THE CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES, institutions, and problems of Chad are
the outgrowth of historical traditions and tendencies that have evolved
over more than 1,000 years. The country is populated by diverse, yet in
many cases, interrelated peoples whose evolution was characterized by
intersecting migrations, splinterings, and regroupings. Most of the
country's population groups originated in areas generally north and east
of Chad's present-day boundaries.
Chad's geographic position along major trans-Saharan trade routes has
also affected its historical development. In early times, trade
consisted of goods and slaves seized in raids on groups in the south.
Consolidations of small chiefdoms led to the evolution of a series of
kingdoms and empires in the central region, of which the most important
were Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, and Wadai. The kingdoms and empires based
their power on, and were ultimately subjected to, raids or the payment
of tribute. Although there were early communities in both northern and
southern Chad, most of the country's known history is focused on the
Muslim peoples of the central region.
The political fortunes of the various kingdoms and empires were
constantly affected by internal factionalism and external invasion-
-factors that still influenced political affairs in the 1970s and 1980s.
Political disintegration was evident in both Borno and Bagirmi when the
French arrived in the late nineteenth century. The rulers of Wadai
resisted the French advance. The leaders of Borno and Bagirmi, however,
regarded the French less as conquerors than as a counterbalance to the
ascendant Wadai.
The French declared the central portion of the country officially
pacified in 1924 and had begun administering much of the non-Muslim
south before that. In many respects, the nomadic northern groups have
never been subjugated, and turmoil in the north persisted in the 1980s.
After 1905 the central and northern areas were administered as a
territory in the federation of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique
Equatoriale Fran�aise--AEF). French interest, however, focused on other
territories in the federation, and until after World War II, the French
presence had little impact on the life of the average inhabitant. The
French limited implementation of their administrative policy primarily
to urban areas and their compulsory agricultural programs to what
constitutes the south of present-day Chad. Participation by the local
population in the colonial administration was marginal, and until the
mid-1950s the educational opportunities prerequisite for such
participation were practically nonexistent.
After World War II, representative institutions were introduced, and
the growth of party politics began. Political groupings reflected
domestic political developments in France and traditional ethnic
factionalism in Chad. Short-lived political coalitions and party
splinterings were commonplace. When Chad achieved independence in 1960,
southerners--the group most exposed to the French
administrators--dominated political life. These southerners were led by
President Fran�ois Tombalbaye, who made only halfhearted efforts at
regional integration in government and who generally repressed
opposition. Within five years of having taken office, Tombalbaye's
heavy-handed approach had alienated a large segment of the population,
especially northerners and easterners, and had spurred rebellions. The
most prominent of the northern rebel groups was the National Liberation
Front of Chad (Front de Lib�ration Nationale du Tchad--FROLINAT), an
umbrella organization formed in 1966. Over the years, FROLINAT went
through a series of transformations and fragmentations. Nonetheless, by
the mid-1970s rebel activity, in conjunction with Tombalbaye's political
ineptitude, helped bring about the government's downfall. Tombalbaye was
killed in 1975 during a military coup d'�tat led by F�lix Malloum.
The new government, however, had no more success than its predecessor
in halting rebel activity. In 1979 Hissein Habr�, a northern rebel
leader, ousted Malloum. Throughout the 1980s, the quest for political
control changed from a north-south struggle to a primarily northern
intraregional conflict. The turmoil of the late 1970s and 1980s had
international and domestic aspects, as Libya, France, the United States,
and many African nations became involved in the Chadian imbroglio. By
early 1988, stability had been restored, but inter- and intraethnic
differences, as well as regional divisions, continued to threaten Chad's
progress toward national integration.
Chad - PREHISTORY
The Kanem Empire originated in the ninth century A.D. to the
northeast of Lake Chad. It was formed from a confederation of nomadic
peoples who spoke languages of the Teda- Daza (Toubou) group. One
theory, based on early Arabic sources, suggests that the dominance of
the Zaghawa people bound the confederation together. But local oral
traditions omit the Zaghawa and refer instead to a legendary Arab, Sayf
ibn Dhi Yazan--believed by some to have been a Yemeni-- who assumed
leadership of the Magoumi clan and began the Sayfawa dynastic lineage.
Historians agree that the leaders of the new state were ancestors of the
Kanembu people. The leaders adopted the title mai, or king, and
their subjects regarded them as divine.
One factor that influenced the formation of states in Chad was the
penetration of Islam during the tenth century. Arabs migrating from the
north and east brought the new religion. Toward the end of the eleventh
century, the Sayfawa king, Mai Humai, converted to Islam. (Some
historians believe that it was Humai rather than Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan who
established the Sayfawa lineage as the ruling dynasty of Kanem.) Islam
offered the Sayfawa rulers the advantages of new ideas from Arabia and
the Mediterranean world, as well as literacy in administration. But many
people resisted the new religion in favor of traditional beliefs and
practices. When Humai converted, for example, it is believed that the
Zaghawa broke from the empire and moved east. This pattern of conflict
and compromise with Islam occurs repeatedly in Chadian history.
Prior to the twelfth century, the nomadic Sayfawa confederation
expanded southward into Kanem (the word for "south" in the
Teda language). By the thirteenth century, Kanem's rule expanded. At the
same time, the Kanembu people became more sedentary and established a
capital at Njimi, northeast of Lake Chad. Even though the Kanembu were
becoming more sedentary, Kanem's rulers continued to travel frequently
throughout the kingdom to remind the herders and farmers of the
government's power and to allow them to demonstrate their allegiance by
paying tribute.
Kanem's expansion peaked during the long and energetic reign of Mai
Dunama Dabbalemi (ca. 1221-59). Dabbalemi initiated diplomatic exchanges
with sultans in North Africa and apparently arranged for the
establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate pilgrimages to
Mecca. During Dabbalemi's reign, the Fezzan region (in present-day
Libya) fell under Kanem's authority, and the empire's influence extended
westward to Kano, eastward to Wadai, and southward to the Adamawa
grasslands (in present-day Cameroon). Portraying these boundaries on
maps can be misleading, however, because the degree of control extended
in ever-weakening gradations from the core of the empire around Njimi to
remote peripheries, from which allegiance and tribute were usually only
symbolic. Moreover, cartographic lines are static and misrepresent the
mobility inherent in nomadism and migration, which were common. The
loyalty of peoples and their leaders was more important in governance
than the physical control of territory.
Dabbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with
authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, tempted
military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus
transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty to the
mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dabbalemi was able
to suppress this tendency, but after his death, dissension among his
sons weakened the Sayfawa Dynasty. Dynastic feuds degenerated into civil
war, and Kanem's outlying peoples soon ceased paying tribute.
