HAITI'S LOW-INCOME, PEASANT-BASED economy faced serious economic and
ecological obstacles to development in the late 1980s. The country's
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1987 was approximately US$1.95 billion,
or about US$330 per capita, ranking Haiti as the poorest country in the
Western Hemisphere and as the twenty-seventh most impoverished nation in
the world. The only low-income country--defined by the World Bank as a
country with a per capita GDP in 1988 below US$425--in the Americas,
Haiti fell even farther behind other low-income countries in Africa and
Asia during the 1980s.
Haiti's economy continued to be fundamentally agricultural in the
1980s, although agriculture's role in the economy--as measured by its
share of GDP, the labor force, and exports--had fallen sharply after
1950. Highly inefficient exploitation of the scarce natural resources of
the countryside caused severe deforestation and soil erosion and
constituted the primary cause of the decline in agricultural
productivity. Manufacturing became the most dynamic sector in Haiti
during the 1970s, as the country's abundant supply of low-cost labor
stimulated the growth of assembly operations. Services such as banking,
tourism, and transportation played comparatively minor roles in the
economy. Tourism, a potential source of foreign-exchange earnings,
expanded rapidly in the 1970s, but it contracted during the 1980s as a
consequence of political upheaval and news coverage that erroneously
identified Haiti as the origin of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (<>AIDS
).
Haiti's agricultural wealth, coveted by many in colonial times, had
waned by the mid-nineteenth century as land reform divided the island's
plantations into small plots farmed by emancipated slaves. Changes in
land tenure contributed significantly to falling agricultural output,
but the failure of Haiti's leaders to manage the economy also
contributed to the country's long-term impoverishment. Haiti's economy
reflected the cleavages (i.e., rural-urban, black-mulatto, poor-rich,
CreoleFrench , traditional-modern) that defined Haitian society. The
mulatto elite dominated the capital, showed little interest in the
countryside, and had outright disdain for the black peasantry.
Disparities between rural and urban dwellers worsened during the
twentieth century under the dynastic rule of Fran�ois Duvalier
(1957-71) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-86); Haiti's tradition
of corruption reached new heights as government funds that could have
aided economic and social development enriched the Duvaliers and their
associates. By the 1980s, an estimated 1 percent of the population
received 45 percent of the national income, and an estimated 200
millionaires in Haiti enjoyed a life of unparalleled extravagance. In
stark contrast, as many as three of every four Haitians lived in abject
poverty, with incomes well below US$150, according to the World Bank.
Similarly, virtually every social indicator pointed to ubiquitous
destitution.
As a result of the traditional passivity of the government and the
country's dire poverty, Haiti has depended extensively, since the
mid-1970s, on foreign development aid for budget support. The United
States has been the largest donor, but it has frequently interrupted the
flow of aid because of alleged human rights abuses, corruption, and
election fraud. Most other development agencies have followed the United
States lead, thus extending United States influence over events in
Haiti. Although the major multilateral and bilateral development
agencies have provided the bulk of foreign funding, hundreds of
nongovernmental organizations have also played a prominent role in
development assistance. These nongovernmental organizations, affiliated
for the most part with religious groups, have sustained hundreds of
thousands of Haitians through countrywide feeding stations. They also
contributed to the country's political upheaval in 1986 by underscoring
the Duvalier regime's neglect of social programs. The accomplishments of
the nongovernmental organizations have proved that concerted efforts at
economic development could achieve results in Haiti.
The prospects for development improved temporarily following
Jean-Claude Duvalier's February 1986 departure; some important economic
reforms took place, and the economy began to grow. Subsequently,
however, renewed political instability forestalled continued reform.
Economic progress was feasible, but entrenched political and social
obstacles prevented Haiti from reaching that goal.
After Christopher Columbus's discovery of Hispaniola (La Isla Espa�ola)
in 1492, Spanish mercantilists generally neglected the island and
instead focused their endeavors on the more richly endowed areas of
Mexico and Peru. In 1664 France successfully converted the western third
of Hispaniola into an unofficial territory; over the next 140 years
French colonialists transformed the colony of Saint-Domingue into a
slave-based plantation economy known as the "pearl of the
Antilles." By the late eighteenth century, SaintDomingue boasted
thousands of profitable plantations: 800 produced sugar; 3,000, coffee;
800, cotton; and nearly 3,000, indigo. Haiti became France's most
lucrative overseas possession. In his classic 1776 publication, The
Wealth of Nations, economist Adam Smith declared Saint-Domingue
"the most important of the sugar colonies of the West Indies."
The Haitian Revolution (1791-1803) devastated agricultural output.
The leadership of the new nation faced the daunting task of reviving
economic activity without relying on slavery. After the 1806
assassination of Haiti's first national leader, JeanJacques Dessalines,
Haiti operated under a dual economy, with forced labor on large
plantations in the north and small-scale farming in partitioned land in
the south. The 1820 unification of the nation entailed the abandonment
of plantation agriculture and the establishment of a peasant-based
agricultural economy. Although policies of land redistribution and
limited social and economic reform improved the lives of the former
slaves, the policies also produced a severe and ultimately irreversible
decline in agricultural production.
Successive Haitian presidents gave priority to selfenrichment and to
the payment of a controversial debt with France, which left little
capital for improving the standard of living. The rigid social
stratification and the political disparity between mulattoes and blacks
further widened the gap between the rich elite and the poor.
The nineteen-year United States occupation of Haiti (1915-34) brought
unquestionable economic benefits. United States administrators
controlled fiscal and monetary policy largely to the country's benefit.
The United States military built major roads, introduced automatic
telephones in Port-au-Prince, constructed bridges, dredged harbors,
erected schools, established clinics, and undertook other previously
neglected public works. The troops departed in 1934, but economic
advisers remained in Haiti to manage the national treasury until 1941.
The Haitian economy enjoyed some growth in the 1940s and the early
1950s, partly because of improvements in the country's infrastructure,
but mostly because of improved prices for its exports.
Fran�ois Duvalier fashioned the modern Haitian economy into a system
dominated by personal patronage, institutionalized corruption, and
internal security concerns. Bent on retaining power at all costs,
Duvalier heavily taxed the citizenry to finance the military, the
paramilitary security forces known as the tonton makouts, and
his family's vast expenses. His subordinates, from cabinet ministers to
rural section chiefs (chefs de sections), followed Duvalier's
example, essentially plundering the peasantry at every level of the
economy. The most notorious example of Duvalier's overt corruption was
his administration of a tax agency, the R�gie du Tabac (Tobacco
Administration), for which no accounting records were kept. Although he
proclaimed himself a champion of black nationalism, Duvalier almost
completely ignored the impoverished rural black population in his
government expenditures. As a result, many Haitians--rich, poor,
educated, and uneducated--left the countryside or fled the country
altogether. "Brain drain" became a serious problem. In 1969,
for example, some observers believed that there were more Haitian health
professionals in <"http://worldfacts.us/Canada-Montreal.htm"> Montreal
than in all of Haiti.
Overall, Duvalier's policies had no positive effect in Haiti.
According to the United Nations (UN), Haiti was the only country in the
world that did not experience real economic growth for most of the 1950s
and the 1960s, a period when the world economy expanded at its most
rapid rate in history.
