain joint family arrangements
even as they work together to control some of the country's largest
financial empires.
The joint family is an ancient Indian institution, but it has
undergone some change in the late twentieth century. Although several
generations living together is the ideal, actual living arrangements
vary widely depending on region, social status, and economic
circumstance. Many Indians live in joint families that deviate in
various ways from the ideal, and many live in nuclear families--a couple
with their unmarried children--as is the most common pattern in the
West. However, even where the ideal joint family is seldom found (as,
for example, in certain regions and among impoverished agricultural
laborers and urban squatters), there are often strong networks of
kinship ties through which economic assistance and other benefits are
obtained. Not infrequently, clusters of relatives live very near each
other, easily available to respond to the give and take of kinship
obligations. Even when relatives cannot actually live in close
proximity, they typically maintain strong bonds of kinship and attempt
to provide each other with economic help, emotional support, and other
benefits.
As joint families grow ever larger, they inevitably divide into
smaller units, passing through a predictable cycle over time. The
breakup of a joint family into smaller units does not necessarily
represent the rejection of the joint family ideal. Rather, it is usually
a response to a variety of conditions, including the need for some
members to move from village to city, or from one city to another to
take advantage of employment opportunities. Splitting of the family is
often blamed on quarrelling women--typically, the wives of coresident
brothers. Although women's disputes may, in fact, lead to family
division, men's disagreements do so as well. Despite cultural ideals of
brotherly harmony, adult brothers frequently quarrel over land and other
matters, leading them to decide to live under separate roofs and divide
their property. Frequently, a large joint family divides after the
demise of elderly parents, when there is no longer a single authority
figure to hold the family factions together. After division, each new
residential unit, in its turn, usually becomes joint when sons of the
family marry and bring their wives to live in the family home.
Variations in Family Structure
Some family types bear special mention because of their unique
qualities. In the sub-Himalayan region of Uttar Pradesh, polygyny is
commonly practiced. There, among Hindus, a simple polygynous family is
composed of a man, his two wives, and their unmarried children. Various
other family types occur there, including the supplemented subpolygynous
household--a woman whose husband lives elsewhere (perhaps with his other
wife), her children, plus other adult relatives. Polygyny is also
practiced in other parts of India by a tiny minority of the population,
especially in families in which the first wife has not been able to bear
children.
Among the Buddhist people of the mountainous Ladakh District of Jammu
and Kashmir, who have cultural ties to Tibet, fraternal polyandry is
practiced, and a household may include a set of brothers with their
common wife or wives. This family type, in which brothers also share
land, is almost certainly linked to the extreme scarcity of cultivable
land in the Himalayan region, because it discourages fragmentation of
holdings.
The peoples of the northeastern hill areas are known for their
matriliny, tracing descent and inheritance in the female line rather
than the male line. One of the largest of these groups, the Khasis--an
ethnic or tribal people in the state of Meghalaya--are divided into
matrilineal clans; the youngest daughter receives almost all of the
inheritance including the house. A Khasi husband goes to live in his
wife's house. Khasis, many of whom have become Christian, have the
highest literacy rate in India, and Khasi women maintain notable
authority in the family and community.
Perhaps the best known of India's unusual family types is the
traditional Nayar taravad , or great house. The Nayars are a
cluster of castes in Kerala. High-ranking and prosperous, the Nayars
maintained matrilineal households in which sisters and brothers and
their children were the permanent residents. After an official
prepuberty marriage, each woman received a series of visiting husbands
in her room in the taravad at night. Her children were all
legitimate members of the taravad . Property, matrilineally
inherited, was managed by the eldest brother of the senior woman. This
system, the focus of much anthropological interest, has been
disintegrating in the twentieth century, and in the 1990s probably fewer
than 5 percent of the Nayars live in matrilineal taravads .
Like the Khasis, Nayar women are known for being well-educated and
powerful within the family.
Malabar rite Christians, an ancient community in Kerala, adopted many
practices of their powerful Nayar neighbors, including naming their sons
for matrilineal forebears. Their kinship system, however, is
patrilineal. Kerala Christians have a very high literacy rate, as do
most Indian Christian groups.
Large Kinship Groups
In most of Hindu India, people belong not only to coresident family
groups but to larger aggregates of kin as well. Subsuming the family is
the patrilineage (known in northern and central India as the khandan
, kutumb , or kul ), a locally based set of males who
trace their ancestry to a common progenitor a few generations back, plus
their wives and unmarried daughters. Larger than the patrilineage is the
clan, commonly known as the gotra or got , a much
larger group of patrilineally related males and their wives and
daughters, who often trace common ancestry to a mythological figure. In
some regions, particularly among the high-ranking Rajputs of western
India, clans are hierarchically ordered. Some people also claim
membership in larger, more amorphous groupings known as vansh
and sakha .
Hindu lineages and clans are strictly exogamous--that is, a person
may not marry or have a sexual alliance with a member of his own lineage
or clan; such an arrangement would be considered incestuous. In North
India, rules further prohibit marriage between a person and his mother's
lineage members as well. Among some high-ranking castes of the north,
exogamy is also extended to the mother's, father's mother's, and
mother's mother's clans. In contrast, in South India, marriage to a
member of the mother's kin group is often encouraged.
Muslims also recognize kinship groupings larger than the family.
These include the khandan , or patrilineage, and the azizdar
, or kindred. The azizdar group differs slightly for each
individual and includes all relatives linked to a person by blood or
marriage. Muslims throughout India encourage marriage within the lineage
and kindred, and marriages between the children of siblings are common.
Within a village or urban neighborhood, members of a lineage
recognize their kinship in a variety of ways. Mutual assistance in daily
work, in emergencies, and in factional struggles is expected. For
Hindus, cooperation in specific annual rituals helps define the kin
group. For example, in many areas, at the worship of the goddess deemed
responsible for the welfare of the lineage, patrilineally related males
and their wives join in the rites and consume specially consecrated
fried breads or other foods. Unmarried daughters of the lineage are only
spectators at the rites and do not share in the special foods. Upon
marriage, a woman becomes a member of her husband's lineage and then
participates regularly in the worship of her husband's lineage goddess.
Lineage bonds are also evident at life-cycle observances, when kin join
together in celebrating births, marriages, and religious initiations.
Upon the death of a lineage member, other lineage members observe ritual
death pollution rules for a prescribed number of days and carry out
appropriate funeral rites and feasts.
For some castes, especially in the north, careful records of lineage
ties are kept by a professional genealogist, a member of a caste whose
traditional task is maintaining genealogical tomes. These itinerant
bards make their rounds from village to village over the course of a
year or more, recording births, deaths, and glorious accomplishments of
the patrilineal descent group. These genealogical services have been
especially crucial among Rajputs, Jats, and similar groups whose
lineages own land and where power can depend on fine calculations of
pedigree and inheritance rights.
Some important kinship linkages are not traced through men but
through women. These linkages involve those related to an individual by
blood and marriage through a mother, married sisters, or married
daughters, and for a man, through his wife. Anthropologist David
Mandelbaum has termed these "feminal kin." Key relationships
are those between a brother and sister, parents and daughters, and a
person and his or her mother's brother. Through bonds with these close
kin, a person has links with several households and lineages in many
settlements. Throughout most of India, there are continuous visits--some
of which may last for months and include the exchange of gifts at
visits, life-cycle rites, and holidays, and many other key interactions
between such relatives. These relationships are often characterized by
deep affection and willingly offered support.
These ties cut across the countryside, linking each person with kin
in villages and towns near and far. Almost everywhere a villager
goes--especially in the north, where marriage networks cover wide
distances--he can find some kind of relative. Moral support, a place to
stay, economic assistance, and political backing are all available
through these kinship networks.
The multitude of kinship ties is further extended through the device
of fictive kinship. Residents of a single village usually use kinship
terms for one another, and especially strong ties of fictive kinship can
be ceremonially created with fellow religious initiates or fellow
pilgrims of one's village or neighborhood. In the villages and cities of
the north, on the festival of Raksha Bandhan (the Tying of the
Protective Thread, during which sisters tie sacred threads on their
brothers' wrists to symbolize the continuing bond between them), a
female may tie a thread on the wrist of an otherwise unrelated male and
"make him her brother." Fictive kinship bonds cut across caste
and class lines and involve obligations of hospitality, gift-giving, and
variable levels of cooperation and assistance.
Neighbors and friends may also create fictive kinship ties by
informal agreement. Actually, any strong friendship between otherwise
unrelated people is typically imbued with kinship-like qualities. In
such friendships, kinship terms are adopted for address, and the give
and take of kinship may develop. Such bonds commonly evolve between
neighbors in urban apartment buildings, between special friends at
school, and between close associates at work. The use of kinship terms
enhances affection in the relationship. In Gujarat, personal names
usually include the word for "sister" and "brother,"
so that the use of someone's personal name automatically sounds
affectionate and caring.
Family Authority and Harmony
In the Indian household, lines of hierarchy and authority are clearly
drawn, shaping structurally and psychologically complex family
relationships. Ideals of conduct are aimed at creating and maintaining
family harmony.
All family members are socialized to accept the authority of those
ranked above them in the hierarchy. In general, elders rank above
juniors, and among people of similar age, males outrank females.
Daughters of a family command the formal respect of their brothers'
wives, and the mother of a household is in charge of her
daughters-in-law. Among adults in a joint family, a newly arrived
daughter-in-law has the least authority. Males learn to command others
within the household but expect to accept the direction of senior males.
Ideally, even a mature adult man living in his father's household
acknowledges his father's authority on both minor and major matters.
Women are especially strongly socialized to accept a position
subservient to males, to control their sexual impulses, and to
subordinate their personal preferences to the needs of the family and
kin group. Reciprocally, those in authority accept responsibility for
meeting the needs of others in the family group.
There is tremendous emphasis on the unity of the family grouping,
especially as differentiated from persons outside the kinship circle.
Internally, efforts are made to deemphasize ties between spouses and
between parents and their own children in order to enhance a wider sense
of harmony within the entire household. Husbands and wives are
discouraged from openly displaying affection for one another, and in
strictly traditional households, they may not even properly speak to one
another in the presence of anyone else, even their own children. Young
parents are inhibited by "shame" from ostentatiously dandling
their own young children but are encouraged to play with the children of
siblings.