By the end of the fourteenth century, internal struggles and external
attacks had torn Kanem apart. Between 1376 and 1400, six mais
reigned, but Bulala invaders (from the area around Lake Fitri to the
east) killed five of them. This proliferation of mais resulted
in numerous claimants to the throne and led to a series of internecine
wars. Finally, around 1396 the Bulala forced Mai Umar Idrismi to abandon
Njimi and move the Kanembu people to Borno on the western edge of Lake
Chad. Over time, the intermarriage of the Kanembu and Borno peoples
created a new people and language, the Kanuri.
But even in Borno, the Sayfawa Dynasty's troubles persisted. During
the first three-quarters of the fifteenth century, for example, fifteen mais
occupied the throne. Then, around 1472 Mai Ali Dunamami defeated his
rivals and began the consolidation of Borno. He built a fortified
capital at Ngazargamu, to the west of Lake Chad (in present-day Niger),
the first permanent home a Sayfawa mai had enjoyed in a
century. So successful was the Sayfawa rejuvenation that by the early
sixteenth century the Bulala were defeated and Njimi retaken. The
empire's leaders, however, remained at Ngazargamu because its lands were
more productive agriculturally and better suited to the raising of
cattle.
Kanem-Borno peaked during the reign of the outstanding statesman Mai
Idris Aluma (ca. 1571-1603). Aluma (also spelled Alooma) is remembered
for his military skills, administrative reforms, and Islamic piety. His
main adversaries were the Hausa to the west, the Tuareg and Toubou to
the north, and the Bulala to the east. One epic poem extols his
victories in 330 wars and more than 1,000 battles. His innovations
included the employment of fixed military camps (with walls); permanent
sieges and "scorched earth" tactics, where soliders burned
everything in their path; armored horses and riders; and the use of
Berber camelry, Kotoko boatmen, and iron-helmeted musketeers trained by
Turkish military advisers. His active diplomacy featured relations with
Tripoli, Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire, which sent a 200-member
ambassadorial party across the desert to Aluma's court at Ngazargamu.
Aluma also signed what was probably the first written treaty or
cease-fire in Chadian history. (Like many cease-fires negotiated in the
1970s and 1980s, it was promptly broken.)
Aluma introduced a number of legal and administrative reforms based
on his religious beliefs and Islamic law (sharia). He sponsored the
construction of numerous mosques and made a pilgrimage to Mecca, where
he arranged for the establishment of a hostel to be used by pilgrims
from his empire. As with other dynamic politicians, Aluma's reformist
goals led him to seek loyal and competent advisers and allies, and he
frequently relied on slaves who had been educated in noble homes. Aluma
regularly sought advice from a council composed of heads of the most
important clans. He required major political figures to live at the
court, and he reinforced political alliances through appropriate
marriages (Aluma himself was the son of a Kanuri father and a Bulala
mother).
Kanem-Borno under Aluma was strong and wealthy. Government revenue
came from tribute (or booty, if the recalcitrant people had to be
conquered), sales of slaves, and duties on and participation in
trans-Saharan trade. Unlike West Africa, the Chadian region did not have
gold. Still, it was central to one of the most convenient trans-Saharan
routes. Between Lake Chad and Fezzan lay a sequence of well-spaced wells
and oases, and from Fezzan there were easy connections to North Africa
and the Mediterranean Sea. Many products were sent north, including
natron (sodium carbonate), cotton, kola nuts, ivory, ostrich feathers,
perfume, wax, and hides, but the most important of all were slaves.
Imports included salt, horses, silks, glass, muskets, and copper.
Aluma took a keen interest in trade and other economic matters. He is
credited with having the roads cleared, designing better boats for Lake
Chad, introducing standard units of measure for grain, and moving
farmers into new lands. In addition, he improved the ease and security
of transit through the empire with the goal of making it so safe that
"a lone woman clad in gold might walk with none to fear but
God."
The administrative reforms and military brilliance of Aluma sustained
the empire until the mid-1600s, when its power began to fade. By the
late 1700s, Borno rule extended only westward, into the land of the
Hausa. Around that time, Fulani people, invading from the west, were
able to make major inroads into Borno. By the early nineteenth century,
Kanem-Borno was clearly an empire in decline, and in 1808 Fulani
warriors conquered Ngazargamu. Usman dan Fodio led the Fulani thrust and
proclaimed a jihad (holy war) on the irreligious Muslims of the area.
His campaign eventually affected Kanem-Borno and inspired a trend toward
Islamic orthodoxy. But Muhammad al Kanem contested the Fulani advance.
Kanem was a Muslim scholar and non-Sayfawa warlord who had put together
an alliance of Shuwa Arabs, Kanembu, and other seminomadic peoples. He
eventually built a capital at Kukawa (in present-day Nigeria). Sayfawa mais
remained titular monarchs until 1846. In that year, the last mai,
in league with Wadai tribesmen, precipitated a civil war. It was at that
point that Kanem's son, Umar, became king, thus ending one of the
longest dynastic reigns in regional history.
Although the dynasty ended, the kingdom of Kanem-Borno survived. But
Umar, who eschewed the title mai for the simpler designation shehu
(from the Arabic "shaykh"), could not match his father's
vitality and gradually allowed the kingdom to be ruled by advisers (wazirs).
Borno began to decline, as a result of administrative disorganization,
regional particularism, and attacks by the militant Wadai Empire to the
east. The decline continued under Umar's sons, and in 1893 Rabih
Fadlallah, leading an invading army from eastern Sudan, conquered Borno.
Chad - Bagirmi and Wadai
In addition to Kanem-Borno, two other states in the region, Bagirmi
and Wadai, achieved historical prominence. The kingdom of Bagirmi
emerged to the southeast of Kanem-Borno in the sixteenth century. Under
the reign of Abdullah IV (1568-98), Islam was adopted, and the state
became a sultanate, using judicial and administrative procedures. Later,
a palace and court were constructed in the capital city of Massenya.
Bagirmi's political history was a function of its strength and unity
in relation to its larger neighbors. Absorbed into KanemBorno during the
reign of Aluma, Bagirmi broke free later in the 1600s, only to be
returned to tributary status in the mid-1700s. During periods of
strength, the sultanate became imperialistic. It established control
over small feudal kingdoms on its peripheries and entered into alliances
with nearby nomadic peoples. Early in the nineteenth century, Bagirmi
fell into decay and was threatened militarily by the nearby kingdom of
Wadai. Although Bagirmi resisted, it accepted tributary status in order
to obtain help from Wadai in putting down internal dissension. When
Rabih Fadlallah's forces burned Massenya in 1893, the twenty-fifth
sultan, Abd ar Rahman Gwaranga, sought and received protectorate status
from the French.