During the 1970s, Haiti enjoyed a 5 percent annual economic growth
rate as foreign aid, overseas investment, and higher commodity prices
buoyed the economy. A key factor in this growth was the 1973 renewal of
foreign aid from the United States and other donors after a ten-year
suspension. The rapid development of assembly manufacturing that began
in the late 1960s also stimulated economic expansion. Higher prices for
coffee, sugar, cacao, and essential oils boosted previously depressed
cash-crop production. Infrastructure development proceeded, construction
boomed, banking prospered, and tourist arrivals more than doubled. Haiti
modernized considerably, especially in Port-au- Prince and the major
provincial cities. Agriculture stagnated, however, and per capita food
production in real terms continued to decline. Jean-Claude Duvalier
showed some interest in developing the nonagricultural sectors of the
economy during his regime, and the state slowly expanded its role.
Haiti's fortunes soured in the 1980s, as real economic growth
declined by 2.5 percent a year from 1980 to 1985. Inflation rose over
the same period from 6 to 8 percent, and official unemployment jumped
from 22 percent to more than 30 percent. After an interval of positive
growth in 1986 and 1987, the negative growth trend continued in 1988,
when the economy contracted by 5 percent. Although the country's poor
performance in the 1980s to some extent reflected hemispheric trends,
Haiti faced its own peculiar obstacles, many of which stemmed from
decades of government indifference to economic development. Uneven
foreign aid flows, resulting from disputes over human rights violations
and a lack of progress toward democracy, hampered government
spending.Worsening ecological problems hindered agricultural
development, and tourist arrivals plummeted because of negative media
coverage of the island's political situation and the high incidence of
AIDS among Haitians.
The most fundamental problems of the Haitian economy, however, were
economic mismanagement and corruption. More avaricious than his father,
Jean-Claude Duvalier overstepped even the traditionally accepted
boundaries of Haitian corruption. Duvalierists under Jean-Claude engaged
in, among other activities, drug trafficking, pilferage of development
and food aid, illegal resale and export of subsidized oil, fraudulent
lotteries, export of cadavers and blood plasma, manipulation of
government contracts, tampering with pension funds, and skimming of
budgeted funds. As a result, the president for life and his wife lived
luxuriously, in stark contrast to the absolute poverty of most Haitians.
Allegations of official corruption surfaced when Duvalier appointed a
former World Bank official, Marc Bazin, to the post of finance minister
in 1982. Bazin sought to investigate corruption and to reform fiscal
accounting practices in connection with a 1981 International Monetary
Fund (IMF) economic stabilization agreement. More zealous than Duvalier
had anticipated, Bazin documented case after case of corruption,
determined that at least 36 percent of government revenue was embezzled,
and declared the country the "most mismanaged in the region."
Although quickly replaced, Bazin gave credence to foreign complaints of
corruption, such as that contained in a 1982 report by the Canadian
government that deemed Duvalier's Haiti a kleptocracy.
After the fall of Duvalier, the provisional National Council of
Government (Conseil National de Gouvernement--CNG) enacted numerous
policy reforms mandated by structural adjustment lending programs from
the IMF and the World Bank. These reforms included the privatization of
unprofitable state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization, and export
promotion. The CNG, however, never fully implemented the economic
reforms because of nagging political instability. At the close of the
decade, the economic direction of the military government, led by
Lieutenant General Prosper Avril, remained unclear.
Fiscal Policy
Despite irregularities in the allocation of funds under the Fran�ois
Duvalier regime, government revenues traditionally equaled, or
surpassed, budget outlays, technically yielding balanced budgets.
Jean-Claude Duvalier's unprecedented intervention in the economy in the
1980s, however, broke this tradition. The public sector under Duvalier
established, or expanded, its ownership of an international fishing
fleet, a flour mill, a cement company, a vegetable-oil processing plant,
and two sugar factories. Duvalierist officials based these investment
decisions primarily on the amount of personal profit that would accrue
to themselves, to Duvalier, and to the rest of his coterie. They ignored
the potential negative impact on the economy. Poorly managed, the
state's newly acquired enterprises drained fiscal accounts, causing the
overall public-sector deficit to reach 10.6 percent of GDP in fiscal
year (FY) 1985, despite sharp reductions in spending on already meager
social programs in accordance with an IMF stabilization program. In July
1986, the Ministry of Finance, under the CNG, revamped fiscal policies
through tax reform, privatization, and revisions of the tariff code.
Although the CNG greatly increased spending on health and education, the
reform measures served to lower the government's deficit to 7 percent of
GDP by FY 1987. General Avril's FY 1989 budget attempted further to
curtail deficit spending, but that prospect remained unlikely without
stable flows of economic assistance.
Expenditures
The misallocation of public revenues for private use and the low
government allocations for economic and social development have
contributed directly to Haiti's extreme poverty. After 1986, national
budgets included a significantly larger portion for development efforts,
but they continued to allocate the largest share--17 percent in FY
1987-88--to the armed forces and internal security forces. About 57
percent of FY 1988 expenditures were for wages and salaries; 26 percent,
for goods and services; 10 percent, for interest payments; 4 percent,
for extrabudgetary spending; and 3 percent, for transfers and subsidies.
Compared with previous budgets in the 1980s, this budget included
increased spending on wages and interest payments and decreased spending
on goods and services, as well as an allocation for unspecified
expenses. The FY 1989 budget continued these fiscal trends. The leading
expenditure items in the FY 1989 budget were defense (16.4 percent),
debt payments (15.8 percent), education (14.5 percent), health and
social services (13.7 percent), and finance, public service, and
commerce (12.4 percent). According to some reports, however,
discrepancies existed between budget allocations and actual
disbursements.
Revenues
The structure of government revenues changed distinctly as a
consequence of the tax and tariff revisions of 1986. Haiti's taxes and
tariffs historically exacted revenues from directly productive
activities--mainly agriculture--and from international trade. This
revenue structure eventually created disincentives for the production of
cash crops and other export products, while it stimulated the
development of uncompetitive industries. Over time, Haiti's authorities
created a public-finance pattern that, when combined with a highly
regressive income tax, raised approximately 85 percent of its revenue
from the rural population, but spent only about 20 percent on those same
taxpayers.
A 10 percent value-added tax was introduced in 1983, but it was not
until 1986 that tax and tariff reforms began to shift the source of
revenues. New tax laws simplified the income-tax process, altered tax
brackets, and strengthened tax-collection efforts. In the area of trade
regulations, the new government phased out export taxes and replaced
quantitative restrictions on all but five goods with ad valorem tariffs
of a maximum of 40 percent, thus essentially lowering import protection
and liberalizing trade. As a result of these policies, revenues derived
from international trade dropped from 35 percent in FY 1984 to an
estimated 22 percent in FY 1989; the revenue balance in both years was
derived from internal taxes.
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies
The Bank of the Republic of Haiti (Banque de la R�publique
d'Haiti--BRH) represented one of the few well-established, public-sector
institutions dedicated to economic management. Founded in 1880 as the
National Bank of Haiti, the BRH--a commercial bank--did not begin to act
as a central bank until 1934, when it became known as the National
Republic Bank of Haiti. Since the 1930s, the bank has performed the
functions of a central bank, a commercial bank, and a
development-finance institution; it also has been involved in other
matters, such as the management of the Port-au-Prince wharf. As a
central bank, the BRH also issued Haiti's national currency, the gourde.
On August 17, 1979, new banking laws gave the BRH its present name
and empowered it with the monetary-management responsibilities
associated with most central banks. The BRH subsequently became actively
involved in controlling credit, setting interest rates, assessing
reserve ratios, and restraining inflation. In the late 1980s, the BRH
pursued generally conservative monetary policies, and it employed high
cash-reserve ratios in commercial banks as the key policy tool to
regulate the money supply. In an effort to increase the dynamism of the
economy, the BRH sought to inject more credit into the private sector,
particularly for long-term uses.
