The island of Hispaniola (La Isla Espa�ola) was the first New World
colony settled by Spain. As such, it served as the logistical base for
the conquest of most of the Western Hemisphere. Christopher Columbus
first sighted the island in 1492 toward the end of his first voyage to
"the Indies." Columbus and his crew found the island inhabited
by a large population of friendly Taino Indians (Arawaks), who made the
explorers welcome. The land was fertile, but of greater importance to
the Spaniards was the discovery that gold could be obtained either by
barter with the natives, who adorned themselves with golden jewelry, or
by extraction from alluvial deposits on the island.
After several attempts to plant colonies along the north coast of
Hispaniola, Spain's first permanent settlement in the New World was
established on the southern coast at the present site of Santo Domingo.
Under Spanish sovereignty, the entire island bore the name Santo
Domingo. Indications of the presence of gold--the life's blood of the
nascent mercantilist system--and a population of tractable natives who
could be used as laborers combined to attract many Spanish newcomers
during the early years. Most were adventurers who, at least initially,
were more interested in acquiring sudden wealth than they were in
settling the land. Their relations with the Taino Indians, whom they
ruthlessly maltreated, deteriorated from the beginning. Aroused by
continued seizures of their food supplies, other exactions, and abuse of
their women, the formerly peaceful Indians rebelled- -only to be crushed
decisively in 1495.
Columbus, who ruled the colony as royal governor until 1499,
attempted to put an end to the more serious abuses to which the Indians
were subjected by prohibiting foraging expeditions against them and by
regulating the informal taxation imposed by the settlers. Being limited
to this milder form of exploitation engendered active opposition among
the settlers. To meet their demands, Columbus devised the repartimiento
system of land settlement and native labor under which a settler,
without assuming any obligation to the authorities, could be granted in
perpetuity a large tract of land together with the services of the
Indians living on it.
The repartimiento system did nothing to improve the lot of
the Indians, and the Spanish crown changed it by instituting the system
of encomienda in 1503. Under the encomienda system,
all land became in theory the property of the crown, and the Indians
thus were considered tenants on royal land. The crown's right to service
from the tenants could be transferred in trust to individual Spanish
settlers (encomenderos) by formal grant and the regular payment
of tribute. The encomenderos were entitled to certain days of
labor from the Indians, who became their charges. Encomenderos
thus assumed the responsibility of providing for the physical well-being
of the Indians and for their instruction in Christianity. An encomienda
theoretically did not involve ownership of land; in practice, however,
possession was gained through other means.
The hard work demanded of the Indians and the privations that they
suffered demonstrated the unrealistic nature of the encomienda
system, which effectively operated on a honor system as a result of the
absence of enforcement efforts by Spanish authorities. The Indian
population died off rapidly from exhaustion, starvation, disease, and
other causes. By 1548 the Taino population, estimated at 1 million in
1492, had been reduced to approximately 500. The consequences were
profound. The need for a new labor force to meet the growing demands of
sugarcane cultivation prompted the importation of African slaves
beginning in 1503. By 1520, black African labor was used almost
exclusively.
The early grants of land without obligation under the repartimiento
system resulted in a rapid decentralization of power. Each landowner
possessed virtually sovereign authority. Power was diffused because of
the tendency of the capital city, Santo Domingo (which also served as
the seat of government for the entire Spanish Indies), to orient itself
toward the continental Americas, which provided gold for the crown, and
toward Spain, which provided administrators, supplies, and immigrants
for the colonies. Local government was doomed to ineffectiveness because
there was little contact between the capital and the hinterland; for
practical purposes, the countryside fell under the sway of the large
landowners. Throughout Dominican history, this sociopolitical order was
a major factor in the development of some of the distinctive
characteristics of the nation's political culture such as paternalism,
personalism, and the tendency toward strong, even authoritarian,
leadership.
As early as the 1490s, the landowners demonstrated their power by
successfully conspiring against Columbus. His successor, Francisco de
Bobadilla, was appointed chief justice and royal commissioner by the
Spanish crown in 1499. Bobadilla sent Columbus back to Spain in irons,
but Queen Isabella soon ordered him released. Bobadilla proved an inept
administrator, and he was replaced in 1503 by the more efficient Nicol�s
de Ovando, who assumed the titles of governor and supreme justice.
Because of his success in initiating reforms desired by the crown--the encomienda
system among them--de Ovando received the title of Founder of Spain's
Empire in the Indies.
In 1509 Columbus's son, Diego Columbus, was appointed governor of the
colony of Santo Domingo. Diego's ambition and the splendid surroundings
he provided for himself aroused the suspicions of the crown. As a
resulted, in 1511 of the crown established the audiencia, a new
political institution intended to check the power of the governor. The
first audiencia was simply a tribunal composed of three judges
whose jurisdiction extended over all the West Indies. In this region, it
formed the highest court of appeal. Employment of the audiencia
eventually spread throughout Spanish America.
The tribunal's influence grew, and in 1524 it was designated the
Royal Audiencia of Santo Domingo, with jurisdiction in the Caribbean,
the Atlantic coast of Central America and Mexico, and the northern coast
of South America, including all of what is now Venezuela and part of
present-day Colombia. As a court representing the crown, the audiencia
was given expanded powers that encompassed administrative, legislative,
and consultative functions; the number of judges increased
correspondingly. In criminal cases the audiencia's decisions
were final, but important civil suits could be appealed to the Royal and
Supreme Council of the Indies (Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias) in
Spain.
The Council of the Indies, created by Charles V in 1524, was the
Spanish crown's main agency for directing colonial affairs. During most
of its existence, the council exercised almost absolute power in making
laws, administering justice, controlling finance and trade, supervising
the church, and directing armies.
The arm of the Council of the Indies that dealt with all matters
concerning commerce between Spain and its colonies in the Americas was
the House of Trade (Casa de Contrataci�n), organized in 1503. Control
of commerce in general, and of tax collection in particular, was
facilitated by the designation of monopoly seaports on either side of
the Atlantic Ocean. During most of the colonial period, overseas trade
consisted largely of annual convoys between monopoly ports. Trade
between the colonies and countries other than Spain was prohibited. The
crown also restricted trade among the colonies. These restrictions
hampered economic activity in the New World and encouraged contraband
traffic.
The Roman Catholic Church became the primary agent in spreading
Spanish culture in the Americas. The ecclesiastical organization
developed for Santo Domingo and later extended throughout Spanish
America reflected a union of church and state actually closer than that
prevailing in Spain itself. The Royal Patronage of the Indies (Real
Patronato de las Indias, or, as it was called later, the Patronato Real)
served as the organizational agent of this affiliation of the church and
the Spanish crown.
Santo Domingo's prestige began to decline in the first part of the
sixteenth century with the conquest of Mexico by Hern�n Cort�s in 1521
and the discovery there, and later in Peru, of great wealth in gold and
silver. These events coincided with the exhaustion of the alluvial
deposits of gold and the dying off of the Indian labor force in Santo
Domingo. Large numbers of colonists left for Mexico and Peru; new
immigrants from Spain largely bypassed Santo Domingo for the greater
wealth to be found in lands to the west. The population of Santo Domingo
dwindled, agriculture languished, and Spain soon became preoccupied with
its richer and vaster mainland colonies.
The stagnation that prevailed in Santo Domingo for the next 250 years
was interrupted on several occasions by armed engagements, as the French
and the English attempted to weaken Spain's economic and political
dominance in the New World. In 1586 the English admiral, Sir Francis
Drake, captured the city of Santo Domingo and collected a ransom for its
return to Spanish control. In 1655 Oliver Cromwell dispatched an English
fleet, commanded by Sir William Penn, to take Santo Domingo. After
meeting heavy resistance, the English sailed farther west and took
Jamaica instead.
The withdrawal of the colonial government from the northern coastal
region opened the way for French buccaneers, who had a base on Tortuga
Island (Ile de la Tortue), off the northwest coast of present-day Haiti,
to settle on Hispaniola in the mid- seventeenth century. Although the
Spanish destroyed the buccaneers' settlements several times, the
determined French would not be deterred or expelled. The creation of the
French West India Company in 1664 signalled France's intention to
colonize western Hispaniola. Intermittent warfare went on between French
and Spanish settlers over the next three decades; however, Spain,
hard-pressed by warfare in Europe, could not maintain a garrison in
Santo Domingo sufficient to secure the entire island against
encroachment. In 1697, under the Treaty of Ryswick, Spain ceded the
western third of the island to France. The exact boundary of this
territory (Saint-Domingue--now Haiti) was not established at the time of
cession and remained in question until 1929.