Psychologically, family members feel an intense emotional
interdependence with each other and the family as an almost organic
unit. Ego boundaries are permeable to others in the family, and any
notion of a separate self is often dominated by a sense of what
psychoanalyst Alan Roland has termed a more inclusive "familial
self." Interpersonal empathy, closeness, loyalty, and
interdependency are all crucial to life within the family.
Family resources, particularly land or businesses, have traditionally
been controlled by family males, especially in high-status groups.
Customarily, according to traditional schools of Hindu law, women did
not inherit land or buildings and were thus beholden to their male kin
who controlled these vital resources. Under Muslim customary law, women
are entitled to inherit real estate and often do so, but their shares
have typically been smaller than those of similarly situated males.
Under modern law, all Indian women can inherit land.
India - Veiling and the Seclusion of Women
A particularly interesting aspect of Indian family life is purdah
(from the Hindi parda , literally, curtain), or the veiling and
seclusion of women. In much of northern and central India, particularly
in rural areas, Hindu and Muslim women follow complex rules of veiling
the body and avoidance of public appearance, especially in the presence
of relatives linked by marriage and before strange men. Purdah practices
are inextricably linked to patterns of authority and harmony within the
family. Rules of Hindu and Muslim purdah differ in certain key ways, but
female modesty and decorum as well as concepts of family honor are
essential to the various forms of purdah. In most areas, purdah
restrictions are stronger for women of high-status families.
The importance of purdah is not limited to family life; rather, these
practices all involve restrictions on female activity and access to
power and the control of vital resources in a male-dominated society.
Restriction and restraint for women in virtually every aspect of life
are the basic essentials of purdah. In India, both males and females are
circumscribed in their actions by economic disabilities, hierarchical
rules of deference in kinship groups, castes, and the larger society.
But for women who observe purdah, there are additional constraints.
For almost all women, modest dress and behavior are important.
Clothing covering most of the body is common; only in tribal groups and
among a few castes do women publicly bare their legs or upper bodies. In
most of the northern half of India, traditionally dressed women cover
the tops of their heads with the end of the sari or scarf (dupatta
). Generally, females are expected to associate only with kin or
companions approved by their families and to remain sexually chaste.
Women are not encouraged to roam about on pleasure junkets, but rather
travel only for explicit family-sanctioned purposes. In North India,
women do relatively little shopping; most shopping is done by men. In
contrast to females, males have much more freedom of movement and
observe much less body modesty.
For both males and females, free association with the opposite sex is
limited, and dating in the Western sense is essentially limited to
members of the educated urban elite. In all areas, illicit liaisons do
occur. Although the male may escape social repudiation if such liaisons
become known, the female may suffer lasting damage to her own reputation
and bring dishonor to her family. Further, if a woman is sexually linked
with a man of lower caste status, the woman is regarded as being
irremediably polluted, "like an earthen pot." A male so
sullied can be cleansed of his temporary pollution, "like a brass
pot," with a ritual bath.
Such rules of feminine modesty are not considered purdah but merely
proper female behavior. For traditional Hindus of northern and central
India, purdah observances begin at marriage, when a woman acquires a
husband and in-laws. Although she almost never observes purdah in her
natal home or before her natal relatives, a woman does observe purdah in
her husband's home and before his relatives. As a young woman, she
remains inside her husband's house much of the time (rather than going
out into lanes or fields), absents herself or covers her face with her
sari in the presence of senior males and females related by marriage,
and, when she does leave the house in her marital village, covers her
face with her sari.
Through use of the end of the sari as a face veil and deference of
manner, a married woman shows respect to her affinal kin who are older
than or equal to her husband in age, as well as certain other relatives.
She may speak to the women before whom she veils, but she usually does
not converse with the men. Exceptions to this are her husband's younger
brothers, before whom she may veil her face, but with whom she has a
warm joking relationship involving verbal banter.
Initially almost faceless and voiceless in her marital home, a
married woman matures and gradually relaxes some of these practices,
especially as elder in-laws become senescent or die and she herself
assumes senior status. In fact, after some years, a wife may neglect to
veil her face in front of her husband when others are present and may
even speak to her husband in public.
Such practices help shield women from unwanted male advances and
control women's sexuality but also express relations within and between
groups of kin. Familial prestige, household harmony, social distance,
affinal respect, property ownership, and local political power are all
linked to purdah.
Restricting women to household endeavors rather than involving them
in tasks in fields and markets is associated with prestige and high rank
in northern India. There the wealthiest families employ servants to
carry water from the well and to work in the fields alongside family
males. Mature women of these families may make rare appearances in the
fields to bring lunch to the family males working there and sometimes to
supervise laborers. Thus elitism is expressed in women's exclusive
domesticity, with men providing economic necessities for the family.
Only women of poor and low-ranking groups engage in heavy manual
labor outside the home, especially for pay. Such women work long hours
in the fields, on construction gangs, and at many other tasks, often
veiling their faces as they work.
For Muslim women, purdah practices involve less emphasis on veiling
from in-laws and more emphasis on protecting women from contact with
strangers outside the sphere of kinship. Because Muslims often marry
cousins, a woman's in-laws may also be her natal relatives, so veiling
her face within the marital home is often inappropriate. Unlike Hindus,
Muslim women do not veil from other women as do Hindus. Traditional
Muslim women and even unmarried girls, however, often refrain from
appearing in public, or if they do go out, they wear an all-covering
garment known as a burka , with a full face covering. A burka
protects a woman--and her family--from undue familiarity with unknown
outsiders, thus emphasizing the unity of the family vis-�-vis the
outside world. Because Muslim women are entitled to a share in the
family real estate, controlling their relationships with males outside
the family can be crucial to the maintenance of family property and
prestige.
In rural communities and in older sections of cities, purdah
observances remain vital, although they are gradually diminishing in
intensity. Among the educated urban and rural elite, purdah practices
are rapidly vanishing and for many have all but disappeared. Chastity
and female modesty are still highly valued, but, for the elite,
face-veiling and the burka are considered unsophisticated. As
girls and women become more widely and more highly educated, female
employment outside the home is commonplace, even for women of elite
families.
India - Life Passages
In India, the ideal stages of life have been most clearly articulated
by Hindus. The ancient Hindu ideal rests on childhood, followed by four
stages: undergoing religious initiation and becoming a celibate student
of religious texts, getting married and becoming a householder, leaving
home to become a forest hermit after becoming a grandparent, and
becoming a homeless wanderer free of desire for all material things.
Although few actually follow this scheme, it serves as a guide for those
attempting to live according to valued standards. For Hindus, dharma (a
divinely ordained code of proper conduct), karma (the sum of one's deeds
in this life and in past lives), and kismat (fate) are
considered relevant to the course of life (see The Roots of Indian
Religion, ch. 3). Crucial transitions from one phase of life to another
are marked by sometimes elaborate rites of passage.
Children and Childhood
Throughout much of India, a baby's birth is celebrated with rites of
welcome and blessing--songs, drums, happy distribution of sweets,
auspicious unguents, gifts for infant and mother, preparation of
horoscopes, and inscriptions in the genealogist's record books. In
general, children are deeply desired and welcomed, their presence
regarded as a blessing on the household. Babies are often treated like
small deities, pampered and coddled, adorned with makeup and trinkets,
and carried about and fed with the finest foods available to the family.
Young girls are worshiped as personifications of Hindu goddesses, and
little boys are adulated as scions of the clan.
In their children, parents see the future of the lineage and wider
kin group, helpers in daily tasks, and providers of security in the
parents' old age. These delightful ideals are articulated and enacted
over and over again; yet, a coexisting harsher reality emerges from a
close examination of events and statistics. Many children lead lives of
striking hardship, and many die premature deaths. In general, conditions
are significantly worse for girls than for boys.
Birth celebrations for baby daughters are more muted than for sons
and are sometimes absent altogether. Although India was once led by a
woman prime minister, Indira Gandhi, and Indian women currently hold a
wide range of powerful positions in every walk of life, there is a
strong cultural bias toward males. Girls are frequently victims of
underfeeding, medical neglect, sex-selective abortion, and outright
infanticide. According to the 1991 census final population totals, there
were 927 females per 1,000 males in India--a figure that has gradually
declined from 972 females per 1,000 males in 1901 and from 934 just
since 1981. Much of this imbalance is attained through neglecting the
nutritional and health needs of female children, and much is also the
result of inadequate health care for women of childbearing years. The
sex ratio is even more imbalanced in urban areas (894 per 1,000 in 1991)
than in rural areas (938 per 1,000 in 1991), partially because a large
number of village men go to work in cities, leaving their wives and
children behind in their rural homes (see Structure and Dynamics, ch.
2).
That girls are victims of fatal neglect and murder has been
thoroughly discussed in the Indian press and in scholarly
investigations. It has been noted that infant girls are killed with
potions of opium in Rajasthan and pastes of poisonous oleander in Tamil
Nadu--most especially girls preceded by the birth of several sisters.
Clinics offering ultrasound and amniocentesis in order to detect and
abort female fetuses have become popular in various parts of the
country, and many thousands of female fetuses have been so destroyed. In
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Punjab such selective abortions have been
outlawed because of pressure from feminist groups. More usually, girls
are simply fed and cared for less well than their brothers.
The sex ratio is particularly unfavorable to females in the central
northern section of the country. For example, in Uttar Pradesh there are
only eighty-eight females per 100 males; in Haryana, eighty-seven per
100; and in Rajasthan ninety-one per 100. By contrast, in Kerala, on the
southwest coast, a region traditionally noted for matriliny, the sex
ratio is reversed, with females outnumbering males 104 to 100. In Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, two large southern states, there are
ninety-seven females per 100 males.
Parents favor boys for various reasons. In the north, a boy's value
in agricultural endeavors is higher than a girl's, and after marriage a
boy continues to live with his parents, ideally supporting them in their
old age. Political scientist Philip Oldenburg notes that in some
violence-prone regions of the north, having sons may enhance families'
capacity to defend themselves and to exercise power. A girl, however,
moves away to live with her husband's relatives, and with her goes a
dowry. In the late twentieth century, the values of dowries have been
increasing, and, furthermore, groups that never gave dowries in the past
are being pressured to do so. Thus, a girl child can represent a
significant economic liability to her parents. In rice-growing areas,
especially in the south, girls receive better treatment, and there is
some evidence that the better treatment is related to the value of women
as field workers in wet-rice cultivation. Throughout most of India, for
Hindus it is important to have a son conduct funeral rites for his
parents; a daughter, as a member of her husband's lineage, has not
traditionally been able to do so.
