SEVERAL THREADS OF CONTINUITY ran through Chad's political
development during its first twenty-eight years of independence that
began in 1960. Dominated by a series of authoritarian regimes, most
under military rule, Chad had no representative national institutions in
1988. Its ruling party, the National Union for Independence and
Revolution (Union Nationale pour l'Ind�pendance et la R�volution--UNIR)
was organized by the government in 1984; UNIR leaders were appointed by
the president from among government officials, and the party served
primarily to reinforce government policy. By late 1988, UNIR had not
opened the political process to democratic participation.
Political fragmentation also characterized Chad's political
development since independence. The Islamic northern and central regions
and the colonially exploited south were divided by regional stereotypes
rooted in their past, which included centuries of slave raids from the
north. Subregional, religious, cultural, and individual differences
complicated major regional divisions.
Chad's diverse population was drawn into power struggles in the drive
for independence following World War II. Numerous political parties and
coalitions sought foreign assistance to bolster weak popular support.
The nation's first independent regime grew increasingly repressive
during its fifteen years in power as its leader, Fran�ois Tombalbaye,
attempted to pacify this fractious population and transform southern
economic domination into political control. Several dissident groups,
most from the northern and central regions, united under the National
Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Lib�ration Nationale du
Tchad--FROLINAT), but this coalition, too, was plagued by factional
strife.
In the early 1970s, Tombalbaye contributed to his own eventual
downfall by implementing the authenticit� movement, an
illconceived authenticity campaign that sought to impose southernbased
ritual traditions on the nation's civil service. The resulting cycle of
public protest and government repression culminated in a 1975 coup, in
which Tombalbaye was killed. His successor, F�lix Malloum, continued
the pattern of concentrating political power in the executive branch of
government but was persuaded to bring rebel leaders Goukouni Oueddei and
Hissein Habr� into his government. Their rebel forces eventually proved
stronger than Malloum's army, and he was forced out of office in 1979.
His successor, Goukouni, was the first of Chad's insurgent leaders to
become president of Chad.
A series of unsuccessful coalition governments oversaw Chad's descent
into a state of civil war. The major coalition, the Transitional
Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de
Transition--GUNT), was led by Goukouni, whose relatively conciliatory
style of governing contrasted with the previous pattern of authoritarian
regimes. His critics considered him weak and indecisive, and he was
strongly influenced by Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi, whose primary
aims were to install a sympathetic Muslim leader in Chad, expand Libya's
influence in the region, and reduce Western influence across the
continent.
A salient feature of Chad's foreign policy since independence has
been foreign intervention--especially by Libya, Chad's aggressive
neighbor to the north, and France, the former colonial power. Libya took
advantage of Chad's instability in the early 1970s to press its claim to
the Aozou
Strip in northern Chad, based on centuries of close
ties among border populations and an unratified 1935 Franco-Italian
agreement, which had been ignored by intervening governments. French
ties with Chad, based on historical, commercial, political, and
strategic interests, rivaled those of Libya, and the Aozou Strip
provided an arena in which this rivalry could be pursued. In addition,
neighboring countries, especially Sudan and Nigeria, also took an active
role in events in Chad, hoping to achieve a favorable balance of power
in the region. Other Central African and West African states sought to
contain Chad's violence and avoid being caught up in the spreading
instability.
Chad's political shifts in the early 1980s resulted from
international fears of Libyan intervention through influence in
Goukouni's regime, France's revised African policy following the
Socialist Party's election victory in 1981, and military gains by Habr�.
Habr� had served in governments led by Tombalbaye, Malloum, and
Goukouni, and he had led insurgencies against all. Finally in 1982, with
loyal northern forces and French and United States support, Habr�
ousted Goukouni and proclaimed himself president of Chad.
Habr�'s patrimonial state was another authoritarian regime. A
written constitution empowered him to appoint almost all high officials
and reduced the legislative branch to a token assembly. He determined
the pace and direction of activity in all branches of government. At the
same time, Habr� gained popular support by stabilizing Chad and working
to establish peace. He also began to reintroduce social services to a
population for whom warfare had been the most noticeable sign of
government activity.
