FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES have had such a long, varied, and troubled
history as Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state originated in the Aksumite
kingdom, a trading state that emerged about the first century A.D. The
Askumites perfected a written language; maintained relations with the
Byzantine Empire, Egypt, and the Arabs; and, in the mid-fourth century,
embraced Christianity. After the rise of Islam in the seventh century,
the Aksumite kingdom became internationally isolated as Arabs gradually
gained control of maritime trade in the Red Sea. By the early twelfth
century, the successors of the Aksumites had expanded southward and had
established a new capital and a line of kings called the Zagwe. A new
dynasty, the so-called "Solomonic" line, which came to power
about 1270, continued this territorial expansion and pursued a more
aggressive foreign policy. In addition, this Christian state, with the
help of Portuguese soldiers, repelled a near-overpowering Islamic
invasion.
Starting about the mid-sixteenth century, the Oromo people, migrating
from the southwest, gradually forced their way into the kingdom, most
often by warfare. The Oromo, who eventually constituted about 40 percent
of Ethiopia's population, possessed their own culture, religion, and
political institutions. As the largest national group in Ethiopia, the
Oromo significantly influenced the course of the country's history by
becoming part of the royal family and the nobility and by joining the
army or the imperial government. During the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, religious and regional rivalries gradually weakened the
imperial state until it was little more than a collection of independent
and competing fiefdoms.
Ethiopia's modern period (1855 to the present)--represented by the
reigns of Tewodros II, Yohannis IV, Menelik II, Zawditu, and Haile
Selassie I; by the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam; and, since
mid-1991, by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia under Meles
Zenawi--has been been characterized by nation-building as well as by
warfare. Tewodros II started the process of recreating a cohesive
Ethiopian state by incorporating Shewa into his empire and by
suppressing revolts in the country's other provinces. Yohannis IV
battled to keep Ethiopia free from foreign domination and to retard the
growing power of the Shewan king, Menelik. Eventually, Menelik became
emperor and used military force to more than double Ethiopia's size. He
also defeated an Italian invasion force that sought to colonize the
country.
Struggles over succession to the throne characterized the reign of
Zawditu--struggles won by Haile Selassie, the next ruler. After becoming
emperor in 1930, Haile Selassie embarked on a nationwide modernization
program. However, the 1935-36 Italo-Ethiopian war halted his efforts and
forced him into exile. After returning to Addis Ababa in 1941, Haile
Selassie undertook further military and political changes and sought to
encourage social and economic development. Although he did initiate a
number of fundamental reforms, the emperor was essentially an autocrat,
who to a great extent relied on political manipulation and military
force to remain in power and to preserve the Ethiopian state. Even after
an unsuccessful 1960 coup attempt led by the Imperial Bodyguard, Haile
Selassie failed to pursue the political and economic policies necessary
to improve the lives of most Ethiopians.
In 1974 a group of disgruntled military personnel overthrew the
Ethiopian monarchy. Eventually, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who participated
in the coup against Haile Selassie, emerged at the head of a Marxist
military dictatorship. Almost immediately, the Mengistu regime unleashed
a military and political reign of terror against its real and imagined
opponents. It also pursued socialist economic policies that reduced
agricultural productivity and helped bring on famine, resulting in the
deaths of untold tens of thousands of people. Thousands more fled or
perished as a result of government schemes to villagize the peasantry
and to relocate peasants from drought-prone areas of the north to
better-watered lands in the south and southwest.
Aside from internal dissent, which was harshly suppressed, the regime
faced armed insurgencies in the northern part of the country. The
longest-running of these was in Eritrea, where the Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF) and its predecessors had been fighting control
by the central government since 1961. In the mid-1970s, a second major
insurgency arose in Tigray, where the Tigray People's Liberation Front
(TPLF), a Marxist-Leninist organization under the leadership of Meles
Zenawi, opposed not only the policies of the military government but
also the very existence of the government itself.
In foreign affairs, the regime aligned itself with the Soviet Union.
As long as the Soviet Union and its allies provided support to
Ethiopia's armed forces, the Mengistu government remained secure. In the
late 1980s, however, Soviet support waned, a major factor in undermining
the ability of government forces to prosecute the wars against the
Eritreans and the Tigray. Gradually, the insurgent movements gained the
upper hand. By May 1991, the EPLF controlled almost all of Eritrea, and
the TPLF, operating as the chief member of a coalition called the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), had overrun
much of the center of the country. Faced with impending defeat, on May
21 Mengistu fled into exile in Zimbabwe; the caretaker government he
left behind collapsed a week later. The EPLF completed its sweep of
Eritrea on May 24 and 25, and a few days later EPLF chairman Issaias
Afwerki announced the formation of the Provisional Government of Eritrea
(PGE). Meanwhile, on May 27-28, EPRDF forces marched into Addis Ababa
and assumed control of the national government.
After seizing power, Tigrayan and Eritrean leaders confronted an
array of political, economic, and security problems that threatened to
overwhelm both new governments. Meles Zenawi and Issaias Afwerki
committed themselves to resolving these problems and to remaking their
respective societies. To achieve these goals, both governments adopted
similar strategies, which concentrated on national reconciliation,
eventual democratization, good relations with the West, and social and
economic development. Each leader, however, pursued different tactics to
implement his respective strategy.
The first task facing the new rulers in Addis Ababa was the creation
of an interim government. To this end, a so-called National Conference
was convened in Addis Ababa from July 1 to July 5. Many political groups
from across a broad spectrum were invited to attend, but the EPRDF
barred those identified with the former military regime, such as the
Workers' Party of Ethiopia and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement, as
well as those that were opposed to the EPRDF, such as the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party and the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic
Forces. A number of international observers also attended, including
delegations from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United
Nations (UN).
Although it received accolades for running an open conference, the
EPRDF tightly controlled the proceedings. The conference adopted a
National Charter, which was signed by representatives of some thirty-one
political groups; it established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia
(TGE), consisting of executive and legislative branches; and it
sanctioned an EPLF-EPRDF agreement that converted Aseb into a free port
in exchange for a referendum on Eritrean self- determination to be held
within two years. The transitional government was to consist of the
offices of president and prime minister and a seventeen-member
multiethnic Council of Ministers. To ensure broad political
representation, an eighty-seven member Council of Representatives was
created, which was to select the new president, draft a new
constitution, and oversee a transition to a new national government. The
EPRDF occupied thirty-two of the eighty- seven council seats. The Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) received twelve seats, and the TPLF, the Oromo
People's Democratic Organization, and the Ethiopian People's Democratic
Movement each occupied ten seats. Twenty-seven other groups shared the
remaining seats.
The National Charter enshrined the guiding principles for what was
expected to be a two-and-one-half-year transitional period. The charter
called for creation of a commission to draft a new constitution to come
into effect by early 1994. It also committed the transitional government
to conduct itself in accordance with the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and to pursue a foreign policy based on noninterference in
the internal affairs of neighboring states. Perhaps its most significant
provisions concerned a new system of internal administration in which
the principle of ethnicity was to constitute the basis of local and
regional government. The charter recognized the right of all of
Ethiopia's nationalities to self-determination, a right that was to be
exercised within the context of a federated Ethiopia, and called for
creation of district and regional councils on the basis of nationality.
Essentially, the National Conference was a first, basic step in the
reconstruction of a viable, legitimate central government. With the end
of civil wars all over the country, the aim was to create a balance of
competing ethnic and political groups at the center of the state that
would allow the wounds of war to heal and economic recovery to begin.
Additionally, there was the task of reconciling some segments of the
population to the impending loss of Eritrea and of Ethiopia's Red Sea
ports.
As the new order got under way, the Council of Representatives
elected Meles Zenawi president of the TGE. Then, in order to implement
the administrative provisions of the National Charter, the TGE drew up
twelve autonomous regions based on ethnic identification and recognized
two multiethnic chartered cities--Addis Ababa and Harer. The largest
nationalities--the Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray--were grouped into
their own regions, while an attempt was made to put culturally related
smaller groups together. Each region was composed of a number of
districts (weredas), intended to be the basic administrative unit. The
largest region--that of the Oromo--contained some 220 weredas; the next
largest region--that of the Amhara-- contained 126, out of a total of
600 weredas in all of Ethiopia. Under this system, each wereda exercised
executive, legislative, and judicial authority over local communities,
while the central government remained supreme in matters of defense,
foreign affairs, economic policy, citizenship requirements, and
currency.