Located northeast of Bagirmi, Wadai was a non-Muslim kingdom that
emerged in the sixteenth century as an offshoot of the state of Darfur
(in present-day Sudan). Early in the seventeenth century, the Maba and
other small groups in the region rallied to the Islamic banner of Abd al
Karim, who led an invasion from the east and overthrew the ruling Tunjur
group. Abd al Karim established a dynasty and sultanate that lasted
until the arrival of the French. During much of the eighteenth century,
Wadai resisted reincorporation into Darfur.
In about 1800, during the reign of Sabun, the sultanate of Wadai
began to expand its power. A new trade route north--via Ennedi, Al
Kufrah, and Benghazi--was discovered, and Sabun outfitted royal caravans
to take advantage of it. He began minting his own coinage and imported
chain mail, firearms, and military advisers from North Africa. Sabun's
successors were less able than he, and Darfur took advantage of a
disputed political succession in 1838 to put its own candidate in power
in Wara, the capital of Wadai. This tactic backfired, however, when
Darfur's choice, Muhammad Sharif, rejected Darfur's meddling and
asserted his own authority. In doing so, he gained acceptance from
Wadai's various factions and went on to become Wadai's ablest ruler.
Sharif conducted military campaigns as far west as Borno and
eventually established Wadai's hegemony over Bagirmi and kingdoms as far
away as the Chari River. In Mecca, Sharif had met the founder of the
Sanusiyya Islamic brotherhood, a movement that was strong among the
inhabitants of Cyrenaica (in present-day Libya) and that was to become a
dominant political force and source of resistance to French
colonization. Indeed, the militaristic Wadai opposed French domination
until well into the twentieth century.
Chad - FRENCH AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
European interest in Africa generally grew during the nineteenth
century. By 1887 France, motivated by the search for wealth, had driven
inland from its settlements on central Africa's west coast to claim the
territory of Ubangi-Chari (present-day Central African Republic). It
claimed this area as a zone of French influence, and within two years it
occupied part of what is now southern Chad. In the early 1890s, French
military expeditions sent to Chad encountered the forces of Rabih
Fadlallah, who had been conducting slave raids (razzias) in
southern Chad throughout the 1890s and had sacked the settlements of
Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, and Wadai. After years of indecisive engagements,
French forces finally defeated Rabih Fadlallah at the Battle of Kouss�ri
in 1900.
Two fundamental themes dominated Chad's colonial experience with the
French: an absence of policies designed to unify the territory and an
exceptionally slow pace of modernization. In the French scale of
priorities, the colony of Chad ranked near the bottom; it was less
important than non-African territories, North Africa, West Africa, or
even the other French possessions in Central Africa. The French came to
perceive Chad primarily as a source of raw cotton and untrained labor to
be used in the more productive colonies to the south. Within Chad there
was neither the will nor the resources to do much more than maintain a
semblance of law and order. In fact, even this basic function of
governance was often neglected; throughout the colonial period, large
areas of Chad were never governed effectively from N'Djamena (called
FortLamy prior to September 1973).
Chad was linked in 1905 with three French colonies to the
south--Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo (present-day Congo), and Gabon. But
Chad did not receive separate colony status or a unified administrative
policy until 1920. The four colonies were administered together as
French Equatorial Africa under the direction of a governor general
stationed in Brazzaville. The governor general had broad administrative
control over the federation, including external and internal security,
economic and financial affairs, and all communications with the French
minister of the colonies. Lieutenant governors, also appointed by the
French government, were expected to implement in each colony the orders
of the governor general. The central administration in Brazzaville
tightly controlled the lieutenant governors despite reformist efforts
toward decentralization between 1910 and 1946. Chad's lieutenant
governor had greater autonomy because of the distance from Brazzaville
and because of France's much greater interest in the other three
colonies.
The lines of control from Brazzaville, feeble as they may have been,
were still stronger than those from N'Djamena to its hinterland. In the
huge Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, the handful of French military
administrators soon reached a tacit agreement with the inhabitants of
the desert; as long as caravan trails remained relatively secure and
minimal levels of law and order were met, the military administration
(headquartered in Faya Largeau) usually left the people alone. In central Chad, French rule was only slightly more substantive.
In Ouadda� and Biltine prefectures, endemic resistance continued
against the French and, in some cases, against any authority that
attempted to suppress banditry and brigandage. The thinly staffed
colonial administration provided only weak supervision over arid Kanem
Prefecture and the sparsely populated areas of Gu�ra and Salamat
prefectures. Old-fashioned razzias continued in the 1920s, and
it was reported in 1923 that a group of Senegalese Muslims on their way
to Mecca had been seized and sold into slavery. Unwilling to expend the
resources required for effective administration, the French government
responded with sporadic coercion and a growing reliance on indirect rule
through the sultanates.
France managed to govern effectively only the south, but until 1946
administrative direction came from Bangui in Ubangi-Chari rather than
N'Djamena. Unlike northern and central Chad, a French colonial system of
direct civilian administration was set up among the Sara, a southern
ethnic group, and their neighbors. Also, unlike the rest of Chad, a
modest level of economic development occurred in the south because of
the introduction in 1929 of largescale cotton production. Remittances and pensions to southerners who served in the
French military also enhanced economic well-being.
But even the advantages of more income, schools, and roads failed to
win popular support for the French in the south. In addition to earlier
grievances, such as forced porterage (which claimed thousands of lives)
and village relocation, southern farmers resented the mandatory quotas
for the production of cotton, which France purchased at artificially low
prices. Governmentprotected chiefs further abused this situation. The
chiefs were resented all the more because they were generally the
artificial creations of the French in a region of previously stateless
societies. This commonality of treatment and the colonial organizational
framework began to create during this period a sense of Sara ethnicity
among persons whose collective identities had previously been limited to
small kinship groups.
Although France had put forth considerable effort during the conquest
of Chad, the ensuing administration of the territory was halfhearted.
Officials in the French colonial service resisted assignments to Chad,
so posts often went to novices or to out-of- favor officials. One
historian of France's empire has concluded that it was almost impossible
to be too demented or depraved to be considered unfit for duty in Chad.
Still, major scandals occurred periodically, and many of the posts
remained vacant. In 1928, for example, 42 percent of the Chadian
subdivisions lacked official administrators.
An event occurred in 1935 that was to have far-reaching consequences
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In that year, the French colonial
administration negotiated a border adjustment with Italy, Libya's
colonial master. The adjustment would have relocated the Libyan-Chad
boundary about 100 kilometers south across the Aozou Strip. Although the
French legislature never ratified the agreement, the negotiations formed
part of the basis of Libya's claim to the area decades later.