For both boys and girls, infant mortality rates tend to be high, and
in the absence of confidence that their infants will live, parents tend
to produce numerous offspring in the hope that at least two sons will
survive to adulthood. Family planning measures are used to a modest
degree in India; perhaps 37.5 percent of couples use contraceptives at
least occasionally (see Population and Family Planning Policy, ch. 2).
Abortion is legal, condoms are advertised on colorful billboards, and
government health services offer small bounties for patients undergoing
vasectomies and tubal ligations. In some regions, most notably Kerala,
better health care and higher infant survival rates are associated with
lowered fertility rates (see Health Conditions, ch. 2).
Most children survive infancy and do not fall victim to the cultural
and economic pressures alluded to above. The majority of children grow
up as valued members of a family, treasured by their parents and
encouraged to participate in appropriate activities. Although relative
ages of children are always known and reflected in linguistic and
deference behavior, there is little age-grading in daily life. Children
of all ages associate with each other and with adults, unlike the
situation in the West, where age-grading is common.
Studies of Indian psychology by Sudhir Kakar, Alan Roland, and others
stress that the young Indian child grows up in intimate emotional
contact with the mother and other mothering persons. Because conjugal
marital relationships are deemphasized in the joint household, a woman
looks to her children to satisfy some of her intimacy needs. Her bond to
her children, especially her sons but also her daughters, becomes
enormously strong and lasting. A child is suckled on demand, sometimes
for years, sleeps with a parent or grandparent, is bathed by doting
relatives, and is rarely left alone. Massaged with oil, carried about,
gently toilet-trained, and gratified with treats, the young child
develops an inner core of well-being and a profound sense of expectation
of protection from others. Such indulgent and close relationships
produce a symbiotic mode of relating to others and effect the
development of a person with a deeply held sense of involvement with
relatives, so vital to the Indian family situation.
The young child learns early about hierarchy within the family, as he
watches affectionate and respectful relationships between seniors and
juniors, males and females. A young child is often carried about by an
older sibling, and strong and close sibling bonds usually develop.
Bickering among siblings is not as common as it is in the West; rather,
most siblings learn to think of themselves as part of a family unit that
must work together as it meets the challenges of the outside world.
Young children are encouraged to participate in the numerous rituals
that emphasize family ties. The power of sibling relationships is
recognized, for example, when a brother touches his sister's feet,
honoring in her the principle of feminine divinity, which, if treated
appropriately, can bring him prosperity. In calendrical and life-cycle
rituals in both the north and the south, sisters bless their brothers
and also symbolically request their protection throughout life.
After about four or five years of indulgence, children typically
experience greater demands from family members. In villages, children
learn the rudiments of agricultural labor, and young children often help
with weeding, harvesting, threshing, and the like. Girls learn domestic
chores, and boys are encouraged to take cattle for grazing, learn
plowing, and begin to drive bullock carts and ride bicycles. City
children also learn household duties, and children of poor families
often work as servants in the homes of the prosperous. Some even pick
through garbage piles to find shreds of food and fuel.
In some areas, children work as exploited laborers in factories,
where they weave carpets for the export market and make matches, glass
bangles, and other products. At Sivakasi, in Tamil Nadu, some 45,000
children work in the match, fireworks, and printing industries,
comprising perhaps the largest single concentration of child labor in
the world. Children reportedly as young as four years old work long
hours each day.
Education in a school setting is available for most of India's
children, and many young people attend school (see Primary and Secondary
Education, ch. 2). Officials state that education is
"compulsory," but the reality is that a significant percentage
of children--especially girls--fail to become literate and instead carry
out many other tasks in order to contribute to family income. More than
half of India's children between the ages of six and fourteen--82.2
million--are not in school. Instead they participate in the labor force,
even as more privileged children study at government and private schools
and prepare for more prestigious jobs. Thus children learn early the
realities of socioeconomic and urban-rural differentiation and grow up
to perpetuate India's hierarchical society.
For many children, especially boys, an important event of young
adolescence is religious initiation. Initiation rituals vary among
different regions, religious communities, and castes (see Life-Cycle
Rituals, ch. 3). In the north, girls reach puberty without public notice
and in an atmosphere of shyness, whereas in much of the south, puberty
celebrations joyously announce to the family and community that a young
girl has grown to maturity.
India - Marriage
In India there is no greater event in a family than a wedding,
dramatically evoking every possible social obligation, kinship bond,
traditional value, impassioned sentiment, and economic resource. In the
arranging and conducting of weddings, the complex permutations of Indian
social systems best display themselves.
Marriage is deemed essential for virtually everyone in India. For the
individual, marriage is the great watershed in life, marking the
transition to adulthood. Generally, this transition, like everything
else in India, depends little upon individual volition but instead
occurs as a result of the efforts of many people. Even as one is born
into a particular family without the exercise of any personal choice, so
is one given a spouse without any personal preference involved.
Arranging a marriage is a critical responsibility for parents and other
relatives of both bride and groom. Marriage alliances entail some
redistribution of wealth as well as building and restructuring social
realignments, and, of course, result in the biological reproduction of
families.
Some parents begin marriage arrangements on the birth of a child, but
most wait until later. In the past, the age of marriage was quite young,
and in a few small groups, especially in Rajasthan, children under the
age of five are still united in marriage. In rural communities,
prepuberty marriage for girls traditionally was the rule. In the late
twentieth century, the age of marriage is rising in villages, almost to
the levels that obtain in cities. Legislation mandating minimum marriage
ages has been passed in various forms over the past decades, but such
laws have little effect on actual marriage practices.
Essentially, India is divided into two large regions with regard to
Hindu kinship and marriage practices, the north and the south.
Additionally, various ethnic and tribal groups of the central,
mountainous north, and eastern regions follow a variety of other
practices. These variations have been extensively described and analyzed
by anthropologists, especially Irawati Karve, David G. Mandelbaum, and
Clarence Maloney.
Broadly, in the Indo-Aryan-speaking north, a family seeks marriage
alliances with people to whom it is not already linked by ties of blood.
Marriage arrangements often involve looking far afield. In the
Dravidian-speaking south, a family seeks to strengthen existing kin ties
through marriage, preferably with blood relatives. Kinship terminology
reflects this basic pattern. In the north, every kinship term clearly
indicates whether the person referred to is a blood relation or an
affinal relation; all blood relatives are forbidden as marriage mates to
a person or a person's children. In the south, there is no clear-cut
distinction between the family of birth and the family of marriage.
Because marriage in the south commonly involves a continuing exchange of
daughters among a few families, for the married couple all relatives are
ultimately blood kin. Dravidian terminology stresses the principle of
relative age: all relatives are arranged according to whether they are
older or younger than each other without reference to generation.
On the Indo-Gangetic Plain, marriages are contracted outside the
village, sometimes even outside of large groups of villages, with
members of the same caste beyond any traceable consanguineal ties. In
much of the area, daughters should not be given into villages where
daughters of the family or even of the natal village have previously
been given. In most of the region, brother-sister exchange marriages
(marriages linking a brother and sister of one household with the sister
and brother of another) are shunned. The entire emphasis is on casting
the marriage net ever-wider, creating new alliances. The residents of a
single village may have in-laws in hundreds of other villages.
In most of North India, the Hindu bride goes to live with strangers
in a home she has never visited. There she is sequestered and veiled, an
outsider who must learn to conform to new ways. Her natal family is
often geographically distant, and her ties with her consanguineal kin
undergo attenuation to varying degrees.
In central India, the basic North Indian pattern prevails, with some
modifications. For example, in Madhya Pradesh, village exogamy is
preferred, but marriages within a village are not uncommon. Marriages
between caste-fellows in neighboring villages are frequent.
Brother-sister exchange marriages are sometimes arranged, and daughters
are often given in marriage to lineages where other daughters of their
lineage or village have previously been wed.
In South India, in sharp contrast, marriages are preferred between
cousins (especially cross-cousins, that is, the children of a brother
and sister) and even between uncles and nieces (especially a man and his
elder sister's daughter). The principle involved is that of return--the
family that gives a daughter expects one in return, if not now, then in
the next generation. The effect of such marriages is to bind people
together in relatively small, tight-knit kin groups. A bride moves to
her in-laws' home--the home of her grandmother or aunt--and is often
comfortable among these familiar faces. Her husband may well be the
cousin she has known all her life that she would marry.
Many South Indian marriages are contracted outside of such close kin
groups when no suitable mates exist among close relatives, or when other
options appear more advantageous. Some sophisticated South Indians, for
example, consider cousin marriage and uncle-niece marriage outmoded.
Rules for the remarriage of widows differ from one group to another.
Generally, lower-ranking groups allow widow remarriage, particularly if
the woman is relatively young, but the highest-ranking castes discourage
or forbid such remarriage. The most strict adherents to the
nonremarriage of widows are Brahmans. Almost all groups allow widowers
to remarry. Many groups encourage a widower to marry his deceased wife's
younger sister (but never her older sister).
Among Muslims of both the north and the south, marriage between
cousins is encouraged, both cross-cousins (the children of a brother and
sister) and parallel cousins (the children of two same-sex siblings). In
the north, such cousins grow up calling each other "brother"
and "sister", yet they may marry. Even when cousin marriage
does not occur, spouses can often trace between them other kinship
linkages.
Some tribal people of central India practice an interesting
permutation of the southern pattern. Among the Murias of Bastar in
southeastern Madhya Pradesh, as described by anthropologist Verrier
Elwin, teenagers live together in a dormitory (ghotul ),
sharing life and love with one another for several blissful years.
Ultimately, their parents arrange their marriages, usually with
cross-cousins, and the delights of teenage romance are replaced with the
serious responsibilities of adulthood. In his survey of some 2,000
marriages, Elwin found only seventy-seven cases of ghotul partners
eloping together and very few cases of divorce. Among the Muria and Gond
tribal groups, cross-cousin marriage is called "bringing back the
milk," alluding to the gift of a girl in one generation being
returned by the gift of a girl in the next.