In order to staff these new administrative units, the TGE scheduled
national elections. Originally foreseen for later 1991, these elections
were postponed for administrative and political reasons into 1992. By
then, the authorities had registered almost 200 political parties; few
of them, however, had a significant membership or any real influence in
shaping government policies. The TGE held preliminary elections for
local governing committees beginning in April and for wereda and
regional councils on June 21, 1992.
Security problems prevented elections from being held in some areas,
notably among the Afar and the Somali and in Harer. More important, a
corps of some 250 UN observers concluded that the June elections
suffered from a number of serious shortcomings, including an absence of
genuine competition, intimidation of nongovernment parties and
candidates, closure of political party offices, and jailing and even
shooting of candidates. Numerous observers also claimed that various
administrative and logistical problems impaired the electoral process
and that many Ethiopians failed to understand the nature of multiparty
politics. As a result, several political parties, including the OLF, the
All-Amhara People's Organization, and the Gideo People's Democratic
Organization, withdrew a few days before the elections. On June 22, the
OLF withdrew from the government and prepared to take up arms once
again. Nonetheless, the TGE accepted the results of the elections,
although it appointed a commission to investigate irregularities and to
take corrective steps.
In the economic arena, the TGE inherited a shattered country. In his
first public speech after the EPRDF had captured Addis Ababa, Meles
Zenawi indicated that Ethiopia's coffers were empty; moreover, some 7
million people were threatened with starvation because of drought and
civil war. Economic performance statistics reflected this gloomy
assessment. In Ethiopian fiscal year (EFY ) 1990/91, for example, the gross domestic product (
GDP ) declined by 5.6 percent, the greatest fall since the
1984-85 drought. Preliminary figures indicated a further decline in GDP
in 1991/92, although some gains were registered for agriculture.
To resolve these problems, the TGE abandoned the failed policies of
the Mengistu regime. It began dismantling the country's command economic
system and shifted toward a market-oriented economy with emphasis upon
private initiative. In December 1992, it adopted a new economic policy
whereby the government would maintain control over essential economic
sectors such as banking, insurance, petroleum, mining, and chemical
industries. However, retail trade, road transport, and a portion of
foreign trade was placed in private hands; and farmers could sell their
produce at free-market prices, although land remained under government
control. While smaller businesses were to be privatized, agriculture was
to receive the most attention and investment. By 1993 the state farms of
the Mengistu era were being dismantled and turned over to private
farmers; similarly, the agricultural cooperatives of prior years had
almost all disappeared. A major effort was also being made to steer
large numbers of ex-soldiers into farming as a way of increasing
production and of providing much-needed employment.
Meanwhile, on October 1, 1992, the TGE devalued Ethiopia's currency
to encourage exports and to aid in correcting a chronic balance of
payments deficit. The country had in addition begun to receive economic
aid from several sources, including the European Community, the World
Bank, Japan, Canada, and the United States.
Developments such as these provided a solid foundation for future
economic improvement--gains that in mid-1993 were still very much in the
realm of anticipation. It seemed clear that Ethiopia would remain one of
the world's poorest nations for the foreseeable future.
Since the downfall of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia's human rights
record has improved. At the same time, the TGE has failed to end human
rights abuses. In the absence of a police force, the TGE delegated
policing functions to the EPRDF and to so-called Peace and Stability
Committees. On occasion, personnel belonging to these organizations were
alleged to have killed, wounded, or tortured criminal suspects. There
were also allegations of extrajudicial killings in many areas of the
country.
Several incidents in early 1993 raised further questions about human
rights in Ethiopia. On January 4, security forces opened fire on
university students protesting UN and EPRDF policies toward Eritrea and
the upcoming independence referendum. At least one person, and possibly
several others, died during the fracas. In early April, the Council of
Representatives suspended five southern political parties from council
membership for having attended a conference in Paris at which the
parties criticized the security situation in the country and the entire
transitional process. A few days later, on April 9, more than forty
instructors at Addis Ababa University were summarily dismissed. The TGE
alleged lack of attention to teaching duties as the reason for its
action, but the instructors asserted that they were being punished for
having spoken out against TGE policies. These developments came on top
of United States Department of State allegations that more than 2,000
officials of the Mengistu regime remained in detention without having
been charged after almost twenty months.
One of the most serious dilemmas confronting the TGE concerned its
inability to restore security throughout Ethiopia. After the EPRDF
assumed power, it dismantled the 440,000-man Ethiopian armed forces. As
a result, several hundred thousand ex-military personnel had to fend for
themselves. The government's inability to find jobs for these soldiers
forced many of them to resort to crime as a way of life. Many of these
ex-soldiers contributed to the instability in Addis Ababa and parts of
southern, eastern, and western Ethiopia.
To help resolve these problems, the TGE created the Commission for
the Rehabilitation of Ex-Soldiers and War Veterans. By mid-1993 this
organization claimed that it had assisted in the rehabilitation of more
than 159,000 ex- soldiers in various rural areas. Additionally,
commission officials maintained that they were continuing to provide aid
to 157,000 ex-soldiers who lived in various urban centers.
Apart from the difficulties caused by former soldiers and criminal
elements, several insurgent groups hampered the TGE's ability to
maintain stability in eastern and western Ethiopia. The situation was
particularly troublesome with the OLF. For example, in mid-1991
government forces clashed with OLF units southwest of Dire Dawa over the
rights to collect qat revenues. Qat is a plant that produces a mild
narcotic intoxication when chewed and that is consumed throughout the
eastern Horn of Africa and in Yemen. Although the two groups signed a
peace agreement in August, tensions still existed, and fighting
continued around Dire Dawa and Harer at year's end. In early 1992,
EPRDF-OLF relations continued to deteriorate, with armed clashes
occurring at several locations throughout eastern and western Ethiopia.
After the OLF withdrew from the elections and the government in late
June, full-scale fighting broke out in the south and southwest, but OLF
forces were too weak to sustain the effort for more than a few weeks.
Even so, in April 1993 the OLF announced that it was once again
expanding its operations, but many observers doubted this claim and the
OLF's ability to launch effective military campaigns against government
forces.
The TGE also experienced problems with the Afar pastoralists who
inhabit the lowlands along Ethiopia's Red Sea coast, particularly during
its first year in power. In early September 1991, some Afar attacked a
food relief truck column near the town of Mile on the Addis Ababa--Aseb
road and killed at least seven drivers. The EPRDF restored security in
this region by shooting armed Afar on sight. Since then, EPRDF-Afar
relations have remained tense. Some Afar have associated themselves with
the OLF, but many others joined the Afar Liberation Movement, which by
early 1993 claimed to have 2,500 members under arms.
Elsewhere in eastern Ethiopia, the TGE experienced problems with the
Isa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF). On October 4, 1991, clashes
between government forces and IGLF rebels resulted in the temporary
closure of the Addis Ababa- Djibouti railroad near Dire Dawa and the
disruption of trade between the two countries. The fighting also
disrupted famine relief distribution to nearly 1 million refugees in
eastern Ethiopia. By early 1992, the IGLF still had refused to recognize
the EPRDF's right to maintain security in the Isa-populated area around
Dire Dawa. By 1993, nonetheless, improved conditions allowed the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railroad to operate on a fairly regular basis.
In western Ethiopia, during the July-September 1991 period, the EPRDF
engaged in several battles in Gojam and Gonder with the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the only major political group
excluded from power. Additionally, in Gambela, the EPRDF battled the
Gambela People's Liberation Front, which claimed the right to administer
Gambela without EPRDF interference. The downfall of the Mengistu regime
also created a crisis for approximately 500,000 southern Sudanese who
lived in refugee camps in and around Gambela. Although the new
government claimed they could remain in Ethiopia, nearly all of the
refugees, fearing reprisals for belonging to or supporting southern
Sudanese insurgents that the EPRDF opposed, fled toward southern Sudan.
As a result, by early 1992 fewer than 15,000 Sudanese refugees remained
in western Ethiopia.