Chad - DECOLONIZATION POLITICS
In 1940 Chad became internationally prominent when its lieutenant
governor, F�lix Ebou�, led the rest of the AEF federation to support
Free France under Charles de Gaulle rather than the government of Vichy
France. Chad became the base for Colonel Jacques Leclerc's conquest of
the Fezzan (1940-43), and the entire episode became the basis of an
enduring sentimental bond between the France of de Gaulle's generation
and Chad. More funds and attention flowed to Chad than ever before, and
Ebou� became the governor general of the entire AEF in November 1941.
Born in French Guiana of mixed African and European parentage, Ebou�
was keenly interested in the problems of cultural dislocation resulting
from unchecked modernization in Africa. He worked to return authority to
authentic traditional leaders while training them in modern
administrative techniques. He recognized a place for African
middle-class professionals in cities, but he opposed the migration of
workers to cities, supporting instead the creation of integrated rural
industries where workers could remain with their families. When Ebou�
died in 1944, the AEF lost a major source of progressive ideas, and Chad
lost a leader with considerable influence in France.
French voters rejected many of the progressive ideas of Ebou� and
others after the war ended. Nevertheless, the constitution that was
approved in 1946 granted Chad and other African colonies the right to
elect a territorial assembly with limited powers. The Assembly in turn
elected delegates to the French General Council of all the AEF. The position of governor general was redesignated
high commissioner, and each territory gained the right to elect
representatives to French parliamentary bodies, including the National
Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and the Assembly of the French
Union. The African peoples became French citizens, and the colonies were
designated overseas territories of France. But the real locus of
authority remained in Paris, and French personnel continued to dominate
the AEF's administration. No formal attempt was made to train Chadian
Africans for civil service positions before 1955.
Until the early 1950s, political forces originating in France
dominated the development of politics in Chad. Local elections were won
largely by members of the Chadian Democratic Union (Union D�mocratique
Tchadienne--UDT), which was associated with a political party in France,
the Assembly of French People. The UDT represented French commercial
interests and a bloc of traditional leaders composed primarily of Muslim
and Ouadda�an nobility. Chad's European community initiated the
practice of using the civil service for partisan political ends; African
civil servants who were identified with organizations opposed to the UDT
soon found themselves dismissed or transferred to distant posts. For
example, Fran�ois Tombalbaye (later to become president) lost his job
as a teacher and ended up making bricks by hand because of his union
activities and his role in the opposition Chadian Progressive Party
(Parti Progressiste Tchadien--PPT).
Nonetheless, by 1953 politics were becoming less European dominated,
and the PPT was emerging as the major rival of the UDT. The leader of
the PPT was Gabriel Lisette, a black colonial administrator born in
Panama and posted to Chad in 1946. Elected as a deputy to the French
National Assembly, Lisette was later chosen as secretary general of the
African Democratic Assembly (Rassemblement D�mocratique Africain--RDA),
an interterritorial, Marxist-oriented party considered quite radical at
the time. The PPT originated as a territorial branch of the RDA and
rapidly became the political vehicle of the country's non-Muslim
intellectuals. Traditional rulers perceived the PPT to be antithetical
to their interests and recognized that the local territorial assembly
could adversely affect their revenue and power. These factors persuaded
traditional rulers to become more active in the UDT, which, because of
internal divisions, had changed its name in the late 1950s to the
Chadian Social Action (Action Sociale Tchadienne--AST).
Although party names changed frequently and dramatic factional
schisms occurred throughout the 1950s, electoral competition was
essentially between three political blocs: the UDT [AST], the PPT, and
the allies of Ahmed Koulamallah from Chari-Baguirmi and Kanem
prefectures. A clever politician and charismatic leader of the Tijaniyya
Islamic brotherhood in Chad, Koulamallah campaigned in different times
and places as a member of the Bagirmi nobility (he was an estranged son
of the sultan), a radical socialist leader, or a militant Muslim
fundamentalist. As a result, politics in the 1950s was a struggle
between the south, which mostly supported the PPT, and the Muslim sahelian
belt, which favored the UDT [AST]. Koulamallah played a generally
disruptive role in the middle.
In 1956 the French National Assembly passed the loi cadre
(enabling act), which resulted in greater self-rule for Chad and other
African territories. Electoral reforms expanded the pool of eligible
voters, and power began to shift from the sparsely settled northern and
central Chadian regions toward the more densely populated south. The PPT
had become less militant, winning the support of chiefs in the south and
members of the French colonial administration, but not that of private
French commercial interests. The PPT and allied parties won forty-seven
of the sixtyfive seats in the 1957 elections, and Lisette formed the
first African government in Chad. He maintained a majority for only
about a year, however, before factions representing traditional chiefs
withdrew their support from his coalition government.
In September 1958, voters in all of Africa's French territories took
part in a referendum on the Fifth Republic's constitution, drawn up
under de Gaulle. For a variety of political and economic reasons, most
of Chad's political groups supported the new constitution, and all voted
for a resolution calling for Chad to become an autonomous republic
within the French community. The three other AEF territories voted
similarly, and in November 1958 the AEF was officially terminated.
Coordination on such issues as customs and currency continued among the
four territories through written agreements or on an ad hoc basis.
Nonetheless, some Chadians supported the creation of an even stronger
French federation, rather than independence. The leading proponent of
this proposal was Barth�lemy Boganda of Ubangi-Chari, but his death in
1959 and the vigorous opposition of Gabon resulted in political
independence on a separate basis for all four republics.
After Lisette's coalition crumbled in early 1959, two other alliances
governed briefly. Then in March the PPT returned to power, this time
under the leadership of Tombalbaye, a union leader and representative
from Moyen-Chari Prefecture. Lisette, whose power was undermined because
of his non-African origins, became deputy prime minister in charge of
economic coordination and foreign affairs. Tombalbaye soon consolidated
enough political support from the south and north to isolate the
opposition into a collection of conservative Muslim leaders from central
Chad. The latter group formed a political party in January 1960, but its
parliamentary representation steadily dropped as Tombalbaye wooed
individual members to the PPT. By independence in August 1960, the PPT
and the south had clearly achieved dominance, but Tombalbaye's political
skills made it possible for observers to talk optimistically about the
possibility of building a broad-based coalition of political forces.
Chad - TOMBALBAYE ERA, 1960-75
Tombalbaye faced a task of considerable magnitude when Chad became a
sovereign state. His challenge was to build a nation out of a vast and
diverse territory that had poor communications, few known resources, a
tiny market, and a collection of impoverished people with sharply
differing political traditions, ethnic and regional loyalties, and
sociocultural patterns. The colonial powers that had created the
country's boundaries had done little to promote economic
interdependence, political cooperation, or crosscultural understanding.