In 1988 factional dynamics in Chad still resembled precolonial
politics. Habr� was a master strategist in this arena, and he succeeded
in winning over numerous former opponents through combined military and
political means. Nevertheless, the threats of new rifts among allies and
of future alliances among enemies still existed, in keeping with the
model of the segmentary political systems that had dominated the region
for centuries.
To strengthen existing ties among former opponents and to mobilize
grass-roots support for his government, Habr� proclaimed his intention
in 1988 to transform the ruling party, UNIR, into a people's vanguard
party. Many people in outlying areas were still skeptical of the need
for an increased governmental presence, however, and many southerners
still considered national government a northern imposition. Both
problems underlined the political challenge that faced Chad as the 1990s
approached.
<>POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Preindependence Factions
Chad became part of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale
Fran�aise--AEF) in 1905 and became a separate colony within the AEF in
1920. Colonial policy exploited the agricultural potential of the south,
exacerbated regional animosities that were the result of centuries of
slave raids from the north, and failed to prepare Chadian citizens for
self-rule. During World War II, the colonial governor general, F�lix
Ebou�, brought Chad to international attention by leading the AEF in
support of Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement.
After the war, Gabriel Lisette and other political activists,
including Fran�ois Tombalbaye, established the Chadian Progressive
Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien--PPT). The PPT protected southern
interests in competition with the more influential Chadian Democratic
Union (Union D�mocratique Tchadienne--UDT). The UDT was dominated by
expatriates, who treated Chad's political arena as a forum for debate
over events in Paris.
More than two dozen political parties and coalitions arose to oppose
this Eurocentric view of local politics and to compete with the UDT and
the PPT. These groups were generally aligned as southerners, northerners
who sought to share in the nation's economic development, other
northerners who opposed modernization, and socialist groups who hoped to
replace the European-dominated economy with one oriented more toward
local needs. Further fragmentation occurred along subregional and
religious lines and over the question of the future role of expatriates
in Chad.
Chad's 1946 constitution declared it an overseas territory of France.
As French citizens, its people elected representatives to a territorial
assembly, which in turn elected delegates to a French General Council
for the AEF and to several governing bodies in France. Chadians demanded
further political rights, however, including training in administrative
and technical areas that would lead to self-government and the right to
set their own political agenda independent of other francophone states.
The PPT won a plurality in the Territorial Assembly, and Lisette became
head of the first government established under the loi cadre of
1956, an enabling act that made Chad an autonomous republic within the
French Community, instituted universal suffrage, and established a
single electoral roll.
Demands for greater local control of politics led to dramatic
political shifts in the late 1950s. The UDT, attempting to shed its
expatriate emphasis, was reorganized and renamed Chadian Social Action
(Action Sociale Tchadienne--AST). The AEF was dissolved in 1958 amid
rising African demands for autonomy. A series of unstable provisional
governments followed the ouster of Lisette as the PPT's leader in 1958.
His successor, Tombalbaye, became head of the territorial assembly in
1959 and head of the nation's first independent government in August
1960.
Southern Dominance, 1960-1978
Tombalbaye banished Lisette and many of his supporters from Chad and
eliminated Lisette's power base by dividing the Logone region of the
south into three prefectures. Tombalbaye openly discriminated against
the north, ignored the growing national political awareness that was
evident during the postwar years, and established a repressive regime
that contributed to Chad's fragmentation during his fifteen-year tenure
as president.
Major regional rifts were complicated by intraregional divisions,
especially in the north, where numerous warlords, each with an
ethnic-based following or cadre of supporters, attempted to overthrow
Tombalbaye's regime. In 1966 northern rebels united as the FROLINAT.
They established bases in Sudan and received assistance from Algeria and
Libya, but FROLINAT, too, was divided over military and political
issues, attitudes toward Libya, interpretations of Islam, and individual
leadership style. An important split occurred in 1969 between northern
factions and those from Chad's eastern and central regions, which had
dominated the group for three years. Northern factions went on to form
FROLINAT's Second Liberation Army.