Finding the perfect partner for one's child can be a challenging
task. People use their social networks to locate potential brides and
grooms of appropriate social and economic status. Increasingly, urban
dwellers use classified matrimonial advertisements in newspapers. The
advertisements usually announce religion, caste, and educational
qualifications, stress female beauty and male (and in the contemporary
era, sometimes female) earning capacity, and may hint at dowry size.
In rural areas, matches between strangers are usually arranged
without the couple meeting each other. Rather, parents and other
relatives come to an agreement on behalf of the couple. In cities,
however, especially among the educated classes, photographs are
exchanged, and sometimes the couple are allowed to meet under heavily
chaperoned circumstances, such as going out for tea with a group of
people or meeting in the parlor of the girl's home, with her relatives
standing by. Young professional men and their families may receive
inquiries and photographs from representatives of several girls'
families. They may send their relatives to meet the most promising
candidates and then go on tour themselves to meet the young women and
make a final choice. In the early 1990s, increasing numbers of marriages
arranged in this way link brides and grooms from India with spouses of
Indian parentage resident in Europe, North America, and the Middle East.
Almost all Indian children are raised with the expectation that their
parents will arrange their marriages, but an increasing number of young
people, especially among the college-educated, are finding their own
spouses. So-called love marriages are deemed a slightly scandalous
alternative to properly arranged marriages. Some young people convince
their parents to "arrange" their marriages to people with whom
they have fallen in love. This process has long been possible for
Indians from the south and for Muslims who want to marry a particular
cousin of the appropriate marriageable category. In the upper classes,
these semi-arranged love marriages increasingly occur between young
people who are from castes of slightly different rank but who are
educationally or professionally equal. If there are vast differences to
overcome, such as is the case with love marriages between Hindus and
Muslims or between Hindus of very different caste status, parents are
usually much less agreeable, and serious family disruptions can result.
In much of India, especially in the north, a marriage establishes a
structural opposition between the kin groups of the bride and
groom--bride-givers and bride-takers. Within this relationship,
bride-givers are considered inferior to bride-takers and are forever
expected to give gifts to the bride-takers. The one-way flow of gifts
begins at engagement and continues for a generation or two. The most
dramatic aspect of this asymmetrical relationship is the giving of
dowry.
In many communities throughout India, a dowry has traditionally been
given by a bride's kin at the time of her marriage. In ancient times,
the dowry was considered a woman's wealth--property due a beloved
daughter who had no claim on her natal family's real estate--and
typically included portable valuables such as jewelry and household
goods that a bride could control throughout her life. However, over
time, the larger proportion of the dowry has come to consist of goods
and cash payments that go straight into the hands of the groom's family.
In the late twentieth century, throughout much of India, dowry payments
have escalated, and a groom's parents sometimes insist on compensation
for their son's higher education and even for his future earnings, to
which the bride will presumably have access. Some of the dowries
demanded are quite oppressive, amounting to several years' salary in
cash as well as items such as motorcycles, air conditioners, and fancy
cars. Among some lower-status groups, large dowries are currently
replacing traditional bride-price payments. Even among Muslims,
previously not given to demanding large dowries, reports of exorbitant
dowries are increasing.
The dowry is becoming an increasingly onerous burden for the bride's
family. Antidowry laws exist but are largely ignored, and a bride's
treatment in her marital home is often affected by the value of her
dowry. Increasingly frequent are horrible incidents, particularly in
urban areas, where a groom's family makes excessive demands on the
bride's family--even after marriage--and when the demands are not met,
murder the bride, typically by setting her clothes on fire in a cooking
"accident." The groom is then free to remarry and collect
another sumptuous dowry. The male and female in-laws implicated in these
murders have seldom been punished.
Such dowry deaths have been the subject of numerous media reports in
India and other countries and have mobilized feminist groups to action.
In some of the worst areas, such as the National Capital Territory of
Delhi, where hundreds of such deaths are reported annually and the
numbers are increasing yearly, the law now requires that all suspicious
deaths of new brides be investigated. Official government figures report
1,786 registered dowry deaths nationwide in 1987; there is also an
estimate of some 5,000 dowry deaths in 1991. Women's groups sometimes
picket the homes of the in-laws of burned brides. Some analysts have
related the growth of this phenomenon to the growth of consumerism in
Indian society.
Fears of impoverishing their parents have led some urban middle-class
young women, married and unmarried, to commit suicide. However, through
the giving of large dowries, the newly wealthy are often able to marry
their treasured daughters up the status hierarchy so reified in Indian
society.
After marriage arrangements are completed, a rich panoply of wedding
rituals begins. Each religious group, region, and caste has a slightly
different set of rites. Generally, all weddings involve as many kin and
associates of the bride and groom as possible. The bride's family
usually hosts most of the ceremonies and pays for all the arrangements
for large numbers of guests for several days, including accommodation,
feasting, decorations, and gifts for the groom's party. These
arrangements are often extremely elaborate and expensive and are
intended to enhance the status of the bride's family. The groom's party
usually hires a band and brings fine gifts for the bride, such as
jewelry and clothing, but these are typically far outweighed in value by
the presents received from the bride's side.
After the bride and groom are united in sacred rites attended by
colorful ceremony, the new bride may be carried away to her in-laws'
home, or, if she is very young, she may remain with her parents until
they deem her old enough to depart. A prepubescent bride usually stays
in her natal home until puberty, after which a separate consummation
ceremony is held to mark her departure for her conjugal home and married
life. The poignancy of the bride's weeping departure for her new home is
prominent in personal memory, folklore, literature, song, and drama
throughout India.
India - Adulthood
Varna, Caste, and Other Divisions
Although many other nations are characterized by social inequality,
perhaps nowhere else in the world has inequality been so elaborately
constructed as in the Indian institution of caste. Caste has long
existed in India, but in the modern period it has been severely
criticized by both Indian and foreign observers. Although some educated
Indians tell non-Indians that caste has been abolished or that "no
one pays attention to caste anymore," such statements do not
reflect reality.
Caste has undergone significant change since independence, but it
still involves hundreds of millions of people. In its preamble, India's
constitution forbids negative public discrimination on the basis of
caste. However, caste ranking and caste-based interaction have occurred
for centuries and will continue to do so well into the foreseeable
future, more in the countryside than in urban settings and more in the
realms of kinship and marriage than in less personal interactions.
Castes are ranked, named, endogamous (in-marrying) groups, membership
in which is achieved by birth. There are thousands of castes and
subcastes in India, and these large kinship-based groups are fundamental
to South Asian social structure. Each caste is part of a locally based
system of interde-pendence with other groups, involving occupational
specialization, and is linked in complex ways with networks that stretch
across regions and throughout the nation.
The word caste derives from the Portuguese casta ,
meaning breed, race, or kind. Among the Indian terms that are sometimes
translated as caste are varna (see Glossary), jati
(see Glossary), jat , biradri , and samaj .
All of these terms refer to ranked groups of various sizes and breadth. Varna
, or color, actually refers to large divisions that include various
castes; the other terms include castes and subdivisions of castes
sometimes called subcastes.
Many castes are traditionally associated with an occupation, such as
high-ranking Brahmans; middle-ranking farmer and artisan groups, such as
potters, barbers, and carpenters; and very low-ranking
"Untouchable" leatherworkers, butchers, launderers, and
latrine cleaners. There is some correlation between ritual rank on the
caste hierarchy and economic prosperity. Members of higher-ranking
castes tend, on the whole, to be more prosperous than members of
lower-ranking castes. Many lower-caste people live in conditions of
great poverty and social disadvantage.
According to the Rig Veda, sacred texts that date back to oral
traditions of more than 3,000 years ago, progenitors of the four ranked varna
groups sprang from various parts of the body of the primordial man,
which Brahma created from clay (see The Vedas and Polytheism, ch. 3).
Each group had a function in sustaining the life of society--the social
body. Brahmans, or priests, were created from the mouth. They were to
provide for the intellectual and spiritual needs of the community.
Kshatriyas, warriors and rulers, were derived from the arms. Their role
was to rule and to protect others. Vaishyas--landowners and
merchants--sprang from the thighs, and were entrusted with the care of
commerce and agriculture. Shudras--artisans and servants--came from the
feet. Their task was to perform all manual labor.
Later conceptualized was a fifth category, "Untouchable"
menials, relegated to carrying out very menial and polluting work
related to bodily decay and dirt. Since 1935 "Untouchables"
have been known as Scheduled Castes, referring to their listing on
government rosters, or schedules. They are also often called by Mohandas
Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi's term Harijans, or "Children of
God." Although the term Untouchable appears in literature
produced by these low-ranking castes, in the 1990s, many politically
conscious members of these groups prefer to refer to themselves as Dalit
(see Glossary), a Hindi word meaning oppressed or downtrodden. According
to the 1991 census, there were 138 million Scheduled Caste members in
India, approximately 16 percent of the total population.
The first four varnas apparently existed in the ancient
Aryan society of northern India. Some historians say that these
categories were originally somewhat fluid functional groups, not castes.
A greater degree of fixity gradually developed, resulting in the complex
ranking systems of medieval India that essentially continue in the late
twentieth century.
Although a varna is not a caste, when directly asked for
their caste affiliation, particularly when the questioner is a
Westerner, many Indians will reply with a varna name. Pressed
further, they may respond with a much more specific name of a caste, or jati
, which falls within that varna . For example, a Brahman may
specify that he is a member of a named caste group, such as a Jijotiya
Brahman, or a Smartha Brahman, and so on. Within such castes, people may
further belong to smaller subcaste categories and to specific clans and
lineages. These finer designations are particularly relevant when
marriages are being arranged and often appear in newspaper matrimonial
advertisements.
Members of a caste are typically spread out over a region, with
representatives living in hundreds of settlements. In any small village,
there may be representatives of a few or even a score or more castes.
Numerous groups usually called tribes (often referred to as Scheduled
Tribes) are also integrated into the caste system to varying degrees.
Some tribes live separately from others--particularly in the far
northeast and in the forested center of the country, where tribes are
more like ethnic groups than castes. Some tribes are themselves divided
into groups similar to subcastes. In regions where members of tribes
live in peasant villages with nontribal peoples, they are usually
considered members of separate castes ranking low on the hierarchical
scale.
