THE FINAL CONGRESS of Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative
Council marked a watershed in modern Ethiopian history. The congress,
held in the capital city of Addis Ababa, was the prelude to the
inauguration, in 1987, of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,
which would be guided by a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party and regime.
At least nominally, thirteen years of rule by the military regime were
at an end. When the Provisional Military Administrative Council had
assumed power in 1974, there were no clear signs that it was committed
to a Marxist-Leninist model of social transformation; neither was there
any indication that it was sincere about its pledge to return Ethiopia
to civilian rule. In fact, within months of seizing power, the new
regime began systematically to buttress the already preeminent role of
the military as the vanguard of the revolution.
Until its collapse in 1974, the Ethiopian imperial state had
attempted to construct an absolutist but modernizing autocracy, a regime
committed to preserving tradition while carefully guiding society into
the twentieth century. Emperor Haile Selassie I, who ruled the country
from 1930 to 1974, portrayed himself as a strong but compassionate
leader, a model for all African statesmen. However, at a very
fundamental level, the imperial state constructed by Haile Selassie was
tenuously held together by a top-heavy, secularized bureaucracy and an
imperial myth. Once the myth that the emperor was unassailable had been
broken, the new regime began the process of reconstituting state
institutions. This process was slow but methodical, and by 1989 the
fruits of this institutional transformation were definitely in evidence.
The tasks of social, political, and economic reconstruction facing
the new regime in 1974 were formidable. To meet these challenges, the
regime attempted to fashion a new ideological foundation for society.
The Provisional Military Administrative Council favored a
Marxist-Leninist development model because of the organizational power
it promised. The approach taken was statist and based on the principles
of scientific socialism as interpreted in the Soviet Union from the time
of Joseph Stalin to that of Leonid Brezhnev. At an operational level,
this choice required the state's reorganization and reconstitution, the
redistribution of wealth and property, the creation of a capacity for
central planning, the pursuit of a state socialist development strategy
under the guidance of a vanguard party of "revolutionary
democrats," and the establishment of a constitutionally based
"people's republic."
Ethiopia's turn toward Marxism-Leninism first became evident in early
1976 with the enunciation of the Program for the National Democratic
Revolution. This document, which reflected the views of those regime
members who espoused Marxism-Leninism long before they seized power,
committed the regime to a noncapitalist approach to development based on
the principles of scientific socialism. For the next decade, the ruling
group used ideology and new socialist institutions to implement and
legitimize its policies. Even when particular economic strategies were
chosen, the regime seemed to be motivated by political objectives rather
than driven by ideological zeal. Chief among the objectives were
establishing the regime's political control and securing popular
legitimacy.
By 1989 it was evident that the government had failed to consolidate
its rule. Natural catastrophes such as drought and famine had taken a
heavy toll. Furthermore, the regime not only was unable to control the
general population, but also dozens of top-ranking officials had
defected to the West, where they bitterly denounced the government. With
military morale at its lowest point since 1974, disaffected senior
officers attempted a coup d'�tat in May 1989. In addition, numerous
opposition groups waged military campaigns against the government. Most
notable among these were the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the
Tigray People's Liberation Front, the latter operating with several
other antigovernment groups in an umbrella organization known as the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. By early 1991, these
groups controlled large stretches of territory in north-central Ethiopia
and were poised to seize even more.
Moreover, by this time the Soviet Union, in the spirit of Mikhail
Gorbachev's glasnost (openness), had abandoned its uncritical support of
Ethiopia's revolution. The winds of democracy that were sweeping across
much of the communist world also meant that Ethiopia could no longer
rely on its Soviet and East European allies for military and economic
assistance. These developments forced the government to reconsider its
efforts to deal with its opponents through military rather than
political means. However, by early 1991 the government had failed to
reach a negotiated settlement with the Eritrean People's Liberation
Front and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front.
Thereafter, both groups launched renewed attacks that by late May
brought the insurgents to power. The leaders of both insurgencies
disavowed the state socialism of the military government and pledged
themselves to democratic principles and free-market economics. Eritrea
was also expected to become an independent country.
Ethiopia - The Workers' Party of Ethiopia
Toward Party Formation
As early as 1976, the Soviet Union had encouraged Addis Ababa's new
leaders to create a civilian-based vanguard party. The Ethiopian head of
state and leader of the Provisional Military Administrative Council
(PMAC; also known as the Derg), Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, initially
had resisted, arguing that the revolution had taken place without such a
party and that there was no need for haste in creating one. However, in
the late 1970s, in the wake of the regime's near collapse under the
weight of armed opposition to its rule, Mengistu believed the creation
of a vanguard party would accomplish the regime's goals of gaining
political control over the general population and of securing popular
legitimacy. Therefore, in December 1979 Mengistu announced the creation
of the Commission to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia
(COPWE).
The establishment of mass organizations, such as the AllEthiopia
Trade Union, the All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' Association, and the
All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association, preceded the creation of COPWE. The
Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association, the Revolutionary Ethiopia
Women's Association, the Working People's Control Committees, and
various professional associations were instituted after COPWE's
establishment. The idea behind the proliferation of mass organizations
was to create a party that would neutralize "narrow
nationalism," or sectarianism, and that would be based on broad,
yet clearly defined, class interests. In response to the fiasco that
resulted from efforts to create a union of Marxist-Leninist
organizations in the mid-1970s, the Derg determined that the party
should be one of individuals, not of political organizations. To the
extent that individual interests were represented, this was to be done
through mass organizations.
Mass organizations not only represented their membership at party
congresses but also guarded their interests on an everyday basis. The
mass organizations had educational and developmental roles. The basic
units of political consciousness and involvement, then, would be party
cells at work sites or in mass organizations. Individuals could belong
to more than one mass organization at a time.
In determining COPWE membership, the regime tried to give the
impression that a broadly representative organization had been created.
Between 1,200 and 1,500 delegates from all regions and all walks of life
attended the three congresses. However, the diversity of the delegates
was questionable. For example, at COPWE's first congress, in 1980, more
than a third of the delegates were members of the armed forces or
residents of the Addis Ababa area.
The first congress unveiled the membership of the COPWE Central
Committee and the Secretariat. The Secretariat, which was supervised by
the top Derg leadership, consisted mainly of civilian ideologues. The
Secretariat was responsible for the day-to-day administration of Central
Committee business. Regional branches under the direction of military
officers in each region complemented COPWE's central leadership.
However, the positions of chief regional administrator and COPWE
representative were divided in late 1981, with the party posts assuming
greater importance. Within a year of the first congress, it was clear
that COPWE was being transformed into a party that could be used by the
state as an instrument of control.
By mid-1983 the COPWE bureaucracy stretched from the national center
to the fourteen regions and thence to the subregional level, to peasant
associations and urban dwellers' associations ( kebeles), and on down to the party cell level. At that time,
there were an estimated 6,500 COPWE party cells, with a total membership
estimated at 30,000 to 50,000.
Party membership, however, was not open to all. The main criterion
for acceptability was loyalty to the regime rather than ideological
sophistication. Although Mengistu had stressed the need for ideological
purity and for only a few "committed communists," concern over
ideological purity appeared to be a facade for the Derg's efforts to
neutralize or preempt its opponents and thus establish the party's
exclusive role in defining the normative order.
Once COPWE was in place, the Derg projected itself into the most
important sectors of the central bureaucracy. Derg members served as the
administrators of twelve of the fourteen regions. An additional thirty
Derg members took up influential posts in subregional administration and
in central ministries. After 1978 the presence of military personnel in
the bureaucracy expanded so greatly that not only members of the Derg
but also other trusted military men served in such roles.
The organizational model followed by COPWE was Soviet inspired. Even
though there was tension between self-styled communists and nationalists
in the Derg, there was an understanding that their collective position
as a ruling group was unassailable. This could be seen in the
distribution of power within COPWE. The most important policy-making
bodies in COPWE were the Executive Committee, whose seven members all
came from the Derg, and the Central Committee, which consisted of
ninety-three full members and thirty alternates. Of the 123 members of
the Central Committee, seventy-nine were military men or police
officers. There were at least twenty Derg members in this group, and
others held important regional posts in the bureaucracy as well as in
COPWE. At the time of COPWE's demise, military personnel represented
more than 50 percent of the congress that established the vanguard
party.
The Vanguard Party
The government announced the formation of the Workers' Party of
Ethiopia (WPE) on September 12, 1984, the tenth anniversary of the
revolution. Regional and local COPWE branches were transformed into WPE
instruments, and it was announced that party congresses would be held at
five-year intervals. These congresses would be responsible for electing
the party Central Committee, a body of 183 members as of 1987. The
Central Committee normally met twice a year. Among its duties was the
election of the WPE's Political Bureau, the general secretary, and
members of the WPE Secretariat. However, the Central Committee was too
large and diverse to serve as an effective decision-making body.
Although in the late 1980s more than half of the Central Committee's
full members were former police or former military personnel, the
Central Committee also included peasants, workers, trade union members,
and representatives of various mass organizations.
The WPE Political Bureau had eleven full members and six alternate
members. The Derg's Standing Committee and the COPWE Executive Committee
had comprised the Derg's seven most influential members. The additional
four members appointed to the WPE were two civilian ideologues and two
career technocrats, who in the years leading up to the WPE's
inauguration had become responsible for the day-to-day direction of
party matters and who evidently had Mengistu's confidence.
The WPE's Political Bureau was the country's most important
decision-making body. Although the Political Bureau's decisions were
always made in secret, there was evidence that General Secretary
Mengistu's wishes generally prevailed, no matter what the opposition.
One observer suggested that whatever power or influence other Political
Bureau members exerted was owed more to their closeness to Mengistu than
to any formal positions they might occupy or to their personal
qualities. The Political Bureau, therefore, was little more than a forum
for the articulation of policies already determined personally by
Mengistu.
The paramount position of the WPE was enshrined in the 1987
constitution, which stated that the party should be "the formulator
of the country's development process and the leading force of the state
and in society." Indeed, the WPE had become more important than the
central government in determining the direction of national and local
policies. Local party leaders sometimes possessed a great deal of
latitude in determining approaches to policy in their regions as long as
their decisions did not conflict with objectives determined in Addis
Ababa. At the national level, highly politicized party representatives
often exercised greater influence than the Western-trained bureaucrats
in government ministries. It appeared that the government bureaucracy
had to follow the lead of the party and often found its policies and
procedures overridden by political decisions.
At the national level, individuals from the military, the government
bureaucracy, and those ethnic groups (especially Amhara and Tigray) that
had historically endorsed the notion of a unitary, "Greater
Ethiopia" dominated the WPE. However, below the level of the
regional first secretary of the WPE, the military and ethnic origins of
party leadership became less important.
Ethiopia - The 1987 Constitution
The primary task facing the WPE following its formation in 1984 was
to devise the new national constitution that would inaugurate the
People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). In March 1986, a
343-member Constitutional Commission was formed to draft a new
constitution based on the principles of scientific socialism.
Eventually, the 122 full and alternate members of the WPE Central
Committee who had been appointed to its membership dominated the
commission.
The Constitutional Commission had its origins in the Institute for
the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, which the Derg had established in
March 1983 to find solutions to problems resulting from Ethiopia's
extreme ethnic diversity. The institute was staffed mostly by academics
from Addis Ababa University, who continued to serve as advisers to the
Constitutional Commission. The commission's diverse membership included
religious leaders, artists, writers, doctors, academics, athletes,
workers, and former nobility. There was also an attempt by those who
chose appointees to the commission to make sure that all major ethnic
nationalities had representation in the body.
For about six months, the commission debated the details of the new
constitution. In June 1986, it issued a 120-article draft document. The
government printed and distributed 1 million copies to kebeles and
peasant associations throughout the country. During the next two months,
the draft was discussed at about 25,000 locations. The regime used this
method of discussion to legitimize the constitution-making process and
to test the mood of the populace. In some cases, people attended
constitutional discussion sessions only after pressure from local WPE
cadres, but in other cases attendance was voluntary. Where popular
interest was apparent, it centered on issues such as taxes, the role of
religion, marriage, the organization of elections, and citizenship
rights and obligations. By far the most controversial draft provision
was the one that outlawed polygamy, which caused a furor among Muslims.
Few questions were raised about the document's failure to address the
nationalities problem and the right to selfdetermination . According to
government officials, the citizenry submitted more than 500,000
suggested revisions. In August the commission reconvened to consider
proposed amendments. In all, the commission accepted ninety-five
amendments to the original draft. Most of the changes, however, were
cosmetic.