Tombalbaye expelled French troops from Chad but otherwise perpetuated
the dependence established under colonial rule. He employed French
advisers in many government posts and allowed France to control most of
the nation's financial operations. Tombalbaye also strengthened
presidential authority and resisted recommendations of his expatriate
advisers, who urged him to decentralize authority to provincial
officials and traditional leaders. Rather than assuage northern
grievances or pacify the increasingly numerous rebel armies, Tombalbaye
responded with repression. He dissolved the National Assembly in 1963
and eliminated rival political parties. He also jailed outspoken critics
and closed down most public media. His repressive style and rebel
violence were mutually reinforcing, leading Tombalbaye to recall French
troops.
Amid increasing destabilization in the early 1970s, Tombalbaye sought
first to protect southern interests. He implemented the authenticit�
movement, an ill-conceived campaign (modeled on that of Zairian
president Mobutu Sese Seko) that deemed southern cultural
characteristics more authentic than those of the north. Opponents
successfully exploited public outrage when Tombalbaye required civil
servants to undergo yondo--traditional initiation rites
indigenous only to his ethnic constituency among the Sara population of
the south. Weak efforts to pacify the north by granting limited autonomy
to traditional leaders and releasing prominent political prisoners
served only to recruit new dissidents.
After Muammar al Qadhaafi seized power in Libya in 1969, he exploited
Chad's instability by stationing troops in northern Chad and by
channeling support to Chadian insurgents. Although Tombalbaye expelled
Libyan diplomats in 1971, blaming them for inciting a coup attempt and
inspiring unrest, in general he sought a balance between concessions and
resistance to Qadhaafi's regional designs, hoping to persuade Qadhaafi
to reduce his support for Chadian insurgents. Tombalbaye voiced a
willingness to cede the Aozou Strip and did not object to Libyan troops'
being stationed there after 1973. Chad erupted in renewed protests
against Tombalbaye's unpopular and weakened regime, culminating in a
successful coup against him in 1975.
General F�lix Malloum, a former government critic imprisoned by
Tombalbaye, proclaimed himself head of the Supreme Military Council
(Conseil Sup�rieur Militaire--CSM), which seized power in 1975. As a
southerner with strong kinship ties to the north, Malloum believed that
he could reconcile Chad's divided regions and establish representative
institutions. He set a high priority on freeing Chad from French
economic and political control, but in this effort he was unsuccessful.
He sent French combat forces home, but he retained several hundred
French advisers and renegotiated a series of military accords to ensure
emergency aid.
Malloum was unable to convert dissatisfaction with Tombalbaye's
regime into acceptance of his own. His opponents exploited popular
displeasure with the remaining French presence by recruiting new
dissidents. In response to this threat, Malloum seized control of all
branches of government and, in the increasingly repressive manner that
characterized his presidency, banned almost all political activity. His
opposition coalesced around FROLINAT, which established alternative
administrations in outlying areas to compete with N'Djamena. In 1978, in
the face of mounting violence, Malloum reluctantly called for the return
of French forces.
Transition to Northern Rule
In 1978 officials in Chad and neighboring countries attempted to
craft a coalition that could control the country through military force
and still claim to have some popular support. Urged by African heads of
state and French advisers, Malloum attempted to bring FROLINAT faction
leaders Hissein Habr� and Goukouni Oueddei into the government, but
these two northerners soon clashed with Malloum and each other. While
Habr�'s troops engaged government forces, Goukouni seized the
opportunity to occupy government buildings and claim control of
N'Djamena. Talks were held first in Sudan and then in Nigeria, but by
late 1979 neighboring states were working primarily to contain Chad's
spreading violence and limit Libyan interference in regional affairs.
As N'Djamena became a war zone, with fighting among FROLINAT factions
and southerners going on between 1979 and early 1982, outsiders
proclaimed the disintegration of the state. Although major disruptions
occurred, the government struggled to maintain basic official functions.
Executive functions were allocated according to ministerial portfolios
and were given limited attention. Many buildings in the capital city
were destroyed, but a small civil service continued to operate. Public
services were erratic but not absent. Still, the government fought for
its survival rather than to protect its citizens, and thousands of
people sought refuge in rural areas or neighboring countries.
Talks in Lagos and Kano in 1979 culminated in the formation of GUNT,
led by Goukouni, which incorporated several rival northern commanders.