During the first years of the eighteenth century, landowners in the
Spanish colony did little with their huge holdings, and the sugar
plantations along the southern coast were abandoned because of
harassment by pirates. Foreign trade all but ceased, and almost all
domestic commerce took place in the capital city.
The Bourbon dynasty replaced the Habsburgs in Spain in 1700. The new
regime introduced innovations--especially economic reforms--that
gradually began to revive trade in Santo Domingo. The crown
progressively relaxed the rigid controls and restrictions on commerce
between the mother country and the colonies and among the colonies. The
last convoys sailed in 1737; the monopoly port system was abolished
shortly thereafter. By the middle of the century, both immigration and
the importation of slaves had increased.
In 1765 the Caribbean islands received authorization for almost
unlimited trade with Spanish ports; permission for the Spanish colonies
in the Americas to trade among themselves followed in 1774. Duties on
many commodities were greatly reduced or were removed altogether. By
1790 traders from any port in Spain could buy and sell anywhere in
Spanish America, and by 1800 Spain had opened colonial trade to all
neutral vessels.
As a result of the stimulus provided by the trade reforms, the
population of the colony of Santo Domingo increased from about 6,000 in
1737 to approximately 125,000 in 1790. Of this number, about 40,000 were
white landowners, about 25,000 were black or mulatto freedmen, and some
60,000 were slaves. The composition of Santo Domingo's population
contrasted sharply with that of the neighboring French colony of
Saint-Domingue, where some 30,000 whites and 27,000 freedmen extracted
labor from at least 500,000 black slaves. To the Spanish colonists,
Saint- Domingue represented a powder keg, the eventual explosion of
which would echo throughout the island.
Dominican Republic - HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO
Although they shared the island of Hispaniola, the colonies of
Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo followed disparate paths. Cultural
differences explained the contrast to some extent, but the primary
divergence was economic. Saint-Domingue was the most productive
agricultural colony in the Western Hemisphere, and its output
contributed heavily to the economy of France. By contrast, Santo Domingo
was a small colony with little impact on the economy of Spain.
Prosperous French plantation owners sought to maximize their gain
through increased production for a growing world market. Thus, they
imported great numbers of slaves from Africa and drove this captive work
force ruthlessly.
Although by the end of the eighteenth century economic conditions
were improving, landowners in Santo Domingo did not enjoy the same level
of wealth attained by their French counterparts in Saint-Domingue. The
absence of market-driven pressure to increase production enabled the
domestic labor force to practice subsistence agriculture and to export
at low levels. For this reason, Santo Domingo imported far fewer slaves
than did Saint-Domingue. Spanish law also allowed a slave to purchase
his freedom and that of his family for a relatively small sum. This
contributed to the higher proportion of freedmen in the Spanish colony;
by the turn of the century, freedmen actually constituted the majority
of the population. Also in contrast to conditions in the French colony,
this population profile contributed to a somewhat more egalitarian
society, plagued much less by the schisms of race.
Stimulated to some degree by a revolution against the monarchy that
was well underway in France, the inevitable explosion took place in
Saint-Domingue in August 1791. The initial reaction of many Spanish
colonists to news of the slaughter of Frenchmen by armies of rebellious
black slaves was to flee Hispaniola entirely. Spain, however, saw in the
unrest an opportunity to seize all, or part, of the western third of the
island through an alliance of convenience with the British. These
intentions, however, did not survive encounters in the field with forces
led by the former slave, Fran�ois-Dominique Toussaint Louverture. In
recognition of his leadership against the Spanish (under whose banner he
had begun his military career), the British, and rebellious royalists
and mulattoes, Toussaint was named governor general of Saint-Domingue by
the French Republic in 1796. By the next year, Spain had surrendered the
entire island to his rule. This action reflected not only Spain's
growing disengagement from its colony, but also its setbacks in Europe
and its relative decline as a world power.
Although France nominally enjoyed sovereignty over the entire island
of Hispaniola, it was prevented from establishing an effective presence
or administration in the east by continuing conflict between the
indigenous forces led by Toussaint--and later by Jean-Jacques
Dessalines--and an expeditionary force dispatched to Hispaniola by Napol�on
Bonaparte in 1802 in an effort to bring the island more firmly under
French control. Upon defeating the French, Dessalines and his followers
established the independent nation of Haiti in January 1804. A small
French presence, however, remained in the former Spanish colony.
Dessalines attempted to take the city of Santo Domingo in March 1805,
but he turned back after receiving reports of the approach of a French
naval squadron.
By 1808 a number of �migr� Spanish landowners had returned to Santo
Domingo. These royalists had no intention of living under French rule,
however, and they sought foreign assistance for a rebellion that would
restore Spanish sovereignty. Help came from the Haitians, who provided
arms, and from the British, who occupied Saman� and blockaded the port
of Santo Domingo. The remaining French representatives fled the island
in July 1809.
The 1809 restoration of Spanish rule ushered in an era referred to by
some historians as Espa�a Boba (Foolish Spain). Under the despotic rule
of Ferdinand VII, the colony's economy deteriorated severely. Some
Dominicans began to wonder if their interests would not best be served
by the sort of independence movement that was sweeping the South
American colonies. In keeping with this sentiment, Spanish lieutenant
governor Jos� N��ez de C�ceres announced the colony's independence
as the state of Spanish Haiti on November 30, 1821. C�ceres requested
admission to the Republic of Gran Colombia (consisting of what later
became Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), recently proclaimed
established by Sim�n Bol�var and his followers. While the request was
in transit, however, the president of Haiti, Jean-Pierre Boyer, decided
to invade Santo Domingo and to reunite the island under the Haitian
flag.
The twenty-two years of Haitian occupation witnessed a steady
economic decline and a growing resentment of Haiti among Dominicans. The
agricultural pattern in the former Spanish colony came to resemble the
one prevailing in all of Haiti at the time-- that is, mainly subsistence
cultivation with little or no production of export crops. Boyer
attempted to enforce in the new territory the Rural Code (Code Rural) he
had decreed in an effort to improve productivity among the Haitian
yeomanry, but the Dominicans proved no more willing to adhere to its
provisions than the Haitians had been. Increasing numbers of Dominican
landowners chose to flee the island rather than to live under Haitian
rule; in many cases, Haitian administrators encouraged such emigration,
confiscated the holdings of the �migr�s, and redistributed them to
Haitian officials. Aside from such bureaucratic machinations, most of
the Dominicans' resentment of Haitian rule developed because Boyer, the
ruler of an impoverished country, did not (or could not) provision his
army. The occupying Haitian forces lived off the land in Santo Domingo,
commandeering or confiscating what they needed to perform their duties
or to fill their stomachs. Dominicans saw this as tribute demanded by
petty conquerors, or as simple theft. Racial animosities also affected
attitudes on both sides; black Haitian troops reacted with reflexive
resentment against lighter-skinned Dominicans, while Dominicans came to
associate the Haitians' dark skin with the oppression and the abuses of
occupation.
Religious and cultural life also suffered under the Haitian
occupation. The Haitians, who associated the Roman Catholic Church with
the French colonists who had so cruelly exploited and abused them before
independence, confiscated all church property in the east, deported all
foreign clergy, and severed the ties of the remaining clergy to the
Vatican. For Dominicans, who were much more strongly Roman Catholic and
less oriented toward folk religion than the Haitians, such actions
seemed insulting and nihilistic. In addition, upper-class Haitians
considered French culture superior to Spanish culture, while Haitian
soldiers and others from the lower class simply disregarded Hispanic
mores and customs.
The emigration of upper-class Dominicans served to forestall
rebellion and to prolong the period of Haitian occupation because most
Dominicans reflexively looked to the upper class for leadership.
Scattered unrest and isolated confrontations between Haitians and
Dominicans undoubtedly occurred; it was not until 1838, however, that
any significant organized movement against Haitian domination began.