The referendum on the constitution was held on February 1, 1987, and
Mengistu announced the results three weeks later. He reported that 96
percent of the 14 million people eligible to participate (adults
eighteen years of age and older) actually voted. Eighty-one percent of
the electorate endorsed the constitution, while 18 percent opposed it (1
percent of the ballots were invalid). Although this was the first
election in Ethiopia's history based on universal suffrage, the presence
of communist cadres throughout the country ensured that the constitution
would be adopted. In Tigray and Eritrea, however, the regime held
referenda only in urban centers because much of these territories was
controlled by the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front, respectively. In other places, such as parts of Welo and
Gonder regions, the vote took place amid heightened security measures.
The constitution officially took effect on February 22, 1987, when
the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was proclaimed, although it
was not until September that the new government was fully in place and
the PMAC formally abolished. The document,
which established the normative foundations of the republic, consisted
of seventeen chapters and 119 articles. The preamble traced Ethiopia's
origins back to antiquity, proclaimed the historical heroism of its
people, praised the country's substantial natural and human resources,
and pledged to continue the struggle against imperialism, poverty, and
hunger. The government's primary concern was proclaimed to be the
country's development through the implementation of the Program for the
National Democratic Revolution (PNDR). In the process, it was assumed
that the material and technical bases necessary for establishing
socialism would be created.
The constitution attempted to situate Ethiopia in the context of the
worldwide movement of so-called "progressive states" and made
no direct reference to Africa. Critics claim that the constitution was
no more than an abridged version of the 1977 Soviet constitution, with
the exception that strong powers were assigned to the newly created
office of the president. A second difference between the Ethiopian and
Soviet constitutions is that the former declared the country to be a
unitary state rather than a union of republics. It was reported that the
problem of nationalities was hotly debated in the Constitutional
Commission, as well as in the WPE Central Committee, but the regime
would not abandon its desire to create a single multiethnic state rather
than a federation.
Ethiopia - The Social Order
Chapter 1 of the constitution defined Ethiopia's social order. The
People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) was declared to be
"a state of working peasants in which the intelligentsia, the
revolutionary army, artisans, and other democratic sections of society
participate." The commitment to socialist construction was
reaffirmed, as was the idea of egalitarianism within the context of a
unitary state. The official language remained Amharic. The functioning
and organization of the country was proclaimed to be based on the
principles of democratic centralism, under which representative party
and state organs are elected by lower bodies. The vanguard character of
the WPE was asserted, and its roles as well as those of mass
organizations were spelled out.
Chapter 2 dealt with the country's economic system. The state was
dedicated to the creation of a "highly interdependent and
integrated national economy" and to the establishment of conditions
favorable to development. In addition, the constitution committed the
state to central planning; state ownership of the means of production,
distribution, and exchange; and expansion of cooperative ownership among
the general population.
Chapter 3 addressed social issues, ranging from education and the
family to historical preservation and cultural heritage. The family was
described as the basis of society and therefore deserving of special
attention by means of the joint efforts of state and society. In
addition, the constitution pledged that health insurance and other
social services would be expanded through state leadership.
National defense was the subject of Chapter 4. The first article
asserted the nation's need to defend its sovereignty and territorial
integrity and to safeguard the accomplishments of the revolution. It was
declared that the Ethiopian people had a historical responsibility to
defend the country. The defense force was to be the army of the
country's working people. The army's fundamental role would be to secure
peace and socialism.
Foreign policy objectives were spelled out in four brief articles in
Chapter 5 and were based on the principles of proletarian
internationalism, peaceful coexistence, and nonalignment. In many
respects, the language of this section resembled that of a constitution
of a Warsaw Pact country in the days before glasnost.
Ethiopia - Citizenship, Freedoms, Rights, and Duties
Chapters 6 and 7 were concerned with defining citizenship and
spelling out the freedoms, rights, and duties of citizens. The language
was egalitarian, and Ethiopians were declared to be equal before the
law, regardless of nationality, sex, religion, occupation, and social or
other status. They had the right to marry, to work, to rest, to receive
free education, and to have access to health care and to a fair trial.
Ethiopians were guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion. As was
not the case in imperial Ethiopia, religion and the state were
proclaimed to be separate institutions. Citizens were assured the
freedoms of movement, speech, press, assembly, peaceful demonstration,
and association. Regarding political participation, citizens had the
right to vote and the right to be elected to political office. Their
duties included national military service, protection of socialist state
property, protection of the environment, and observance of the
constitution and laws of the country.
In spite of the attention the constitution paid to basic freedoms,
until the last days of the regime international human rights
organizations were virtually unanimous in condemning the Mengistu
regime. Summary execution, political detention, torture, and forced
migration represented only some of the violations cited by these groups.
Ethiopia - National Shengo (National Assembly)
The 1987 constitution established the office of president.
Theoretically, the Council of State ruled along with the president and
exercised legislative oversight in relation to other branches of
government. In reality, however, the office of the president in
particular and the executive branch in general were the most powerful
branches of government. The president was able to act with considerable
independence from the National Shengo.
Although the constitution stipulated that the president was
accountable to the National Shengo, Mengistu demonstrated repeatedly
that there was no authority higher than his own office. By law he was
responsible for presenting members of his executive staff and the
Supreme Court to the National Shengo for election. At the same time, the
president, "when compelling circumstances warrant it" between
sessions of the National Shengo, could appoint or relieve the prime
minister, the deputy prime minister, and other members of the Council of
Ministers; the president, the vice president, and Supreme Court judges;
the prosecutor general; the chairman of the National Workers' Control
Committee; and the auditor general. The National Shengo was by law
supposed to act on such decrees in its next regular session, but this
appeared to be only pro forma.
The president, who could be elected to an indefinite number of
successive five-year terms, had to submit nominations for appointment to
the Council of Ministers (his cabinet) to the National Shengo for
approval. However, by the time nominations reached the National Shengo
for consideration, their appointment was a foregone conclusion. In
practice, President Mengistu would chose individuals for particular
offices without any apparent input from the National Shengo, the WPE, or
the Council of State.
The president, who was also commander in chief of the armed forces,
was also responsible for implementing foreign and domestic policy,
concluding international treaties, and establishing diplomatic missions.
If he deemed it necessary, the president could rule by decree.
Ethiopia - Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers, defined in the constitution as "the
Government," was the government's highest executive and
administrative organ. The body consisted of the prime minister, the
deputy prime minister, the ministers, and other members as determined by
law. Members were accountable to the National Shengo, but between
sessions they were accountable to the president and the Council of
State. Members of this council were chosen from regularly elected
members of the National Shengo and served five-year terms, unless they
resigned or were removed by the president. For example, in early
November 1989 Prime Minister FikreSelassie Wogderes resigned his office,
allegedly for health reasons. However, some reports maintained that he
was forced out by Mengistu because of his apparent loss of enthusiasm
for the regime's policies. At the same time, Mengistu reshuffled his
cabinet. Significantly, these events occurred weeks after the annual
session of the National Shengo had concluded.
The Council of Ministers was responsible for the implementation of
laws and regulations and for the normal administrative functions of
national government. It prepared social and economic development plans,
the annual budget, and proposals concerning foreign relations. In their
respective areas of responsibility, members of the Council of Ministers
were the direct representatives of the president and the government; and
because they typically held parallel offices within the WPE, as a group
they tended to be the most significant political actors in the
government.
In 1991 there were twenty-one ministries. Portfolios consisted of the
Ministry in Charge of the General Plan and the ministries of
agriculture; coffee and tea development; communications and transport;
construction; culture and sports affairs; domestic trade; education and
fine arts; finance; foreign affairs; foreign trade; health; industry;
information; internal affairs; labor and social affairs; law and
justice; mines, energy, and water resources; national defense; state
farms; and urban development and housing. In addition to these
ministries, there were several other important state authorities, such
as the Office of the National Council for Central Planning, the
Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission, and the National Bank of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia - Judicial System
The constitution provided for Ethiopia's first independent judiciary.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court and various lower courts were the
responsibility of the Ministry of Law and Justice. After Haile
Selassie's overthrow, much of the formal structure of the existing
judicial structure remained intact. Over the years, regional and
district level courts were reformed somewhat. However, the new
constitutional provisions had the potential to change Ethiopia's
national judicial system significantly.
The constitution stipulated that judicial authority was vested in
"one Supreme Court, courts of administrative and autonomous
regions, and other courts established by law." Supreme Court judges
were elected by the National Shengo; those who served at the regional
level were elected by regional shengos (assemblies). In each case, the
judges served terms concurrent with that of the shengo that elected
them. The Supreme Court and higher courts at the regional level were
independent of the Ministry of Law and Justice, but judges could be
recalled by the relevant shengo.
The Supreme Court was responsible for administering the national
judicial system. The court's powers were expanded to oversee all
judicial aspects of lesser courts, not just cases appealed to it. At the
request of the prosecutor general or the president of the Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court could review any case from another court. Noteworthy
is the fact that, in addition to separate civil and criminal sections,
the court had a military section. In the late 1980s, it was thought that
this development might bring the military justice system, which had been
independent, into the normal judicial system. However, it became evident
that it would be some time before the Supreme Court could begin to serve
this function adequately.
Between 1987 and 1989, the government undertook a restructuring of
the Supreme Court with the intent of improving the supervision of judges
and of making the administration of justice fairer and more efficient.
The Supreme Court Council was responsible for overseeing the court's
work relating to the registration and training of judges and lawyers.
The Supreme Court Council's first annual meeting was held in August
1988, at which time it passed rules of procedure and rules and
regulations for judges. Although the government reported that the courts
were becoming more efficient, it admitted that there was much to be done
before the heavy case burden of the courts could be relieved.
Chapter 15 of the constitution established the Office of the
Prosecutor General, which was responsible for ensuring the uniform
application and enforcement of law by all state organs, mass
organizations, and other bodies. The prosecutor general was elected by
the National Shengo for a five-year term and was responsible for
appointing and supervising prosecutors at all levels. In carrying out
their responsibilities, these officials were independent of local
government offices.
Local tribunals, such as kebele tribunals and peasant association
tribunals, were not affected by the 1987 constitution. People's courts
were originally established under the jurisdiction of peasant
associations and kebeles. All matters relating to land redistribution
and expropriation were removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Law and Justice and placed under the jurisdiction of the peasant
association tribunals, whose members were elected by association
members. In addition, such tribunals had jurisdiction over a number of
minor criminal offenses, including intimidation, violation of the
privacy of domicile, and infractions of peasant association regulations.
The tribunals also had jurisdiction in disputes involving small sums of
money and in conflicts between peasant associations, their members, and
other associations. Appeals from people's tribunals could be filed with
regional courts. Kebele tribunals had powers similar to those of their
counterparts in peasant associations.
Ethiopia - Regional and Local Government
Regional Administration
When it assumed power in 1974, the Derg only slightly reordered the
imperial regime's pattern of administrative organization at the national
level. By contrast, the new regime saw existing local administration as
anathema to the objectives of socialist construction, and its reform
efforts were initially more evident on the local level than in the
central bureaucracy.
Immediately after assuming power, the Derg reorganized Ethiopia's
fourteen provincial administrations and replaced all serving governors
general. The fourteen provinces (teklay ghizats) were relabeled regions
(kifle hagers) and were divided into 102 subregions (awrajas) and 556
districts (weredas). (By 1981 the number of administrative divisions had
increased to sixteen with the addition of Addis Ababa and Aseb.) The
restructuring was a major step toward dismantling feudal privilege.
Moreover, all new appointees were either military men or
university-educated individuals who were considered progressives.
The main charge of these new administrators initially was to promote
development, and the maintenance of law and order was considered only of
secondary importance. Despite the commitment to rural development and to
the staffing of regional administrative positions with young, dynamic,
educated people, not much could be done to accelerate the process of
change. Field bureaucrats had few resources to work with, their staffs
were small, and their budgets were committed almost exclusively to
salaries. By the mid-1980s, the relief and rehabilitation contributions
of foreign private voluntary organizations in some cases made more
resources available at the local level than did the regional
administrations.
After having concentrated on a gradual transformation of the state's
administrative structure, with the promulgation of the 1987 constitution
the Mengistu regime prepared for a further reorganization of regional
administration. Hence, at its inaugural session, the National Shengo
enacted a government plan for the administrative reorganization of
regional government. As a result, twenty-five administrative regions and
five autonomous regions were created. The autonomous regions consisted of Eritrea (broken further into
three subregions in the north, west, and south), Aseb, Tigray, Dire
Dawa, and Ogaden. The change promised to alter significantly Ethiopia's
traditional pattern of administrative organization.
If the plan were to be fully implemented, this reorganization would
have required a dramatic expansion in the government and party
bureaucracy. Relatively new institutions, like regional planning bodies,
would have been eliminated and replaced with new planning agencies in
the various regions. Some observers suggested that this plan was
initially endorsed to pursue a Soviet-style approach to the
nationalities problem. They argued that the regime was trying to
organize regional administration along ethnic lines. Consequently, this
reform had little positive effect on enhancing the regime's legitimacy
and in fact limited its control over the general population.