Since 1919 the Haitian currency has been pegged to the United States
currency at the rate of five gourdes to the dollar. Since that same
date, the United States dollar has served as legal tender on the island
and has circulated freely. Remarkably, the value of Haiti's fixed
exchange rate remained strong for decades; it fluctuated only with the
movements of the currency of the United States, its main trading
partner. Until the 1980s, no black market existed for gourdes, but
unusually high inflation and large budget deficits eroded their value
and brought premiums of up to 25 percent for black-market transactions
in the early 1980s. The black market subsided considerably in the late
1980s, but the gourde's real rate of exchange remained above the 1980
level.
Haiti - LABOR
Haiti's 1989 labor force was estimated at 2.8 million people. The
economically active population (those over age ten), however,
represented more than half of the country's total 6.1 million
population. Forty-two percent of the official work force was female,
ranking the country's female participation as one of the highest among
developing countries. In rural areas, however, the role of women in
production and commerce was apparently much greater than these
statistics indicated.
The distribution of the labor force by economic sector from 1950 to
1987 reflected a shift from agriculture to services, with some growth in
industry. Despite these changes, agriculture continued to dominate
economic activity in the 1980s, employing 66 percent of the labor force;
it was followed by services, 24 percent, and industry, 10 percent. Based
on these figures, Haiti continued to be the most agrarian, and the least
industrial, society in the Western Hemisphere. The country's employment
of only 50,000 salaried workers in 1988 was further evidence of the
traditional character of the work force.
Statistics on employment and the methodologies used to gather such
data varied widely; most unemployment figures were only estimates. In
1987 the United States Department of Labor estimated that Haiti's
unemployment rate was 49 percent. Other estimates ranged from 30 to 70
percent. Official unemployment was severe in Port-au-Prince, but
comparatively low in rural areas, reflecting urban migration trends,
rapid population growth, and the low number of skilled and semi-skilled
workers.
Haiti established a labor code in 1961, but revised it in March 1984
to bring legislation more in line with standards set by the
International Labour Office (ILO). Conformity with ILO guidelines was a
prerequisite for certification under the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI--see Appendix B) enacted by the United States Congress in 1983.
Haiti's most fundamental labor law, the minimum wage, was also the
most controversial. Low wage rates attracted foreign assembly
operations. In 1989 the average minimum wage stood at the equivalent of
US$3 a day, with some small variations for different types of assembly
work. The minimum wage in the late 1980s was below the 1970 level in
real terms, but assembly manufacturers and government officials refused
to increase wages because they needed to remain competitive with other
Caribbean countries. Labor laws included an array of provisions
protecting workers in the areas of overtime, holidays, night-shift work,
and sick leave. The government, however, did not universally enforce
many of these provisions. The greatest number of workers' complaints
came from assembly plants where seasonal layoffs were common.
The organized-labor movement, generally suppressed under the
Duvaliers, grew rapidly in the wake of the dynasty's collapse. Three
major trade unions dominated organized-labor activity in the 1980s. The
newest of these three was the Federation of Union Workers (F�deration
des Ouvriers Syndiqu�s--FOS). Established in 1983 after negotiations
over the CBI opened the way for public labor organization, the FOS by
1987 represented forty-four member unions, nineteen of which were
registered with the government. Its combined membership in
Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes totaled approximately 15,000. Politically
moderate, the FOS was affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. The oldest
union of influence, the Autonomous Federation of Haitian
Workers/Federation of Latin American Workers (Centrale Autonome des
Travailleurs Ha�tiens/Centrale Latino-Am�ricaine des
Travailleurs--CATH/CLAT), was affiliated with the Latin American
trade-union movement and shared its history of political activism.
CATH/CLAT consisted of 150 unions, including 63 that were registered
with the government. It professed a membership of 7,000. Haiti's third
principal union, the CATH, had splintered from CATH/CLAT in 1980; it had
managed to take with it forty-four member unions, all recognized by the
state. CATH claimed a membership of 5,000. CATH and CATH/CLAT primarily
represented assembly workers. The Ministry of Social Affairs registered
only unions and not individual members; this practice allowed unions to
exaggerate their membership, which probably amounted to fewer than 5,000
by 1987. By the end of the decade, trade unions had made only small
organizational inroads among assembly workers; the role of union
activity in that sector was the central point of debate in the
organized-labor movement.
Haiti - AGRICULTURE
Agriculture continued to be the mainstay of the economy in the late
1980s; it employed approximately 66 percent of the labor force and
accounted for about 35 percent of GDP and for 24 percent of exports in
1987. The role of agriculture in the economy has declined severely since
the 1950s, when the sector employed 80 percent of the labor force,
represented 50 percent of GDP, and contributed 90 percent of exports.
Many factors have contributed to this decline. Some of the major ones
included the continuing fragmentation of landholdings, low levels of
agricultural technology, migration out of rural areas, insecure land
tenure, a lack of capital investment, high commodity taxes, the low
productivity of undernourished farmers, animal and plant diseases, and
inadequate infrastructure. Neither the government nor the private sector
invested much in rural ventures; in FY 1989 only 5 percent of the
national budget went to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources,
and Rural Development (Minist�re de l'Agriculture, des Resources
Naturelles et du D�veloppement Rural--MARNDR). As Haiti entered the
1990s, however, the main challenge to agriculture was not economic, but
ecological. Extreme deforestation, soil erosion, droughts, flooding, and
the ravages of other natural disasters had all led to a critical
environmental situation.
<>Land Tenure and Land
Policy
After independence from France, Alexandre P�tion (and later
Jean-Pierre Boyer) undertook Latin America's first, and perhaps most
radical, land reform by subdividing plantations for the use of
emancipated slaves. The reform measures were so extensive that by 1842
no plantation was its original size. By the mid-nineteenth century,
therefore, Haiti's present-day land structure was largely in place. The
basic structures of land tenure remained remarkably stable during the
twentieth century, despite steadily increasing pressure for land, the
fragmentation of land parcels, and a slight increase in the
concentration of ownership.
For historical reasons, Haiti's patterns of land tenure were quite
different from those of other countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Most Haitians owned at least some of their land. Complex
forms of tenancy also distinguished Haitian land tenure. Moreover, land
owned by peasants often varied in the size and number of plots, the
location and topography of the parcels, and other factors.
Scholars have debated issues related to land tenure and agriculture
in Haiti because they considered census data unreliable. Other primary
data available to them were geographically limited and frequently out of
date. The three national censuses of 1950, 1971, and 1982 provided core
information on land tenure, but other studies financed by the United
States Agency for International Development (AID) supplemented and
updated census data. The final tabulations of the 1982 census were still
unavailable in late 1989.
The 1971 census revealed that there were 616,700 farms in Haiti, and
that an average holding of 1.4 hectares consisted of several plots of
less than 1 hectare. Haitians, however, most commonly measured their
land by the common standard, a carreau, equal to about 3.3
hectares. The survey concluded that the largest farms made up only 3
percent of the total number of farms and that they comprised less than
20 percent of the total land. It also documented that 60 percent of
farmers owned their land, although some lacked official title to it.
Twentyeight percent of all farmers rented and sharecropped land. Only a
small percentage of farms belonged to cooperatives. The 1950 census, by
contrast, had found that 85 percent of farmers owned their land.