In southern Ethiopia, crime was the main security problem. In late
March 1992, EPRDF troops reportedly arrested 1,705 armed bandits and
captured thousands of weapons, including machine guns and
rocket-propelled grenades. Despite this and similar sweeps, many Western
observers believed that security problems would continue to plague the
EPRDF regime for the foreseeable future because of the large number of
available arms and unemployed ex-fighters in the south.
In contrast with the political divisiveness in Ethiopia, nearly all
Eritreans appeared to support the EPLF and its goals. As a result, in
the first two years after military victory, the PGE was able to move
swiftly on a number of fronts. As one of its first acts, the new
government expelled thousands of soldiers and personnel of the former
Ethiopian army and government in Eritrea, together with their
dependents, forcing them across the border into Tigray. The PGE
maintained that the expulsions were necessary to free up living quarters
and jobs for returning Eritreans and to help reduce budgetary outlays.
In October 1992, the government opened schools across Eritrea. A few
weeks later, the PGE announced new criminal and civil codes and
appointed dozens of judges to run the court system. A National Service
Decree made it mandatory for all Eritreans between the ages of eighteen
and forty to perform twelve to eighteen months of unpaid service in the
armed forces, police, government, or in fields such as education or
health.
Perhaps most important, the PGE honored the agreement it had reached
with the EPRDF and the OLF in 1991 to postpone a referendum on the
question of Eritrean independence for two years. By early 1993, given
the general popularity of the PGE and the desire among Eritreans to be
free of control from Addis Ababa, the outcome of the referendum was a
foregone conclusion. On April 23-25, 1993, the PGE carried out the poll.
In a turnout of 98.5 percent of the approximately 1.1 million registered
voters, 99.8 percent voted for independence. A 121-member UN observer
mission certified that the referendum was free and fair. Within hours,
the United States, Egypt, Italy, and Sudan extended diplomatic
recognition to the new country. Thereafter, Eritrea joined the UN, the
Organization of Africa Unity, and the Lom�
Convention.
A month after the referendum, the EPLF transformed the PGE into the
Government of Eritrea, composed of executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Supreme power resided with a new National Assembly, comprised
of the EPLF's former central committee augmented by sixty additional
representatives from the ten provinces into which Eritrea was divided.
Aside from formulating internal and external policies and budgetary
matters, the assembly was charged with electing a president, who would
be head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. The
executive branch consisted of a twenty-four-member State Council,
chaired by the president. The judiciary, already in place, continued as
before. At its initial meeting on May 21, the assembly elected Issaias
Afwerki president. This new political configuration was to last not
longer than four years, during which time a democratic constitution was
to be drafted and all members of the EPLF would continue to work for the
state without salary.
In the months following independence, the Eritrean government enjoyed
almost universal popular support. Even such former adversaries as the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean Liberation Front-United
Organization, and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council
issued statements of support for the referendum and for the new regime.
During his first press conference after the referendum, President
Issaias stressed that his government would pursue pragmatic and flexible
policies. He also discussed prospects for close economic cooperation
with Ethiopia and raised the prospects of a future confederation between
the two countries. Meanwhile, the president pledged that Aseb would
remain a free port for goods in transit to Ethiopia. Additionally, he
reaffirmed the EPLF's commitment to the eventual establishment of a
multiparty political system, but there would be no political parties
based on ethnicity or religion.
Its popularity notwithstanding, the Eritrean government faced many
problems and an uncertain future. Economically, the country suffered
from the devastation of thirty years of war. Eritrea's forty publicly
owned factories operated at no more than one-third capacity, and many of
its more than 600 private companies had ceased operations. War damage
and drought had caused agricultural production to decline by as much as
40 percent in some areas; as a result, about 80 percent of the
population required food aid in 1992. The fighting also had wrecked
schools, hospitals, government offices, roads, and bridges throughout
the country, while bombing had destroyed economically important towns
like Mitsiwa and Nakfa.
To resolve these problems, Eritrea implemented a multifaceted
strategy that concentrated on restarting basic economic activities and
rehabilitating essential infrastructure; encouraging the return and
reintegration of nearly 500,000 Eritrean refugees from neighboring
Sudan; and establishing the Recovery and Rehabilitation Project for
Eritrea. Additionally, the Eritrean government reaffirmed its commitment
to a liberal investment code, the response to which by mid-1993 was
encouraging. Even so, the Eritrean government estimated that it needed
at least US$2 billion to rehabilitate the economy and to finance
development programs--aid that it sought largely from Western countries
and financial institutions.
Another serious issue confronting the new government concerned the
status of the country's armed forces. Since the country's liberation in
1991, the government had lacked the funds to pay salaries. Nevertheless,
officials adopted a compulsory national service act that required all
former fighters to labor without pay for two years on various public
works projects. When the new Government of Eritrea extended unpaid
compulsory national service for an additional four years on May 20,
1993, thousands of frustrated former fighters who wanted to be paid and
to return at last to their families demonstrated in Asmera. The
government responded by promising to begin paying the fighters and by
instituting a military demobilization program that would allow
volunteers who could fend for themselves to return to their homes.
Eritrea's long-term well-being also depended on President Issaias's
ability to preserve the country's unity. Achieving this goal will be
difficult. Eritrea's 3.5 million population is split equally between
Christians and Muslims; it also is divided into nine ethnic groups, each
of which speaks a different language. A reemergence of the historical
divisions between the Muslim-dominated ELF and the largely Christian
EPLF is possible and could prove to be the young country's undoing.
Also, at least some Eritreans doubted President Issaias's pledge to
establish a multiparty democracy and viewed with skepticism his
determination to prevent the establishment of political parties based on
ethnic group or religion. However, as of mid-1993, Eritrea remained at
peace, and the government enjoyed considerable support. As a result,
most Western observers maintained that the country had a good chance of
avoiding the turbulence that plagued much of the rest of the Horn of
Africa.
The ultimate fates of Ethiopia and Eritrea are inevitably
intertwined. For economic reasons, Ethiopia needs to preserve its access
to Eritrean ports, and Eritrea needs food from Ethiopia as well as the
revenue and jobs that will be generated by acting as a transshipment
point for Ethiopian goods. Also, political and military cooperation well
be necessary to prevent conflict between the two nations.
Despite this obvious interdependence, Ethiopia and Eritrea face a
difficult future. Many Ethiopians, primarily those who are Amhara, and
some Eritreans, largely from the Muslim community, remain opposed to
Eritrean independence and the EPLF-dominated government. These
malcontents could become a catalyst for antigovernment activities in
both countries. Within Ethiopia, the TGE's concept of ethnicity as the
basis for organizing political life has aroused controversy and has
stymied many of the TGE's policies and programs, thereby reducing
chances for the emergence of a democratic government. Additionally, if
the EPRDF does not broaden its ethnic base of support and bring such
groups as the Amhara and the Oromo into the political process, the
likelihood of violence will increase. As of mid-1993, it was unclear
whether the TGE's plans for a new constitution and national government
would resolve these problems or would founder on the shoals of ethnic
politics and economic despair.
Ethiopia - Early Populations and Neighboring States
The Aksumite state emerged at about the beginning of the Christian
era, flourished during the succeeding six or seven centuries, and
underwent prolonged decline from the eighth to the twelfth century A.D.
Aksum's period of greatest power lasted from the fourth through the
sixth century. Its core area lay in the highlands of what is today
southern Eritrea, Tigray, Lasta (in present-day Welo), and Angot (also
in Welo); its major centers were at Aksum and Adulis. Earlier centers,
such as Yeha, also continued to flourish. At the kingdom's height, its
rulers held sway over the Red Sea coast from Sawakin in present-day
Sudan in the north to Berbera in present-day Somalia in the south, and
inland as far as the Nile Valley in modern Sudan. On the Arabian side of
the Red Sea, the Aksumite rulers at times controlled the coast and much
of the interior of modern Yemen. During the sixth and seventh centuries,
the Aksumite state lost its possessions in southwest Arabia and much of
its Red Sea coastline and gradually shrank to its core area, with the
political center of the state shifting farther and farther southward.