Chadians who had hoped that the country's first president might turn out
to be a state builder like the thirteenth century's Dabbalemi or the
sixteenth century's Aluma were soon disappointed. During its first
fifteen years, Chad under Tombalbaye experienced worsening economic
conditions, eventual alienation of the most patient of foreign allies,
exacerbation of ethnic and regional conflict, and grave weakening of the
state as an instrument of governance.
Tombalbaye's Governance: Policies and Methods
At the outset, Tombalbaye demonstrated an autocratic style along with
a distrust of the institutions of democracy. One week before the country
gained independence, Tombalbaye purged Lisette from his own party,
declared Lisette a noncitizen while he was traveling abroad, and barred
him from returning to Chad. This "coup by telegram" was the
first in an extensive series of Tombalbaye's increasingly authoritarian
actions to eliminate or neutralize opponents.
To increase his power and freedom of action, Tombalbaye declared a
ban on all political parties except the PPT in January 1962, and in
April he established a presidential form of government. When serious
rioting occurred in 1963 in N'Djamena and Am Timan, the government
declared a state of emergency and dissolved the National Assembly. And,
as part of a major campaign against real and imagined political
opponents, Tombalbaye created a special criminal court. By the end of
the year, the country's prisons contained a virtual "who's
who" of Chadian politicians. In June 1964, a new National Assembly
granted Tombalbaye complete control over all appointments to the
Political Bureau of the PPT, which by then was the sole source of
political authority. With the PPT, government, and upper echelons of the
civil service stocked with loyalists, and with opposition leaders in
prison, exile, or completely co-opted, Tombalbaye was in full command of
the country.
An effort to Africanize the civil service and security forces as
rapidly as possible complemented Tombalbaye's drive for personal power.
Between 1960 and 1963, the number of French officials in the central
government administration declined from ninety-five to thirty (although
the total number of French personnel increased as technical advisers
were hired for development programs), and by the end of 1962 the entire
territorial administrative structure was in Chadian hands. In addition,
units of the Chad's national army replaced French military forces in
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture and in Ab�ch�, a process formally
completed on January 23, 1965.
Africanization was not entirely popular among Chad's farmers and
herders, despite their deep resentment of French colonial rule. A
decline in the quality of government service was immediately apparent,
in part because of the usual difficulties of transition, but also
because many of the newly hired and promoted Chadians were less
experienced and less adequately trained than their departing French
counterparts. Increasing the discontent, Tombalbaye imposed an
additional tax in 1964, under the euphemism of a "national
loan." On top of that action, some government administrators were
allegedly forcing citizens in rural areas to make payments at three
times the official taxation rates. Reports of corruption and other
abuses of authority grew as Chad's new officials became aware of both
the increased pressures and the decreased constraints on public
servants.
Because the great majority of the country's Western-educated and
French-speaking citizens were southerners, the policy of Africanization
often represented a "southernization" of the Chadian
government. What appeared to some Western observers to be progress in
African self-government was perceived by those from the northern and
central areas to be an increasingly blatant seizure of power by
southerners. To many in northern and central Chad, the southern Chadians
were simply another set of foreigners, almost as alien and arrogant as
the departing French. Tombalbaye's failure to establish hiring and
training policies geared to achieving greater ethnic and regional
balance in public administration was one of his most serious
shortcomings. Another was his lack of success--or lack of interest--in
reaching power-sharing agreements with key leaders in the Saharan and sahelian
regions.
Dissatisfaction with these failures was expressed violently, and the
government response was just as violent. When Muslims rioted in
N'Djamena in September 1963 following the arbitrary arrests of three
Muslim leaders, the government reacted swiftly and repressively. A
little more than a year later, an altercation at a public dance in the
northern town of Barda� prompted a Sara deputy prefect to order the
inhabitants of an entire village to march to prison, where many were
stripped and all were insulted. Many were arbitrarily fined for such
offenses as wearing beards or turbans. Included among the targets of
abuse was Oueddei Kichidemi, the derde, or spiritual head, of
the Teda people, a Toubou group. Explosive confrontations such as this
occurred repeatedly as the inexperienced southerners, who understood
little and cared less for the customs of the peoples they governed,
replaced experienced French administrators.
By this time, just five years after independence, the possibility of
armed conflict was growing. Politicians throughout Chad increasingly
used traditional loyalties and enmities to decry opposition and solidify
popular support for their positions. In view of Chad's historical legacy
of conflict, some historians have argued that even the most competent
leader with the most enlightened set of policies would have eventually
faced secessionist movements or armed opposition. Tombalbaye, however,
hastened the onset of civil conflict by quickly squandering his
legitimacy through repressive tactics and regional favoritism.
Tombalbaye's Governance: Policies and Methods
At the outset, Tombalbaye demonstrated an autocratic style along with
a distrust of the institutions of democracy. One week before the country
gained independence, Tombalbaye purged Lisette from his own party,
declared Lisette a noncitizen while he was traveling abroad, and barred
him from returning to Chad. This "coup by telegram" was the
first in an extensive series of Tombalbaye's increasingly authoritarian
actions to eliminate or neutralize opponents.
To increase his power and freedom of action, Tombalbaye declared a
ban on all political parties except the PPT in January 1962, and in
April he established a presidential form of government. When serious
rioting occurred in 1963 in N'Djamena and Am Timan, the government
declared a state of emergency and dissolved the National Assembly. And,
as part of a major campaign against real and imagined political
opponents, Tombalbaye created a special criminal court. By the end of
the year, the country's prisons contained a virtual "who's
who" of Chadian politicians. In June 1964, a new National Assembly
granted Tombalbaye complete control over all appointments to the
Political Bureau of the PPT, which by then was the sole source of
political authority. With the PPT, government, and upper echelons of the
civil service stocked with loyalists, and with opposition leaders in
prison, exile, or completely co-opted, Tombalbaye was in full command of
the country.
An effort to Africanize the civil service and security forces as
rapidly as possible complemented Tombalbaye's drive for personal power.
Between 1960 and 1963, the number of French officials in the central
government administration declined from ninety-five to thirty (although
the total number of French personnel increased as technical advisers
were hired for development programs), and by the end of 1962 the entire
territorial administrative structure was in Chadian hands. In addition,
units of the Chad's national army replaced French military forces in
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture and in Ab�ch�, a process formally
completed on January 23, 1965.
Africanization was not entirely popular among Chad's farmers and
herders, despite their deep resentment of French colonial rule. A
decline in the quality of government service was immediately apparent,
in part because of the usual difficulties of transition, but also
because many of the newly hired and promoted Chadians were less
experienced and less adequately trained than their departing French
counterparts. Increasing the discontent, Tombalbaye imposed an
additional tax in 1964, under the euphemism of a "national
loan." On top of that action, some government administrators were
allegedly forcing citizens in rural areas to make payments at three
times the official taxation rates. Reports of corruption and other
abuses of authority grew as Chad's new officials became aware of both
the increased pressures and the decreased constraints on public
servants.