Crucial to these stirrings was a twenty-year-old Dominican, of a
prominent Santo Domingo family, who had returned home five years earlier
after seven years of study in Europe. The young student's name was Juan
Pablo Duarte.
Dominican history can in many ways be encompassed by a series of
biographies. The personality and attributes of Duarte, however, ran
counter to those of most of the country's caudillos. Duarte was an
idealist, an ascetic, a genuine nationalist, a man of principle, and a
romantic in a romantic age. Although he played no significant part in
its rule, he is considered the father of his country. He certainly
provided the inspiration and impetus for the achievement of independence
from Haiti. Shocked, when he returned from Europe, by the deteriorated
condition of Santo Domingo, the young student resolved to establish a
resistance movement that would eventually throw off the Haitian yoke. He
dubbed his movement La Trinitaria (The Trinity) because its original
nine members had organized themselves into cells of three; the cells
went on to recruit as separate organizations, maintaining strict
secrecy, with little or no direct contact among themselves in order to
minimize the possibility of detection or betrayal to the Haitian
authorities. Young recruits flocked to Duarte's banner (almost
literally, for it was Duarte who designed the modern Dominican flag) as
a result of the pent- up resentment under Haitian rule. Despite its
elaborate codes and clandestine procedures, La Trinitaria was eventually
betrayed to the Haitians. It survived largely intact, however, emerging
under the new designation, La Filantr�pica, to continue its work of
anti-Haitian agitation.
Despite their numbers and their base of popular support, the
Trinitarios (as the rebels still referred to themselves) required a
political disruption in Haiti proper to boost their movement toward its
ultimate success. The overthrow of Boyer in the Revolution of 1843
provided a catalyst for the Dominican rebels. Charles Rivi�re-H�rard
replaced Boyer as president of Haiti. Like most Haitian leaders, he
required a transition period in which to deal with competitors and to
solidify his rule. Rivi�re-Herard apparently identified one disaffected
Haitian faction in the administration of the eastern territory; his
crackdown on this group extended to the Trinitarios as well, because
apparently there had been some fruitless contacts between the Dominicans
and some liberal Haitians. The increased pressure induced Duarte to
leave the country temporarily in search of support in other Latin
American states, mainly Colombia and Venezuela. In December 1843, a
group of Duarte's followers urged him to return to Santo Domingo. They
feared that their plans for an insurrection might be betrayed to the
Haitians and had therefore resolved to carry them through quickly.
Duarte sailed as far north from Caracas as the island of Cura�ao, where
he fell victim to a violent illness. When he had not arrived home by
February 1844, the rebels, under the leadership of Francisco del Rosario
S�nchez and Ram�n Mella, agreed to launch their uprising without him.
On February 27, 1844--thereafter celebrated as Dominican Independence
Day--the rebels seized the Ozama fortress in the capital. The Haitian
garrison, taken by surprise and apparently betrayed by at least one of
its sentries, retired in disarray. Within two days, all Haitian
officials had left Santo Domingo. Mella headed the provisional governing
junta of the new Dominican Republic. Duarte, finally recovered, returned
to his country on March 14. The following day he entered the capital
amidst great adulation and celebration. As is so often the case in such
circumstances, the optimism generated by revolutionary triumph would
eventually give way to the disillusion caused by the struggle for power.
Dominican Republic - SANTANA AND BAEZ
Two leaders dominated the period between 1844 and 1864: General Pedro
Santana Familias and Buenaventura B�ez M�ndez. Dissimilar in
appearance and temperament, the two alternated in power by means of
force, factionalism, and repeated efforts to secure their country's
protection or annexation by a foreign power. Their unprincipled,
self-serving dominance did much to entrench the tradition of caudillo
rule in the Dominican Republic.
The Infant Republic
Santana's power base lay in the military forces mustered to defend
the infant republic against Haitian retaliation. Duarte, briefly a
member of the governing junta, for a time commanded an armed force as
well. He was temperamentally unsuited to generalship, however, and the
junta eventually replaced him with General Jos� Mar�a Imbert. Duarte
assumed the post of governor of the Cibao, the northern farming region
administered from the city of Santiago de los Caballeros, commonly known
as Santiago. In July 1844, Mella and a throng of other Duarte supporters
in Santiago urged him to take the title of president of the republic.
Duarte agreed to do so, but only if free elections could be arranged.
Santana, who felt that only the protection of a great power could assure
Dominican safety against the Haitian threat, did not share Duarte's
enthusiasm for the electoral process. His forces took Santo Domingo on
July 12, 1844, and they proclaimed Santana ruler of the Dominican
Republic. Mella, who attempted to mediate a compromise government
including both Duarte and Santana, found himself imprisoned by the new
dictator. Duarte and S�nchez followed Mella into prison and
subsequently into exile.
Although in 1844 a constituent assembly drafted a constitution, based
on the Haitian and the United States models, which established
separation of powers and legislative checks on the executive, Santana
proceeded to emasculate the document that same year by demanding the
inclusion of Article 210, which granted him untrammeled power
"during the current war" against Haiti.
As it turned out, the Dominicans repelled the Haitian forces, on both
land and sea, by December 1845. Santana's dictatorial powers, however,
continued throughout his first term (1844-48). He consolidated his power
by executing anti-Santana conspirators, by rewarding his close
associates with lucrative positions in government, and by printing paper
money to cover the expenses of a large standing army, a policy that
severely devalued the new nation's currency. Throughout his term,
Santana also continued to explore the possibility of an association with
a foreign power. The governments of the United States, France, and Spain
all declined the offer.
Santana responded to general discontent, prompted mainly by the
deteriorating currency and economy, by resigning from the presidency in
February 1848 and retiring to his ranch in the province of El Seibo. The
Council of Secretaries of State, made up of former cabinet members,
selected minister of war Manuel Jim�nez to replace Santana in August
1848. Jim�nez displayed little enthusiasm and no aptitude as a ruler.
His tenure, which would probably have been brief in any case, ended in
May 1849. The violent sequence of events that culminated in Jim�nez's
departure began with a new invasion from Haiti, this time led by
self-styled emperor Faustin Soulouque. Santana returned to prominence at
the head of the army that checked the Haitian advance at Las Carreras in
April 1849. As the Haitians retired, Santana pressed his advantage
against Jim�nez. After some brief skirmishes between his forces and
those loyal to the president, Santana took control of Santo Domingo and
the government on May 30, 1849.
Although Santana once again held the reins of power, he declined to
formalize the situation by standing for office. Instead, he renounced
the temporary mandate granted him by the legislature and called for an
election--carried out under an electoral college system with limited
suffrage--to select a new president. Santana favored Santiago Espaillat,
who won a ballot in the Congress on July 5, 1849; Espaillat declined to
accept the presidency, however, knowing that he would have to serve as a
puppet so long as Santana controlled the army. This cleared the way for
B�ez, president of the legislature, to win a second ballot, which was
held on August 18, 1849.
B�ez made even more vigorous overtures to foreign powers to
establish a Dominican protectorate. Both France (B�ez's personal
preference) and the United States, although still unwilling to annex the
entire country, expressed interest in acquiring the bay and peninsula of
Saman� as a naval or commercial port. Consequently, in order to
preserve its lucrative trade with the island nation and to deny a
strategic asset to its rivals, Britain became more actively involved in
Dominican affairs. In 1850 the British signed a commercial and maritime
treaty with the Dominicans. The following year, Britain mediated a peace
treaty between the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
B�ez's first term established the personal rivalry with Santana that
dominated Dominican politics until the latter's death in 1864. President
B�ez purged Santana's followers (santanistas) from the
government and installed his own sycophants (baecistas) in
their place, pardoned a number of Santana's political opponents,
reorganized the military in an effort to dilute Santana's power base,
and apparently conceived a plan to create a militia that would serve as
a counterforce to the army.
Seeing his influence clearly threatened, Santana returned to the
political arena in February 1853, when he was elected to succeed B�ez.
The general moved quickly to deal with B�ez, who had once been a
colonel under his command. In a public address on July 3, 1853, Santana
denounced B�ez as a collaborator under the Haitian occupation (which
was true) and a paid agent of influence for the Haitians after
independence (which may have been true, although not to the extent that
Santana declared). Publicly characterizing B�ez's presence in the
nation a threat to security, Santana exercised his authority under
Article 210 of the constitution and expelled the former president from
the Dominican Republic.