Studies in the 1980s indicated a trend toward increased fragmentation
of peasant lands, an expanding role for sharecropping and renting, and a
growing concentration of higherquality land, particularly in the
irrigated plains. As a consequence of high rural population density and
deteriorating soils, competition over land appeared to be intensifying.
Haiti's land density, that is, the number of people per square kilometer
of arable land, jumped from 296 in 1965 to 408 by the mid-1980s-- a
density greater than that in India.
The three major forms of land tenancy in Haiti were ownership,
renting (or subleasing), and sharecropping. Smallholders typically
acquired their land through purchase, inheritance, or a claim of
long-term use. Many farmers also rented land temporarily from the state,
absentee landlords, local owners, or relatives. In turn, renters
frequently subleased some of these lands, particularly parcels owned by
the state. Renters generally enjoyed more rights to the land they worked
than did sharecroppers. Unlike sharecroppers, however, renters had to
pay for land in advance, typically for a period of one year. The
prevalence of renting made the land market exceedingly dynamic; even
small farmers rented land, depending on the amount of extra income they
derived from raising cash crops. Sharecropping, also very common, was
usually a shorter-term agreement, perhaps lasting only one growing
season. Sharecropper and landowner partnerships were less exploitive
than those in many other Latin American countries; in most agreements,
farmers gave landowners half the goods they produced on the land.
Other land arrangements included managing land for absentee
landlords, squatting, and wage labor. The practice of having an on-site
overseer (j�ran) manage land for another owner, usually
another peasant residing far away, was a variation of sharecropping. J�rans
were generally paid in-kind for their custodial services. Overgrazing,
or unregulated gardening, was the most common form of squatting, which
took place on most kinds of lands, especially state-owned land. A small
minority of peasants were landless; they worked as day laborers or
leased subsistence plots. In addition, thousands of Haitians migrated
seasonally to the Dominican Republic as braceros (temporary laborers) to
cut sugarcane under wretched conditions.
Haiti - Land Use and Farming Technology
It is difficult to understand the complex variations in land tenancy
without an appreciation of land use and peasant attitudes toward land.
More mountainous than Switzerland, Haiti has a limited amount of
cultivable land. According to soil surveys by the United States
Department of Agriculture in the early 1980s, 11.3 percent of the land
was highly suitable for crops, while 31.7 percent was suitable with some
restrictions related to erosion, topography, or conservation. The
surveys revealed that 2.3 percent was mediocre because of poor drainage,
but was acceptable for rice cultivation, and 54.7 percent was
appropriate only for tree crops or pastures because of severe erosion or
steep slopes. According to estimates of land use in 1978, 42.2 percent
of land was under constant or shifting cultivation, 19.2 percent was
pasture land, and 38.6 percent was not cultivated.
The use of purchased inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticides,
machinery, and irrigation, was rare; farmers in Haiti employed
traditional agricultural practices more than did farmers in any other
part of the Western Hemisphere. Although Haitian farmers used increased
amounts of chemical fertilizers in the 1970s and the 1980s, their use of
an average of only seven kilograms per hectare ranked Haiti ahead of
Bolivia, only, among Western Hemisphere countries. Peasants applied
mostly natural fertilizers, such as manure, mulch, and bat guano. Large
landowners consumed most of the country's small amounts of chemical
fertilizers, and they benefited from subsidized fertilizers imported
from the Dominican Republic and mixed in Port-au-Prince. Five importers
controlled the 400,000 kilograms of pesticides that entered the country
each year; malariacarrying mosquitoes and rodents in the rice fields
were the main targets of pesticide application. Most rural cultivators
used small hand tools, such as hoes, machetes, digging sticks, and a
local machete-like tool called the serpette. There was an
average of one tractor per 1,700 hectares; most farmers considered such
machinery inappropriate for use on tiny plots scattered along deeply
graded hillsides. The insecurity of land tenure further discouraged the
use of capital inputs.
The amount of irrigated crop land in the 1980s, estimated at between
70,000 and 110,00 hectares, was substantially less than the 140,000
hectares of colonial times. Of the nearly 130 irrigation systems in
place, many lacked adequate maintenance, were clogged with silt, or
provided irregular supplies to their 80,000 users. By the 1980s, the
irrigation network had been extended as far as was possible.
The minimal amount of research on agriculture and the limited number
of extension officers that MARNDR provided gave little assistance to
already low levels of farming technology. Foreign organizations, such as
the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture, carried out
the most research. Foreign organizations also provided more technical
assistance in agriculture than the government.
Peasant attitudes and limited access to credit also helped to explain
the traditional nature of farming. Most observers blamed agricultural
underdevelopment on peasants' individualistic nature, their proclivity
toward superstition, and their unwillingness to innovate. Small farmers
also lacked access to credit. Informal credit markets flourished, but
credit was not always available at planting time. When credit was
available, it was usually provided at usurious rates. The country's
major public financial institutions provided loans to the agricultural
sector, but this lending benefited less than 10 percent of all farmers.
Major credit sources included the Agricultural Credit Bureau,
agriculture credit societies, credit unions, cooperatives, and
institutions created by nongovernmental organizations.
Haiti - Cash Crops
Despite its relative decline, coffee endured as the leading
agricultural export during the 1980s. The French had introduced coffee
to Haiti from Martinique in 1726, and soon coffee became an important
colonial commodity. Coffee production peaked in 1790, and it declined
steadily after independence. Production dropped precipitously during the
1960s. After a boom in prices and in the production of coffee in the
late 1970s, output declined again from 42,900 tons in 1980 to 30,088
tons by 1987. Coffee trees covered an estimated 133,000 hectares in the
1980s, with an average annual yield of 35,900 tons. Haiti was a member
of the International Coffee Organization (ICO), but found itself
increasingly unable to fulfill its ICO export quota, which stood at
300,000 bags, of 60 kilograms each, in 1988. Most analysts believed that
excessive taxation and the low prices afforded to peasant farmers had
contributed to the decline in coffee production.
Coffee provides one of the best examples of the market orientation of
Haiti's peasant economy. Most peasants grew coffee, usually alongside
other crops. More than 1 million Haitians participated in the coffee
industry as growers, marketers (known as Madame Sarahs), middlemen (sp�culateurs),
or exporters. The peasants' widespread participation throughout the
coffee industry demonstrated that they were not merely subsistence
farmers, but that they were also actively engaged in the market economy.
After harvest by peasants, female Madame Sarahs transported coffee to
local and urban markets and sold the beans. Middlemen, in turn, sold
coffee to members of the Coffee Exporters Association (Association des
Exportateurs de Caf�--Asdec), which set prices and thereby passed on
the traditionally high coffee-export taxes directly to producers.
Because of its prominent role in agriculture and the inequitable nature
of the trade, the coffee industry was the subject of numerous studies.
The majority of these studies highlighted imperfect competition and the
systematic enrichment of a small group of Port-au-Prince exporters.
Sugar was another cash crop with a long history in Haiti. Columbus
brought sugarcane to present-day Haiti on his second voyage to
Hispaniola, and sugar rapidly became the colony's most important cash
crop. After 1804, production never returned to preindependence levels,
but sugar production and low-level exports continued. Unlike the system
in other Caribbean countries, sugar in Haiti was a cash crop raised by
peasants rather than by large-scale plantations. The sugar harvest
dipped to under 4 million tons by the early 1970s, but it rebounded to
nearly 6 million tons of cane by the middle of the decade with a sharp
increase in the world price of the commodity. Lower world prices and
structural problems combined to cause a drop in sugar output in the
1980s; by the end of the decade, sugarcane covered fewer than 114,000
hectares of the coastal plains, and it yielded fewer than 4.5 million
tons annually.