The primary organs of state power at the regional level were regional
shengos. These bodies were responsible mainly for implementing the
central government's laws and decisions. Regional shengos could draft
their own budgets and development plans, but these had to be approved by
the National Shengo. Regional shengos also possessed some latitude in
devising and enforcing local laws and regulations and in electing local
judges. By the summer of 1989, however, regional shengos had been
elected in only eleven of the twenty-five newly designated
administrative regions and in only three of the five regions designated
as "autonomous."
Ethiopia - Peasant Associations
During its thirteen-year existence (1974 to 1987), the Derg worked to
spread administrative reform down to the lowest echelons of regional
administration. To this end, it took several important steps in 1975.
With its Land Reform Proclamation in March 1975, the Derg abolished
the lowest level of rural administration, the balabat , and called for the formation of peasant associations
that would be responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
land reform measures. Later in the year, the Derg issued Proclamation
No. 71, which gave peasant associations legal status and authorized them
to create "conditions facilitating the complete destruction of the
feudal order." It also empowered the associations' executive
committees to draft internal regulations that would, in theory, devolve
more power to local communities. These associations were to be guided
initially by students in the Development Through Cooperation Campaign
(commonly referred to as zemecha), who were expected to teach peasants about the
revolution's goals. Students were also supposed to help local
communities plan and implement development programs in their areas.
Initially, it was not clear how much power, authority, or autonomy
the regime intended to devolve to local institutions. Consequently,
state agents often came into conflict with local organizations under the
guidance of students who were often more radical and politically astute
than government functionaries. By 1976, to bring local communities under
tighter central control, the Derg introduced laws spelling out the
rights and obligations of peasant associations and kebeles.
To the extent that peasant associations maintained some of their
initial autonomy, they did so almost exclusively with regard to local
issues. On national issues, the regime, through the party and other
agencies, manipulated peasant associations to suit its purposes. After
1978, for example, production cadres and political cadres of the
National Revolutionary Development Campaign (and later the WPE) played
important roles in motivating peasant production and in political
indoctrination. State control of local associations was also a natural
by-product of the villagization and resettlement programs of the mid- to
late 1980s.
By 1990 there were more than 20,000 peasant associations throughout
the country. They represented the lowest level of government
administration and, in collaboration with the local WPE office, were
responsible for processing and interpreting national policies,
maintaining law and order, and planning and implementing certain local
development policies. State control grew further in 1975 when the Derg
promoted the formation of the All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association (AEPA),
a national association having district offices responsible for
overseeing the activities of local associations. Before the WPE's
formation, AEPA district representatives exercised supervisory powers
over the associations under their jurisdiction. The management of
elections, investigations into allegations of mismanagement, changes to
association boundaries, and organization of political meetings all came
under the purview of the AEPA district representative. However, by 1989
WPE cadres were active in monitoring and providing guidance to local
peasant associations.
Ethiopia - Kebeles
In July 1975, the Derg issued Proclamation No. 47, which established
kebeles, or urban dwellers' associations, in Addis Ababa and five other
urban centers. Organized similarly to peasant associations, Addis
Ababa's 291 kebeles possessed neighborhood constituencies ranging from
3,000 to 12,000 residents each. Like the peasant associations in the
countryside, the kebeles were initially responsible only for the
collection of rent, the establishment of local judicial tribunals, and
the provision of basic health, education, and other social services in
their neighborhoods. Kebele powers were expanded in late 1976 to include
the collection of local taxes and the registration of houses, residents,
births, deaths, and marriages.
During the height of the Red Terror, kebeles were responsible for
ensuring neighborhood defense. Neighborhood defense squads patrolled
their communities day and night and sometimes operated outside the
control of the central authorities. Many brutal excesses were attributed
to kebele defense squads between 1976 and 1978, but they were more
closely monitored thereafter.
In April 1981, the Derg issued Proclamation No. 25, which provided
kebeles with extended powers and a more elaborate administrative
structure. According to this new structure, the general assembly,
composed of all kebele residents, was empowered to elect a policy
committee, which in turn was authorized to appoint the executive
committee, the revolution defense committee, and the judicial tribunal.
At the time of this proclamation, there were 1,260 kebeles in 315 towns.
The government estimated national kebele membership in the late 1980s
at 4.4 million. The All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' Association (AEUDA)
linked kebeles throughout the country. This organization's bureaucracy
extended, in layers that paralleled the central bureaucracy, down to the
neighborhood level. However, as in the countryside, the WPE had become
the most important political institution, capable of overriding
decisions taken by kebeles as well as by peasant associations.
Ethiopia - Civil Service
Upon assuming power in 1974, the Derg decided to undertake extensive
reforms of the central administration. Rather than engage in immediate,
wholesale reorganization, the Derg concentrated on replacing career
bureaucrats in the key ministries of interior, community development,
and justice. If the Derg had purged the upper echelons of the entire
civil service after 1974, there would have been insufficient numbers of
educated, skilled, and experienced managers to conduct the normal
affairs of government.
In general, the Derg allowed most bureaucrats who had served the
emperor to remain at their posts and appointed army officers to monitor
their activities in every ministry. At the same time, the Derg attempted
to recruit into the civil service former high school and college
students who were then serving in the zemecha. This group tended to be
committed to revolutionary change, but it often lacked the bureaucratic
skills to achieve this goal. Moreover, although the campaigners
generally favored the revolution, many opposed military rule, and once
in positions of authority they undermined rather than promoted the
regime's goals.
Eventually, the Derg required all civil servants and political
appointees to undergo reeducation to acquire the proper socialist
orientation. Many civil servants, as well as military personnel,
traveled to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba for ideological
training. After the establishment in 1976 of the Yekatit '66 Ideological
School and after the creation of COPWE in 1979, hundreds more could be
taught Marxist-Leninist doctrine inside Ethiopia. Some became party
cadres and served in various parts of the country to encourage and
monitor the political education and economic productivity of both
government agencies and the citizenry at large.
In the early days of the revolution, the central bureaucracy was
characterized by constant bickering among the various ministries and a
general lack of interministerial coordination. This situation forced the
Derg to create the Ministry of National Resource Development in 1975 to
promote agricultural development as a possible solution to
interministerial coordination problems and to address the problem of low
productivity within society at large. By 1976 this strategy had failed,
and the functions of the Ministry of National Resource Development were
distributed among several ministries and parastatal bodies. The creation
of the Central Planning Supreme Council in 1978 represented a more
concerted attempt to coordinate bureaucratic participation in
development. This strategy worked for a brief time, but by the late
1980s bureaucratic inefficiency had returned.
Starting in 1978, the Mengistu regime systematically attempted to
enhance its ability to control the general population, and to a certain
extent it used the civil service for this purpose. The state bureaucracy
expanded enormously in the first decade of the revolution, and control
by the military deepened and expanded in the process. This bureaucratic
expansion increased the coercive capacity of the state and laid the
groundwork for the establishment of the all-embracing vanguard party.
After the creation of the WPE in 1984, the regime established a wide
array of government institutions that radiated from the center out to
the regional and local levels. Leadership positions in these new
institutions were used as patronage by the regime to reward loyal
supporters or to co-opt potential adversaries in the military. Although
patronage had been employed by Haile Selassie, it was different under
the Mengistu regime in that it was not rooted in the traditional social
order but rather in the spoils accruing to a transitional state that
controlled access to wealth and power.
The inauguration of the WPE resulted in a blurring of the lines
between party and state. As noted previously, party operatives tended to
interject themselves freely into the areas of administration and
government policy. For example, party cadres had important political and
intelligencegathering roles in the workplace. The Working People's
Control Committees (WPCCs), created in 1981, had come to serve as a
somewhat threatening "watchdog" over productive activities.
WPCCs were supposed to be involved in the implementation, supervision,
and follow-up of government policies, regulations, and directives. WPCCs
also could audit the accounts of any government institution, mass
organization, or private individual. By 1984 the regime was crediting
WPCCs with having uncovered numerous incidents of fraud, corruption,
waste, and counterrevolution. For all its authoritarianism, the Haile
Selassie regime was never able to achieve such tight surveillance. The
Derg's capacity in this area was an indication of the effectiveness of
the training provided by security advisers from the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
Although it was difficult to calculate its actual size, the central
bureaucracy evidently grew tremendously after the revolution. The
dimensions of this growth can be deduced from an analysis of consumption
expenditures, which include wages and salaries. Figures available in
late 1989 indicated that between 1974 and 1980 such expenditure grew
from about 5 billion birr to almost 8 billion birr, an increase of 60
percent. Central administration and defense accounted for about 80
percent of the 1980 figures. The growth of the public bureaucracy, even
when the party bureaucracy was excluded, represented a tremendous drain
on the resources available for development. Moreover, it appeared that
if the regional reforms announced in 1987 were to be implemented fully,
the civil service would have to expand even further.
Ethiopia - The Politics of Development
During the 1980s, the government attempted to consolidate the
revolution both structurally and ideologically. When it assumed power in
1974, the Derg pledged immediate attention to the social injustices that
had been perpetrated by the imperial regime. In the revolution's
earliest stages, the Derg's commitment to this pledge was manifested in
particular by policies such as the nationalization of rural and urban
property. The first year and a half of the new order could be described
as a "phase of redistribution." In the name of the
"people," the "toiling masses," and the
"oppressed tillers of the soil," the government confiscated
property previously owned by the nobility and other persons of wealth
and redistributed it to peasants, tenants, and renters.
Peasants and workers expected that the new order would bring about a
fundamental change in their circumstances, and to a certain extent this
did happen. They also expected to be involved in determining their own
fate; this, however, did not occur. The Derg quickly declared its own
preeminent role as the vanguard of the revolution, causing concern among
urban workers that their role was being minimized. When labor tried to
become more instrumental in the changes that were beginning to take
place, the government suppressed the workers' movement. The Derg
condemned the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) as
reactionary and disbanded it in late 1975. In its place, in 1977 the
regime created the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU), a confederation of
1,700 unions whose rank and file numbered more than 300,000 in 1984. The
regime thus co-opted the labor movement, and after 1976 the government
seemed free to devise its own social development strategy without much
input from the groups that would be most affected.
The Derg tried to develop a social policy strategy to enhance its
power and legitimacy. To this end, the government achieved progress in
fields such as education and health care. In 1979, for example, Ethiopia
launched a massive rural literacy campaign; the government also
established hundreds of health stations to provide minimal health care
to the citizenry. However, it proved unable to effect dramatic
improvements in the quality of life among broad segments of the
population. In part, this was because Ethiopia had long been one of the
world's poorest countries. At the same time, two additional factors
greatly affected the performance of the Mengistu regime: the interaction
of natural catastrophes and civil unrest, and misguided development
policies such as resettlement and villagization.
Ethiopia - The Politics of Drought and Famine
The Derg's limited ability to lead development and to respond to
crises was dramatically demonstrated by the government's reliance on
foreign famine relief between 1984 and 1989. By 1983 armed conflict
between the government and opposition movements in the north had
combined with drought to contribute to mass starvation in Eritrea,
Tigray, and Welo. Meanwhile, drought alone was having a devastating
impact on an additional nine regions. This natural disaster far exceeded
the drought of 1973-74, which had contributed to the demise of the Haile
Selassie regime. By early 1985, some 7.7 million people were suffering
from drought and food shortages. Of that number, 2.5 million were at
immediate risk of starving. More than 300,000 died in 1984 alone, more
than twice the number that died in the drought a decade before. Before
the worst was over, 1 million Ethiopians had died from drought and
famine in the 1980s.
As it had in the past, in the mid-1980s the international community
responded generously to Ethiopia's tragedy once the dimensions of the
crisis became understood. Bilateral, multilateral, and private donations
of food and other relief supplies poured into the country by late 1984.
Contributions ranged from food to transport trucks, antibiotics,
welldrilling equipment, and technical assistance. Fund raising by
spontaneously created volunteer organizations in the West, such as USA
for Africa, BandAid, and numerous church and humanitarian groups, was
instrumental to the provision of substantial nongovernment famine
relief. Most of the money and supplies sent to Ethiopia, however, were
provided by Western governments, in particular those of Britain, Canada,
Italy, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States. Ethiopia's
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), at the time headed by an
Ethiopian official named Dawit Wolde Giorgis, coordinated delivery of
this assistance. Although Mengistu and other members of the Derg were
nervous about the prospect of so many Westerners flooding into the
country and having access to areas where the regime was not popular,
Dawit apparently was able to develop enough trust in the international
aid community to bring the catastrophe under control by late 1986 (Dawit
later defected to the United States).