Although he enjoyed considerable popularity, Santana confronted
several crises during his second term. In February 1854, a constituent
assembly promulgated a new, liberal constitution that eliminated the
dictatorial powers granted by Article 210. With his control over the
army restored, however, Santana readily forced the adoption of a new
constitution restoring most of the excised prerogatives of the
executive. On the international front, renewed annexation talks between
the Dominican and the United States governments aroused the concern of
Haitian emperor Soulouque. Motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
prevent the acquisition of any portion of Hispaniola by the slaveholding
United States, Soulouque launched a new invasion in November 1855.
However, Dominican forces decisively defeated the Haitians in a number
of engagements and forced them back across the border by January 1856.
The final crisis of Santana's second term also originated in the
foreign policy sphere. Shortly after the Haitian campaign, the Dominican
and the United States governments signed a commercial treaty that
provided for the lease of a small tract in Saman� for use as a coaling
station. Although Santana delayed implementation of the lease, its
negotiation provided his opponents--including baecistas and the
government of Spain--with an opportunity to decry Yankee imperialism and
to demand the president's ouster. Pressure built to such an extent that
Santana felt compelled to resign on May 26, 1856, in favor of his vice
president, Manuel de la Regla Mota.
Regla Mota's rule lasted almost five months. An empty treasury forced
the new president to discharge most of the army. Thus deprived of the
Dominican rulers' traditional source of power, his government all but
invited the return of B�ez. With the support of the Spanish, B�ez was
named vice president by Regla Mota, who then resigned in B�ez's favor.
Not a forgiving man by nature, B�ez lost little time before denouncing
ex- president Santana and expelling him from the country. Once again, B�ez
purged santanistas from the government and replaced them with
his own men.
B�ez had little time in which to savor his triumph over his rival,
however. Reverting to the policies of his first term, the government
flooded the country with what rapidly became all but worthless paper
money. Farmers in the Cibao, who objected strongly to the purchase of
their crops with this devalued currency, rose against B�ez in what came
to be known as the Revolution of 1857. Their standard-bearer, not
surprisingly, was Santana.
Pardoned by a provisional government established at Santiago de los
Caballeros, Santana returned in August 1857 to join the revolution. He
raised his own personal army and soon dominated the movement. A year of
bloody conflict between the governments of Santiago and Santo Domingo
took a heavy toll in lives and money. Under the terms of a June 1857
armistice, B�ez once again fled to Cura�ao with all the government
funds that he could carry. Santana proceeded to betray the aspirations
of some of his liberal revolutionary followers by restoring the
dictatorial constitution of 1854. Santanismo again replaced baecismo;
only a small group of loyalists realized any benefit from the exchange,
however. Politically, the country continued to walk a treadmill.
Economically, conditions had become almost unbearable for many
Dominicans. The general climate of despair ensured the inevitable
success of Santana's renewed efforts to secure a protector for his
country.
Dominican Republic - Annexation by Spain, 1861-65
On March 17, 1861, Santana announced the annexation of the Dominican
Republic by Spain. A number of conditions had combined to bring about
this reversion to colonialism. The Civil War in the United States had
lessened the Spanish fear of retaliation from the north. In Spain
itself, the ruling Liberal Union of General Leopoldo O'Donnell had been
advocating renewed imperial expansion. And in the Dominican Republic,
both the ruler and a portion of the ruled were sufficiently concerned
about the possibility either of a renewed attack from Haiti or of
domestic economic collapse to find the prospect of annexation
attractive.
Support for annexation did not run as deep as Santana and his clique
had represented to the Spanish, however. The first rebellion against
Spanish rule broke out in May 1861, but it was quashed in short order. A
better organized revolt, under the leadership of the baecista,
General S�nchez, sprang up only a month later. Santana, now bearing the
title of captain general of the Province of Santo Domingo, was forced to
take to the field against his own countrymen as the representative of a
foreign power. The wily Santana lured S�nchez into an ambush, where he
was captured and executed. Despite this service, Santana found his
personal power and his ability to dole out patronage to his followers
greatly restricted under Spanish rule. In a fit of pique, he resigned
the captaincy general in January 1862.
Resentment and rebellion continued, fed by racial tension, excessive
taxation, the failure to stabilize the currency, the uncompensated
requisition of supplies by the Spanish army, heavyhanded reform of local
religious customs by an inflexible Spanish archbishop, and the
restriction of trade to the benefit of the Spanish empire. The Spaniards
quelled more uprisings in 1863, but guerrilla actions continued. In
response to the continuing unrest, a state of siege was declared in
February 1863.
Rebellious Dominicans set up a provisional government in Santiago,
headed by General Jos� Antonio Salcedo Ram�rez, on September 14, 1863.
Their proclamation of an Act of Independence launched what is known as
the War of Restoration. For their part, the Spanish once again turned to
Santana, who received command of a force made up largely of mercenaries;
however, this campaign was the last for the old caudillo. By this time,
his popularity had all but disappeared. Indeed, the provisional
government had denounced Santana and had condemned him to death for his
actions against his countrymen. On June 14, 1864, a broken and
despondent Santana saved the rebels the trouble of carrying out their
sentence. The timing of his death lent credence to speculation that he
had committed suicide, although this belief was never proven.
Meanwhile, the guerrilla war against the Spanish ground on. The
rebels further formalized their provisional rule by replacing Salcedo
(who had advocated the return of B�ez to rule a restored republic) and
by then holding a national convention on February 27, 1865, which
enacted a new constitution and elected Pedro Antonio Pimentel Chamorro
president.
Circumstances began to favor a Spanish withdrawal. The conclusion of
its Civil War promised that the United States would make new efforts to
enforce the Monroe Doctrine, which barred European powers from the
Western Hemisphere. Spanish military forces, unable to contain the
spread of the insurrection, lost even greater numbers of troops to
disease than they did to the guerrillas. The O'Donnell government had
fallen, taking with it any dreams of a renewed Spanish empire. On March
3, 1865, the Queen of Spain approved a decree repealing the annexation
of Santo Domingo.
The Spanish left political chaos in their wake. A power struggle
began between the conservative, cacique-dominated south and the more
liberal Cibao, where the prevalence of medium-sized landholdings
contributed to a more egalitarian social structure. The two camps
eventually coalesced under the banners of separate political parties.
The Cibae�os (residents of the Cibao) adhered to the National Liberal
Party (Partido Nacional Liberal), which became known as the Blue Party
(Partido Azul). The southerners rallied to the Red Party (Partido Rojo).
The conservative Reds effectively employed their numerical
superiority in the capital to force the restoration of B�ez, who
returned triumphantly from exile and assumed the presidency on December
8, 1865. Never again, however, would he exercise the sort of dictatorial
control over the republic that he and Santana had once alternately
enjoyed. The country's institutions had changed. Regional forces
mustered during the War of Restoration had replaced the national army
that previously had done battle with the Haitians. Political power had
likewise been diffused, particularly between the opposing poles of the
Cibao and the south. Under these conditions, it was difficult, if not
impossible, for one man to dominate the entire nation.
Dominican Republic - The Contest for Power, 1865-82
Ulises Heureaux, Luper�n's lieutenant, stood out among his fellow
Dominicans both physically and temperamentally. The illegitimate son of
a Haitian father and a mother who was originally from the island of St.
Thomas, he was distinguished by his blackness from most other contenders
for power, with the exception of Luper�n. As events were to
demonstrate, he also possessed a singular thirst for power and a
willingness to take any measures necessary to attain and to hold it.
During the four years between B�ez's final withdrawal and Heureaux's
ascension to the presidency, seven individuals held or claimed national,
regional, or interim leadership. Among them were Ignacio Mar�a Gonz�lez
Santin, who held the presidency from June to September 1878; Luper�n,
who governed from Puerto Plata as provisional president from October
1879 to August 1880; and Meri�o, who assumed office in September 1880
after apparently fraudulent general elections. Heureaux served as
interior minister under Meri�o; his behind-the-scenes influence on the
rest of the cabinet apparently exceeded that of the president. Although
Meri�o briefly suspended constitutional procedures in response to
unrest fomented by some remaining baecistas, he abided by the
two-year term established under Luper�n and turned the reins of
government over to Heureaux on September 1, 1882.