Inequalities among castes are considered by the Hindu faithful to be
part of the divinely ordained natural order and are expressed in terms
of purity and pollution. Within a village, relative rank is most
graphically expressed at a wedding or death feast, when all residents of
the village are invited. At the home of a high-ranking caste member,
food is prepared by a member of a caste from whom all can accept cooked
food (usually by a Brahman). Diners are seated in lines; members of a
single caste sit next to each other in a row, and members of other
castes sit in perpendicular or parallel rows at some distance. Members
of Dalit castes, such as Leatherworkers and Sweepers, may be seated far
from the other diners--even out in an alley. Farther away, at the edge
of the feeding area, a Sweeper may wait with a large basket to receive
discarded leavings tossed in by other diners. Eating food contaminated
by contact with the saliva of others not of the same family is
considered far too polluting to be practiced by members of any other
castes. Generally, feasts and ceremonies given by Dalits are not
attended by higher-ranking castes.
Among Muslims, although status differences prevail, brotherhood may
be stressed. A Muslim feast usually includes a cloth laid either on
clean ground or on a table, with all Muslims, rich and poor, dining from
plates placed on the same cloth. Muslims who wish to provide hospitality
to observant Hindus, however, must make separate arrangements for a
high-caste Hindu cook and ritually pure foods and dining area.
Castes that fall within the top four ranked varnas are
sometimes referred to as the "clean castes," with Dalits
considered "unclean." Castes of the top three ranked varnas
are often designated "twice-born," in reference to the ritual
initiation undergone by male members, in which investiture with the
Hindu sacred thread constitutes a kind of ritual rebirth. Non-Hindu
castelike groups generally fall outside these designations.
Each caste is believed by devout Hindus to have its own dharma, or
divinely ordained code of proper conduct. Accordingly, there is often a
high degree of tolerance for divergent lifestyles among different
castes. Brahmans are usually expected to be nonviolent and spiritual,
according with their traditional roles as vegetarian teetotaler priests.
Kshatriyas are supposed to be strong, as fighters and rulers should be,
with a taste for aggression, eating meat, and drinking alcohol. Vaishyas
are stereotyped as adept businessmen, in accord with their traditional
activities in commerce. Shudras are often described by others as
tolerably pleasant but expectably somewhat base in behavior, whereas
Dalits--especially Sweepers--are often regarded by others as followers
of vulgar life-styles. Conversely, lower-caste people often view people
of high rank as haughty and unfeeling.
The chastity of women is strongly related to caste status. Generally,
the higher ranking the caste, the more sexual control its women are
expected to exhibit. Brahman brides should be virginal, faithful to one
husband, and celibate in widowhood. By contrast, a Sweeper bride may or
may not be a virgin, extramarital affairs may be tolerated, and, if
widowed or divorced, the woman is encouraged to remarry. For the higher
castes, such control of female sexuality helps ensure purity of
lineage--of crucial importance to maintenance of high status. Among
Muslims, too, high status is strongly correlated with female chastity.
Within castes explicit standards are maintained. Transgressions may
be dealt with by a caste council (panchayat-- see Glossary),
meeting periodically to adjudicate issues relevant to the caste. Such
councils are usually formed of groups of elders, almost always males.
Punishments such as fines and outcasting, either temporary or permanent,
can be enforced. In rare cases, a person is excommunicated from the
caste for gross infractions of caste rules. An example of such an
infraction might be marrying or openly cohabiting with a mate of a caste
lower than one's own; such behavior would usually result in the
higher-caste person dropping to the status of the lower-caste person.
Activities such as farming or trading can be carried out by anyone,
but usually only members of the appropriate castes act as priests,
barbers, potters, weavers, and other skilled artisans, whose
occupational skills are handed down in families from one generation to
another. As with other key features of Indian social structure,
occupational specialization is believed to be in accord with the
divinely ordained order of the universe.
The existence of rigid ranking is supernaturally validated through
the idea of rebirth according to a person's karma, the sum of an
individual's deeds in this life and in past lives. After death, a
person's life is judged by divine forces, and rebirth is assigned in a
high or a low place, depending upon what is deserved. This supernatural
sanction can never be neglected, because it brings a person to his or
her position in the caste hierarchy, relevant to every transaction
involving food or drink, speaking, or touching.
In past decades, Dalits in certain areas (especially in parts of the
south) had to display extreme deference to high-status people,
physically keeping their distance--lest their touch or even their shadow
pollute others--wearing neither shoes nor any upper body covering (even
for women) in the presence of the upper castes. The lowest-ranking had
to jingle a little bell in warning of their polluting approach. In much
of India, Dalits were prohibited from entering temples, using wells from
which the "clean" castes drew their water, or even attending
schools. In past centuries, dire punishments were prescribed for Dalits
who read or even heard sacred texts.
Such degrading discrimination was made illegal under legislation
passed during British rule and was protested against by preindependence
reform movements led by Mahatma Gandhi and Bhimrao Ramji (B.R.)
Ambedkar, a Dalit leader. Dalits agitated for the right to enter Hindu
temples and to use village wells and effectively pressed for the
enactment of stronger laws opposing disabilities imposed on them. After
independence, Ambedkar almost singlehandedly wrote India's constitution,
including key provisions barring caste-based discrimination.
Nonetheless, discriminatory treatment of Dalits remains a factor in
daily life, especially in villages, as the end of the twentieth century
approaches.
In modern times, as in the past, it is virtually impossible for an
individual to raise his own status by falsely claiming to be a member of
a higher-ranked caste. Such a ruse might work for a time in a place
where the person is unknown, but no one would dine with or intermarry
with such a person or his offspring until the claim was validated
through kinship networks. Rising on the ritual hierarchy can only be
achieved by a caste as a group, over a long period of time, principally
by adopting behavior patterns of higher-ranked groups. This process,
known as Sanskritization, has been described by M.N. Srinivas and
others. An example of such behavior is that of some Leatherworker castes
adopting a policy of not eating beef, in the hope that abstaining from
the defiling practice of consuming the flesh of sacred bovines would
enhance their castes' status. Increased economic prosperity for much of
a caste greatly aids in the process of improving rank.
Intercaste Relations
In a village, members of different castes are often linked in what
has been called the jajmani system, after the word jajman
, which in some regions means patron. Members of various service castes
perform tasks for their patrons, usually members of the dominant, that
is, most powerful landowning caste of the village (commonly castes of
the Kshatriya varna ). Households of service castes are linked
through hereditary bonds to a household of patrons, with the lower-caste
members providing services according to traditional occupational
specializations. Thus, client families of launderers, barbers,
shoemakers, carpenters, potters, tailors, and priests provide customary
services to their patrons, in return for which they receive customary
seasonal payments of grain, clothing, and money. Ideally, from
generation to generation, clients owe their patrons political allegiance
in addition to their labors, while patrons owe their clients protection
and security.
The harmonious qualities of the jajmani system have been
overidealized and variations of the system overlooked by many observers.
Further, the economic interdependence of the system has weakened since
the 1960s. Nevertheless, it is clear that members of different castes
customarily perform a number of functions for one another in rural India
that emphasize cooperation rather than competition. This cooperation is
revealed in economic arrangements, in visits to farmers' threshing
floors by service caste members to claim traditional payments, and in
rituals emphasizing interdependence at life crises and calendrical
festivals all over South Asia. For example, in rural Karnataka, in an
event described by anthropologist Suzanne Hanchett, the annual
procession of the village temple cart bearing images of the deities
responsible for the welfare of the village cannot go forward without the
combined efforts of representatives of all castes. It is believed that
the sacred cart will literally not move unless all work together to move
it, some pushing and some pulling.
Some observers feel that the caste system must be viewed as a system
of exploitation of poor low-ranking groups by more prosperous
high-ranking groups. In many parts of India, land is largely held by
dominant castes--high-ranking owners of property--that economically
exploit low-ranking landless laborers and poor artisans, all the while
degrading them with ritual emphases on their so-called god-given
inferior status. In the early 1990s, blatant subjugation of low-caste
laborers in the northern state of Bihar and in eastern Uttar Pradesh was
the subject of many news reports. In this region, scores of Dalits who
have attempted to unite to protest low wages have been the victims of
lynchings and mass killings by high-caste landowners and their hired
assassins.
In 1991 the news magazine India Today reported that in an
ostensibly prosperous village about 160 kilometers southeast of Delhi,
when it became known that a rural Dalit laborer dared to have a love
affair with the daughter of a high-caste landlord, the lovers and their
Dalit go-between were tortured, publicly hanged, and burnt by agents of
the girl's family in the presence of some 500 villagers. A similar
incident occurred in 1994, when a Dalit musician who had secretly
married a woman of the Kurmi cultivating caste was beaten to death by
outraged Kurmis, possibly instigated by the young woman's family. The
terrified bride was stripped and branded as punishment for her
transgression. Dalit women also have been the victims of gang rapes by
the police. Many other atrocities, as well as urban riots resulting in
the deaths of Dalits, have occurred in recent years. Such extreme
injustices are infrequent enough to be reported in outraged articles in
the Indian press, while much more common daily discrimination and
exploitation are considered virtually routine.
Changes in the Caste System
Despite many problems, the caste system has operated successfully for
centuries, providing goods and services to India's many millions of
citizens. The system continues to operate, but changes are occurring.
India's constitution guarantees basic rights to all its citizens,
including the right to equality and equal protection before the law. The
practice of untouchability, as well as discrimination on the basis of
caste, race, sex, or religion, has been legally abolished. All citizens
have the right to vote, and political competition is lively. Voters from
every stratum of society have formed interest groups, overlapping and
crosscutting castes, creating an evolving new style of integrating
Indian society.
Castes themselves, however, far from being abolished, have certain
rights under Indian law. As described by anthropologist Owen M. Lynch
and other scholars, in the expanding political arena caste groups are
becoming more politicized and forced to compete with other interest
groups for social and economic benefits. In the growing cities,
traditional intercaste interdependencies are negligible.
Independent India has built on earlier British efforts to remedy
problems suffered by Dalits by granting them some benefits of protective
discrimination. Scheduled Castes are entitled to reserved electoral
offices, reserved jobs in central and state governments, and special
educational benefits. The constitution mandates that one-seventh of
state and national legislative seats be reserved for members of
Scheduled Castes in order to guarantee their voice in government.
Reserving seats has proven useful because few, if any, Scheduled Caste
candidates have ever been elected in nonreserved constituencies.