By 1987 the physical impact of this massive influx of aid over such a
short time was noticeable not only in the abatement of famine but also
in what seemed to be the permanent establishment of local offices by
various donor agencies. Although many foreign relief workers had
returned home by 1987, some relief agencies remained to attempt to begin
the rehabilitation and development processes. These would have been
difficult tasks under the best of circumstances, but in the context of a
regime pursuing a specific political agenda in spite of the
unprecedented humanitarian imperatives involved in the situation, those
agencies that remained had difficulty engaging in effective
rehabilitation and development. In the countryside, the WPE often
closely regulated the activities of foreign and local nongovernment
agencies. At one point in the spring of 1989, the WPE forbade the
International Committee of the Red Cross to operate in areas most
severely ravaged by war. Before the year was out, drought and war again
threatened the lives of more than 7 million people.
Despite drought and famine of unprecedented proportions in modern
Ethiopian history, the Derg persisted on its controversial political
course. If the famine had a positive side for the government, it was
that the flood of famine relief assistance during the period of party
construction and constitution-making allowed the regime to devote more
of its budget to suppression of the rebellions in Eritrea and Tigray.
However, by late 1989 drought, famine, and war, combined with so-called
"aid fatigue" among many donors, forced the regime to take
desperate measures. The government reinstated national conscription,
required workers to give one month's salary to aid in combating famine
and war, and halved the development budget as funds were diverted to
defense.
Ethiopia - The Politics of Resettlement
The Derg's policies appear to have been driven more by political
imperatives than by perceived economic objectives. A case in point was
the controversial policy of resettling the victims of the drought and
famine outside their home areas. At the height of the drought and famine
in 1984, the regime set in motion a resettlement policy that was
initially designed to relocate 1.5 million people from areas in the
north most severely affected by drought to areas in the west and south
that had experienced adequate rainfall. By 1988, despite the
resettlement program's obvious failure, President Mengistu repeatedly
asserted that the program would continue. He estimated that eventually 7
million of Ethiopia's approximately 48 million people would be
resettled. The government claimed that it was carrying out the program
for humanitarian reasons, contending that it would remove the people
from exhausted and unproductive land and place them in settlements with
rich agricultural potential. In addition, the government argued that the
new settlements would greatly facilitate its efforts to provide social
services.
Initially, settlers were chosen from feeding centers in Welo, Tigray,
and northern Shewa and transported by trucks, buses, and cargo aircraft
to resettlement sites in Kefa, Gojam, Gonder, Welega, and Ilubabor. The
government was poorly prepared for the operation, and the first settlers
experienced tremendous hardships in alien, underdeveloped, and
disease-infested areas. Some peasants moved voluntarily, but many more
were forced to move. Many of those forcibly resettled were able to
escape. Some fled into Sudan or Somalia, and others took shelter in
refugee camps or walked thousands of miles to reenter their native
regions. Still others joined opposition groups dedicated to overthrowing
the regime. Those who remained in resettled areas were often resented by
the local residents, many of whom had been impressed into building
community infrastructure and donating materials.
Some critics rejected the government's argument that resettlement was
driven by humanitarian considerations. Instead, they contended that the
government's motives were political. The policy led to a depopulation of
areas that harbored groups that militarily opposed the regime, such as
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
Critics within the international community charged that the Ethiopian
government's resettlement program served as an obstacle to dealing more
effectively with the problems of drought and famine relief. Moving
victims to settlements far from their home areas merely made them
inordinately dependent on the government. In addition, they claimed that
fundamental human rights were sacrificed in the name of political
expediency.
Regardless of the real motive for the resettlement policy, its net
effect was to increase government control over large segments of
society. In each resettlement site, WPE cadres carried out political
education and attempted to stimulate the population to be more
productive. The government insisted that it was not trying to enforce
collectivized agricultural production but rather was trying to encourage
more efficient activities. However, in actual practice, cadres pressured
peasants to form collectives. The main value of this policy for the
regime seems to have been the political control it promised.
Ethiopia - The Politics of Villagization
Further evidence of the Ethiopian government's desire to enhance its
control over the citizenry was its villagization program. The idea of
clustering villages was introduced in the Land Reform Proclamation of
1975; however, there was no immediate effort to implement such a policy
on a large scale. The first area to become the object of serious
government efforts was Bale, following the onset of the Ogaden War of
1977-78. At that time, ethnic Somali and Oromo living in Bale
were forced by the Ethiopian government into strategically clustered
villages. The official objective of the move was to provide social
services more efficiently and to stimulate voluntary selfhelp among
villagers. By 1983 there were 519 villagized communities ranging in
population from 300 to 7,000.
The government did not introduce a comprehensive villagization plan
until 1985. In January of that year, the villagization process began in
earnest in Harerge, and by May there were some 2,000 villagized
communities there. That summer, the process was begun in Shewa and Arsi,
and in 1986 small-scale villagization efforts were begun in Gojam,
Welega, Kefa, Sidamo, and Ilubabor. The National Villagization
Coordinating Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture, in collaboration
with the WPE, organized and managed the project. By March 1987, it was
estimated that there were as many as 10,000 villagized communities
throughout the country. The long-term goal of the program was the
movement of 33 million rural residents-- approximately two-thirds of the
nation's population--into villagized settlements by 1994. By late 1989,
however, only about 13 million peasants had been villagized.
The WPE introduced guidelines for site selection, village layout, and
related matters. At the regional level, a committee planned,
coordinated, and monitored the program through a network of
subcommittees (planning and programming; site selection and surveying;
material procurement, transportation, and logistics; construction;
propaganda and training; monitoring and evaluation; and security). This
structure was replicated in successive administrative layers down to the
peasant associations--the level with ultimate responsibility for
implementation.
In some regions of the country, the decision to villagize was a
voluntary one, but in others the process was compulsory. In either case,
peasants were required to dismantle their homes and, where possible,
transport the housing materials to the new village site. Campaigners
were usually brought in by the party and government to help the people
physically reconstruct their communities.
Like resettlement, villagization generally caused a good deal of
social disruption. Families usually were required to move from their
traditional locations, close to their customary farming plots, into
clustered villages where the land to be cultivated often was on
fragmented plots far from the homestead.
The villagization program was most successful in the central
highlands and southern lowlands, regions such as central Shewa, Arsi,
and highland Harerge that were firmly under government control.
Government efforts to villagize parts of western Shewa, the Harerge
lowlands, and Gojam met with resistance. In the case of Gojam and
western Shewa, this resistance in large measure was attributed to the
fact that the TPLF and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM)
were most active in those regions. The Harerge lowlands were populated
by ethnic Somali who were not as cooperative with the government as were
the highlanders, who tended to be Oromo.
But not all Oromo peasants readily supported the villagization
program. Many fled from new villages in Harerge after 1986, taking
refuge in camps in Somalia. By June 1986, an estimated 50,000 such
refugees had fled resettlement, mainly for political reasons. Some
refugees complained that they were forced to abandon their traditional
patterns of cultivation and to move into villages where they had to farm
collectively and to participate in "food for work" programs.
Private humanitarian agencies and bilateral and multilateral development
agencies were apparently aware of alleged, as well as real, violations
of human rights associated with the villagization program. Nonetheless,
by early 1987 many seem to have turned a blind eye to such incidents and
to have concentrated on the humanitarian dimensions of their work.
On purely technical grounds, villagization, like resettlement, seemed
to make sense. The official goal was to improve the access of rural
residents to social services and to strengthen the ability of rural
communities to defend themselves. Another motive, however, seemed to be
the conversion of villagized communities into producers' cooperatives or
collectives, as well as into centers for military recruitment.
Ethiopia - Political Dynamics
The period immediately following the overthrow of Haile Selassie was
a time of open political debate. The new regime did not have a clearly
defined ideology, but it was swept along by the growing radical
discourse among members of the civilian left. Initially, the Derg tried
to win the support of the Ethiopian left by declaring its socialist
intentions in its program statement, Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First).
The economic and social policies articulated in this document were
populist in tone and did little to co-opt the civilian left.
Once it became clear that the Derg had assigned to itself the
vanguard role in the revolution, elements in the civilian left began to
criticize the new regime. Chief among such critics was the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). By 1976 the EPRP had become engaged
in a systematic campaign to undermine and discredit the Derg. The party
was successful in infiltrating the zemecha, the CELU, and even the
Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA), the
precursor to the Yekatit '66 Ideological School. At the height of its
activities, the EPRP included students, intellectuals, teachers,
merchants, and government bureaucrats. It even had sympathizers within
the military.
During the late 1970s, apart from the military, the Derg relied for
support on the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (whose Amharic acronym
was MEISON). Rather than challenge the vanguard role of the military,
MEISON entered into a strategic alliance with the Derg, accepting its
hegemony at least for the short term. In the highly charged political
climate of the moment, MEISON engaged in vigorous debate with the EPRP
over the most appropriate strategy for reconstructing Ethiopian society.
The debate between the two groups first took place in their
organizations' newspapers and in pamphlets but later moved to the
streets in the form of bloody assassination and counterassassination
campaigns. The differences between MEISON and the EPRP were fundamental.
The EPRP pressed uncompromisingly for a genuine "people's
democracy," whereas MEISON favored "controlled democracy"
and was prepared to give the Derg some time to return to the barracks.
The friction between the two groups inspired the Derg to become more
radical in its ideology and public policies. The regime determined that
to survive it would have to alter its program and co-opt or destroy its
civilian opponents. It pursued both goals simultaneously by setting up
three organizations: the PNDR, the Yekatit '66 Ideological School, and a
political advisory body called the Politburo (not to be confused with
the Political Bureau of the WPE).
The Derg seemed hesitant to permit free and open political
competition, although it attempted to create the impression of openness
by allowing political groups to operate in a limited fashion.
Organizations resembling political parties were not allowed to organize
on a mass basis, but they could participate in politics through
representation on the Politburo; in fact, both the EPRP and MEISON were
represented on the Politburo. Also represented were Abyot Seded
(Revolutionary Flame), founded in 1976 by members of the armed forces
and led by Mengistu himself; the Waz (Labor) League, which claimed a
working-class base and shared the EPRP's radical populist tendencies;
and the Revolutionary Struggle of the Ethiopian Masses (whose Amharic
acronym was ECHAAT), a largely Oromo political organization. The
Politburo provided a forum where the differences among the various
political groupings could be clarified and where the Derg could monitor
the tendencies of its opponents.
By late 1976, MEISON had become the most influential civilian group
on the Politburo. However, the growing power of Abyot Seded was also
evident, as it challenged MEISON and the EPRP within the Politburo and
in grass-roots institutions such as kebeles and peasant associations. To
counter this threat, the Derg began to prepare Abyot Seded to assume the
role of chief adviser on ideological, political, and organizational
matters. The aim seems to have been the creation of a cadre of Abyot
Seded members with sufficient ideological sophistication to neutralize
all civilian opponents, including MEISON. Abyot Seded members received
ideological training in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba. On
their return, they were assigned the task of politicizing the rank and
file of the military.
The EPRP's efforts to discredit and undermine the Derg and its MEISON
collaborators escalated in the fall of 1976. It targeted public
buildings and other symbols of state authority for bombings and
assassinated numerous Abyot Seded and MEISON members, as well as public
officials at all levels. The Derg, which countered with its own Red
Terror campaign, labeled the EPRP's tactics the White Terror. Mengistu
asserted that all "progressives" were given "freedom of
action" in helping root out the revolution's enemies, and his wrath
was particularly directed toward the EPRP. Peasants, workers, public
officials, and even students thought to be loyal to the Mengistu regime
were provided with arms to accomplish this task.
Mengistu's decision resulted in fratricidal chaos. Many civilians he
armed were EPRP sympathizers rather than supporters of MEISON or the
Derg. Between early 1977 and late 1978, roughly 5,000 people were
killed. In the process, the Derg became estranged from civilian groups,
including MEISON. By early 1979, Abyot Seded stood alone as the only
officially recognized political organization; the others were branded
enemies of the revolution. Growing human rights violations prompted the
United States, Ethiopia's superpower patron, to counsel moderation.
However, the Derg continued to use extreme measures against its real and
perceived opponents to ensure its survival.
When he assumed office in early 1977, United States president Jimmy
Carter curtailed arms sales to Ethiopia because of its human rights
abuses. In response, Mengistu severely curtailed relations with the
United States, ordering all United States military personnel and most
embassy staff to leave the country. In search of an alternate source of
military aid, Mengistu eventually turned to the Soviet Union. However,
before the Soviet Union and its allies could establish an effective
presence in Ethiopia, opposition groups stepped up their campaigns
against the Derg.