Further expansion of the sugar industry faced serious deeprooted
obstacles. For example, the production cost of Haitian sugar was three
times more than the world price in the 1980s. Shifts in the world sugar
market, caused mainly by the international substitution of corn-based
fructose for sugarcane, exerted further pressure on Haitian producers.
One result of this situation was the practice of importing sugar, which
was then reexported to the United States under the Haitian sugar quota.
Reductions in Haiti's quota during the 1980s, however, limited exchanges
of this sort.
Total sugar exports dropped from 19,200 tons in 1980 to 6,500 tons in
1987. In 1981, 1982, and 1988 Haiti exported no sugar. Haiti's four
sugar mills closed temporarily on several occasions during the decade. The oldest mill, the Haitian American Sugar Company
(HASCO), was the only plant that maintained a large cane plantation.
Realizing the dim future for sugar, outside development agencies
proposed alternatives to sugar, such as soybeans, for Haiti's plains.
Cacao, sisal, essential oils, and cotton were other significant cash
crops. Cacao trees covered an estimated 10,400 hectares in 1987, and
they yielded 4,000 tons of cocoa a year. Mennonite missionaries played a
growing role in the cocoa industry, mostly around southern departments,
especially Grande'Anse. Sisal, exported as a twine since 1927, peaked in
the 1950s, as the Korean War demanded much of the nation's 40,000-ton
output. By the 1980s, however, Haiti exported an average of only 6,500
tons a year, mainly to the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. The
substitution of synthetic fibers for sisal reduced most large-scale
growing of the plant, but many peasants continued to harvest the natural
fiber for its use in hats, shoes, carpets, and handbags. The export of
essential oils, derived from vetiver, lime, amyris, and bitter orange,
peaked in 1976 at 395 tons. Exports leveled off at a little more than
200 tons during the 1980s, generating an average of US$5 million in
foreign exchange. Cotton cultivation peaked in the 1930s, before Mexican
boll weevil beetles ravaged the crop. Growers introduced a higher
quality of cotton, in the 1960s, which was processed in local cotton
gins and then exported to Europe. Cotton prices fell in the 1980s,
however, and cotton plantings shrank from 12,400 hectares in 1979 to
under 8,000 hectares by 1986. Exports ceased. Government policies in the
1980s emphasized diversification into nontraditional export crops that
would benefit under the terms of the CBI; the poor performance of
traditional cash crops enhanced the importance of these efforts for the
Haitian economy.
Haiti - Food Crops
Food crops fared somewhat better than cash crops in the 1980s, as
prices for cash crops dropped, and economic uncertainty increased.
Nonetheless, real per capita food production declined, and the country
continued to import millions of tons of grains. The trend toward
increased production of food crops had negative ecological consequences
as the planting and the harvesting of tuber staples accelerated soil
erosion. Haiti's peasants were already underfed. It was therefore
unlikely that farmers would grow tree crops in place of staples without
appropriate incentives.
Peasants cultivated a variety of cereals for food and animal feeds,
notably corn, sorghum, and rice. Corn, also referred to as maize, was
the leading food crop; it was sown on more hectares-- 220,000 in
1987--than any other crop. Farmers in southern departments grew corn
separately, but elsewhere they mixed it with other crops, mostly
legumes. Total production averaged approximately 185,000 tons during the
1980s; yields increased in some areas. Drought-resistant sorghum often
replaced corn during the second growing season as the leading crop, but
total hectares planted and total production averaged only 156,250 and
125,000 tons, respectively. Rice became an increasingly common cereal,
beginning in the 1960s, when increased irrigation of the Artibonite
Valley aided larger-scale farming. Rice production, however, fluctuated considerably, and it
remained dependent on government subsidies. An estimated 60,000 hectares
of rice yielded an average of 123,000 tons, from 1980 to 1987.
Tubers were also cultivated as food. Sweet potatoes, one of the
nation's largest crops, grew on an estimated 100,000 hectares, and they
yielded 260,000 tons of produce a year in the 1980s. Manioc, or cassava,
another major tuber, was mix-cropped on upwards of 60,000 hectares to
produce between 150,000 and 260,000 tons a year, much of which was for
direct consumption. The cultivation of yams, limited by the lack of deep
moist soils, took up only 26,000 hectares. The tropical Pacific tuber
taro, called malang� in Haiti, grew with other tubers on more
than 27,000 hectares.
Haitians also cultivated dozens of other food crops. Red, black, and
other kinds of beans were very popular; they provided the main source of
protein in the diet of millions. As many as 129,000 hectares provided
67,000 tons of beans in 1987. Banana and plantain trees were also common
and provided as much as 500,000 tons of produce, almost entirely for
domestic consumption. Although the flimsy trees were vulnerable to
hurricanes and to droughts, rapid replanting helped sustain the crop.
Mangoes, another tree crop, were a daily source of food, and they
provided some exports. Other food crops included citrus fruit, avocados,
pineapples, watermelons, almonds, coconut, okra, peanuts, tomatoes,
breadfruit, and mamey (tropical apricot). In addition, Haitians
grew a wide variety of spices for food, medicine, and other purposes,
including thyme, anise, marjoram, absinthe, oregano, black pepper,
cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg, garlic, and horseradish.
Haiti - Forestry
Nothing better symbolized the vicious cycle of poverty in Haiti than
the process of deforestation. Haiti was once a lush tropical island,
replete with pines and broad leaf trees; however, by 1988 only about 2
percent of the country had tree cover.
The most direct effect of deforestation was soil erosion. In turn,
soil erosion lowered the productivity of the land, worsened droughts,
and eventually led to desertification, all of which increased the
pressure on the remaining land and trees. The United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization estimated that this cycle destroyed 6,000
hectares of arable land a year in the 1980s. Analysts calculated that,
at the rate of deforestation prevailing in the late 1980s, the country's
tree cover would be completely depleted by 2008.
Deforestation accelerated after Hurricane Hazel downed trees
throughout the island in 1954. Beginning in about 1954, concessionaires
stepped up their logging operations, in response to Port-au-Prince's
intensified demand for charcoal, thus accelerating deforestation, which
had already become a problem because of environmentally unsound
agricultural practices, rapid population growth, and increased
competition over scarce land.
Most of Haiti's governments paid only lip service to the imperative
of reforestation. As was the case in other areas of Haitian life, the
main impetus to act came from abroad. AID's Agroforestry Outreach
Program, Proj� Pyebwa, was the country's major reforestation program in
the 1980s. Peasants planted more than 25 million trees under Proj�
Pyebwa, but as many as seven trees were cut for each new tree planted.
Later efforts to save Haiti's trees--and thus its ecosystem--focused on
intensifying reforestation programs, reducing waste in charcoal
production, introducing more wood-efficient stoves, and importing wood
under AID's Food for Peace program.
Haiti - Livestock and Fishing
Most peasants possessed a few farm animals, usually goats, pigs,
chickens, and cattle. Few holdings, however, were large, and few
peasants raised only livestock. Many farm animals, serving as a kind of
savings account, were sold or were slaughtered to pay for marriages,
medical emergencies, schooling, seeds for crops, or a voodoo ceremony.
From the perspective of rural peasants, perhaps the most important
event to occur in Haiti during the 1980s was the slaughter of the
nation's pig stock, which had become infected with the highly contagious
African Swine Fever (ASF) in the late 1970s. Having spread from Spain to
the Dominican Republic and then to Haiti via the Artibonite River, ASF
infected approximately one-third of the nation's pigs from 1978 to 1982.