Educationally, Dalit students have benefited from scholarships, and
Scheduled Caste literacy increased (from 10.3 percent in 1961 to 21.4
percent in 1981, the last year for which such figures are available),
although not as rapidly as among the general population. Improved access
to education has resulted in the emergence of a substantial group of
educated Dalits able to take up white-collar occupations and fight for
their rights.
There has been tremendous resistance among non-Dalits to this
protective discrimination for the Scheduled Castes, who constitute some
16 percent of the total population, and efforts have been made to
provide similar advantages to the so-called Backward Classes (see
Glossary), who constitute an estimated 52 percent of the population. In
August 1990, Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap (V.P.) Singh announced his
intention to enforce the recommendations of the Backward Classes
Commission (Mandal Commission--see Glossary), issued in December 1980
and largely ignored for a decade. The report, which urged special
advantages for obtaining civil service positions and admission to higher
education for the Backward Classes, resulted in riots and
self-immolations and contributed to the fall of the prime minister. The
upper castes have been particularly adamant against these policies
because unemployment is a major problem in India, and many feel that
they are being unjustly excluded from posts for which they are better
qualified than lower-caste applicants.
As an act of protest, many Dalits have rejected Hinduism with its
rigid ranking system. Following the example of their revered leader, Dr.
Ambedkar, who converted to Buddhism four years before his death in 1956,
millions of Dalits have embraced the faith of the Buddha (see Buddhism,
ch. 3). Over the past few centuries, many Dalits have also converted to
Christianity and have often by this means raised their socioeconomic
status. However, Christians of Dalit origin still often suffer from
discrimination by Christians--and others--of higher caste backgrounds.
Despite improvements in some aspects of Dalit status, 90 percent of
them live in rural areas in the mid-1990s, where an increasing
proportion--more than 50 percent--work as landless agricultural
laborers. State and national governments have attempted to secure more
just distribution of land by creating land ceilings and abolishing
absentee landlordism, but evasive tactics by landowners have
successfully prevented more than minimal redistribution of land to
tenant farmers and laborers. In contemporary India, field hands face
increased competition from tractors and harvesting machines. Similarly,
artisans are being challenged by expanding commercial markets in
mass-produced factory goods, undercutting traditional mutual obligations
between patrons and clients. The spread of the Green Revolution has
tended to increase the gap between the prosperous and the poor--most of
whom are low-caste (see The Green Revolution, ch. 7).
The growth of urbanization (an estimated 26 percent of the population
now lives in cities) is having a far-reaching effect on caste practices,
not only in cities but in villages. Among anonymous crowds in urban
public spaces and on public transportation, caste affiliations are
unknown, and observance of purity and pollution rules is negligible.
Distinctive caste costumes have all but vanished, and low-caste names
have been modified, although castes remain endogamous, and access to
employment often occurs through intracaste connections. Restrictions on
interactions with other castes are becoming more relaxed, and, at the
same time, observance of other pollution rules is declining--especially
those concerning birth, death, and menstruation. Several growing Hindu
sects draw members from many castes and regions, and communication
between cities and villages is expanding dramatically. Kin in town and
country visit one another frequently, and television programs available
to huge numbers of villagers vividly portray new lifestyles. As new
occupations open up in urban areas, the correlation of caste with
occupation is declining.
Caste associations have expanded their areas of concern beyond
traditional elite emulation and local politics into the wider political
arenas of state and national politics. Finding power in numbers within
India's democratic system, caste groups are pulling together closely
allied subcastes in their quest for political influence. In efforts to
solidify caste bonds, some caste associations have organized marriage
fairs where families can make matches for their children. Traditional
hierarchical concerns are being minimized in favor of strengthening
horizontal unity. Thus, while pollution observances are declining, caste
consciousness is not.
Education and election to political office have advanced the status
of many Dalits, but the overall picture remains one of great inequity.
In recent decades, Dalit anger has been expressed in writings,
demonstrations, strikes, and the activities of such groups as the Dalit
Panthers, a radical political party demanding revolutionary change. A
wider Dalit movement, including political parties, educational
activities, self-help centers, and labor organizations, has spread to
many areas of the country.
In a 1982 Dalit publication, Dilip Hiro wrote, "It is one of the
great modern Indian tragedies and dangers that even well meaning Indians
still find it so difficult to accept Untouchable mobility as being
legitimate in fact as well as in theory. . . ." Still, against all
odds, a small intelligentsia has worked for many years toward the goal
of freeing India of caste consciousness.
Classes
In village India, where nearly 74 percent of the population resides,
caste and class affiliations overlap. According to anthropologist Miriam
Sharma, "Large landholders who employ hired labour are
overwhelmingly from the upper castes, while the agricultural workers
themselves come from the ranks of the lowest--predominantly
Untouchable--castes." She also points out that
household-labor-using proprietors come from the ranks of the middle
agricultural castes. Distribution of other resources and access to
political control follow the same pattern of caste-cum-class
distinctions. Although this congruence is strong, there is a tendency
for class formation to occur despite the importance of caste, especially
in the cities, but also in rural areas.
In an analysis of class formation in India, anthropologist Harold A.
Gould points out that a three-level system of stratification is taking
shape across rural India. He calls the three levels Forward Classes
(higher castes), Backward Classes (middle and lower castes), and
Harijans (very low castes). Members of these groups share common
concerns because they stand in approximately the same relationship to
land and production--that is, they are large-scale farmers, small-scale
farmers, and landless laborers. Some of these groups are drawing
together within regions across caste lines in order to work for
political power and access to desirable resources. For example, since
the late 1960s, some of the middle-ranking cultivating castes of
northern India have increasingly cooperated in the political arena in
order to advance their common agrarian and market-oriented interests.
Their efforts have been spurred by competition with higher-caste landed
elites.
In cities other groups have vested interests that crosscut caste
boundaries, suggesting the possibility of forming classes in the future.
These groups include prosperous industrialists and entrepreneurs, who
have made successful efforts to push the central government toward a
probusiness stance; bureaucrats, who depend upon higher education rather
than land to preserve their positions as civil servants; political
officeholders, who enjoy good salaries and perquisites of all kinds; and
the military, who constitute one of the most powerful armed forces in
the developing world (see Organization and Equipment of the Armed
Forces, ch. 10).
Economically far below such groups are members of the menial
underclass, which is taking shape in both villages and urban areas. As
the privileged elites move ahead, low-ranking menial workers remain
economically insecure. Were they to join together to mobilize
politically across lines of class and religion in recognition of their
common interests, Gould observes, they might find power in their sheer
numbers.
India's rapidly expanding economy has provided the basis for a
fundamental change--the emergence of what eminent journalist Suman Dubey
calls a "new vanguard" increasingly dictating India's
political and economic direction. This group is India's new middle
class--mobile, driven, consumer-oriented, and, to some extent,
forward-looking. Hard to define precisely, it is not a single stratum of
society, but straddles town and countryside, making its voice heard
everywhere. It encompasses prosperous farmers, white-collar workers,
business people, military personnel, and myriad others, all actively
working toward a prosperous life. Ownership of cars, televisions, and
other consumer goods, reasonable earnings, substantial savings, and
educated children (often fluent in English) typify this diverse group.
Many have ties to kinsmen living abroad who have done very well.
The new middle class is booming, at least partially in response to a
doubling of the salaries of some 4 million central government employees
in 1986, followed by similar increases for state and district officers.
Unprecedented liberalization and opening up of the economy in the 1980s
and 1990s have been part of the picture (see Growth since 1980, ch. 6).
There is no single set of criteria defining the middle class, and
estimates of its numbers vary widely. The mid-range of figures presented
in a 1992 survey article by analyst Suman Dubey is approximately 150 to
175 million--some 20 percent of the population--although other observers
suggest alternative figures. The middle class appears to be increasing
rapidly. Once primarily urban and largely Hindu, the phenomenon of the
consuming middle class is burgeoning among Muslims and prosperous
villagers as well. According to V.A. Pai Panandikar, director of the
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, cited by Dubey, by the end of the
twentieth century 30 percent--some 300 million--of India's population
will be middle class.
The middle class is bracketed on either side by the upper and lower
echelons. Members of the upper class--around 1 percent of the
population--are owners of large properties, members of exclusive clubs,
and vacationers in foreign lands, and include industrialists, former
maharajas, and top executives. Below the middle class is perhaps a third
of the population--ordinary farmers, tradespeople, artisans, and
workers. At the bottom of the economic scale are the poor--estimated at
320 million, some 45 percent of the population in 1988--who live in
inadequate homes without adequate food, work for pittances, have
undereducated and often sickly children, and are the victims of numerous
social inequities.
The Fringes of Society
India's complex society includes some unique members--sadhus (holy
men) and hijras (transvestite-eunuchs). Such people have
voluntarily stepped outside the usual bonds of kinship and caste to join
with others in castelike groups based upon personal--yet culturally
shaped--inclinations.
In India of the 1990s, several hundred thousand Hindu and Jain sadhus
and a few thousand holy women (sadhvis ) live an ascetic life.
They have chosen to wear ocher robes, or perhaps no clothing at all, to
daub their skin with holy ash, to pray and meditate, and to wander from
place to place, depending on the charity of others. Most have given up
affiliation with their caste and kin and have undergone a funeral
ceremony for themselves, followed by a ritual rebirth into their new
ascetic life. They come from all walks of life, and range from
illiterate villagers to well-educated professionals. In their new lives
as renunciants, they are devoted to spiritual concerns, yet each is
affiliated with an ascetic order or subsect demanding strict adherence
to rules of dress, itinerancy, diet, worship, and ritual pollution.
Within each order, hierarchical concerns are exhibited in the
subservience novitiates display to revered gurus (see The Tradition of
the Enlightened Master, ch. 3). Further, at pilgrimage sites, different
orders take precedence in accordance with an accepted hierarchy. Thus,
although sadhus have foresworn many of the trappings of ordinary life,
they have not given up the hierarchy and interdependence so pervasive in
Indian society.