Inscriptions from Aksum and elsewhere date from as early as the end
of the second century A.D. and reveal an Aksumite state that already had
expanded at the expense of neighboring peoples. The Greek inscriptions
of King Zoskales (who ruled at the end of the second century A.D.) claim
that he conquered the lands to the south and southwest of what is now
Tigray and controlled the Red Sea coast from Sawakin south to the
present-day Djibouti and Berbera areas. The Aksumite state controlled
parts of Southwest Arabia as well during this time, and subsequent
Aksumite rulers continually involved themselves in the political and
military affairs of Southwest Arabia, especially in what is now Yemen.
Much of the impetus for foreign conquest lay in the desire to control
the maritime trade between the Roman Empire and India and adjoining
lands. Indeed, King Zoskales is mentioned by name in the Periplus of the
Erythrean Sea (the Latin term for the Red Sea is Mare Erythreum), a
Greek shipping guide of the first to third centuries A.D., as promoting
commerce with Rome, Arabia, and India. Among the African commodities
that the Aksumites exported were gold, rhinoceros horn, ivory, incense,
and obsidian; in return, they imported cloth, glass, iron, olive oil,
and wine.
During the third and fourth centuries, the traditions related to
Aksumite rule became fixed. Gedara, who lived in the late second and
early third centuries, is referred to as the king of Aksum in
inscriptions written in Gi'iz (also seen as Ge'ez), the Semitic language
of the Aksumite kingdom. The growth of imperial traditions was
concurrent with the expansion of foreign holdings, especially in
Southwest Arabia in the late second century A.D. and later in areas west
of the Ethiopian highlands, including the kingdom of Mero�.
Mero� was centered on the Nile north of the confluence of the White
Nile and Blue Nile. Established by the sixth century B.C. or earlier,
the kingdom's inhabitants were black Africans who were heavily
influenced by Egyptian culture. It was probably the people of Mero� who
were the first to be called Aithiopiai ("burnt faces") by the
ancient Greeks, thus giving rise to the term Ethiopia that considerably
later was used to designate the northern highlands of the Horn of Africa
and its inhabitants. No evidence suggests that Mero� had any political
influence over the areas included in modern Ethiopia; economic influence
is harder to gauge because ancient commercial networks in the area were
probably extensive and involved much long-distance trade.
Sometime around A.D. 300, Aksumite armies conquered Mero� or forced
its abandonment. By the early fourth century A.D., King Ezana (reigned
325-60) controlled a domain extending from Southwest Arabia across the
Red Sea west to Mero� and south from Sawakin to the southern coast of
the Gulf of Aden. As an indication of the type of political control he
exercised, Ezana, like other Aksumite rulers, carried the title negusa
nagast (king of kings), symbolic of his rule over numerous
tribute-paying principalities and a title used by successive Ethiopian
rulers into the mid-twentieth century.
The Aksumites created a civilization of considerable distinction.
They devised an original architectural style and employed it in stone
palaces and other public buildings. They also erected a series of carved
stone stelae at Aksum as monuments to their deceased rulers. Some of
these stelae are among the largest known from the ancient world. The
Aksumites left behind a body of written records, that, although not
voluminous, are nonetheless a legacy otherwise bequeathed only by Egypt
and Mero� among ancient African kingdoms. These records were written in
two languages--Gi'iz and Greek. Gi'iz is assumed to be ancestral to
modern Amharic and Tigrinya, although possibly only indirectly. Greek
was also widely used, especially for commercial transactions with the
Hellenized world of the eastern Mediterranean. Even more remarkable and
wholly unique for ancient Africa was the minting of coins over an
approximately 300-year period. These coins, many with inlay of gold on
bronze or silver, provide a chronology of the rulers of Aksum.
One of the most important contributions the Aksumite state made to
Ethiopian tradition was the establishment of the Christian Church. The
Aksumite state and its forebears had certainly been in contact with
Judaism since the first millennium B.C. and with Christianity beginning
in the first century A.D. These interactions probably were rather
limited. However, during the second and third centuries, Christianity
spread throughout the region. Around A.D. 330- 40, Ezana was converted
to Christianity and made it the official state religion. The variant of
Christianity adopted by the Aksumite state, however, eventually followed
the Monophysite belief, which embraced the notion of one rather than two
separate natures in the person of Christ as defined by the Council of
Chalcedon in 451.
Little is known about fifth-century Aksum, but early in the next
century Aksumite rulers reasserted their control over Southwest Arabia,
though only for a short time. Later in the sixth century, however,
Sassanian Persians established themselves in Yemen, effectively ending
any pretense of Aksumite control. Thereafter, the Sassanians attacked
Byzantine Egypt, further disrupting Aksumite trade networks in the Red
Sea area. Over the next century and a half, Aksum was increasingly cut
off from its overseas entrep�ts and as a result entered a period of
prolonged decline, gradually relinquishing its maritime trading network
and withdrawing into the interior of northern Ethiopia.
Ethiopia - Ethiopia and the Early Islamic Period
Egyptian Muslims had destroyed the neighboring Nile River valley's
Christian states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Tenuous
relations with Christians in Western Europe and the Byzantine Empire
continued via the Coptic Church in Egypt. The Coptic patriarchs in
Alexandria were responsible for the assignment of Ethiopian
patriarchs--a church policy that Egypt's Muslim rulers occasionally
tried to use to their advantage. For centuries after the Muslim
conquests of the early medieval period, this link with the Eastern
churches constituted practically all of Ethiopia's administrative
connection with the larger Christian world.
A more direct if less formal contact with the outside Christian world
was maintained through the Ethiopian Monophysite community in Jerusalem
and the visits of Ethiopian pilgrims to the Holy Land. Ethiopian monks
from the Jerusalem community attended the Council of Florence in 1441 at
the invitation of the pope, who was seeking to reunite the Eastern and
Western churches. Westerners learned about Ethiopia through the monks
and pilgrims and became attracted to it for two main reasons. First,
many believed Ethiopia was the long-sought land of the legendary
Christian priest-king of the East, Prester John. Second, the West viewed
Ethiopia as a potentially valuable ally in its struggle against Islamic
forces that continued to threaten southern Europe until the Turkish
defeat at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.
Portugal, the first European power to circumnavigate Africa and enter
the Indian Ocean, displayed initial interest in this potential ally by
sending a representative to Ethiopia in 1493. The Ethiopians, in turn,
sent an envoy to Portugal in 1509 to request a coordinated attack on the
Muslims. Europe received its first written accounts of the country from
Father Francisco Alvarez, a Franciscan who accompanied a Portuguese
diplomatic expedition to Ethiopia in the 1520s. His book, The Prester
John of the Indies, stirred further European interest and proved a
valuable source for future historians. The first Portuguese forces
responded to a request for aid in 1541, although by that time the
Portuguese were concerned primarily with strengthening their hegemony
over the Indian Ocean trade routes and with converting the Ethiopians to
Roman Catholicism. Nevertheless, joining the forces of the Christian
kingdom, the Portuguese succeeded eventually in helping to defeat and
kill Gra�.
Portuguese Roman Catholic missionaries arrived in 1554. Efforts to
induce the Ethiopians to reject their Monophysite beliefs and accept
Rome's supremacy continued for nearly a century and engendered
bitterness as pro- and anti-Catholic parties maneuvered for control of
the state. At least two emperors in this period allegedly converted to
Roman Catholicism. The second of these, Susenyos (reigned 1607- 32),
after a particularly fierce battle between adherents of the two faiths,
abdicated in 1632 in favor of his son, Fasiladas (reigned 1632-67), to
spare the country further bloodshed. The expulsion of the Jesuits and
all Roman Catholic missionaries followed. This religious controversy
left a legacy of deep hostility toward foreign Christians and Europeans
that continued into the twentieth century. It also contributed to the
isolation that followed for the next 200 years.
Emperor Fasiladas kept out the disruptive influences of the foreign
Christians, dealt with sporadic Muslim incursions, and in general sought
to reassert central authority and to reinvigorate the Solomonic monarchy
and the Orthodox Church. He revived the practice of confining royal
family members on a remote mountaintop to lessen challenges to his rule
and distinguished himself by reconstructing the cathedral at Aksum
(destroyed by Gra�) and by establishing his camp at Gonder--a locale
that gradually developed into a permanent capital and that became the
cultural and political center of Ethiopia during the Gonder period.