Farmers slaughtered their infected animals. Fear of further infection
persuaded peasants to slaughter another one-third in panic sales. A
government eradication program virtually wiped out what remained of the
1.2-million pig population by 1982.
At the grassroots level, the government's eradication and
repopulation programs became highly controversial. Farmers complained
that they were not fairly compensated for--or not paid at all for--their
slaughtered livestock and that the sentinel breed of pigs imported from
the United States to replace the hardy creole pigs was inappropriate for
the Haitian environment and economy. Nonetheless, repopulation of the
nation's pigs with both sentinel and Jamaican creole pigs augmented the
national stock from an official figure of zero in 1982 to about 500,000
by 1989. Many analysts noted, however, that ASF and the pig slaughter
had further impoverished already struggling peasants. The disaster
forced many children to quit school. Small farmers mortgaged their land;
others cut down trees for cash income from charcoal. The loss of the
creole pigs to ASF undoubtedly increased the hardships of the rural
population, and it may well have fueled to some degree the popular
revolt that forced JeanClaude Duvalier from power.
Goats were one of the most plentiful farm animals in Haiti. Like the
creole pigs, they were well adapted to the rugged terrain and sparse
vegetation. Approximately 54 percent of all farmers owned goats; the
total had climbed from 400,000 in 1981 to more than 1 million by the
late 1980s. Peasants owned the majority of the country's estimated 1
million head of cattle in 1987; about 48 percent of the farmers owned at
least one head of cattle. Until 1985 the primary export market for beef
cattle was the American baby food industry. Farmers raised sheep in some
areas, but these animals were not particularly well adapted to the
country's climate. Chickens, ducks, turkeys, and guinea hens were raised
throughout Haiti under little supervision, although one medium-sized
hatchery raised chickens for domestic consumption. After the swine-fever
epidemic and the subsequent slaughter of pigs, chicken replaced pork as
the most widely consumed meat in the Haitian diet.
About 11,000 Haitians fished the nation's 1,500-kilometer coastline
on a full-time or part-time basis, netting an average annual catch of
5,000 tons. The country imported an additional 12,000 tons a year of
fish products to satisfy domestic demand. The island's coastal waters
suffered from low productivity, and few fisherman ventured far from
shore. Nevertheless, Haiti managed to export about US$4 million worth of
lobster, conch, and other shellfish in the 1980s. Some minor aquaculture
also existed.
Haiti - INDUSTRY
Manufacturing
Manufacturing was the most dynamic sector of the economy in the
1980s. Growth in this sector had averaged more than 10 percent a year
during the 1970s; manufactures replaced agricultural commodities as the
country's leading export goods during this decade. In 1988 manufacturing
accounted for 17 percent of GDP and for 53 percent of exports; it
employed about 6 percent of the labor force. In addition to the dynamic
assembly subsector, which experienced 22 percent real annual growth in
the 1970s, included small-scale local manufacturing enterprises and
large-scale, state-owned organizations.
The manufacturing sector in the late 1980s comprised 500 enterprises,
most of which were small or medium in size and family-owned. Their major
products included processed foods, electrical equipment, textiles, and
clothing. Small enterprises, employing up to 50 workers, represented 57
percent of all manufacturing firms, but they employed only 10 percent of
the industrial labor force. Medium enterprises, with 51 to 300 workers,
accounted for 35 percent of the sector's firms and employed 44 percent
of the industrial labor force. Large enterprises, those with more than
300 employees, constituted only 8 percent of the companies, but they
employed 43 percent of all manufacturing workers, mostly in large
assembly factories in the industrial parks of Port-au-Prince.
<>Assembly
Manufacturing
The development of assembly manufacturing in Haiti was an outgrowth
of the island's cheap labor, its proximity to the United States market,
the increasing multinational nature of modern firms, and changes in the
United States Tariff Code, which in 1962 began to exact duties only on
the value-added of products assembled overseas. Assembly
operations--typical examples included the sewing of garments, the
stuffing of toys, or the stringing of baseballs--grew modestly in the
depressed economic climate of the 1960s, but they accelerated rapidly in
the early 1970s in response to new fiscal incentives enacted by the
government. The warming of Haitian-United States relations after 1973
encouraged foreign investment. The number of assembly enterprises
swelled from only 13 companies in 1966 to 67 by 1973 and then to 127 by
1978. When the subsector peaked in 1980, an estimated 200 assembly firms
employed nearly 60,000 workers. Political instability, increased
regional competition under the CBI, nascent union activity, and the
failure of government institutions to attract further investment all
contributed to a decline in assembly investment and employment after
1986. In 1989 approximately 150 assembly companies employed only 41,000
workers, more than three-quarters of them women. Assembly exports
continued to expand, however, as a result of increased productivity on
the part of assembly exporters.
Despite the low wages paid to workers, future growth in the assembly
subsector was uncertain. Numerous constraints to growth included the
highest utility costs in the Caribbean, excessive shipping and
warehousing costs, underdeveloped infrastructure, a largely illiterate
work force, scarce managerial personnel, foreign-exchange shortages,
expensive or inferior-quality local inputs, political instability, and
the personalized nature of business activity. Some United States
officials predicted in the 1980s that Haiti would progress to become the
"Taiwan of the Caribbean." The implementation of the CBI,
however, appeared to hurt Haiti's position in assembly production, as
other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Costa
Rica, began to capitalize more effectively on the advantages of the
initiative. In the mid-1980s, more than 40 percent of all assembly
operations were owned by Haitians. The other operations were either
owned by firms based in the United States or jointly owned by Haitian
and United States interests. Asian investment in the country continued
to grow.
Four industrial parks catered to the assembly industry; two were run
by the government's National Industrial Park Company (Soci�t�
Nationale des Parcs Industriels--Sonapi) and two by a private company.
Most firms operated with short-term subcontracting arrangements under
which Haitian factories filled requests of American companies that
provided partial products, inputs, and machinery. Workers earned
piece-work wages, with a guaranteed minimum wage of US$3 a day in 1989,
and most made slightly more than that amount. These workers were among
the best paid in Haiti, but most of them supported an average of four
people on their wages.
The major products assembled in Haiti were garments, electronics,
baseballs, games, sporting goods, toys, footwear, and leather products.
The largest assembly activity in the late 1980s produced garments. The
fastest-growing activity produced electronics; it included
subcontracting work for the United States Department of Defense. One of
the island's major baseball producers, MacGregor Sporting Goods, decided
in 1988 to move its baseball-sewing operations to Mexico, however; and,
as a result of the deteriorating political situation in Haiti, other
assembly companies decided to fill their orders at the Free Zone of San
Isidro, Dominican Republic.
Many Haitians were eager to find jobs in the assembly sector, but
some criticized the effects of the industry on workers and on the
economy. For example, unions complained that new employees earned only
60 percent of the minimum wage for their first few months and that
short-term contracts and seasonal demand led to job instability and the
annual dismissal of as many as 5,000 workers with no compensation. Some
economists noted that, although assembly operations provided badly
needed urban jobs, these operations industries forged few linkages with
the rest of the economy. A few local plants utilized domestically
produced glue, thread, sisal, and textiles, but the overwhelming share
of producers opted for imported inputs, which were generally cheaper, of
better quality, and more plentiful. Finally, others disapproved of the
generous tax holidays and the duty-free imports that both domestic and
foreign manufacturers enjoyed.