The most extreme sadhus, the aghoris , turn normal rules of
conduct completely upside down. Rajesh and Ramesh Bedi, who have studied
sadhus for decades, estimate that there may be fewer than fifteen aghoris
in contemporary India. In the quest for great spiritual attainment, the aghori
lives alone, like Lord Shiva, at cremation grounds, supping from a human
skull bowl. He eats food provided only by low-ranking Sweepers and
prostitutes, and in moments of religious fervor devours his own bodily
wastes and pieces of human flesh torn from burning corpses. In violating
the most basic taboos of the ordinary Hindu householder, the aghori
sadhu graphically reminds himself and others of the correct rules
of social behavior.
Hijras are males who have become "neither man nor
woman," transsexual transvestites who are usually castrated and are
attributed with certain ritual powers of blessing. As described by
anthropologist Serena Nanda, they are distinct from ordinary male
homosexuals (known as zenana , woman, or anmarad ,
un-man), who retain their identity as males and continue to live in
ordinary society. Most hijras derive from a middle- or
lower-status Hindu or Muslim background and have experienced male
impotency or effeminacy. A few originally had ambiguous or
hermaphroditic sexual organs. An estimated 50,000 hijras live
throughout India, predominantly in cities of the north. They are united
in the worship of the Hindu goddess Bahuchara Mata.
Hijras voluntarily leave their families of birth, renounce
male sexuality, and assume a female identity, name, and dress. A hijra
undergoes a surgical emasculation in which he is transformed from
an impotent male into a potentially powerful new person. Like
Shiva--attributed with breaking off his phallus and throwing it to
earth, thereby extending his sexual power to the universe (recognized in
Hindu worship of the lingam)--the emasculated hijra has the
power to bless others with fertility (see Shiva, ch. 3). Groups of hijras
go about together, dancing and singing at the homes of new baby boys,
blessing them with virility and the ability to continue the family line.
Hijras are also attributed with the power to bring rain in
times of drought. Hijras receive alms and respect for their
powers, yet they are also ridiculed and abused because of their unusual
sexual condition and because some act as male prostitutes.
The hijra community functions much like a caste. They have
communal households; newly formed fictive kinship bonds, marriage-like
arrangements; and seven nationwide "houses," or symbolic
descent groups, with regional and national leaders, and a council. There
is a hierarchy of gurus and disciples, with expulsion from the community
a possible punishment for failure to obey group rules. Thus, although
living on the margins of society, hijras are empowered by their
special relationship with their goddess and each other and occupy an
accepted and meaningful place in India's social world.
India - The Village Community
Settlement and Structure
Scattered throughout India are approximately 500,000 villages. The
Census of India regards most settlements of fewer than 5,000 as a
village. These settlements range from tiny hamlets of thatched huts to
larger settlements of tile-roofed stone and brick houses (see Structure
and Dynamics, ch. 2). Most villages are small; nearly 80 percent have
fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, according to the 1991 census. Most are
nucleated settlements, while others are more dispersed. It is in
villages that India's most basic business--agriculture--takes place.
Here, in the face of vicissitudes of all kinds, farmers follow
time-tested as well as innovative methods of growing wheat, rice,
lentils, vegetables, fruits, and many other crops in order to accomplish
the challenging task of feeding themselves and the nation. Here, too,
flourish many of India's most valued cultural forms.
Viewed from a distance, an Indian village may appear deceptively
simple. A cluster of mud-plastered walls shaded by a few trees, set
among a stretch of green or dun-colored fields, with a few people slowly
coming or going, oxcarts creaking, cattle lowing, and birds singing--all
present an image of harmonious simplicity. Indian city dwellers often
refer nostalgically to "simple village life." City artists
portray colorfully garbed village women gracefully carrying water pots
on their heads, and writers describe isolated rural settlements
unsullied by the complexities of modern urban civilization. Social
scientists of the past wrote of Indian villages as virtually
self-sufficient communities with few ties to the outside world.
In actuality, Indian village life is far from simple. Each village is
connected through a variety of crucial horizontal linkages with other
villages and with urban areas both near and far. Most villages are
characterized by a multiplicity of economic, caste, kinship,
occupational, and even religious groups linked vertically within each
settlement. Factionalism is a typical feature of village politics. In
one of the first of the modern anthropological studies of Indian village
life, anthropologist Oscar Lewis called this complexity "rural
cosmopolitanism."
Throughout most of India, village dwellings are built very close to
one another in a nucleated settlement, with small lanes for passage of
people and sometimes carts. Village fields surround the settlement and
are generally within easy walking distance. In hilly tracts of central,
eastern, and far northern India, dwellings are more spread out,
reflecting the nature of the topography. In the wet states of West
Bengal and Kerala, houses are more dispersed; in some parts of Kerala,
they are constructed in continuous lines, with divisions between
villages not obvious to visitors.
In northern and central India, neighborhood boundaries can be vague.
The houses of Dalits are generally located in separate neighborhoods or
on the outskirts of the nucleated settlement, but there are seldom
distinct Dalit hamlets. By contrast, in the south, where socioeconomic
contrasts and caste pollution observances tend to be stronger than in
the north, Brahman homes may be set apart from those of non-Brahmans,
and Dalit hamlets are set at a little distance from the homes of other
castes.
The number of castes resident in a single village can vary widely,
from one to more than forty. Typically, a village is dominated by one or
a very few castes that essentially control the village land and on whose
patronage members of weaker groups must rely. In the village of about
1,100 population near Delhi studied by Lewis in the 1950s, the Jat caste
(the largest cultivating caste in northwestern India) comprised 60
percent of the residents and owned all of the village land, including
the house sites. In Nimkhera, Madhya Pradesh, Hindu Thakurs and
Brahmans, and Muslim Pathans own substantial land, while lower-ranking
Weaver (Koli) and Barber (Khawas) caste members and others own smaller
farms. In many areas of the south, Brahmans are major landowners, along
with some other relatively high-ranking castes. Generally, land,
prosperity, and power go together.
In some regions, landowners refrain from using plows themselves but
hire tenant farmers and laborers to do this work. In other regions,
landowners till the soil with the aid of laborers, usually resident in
the same village. Fellow villagers typically include representatives of
various service and artisan castes to supply the needs of the
villagers--priests, carpenters, blacksmiths, barbers, weavers, potters,
oilpressers, leatherworkers, sweepers, waterbearers, toddy-tappers, and
so on. Artisanry in pottery, wood, cloth, metal, and leather, although
diminishing, continues in many contemporary Indian villages as it did in
centuries past. Village religious observances and weddings are occasions
for members of various castes to provide customary ritual goods and
services in order for the events to proceed according to proper
tradition.
Aside from caste-associated occupations, villages often include
people who practice nontraditional occupations. For example, Brahmans or
Thakurs may be shopkeepers, teachers, truckers, or clerks, in addition
to their caste-associated occupations of priest and farmer. In villages
near urban areas, an increasing number of people commute to the cities
to take up jobs, and many migrate. Some migrants leave their families in
the village and go to the cities to work for months at a time. Many
people from Kerala, as well as other regions, have temporarily migrated
to the Persian Gulf states for employment and send remittances back to
their village families, to which they will eventually return.
At slack seasons, village life can appear to be sleepy, but usually
villages are humming with activity. The work ethic is strong, with
little time out for relaxation, except for numerous divinely sanctioned
festivals and rite-of-passage celebrations. Residents are quick to judge
each other, and improper work or social habits receive strong criticism.
Villagers feel a sense of village pride and honor, and the reputation of
a village depends upon the behavior of all of its residents.
Village Unity and Divisiveness
Villagers manifest a deep loyalty to their village, identifying
themselves to strangers as residents of a particular village, harking
back to family residence in the village that typically extends into the
distant past. A family rooted in a particular village does not easily
move to another, and even people who have lived in a city for a
generation or two refer to their ancestral village as "our
village."
Villagers share use of common village facilities--the village pond
(known in India as a tank), grazing grounds, temples and shrines,
cremation grounds, schools, sitting spaces under large shade trees,
wells, and wastelands. Perhaps equally important, fellow villagers share
knowledge of their common origin in a locale and of each other's
secrets, often going back generations. Interdependence in rural life
provides a sense of unity among residents of a village.
A great many observances emphasize village unity. Typically, each
village recognizes a deity deemed the village protector or protectress,
and villagers unite in regular worship of this deity, considered
essential to village prosperity. They may cooperate in constructing
temples and shrines important to the village as a whole. Hindu festivals
such as Holi, Dipavali (Diwali), and Durga Puja bring villagers together
(see Public Worship, ch.3). In the north, even Muslims may join in the
friendly splashing of colored water on fellow villagers in Spring Holi
revelries, which involve villagewide singing, dancing, and joking.
People of all castes within a village address each other by kinship
terms, reflecting the fictive kinship relationships recognized within
each settlement. In the north, where village exogamy is important, the
concept of a village as a significant unit is clear. When the all-male
groom's party arrives from another village, residents of the bride's
village in North India treat the visitors with the appropriate behavior
due to them as bride-takers--men greet them with ostentatious respect,
while women cover their faces and sing bawdy songs at them. A woman born
in a village is known as a daughter of the village while an in-married
bride is considered a daughter-in-law of the village. In her conjugal
home in North India, a bride is often known by the name of her natal
village; for example, Sanchiwali (woman from Sanchi). A man who chooses
to live in his wife's natal village--usually for reasons of land
inheritance--is known by the name of his birth village, such as
Sankheriwala (man from Sankheri).
Traditionally, villages often recognized a headman and listened with
respect to the decisions of the panchayat , composed of
important men from the village's major castes, who had the power to levy
fines and exclude transgressors from village social life. Disputes were
decided within the village precincts as much as possible, with
infrequent recourse to the police or court system. In present-day India,
the government supports an elective panchayat and headman
system, which is distinct from the traditional council and headman, and,
in many instances, even includes women and very low-caste members. As
older systems of authority are challenged, villagers are less reluctant
to take disputes to court.
The solidarity of a village is always riven by conflicts, rivalries,
and factionalism. Living together in intensely close relationships over
generations, struggling to wrest a livelihood from the same limited area
of land and water sources, closely watching some grow fat and powerful
while others remain weak and dependent, fellow villagers are prone to
disputes, strategic contests, and even violence. Most villages include
what villagers call "big fish," prosperous, powerful people,
fed and serviced through the labors of the struggling "little
fish." Villagers commonly view gains as possible only at the
expense of neighbors. Further, the increased involvement of villagers
with the wider economic and political world outside the village via
travel, work, education, and television; expanding government influence
in rural areas; and increased pressure on land and resources as village
populations grow seem to have resulted in increased factionalism and
competitiveness in many parts of rural India.