Heureaux's first term as president was not particularly noteworthy.
The administrations of Luper�n and Meri�o had achieved some financial
stability for the country; political conditions had settled down to the
point that Heureaux needed to suppress only one major uprising during
his two-year tenure. By 1884, however, no single potential successor,
among the various caciques who constituted the republic's ruling group,
enjoyed widespread support. Luper�n, still the leader of the ruling
Blue Party, supported General Segundo Imbert for the post, while
Heureaux backed the candidacy of General Francisco Gregorio Billini. A
consummate dissembler, Heureaux assured Luper�n that he would support
Imbert should he win the election, but Heureaux also had ballot boxes in
critical precincts stuffed in order to assure Billini's election.
Inaugurated president on September 1, 1884, Billini resisted
Heureaux's efforts to manipulate him. Thus denied de facto rule,
Heureaux undermined Billini by spreading rumors to the effect that the
president had decreed a political amnesty so that he could conspire with
ex-president Cesareo Guillermo Bastardo (February 27-December 6, 1879)
against Luper�n's leadership of the Blues. This precipitated a
governmental crisis that resulted in Billini's resignation on May 16,
1885. Vice President Alejandro Woss y Gil succeeded Billini. Heureaux
assumed a more prominent role under the new government; a number of his
adherents were included in the cabinet, and the general himself assumed
command of the national army in order to stem a rebellion led by
Guillermo, whose suicide when he was faced with capture, removed another
potential rival for power and further endeared Heureaux to Luper�n, a
longtime enemy of Guillermo.
Luper�n accordingly supported Heureaux in the 1886 presidential
elections. Opposed by Casimiro de Moya, Heureaux relied on his
considerable popularity and his demonstrated skill at electoral
manipulation to carry the balloting. The blatancy of the fraud in some
areas, particularly the capital, inspired Moya's followers to launch an
armed rebellion. Heureaux again benefited from Luper�n's support in
this struggle; it delayed his inauguration by four months, but it
further narrowed the field of political contenders. Having again
achieved power, Heureaux maintained his grip on it for the rest of his
life.
Several moves served to lay the groundwork for Heureaux's
dictatorship. Constitutional amendments requested by the president and
effected by the Congress extended the presidential term from two to four
years and eliminated direct elections in favor of the formerly employed
electoral college system. To expand his informal power base, Heureaux
(who became popularly known as General Lil�s, thanks to a common
mispronunciation of his first name) incorporated both Reds and Blues
into his government. The president also established an extensive network
of secret police and informants in order to avert incipient rebellions.
The press, previously unhampered, came under new restrictions.
In the face of impending dictatorship, concerned Dominican liberals
turned to the only remaining figure of stature, Luper�n. The elections
of 1888 therefore pitted Heureaux against his political mentor. If the
dictator felt any respect for his former commander, he did not
demonstrate it during the campaign. Heureaux's agents attacked Luper�n's
campaigners and supporters, arresting and incarcerating considerable
numbers of them. Recognizing the impossibility of a free election under
such circumstances, Luper�n withdrew his candidacy, declined the
entreaties of those of his followers who urged armed rebellion, and fled
into exile in Puerto Rico.
Although plots, intrigue, and abortive insurrections continued under
his rule, Heureaux faced no serious challenges until his assassination
in 1899. He continued to govern in mockconstitutional fashion, achieving
reelection through institutionalized fraud. Despite his relatively
secure position, his repression of dissent became more severe, and the
number of political prisoners expanded along with the dictator's
paranoia. Like Santana and B�ez before him, Heureaux sought the
protection of a foreign power, principally the United States. Although
annexation was no longer an option, the dictator did offer to lease the
Saman� Peninsula to the United States. The deal was never consummated,
however, because of opposition from the liberal wing of the Blue Party
and a number of concerned European powers. In 1891 Washington and Santo
Domingo did conclude a reciprocity treaty that allowed twenty-six United
States products free entry into the Dominican market in exchange for
similar duty-free access for certain Dominican goods. The governments of
Germany, Britain, and France all filed official protests over the
treaty, which they saw as detrimental to their most-favored- nation
trading status.
Under Heureaux, the Dominican government considerably expanded its
external debt. Although some improvements to infrastructure resulted,
much of the money went to support the dictator's personal extravagances
and the financial requirements of his police state. The failure to apply
the funds productively exacerbated both domestic budget deficits and
shortfalls in the external balance of payments. In an effort to head off
complete bankruptcy, the government turned to the familiar expedient of
printing paper money. The huge issuance of 1897, however, debased the
currency to such an extent that even Dominicans refused to accept it.
Despite the dictator's comprehensive efforts to repress
opposition--his network of spies and agents extended even to foreign
countries--a revolutionary organization eventually emerged. Established
in Puerto Rico by Horacio V�squez Lajara, a young adherent of Luper�n,
the group called itself the Young Revolutionary Junta (Junta
Revolucionaria de J�venes). Other prominent members of the group
included Federico Vel�squez and Ram�n C�ceres V�squez. The three
returned to their plantations in the Cibao and began to lay the
groundwork for a coordinated rebellion against the widely detested
Heureaux. The impetuous C�ceres, however, opted for a revolution at a
single stroke when the dictator passed through the town of Moca on July
26, 1899. He shot Heureaux several times and left the longtime ruler
fatally wounded amid a startled crowd. C�ceres escaped unharmed.
Dominican Republic - RENEWED CONFLICT, 1899-1916
After a brief period of armed conflict, the revolutionaries
prevailed. V�squez headed a provisional government established in
September 1899. Free, direct elections brought to the presidency Juan
Isidro Jim�nez Pereyra on November 15. The Jim�nez administration
faced a fiscal crisis when European creditors, led by the French, began
to call in loans that had been contracted by Heureaux. Customs fees
represented the only significant source of government revenue at that
time. When the Jim�nez government pledged 40 percent of its customs
revenue to repay its foreign debt, it provoked the ire of the San
Domingo Improvement Company. A United States-based firm, the Improvement
Company had lent large sums to the Heureaux regime. As a result, it had
not only received a considerable percentage of customs revenue, but also
had been granted the right to administer Dominican customs in order to
ensure regular repayment. Stung by the Jim�nez government's resumption
of control over its customs receipts, the directors of the Improvement
Company protested to the United States Department of State. The review
of the case prompted a renewed interest in Washington in Dominican
affairs.
The death of Heureaux, however, had by no means ushered in an era of
political tranquility. Jim�nez's various financial negotiations with
foreign powers had aroused opposition among nationalists, particularly
in the Cibao, who suspected the president of bargaining away Dominican
sovereignty in return for financial settlements. Government forces led
by V�squez put down some early uprisings. Eventually, however, personal
and political competition between Jim�nez and V�squez brought them
into more serious conflict. V�squez's forces proclaimed a revolution on
April 26, 1902; with no real base of support, Jim�nez fled his office
and his country a few days later. Although highly principled, V�squez
was not a strong leader. Squabbles among his followers and opposition to
his government from local caciques grew into general unrest that
culminated in the seizure of power by ex-president Woss y Gil in April
1903.
Dominican politics had once again polarized into two largely
nonideological camps. Where once the Blues and the Reds had contended
for power, now the jimenistas (supporters of Jim�nez; sing., jimenista)
and the horacistas (supporters of V�squez and C�ceres; sing.,
horacista) vied for control. Woss y Gil, a jimenista,
made the mistake of seeking supporters among the horacista camp
and he was overthrown by the jimenista general, Carlos F.
Morales Languasco, in December 1903. Rather than restore the country's
leadership to Jim�nez, however, Morales set up a provisional government
and announced his own candidacy for the presidency-- with C�ceres as
his running mate. The renewed fraternization with the horacistas
incited another jimenista rebellion. This uprising proved
unsuccessful, and Morales and C�ceres were inaugurated on June 19,
1904.
Conflict within the Morales administration between supporters of the
president and those of the vice president debilitated the government. By
late 1905, it became clear that Morales had lost effective control to C�ceres
and the cabinet. Morales resolved to lead a coup against his own
government; his plan was discovered by the horacistas, however,
and he was captured and dispatched into exile. C�ceres assumed the
presidency on December 29, 1905.