Haiti - Domestic Manufacturing
Attempts at import-substitution manufacturing gave most local
factories generous import protection from the 1970s to the mid-1980s,
thereby insulating them from foreign competition. Industries of this
kind produced paper, matches, cardboard, footwear, leather, food
products, beverages, rubber, plastics, metals, building materials,
textiles, cigarettes, soap, beer, and other basic goods. Most local
factories were small or medium in size. Some very small producers
demonstrated incredible ingenuity in transforming virtual junk into
usable goods, but the limited domestic market and the weak purchasing
power of most Haitians severely limited economies of scale, forcing most
enterprises to function inefficiently and below capacity. A handful of
local manufacturers, who produced rum, paints, essential oils, leather,
and handicrafts, were able to expand their businesses through exports.
Haitian rum was of exceptional quality, as were the country's
handicrafts. Nongovernmental organizations were particularly active in
marketing handicrafts in the United States and Europe.
In 1986 the CNG enacted broad import-liberalization policies and
abolished long-standing import protection, forcing local producers to
compete internationally. As a consequence, domestic manufacturing,
already hampered by competition with lower-priced goods smuggled into
Haiti from the Dominican Republic, experienced a painful transition in
the late 1980s. Many manufacturers closed their doors.
The other major manufacturing subsector was large-scale production by
state-owned enterprises of items such as vegetable oils, sugar, flour,
and cement. From 1980 to 1985, the government either built, or bought, a
majority share in five of the country's largest manufacturing companies.
As the losses of these inefficient parastatals mounted, reaching more
than 4 percent of GDP from 1982 to 1985, international lenders
increasingly pressured the government to divest its interests in these
ventures, a process that began after 1986.
Haiti - Construction
Endowed with few commercially valuable natural resources, Haiti
maintained only a small mining sector in the late 1980s; mining
accounted for less than 1 percent of GDP, and it employed less than 1
percent of the labor force. The country's only bauxite mine, the Mirago�ne
mine in the southern peninsula, produced an average of 500,000 tons of
bauxite a year in the early 1980s; however, in 1982 the declining metal
content of the ore, high production costs, and the oversupplied
international bauxite market forced the mine to close. Bauxite had at
one time been the country's second leading export. Copper also was
mined, beginning in the 1960s, but production of the ore was sporadic.
Haiti contained relatively small amounts of gold, silver, antimony,
tin, lignite, sulphur, coal, nickel, gypsum, limestone, manganese,
marble, iron, tungsten, salt, clay, and various building stones. Mining
activity in the late 1980s focused on raw materials for the construction
industry. The government announced the discovery of new gold deposits in
the northern peninsula in 1985, but long-standing plans for gold
production proceeded slowly. With funding from the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), the government planned to perform its first
comprehensive geological survey in the late 1980s.
Haiti - Energy
Haiti had limited energy resources in the late 1980s. The country had
no petroleum resources, little hydroelectricity potential, and rapidly
diminishing supplies of wood fuels. Wood accounted for 75 percent of the
nation's energy consumption. Petroleum accounted for 15 percent; bagasse
(sugarcane residue), for 5 percent; and hydroelectric power, for 5
percent. Energy consumption was paltry, even for a low-income country.
Haiti's per capita energy use in 1985 was equivalent to that in
Bangladesh and about seventeen times less than that of neighboring
Jamaica. Having virtually no access to electricity, Haiti's poor
depended on the felling of trees for the production of charcoal.
Similarly, many rural and provincial small businesses used wood as a
fuel in powering their operations.
Beginning in the late 1940s, various international oil companies had
unsuccessfully explored for oil in Haiti's Artibonite Basin and
Cul-de-Sac Basin. The prospects for drilling deeper wells or attempting
even higher-risk offshore exploration were not promising. Oil imports,
mainly from the Netherlands Antilles and Trinidad and Tobago, amounted
to about 15 percent of total imports.
Electricity consumption increased sixfold between 1970 and 1987, but
only 10 percent of the population had access to electricity by 1986.
About 45 percent of the residents of Portau -Prince had access to
electricity--a reflection of the concentration of national economic
efforts and resources in the capital--while a mere 3 percent of those
outside the capital enjoyed similar access.
Installed electricity capacity in the late 1980s was estimated at 147
megawatts (MW), and it was expected to increase to 190 MW by the late
1990s. The National Electricity Company (Electricit� d'Haiti--EdH),
created in 1971 to control the newly built P�ligre hydroelectric plant,
operated the nation's power system in the late 1980s. As was true of
other enterprises throughout the economy, the president was the nominal
head of EdH. The company administered the 47-MW P�ligre hydroelectric
plant, the 22-MW Guayamouc hydroelectric plant, a series of smaller
hydroelectric plants, two large thermo-electric operations (42-MW
Varreux and 38-MW Carrefour), small generators, and the distribution
system. The national system, however, was highly disjointed; no power
links extended from the capital to provincial cities. Supplies of
imported petroleum used in thermal plants fluctuated because of
foreign-exchange shortages, and dryseason water shortfalls hampered
production at hydroelectric dams. EdH's generation was unreliable. Under
these conditions, rationing of electricity was common in the 1980s, and
most larger businesses maintained back-up generators. EdH, which had
suffered financial problems in the 1970s, charged the highest
electricity rates in the Caribbean in the 1980s. Many people illegally
tapped into power lines, and by the late 1980s, as many as one in four
urban residents reportedly engaged in this practice. International
development agencies had explored alternative sources of energy, such as
wind power, solar power, methanol production from sorghum, and power
generation from organic waste, but none appeared to be immediately
feasible.
Haiti - SERVICES
Banking and Financial Services
Banking and financial services expanded by almost 10 percent a year
during the 1970s, in the wake of the growth of assembly manufacturing,
construction, and tourism. By the 1980s, however, the country's
financial institutions suffered from negative growth as a result of
political instability and the consequently insecure investment climate.
In the late 1980s, banking and related services accounted for 10 percent
of GDP, and they employed about 4 percent of the labor force.
Nine commercial banks--five Haitian and four foreign-- constituted
the heart of the financial system. In 1989 the five local banks were the
Haitian Popular Bank (Banque Populaire Ha�tienne), Union Bank of Haiti
(Banque de l'Union d'Haiti), Industrial and Commercial Bank of Haiti
(Banque Industrielle et Commerciale d'Haiti), Commercial Bank of Haiti
(Banque Commerciale d'Haiti), and the Haitian General Banking Society
(Soci�t� G�n�rale Ha�tienne de Banque--Sogebank). Sogebank expanded
its holdings in 1986 to encompass the two branches of the Royal Bank of
Canada, previously the oldest and largest foreign-owned bank in Haiti.
Of the four foreign-owned banks, two were based in the United States
(Citibank and the Bank of Boston), one in Canada (the Bank of Nova
Scotia), and one in France (Banque Nationale de Paris). Haiti considered
the United States dollar legal tender, but the government prohibited
foreign banks from maintaining foreign-currency accounts. Seventy-five
percent of all commercial credit went to manufacturing and commerce;
only 3 percent went to agriculture. Excessive collateral requirements,
high interest rates, and a proclivity toward short-term financing
diminished the role of commercial banks in stimulating output,
especially among small producers.