Although the Gonder period produced a flowering of architecture and
art that lasted more than a century, Gonder monarchs never regained full
control over the wealth and manpower that the nobility had usurped
during the long wars against Gra� and then the Oromo. Many nobles,
commanding the loyalty of their home districts, had become virtually
independent, especially those on the periphery of the kingdom. Moreover,
during Fasiladas's reign and that of his son Yohannis I (reigned
1667-82), there were substantial differences between the two monastic
orders of the Orthodox Church concerning the proper response to the
Jesuit challenge to Monophysite doctrine on the nature of Christ. The
positions of the two orders were often linked to regional opposition to
the emperor, and neither Fasiladas nor Yohannis was able to settle the
issue without alienating important components of the church.
Iyasu I (reigned 1682-1706) was a celebrated military leader who
excelled at the most basic requirement of the warrior-king. He
campaigned constantly in districts on the south and southeast of the
kingdom and personally led expeditions to Shewa and beyond, areas from
which royal armies had long been absent. Iyasu also attempted to mediate
the doctrinal quarrel in the church, but a solution eluded him. He
sponsored the construction of several churches, among them Debre Birhan
Selassie, one of the most beautiful and famous of the churches in
Gonder.
Iyasu's reign also saw the Oromo begin to play a role in the affairs
of the kingdom, especially in the military sense. Iyasu co-opted some of
the Oromo groups by enlisting them into his army and by converting them
to Christianity. He came gradually to rely almost entirely upon Oromo
units and led them in repeated campaigns against their countrymen who
had not yet been incorporated into the Amhara-Tigray state. Successive
Gonder kings, particularly Iyasu II (reigned 1730-55), likewise relied
upon Oromo military units to help counter challenges to their authority
from the traditional nobility and for purposes of campaigning in
farflung Oromo territory. By the late eighteenth century, the Oromo were
playing an important role in political affairs as well. At times during
the first half of the nineteenth century, Oromo was the primary language
at court, and Oromo leaders came to number among the highest nobility of
the kingdom.
During the reign of Iyoas (reigned 1755-69), son of Iyasu II, the
most important political figure was Ras Mikael Sehul, a good example of
a great noble who made himself the power behind the throne. Mikael's
base was the province of Tigray, which by now enjoyed a large measure of
autonomy and from which Mikael raised up large armies with which he
dominated the Gonder scene. In 1769 he demonstrated his power by
ordering the murder of two kings (Iyoas and Yohannis II) and by placing
Tekla Haimanot II (son of Yohannis II) on the throne, a weak ruler who
did Mikael's bidding. Mikael continued in command until the early 1770s,
when a coalition of his opponents compelled him to retire to Tigray,
where he eventually died of old age.
Mikael's brazen murder of two kings and his undisguised role as
kingmaker in Gonder signaled the beginning of what Ethiopians have long
termed the Zemene Mesafint (Era of the Princes), a time when Gonder
kings were reduced to ceremonial figureheads while their military
functions and real power lay with powerful nobles. During this time,
traditionally dating from 1769 to 1855, the kingdom no longer existed as
a united entity capable of concerted political and military activity.
Various principalities were ruled by autonomous nobles, and warfare was
constant.
The five-volume work Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile by
James Bruce, the Scottish traveler who lived in Ethiopia from 1769 to
1772, describes some of the bloody conflicts and personal rivalries that
consumed the kingdom. During the most confused period, around 1800,
there were as many as six rival emperors. Provincial warlords were
masters of the territories they controlled but were subject to raids
from other provinces. Peasants often left the land to become soldiers or
brigands. In this period, too, Oromo nobles, often nominally Christian
and in a few cases Muslim, were among those who struggled for hegemony
over the highlands. The church, still riven by theological controversy,
contributed to the disunity that was the hallmark of the Zemene
Mesafint.
Ethiopia - The Reestablishment of the Ethiopian Monarchy
Tewodros II's origins were in the Era of the Princes, but his
ambitions were not those of the regional nobility. He sought to
reestablish a cohesive Ethiopian state and to reform its administration
and church. He did not initially claim Solomonic lineage but did seek to
restore Solomonic hegemony, and he considered himself the "Elect of
God." Later in his reign, suspecting that foreigners considered him
an upstart and seeking to legitimize his reign, he added "son of
David and Solomon" to his title.
Tewodros's first task was to bring Shewa under his control. During
the Era of the Princes, Shewa was, even more than most provinces, an
independent entity, its ruler even styling himself negus. In the course
of subduing the Shewans, Tewodros imprisoned a Shewan prince, Menelik,
who would later become emperor himself. Despite his success against
Shewa, Tewodros faced constant rebellions in other provinces. In the
first six years of his reign, the new ruler managed to put down these
rebellions, and the empire was relatively peaceful from about 1861 to
1863, but the energy, wealth, and manpower necessary to deal with
regional opposition limited the scope of Tewodros's other activities. By
1865 other rebels had emerged, including Menelik, who had escaped from
prison and returned to Shewa, where he declared himself negus.
In addition to his conflicts with rebels and rivals, Tewodros
encountered difficulties with the European powers. Seeking aid from the
British government (he proposed a joint expedition to conquer
Jerusalem), he became unhappy with the behavior of those Britons whom he
had counted on to advance his request, and he took them hostage. In
1868, as a British expeditionary force sent from India to secure release
of the hostages stormed his stronghold, Tewodros committed suicide.
Tewodros never realized his dream of restoring a strong monarchy,
although he took some important initial steps. He sought to establish
the principle that governors and judges must be salaried appointees. He
also established a professional standing army, rather than depending on
local lords to provide soldiers for his expeditions. He also intended to
reform the church, believing the clergy to be ignorant and immoral, but
he was confronted by strong opposition when he tried to impose a tax on
church lands to help finance government activities. His confiscation of
these lands gained him enemies in the church and little support
elsewhere. Essentially, Tewodros was a talented military campaigner but
a poor politician.
The kingdom at Tewodros's death was disorganized, but those
contending to succeed him were not prepared to return to the Zemene
Mesafint system. One of them, crowned Tekla Giorgis, took over the
central part of the highlands. Another, Kasa Mercha, governor of Tigray,
declined when offered the title of ras in exchange for recognizing Tekla
Giorgis. The third, Menelik of Shewa, came to terms with Tekla Giorgis
in return for a promise to respect Shewa's independence. Tekla Giorgis,
however, sought to bring Kasa Mercha under his rule but was defeated by
a small Tigrayan army equipped with more modern weapons than those
possessed by his Gonder forces. In 1872 Kasa Mercha was crowned negusa
nagast in a ceremony at the ancient capital of Aksum, taking the throne
name of Yohannis IV.
Yohannis was unable to exercise control over the nearly independent
Shewans until six years later. From the beginning of his reign, he was
confronted with the growing power of Menelik, who had proclaimed himself
king of Shewa and traced his Solomonic lineage to Lebna Dengel. While
Yohannis was struggling against opposing factions in the north, Menelik
consolidated his power in Shewa and extended his rule over the Oromo to
the south and west. He garrisoned Shewan forces among the Oromo and
received military and financial support from them. Despite the
acquisition of European firearms, in 1878 Menelik was compelled to
submit to Yohannis and to pay tribute; in return, Yohannis recognized
Menelik as negus and gave him a free hand in territories to the south of
Shewa. This agreement, although only a truce in the long-standing
rivalry between Tigray and Shewa, was important to Yohannis, who was
preoccupied with foreign enemies and pressures. In many of Yohannis's
external struggles, Menelik maintained separate relations with the
emperor's enemies and continued to consolidate Shewan authority in order
to strengthen his own position. In a subsequent agreement designed to
ensure the succession in the line of Yohannis, one of Yohannis's younger
sons was married to Zawditu, Menelik's daughter.
In 1875 Yohannis had to meet attacks from Egyptian forces on three
fronts. The khedive in Egypt envisioned a "Greater Egypt" that
would encompass Ethiopia. In pursuit of this goal, an Egyptian force
moved inland from present-day Djibouti but was annihilated by Afar
tribesmen. Other Egyptian forces occupied Harer, where they remained for
nearly ten years, long after the Egyptian cause had been lost. Tigrayan
warriors defeated a more ambitious attack launched from the coastal city
of Mitsiwa in which the Egyptian forces were almost completely
destroyed. A fourth Egyptian army was decisively defeated in 1876
southwest of Mitsiwa.