India - Urban Life
The Growth of Cities
Accelerating urbanization is powerfully affecting the transformation
of Indian society. Slightly more than 26 percent of the country's
population is urban, and in 1991 more than half of urban dwellers lived
in 299 urban agglomerates or cities of more than 100,000 people. By 1991
India had twenty-four cities with populations of at least 1 million. By
that year, among cities of the world, Bombay (or Mumbai, in Marathi), in
Maharashtra, ranked seventh in the world at 12.6 million, and Calcutta,
in West Bengal, ranked eighth at almost 11 million. In the 1990s,
India's larger cities have been growing at twice the rate of smaller
towns and villages. Between the 1960s and 1991, the population of the
Union Territory of Delhi quadrupled, to 8.4 million, and Madras, in
Tamil Nadu, grew to 5.4 million. Bangalore, in Karnataka; Hyderabad, in
Andhra Pradesh; and many other cities are expanding rapidly. About half
of these increases are the result of rural-urban migration, as villagers
seek better lives for themselves in the cities.
Most Indian cities are very densely populated. New Delhi, for
example, had 6,352 people per square kilometer in 1991. Congestion,
noise, traffic jams, air pollution, and major shortages of key
necessities characterize urban life. Every major city of India faces the
same proliferating problems of grossly inadequate housing,
transportation, sewerage, electric power, water supplies, schools, and
hospitals. Slums and jumbles of pavement dwellers' lean-tos constantly
multiply. An increasing number of trucks, buses, cars, three-wheel
autorickshaws, motorcy-cles, and motorscooters, all spewing uncontrolled
fumes, surge in sometimes haphazard patterns over city streets jammed
with jaywalking pedestrians, cattle, and goats. Accident rates are high
(India's fatality rate from road accidents, the most common cause of
accidental death, is said to be twenty times higher than United States
rates), and it is a daily occurrence for a city dweller to witness a
crash or the running down of a pedestrian. In 1984 the citizens of
Bhopal suffered the nightmare of India's largest industrial accident,
when poisonous gas leaking from a Union Carbide plant killed and injured
thousands of city dwellers. Less spectacularly, on a daily basis,
uncontrolled pollutants from factories all over India damage the urban
environments in which millions live.
Urban Inequities
Major socioeconomic differences are much on display in cities. The
fine homes--often a walled compound with a garden, servants' quarters,
and garage--and gleaming automobiles of the super wealthy stand in stark
contrast to the burlap-covered huts of the barefoot poor. Shops filled
with elegant silk saris and air-conditioned restaurants cater to the
privileged, while ragged dust-covered children with outstretched hands
wait outside in hopes of receiving a few coins. The wealthy and the
middle class employ servants and workers of various kinds, but jajmani
-like ties are essentially lacking, and the rich and the poor live much
more separate lives than in villages. At the same time, casual
interaction and physical contact among people of all castes is constant,
on public streets and in buses, trains, and movie theaters.
As would-be urbanites stream into the cities, they often seek out
people from their village, caste, or region who have gone before them
and receive enough hospitality to tide them over until they can settle
in themselves. They find accommodation wherever they can, even if only
on a quiet corner of a sidewalk, or inside a concrete sewer pipe waiting
to be laid. Some are fortunate enough to find shelter in decrepit
tenements or in open areas where they can throw up flimsy structures of
mud, tin sheeting, or burlap. In such slum settlements, a single
outhouse may be shared by literally thousands of people, or, more
usually, there are no sanitary facilities at all. Ditches are awash in
raw sewage, and byways are strewn with the refuse of people and animals
with nowhere else to go.
Despite the exterior appearance of chaos, slum life is highly
structured, with many economic, religious, caste, and political
interests expressed in daily activity. Living conditions are extremely
difficult, and slum dwellers fear the constant threat of having their
homes bulldozed in municipal "slum clearance" efforts;
nonetheless, slum life is animated by a strong sense of joie de vivre.
In many sections of Indian cities, scavenging pigs, often owned by
Sweepers, along with stray dogs, help to recycle fecal material. Piles
of less noxious vegetal and paper garbage are sorted through by the
poorest people, who seek usable or salable bits of things. Cattle and
goats, owned by entrepreneurial folk, graze on these piles, turning
otherwise useless garbage into valuable milk, dung (used for cooking
fuel), and meat. These domestic animals roam even in neighborhoods of
fine homes, outside the compound walls that protect the privileged and
their gardener-tended rose bushes from needy animals and people.
Finding employment in the urban setting can be extremely challenging,
and, whenever possible, networks of relatives and friends are used to
help seek jobs. Millions of Indians are unemployed or underemployed.
Ingenuity and tenacity are the hallmarks of urban workers, who carry out
a remarkable multitude of tasks and sell an incredible variety of foods,
trinkets, and services, all under difficult conditions. Many of the
urban poor are migrant laborers carrying headloads of bricks and earth
up rickety bamboo scaffolding at construction sites, while their small
children play about at the edge of excavations or huddle on mounds of
gravel in the blazing sun. Nursing mothers must take time out
periodically to suckle their babies at the edge of construction sites;
such "recesses" are considered reason to pay a woman less for
a day's work than a man earns (male construction workers earned about
US$1 a day in 1994). Moreover, women are seen as physically weaker by
some employers and thus not deserving of equal wages with men.
These construction projects are financed by governments and by
business enterprises, which are run by cadres of well-educated, healthy,
well-dressed men and, increasingly, women, who occupy positions of power
and make decisions affecting many people. India's major cities have long
been headquarters for the country's highest socioeconomic groups, people
with transnational and international connections whose choices are
taking India into new realms of economic development and social change.
Among these well-placed people, intercaste marriages raise few eyebrows,
as long as marital unions link people of similar upper- or
upper-middle-class backgrounds. Such marriages, sometimes even across
religious lines, help knit India's most powerful people together.
Increasingly conspicuous in India's cities are the growing ranks of
the middle class. In carefully laundered clothes, they emerge from
modest and semiprosperous homes to ride buses and motorscooters to their
jobs in offices, hospitals, courts, and commercial establishments. Their
well-tended children are educated in properly organized schools. Family
groups go out together to places of worship, social events, snack shops,
and to bazaars bustling with consumers eager to buy the necessities of a
comfortable life. Members of the middle class cluster around small
stock-market outlets in cities all over the country. Even in Calcutta,
notorious for slums and street dwellers, the dominant image is of office
workers in pressed white garments riding crowded buses--or Calcutta's
world-class subway line--to their jobs as office workers and
professionals (see Transportation, ch. 6).
For nearly everyone within the highly challenging urban environment,
ties to family and kin remain crucial to prosperity. Even in the
harshest urban conditions, families show remarkable resilience.
Neighborhoods, too, take on importance, and neighbors from various
backgrounds develop cooperative ties with one another. Neighborhood
solidarity is expressed at such annual Hindu festivals as Ganesh's
Birthday (Ganesh Chaturthi) in Bombay and Durga Puja in Calcutta, when
neighborhood associations create elaborate images of the deities and
take them out in grand processions.
Cities as Centers
Cosmopolitan cities are the great hubs of commerce and government
upon which the nation's functioning depends. Bombay, India's largest
city and port, is India's economic powerhouse and locus of the nation's
atomic research. The National Capital Territory of Delhi, where a series
of seven cities was built over centuries, is the site of the
capital--New Delhi--and political nerve center of the world's largest
democracy. Calcutta and Madras fill major roles in the country's
economic life, as do high-tech Bangalore and Ahmadabad (in Gujarat),
famous for textiles. Great markets in foods, manufactured goods, and a
host of key commodities are centered in urban trading and distribution
points. Most eminent institutions of higher learning, cradles of
intellectual development and scientific investigation, are situated in
cities. The visual arts, music, classical dancing, poetry, and
literature all flourish in the urban setting. Critical political and
social commentary appears in urban newspapers and periodicals. Creative
new trends in architecture and design are conceptualized and brought to
reality in cities.
Cities are the source of television broadcasts and those great
favorites of the Indian public, movies. Bombay, sometimes called
"Bollywood," and Madras are major centers of film production,
bringing depictions of urban lifestyles before the eyes of small-town
dwellers and villagers all over the nation. With the continuing national
proliferation of television sets, videocassette recorders, and movie
videocassettes, the influence of such productions should not be
underestimated.
Social revolutions, too, receive the support of urban visionaries.
Among the more important social developments in contemporary India is
the growing women's movement, largely led by educated urban women.
Seeking to restructure society and gender relations, activists,
scholars, and workers in the women's movement have come together in
numerous loosely allied and highly diverse organizations focusing on
issues of rights and equality, empowerment, and justice for women. Some
of these groups exist in rural areas, but most are city based.
The escalating issues of dowry-related murder and suicide are most
pressing in New Delhi, where groups such as Saheli (Woman Friend)
provide essential support to troubled women. The pathbreaking feminist
publication Manushi is published in New Delhi and distributed
throughout the country. The overwhelming economic needs of self-employed
poor female workers in Ahmadabad inspired Ela Bhatt and her coworkers in
the Self-Employed Women's Association, which has been highly successful
in helping poor women improve their own lives.
Urban women have initiated protests challenging female feticide,
child marriage, child prostitution, domestic violence, polygyny, sati,
sexual harassment, police rape of female plaintiffs, and other
gender-related injustices. Their efforts have brought new ways of
thinking out of elite, educated circles into the broader public arena of
India's multilevel society.
In 1994, two attractive urban Indian women won the most prominent
international beauty contests, the Miss Universe and the Miss World
competitions. Thousands of young Indian women idolized the glamorous
beauties and many newspapers gushed about the victories, but women's
groups and feminist commentators decried this adulation. They pointed
out that the deprivations and injustices experienced by a high
proportion of Indian women were being given short shrift. While the
beauty contest winners were being paraded about in crowns and white
chariots before admiring throngs, almost ignored by the public and the
media were the torture-slaying of a village woman accused of theft by a
soothsayer and the historic qualification of six women as the Indian air
force's first female pilots (see The Air Force, ch. 10). In 1995, the
All India Democratic Women's Association and other groups protested in
New Delhi against the Miss India contest.