Five development-finance institutions--both public and
private--helped to offset deficiencies in commercial-bank financing. The
main lenders for agriculture were the Agricultural Credit Bank (Bureau
de Cr�dit Agricole--BCA) and the National Agricultural and Industrial
Development Bank (Banque Nationale de D�veloppement Agricole et
Industriel--BNDAI). BCA provided shortterm credit to nearly 20,000
small-scale farmers for the purchase of inputs and tools. Established in
1951, BNDAI lent to all categories of farmers, but it provided mostly
short-term financing to larger, more capital-intensive producers,
particularly those cultivating irrigated rice. BNDAI also lent to
industrial enterprises, generally on a long-term basis. Private and
public funds helped to set up the Industrial Development Fund (Fonds de
D�veloppement Industriel--FDI) and the Haitian Financial Development
Society (Soci�t� Financi�re Ha�tienne de D�veloppement--Sofihdes)
in the 1980s. FDI, founded in 1981 to aid firms with ownership that was
at least 51-percent Haitian, offered no direct lending to industry, but
it assisted existing companies or new ventures in acquiring credit,
supplied guarantees on new loans, and provided technical assistance.
Sofihdes, established in 1983 with funds from the CBI, AID, and the
Haitian private sector, supplied credit with extended repayment
schedules to manufacturing firms and agribusinesses ineligible for
commercial bank loans. A fifth development-finance institution was the
Mortgage Bank (Banque de Cr�dit Immobilier-- BCI). Established in 1986
with 98 percent private capital, the BCI provided loans of up to
US$100,000 for the housing industry, and it offered technical assistance
and special loans for some low-income workers.
Other financial institutions included insurance companies, credit
unions, finance institutions for the informal sector, and an extensive
underground credit system. Several dozen companies wrote insurance
policies in Haiti in the 1980s, but only a few were locally owned.
Credit unions, established in the 1940s, mobilized savings primarily for
agricultural cooperatives. The Haitian Development Foundation and the
Haitian Fund for Assistance to Women were instrumental in the late 1980s
in lending to small businesses that could not obtain commercial bank
credit. There was no Haitian stock exchange.
<>Tourism
A new international airport in 1965 and improved relations with the
United States helped Haiti's tourism industry to flourish in the 1970s.
Tourist arrivals (139,000 by air and 163,000 by sea) peaked in 1980, and
net expenditures on tourism (US$44 million) reached their highest level
in 1981 before a series of events made Haiti unpopular among tourists.
One of these events was publicity surrounding Haiti as a possible origin
of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and the high number of
AIDS cases among Haitians. The former allegation proved false, but the
portrait lingered, along with television images of political violence,
dire poverty, "boat people," and general instability.
For the tourists who ventured to the "land of mountains,"
Haiti held a number of attractions: exotic culture, exquisite French
cuisine, distinctive and colorful art and handicrafts, castles, hotels,
and a resort setting virtually free of street crime. Its warm climate,
friendly people, and low prices were further attractions. In the late
1980s, North Americans, especially people from the United States,
continued to account for more than three-quarters of all visitors. Large
numbers of Haitian emigr�s also visited the country after the fall of
JeanClaude Duvalier. The declining number of tourists in general forced
many hotels to close, however, and the total number of rooms registered
in the industry dropped from 3,000 in 1981 to 1,500 in 1987. In
contrast, the number of hotel rooms in the neighboring Dominican
Republic quadrupled over the same time period. Haiti's tourist industry
tended to be an enclave economic activity, distinguished by
all-inclusive, self-contained beach resorts and brief cruise ship
dockings in Cap Ha�tien or Port-au- Prince. Prospects for reviving
tourism dimmed in the late 1980s, when the Haitian government closed its
tourist-promotion office in New York City.
Haiti - FOREIGN TRADE
Throughout Haiti's history, foreign trade has played a major economic
role. Trade provided crucial foreign exchange for Haiti, but the
structure of trade and government policies resulted in falling incomes
and poorly distributed wealth. In the mid-1980s, about twenty families
dominated the importation of basic consumer items. Traditionally,
government import-licensing schemes and tariff policies supported import
monopolies, a major cause of prevailing high consumer prices. This same
structure also permitted the plentiful importation of luxury items at
relatively low tariffs. A small group of businessmen also controlled
exports, particularly coffee, and its members generally favored commerce
over more productive investment. The effects of major trade reforms
enacted in 1986 remained to be seen in the late 1980s.
Officially, imports in 1987 reached US$307.7 million, the second
lowest level of the decade (after the 1986 level of US$303.2 million).
An export level of only US$198.4 million in 1987 created a trade deficit
of US$110 million. Not reflected in these data, however, were sizable
amounts of contraband. The structure of the country's imports changed
little during the 1980s. Foodstuffs continued to account for the
greatest share (19 percent) of imports in 1987, followed by machinery
and transport equipment (17 percent), manufacturing (16 percent),
petroleum (13 percent), chemicals (10 percent), edible oils (10
percent), and other categories (15 percent). The United States was the
leading exporter to Haiti, supplying 64 percent of all goods and
services in 1987.
In July 1986, the National Council of Government (Conseil National de
Gouvernement--CNG) swiftly introduced importliberalization policies that
eliminated all quantitative restrictions on import items, with the
exception of seven (later amended to five) basic consumer goods. Ad
valorem tariffs replaced import quotas; this reform also lowered other
tariffs significantly. At the same time, authorities began a complete
revision of the Tariff Code that resulted in markedly lower overall
protection by the end of 1986. In addition, the government revoked the
tariff subsidies enjoyed by state-owned enterprises. Additional trade
reform streamlined complex importlicensing schemes, which often favored
traditional merchants. The government also attempted to expedite customs
procedures, something the private sector had long advocated. Import
policies, however, conspicuously lacked a serious and comprehensive
policy to halt widespread smuggling.
Exports generally increased during the 1980s, but political
instability started to weaken export performance toward the end of the
decade. The structure of exports changed dramatically as the result of
the long decline in agriculture, the termination of bauxite mining, and
the implementation of the CBI. In 1987 manufacturing contributed 53
percent of total exports, followed by coffee (18 percent), handicrafts
(14 percent), essential oils (2 percent), cocoa (2 percent), and other
goods (11 percent). Agriculture, which accounted for 52 percent of
exports in 1980, contributed only 24 percent by 1987; exports of
traditional commodities, such as sugar, sisal, and meat, either declined
to insignificant levels or ceased altogether. Haiti exported goods
mostly to the United States, the destination of 84 percent of the
country's overseas sales in 1987. France and Italy, the main purchasers
of Haiti's coffee, accounted for 3 percent and 4 percent, respectively,
of 1987 exports. The balance of exports went to the Dominican Republic
(2 percent) and other West European and Latin American countries (7
percent).
Trade policy in the late 1980s strongly favored export promotion
within the framework of the CBI, the expansion of assembly
manufacturing, and the maintenance of the country's export
competitiveness. In an effort to generate more exports, the Duvalier
government solicited increased foreign investment through revisions in
the foreign investment code during 1985. With funding from AID, the
private sector in February 1987 established an export-promotion office
to spearhead new investment and to recoup the momentum of exports that
had been lost to political upheaval. Other economic reforms, such as
budget cuts that helped to maintain the value of the gourde, maintenance
of low minimum wages, and trade liberalization, were intended to
stimulate investment and exports. The duty-free entry of additional
Haitian goods into the United States under the CBI favored the overall
growth in exports. In a bid to revitalize traditional exports, the
government in 1986 also eliminated longstanding export taxes on coffee,
cocoa, sisal, and other items. Haiti had applied for membership in the
free-trade association, the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(Caricom), in the early 1970s, but it had not been accepted as of 1989.