Italy was the next source of danger. The Italian government took over
the port of Aseb in 1882 from the Rubattino Shipping Company, which had
purchased it from a local ruler some years before. Italy's main interest
was not the port but the eventual colonization of Ethiopia. In the
process, the Italians entered into a long-term relationship with
Menelik. The main Italian drive was begun in 1885 from Mitsiwa, which
Italy had occupied. From this port, the Italians began to penetrate the
hinterland, with British encouragement. In 1887, after the Italians were
soundly defeated at Dogali by Ras Alula, the governor of northeastern
Tigray, they sent a stronger force into the area.
Yohannis was unable to attend to the Italian threat because of
difficulties to the west in Gonder and Gojam. In 1887 Sudanese Muslims,
known as Mahdists, made incursions into Gojam and Begemdir and laid
waste parts of those provinces. In 1889 the emperor met these forces in
the Battle of Metema on the Sudanese border. Although the invaders were
defeated, Yohannis himself was fatally wounded, and the Ethiopian forces
disintegrated. Just before his death, Yohannis designated one of his
sons, Ras Mengesha Yohannis of Tigray, as his successor, but this
gesture proved futile, as Menelik successfully claimed the throne in
1889.
The Shewan ruler became the dominant personality in Ethiopia and was
recognized as Emperor Menelik II by all but Yohannis's son and Ras
Alula. During the temporary period of confusion following Yohannis's
death, the Italians were able to advance farther into the hinterland
from Mitsiwa and establish a foothold in the highlands, from which
Menelik was unable to dislodge them. From 1889 until after World War II,
Ethiopia was deprived of its maritime frontier and was forced to accept
the presence of an ambitious European power on its borders.
Ethiopia - The Reign of Menelik II, 1889-1913
By 1900 Menelik had succeeded in establishing control over much of
present-day Ethiopia and had, in part at least, gained recognition from
the European colonial powers of the boundaries of his empire. Although
in many respects a traditionalist, he introduced several significant
changes. His decision in the late 1880s to locate the royal encampment
at Addis Ababa ("New Flower") in southern Shewa led to the
gradual rise of a genuine urban center and a permanent capital in the
1890s, a development that facilitated the introduction of new ideas and
technology. The capital's location symbolized the empire's southern
reorientation, a move that further irritated Menelik's Tigrayan
opponents and some Amhara of the more northerly provinces who resented
Shewan hegemony. Menelik also authorized a French company to build a
railroad, not completed until 1917, that eventually would link Addis
Ababa and Djibouti.
Menelik embarked on a program of military conquest that more than
doubled the size of his domain. Enjoying superior firepower, his forces overran the Kembata and
Welamo regions in the southern highlands. Also subdued were the Kefa and
other Oromo- and Omotic-speaking peoples.
Expanding south, Menelik introduced a system of land rights
considerably modified from that prevailing in the AmharaTigray
highlands. These changes had significant implications for the ordinary
cultivator in the south and ultimately were to generate quite different
responses there to the land reform programs that would follow the
revolution of 1974. In the central and northern
highlands, despite regional variations, most peasants had substantial
inheritable (broadly, rist) rights in land. In addition to holding rights of
this kind, the nobility held or were assigned certain economic rights in
the land, called gult rights, which entitled them to a portion of the produce
of the land in which others held rist rights and to certain services
from the rist holders. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church also held land of
its own and gult rights in land to which peasants held rist rights. In
the south, all land theoretically belonged to the emperor. He in turn
allocated land rights to those he appointed to office and to his
soldiers. The rights allocated by the king were more extensive than the
gult rights prevailing in the north and left most of the indigenous
peoples as tenants, with far fewer rights than Amhara and Tigray
peasants. Thus, the new landowners in the south were aliens and remained
largely so.
At the same time that Menelik was extending his empire, European
colonial powers were showing an interest in the territories surrounding
Ethiopia. Menelik considered the Italians a formidable challenge and
negotiated the Treaty of Wuchale with them in 1889. Among its terms
were those permitting the Italians to establish their first toehold on
the edge of the northern highlands and from which they subsequently
sought to expand into Tigray. Disagreements over the contents of the
treaty eventually induced Menelik to renounce it and repay in full a
loan Italy had granted as a condition. Thereafter, relations with Italy
were further strained as a result of the establishment of Eritrea as a
colony and Italy's penetration of the Somali territories.
Italian ambitions were encouraged by British actions in 1891, when,
hoping to stabilize the region in the face of the Mahdist threat in
Sudan, Britain agreed with the Italian government that Ethiopia should
fall within the Italian sphere of influence. France, however, encouraged
Menelik to oppose the Italian threat by delineating the projected
boundaries of his empire. Anxious to advance French economic interests
through the construction of a railroad from Addis Ababa to the city of
Djibouti in French Somaliland, France accordingly reduced the size of
its territorial claims there and recognized Ethiopian sovereignty in the
area.
Italian-Ethiopian relations reached a low point in 1895, when Ras
Mengesha of Tigray, hitherto reluctant to recognize the Shewan emperor's
claims, was threatened by the Italians and asked for the support of
Menelik. In late 1895, Italian forces invaded Tigray. However, Menelik
completely routed them in early 1896 as they approached the Tigrayan
capital, Adwa. This victory brought Ethiopia new prestige as well as
general recognition of its sovereign status by the European powers.
Besides confirming the annulment of the Treaty of Wuchale, the peace
agreement ending the conflict also entailed Italian recognition of
Ethiopian independence; in return, Menelik permitted the Italians to
retain their colony of Eritrea.
In addition to attempts on the part of Britain, France, and Italy to
gain influence within the empire, Menelik was troubled by intrigues
originating in Russia, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. But, showing a
great capacity to play one power off against another, the emperor was
able to avoid making any substantial concessions. Moreover, while
pursuing his own territorial designs, Menelik joined with France in 1898
to penetrate Sudan at Fashoda and then cooperated with British forces in
British Somaliland between 1900 and 1904 to put down a rebellion in the
Ogaden by Somali leader Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. By 1908 the colonial
powers had recognized Ethiopia's borders except for those with Italian
Somaliland.
After Menelik suffered a disabling stroke in May 1906, his personal
control over the empire weakened. Apparently responding to that weakness
and seeking to avoid an outbreak of conflict in the area, Britain,
France, and Italy signed the Tripartite Treaty, which declared that the
common purpose of the three powers was to maintain the political status
quo and to respect each other's interests. Britain's interest, it was
recognized, lay around Lake Tana and the headwaters of the Abay (Blue
Nile). Italy's chief interest was in linking Eritrea with Italian
Somaliland. France's interest was the territory to be traversed by the
railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti in French Somaliland.
Apparently recognizing that his political strength was ebbing,
Menelik established a Council of Ministers in late 1907 to assist in the
management of state affairs. The foremost aspirants to the throne, Ras
Mekonnen and Ras Mengesha, had died in 1906. In June 1908, the emperor
designated his thirteen-year-old nephew, Lij Iyasu, son of Ras Mikael of
Welo, as his successor. After suffering another stroke in late 1908, the
emperor appointed Ras Tessema as regent. These developments ushered in a
decade of political uncertainty. The great nobles, some with foreign
financial support, engaged in intrigues anticipating a time of troubles
as well as of opportunity upon Menelik's death.
Empress Taytu, who had borne no children, was heavily involved in
court politics on behalf of her kin and friends, most of whom lived in
the northern provinces and included persons who either had claims of
their own to the throne or were resentful of Shewan hegemony. However,
by 1910 her efforts had been thwarted by the Shewan nobles; thereafter,
the empress withdrew from political activity.
Ethiopia - The Interregnum
As late as September 29, 1934, Rome affirmed its 1928 treaty of
friendship with Ethiopia. Nonetheless, it became clear that Italy wished
to expand and link its holdings in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the international climate of the mid-1930s provided
Italy with the expectation that aggression could be undertaken with
impunity. Determined to provoke a casus belli, the Mussolini regime
began deliberately exploiting the minor provocations that arose in its
relations with Ethiopia.