In addition to the urban guerrilla warfare being waged by the EPRP,
nationalist movements such as the EPLF, the OLF, the TPLF, and the
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) also stepped up their military
campaigns in the countryside. By the end of 1976, the Eritreans had made
substantial gains in rural areas, forcing Ethiopian troops into
garrisons and urban centers in Eritrea. Meanwhile, armed groups such as
the OLF and the TPLF were severely testing the regime, and in 1977 the
WSLF, with the assistance of Somali troops, occupied most of the Ogaden.
The Ethiopian government, however, with aid from the Soviet Union, Cuba,
and Eastern Europe, reasserted its authority over contested areas by the
following spring.
Once it had reestablished control, the Derg resumed the creation of
institutions that would enhance its political hegemony and legitimacy.
After having almost met its demise, the Derg decided to form a vanguard
party. In June 1978, the Derg announced that Abyot Seded would be joined
with the factional remnants of the Waz League and the MarxistLeninist
Revolutionary Organization (whose Amharic acronym was MALERED), a small
splinter group of MEISON, in the allembracing Union of Ethiopian
Marxist-Leninist Organizations (whose Amharic acronym was EMALEDEH). The
task of the front was to identify strategies for the creation of a
vanguard party. The following year, Mengistu announced that he would
form a commission to develop a framework for the longawaited vanguard
party.
By 1978 all civilian opposition groups had been destroyed or forced
underground. The EPRP had been driven out of the cities and into the
mountains of the central highlands, where it tried unsuccessfully to
develop the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (EPRA). The OLF had
been driven into refugee camps in Sudan and Somalia; the WSLF had sought
refuge in Somalia; the TPLF and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), a
group of former nobility and officials of the Haile Selassie government,
had been pushed into Sudan; and the EPLF had been forced back into its
strongholds along the Sudanese border. The task then facing the Derg was
to establish its popular legitimacy among the various ethnic communities
opposed to its rule. The most vigorous opposition came from the EPLF and
the TPLF. The OLF, the EPRP, and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) were
experiencing revivals but had yet to become militarily effective.
Ethiopia - The Eritrean Movement
Eritrea and the Imperial Regime
Eritrean separatism had its roots in World War II. In 1941, in the
Battle of Keren, the Allies drove Italian forces out of Eritrea, which
had been under Italy's rule since the end of the nineteenth century.
Administration of the region was then entrusted to the British military
until its fate could be determined by the Allies. Britain, however,
sought to divide Eritrea along religious lines, giving the coast and
highland areas to Ethiopia and the Muslim-inhabited northern and western
lowlands to British-ruled Sudan.
In 1952 the United Nations (UN) tried to satisfy the demand for
self-determination by creating an EritreanEthiopian federation. In 1962,
however, Haile Selassie unilaterally abolished the federation and
imposed imperial rule throughout Eritrea.
Radical opposition to the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia had
begun in 1958 with the founding of the Eritrean Liberation Movement
(ELM), an organization made up mainly of students, intellectuals, and
urban wage laborers. The ELM engaged in clandestine political activities
intended to cultivate resistance to the centralizing policies of the
imperial state. By 1962, however, the ELM had been discovered and
destroyed by imperial authorities.
Even as the ELM was being neutralized, a new organization of Eritrean
nationalists was forming. In 1960 Eritrean exiles in Cairo founded the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). In contrast to the ELM, from the outset
the ELF was bent on waging armed struggle on behalf of Eritrean
independence. The ELF was composed mainly of Eritrean Muslims from the
rural lowlands on the western edge of the territory. In 1961 the ELF's
political character was vague, but radical Arab states such as Syria and
Iraq sympathized with Eritrea as a predominantly Muslim region
struggling to escape oppression and imperial domination. These two
countries therefore supplied military and financial assistance to the
ELF.
The ELF initiated military operations in 1961. These operations
intensified in response to the 1962 dissolution of the
Eritrean-Ethiopian federation. The ELF claimed that the process by which
this act took place violated the Eritrean federal constitution and
denied the Eritrean people their right to self-determination. By this
time, the movement claimed to be multiethnic, involving individuals from
Eritrea's nine major ethnic groups.
The ELF's first several years of guerrilla activity in Eritrea were
characterized by poor preparation, poor leadership, and poor military
performance. By 1967, however, the ELF had gained considerable support
among peasants, particularly in Eritrea's north and west, and around the
port city of Mitsiwa. Haile Selassie attempted to calm the growing
unrest by visiting Eritrea and assuring its inhabitants that they would
be treated as equals under the new arrangements. Although he doled out
offices, money, and titles in early 1967 in hopes of co-opting would-be
Eritrean opponents, the resistance intensified.
From the beginning, a serious problem confronting the ELF was the
development of a base of popular support and a cohesive military wing.
The front divided Eritrea into five military regions, giving regional
commanders considerable latitude in carrying out the struggle in their
respective zones. Perhaps just as debilitating were internal disputes
over strategy and tactics. These disagreements eventually led to the
ELF's fragmentation and the founding in 1972 of another group, the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The leadership of this
multiethnic movement came to be dominated by leftist, Christian
intellectuals who spoke Tigrinya, Eritrea's predominant language.
Sporadic armed conflict ensued between the two groups from 1972 to 1974,
even as they fought the Ethiopian forces. The various organizations,
each waging a separate campaign against the Haile Selassie regime, had
become such a serious threat that the emperor declared martial law in
Eritrea and deployed half his army to contain the struggle. But the
Eritrean insurgents fiercely resisted. In January 1974, the EPLF handed
Haile Selassie's forces a crushing defeat at Asmera, severely affecting
the army's morale and exposing the crown's ever-weakening position.
Ethiopia - Eritrea and the Mengistu Regime
After the emperor was deposed, the Derg stated its desire to resolve
the Eritrean question once and for all. There were those in the Derg's
ranks who pressed for a decisive military solution, while others favored
some form of negotiated settlement. Influential Derg nationalists
continued to endorse, as had the imperial regime before them, the ideal
of a "Greater Ethiopia," a unitary, multiethnic state. They
pressed for a military solution while claiming to support the right of
all Ethiopian nationalities to self-determination. This position was
first articulated in the PNDR in 1976 and clarified later that year by
the Nine Point Statement on Eritrea. Subsequently, the regime made other
attempts at dealing, at least rhetorically and symbolically, with the
Eritrean problem.
In 1976 Osman Salah Sabbe, an Eritrean who had helped found both the
ELM and the ELF, attempted to reconcile the two movements to form a
united front. But after this effort failed, Osman formed a third front,
the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Front (ELF-PLF). In
later years, the Derg sought to exploit the internecine Eritrean
disputes.
Disagreements among the various Eritrean factions continued
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These differences were mainly
ideological. At the time, the EPLF and the ELF could best be described
in ideological terms as leftistnationalist and the ELF-PLF as moderate
nationalist. Although the EPLF and the ELF-PLF consistently called for
Eritrea's independence, the main ELF faction never closed the door to
the possibility of an equitable federal union. As subtle as the
differences among these groups appeared, they were enough to prevent the
formation of a united front against Addis Ababa.
In addition to its highly disciplined combatants, the EPLF benefited
from its broad base of popular support and its political organization.
The EPLF became a de facto government in areas it controlled. It was a
highly structured political and military institution involved not only
in training its fighters militarily but also in educating them
politically. The EPLF's basic units for political participation were
national unions. The Eritrean national congress was the paramount
political organ of the EPLF and was made up of the Central Committee,
delegates elected by the national unions, and the Eritrean People's
Liberation Army (EPLA). The congress defined general policy and elected
the Central Committee (composed in the late 1980s of seventy-one full
members and seven alternates), which in turn elected the general
secretary and the Political Bureau's eight members. The EPLF charter
called for national congresses to be held every three years unless
circumstances dictated otherwise. Between congressional sessions, the
EPLF Central Committee was the highest authority within the front. It
met every nine months and was responsible for developing the EPLF
political agenda and for overseeing policy implementation. The Political
Bureau was the EPLF's primary executive organ. It met every three months
and had broad administrative powers. When the Political Bureau was not
in session, the general secretary, aided by a secretariat, possessed
wide executive authority.
In March 1987, the EPLF held its second congress in areas of Eritrea
that it controlled. The first congress had been held ten years earlier
after Eritrean forces had captured almost all of Eritrea. At that time,
the euphoric Eritreans expected that their goal of an independent
Eritrea was about to be realized. However, they subsequently suffered a
series of reversals from which it took the EPLF almost a decade to
recover. Like that earlier meeting, the 1987 gathering was also a unity
congress. It resulted in resolution of the difference between the EPLF
and another splinter group, the Eritrean Liberation Front-Central
Command (ELF-CC), at the time the most prominent remaining ELF faction.
Following the EPLF unity congress, the organization stepped up
military pressure against the Ethiopian regime. By March 1988, the EPLF
had scored some impressive battlefield successes. The EPLF broke out of
entrenched positions in the Nakfa area of northern Eritrea and occupied
the important garrison town of Afabet. Afabet's fall forced the
Ethiopian army to evacuate the urban centers of Barca, Teseney, Barentu,
and Akordat. The government also ordered all foreign relief workers out
of Eritrea and Tigray, declared states of emergency in both regions, and
redeployed troops from the Ogaden to Eritrea. The highly disciplined
Eritrean forces faced much larger and better equipped Ethiopian units,
but the Ethiopian troops, many of whom were teenagers, had become war
weary and demoralized. By early 1991, the EPLF controlled most of
Eritrea except for some urban centers.
The most significant attempt to address the Eritrean issue was
embodied in the 1987 constitution, which allowed for the possibility of
regional autonomy. At its inaugural session, the National Shengo acted
on this provision and endorsed a plan for regional autonomy. Among autonomous regions, the plan
accorded Eritrea the greatest degree of autonomy. In particular, the
plan assigned Eritrea's regional government broader powers than those
assigned to the other four autonomous regions, especially in the areas
of industrial development and education. Under the plan, Eritrea also
was distinguished from other autonomous regions in that it was to have
three administrative subregions: one in the north, made up of Akordat,
Keren, and Sahel awrajas; one in the south-central part of historical
Eritrea, consisting of Hamasen, Mitsiwa, Seraye, and Akale Guzay
awrajas; and one encompassing the western awraja of Gashe na Setit. By
creating Aseb Autonomous Region, the government in Addis Ababa appeared
to be attempting to ensure itself a secure path to the Red Sea. Aseb
Autonomous Region comprised Aseb awraja of historical Eritrea, along
with parts of eastern Welo and Tigray regions.
By 1991, however, administrative reorganization in the north-central
part of the country was a reality only on paper. Since 1988 the area had
been under a state of emergency. The regime had been unable to establish
the necessary party and administrative infrastructure to implement the
plan, mostly because of the escalation of opposition in Eritrea and
Tigray since the promulgation of the 1987 constitution. The EPLF, for
example, rejected the reorganization plan, terming it "old wine in
new bottles." The ELF expressed particular outrage over the
creation of Aseb Autonomous Region, viewing it as another WPE attempt to
annex a significant part of the historical colony of Eritrea to
Ethiopia. The ELF called for the Ethiopian government to agree to
immediate negotiations without preconditions with a unified Eritrean
delegation.
Even as the EPLF recorded its most significant battlefield success in
1988-89, a rift was developing between that organization and ELF
splinter groups. This rift revolved around religion, as the ELF's
conservative, primarily Islamic elements came to distrust the EPLF's
predominantly Christian leadership. The EPLF also espoused a much more
explicitly socialist program than did the ELF factions. To encourage
further divisions among the Eritreans, the Mengistu regime in late 1988
met with five former ELF members (who claimed to represent 750,000
Eritreans) to accept their proposal for the creation of an autonomous
Eritrean region in the predominantly Muslim lowlands. These five men
rejected the EPLF's claim that it represented all Eritreans. Mengistu
forwarded the proposal to the National Shengo for consideration, but the
regime collapsed before action could be taken.
Ethiopia - The Tigrayan Movement
Tigrayan opposition to the Ethiopian government started during
Emperor Menelik's reign. In 1896 Menelik, who opposed Italy's
territorial designs on Ethiopia, deployed an 80,000- man army into
Tigray without adequate provisions, thereby forcing the soldiers to live
off the land. According to Tigrayan nationalists, the Tigray who died
protecting their homes against Menelik's troops outnumbered the defeated
Italians who died at the Battle of Adwa that year. Forty years later,
when fascist Italy's forces invaded Ethiopia, the main battlefield was
again in Tigray, and once again the inhabitants suffered. In 1943, after
the Allied Powers had defeated Italy and Haile Selassie had returned to
Ethiopia, Tigrayan peasants revolted against the imperial regime. Government forces, supported by British units,
suppressed the revolt. The emperor then imposed a harsh peace on Tigray.