Because the great majority of the country's Western-educated and
French-speaking citizens were southerners, the policy of Africanization
often represented a "southernization" of the Chadian
government. What appeared to some Western observers to be progress in
African self-government was perceived by those from the northern and
central areas to be an increasingly blatant seizure of power by
southerners. To many in northern and central Chad, the southern Chadians
were simply another set of foreigners, almost as alien and arrogant as
the departing French. Tombalbaye's failure to establish hiring and
training policies geared to achieving greater ethnic and regional
balance in public administration was one of his most serious
shortcomings. Another was his lack of success--or lack of interest--in
reaching power-sharing agreements with key leaders in the Saharan and sahelian
regions.
Dissatisfaction with these failures was expressed violently, and the
government response was just as violent. When Muslims rioted in
N'Djamena in September 1963 following the arbitrary arrests of three
Muslim leaders, the government reacted swiftly and repressively. A
little more than a year later, an altercation at a public dance in the
northern town of Barda� prompted a Sara deputy prefect to order the
inhabitants of an entire village to march to prison, where many were
stripped and all were insulted. Many were arbitrarily fined for such
offenses as wearing beards or turbans. Included among the targets of
abuse was Oueddei Kichidemi, the derde, or spiritual head, of
the Teda people, a Toubou group. Explosive confrontations such as this
occurred repeatedly as the inexperienced southerners, who understood
little and cared less for the customs of the peoples they governed,
replaced experienced French administrators.
By this time, just five years after independence, the possibility of
armed conflict was growing. Politicians throughout Chad increasingly
used traditional loyalties and enmities to decry opposition and solidify
popular support for their positions. In view of Chad's historical legacy
of conflict, some historians have argued that even the most competent
leader with the most enlightened set of policies would have eventually
faced secessionist movements or armed opposition. Tombalbaye, however,
hastened the onset of civil conflict by quickly squandering his
legitimacy through repressive tactics and regional favoritism.
Fall of the Tombalbaye Government
Tombalbaye's reform efforts ceased abruptly in August 1971. In that
month, he claimed to have quashed a coup involving some recently
amnestied Chadians who allegedly received support from Libyan leader
Muammaral Qadhaafi. Tomabalbaye severed relations with Libya and invited
anti-Qadhaafi elements to establish bases in Chad. In retaliation,
Qadhaafi recognized FROLINAT, offered (for the first time formally) an
operational base in Tripoli to Siddick, and increased the flow of
supplies to the Chadian rebels.
Domestic calm deteriorated further when students conducted a strike
in N'Djamena in November 1971. Although easily contained, the strike
demonstrated the growing politicization and disaffection of young
members of the southern elite and reflected their increased awareness of
the army's political potential. Tombalbaye then replaced the chief of
staff, General Jacques Doumro, who was a favorite of the students, with
Colonel F�lix Malloum.
In June 1972, a band of Libyan-trained saboteurs was captured while
attempting to smuggle guns and explosives into the capital. These
arrests coincided with a serious financial crisis, a worsening drought,
bitter government infighting, and civil unrest in the capital. These
events convinced Tombalbaye to abandon his policy of national
reconciliation. He incarcerated more than 1,000 real or suspected
"enemies of the state." In an indication of his growing
distrust of the previously secure south, Tombalbaye detained hundreds of
southerners and removed two key southern cabinet ministers. He also
effected a dramatic diplomatic aboutface designed to obtain economic
assistance from the Arab world while undermining FROLINAT. To enhance
ties to the Arab world, Tombalbaye broke Chad's relations with Israel in
September 1972. A few months later, Tombalbaye secured an initial pledge
of CFA F23 billion from Libya. In 1973 other Arab capitals promised aid.
In addition, Chad withdrew from the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common
Organization (Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache, et
Mauricienne--OCAMM), a moderate alliance of French-speaking African
states.
Tombalbaye's strategy to create difficulties for FROLINAT was
successful. When Qadhaafi began restricting deliveries of military
supplies and food to the rebels, fighting for the limited supplies
erupted between FROLINAT's First Liberation Army and FAN (at that time
also called the Second Liberation Army). The Second Liberation Army lost
control of Ennedi and retreated into northern Borkou and Tibesti. In
April 1974, however, it struck back by seizing three European hostages,
including a French archaeologist at Barda�.
By this time, the Tombalbaye presidency was rapidly unraveling, as
greater attention focused on the real and suspected threats from within
the government. In June 1973, Tombalbaye arrested Malloum, the head of
the women's wing of the PPT, and a score of other party officials,
mostly from the south. These individuals were held on charges of
"political sorcery" in what came to be known as the
"Black Sheep Plot" because of their alleged involvement in
animal sacrifices. Moreover, when Outel Bono, a widely admired liberal
politician, was assassinated in Paris while organizing a new political
party in August, many believed that Tombalbaye's government was behind
the murder. Also that month, Tombalbaye decided to replace the PPT with
a new party, the National Movement for the Cultural and Social
Revolution (Mouvement National pour la R�volution Culturelle et
Sociale--MNRCS).
To deflect domestic criticism, Tombalbaye embarked on a campaign to
promote authenticit�, or "Chaditude." This effort
was aimed at expunging foreign practices and influences. To shore up his
support from Chad's expanding urban elite, Tombalbaye Africanized the
names of several places (Fort-Lamy and FortArchambault became N'Djamena
and Sarh, respectively) and ordered civil servants to use indigenous
names in place of their European ones; he changed his first name to
Ngarta. In addition, his policies induced many foreign missionaries to
repatriate. His strident attacks on the French government were also
popular. Tombalbaye lashed out specifically at Jacques Foccart, the
powerful secretary general to the French Presidency for African Affairs,
who was labeled an "evil genius" and formally condemned in a
National Assembly resolution as the source of some "fourteen
plots" against the government of Chad.
To restore his sagging support among Sara traditionalists in the
rural south, Tombalbaye came out in favor of the harsh physical and
psychological yondo initiation rites for all southern males
between sixteen and fifty, making them compulsory for any non-Muslim
seeking admission to the civil service, government, and higher ranks of
the military. From mid-1973 to April 1974, an estimated 3,000 southern
civil servants, including two cabinet ministers and one colonel, went
through the yondo ordeal. Because the rites were perceived as
anti-Christian and essentially borrowed from one Sara subgroup,
resistance to the process exacerbated antagonisms along clan and
religious lines. Therefore, rather than encouraging greater southern
support, Tombalbaye's action created disaffection among civil servants,
army officers, and students.
The worsening drought in the early 1970s also affected Chad's
degenerating political situation. Throughout 1974 international
criticism of Chad's handling of drought-relief efforts reached a new
peak, as government insensitivity and overt profiteering became obvious.