The influence of the United States had increased considerably during
the first few years of the twentieth century. United States military
forces had intervened in a minor way to ensure the safety of United
States citizens and to prevent the deployment of warships by European
governments seeking immediate repayment of debt. By 1904 Washington had
begun to take a greater interest in the stability of Caribbean nations,
particularly those--like the Dominican Republic--situated along the
approaches to the forthcoming Panama Canal. The administration of
Theodore Roosevelt took a particular interest in resolving the
republic's economic situation. It negotiated an agreement in June 1904
whereby the Dominican government bought out the holdings of the San
Domingo Improvement Company. The Morales government also agreed to
accept the appointment by the United States government of a financial
agent to oversee the repayment of the outstanding debt to the
Improvement Company from customs duties. This agreement was subsequently
superseded by a financial accord signed between the two governments on
February 7, 1905; under the provisions of this accord, the United States
government assumed responsibility for all Dominican debt as well as for
the collection of customs duties and the allocation of those revenues to
the Dominican government and to the repayment of its domestic and
foreign debt. Although parts of this agreement were rejected by the
United States Senate, it formed the basis for the establishment in April
1905 of the General Customs Receivership, the office through which the
United States government administered the finances of the Dominican
Republic.
The C�ceres government became the financial beneficiary of this
arrangement. Freed from the burden of dealing with creditors, C�ceres
attempted to reform the political system. Constitutional reforms placed
local ayuntamientos (town councils) under the power of the
central government, extended the presidential term to six years, and
eliminated the office of vice president. C�ceres also nationalized
public utilities and established a bureau of public works to administer
them. All of these actions engendered both opposition and support. The
curtailment of local authority particularly irked those caciques who
preferred to rule through compliant ayuntamientos. The
continued financial sovereignty of the Yankees also outweighed the
economic benefits of the receivership in the minds of many nationalistic
Dominicans. Intrigues fomented in exile by Morales, Jim�nez, and others
beset C�ceres. On November 19, 1911, a small group headed by Luis
Tejera assassinated C�ceres as he took his evening drive through the
streets of Santo Domingo.
Dominican Republic - OCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES, 1916-24
The assassination of C�ceres turned out to be but the first act of a
frenzied drama that culminated in the republic's occupation by the
United States. The fiscal stability that had resulted from the 1905
receivership eroded under C�ceres's successor, Eladio Victoria y
Victoria; most of the increased outlays went to support military
campaigns against rebellious partisans, mainly in the Cibao. The
continued violence and instability prompted the administration of
President William H. Taft to dispatch a commission to Santo Domingo on
September 24, 1912, to mediate among the warring factions. The presence
of a 750-member force of United States Marines apparently convinced the
Dominicans of the seriousness of Washington's threats to intervene
directly in the conflict; Victoria agreed to step down in favor of a
neutral figure, Roman Catholic archbishop Adolfo Alejandro Nouel
Bobadilla. The archbishop assumed office as provisional president on
November 30.
Nouel proved unequal to the burden of national leadership. Unable to
mediate successfully between the ambitions of rival horacistas
and jimenistas, he stepped down on March 31, 1913. His
successor, Jos� Bordas Vald�s, was equally unable to restrain the
renewed outbreak of hostilities. Once again, Washington took a direct
hand and mediated a resolution. The rebellious horacistas
agreed to a cease-fire based on a pledge of United States oversight of
elections for members of local ayuntamientos and a constituent
assembly that would draft the procedures for presidential balloting. The
process, however, was flagrantly manipulated and resulted in Bordas's
reelection on June 15, 1914. Both horacistas and jimenistas
took offense at this blatant maneuver and rose up against Bordas.
The United States government, this time under President Woodrow
Wilson, again intervened. Where Taft had cajoled the combatants with a
clear intimation of military action, Wilson delivered an ultimatum:
elect a president or the United States will impose one. The Dominicans
accordingly selected Ram�n B�ez Machado as provisional president on
August 27, 1914. Comparatively fair presidential elections held on
October 25 returned Jim�nez to the presidency. Despite his victory,
however, Jim�nez felt impelled to appoint leaders and prominent members
of the various political factions to positions in his government in an
effort to broaden its support. The internecine conflicts that resulted
had quite the opposite effect, weakening the government and the
president and emboldening Secretary of War Desiderio Arias to take
control of both the armed forces and the Congress, which he compelled to
impeach Jim�nez for violation of the constitution and the laws.
Although the United States ambassador offered military support to his
government, Jim�nez opted to step down on May 7, 1916.
Arias never formally assumed the presidency. The United States
government had apparently tired of its recurring role as mediator and
had decided to take more direct action. United States forces had already
occupied Haiti by this time. The initial military
administrator of Haiti, Rear Admiral William Caperton, had actually
forced Arias to retreat from Santo Domingo by threatening the city with
naval bombardment on May 13. The first Marines landed three days later.
Although they established effective control of the country within two
months, the United States forces did not proclaim a military government
until November. Most Dominican laws and institutions remained intact
under military rule, although the shortage of Dominicans willing to
serve in the cabinet forced the military governor, Rear Admiral Harry S.
Knapp, to fill a number of portfolios with United States naval officers.
The press and radio were censored for most of the occupation, and public
speech was limited.
The surface effects of the occupation were largely positive. The
Marines restored order throughout most of the republic (with the
exception of the eastern region); the country's budget was balanced, its
debt was diminished, and economic growth resumed; infrastructure
projects produced new roads that linked all the country's regions for
the first time in its history; a professional military organization, the
Dominican Constabulary Guard, replaced the partisan forces that had
waged a seemingly endless struggle for power. Most Dominicans,
however, greatly resented the loss of their sovereignty to foreigners,
few of whom spoke Spanish or displayed much real concern for the welfare
of the republic.
The most intense opposition to the occupation arose in the eastern
provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macor�s. From 1917 to 1921, the
United States forces battled a guerrilla movement in that area known as
the gavilleros. The guerrillas enjoyed considerable support
among the population, and they benefited from a superior knowledge of
the terrain. The movement survived the capture and the execution of its
leader, Vicente Evangelista, and some initially fierce encounters with
the Marines. However, the gavilleros eventually yielded to the
occupying forces' superior firepower, air power (a squadron of six
Curtis Jennies), and determined (often brutal) counterinsurgent methods.
After World War I, public opinion in the United States began to run
against the occupation. Warren G. Harding, who succeeded Wilson in March
1921, had campaigned against the occupations of both Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. In June 1921, United States representatives
presented a withdrawal proposal, known as the Harding Plan, which called
for Dominican ratification of all acts of the military government,
approval of a loan of US$2.5 million for public works and other
expenses, the acceptance of United States officers for the
constabulary--now known as the National Guard (Guardia Nacional)--and
the holding of elections under United States supervision. Popular
reaction to the plan was overwhelmingly negative. Moderate Dominican
leaders, however, used the plan as the basis for further negotiations
that resulted in an agreement allowing for the selection of a
provisional president to rule until elections could be organized. Under
the supervision of High Commissioner Sumner Welles, Juan Bautista Vicini
Burgos assumed the provisional presidency on October 21, 1922. In the
presidential election of March 15, 1924, Horacio V�squez Lajara handily
defeated Francisco J. Peynado. V�squez's Alliance Party (Partido
Alianza) also won a comfortable majority in both houses of Congress.
With his inauguration on July 13, control of the republic returned to
Dominican hands.
Dominican Republic - THE ERA OF TRUJILLO
The V�squez administration shines in Dominican history like a star
amid a gathering storm. After the country's eight years of subjugation,
V�squez took care to respect the political and civil rights of the
population. An upswing in the price of export commodities, combined with
increased government borrowing, buoyed the economy. Public works
projects proliferated. Santo Domingo expanded and modernized. This brief
period of progress, however, ended in the resurgent maelstrom of
Dominican political instability. The man who would come to occupy the
eye of this political cyclone was Rafael Trujillo.