In December 1934, an incident took place at Welwel in the Ogaden, a
site of wells used by Somali nomads regularly traversing the borders
between Ethiopia and British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The
Italians had built fortified positions in Welwel in 1930 and, because
there had been no protests, assumed that the international community had
recognized their rights over this area. However, an Anglo-Ethiopian
boundary commission challenged the Italian position when it visited
Welwel in late November 1934 on its way to set territorial boundary
markers. On encountering Italian belligerence, the commission's members
withdrew but left behind their Ethiopian military escort, which
eventually fought a battle with Italian units.
In September 1935, the League of Nations exonerated both parties in
the Welwel incident. The long delay and the intricate British and French
maneuverings persuaded Mussolini that no obstacle would be placed in his
path. An Anglo-French proposal in August 1935--just before the League of
Nations ruling--that the signatories to the 1906 Tripartite Treaty
collaborate for the purpose of assisting in the modernization and
reorganization of Ethiopian internal affairs, subject to the consent of
Ethiopia, was flatly rejected by the Italians. On October 3, 1935, Italy
attacked Ethiopia from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland without a
declaration of war. On October 7, the League of Nations unanimously
declared Italy an aggressor but took no effective action.
In a war that lasted seven months, Ethiopia was outmatched by Italy
in armaments--a situation exacerbated by the fact that a League of
Nations arms embargo was not enforced against Italy. Despite a valiant
defense, the next six months saw the Ethiopians pushed back on the
northern front and in Harerge. Acting on long-standing grievances, a
segment of the Tigray forces defected, as did Oromo forces in some
areas. Moreover, the Italians made widespread use of chemical weapons
and air power. On March 31, 1936, the Ethiopians counterattacked the
main Italian force at Maychew but were defeated. By early April 1936,
Italian forces had reached Dese in the north and Harer in the east. On
May 2, Haile Selassie left for French Somaliland and exile--a move
resented by some Ethiopians who were accustomed to a warrior emperor.
The Italian forces entered Addis Ababa on May 5. Four days later, Italy
announced the annexation of Ethiopia.
On June 30, Haile Selassie made a powerful speech before the League
of Nations in Geneva in which he set forth two choices--support for
collective security or international lawlessness. The emperor stirred
the conscience of many and was thereafter regarded as a major
international figure. Britain and France, however, soon recognized
Italy's control of Ethiopia. Among the major powers, the United States
and the Soviet Union refused to do so.
In early June 1936, Rome promulgated a constitution bringing
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland together into a single
administrative unit divided into six provinces. On June 11, 1936,
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani replaced Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who had
commanded the Italian forces in the war. In December the Italians
declared the whole country to be pacified and under their effective
control. Ethiopian resistance nevertheless continued.
After a failed assassination attempt against Graziani on February 19,
1937, the colonial authorities executed 30,000 persons, including about
half of the younger, educated Ethiopian population. This harsh policy,
however, did not pacify the country. In November 1937, Rome therefore
appointed a new governor and instructed him to adopt a more flexible
line. Accordingly, large-scale public works projects were undertaken.
One result was the construction of the country's first system of
improved roads. In the meantime, however, the Italians had decreed
miscegenation to be illegal. Racial separation, including residential
segregation, was enforced as thoroughly as possible. The Italians showed
favoritism to non-Christian Oromo (some of whom had supported the
invasion), Somali, and other Muslims in an attempt to isolate the
Amhara, who supported Haile Selassie.
Ethiopian resistance continued, nonetheless. Early in 1938, a revolt
broke out in Gojam led by the Committee of Unity and Collaboration,
which was made up of some of the young, educated elite who had escaped
the reprisal after the attempt on Graziani's life. In exile in Britain,
the emperor sought to gain the support of the Western democracies for
his cause but had little success until Italy entered World War II on the
side of Germany in June 1940. Thereafter, Britain and the emperor sought
to cooperate with Ethiopian and other indigenous forces in a campaign to
dislodge the Italians from Ethiopia and from British Somaliland, which
the Italians seized in August 1940, and to resist the Italian invasion
of Sudan. Haile Selassie proceeded immediately to Khartoum, where he
established closer liaison with both the British headquarters and the
resistance forces within Ethiopia.
Ethiopia - Ethiopia in World War II
Outside the Amhara-Tigray heartland, the two areas posing the most
consistent problems for Ethiopia's rulers were Eritrea and the largely
Somali-occupied Ogaden and adjacent regions.
The Liberation Struggle in Eritrea
Eritrea had been placed under British military administration in 1941
after the Italian surrender. In keeping with a 1950 decision of the UN
General Assembly, British military administration ended in September
1952 and was replaced by a new autonomous Eritrean government in federal
union with Ethiopia. Federation with the former Italian colony restored
an unhindered maritime frontier to the country. The new arrangement also
enabled the country to gain limited control of a territory that, at
least in its inland areas, was more advanced politically and
economically.
The Four Power Inquiry Commission established by the World War II
Allies (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States) had
failed to agree in its September 1948 report on a future course for
Eritrea. Several countries had displayed an active interest in the area.
In the immediate postwar years, Italy had requested that Eritrea be
returned as a colony or as a trusteeship. This bid was supported
initially by the Soviet Union, which anticipated a communist victory at
the Italian polls. The Arab states, seeing Eritrea and its large Muslim
population as an extension of the Arab world, sought the establishment
of an independent state. Some Britons favored a division of the
territory, with the Christian areas and the coast from Mitsiwa southward
going to Ethiopia and the northwest area going to Sudan.
A UN commission, which arrived in Eritrea in February 1950,
eventually approved a plan involving some form of association with
Ethiopia. In December the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
affirming the commission's plan, with the provision that Britain, the
administering power, should facilitate the UN efforts and depart from
the colony no later than September 15, 1952. Faced with this constraint,
the British administration held elections on March 16, 1952, for a
Representative Assembly of sixty-eight members. This body, made up
equally of Christians and Muslims, accepted the draft constitution
advanced by the UN commissioner on July 10. The constitution was
ratified by the emperor on September 11, and the Representative
Assembly, by prearrangement, was transformed into the Eritrean Assembly
three days before the federation was proclaimed.
The UN General Assembly resolution of September 15, 1952, adopted by
a vote of forty-seven to ten, provided that Eritrea should be linked to
Ethiopia through a loose federal structure under the emperor's
sovereignty but with a form and organization of internal
self-government. The federal government, which for all intents and
purposes was the existing imperial government, was to control foreign
affairs, defense, foreign and interstate commerce, transportation, and
finance. Control over domestic affairs (including police, local
administration, and taxation to meet its own budget) was to be exercised
by an elected Eritrean assembly on the parliamentary model. The state
was to have its own administrative and judicial structure and its own
flag.
Almost from the start of federation, the emperor's representative
undercut the territory's separate status under the federal system. In
August 1955, Tedla Bairu, an Eritrean who was the chief executive
elected by the assembly, resigned under pressure from the emperor, who
replaced Tedla with his own nominee. He made Amharic the official
language in place of Arabic and Tigrinya, terminated the use of the
Eritrean flag, and moved many businesses out of Eritrea. In addition,
the central government proscribed all political parties, imposed
censorship, gave the top administrative positions to Amhara, and
abandoned the principle of parity between Christian and Muslim
officials. In November 1962, the Eritrean Assembly, many of whose
members had been accused of accepting bribes, voted unanimously to
change Eritrea's status to that of a province of Ethiopia. Following his
appointment of the archconservative Ras Asrate Kasa as governor general,
the emperor was accused of "refeudalizing" the territory.
The extinction of the federation consolidated internal and external
opposition to union. Four years earlier, in 1958, a number of Eritrean
exiles had founded the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in Cairo,
under Hamid Idris Awate's leadership. This organization, however, soon
was neutralized. A new faction, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),
emerged in 1960. Initially a Muslim movement, the ELF was nationalist
rather than Marxist and received Iraqi and Syrian support. As urban
Christians joined, the ELF became more radical and anticapitalist.
Beginning in 1961, the ELF turned to armed struggle and by 1966
challenged imperial forces throughout Eritrea.