In response to its economic crisis, the government launched Operation
Agriculture, which involved a massive volunteer cottonplanting effort on
virgin lands. The project increased production somewhat, but at the
expense of major economic dislocations and greater southern resentment,
particularly from people in cities and towns who were rounded up by the
military to "volunteer" for agricultural labor.
By early 1975, many observers believed that Tombalbaye had eroded his
two main bases of support--the south and the armed forces. Only
intra-Sara divisions and concern over the possible loss of southern
influence in government had prevented any wellorganized anti-Tombalbaye
movement. In addition, throughout the early 1970s Tombalbaye's criticism
of the army's mediocre performance in the field had angered the officer
corps and dissipated its loyalty. Other military grievances included
frequent purges and reshufflings of the top ranks. In March 1975,
Tombalbaye ordered the arrest of several senior military officers, as
suspects in yet another plot. On April 13, 1975, several units of
N'Djamena's gendarmerie, acting under the initial direction of junior
military officers, killed Tombalbaye during a mutiny.
Chad - CIVIL WAR AND NORTHERN DOMINANCE, 1975-82
Malloum's Military Government, 1975-78
The coup d'�tat that terminated Tombalbaye's government received an
enthusiastic response in N'Djamena. Malloum emerged as the chairman of
the new Supreme Military Council (Conseil Sup�rieur Militaire--CSM).
His government contained more Muslims from northern and eastern Chad,
but ethnic and regional dominance still remained very much in the hands
of southerners. The successor government soon overturned many of
Tombalbaye's more odious policies. For example, the CSM attempted to
distribute external drought relief assistance more equitably and
efficiently and devised plans to develop numerous economic reforms,
including reductions in taxes and government expenditures.
Neither reformers nor skilled administrators, the new military
leaders were unable to retain for long the modicum of authority,
legitimacy, and popularity that they had gained through their overthrow
of the unpopular Tombalbaye. The expectations of most urban Chadians far
exceeded the capacity of the new government--or possibly any
government--to satisfy them. It soon became clear, moreover, that the
new leaders (mostly southern military officers) saw themselves as
caretakers rather than innovators, and few of Tombalbaye's close
associates were punished. Throughout its tenure, the CSM was unable to
win the support of the capital's increasingly radicalized unions,
students, and urban dwellers. The government suspended the National
Union of Chadian Workers (Union Nationale de Travailleurs du
Tchad--UNTT) and prohibited strikes, but labor and urban unrest
continued from 1975 through 1978. On the first anniversary of the
formation of the CSM, Malloum was the target of a grenade attack that
injured several top officials and spectators. A year after that, in
March 1977, the CSM executed summarily the leaders of a short-lived
mutiny by several military units in N'Djamena.
The fundamental failures of Malloum's government, however, were most
evident in its interactions with France, Libya, and FROLINAT. In his
first few months in office, Malloum persuaded a few eastern rebel
elements to join the new government. In the north, the derde
(Oueddei Kichidemi) returned from exile in Libya in August 1975. But his
son, Goukouni Oueddei, refused to respond to his entreaties or those of
the government and remained in opposition. When the Command Council of
the Army Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commandement des Forces
Arm�es du Nord-- CCFAN), a structure set up in 1972 by Habr� and
Goukouni to represent northern elements in FROLINAT, continued to refuse
negotiations with the CSM over the release of the hostage French
archaeologist, France began dealing directly with the rebels. Malloum's
government reacted to this embarrassment by demanding the departure of
1,500 French troops, at a time in late 1975 when Chad's military
situation was beginning to worsen. Throughout 1976 and 1977, the
military balance of power shifted in favor of FROLINAT as Libya provided
the rebels with substantially more weaponry and logistical support than
ever before. Faya Largeau was placed under siege twice in 1976, and then
in June 1977 Barda� fell to the CCFAN.
The sharp increase in Libyan activity also brought to a head the
power struggle within the CCFAN between Goukouni and Habr�. In 1971
Habr� had left his position as a deputy prefect in the Tombalbaye
government to join Goukouni's rebels. Goukouni and Habr�, ambitious
Toubou leaders from two different and competing clans, became bitter
rivals, first within the CCFAN and later within all of Chad. In the
CCFAN, the key issues dividing the men were relations with Libya and the
handling of the hostage affair. Habr� opposed vigorously all Libyan
designs on the Aozou Strip and favored retaining the French hostage even
after most of the ransom demands had been met. Goukouni felt that
priority should go to the conflict with the CSM, for which Libyan
assistance could be decisive, and that the kidnapping had already
achieved more than enough. Habr� finally split with him in 1976, taking
a few hundred followers to fight in Batha and Biltine prefectures and
retaining for his group the name FAN. Goukouni and his followers
prevailed (the CCFAN released the hostage to French authorities in
January 1977).
As the military position of the CSM continued to decline in 1977,
Malloum's political overtures to the rebel groups and leaders became
increasingly flexible. In September Malloum and Habr� met in Khartoum
to begin negotiations on a formal alliance. Their efforts culminated in
a carefully drafted agreement, the Fundamental Charter, which formed the
basis of the National Union Government of August 1978. Malloum was named
president of the new government, while Habr�, as prime minister, became
the first significant insurgent figure to hold an executive position in
a postcolonial government.
Habr�'s ascension to power in N'Djamena was intended to signal to
Goukouni and other rebel leaders the government's willingness to
negotiate seriously following its reversals on the battlefield in 1978.
In February Faya Largeau fell to FROLINAT, and with it roughly half the
country's territory. Shortly thereafter, Malloum flew to Sabha in
southern Libya to negotiate a cease-fire, but even as it was being
codified in March, FROLINAT's position was hardening. Goukouni claimed
that all three liberation armies were now united under his leadership in
the new People's Armed Forces (Forces Arm�es Populaires--FAP) and that
their objective remained the overthrow of the "dictatorial
neocolonial regime imposed by France on Chad since August 11,
1960." FAP continued to advance toward the capital until it was
halted near Ati in major battles with French military forces and units
of the Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Arm�es Tchadiennes--FAT). It was
Malloum's hope that the FROLINAT leadership would soften its terms, or
possibly undergo renewed fragmentation.