The first sign of open resistance to the Mengistu regime in Tigray
(where the rebellion became known as the Weyane, the same as the 1943
revolt) occurred in October 1974. At that time, the Derg ordered Ras
Mengesha Seyoum--governor general of Tigray, member of the Tigrayan
royal family, and grandson-in-law of the emperor--to relinquish his
office and surrender to the authorities. Rather than submit, he fled to
the bush and organized the Tigray Liberation Organization (TLO). The TLO
operated in clandestine political cells and engaged in a program of
systematic agitation. During the tumultuous mid-1970s, the TLO
established cells in various parts of the country. In early 1975,
Mengesha left Tigray and, with other aristocrats, formed the Ethiopian
Democratic Union (EDU). Members of the TLO who remained in Tigray and
who came under the influence of the EPLF formed the Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF), whose goals included the overthrow of the
Mengistu regime, the establishment of a "more democratic"
government, and the removal of all foreign military bases from Ethiopia. The TPLF also condemned Mengesha, accepted
Marxism-Leninism, and argued for an independent Eritrean-Tigrayan
federation. Eventually, the TPLF neutralized the TLO by killing many of
its leaders and by jailing and executing others.
At the time, the TPLF shared the field with the more conservative
Tigray-based EDU and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP).
However, the Red Terror had decimated both of these organizations, and
by 1978 they had ceased to be a factor. The TPLF was also severely
weakened but, with the assistance of the EPLF, developed into an
effective fighting force. Its ranks were expanded initially by the
absorption of former EPRP members.
Beginning in 1980, the TPLF sought to establish local
selfadministration in areas under its control. The basic administrative
unit was the people's council (baito), which was typically introduced in
two stages. In the first stage, representatives from mass associations
were elected to form the provisional administrative council. The second
stage involved the establishment of a full-fledged people's council.
Council members were elected to two-year terms. All members of a number
of mass associations who were at least sixteen years of age had the
right to vote and to stand for election to a people's council. People's
councils were responsible for local administrative, economic, and social
affairs. By late 1989, however, this structure had not grown much beyond
the pilot stage in most of Tigray.
In the 1980s, the TPLF drew almost exclusively from among the
Tigrayan population of north-central Ethiopia for its support, although
it claimed to be dedicated toward building a united national front
representing all groups and nationalities struggling against the
Mengistu regime. On May 8, 1984, the TPLF issued a proposal calling for
the formation of a united front based on a "minimum program,"
whose sole objective was the overthrow of the Mengistu regime. By 1984
the TPLF was active throughout Tigray and in parts of Welo and Gojam.
Although its political program continued to have a populist orientation,
the dominant ideologues within the organization claimed to be dedicated
to constructing the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray. Observers likened
this group's strident rhetoric to that of Albania's Stalinist
ideologues.
On the eve of its thirteenth anniversary in February 1988, the TPLF
was engaged in its largest offensive against Ethiopian forces. Over the
next year and a half, the TPLF captured all of Tigray, including urban
centers such as Aksum, Inda Silase, and Mekele. By May 1989, the
Ethiopian army had withdrawn completely from Tigray.
The TPLF's efforts to develop a united front began to bear fruit just
as its major offensive was unfolding. In January 1989, it entered into
an alliance with the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), an
organization composed mainly of Amhara from Welo, Gonder, and the
northern part of Shewa, many of whom had once belonged to the EPRP. The
two groups had cooperated in military activities for several years, but
they had not had a formal alliance. It was estimated that by the fall of
1989, there were 2.5 million people in EPDM-controlled areas. The EPDM,
like the TPLF, supported the right of all nationalities to
self-determination and the formation of a democratic state once the
Mengestu regime had been overthrown.
The TPLF and EPDM called their alliance the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF's charter borrowed
from the TPLF charter. It called for the establishment of a democratic
government, the elimination of the last vestiges of feudalism and
imperialism, the formation of a genuine people's government based on
people's councils, the guarantee of basic human and civil rights, and
self-determination for all oppressed nationalities. Subsequently,
several other dissident groups, some created specifically by the EPRDF,
also joined the alliance.
By the fall of 1989, the EPRDF had moved from its strongholds in
Tigray, Welo, and Gonder and threatened parts of northern Shewa. At the
time, the force seemed more capable of pushing back the beleaguered
Ethiopian troops than of setting up any type of permanent political
structures. During a six-week period beginning in August 1989, the EPRDF
wounded or captured an estimated 20,000 government soldiers, seized vast
stocks of military hardware, and pushed the battle line between the two
sides down to northern Shewa. In part, these advances were facilitated
by the demoralization of the Ethiopian military following the abortive
coup of May 1989. Some Ethiopian troops defected to the opposition,
significantly improving the military capabilities of the EPRDF.
Ethiopia - Other Movements and Fronts
The EPLF, the TPLF, the EPDM, and the EPRDF were the most militarily
significant opposition movements challenging the Mengistu regime in
1991. In addition, several other groups, composed mainly of ethnic
Oromo, Afar, and Somali, were also active.
Oromo Groups
The Oromo, representing about 40 percent of the population, occupy
areas in south and central Ethiopia that only became part of modern
Ethiopia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
people in these areas largely became tenants on their own land as the
empire consolidated its rule. Many Oromo resented the alien rule of
Amhara and Tigray from the highland core of the empire. Haile Selassie
tried to win Oromo loyalty by developing alliances with key Oromo
leaders. Although this strategy enabled the emperor to co-opt many Oromo
into the imperial system, it failed to end Oromo resistance. Examples of
this opposition to Addis Ababa included the Azebo-Raya revolt of
1928-30; the 1936 Oromo Independence Movement; and the establishment in
1965 of the Mecha-Tulema, an Oromo self-help organization.
From 1964 to 1970, a revolt in Bale presented the most serious
challenge to the Ethiopian government. During that time, separate Oromo
rebel groups in Bale conducted hit-and- run raids against military
garrisons and police stations. Until 1969 the Somali government provided
military assistance to these rebels as part of its strategy of
reestablishing a "Greater Somalia." In addition, Oromo rebels
attempted to coordinate their military activities with the Western
Somali Liberation Front. After Mahammad Siad Barre took over the Somali
government in 1969, the Oromo rebels lost Somali support and found it
impossible to sustain their campaigns in southeastern Ethiopia. In 1970
the rebels agreed to a truce with the Haile Selassie regime.
In 1973 Oromo dissidents formed the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an
organization dedicated to the "total liberation of the entire Oromo
nation from Ethiopian colonialism". The OLF began an offensive against the Ethiopian
government in Harerge in 1974, but sustained activities did not begin
until 1976. The OLF subsequently extended its sphere of activity to
Welega.
Young, educated Oromo from Arsi initially composed the OLF
leadership, but by 1976 the organization claimed a broadbased leadership
with a following from all Oromo areas. Beyond national liberation, the
OLF's program called for the establishment of an independent Democratic
Republic of Oromia, which would include all of central and southern
Ethiopia, excluding the Ogaden and Omo River regions.
In late 1989, the OLF had approximately 200 combatants in Harerge and
about 5,000 in Welega. OLF troops were poorly armed and unable to pose a
serious threat to the Ethiopian army. In addition, the OLF had been
unable to mobilize popular support against the Ethiopian government.
This failure resulted from the OLF's inability to organize an effective
antigovernment movement, to convince the majority of Oromo people that
separatism was a viable political alternative, or to sustain military
operations in the geographically separated areas of Welega, Arsi, and
Harerge. In spite of these difficulties, in 1989 the OLF announced
several military successes against the Ethiopian armed forces,
especially in Asosa, a town on the SudaneseEthiopian border.
On the political side, in February 1988 the OLF convened its first
national congress at Begi in newly created Asosa Region. Apart from
expressing support for the EPLF and the TPLF, the congress condemned the
Mengistu regime and voiced opposition to the government's villagization
and resettlement policies.
Ethiopia - Afar Groups
Somali guerrilla activity in the Ogaden and in the Haud area east of
Harer flared sporadically after Somalia gained its independence in 1960,
but the guerrilla activity remained essentially a police concern until a
border war erupted in 1964. When he seized power in Mogadishu in 1969,
Siad Barre thwarted attempts at an understanding between Ethiopia and
Somalia. He pledged to renew efforts to establish a "Greater
Somalia" that would encompass about one-third of Ethiopia's
territory. Encouraged by the breakdown of authority in Addis Ababa after
the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, Somalia provided mat�riel, moral,
and organizational support to insurgent movements in the Ogaden and
southern Ethiopia.
The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which operated in the
Ogaden, supported the "Greater Somalia" concept. The Somali
Abo Liberation Front (SALF) maintained links to the WSLF. Its sphere of
operations was in Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi, where it advocated union with
Somalia or the creation of an independent state. Somalia equipped both
groups with Soviet arms; both also received aid and training from
various Arab and communist nations, including Cuba.
After the 1977-78 Ogaden War, the WSLF was routed, and its troops
flocked to camps in Somalia. The Somali government subsequently forbade
the WSLF to use its territory to launch attacks into Ethiopia. By 1989
the WSLF had ceased to be an effective guerrilla organization within
Ethiopia. Siad Barre's decision to restrict the WSLF led to the
formation of a WSLF splinter group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF), whose headquarters were in Kuwait. Elements of the ONLF slipped
back into the Ogaden in 1988 but failed to generate a significant
military capability.
Ethiopia - Leftist Groups
The WPE regime's attempt to create conditions for popular acceptance
of its legitimacy failed. Testimony to this was the attempted coup that
began on May 16, 1989. The coup was the result of months of planning by
senior officers, some of whom may have been members of the Free Ethiopia
Soldiers' Movement, an opposition group that involved active-duty
military officers and former officers in exile. The coup began shortly
after Mengistu left for a state visit to East Germany. Top generals
invited colleagues to attend a meeting at the Ministry of National
Defense, where they delivered an ultimatum to the defense minister,
Major General Haile Giorgis Habte Mariam, to join them or be jailed.
Haile Giorgis refused and was shot dead. The shots were heard by two
senior officers loyal to Mengistu, who ordered army tanks to encircle
the ministry and guard the road to the airport.
Officers commanding units in Eritrea and Tigray also joined in the
coup. They initially seized the Asmera radio station and issued a call
to the "broad masses" to join in the effort to bring down the
"tyrannical and dictatorial regime of Mengistu." However,
Mengistu returned to the country and, with the support of the
Presidential Guard and other loyal troops, regained control three days
after the coup began.
The plotters' aim had been to establish a transitional military
government. Exiled supporters of the Free Ethiopia Soldiers' Movement
claimed that the coup-makers planned to negotiate a settlement in
Eritrea, establish a ruling council, and return the military to their
barracks. Senior officers had become desperate for a political
settlement of the wars raging in the north. Pamphlets expressing their
discontent had been distributed to the military rank and file by junior
and middle ranking officers sympathetic to their cause. The new leader
reportedly was to have been Major General Seyoum Mekonnen, the former
head of military intelligence.
To wipe out his enemies in the military, Mengistu purged the officer
corps. At least twelve generals were executed or committed suicide
rather than be captured, and 300 to 400 officers suspected of being
involved in the coup were arrested. Nearly all generals, division
commanders, and political commissars assigned to units stationed in the
north reportedly were detained. These individuals were replaced by
Mengistu loyalists, many of whom lacked experience as military leaders.
The attempted coup and continuing problems related to war, drought,
and famine caused considerable instability in the WPE's upper levels.
Council of State members became increasingly critical of Mengistu's
policies, and some even suggested that he step down. However, Mengistu
mustered enough support to retain power. At the same time, by mid1989
the success of opposition forces, the Soviet Union's refusal to increase
military assistance to Ethiopia, and pressure from Moscow had forced
Mengistu to seek negotiated settlements to Ethiopia's various wars. The
loss of East German military support because of the democratization
movement that occurred later in the year also softened the government's
stance toward negotiations.
On June 5, 1989, the National Shengo, in a special session, endorsed
a proposal calling for unconditional peace talks with the EPLF. The EPLF
accepted, and the two sides agreed that former United States president
Jimmy Carter would mediate the negotiations. The first talks were held
at the Carter Presidential Center of Emory University in Atlanta,
Georgia, in early September. WPE Central Committee member Ashagre
Yigletu headed the Ethiopian delegation, and Al Amin Muhammad Sayyid led
the Eritrean team. The two sides agreed on several procedural issues and
set the next round of talks for November 1989 in Nairobi, Kenya.