The rapid growth of the ELF also created internal divisions between
urban and rural elements, socialists and nationalists, and Christians
and Muslims. Although these divisions did not take any clear form, they
were magnified as the ELF extended its operations and won international
publicity. In June 1970, Osman Salah Sabbe, former head of the Muslim
League, broke away from the ELF and formed the Popular Liberation Forces
(PLF), which led directly to the founding of the Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF) in early 1972. Both organizations initially
attracted a large number of urban, intellectual, and leftist Christian
youths and projected a strong socialist and nationalist image. By 1975
the EPLF had more than 10,000 members in the field. However, the growth
of the EPLF was also accompanied by an intensification of internecine
Eritrean conflict, particularly between 1972 and 1974, when casualties
were well over 1,200. In 1976 Osman broke with the EPLF and formed the
Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Front (ELF-PLF), a division
that reflected differences between combatants in Eritrea and
representatives abroad as well as personal rivalries and basic
ideological differences, factors important in earlier splits within the
Eritrean separatist movement.
Encouraged by the imperial regime's collapse and attendant confusion,
the guerrillas extended their control over the whole region by 1977.
Ethiopian forces were largely confined to urban centers and controlled
the major roads only by day.
Ethiopia - Discontent in Tigray
The government's failure to effect significant economic and political
reforms over the previous fourteen years--combined with rising
inflation, corruption, a famine that affected several provinces (but
especially Welo and Tigray) and that was concealed from the outside
world, and the growing discontent of urban interest groups--provided the
backdrop against which the Ethiopian revolution began to unfold in early
1974. Whereas elements of the urban-based, modernizing elite previously
had sought to establish a parliamentary democracy, the initiation of the
1974 revolution was the work of the military, acting essentially in its
own immediate interests. The unrest that began in January of that year
then spread to the civilian population in an outburst of general
discontent.
The Ethiopian military on the eve of the revolution was riven by
factionalism; the emperor promoted such division to prevent any person
or group from becoming too powerful. Factions included the Imperial
Bodyguard, which had been rebuilt since the 1960 coup attempt; the
Territorial Army (Ethiopia's national ground force), which was broken
into many factions but which was dominated by a group of senior officers
called "The Exiles" because they had fled with Haile Selassie
in 1936 after the Italian invasion; and the air force. The officer
graduates of the Harer Military Academy also formed a distinct group in
opposition to the Holeta Military Training Center graduates.
Conditions throughout the army were frequently substandard, with
enlisted personnel often receiving low pay and insufficient food and
supplies. Enlisted personnel as well as some of the Holeta graduates
came from the peasantry, which at the time was suffering from a
prolonged drought and resulting famine. The general perception was that
the central government was deliberately refusing to take special
measures for famine relief. Much popular discontent over this issue,
plus the generally perceived lack of civil freedoms, had created
widespread discontent among the middle class, which had been built up
and supported by the emperor since World War II.
The revolution began with a mutiny of the Territorial Army's Fourth
Brigade at Negele in the southern province of Sidamo on January 12,
1974. Soldiers protested poor food and water conditions; led by their
noncommissioned officers, they rebelled and took their commanding
officer hostage, requesting redress from the emperor. Attempts at
reconciliation and a subsequent impasse promoted the spread of the
discontent to other units throughout the military, including those
stationed in Eritrea. There, the Second Division at Asmera mutinied,
imprisoned its commanders, and announced its support for the Negele
mutineers. The Signal Corps, in sympathy with the uprising, broadcast
information about events to the rest of the military. Moreover, by that
time, general discontent had resulted in the rise of resistance
throughout Ethiopia. Opposition to increased fuel prices and curriculum
changes in the schools, as well as low teachers' salaries and many other
grievances, crystalized by the end of February. Teachers, workers, and
eventually students--all demanding higher pay and better conditions of
work and education--also promoted other causes, such as land reform and
famine relief. Finally, the discontented groups demanded a new political
system. Riots in the capital and the continued military mutiny
eventually led to the resignation of Prime Minister Aklilu. He was
replaced on February 28, 1974, by another Shewan aristocrat,
Endalkatchew Mekonnen, whose government would last only until July 22.
On March 5, the government announced a revision of the 1955
constitution--the prime minister henceforth would be responsible to
parliament. The new government probably reflected Haile Selassie's
decision to minimize change; the new cabinet, for instance, represented
virtually all of Ethiopia's aristocratic families. The conservative
constitutional committee appointed on March 21 included no
representatives of the groups pressing for change. The new government
introduced no substantial reforms (although it granted the military
several salary increases). It also postponed unpopular changes in the
education system and instituted price rollbacks and controls to check
inflation. As a result, the general discontent subsided somewhat by late
March.
By this time, there were several factions within the military that
claimed to speak for all or part of the armed forces. These included the
Imperial Bodyguard under the old high command, a group of
"radical" junior officers, and a larger number of moderate and
radical army and police officers grouped around Colonel Alem Zewd
Tessema, commander of an airborne brigade based in Addis Ababa. In late
March, Alem Zewd became head of an informal, inter-unit coordinating
committee that came to be called the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee
(AFCC). Acting with the approval of the new prime minister, Alem Zewd
arrested a large number of disgruntled air force officers and in general
appeared to support the Endalkatchew government.
Such steps, however, did not please many of the junior officers, who
wished to pressure the regime into making major political reforms. In
early June, a dozen or more of them broke away from the AFCC and
requested that every military and police unit send three representatives
to Addis Ababa to organize for further action. In late June, a body of
men that eventually totaled about 120, none above the rank of major and
almost all of whom remained anonymous, organized themselves into a new
body called the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and
Territorial Army that soon came to be called the Derg (Amharic for "committee" or "council"
). They elected Major Mengistu Haile Mariam chairman and Major
Atnafu Abate vice chairman, both outspoken proponents of far-reaching
change.
This group of men would remain at the forefront of political and
military affairs in Ethiopia for the next thirteen years. The identity
of the Derg never changed after these initial meetings in 1974. Although
its membership declined drastically during the next few years as
individual officers were eliminated, no new members were admitted into
its ranks, and its deliberations and membership remained almost entirely
unknown. At first, the Derg's officers exercised their influence behind
the scenes; only later, during the era of the Provisional Military
Administrative Council, did its leaders emerge from anonymity and become
both the official as well as the de facto governing personnel.
Because its members in effect represented the entire military
establishment, the Derg could henceforth claim to exercise real power
and could mobilize troops on its own, thereby depriving the emperor's
government of the ultimate means to govern. Although the Derg professed
loyalty to the emperor, it immediately began to arrest members of the
aristocracy, military, and government who were closely associated with
the emperor and the old order. Colonel Alem Zewd, by now discredited in
the eyes of the young radicals, fled.
In July the Derg wrung five concessions from the emperor-- the
release of all political prisoners, a guarantee of the safe return of
exiles, the promulgation and speedy implementation of the new
constitution, assurance that parliament would be kept in session to
complete the aforementioned task, and assurance that the Derg would be
allowed to coordinate closely with the government at all levels of
operation. Hereafter, political power and initiative lay with the Derg,
which was increasingly influenced by a wide-ranging public debate over
the future of the country. The demands made of the emperor were but the
first of a series of directives or actions that constituted the
"creeping coup" by which the imperial system of government was
slowly dismantled. Promoting an agenda for lasting changes going far
beyond those proposed since the revolution began in January, the Derg
proclaimed Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First) as its guiding philosophy.
It forced out Prime Minister Endalkatchew and replaced him with Mikael
Imru, a Shewan aristocrat with a reputation as a liberal.
The Derg's agenda rapidly diverged from that of the reformers of the
late imperial period. In early August, the revised constitution, which
called for a constitutional monarchy, was rejected when it was forwarded
for approval. Thereafter, the Derg worked to undermine the authority and
legitimacy of the emperor, a policy that enjoyed much public support.
The Derg arrested the commander of the Imperial Bodyguard, disbanded the
emperor's governing councils, closed the private imperial exchequer, and
nationalized the imperial residence and the emperor's other landed and
business holdings. By late August, the emperor had been directly accused
of covering up the Welo and Tigray famine of the early 1970s that
allegedly had killed 100,000 to 200,000 people. After street
demonstrations took place urging the emperor's arrest, the Derg formally
deposed Haile Selassie on September 12 and imprisoned him. The emperor
was too old to resist, and it is doubtful whether he really understood
what was happening around him. Three days later, the Armed Forces
Coordinating Committee (i.e., the Derg) transformed itself into the
Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) under the
chairmanship of Lieutenant General Aman Mikael Andom and proclaimed
itself the nation's ruling body.
Ethiopia - The Struggle for Power, 1974-77