Although a principled man by Dominican standards, V�squez was also a
product of long years of political infighting. In an effort to undercut
his primary rival, Federico Vel�squez, and to preserve power for his
own followers, the president agreed in 1927 to a prolongation of his
term from four to six years. There was some debatable legal basis for
the move, which was approved by the Congress, but its enactment
effectively invalidated the constitution of 1924 that V�squez had
previously sworn to uphold. Once the president had demonstrated his
willingness to disregard constitutional procedures in the pursuit of
power, some ambitious opponents decided that those procedures were no
longer binding. Dominican politics returned to their pre-occupation
status; the struggle among competing caudillos resumed.
Trujillo occupied a strong position in this contest. The commander of
the National Army (Ej�rcito Nacional, the new designation of the armed
force created under the occupation), Trujillo came from a humble
background. He had enlisted in the National Police in 1918, a time when
the upper-class Dominicans, who had formerly filled the officer corps,
largely refused to collaborate with the occupying forces. Trujillo
harbored no such scruples. He rose quickly in the officer corps, while
at the same time he built a network of allies and supporters. Unlike the
more idealistic North American sponsors of the constabulary, Trujillo
saw the armed force not for what it should have been--an apolitical
domestic security force--but for what it was: the main source of
concentrated power in the republic.
Having established his power base behind the scenes, Trujillo was
ready by 1930 to assume control of the country. Although elections were
scheduled for May, V�squez's extension in office cast doubt on their
potential fairness. (V�squez had also eliminated from the constitution
the prohibition against presidential reelection.) This uncertainty
prompted Rafael Estrella Ure�a, a political leader from Santiago, to
proclaim a revolution in February. Having already struck a deal with
Trujillo, Estrella marched on the capital; army forces remained in their
barracks as Trujillo declared his "neutrality" in the
situation. The ailing V�squez, a victim of duplicity and betrayal, fled
the capital. Estrella assumed the provisional presidency.
Part of the arrangement between Estrella and Trujillo apparently
involved the army commander's candidacy for president in the May
elections. As events unfolded, it became clear that Trujillo would be
the only candidate that the army would permit to participate; army
personnel harassed and intimidated electoral officials and eliminated
potential opponents. A dazed nation stood by as the new dictator
announced his election with 95 percent of the vote. After his
inauguration in August, and at his express request, the Congress issued
an official proclamation announcing the commencement of "the Era of
Trujillo."
The dictator proceeded to rule the country like a feudal lord for
thirty-one years. He held the office of president from 1930 to 1938 and
from 1942 to 1952. During the interim periods, he exercised absolute
power, while leaving the ceremonial affairs of state to puppet
presidents such as his brother, H�ctor Bienvenido Trujillo Molina, who
occupied the National Palace from 1952 to 1960, and Joaqu�n Balaguer
Ricardo, an intellectual and scholar who served from 1960 to 1961.
Although cast in the mold of old- time caudillos such as Santana and
Heureaux, Trujillo surpassed them in efficiency, rapacity, and utter
ruthlessness. Like Heureaux, he maintained a highly effective secret
police force that monitored (and eliminated, in some instances)
opponents both at home and abroad. Like Santana, he relied on the
military as his primary support. Armed forces personnel received
generous pay and perquisites under his rule, and their ranks and
equipment inventories expanded. Trujillo maintained control over the
officer corps through fear, patronage, and the frequent rotation of
assignments, which inhibited the development of strong personal
followings. The other leading
beneficiaries of the dictatorship--aside from Trujillo himself and his
family--were those who associated themselves with the regime both
politically and economically. The establishment of state monopolies over
all major enterprises in the country brought riches to the Trujillos and
their cronies through the manipulation of prices and inventories as well
as the outright embezzlement of funds.
Generally speaking, the quality of life improved for the average
Dominican under Trujillo. Poverty persisted, but the economy expanded,
the foreign debt disappeared, the currency remained stable, and the
middle class expanded. Public works projects enhanced the road system
and improved port facilities; airports and public buildings were
constructed, the public education system grew, and illiteracy declined.
These advances might well have been achieved in even greater measure
under a responsive democratic government, but to Dominicans, who had no
experience with such a government, the results under Trujillo were
impressive. Although he never tested his personal popularity in a free
election, some observers feel that Trujillo could have won a majority of
the popular vote up until the final years of his dictatorship.
Ideologically, Trujillo leaned toward fascism. The trappings of his
personality cult (Santo Domingo was renamed Ciudad Trujillo under his
rule), the size and architectural mediocrity of his building projects,
and the level of repressive control exercised by the state all invited
comparison with the style of his contemporaries, Hitler in Germany and
Mussolini in Italy. Basically, however, Trujillo was not an ideologue,
but a Dominican caudillo expanded to monstrous proportions by his
absolute control of the nation's resources. His attitude toward
communism tended toward peaceful coexistence until 1947, when the Cold
War winds from Washington persuaded him to crack down and to outlaw the
Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano--PCD). As
always, self-interest and the need to maintain his personal power guided
Trujillo's actions.
Although conspiracies--both real and imagined--against his rule
preoccupied Trujillo throughout his reign, it was his adventurous
foreign policy that drew the ire of other governments and led directly
to his downfall. Paradoxically, his most heinous action in this arena
cost him the least in terms of influence and support. In October 1937,
Trujillo ordered the massacre of Haitians living in the Dominican
Republic in retaliation for the discovery and execution by the Haitian
government of his most valued covert agents in that country. The
Dominican army slaughtered as many as 20,000 largely unarmed men, women,
and children, mostly in border areas, but also in the western Cibao.
News of the atrocity filtered out of the country slowly; when it reached
the previously supportive administration of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt in the United States, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded
internationally mediated negotiations for a settlement and indemnity.
Trujillo finally agreed. The negotiations, however, fixed a ludicrously
low indemnity of US$750,000, which was later reduced to US$525,000 by
agreement between the two governments. Although the affair damaged
Trujillo's international image, it did not result in any direct efforts
by the United States or by other countries to force him from power.
In later years, the Trujillo regime became increasingly isolated from
the governments of other nations. This isolation compounded the
dictator's paranoia, prompting him to increase his foreign
interventionism. To be sure, Trujillo did have cause to resent the
leaders of certain foreign nations, such as Cuba's Fidel Castro Ruz, who
aided a small, abortive invasion attempt by dissident Dominicans in
1959. Trujillo, however, expressed greater concern over Venezuela's
President R�mulo Betancourt (1959-64). An established and outspoken
opponent of Trujillo, Betancourt had been associated with some
individual Dominicans who had plotted against the dictator. Trujillo
developed an obsessive personal hatred of Betancourt and supported
numerous plots of Venezuelan exiles to overthrow him. This pattern of
intervention led the Venezuelan government to take its case against
Trujillo to the Organization of American States (OAS). This development
infuriated Trujillo, who ordered his foreign agents to assassinate
Betancourt. The attempt, on June 24, 1960, injured, but did not kill,
the Venezuelan president. The incident inflamed world opinion against
Trujillo. The members of the OAS, expressing this outrage, voted
unanimously to sever diplomatic relations and to impose economic
sanctions on the Dominican Republic.
The firestorm surrounding the Betancourt incident provoked a review
of United States policy toward the Dominican Republic by the
administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The United States had
long tolerated Trujillo as a bulwark of stability in the Caribbean; some
in Washington still saw him as a desirable counterforce to the Castro
regime. Others, however, saw in Trujillo another Fulgencio Batista--the
dictator Castro deposed in 1959--ripe for overthrow by radical,
potentially communist, forces. Public opinion in the United States also
began to run strongly against the Dominican dictatorship. In August
1960, the United States embassy in Santo Domingo was downgraded to
consular level. According to journalist Bernard Diederich, Eisenhower
also asked the National Security Council's Special Group (the
organization responsible for approving covert operations) to consider
the initiation of operations aimed at Trujillo's ouster. On May 30,
1961, Trujillo was assassinated. According to Diederich, the United
States Central Intelligence Agency supplied the weapons used by the
assassins.