At the second meeting, additional procedural issues were resolved,
and former Tanzanian president Julius K. Nyerere was asked to co-chair
further talks with former President Carter. The most difficult issue
resolved in the eight-day talks was determining who would serve as
international observers for the main negotiations. Seven observers were
invited--each side had two unrestricted choices, and three others were
chosen by mutual consent. The parties also concluded that additional
observers could be invited later upon mutual agreement. At the end of
the session, six observers had accepted invitations: Kenya, Senegal,
Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
A seventh invitation was proposed for the UN, but because Ethiopia, a UN
member, refused to endorse the idea, the UN declined to participate.
Subsequent meetings in Washington in October 1990 and February 1991,
chaired by United States Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Herman Cohen, failed to resolve this issue. Even so, both sides
agreed to continue their dialogue, with the next meeting tentatively
scheduled for May in London.
The Ethiopian regime also agreed to peace negotiations with the TPLF,
to be convened by the Italian government. Preliminary talks began in
Rome on November 4, 1989. Ashagre Yigletu led the Ethiopian team, and
Central Committee chairman Meles Zenawi headed the TPLF delegation.
Because its troops were advancing on the battlefield, the TPLF refrained
from making a cease-fire a precondition for participating in the talks.
The TPLF called for the establishment of a provisional government made
up of representatives from all major nationality groups and political
organizations. The main task of this provisional government would be to
draft a democratic constitution and prepare for free elections. Before
the talks began, the Ethiopian government rejected the idea of a
provisional government, claiming that the Ethiopian people had approved
the 1987 constitution in a fair referendum and that a popularly elected
parliament had put the new government in place.
The first round of talks lasted one week and ended with agreement
only on procedural points. Although the TPLF had called for a national
united front, it represented only itself at the Rome talks. It
suggested, however, that the main item on the agenda should be its peace
proposal. The Ethiopian delegation rejected this idea but offered no
counterproposal.
The second round of preliminary talks opened in Rome on December 12,
1989. The two sides reached an agreement whereby Italy and Kenya would
act as mediators and Nigeria, Sweden, Sudan, and Uganda would act as
observers in future peace negotiations. The Italian minister of foreign
affairs announced that the third round of preliminary talks would open
in Rome on March 20, 1990.
Unfortunately, the Ethiopian delegation terminated these discussions
nine days after they began. According to rebel spokesmen, the talks
failed because Ethiopia insisted that the TPLF deal only with questions
pertaining "to the autonomous region of Tigray" rather than
with Ethiopia as a whole. Moreover, Ethiopia refused to accept a joint
TPLFEPDM delegation at the main peace talks. The TPLF maintained that
the EPDM, its ally in war, also should be its ally in peace. As a result
of these differences, the negotiating process between the TPLF and
Ethiopia ended.
On the military front, the TPLF pressed its offensive throughout the
fall of 1989. By the beginning of 1990, its advances had bogged down,
and the Ethiopian army had begun a counteroffensive. By mid-June 1990,
however, the TPLF, operating as part of the EPRDF, had taken up
positions within 160 kilometers of Addis Ababa. By contrast, the EPLF
had reduced its military operations over the same period, perhaps to
regroup. In February 1990, however, the EPLF mounted a major drive aimed
at capturing the port city of Mitsiwa, the entry point for much of
Ethiopia's food and military supplies. By mid-February the EPLF had
overrun the port and severed the traffic that flowed from Mitsiwa via
Asmera to the strategic garrison town of Keren. A few months later,
however, Mitsiwa resumed operation in accordance with an agreement
between the EPLF and government forces. By the end of the year, the EPLF
had started conducting military operations in the vicinity of the Dahlak
Islands and initiated an offensive toward the port of Aseb.
Ethiopia - Mass Media
As one of only two African states that have never been permanently
colonized (the other is Liberia), Ethiopia has a long diplomatic
tradition. Tewodros II, who reigned in the mid-nineteenth century, was
the first modern Ethiopian leader to try to develop a foreign policy
that transcended the Horn region. His successor, Yohannis IV,
followed a less dynamic course and was greatly troubled by European
expansionism in general and penetration by Italy in particular. Menelik
II, who succeeded Yohannis in 1889, failed to find a peaceful solution
to Italy's encroachments. He had greater success, however, in the
military sphere, defeating the Italian army at Adwa in 1896.
Menelik died in 1913, and it was not until 1930 that another strong
emperor, Haile Selassie I, assumed the throne. Haile Selassie quickly
demonstrated that he was committed to the creation of a strong, modern,
bureaucratic empire that would command unquestioned international
respect. As early as 1923, while serving as regent, he negotiated
Ethiopia's admission into the League of Nations. The Italian occupation
of Ethiopia between 1936 and 1941 briefly halted his efforts to
establish Ethiopia's position in the world community. However, when he
reassumed the throne in 1941, he renewed his efforts to bolster
Ethiopia's international standing.
After World War II, Haile Selassie achieved considerable
international success primarily because of his active participation in
the UN, his alignment with the West, and his vocal support for the
African independence movement. As a UN member, Ethiopia committed troops
to the peacekeeping mission in Korea from 1950 to 1953 and to the Congo
(present-day Zaire) in 1960. Moreover, Ethiopia's military and
diplomatic relationship with the United States provided it with a
superpower ally. Finally, Haile Selassie took the lead in pressing for a
resolution establishing the territorial integrity of the independent
states of Africa. Over the years, he developed a reputation as a sage
voice of moderation on a continent filled with militant nationalists. It
was in this capacity that he offered to host the headquarters of the OAU
upon its founding in the early 1960s, once again demonstrating his
diplomatic acumen.
Ethiopia - Foreign Policy of the Derg
The foreign policy of Ethiopia did not change immediately upon the
demise of the imperial regime. Initially, the country's new leaders
maintained the general thrust of the foreign policy developed under
Haile Selassie and concentrated mainly on consolidating their rule.
Nonetheless, the Marxist ideology of the Derg and its civilian allies
made conflict with Ethiopia's superpower patron, the United States,
inevitable.
By the mid-1970s, Kagnew station, the communications monitoring base
in Asmera granted under terms of the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement between Ethiopia and the United States, had largely lost its
value. Advances in satellite technology had rendered land-based
facilities like Kagnew station less important for long-range
communications monitoring. Yet the United States felt the need to
maintain a presence in this strategically important part of Africa,
particularly because the Soviet Union was beginning to become active in
the area. The administration of President Gerald Ford (1974-77) wanted
to avoid an embarrassment similar to that experienced by the United
States in Angola in 1975, when covert United States aid to anticommunist
combatants failed to dislodge the pro-Moscow Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola. Even though President Ford and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger indicated uneasiness with Ethiopia's violations of human
rights and growing leftist tendencies, they did no more than cautiously
encourage the Derg to moderate its human rights policies.
The United States began to express concern over the Derg's human
rights violations when on November 23, 1974, a day that came to be known
as "Bloody Saturday," fifty-nine officials who had served in
the old regime were executed. Official United States concern intensified
two months later when the Derg mobilized a force consisting of regular
military units and the hastily assembled People's Militia in an effort
to resolve the Eritrean question through military means. But Eritrean forces attacked first, surprising the
Ethiopian forces in their base camps and scoring an impressive victory.
Whereas the administration of President Ford had been reluctant to
impose sanctions on Ethiopia because of its human rights record,
President Jimmy Carter made human rights a central concern of his
administration (1977-81). On February 25, 1977, Carter announced that
because of continued human rights violations, certain governments that
were receiving Washington's military aid (including Ethiopia) would
receive reduced assistance in the following fiscal year. Consequently,
the Derg began to cast about for alternative sources of military
assistance. Among the countries Ethiopia turned to were China and the
Soviet Union. At first, the actual assistance provided by these
superpowers was minimal, and the United States maintained its presence
in the country. However, relations between the United States and
Ethiopia deteriorated rapidly. By April 1977, Mengistu had demanded that
Washington close down Kagnew station and most other installations; only
a small staff was allowed to remain at the United States embassy. By
then, the first supplies of Soviet military hardware had begun to
arrive.
Having its military presence in Ethiopia ended, and with tensions
mounting in the Middle East and Iran, the United States began to
cultivate alliances in northeast Africa that could facilitate the
development of a long-range military strike capability. These
developments coincided with an escalation of tensions in the Horn region
in general. The United States eventually began the systematic pursuit of
a strategy that amounted to encircling the Arabian Peninsula. The United
States asked Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Oman to allow their
territories to be used as staging grounds for the fledgling Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF), which later became the United States Central
Command. The Soviet Union's clients in the region--Ethiopia, Libya, and
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)-- perceiving
Washington's action as a threat, signed a tripartite agreement in 1981
and pledged to repulse any effort to intervene in their respective
countries. However, this alliance never played a significant role in the
region.
Ethiopia - The Derg, the Soviet Union, and the Communist World
Apparently sensing that the Mengistu regime was in desperate trouble,
internal and external enemies took action to hasten its demise. Most important, civilian opposition
groups began to wage urban guerrilla campaigns to demoralize and
discredit the Derg, and Somalia committed regular troops to assist
ethnic Somali living in Ethiopia's Ogaden region in their efforts to
separate from Ethiopia. Simultaneously, the Somali government expressed
concern over the growing Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia. Until
then, Somalia had been an ally of the Soviet Union. After the Somali
National Army (SNA) invaded the Ogaden region in July 1977, the Soviet
Union withdrew its 1,000 advisers from Somalia. In November Somalia
announced that it had abrogated the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the Soviet Union and that it had suspended diplomatic
relations with Cuba. At that point, the Soviet Union adopted Ethiopia as
its main ally in the Horn of Africa. In late November, it launched a
massive airlift and sealift of arms and other military equipment to
Ethiopia. Over the next several months, about 17,000 Cuban and 1,000
Soviet military personnel arrived in the country and were deployed to
the Ogaden front. This aid turned the tide in favor of Ethiopia by early
1978.
As had the regime of Haile Selassie, the Derg accorded its
international image and territorial integrity the highest priority in
its foreign policy. Opposition groups had forced the regime to rely
extensively on the Soviet Union to maintain itself in power and to
preserve the country's territorial integrity. From 1977 to 1990, Soviet
military assistance to Ethiopia was estimated to be as much as US$13
billion. However, by 1987 there was evidence that the Soviet Union had
decided to cut back military assistance to Ethiopia and to press for
political solutions to that country's several civil conflicts. By that
time, there were fewer than 1,800 Soviet advisers in Ethiopia and a
total of about 2,000 advisers from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
East Germany, and Poland. Furthermore, all Cuban troops in the Ogaden
had withdrawn, and the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia had dropped
to fewer than 2,000.
Although Ethiopia was dependent on the Soviet Union for military
assistance and sided with it in the international diplomatic arena,
Addis Ababa on numerous occasions demonstrated its independence in the
area of domestic policy and international economic policy. For instance,
the Derg procrastinated in setting up a vanguard party despite Soviet
pressure to do so. Once the party was formed, it was dominated by former
military personnel, again contrary to Soviet wishes. In the economic
sphere, Addis Ababa had close aid and trade relations with the West and
pursued a pragmatic investment policy.
Although Mengistu eschewed any talk of Ethiopian-style glasnost,
Ethiopia could not escape the global impact of Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev's reforms. When Mengistu visited the Soviet Union in 1988,
Gorbachev told him that if Moscow's support were to continue, the Soviet
Union would have to see dramatic changes in Ethiopia's agricultural
priorities, coupled with political liberalization. The Soviet leader
also refused to continue unqualified military and economic support of
the Mengistu regime. A combination of economic realities and Soviet
pressure encouraged the Mengistu regime in 1989 to retreat at least
partially from its dogmatically statist approach to economic
development. By late 1990, the SovietEthiopian alliance had ended. As a
result, Addis Ababa looked to several other nations, including Israel
and China, for military assistance. None of these nations, however, was
capable of replacing the amount of military equipment the Soviet Union
had supplied to Ethiopia.
Ethiopia - The Derg and the West
As the Mengistu regime attempted to consolidate its rule, it had to
cope with serious border problems, particularly with Somalia and Sudan.
The point at issue with Somalia was the Ogaden region, an area that
Mogadishu claimed as part of the historical Somali nation that had been
seized by the Ethiopians during the colonial partition of the Horn of
Africa. In fact, Ethiopia's only undefined boundary was the border it
shared with the former Italian Somaliland. On maps drawn after 1950,
this boundary is termed "Administrative Line". Upon gaining independence from European colonial rule in 1960,
the inhabitants of the Republic of Somalia nurtured the hope that all
Somali eventually would be united in a modern nation-state. Somali
claims to the Ogaden, Djibouti, and parts of Kenya, however, had been
consistently rejected by the UN, the OAU, and most of the world's
sovereign states. Still, Somalia's leadership remained unwilling to
forsake these claims publicly.