Civil War and Multilateral Mediation, 1979-82
From 1979 to 1982, Chad experienced unprecedented change and
spiraling violence. Southerners finally lost control of what remained of
the Chadian government, while civil conflicts became significantly more
internationalized. In early 1979, the fragile Malloum-Habr� alliance
collapsed after months of aggressive actions by Habr�, including
demands that more northerners be appointed to high government offices
and that Arabic be used in place of French in broadcasting. Appealing
for support among the large communities of Muslims and Arabs in
N'Djamena, Habr� unleashed his FAN on February 12. With the French
garrison remaining uninvolved, FAN sent Malloum into retirement (under
French protection) and drove the remnants of FAT toward the south. On
February 22, Goukouni and FAP entered the capital. By this time, most of
the city's Sara population had fled to the south, where attacks against
Muslims and nonsoutherners erupted, particularly in Sarh, Moundou, and
throughout Moyen-Chari Prefecture. By mid-March more than 10,000 were
said to have died as a result of violence throughout the south.
In early 1979, Chad became an open arena of unrestrained factional
politics. Opportunistic power seekers sought to gather followers (often
using sectarian appeals) and to win support from Chad's African
neighbors. Between March 10 and August 21, four separate conferences
took place in the Nigerian cities of Kano and Lagos, during which Chad's
neighbors attempted to establish a political framework acceptable to the
warring factions. Chad's neighbors, however, also used the meetings to
pursue interests of their own, resulting in numerous externally
generated complications and a growing number of factions brought into
the process. For example, at one point, Qadhaafi became so angry with
Habr� that the Libyan sent arms to Colonel Wadel Abdelkader Kamougu�'s
anti-Habr� faction in the south, even though Kamougu� was also
anti-Libyan. At the second conference in Kano, both Habr� and Goukouni
were placed under what amounted to house arrest so Nigeria could promote
the chances of a Kanembu leader, Mahmat Shawa Lol. In fact, Nigerian
support made Lol the Chadian titular head of state for a few weeks, even
though his Third Liberation Army was only a phantom force, and his
domestic political support was insignificant. Within Chad the warring
parties used the conferences and their associated truces to recover from
one round of fighting and prepare for the next.
The final conference culminated in the Lagos Accord of August 21,
1979, which representatives of eleven Chadian factions signed and the
foreign ministers of nine other African states witnessed. The Lagos
Accord established the procedures for setting up the Transitional
Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de
Transition--GUNT), which was sworn into office in November. By mutual
agreement, Goukouni was named president, Kamougu� was appointed
vice-president, and Habr� was named minister of national defense,
veterans, and war victims. The distribution of cabinet positions was
balanced between south (eleven portfolios), north, center, and east
(thirteen), and among prot�g�s of neighboring states. A peacekeeping
mission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be drawn from
troops from Congo, Guinea, and Benin, was to replace the French. This
force never materialized in any effective sense, but the OAU was
committed to GUNT under the presidency of Goukouni.
GUNT, however, failed. Its major participants deeply mistrusted each
other, and they never achieved a sense of coherence. As a result, the
various factional militias remained armed. By January 1980, a unit of
Habr�'s army was attacking the forces of one of the constituent groups
of GUNT in Ouadda� Prefecture. Shortly thereafter, N'Djamena plunged
into another cycle of violence, and by the end of March 1980 Habr� was
openly defying the government, having taken control of a section of the
capital. The 600 Congolese troops of the OAU peacekeeping force remained
out of the fray, as did the French, while units of five separate Chadian
armies prowled the streets of N'Djamena. The battles continued
throughout the summer, punctuated by more OAU mediation efforts and five
formal cease-fires.
It became evident that the profound rivalry between Goukouni and Habr�
was at the core of the conflict. By mid-1980 the south-- cut off from
communication and trade with N'Djamena and defended by a regrouped,
southern army--had become a state within a state. Colonel Kamougu�, the
strongman of the south, remained a prudent distance away from the
capital and waited to negotiate with whichever northerner emerged as the
winner.
In 1980 the beleaguered Goukouni turned to Libya, much as he had done
four years earlier. With the French forces having departed in mid-May
1980, Goukouni signed a military cooperation treaty with Libya in June
(without prior approval of the all-but-defunct GUNT). In October he
requested direct military assistance from Qadhaafi, and by December
Libyan forces had firm control of the capital and most other urban
centers outside the south. Habr� fled to Sudan, vowing to resume the
struggle.
Although Libyan intervention enabled Goukouni to win militarily, the
association with Qadhaafi created diplomatic problems for GUNT. In
January 1981, when Goukouni and Qadhaafi issued a joint communiqu�
stating that Chad and Libya had agreed to "work for the realization
of complete unity between the two countries," an international
uproar ensued. Although both leaders later denied any intention to merge
their states politically, the diplomatic damage had been done.
Throughout 1981 most of the members of the OAU, along with France and
the United States, encouraged Libyan troops to withdraw from Chad. One
week after the "unity communiqu�," the OAU's committee on
Chad met in Togo to assess the situation. In a surprisingly blunt
resolution, the twelve states on the committee denounced the union goal
as a violation of the 1979 Lagos Accord, called for Libya to withdraw
its troops, and promised to provide a peacekeeping unit, the
Inter-African Force (IAF). Goukouni was skeptical of OAU promises, but
in September he received a French pledge of support for his government
and the IAF.
But as Goukouni's relations with the OAU and France improved, his
ties with Libya deteriorated. One reason for this deterioration was that
the economic assistance that Libya had promised never materialized.
Another, and perhaps more significant, factor was that Qadhaafi was
strongly suspected of helping Goukouni's rival within GUNT, Acyl Ahmat,
leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Council (Conseil D�mocratique R�volutionnaire--CDR).
Both Habr� and Goukouni feared Acyl because he and many of the members
of the CDR were Arabs of the Awlad Sulayman tribe. About 150 years
earlier, this group had migrated from Libya to Chad and thus represented
the historical and cultural basis of Libyan claims in Chad.
As a consequence of the Libya-Chad rift, Goukouni asked the Libyan
forces in late October 1981 to leave, and by mid-November they had
complied. Their departure, however, allowed Habr�'s FAN-- reconstituted
in eastern Chad with Egyptian, Sudanese, and, reportedly, significant
United States assistance--to win key positions along the highway from Ab�ch�
to N'Djamena. Habr� was restrained only by the arrival and deployment
in December 1981 of some 4,800 IAF troops from Nigeria, Senegal, and
Zaire.
In February 1982, a special OAU meeting in Nairobi resulted in a plan
that called for a cease-fire, negotiations among all parties, elections,
and the departure of the IAF; all terms were to be carried out within
six months. Habr� accepted the plan, but Goukouni rejected it,
asserting that Habr� had lost any claim to legitimacy when he broke
with GUNT. When Habr� renewed his military advance toward N'Djamena,
the IAF remained essentially neutral, just as the French had done when
FROLINAT marched on Malloum three years earlier. FAN secured control of
the capital on June 7. Goukouni and other members of GUNT fled to
Cameroon and eventually reappeared in Libya. For the remainder of the
year, Habr� consolidated his power in much of war-weary Chad and worked
to secure international recognition for his government.