Dominican Republic - THE POST-TRUJILLO ERA
Transition to Elected Government
At the time of his assassination, Trujillo was seventy years old. He
had left no designated successor. It soon became clear that the
conspirators had planned his assassination more thoroughly than the
subsequent seizure of government, which never took place. Puppet
President Balaguer remained in office, allowing the late dictator's son,
Rafael Trujillo Lovat�n (also called Rafael, Jr., or Ramfis), to return
from Paris and assume de facto control. Ramfis lacked the dynamism of
his father, however, and he eventually fell into a dispute with his two
uncles over potential liberalization of the regime. The "wicked
uncles"--H�ctor and Jos� Arismendi Trujillo Molina--returned to
the republic from exile in November 1961. Ramfis, having little
enthusiasm for a power struggle, fled the country.
Opposition from Washington, made very plain by the deployment of
United States warships off the Dominican coast, blunted the ambitions of
the uncles and forced them to resume their exile only days later.
Balaguer retained the presidency. As a prot�g� of the fallen dictator,
however, he had neither a power base nor a popular following. Popular
unrest, punctuated by a general strike, forced Balaguer to share power
with a seven-member Council of State, established on January 1, 1962.
The council included Balaguer and the two surviving assassins of
Trujillo, Antonio Imbert Barrera and Luis Amiama T�o (the others having
been slain by Trujillo's security service). The council lasted only
sixteen days, however, before air force general Pedro Rodr�guez
Echavarr�a overthrew it in a coup d'�tat. Rodr�guez's attempt at rule
also foundered on the rocks of popular protest and opposition from the
United States. Less senior officers seized the general, deported him,
and restored the council minus Balaguer, who had also been exiled.
The restored Council of State guided the country until elections
could be organized. The leading candidates were Juan Bosch Gavi�o, a
scholar and poet, who had organized the opposition Dominican
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD) in exile,
and Viriato Fiallo of the National Civic Union (Uni�n C�vica
Nacional--UCN). In the balloting of December 20, 1963, the conservative
image of the UCN and its association with the country's economic elite
benefited Bosch, whose support came mainly from the urban lower class.
Bosch won the election with 64 percent of the vote; the PRD also
captured two-thirds majorities in both houses of the legislature.
The Bosch administration was very much an oddity in Dominican history
up to that point: a freely elected, liberal, democratic government that
expressed concern for the welfare of all Dominicans, particularly those
of modest circumstances, those whose voices had never really been heard
before in the National Palace. The 1963 constitution separated church
and state, guaranteed civil and individual rights, and endorsed civilian
control of the military. These and other changes, such as land reform,
struck conservative landholders and military officers as radical and
threatening, particularly when juxtaposed against three decades of
somnolent authoritarianism under Trujillo. The hierarchy of the Roman
Catholic Church also resented the secular nature of the new
constitution, in particular its provision for legalized divorce. The
hierarchy, along with the military leadership and the economic elite,
also feared communist influence in the republic, and they warned of the
potential for "another Cuba." The result of this concern and
opposition was a military coup on September 25, 1963.
Dominican Republic - Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965
A fractious campaign ensued between the country's two leading
political figures: Bosch and Balaguer. Bosch's appeal was tempered by
fear; many Dominicans felt that his reelection would rekindle the
violence of April 1965. This trepidation aided Balaguer, who also
appealed to conservative voting sectors such as peasants, women
(considered to be more religious than men), and businesspeople. Balaguer
thus won handily, garnering 57 percent of the vote in balloting held
July 1, 1966. His Reformist Party (Partido Reformista--PR) also captured
majorities in the Congress.
Balaguer went on to serve as president for twelve years. A relative
nonentity under Trujillo, he demonstrated, once in power, the astuteness
with which he had studied the techniques of the late dictator. Even
though as a conservative he theoretically was more secure against
military machinations, he actively sought to head off opposition from
the armed forces by rewarding officers loyal to him, purging those he
suspected, and rotating everyone's assignments on a regular and frequent
basis. He curtailed nonmilitary opposition through selective (compared
to the Trujillo years) repression by the National Police. His reelection
in 1970 and in 1974 was accomplished largely through intimidation. The
PRD, the only viable, broad-based opposition party, boycotted both
elections to safeguard the well-being of those who would have been their
candidates.
The Dominican economy expanded at a record rate under Balaguer.
Favorable international prices for sugar provided the basis for this
so-called Dominican miracle. Foreign investment, foreign borrowing,
foreign aid, the growth of tourism, and extensive public works programs
also contributed to high levels of growth. By the late 1970s, however,
the expansion had slowed considerably as sugar prices dipped and oil
prices rose. Rising inflation and unemployment diminished support for
the government, particularly among the middle class.
The PRD, feeling the mood of the population and sensing support from
the administration of United States president Jimmy Carter, nominated
Silvestre Antonio Guzm�n Fern�ndez to oppose Balaguer in the elections
of May 16, 1978. A relatively heavy 70 percent turnout seemed to favor
the PRD; early returns confirmed this as Guzm�n built a sizable lead.
Early in the morning of May 17, however, military units occupied the
Central Electoral Board and impounded the ballots. Clearly, Balaguer was
attempting to nullify the balloting or to falsify the results in his
favor. Only forceful remonstrances by the Carter administration, backed
up by a naval deployment, moved Balaguer to allow the resumption of the
vote count. Two weeks later, Guzm�n's victory was officially announced.
Dominican Republic - Antonio Guzm�n, 1978-82
Guzm�n's assumption of office on August 16, 1978, presented many
political challenges to both him and the republic. Mindful of the fate
of Juan Bosch sixteen years before, Guzm�n determined to move slowly in
the area of social and economic reforms and to deal as directly as
possible with the threat of political pressure from the armed forces. He
attacked the latter problem first with a program of military
depoliticization that included the removal or the reassignment of
general officers of questionable loyalty or professionalism, the
promotion of younger and more apolitical officers than those who had
held sway under Balaguer, and the institution of a formal training
course for officers and enlisted personnel that stressed the
nonpolitical role of the armed forces in a democratic society. This
campaign was largely successful, and it constituted the major legacy
left by Guzm�n to his successor, Salvador Jorge Blanco.
Politically, Guzm�n was restrained to some extent by the unusual
outcome of the 1978 elections. Although the Central Electoral Board
acknowledged the PRD's victories in the races for the presidency and the
Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Congress), it managed through
some creative counting--apparently taking the number of ballots not used
in some provinces and dividing them among the top two vote-getters--to
give Balaguer's PR a sixteen to eleven majority in the Senate. This
essentially granted the PR a legislative veto over any initiatives Guzm�n
might wish to launch, and it also became a factor in the president's
cautious approach to reform.
Some observers felt that Guzm�n's economic and social background--he
was a wealthy cattle rancher from the Santiago area--influenced his
economic policies as well. Despite his nationalization of public
transportation and an increase in the minimum wage, more reform-minded
politicians, even within his own party, criticized the president for his
inadequate response to continued economic decline. Jorge was one of Guzm�n's
leading critics in this area; ironically, he too, would be confronted
with the stark realities of the economy and the lack of acceptable
options available to the president after his own election in 1982. Faced with the continually rising
oil prices and declining sugar prices, Guzm�n opted for politically
unpopular austerity policies, including a steep increase in the retail
price of gasoline. Compounding to the general woes of a slowed economy
was the extensive damage wreaked on the country by Hurricane David in
August 1979.
In retrospect, the Guzm�n administration represented a bridge
between lingering post-Trujillo authoritarianism and a more liberal,
democratic style of politics and government. Guzm�n's
professionalization of the military was a significant contribution to
this process. Although the Dominican economic situation plagued him,
Guzm�n handled matters with sufficient competence to allow for the
election of Jorge on the PRD ticket on May 16, 1982. (Guzm�n had
pledged not to seek reelection.) Jorge's leading opponents had been PR
candidate Balaguer and Bosch, who had split from the PRD and had formed
his own party, the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberaci�n
Dominicana--PLD). For reasons never fully explained, Guzm�n committed
suicide in July 1982; he was said to have been depressed by allegations
of corruption and nepotism in his administration. His vice president,
Jacobo Majluta Azar, served out the remainder of the term. Guzm�n's
suicide prevented what would have been a historic event--the peaceful
transfer of power from one freely and fairly elected president to
another. Jorge's administration also fell victim to corruption and the
effects of economic austerity. With the election and peaceful return to
power of Balaguer in 1986, a tradition of fair electoral competition
appeared to be developing; democracy seemed to be taking root in the
Dominican Republic.