In 1961, less than a year after Somalia gained independence, its
troops clashed with Ethiopian soldiers along their common border. In
1964 renewed tensions erupted into a minor regional war. In both cases,
Somalia was defeated. Ethnic Somali in Kenya's northeast also
unsuccessfully challenged that country's new government in the early
1960s. Pan-Somalism, then, served as a basis for the continuance of
cooperative relations between Nairobi and Addis Ababa, despite the
change of regime in Ethiopia. The two countries first signed a mutual
defense agreement in 1964 that resulted in the creation of the
Ethiopia-Kenya Border Administration Commission.
The Ogaden War (1977-78) was the most serious border conflict between
Ethiopia and Somalia. Beginning in the early summer of 1977, SNA units and
WSLF guerrillas, a movement of ethnic Somali opposed to incorporation in
Ethiopia, occupied vast tracts of the Ogaden and forced the Ethiopian
army into fortresses at Jijiga, Harer, and Dire Dawa for almost eight
months. The intention was to separate the Ogaden from Ethiopia to set
the stage for ethnic Somali in the region to decide their own future.
It was only with Soviet and Cuban assistance that the Derg regained
control over the region by early 1978. The Soviet Union not only
provided massive amounts of military equipment but also advisers, who
trained Ethiopian soldiers and pilots. Moreover, Cuban troops
spearheaded the counteroffensive that began in March 1978. Cuban and
Ethiopian troops quickly defeated the SNA and WSLF once the
counteroffensive began. Many WSLF fighters returned to their villages or
took refuge inside Somalia. In addition, some 650,000 Somali and Oromo
fled from southeastern Ethiopia into Somalia by early 1978 to escape
unsettled local conditions and repression by Ethiopian armed forces.
After the defeat, Somali opposition reverted to sporadic guerrilla
ambushes and occasional acts of sabotage.
On April 4, 1988, after several preparatory meetings, Ethiopia and
Somalia signed a joint communiqu� that supposedly ended the Ogaden
conflict. According to the communiqu�'s terms, the two countries
committed themselves to withdrawing their military forces fifteen
kilometers from the border, exchanging prisoners of war, restoring
diplomatic relations, and refraining from supporting each other's
antigovernment guerrilla groups. Reportedly, a separate secret accord
contained a Somali renunciation of all claims to the Ogaden region. From
Mengistu's point of view, the joint communiqu� secured Ethiopia's
southeastern border, thereby enabling Addis Ababa to devote more
resources to the struggle against the EPLF and TPLF in northern
Ethiopia.
Nevertheless, by 1991 it had become evident that Ethiopia had failed
to honor the provisions of the joint communiqu�. The Mengistu regime
allowed the anti-Siad Barre Somali National Movement (SNM) to maintain
offices in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and to operate five training camps
near Dire Dawa. Additionally, the Ethiopian government still provided
mat�riel and logistical support to the SNM. Despite these violations,
Somalia refrained from reinitiating hostilities with Ethiopia.
Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan were generally good until the
mid-1980s, when the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) emerged to
challenge the hegemony of Khartoum. Emperor Haile Selassie had been
instrumental in mediating an end to the Sudanese civil war in 1972.
However, Ethiopia regularly expressed disappointment that the Sudanese
government had not prevented Eritrean guerrillas from operating out of
its territory. Sudan attempted to negotiate an end to the Eritrean
conflict in 1975 but was unsuccessful. When Ethiopia turned to the
Soviet Union and away from the United States, Sudan's government became
concerned. Sudanese president Jaafar an Nimeiri had accused the Soviet
Union of having inspired coup attempts against his regime in 1971 and
1976. Sudan recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia in January 1977, and for
several years serious border tensions existed between the two countries.
Ethiopia's turn toward the Soviet Union caused Sudan to seek the
support of new allies in preparing for the possibility of external
invasions sponsored by Khartoum's regional enemies. Nimeiri decided to
openly support certain Eritrean liberation movements. In addition, he
supported Somalia during the Ogaden War. Nimeiri claimed that he wanted
to build a "high wall against communism" in the Horn of Africa
and agreed to participate with the United States, Kenya, Egypt, Somalia,
and Oman in the development of the RDF. By 1980 the tensions between
Sudan and Ethiopia had abated, however, with the signing of a peace
treaty calling for the mutual respect of the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the two countries.
The 1981 tripartite agreement among Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen
undermined relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum. For some time,
the Libyan government had been trying to overthrow Nimeiri. Now Ethiopia
appeared to be joining the Libyan effort. Border tensions between the
two countries also increased after Ethiopia started supporting the SPLA.
After Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985, Sadiq al Mahdi's regime made it
clear that it wanted to improve relations with Ethiopia and Libya.
Supposedly, this was the first step in the resolution of Sudan's civil
war. The change in regimes in Sudan also prompted a deterioration in
United States-Sudanese relations, manifested by Khartoum's cancellation
of the agreement calling for the participation of Sudanese troops in the
Operation Bright Star exercises. Despite Sudan's estrangement from the
United States and Mahdi's growing closeness to Libya after 1985, there
was no substantive improvement in Ethiopian-Sudanese relations. The
problem continued to center on Sudan's support for Eritrean rebels and
Mengistu's continued support of the SPLA. By 1989, following the
overthrow of Sadiq al Mahdi, Khartoum and Addis Ababa had offered to
negotiate their respective internal conflicts, but nothing tangible came
of this.
Ethiopia - Addis Ababa and the Middle East
To undermine regional support for the Eritrean movements, after 1987
the Ethiopian government tried to develop better relations with several
Arab countries. Between 1987 and 1989, high-level Ethiopian delegations
visited Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. In the fall of
1988, Mengistu paid a two-day visit to Syria to explain to President
Hafiz al Assad the various reforms the Ethiopian regime had recently
made, including the creation of autonomous regions, designed to be
responsive to the desires of groups like the Eritreans. Prime Minister
Fikre-Selassie Wogderes made a visit to Cairo in November 1988 to seek
improved relations with Egypt and to express support for Egypt's offer
to negotiate a settlement of the Eritrean conflict. Despite these moves,
Ethiopia's relations with the Middle East remained minimal.
By 1989 the lack of progress toward improved relations with Arab
countries and the desperate need for arms appeared to have inspired
Ethiopia to develop closer ties with Israel. Subsequently, diplomatic
relations between the two countries, which had been broken off at the
time of the October 1973 War, were restored. Approximately 10,000 Beta
Israel (Ethiopian Jews; also called Falasha) had been spirited out of
Ethiopia to Israel in 1984 in a secret airlift known as Operation Moses,
and Israel remained committed to securing the emigration of the
remaining Beta Israel. In return, Israel agreed to provide the Mengistu
regime with military assistance.
Israel obtained the release of an additional large number of Beta
Israel in May 1991 in the midst of the collapse of the Mengistu regime.
Negotiations for another Beta Israel exodus were already under way, and
large numbers of them had already been brought to Addis Ababa when the
military government came under intense pressure from EPRDF forces. At
the behest of both Israel and the United States, the government agreed
to release the Beta Israel against an Israeli payment of US$35 million.
On May 24-26, in what was called Operation Solomon, some 15,000 Beta
Israel were airlifted from Ethiopia to Israel, leaving an estimated
5,000 behind, mostly around Gonder.
Ethiopia - The Demise of the Military Government
In retrospect, perhaps the two crucial factors in the fall of the
Mengistu regime were the abortive coup of May 1989 and the loss of
Soviet military and political support. In the aftermath of quelling the
coup, disaffection spread throughout the army. Thereafter, whole
military units defected, taking their arms and equipment with them as
they joined insurgent groups. At the same time, Soviet military
deliveries dwindled and then ceased, a source of supply that Mengistu
was never able to replace, leaving government forces still further
weakened and demoralized. It was these developments that led Mengistu to
attempt economic reforms in 1989 and 1990 and to initiate peace talks
with the EPLF and EPRDF under Italian and United States auspices.
During the early months of 1991, both the military and the political
outlooks darkened considerably for the government. The EPLF pressed its
sweep down the Red Sea coast with the aim of capturing Aseb. In February and March, EPRDF forces overran large
portions of Gonder, Gojam, and Welega, threatening Addis Ababa from the
northwest and west. In mid-April the National Shengo proposed talks with
all political groups that would lead to a transitional government, a
cease-fire, and amnesty for all political prisoners. At the same time,
the National Shengo tempered its peace initiative by calling for the
mobilization of all adults over the age of eighteen and for the
strengthening of the WPE. A few days later, on April 26, Mengistu, in a
gesture to his opponents, reshuffled the government, dropping several
hard-liners and replacing them with moderates. Among the latter were
Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, one of the army's commanders in
Eritrea, who was promoted to vice president, and Tesfaye Dinka, former
foreign minister, who became prime minister. Both belonged to a group of
advisers who had been urging Mengistu to compromise with the Eritreans
and the Tigray.
The main opposition parties--the EPLF, EPRDF, and OLF-- rebuffed the
National Shengo's offer. During the next month, as all parties prepared
for the next round of talks scheduled for London in late May, the EPLF
and EPRDF pressed hard on the military front. In late April, EPRDF
forces were reported to be some 100 kilometers west of Addis Ababa and
still advancing; in Eritrea the EPLF made gains along the Red Sea coast
and closed in on Keren and Asmera. In mid-May the last major government
strongholds north of Addis Ababa-- Dese and Kembolcha in southern
Welo--fell to the EPRDF. With little but demoralized and fleeing troops
between the capital and the EPRDF forces, Mengistu resigned the
presidency and fled the country on May 21. His exit, widely regarded as
essential if the upcoming negotiations were to succeed, was secured in
part through the efforts of Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen,
who pressured Mengistu to resign and arranged for his exile in Zimbabwe.
Lieutenant General Tesfaye, now head of state, called for a
cease-fire; he also offered to share power with his opponents and went
so far as to begin releasing political prisoners, but to no avail. EPRDF
fighters continued their advance on the virtually defenseless capital
and announced that they could enter it at will. Meanwhile, on May 24,
the EPLF received the surrender of Keren and the 120,000-member garrison
in Asmera, which brought the whole of Eritrea under its control except
for Aseb, which fell the next day. The goal of independence from
Ethiopia, for which Eritreans had fought for three decades, now seemed a
virtual certainty.
Against the background of these events, the London conference opened
on May 27. The main contending parties were all in attendance: the
government party headed by Tesfaye Dinka, the EPLF under Issaias
Afwerki, the EPRDF under TPLF leader Meles Zenawi, and the OLF under its
deputy secretary general, Lencho Letta. Assistant Secretary Cohen served
as a mutually acceptable mediator. Ostensibly, the conference was
supposed to explore ways to set up a transitional government in Addis
Ababa, but its proceedings were soon overtaken by events on the ground.
The talks had hardly gotten under way when Cohen received a message to
the effect that Lieutenant General Tesfaye had lost control of the
government's remaining armed units and that Addis Ababa was threatened
with a complete breakdown of law and order. To prevent uncontrolled
destruction and looting, Cohen recommended that EPRDF forces immediately
move into Addis Ababa and establish control. Tesfaye Dinka strenuously
objected, but he spoke from a position of weakness and could not
prevail; he subsequently withdrew from the conference. On the night of
May 27-28, EPRDF forces marched into Addis Ababa and assumed control of
the city and national government.
The next day, Cohen again met with leaders of the EPLF, EPRDF, and
OLF, but now as an adviser and not as a mediator. The insurgent leaders
committed themselves to a pluralist democratic society and government
for Ethiopia and agreed that Eritreans would be free to determine their
own future, including independence if they wished. They also agreed that
the EPRDF should continue to exercise temporary control in Addis Ababa.
The task of constructing a transitional government, however, was
postponed until early July, when a national conference broadly
representative of all major political groups would convene in Addis
Ababa to take up the matter. With these agreements in hand, the London
conference adjourned, but not before Cohen stressed the need for
fundamental reforms and conditioned future United States aid upon
construction of a democratic political system.
By early June, the EPRDF claimed that it had established effective
control over most of the country, the last remaining government troops
in Dire Dawa and Harer having surrendered along with some 300 officials
and military officers of the former regime. The new rulers faced a
number of daunting problems, among them famine and starvation affecting
several million people, a severely dislocated economy and society, the
prospect of Eritrean independence and with it the loss of direct access
to the Red Sea, and the thorny and far from settled question of
ethnicity. The explosive potential of these problems was immediately
apparent when, only a day after having marched into Addis Ababa, EPRDF
soldiers shot or wounded several demonstrators protesting the EPRDF
takeover, agreements affecting Eritrea, and United States policies
toward the country. Even so, there was much hope and optimism about the
future among a war-weary population, as well as a palpable sense of
relief that seventeen years of despised military rule had at last come
to an end.