Malloum left the country, and the locus of governmental power shifted
from south to north, largely because of northern military successes,
popular discontent throughout the country, and pressure from neighboring
states for an end to Chadian violence. National unity became
increasingly ephemeral, however, as members of this coalition were
polarized between Habr� and Goukouni. Goukouni was the son of the derde,
a respected traditional leader among the Teda population of the north,
one of the Toubou groups that had generally been receptive to the
Libyan-based Sanusiyya brotherhood before independence. In his view,
Libyan interests in Chad were valid. Goukouni requested Qadhaafi's
assistance against Habr� in 1980, bringing Libyan troops into the
country as far south as N'Djamena.
As head of state, Goukouni did not implement promised democratic
reforms, but neither did he tolerate unlimited reprisals against the
south. Instead, he was relatively tolerant of minor expressions of
dissent, warned security forces against harsh retaliation in the south,
and gave local administrators limited autonomy.
Both allies and opponents perceived this relatively conciliatory
attitude as a presidential weakness and a hesitant style of leadership.
Indeed, this hesitancy was apparent in 1981 when Qadhaafi proclaimed a
merger between Libya and Chad. Following international and domestic
protests, Goukouni reversed his position and balked at Qadhaafi's
regional demands.
French political shifts in 1981 also had an important impact on
events in Chad. The election of Fran�ois Mitterrand as French president
heralded a reorientation in African policy. Socialist leaders vowed to
reduce the overall French presence in Africa and to avoid an open
confrontation with Libya, a major source of French oil imports. French
support shifted cautiously to Habr�, who appeared willing to resist
Libyan domination with outside support and whose decisive leadership had
been demonstrated against French troops for over a decade. France's
Socialist Party pursued its goal of reducing its interventionist profile
in Africa by persuading francophone states, through the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), to send peacekeeping troops to Chad. Goukouni
called for the removal of Libya's forces, but when Habr�'s Armed Forces
of the North (Forces Arm�es du Nord--FAN) moved on the capital, they
encountered almost no resistance from the OAU-sponsored InterAfrican
Force (IAF). As a result, in June 1982 FAN seized N'Djamena and
proclaimed Habr� head of state.
Habr�'s decisiveness and his preference for French rather than
Libyan patronage shifted the focus of government once again. He took
limited steps to assuage regional dissent, relying on northerners in
most military commands and top political offices but appointing
southerners to several executive and administrative positions. Habr�
also reduced the aim of independence from French domination to the
status of a long-term goal. France maintained vital economic, financial,
military, and security assistance; underwrote the budget; effectively
operated the banking system; and provided a variety of commercial and
technical advisers. Furthermore, Habr� used French and United States
military assistance to repel Libyan troops, Libyan-supported insurgents,
and local rebel forces. French funds also helped Habr� co-opt former
opponents.
As president, Habr� brought more peace to Chad than that country had
known in a decade. Habr� vowed to remove Libyan forces from the north,
reconcile north and south, and establish a democratic state. In his
first six years in office, he took steps to accomplish some of these
goals.
Chad - STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
Constitutional System
Between 1959 and 1988, Chad's constitution was revised six times and
altered by several major amendments. The preindependence constitution
adopted by the territorial assembly in March 1959 was modified at
independence in 1960. The new document established a parliamentary
system of government with an executive prime minister. Further revisions
in 1962 strengthened the executive, and the 1965 constitution eliminated
all rivals to the ruling party, the PPT. In 1973 President Tombalbaye
codified in the constitution his version of the authenticit�
movement to reaffirm indigenous values. This movement required civil
servants to undergo initiation rites common to some ethnic
constituencies of the south. Following a military coup in 1975, in which
Tombalbaye was killed, and the general deterioration of state
institutions, lengthy negotiations in 1978 led to a new constitution
that established an unsuccessful coalition among Chad's warring
factions.
In June 1982, when Habr� seized control of N'Djamena, he dissolved
the existing government and in October promulgated the Fundamental Law,
a document that served as an interim constitution through 1988. In July
1988, Habr� appointed a constitutional committee to draft a new
document to be presented to the government in 1989.
The Fundamental Law of 1982 declared Chad a secular, indivisible
republic, with ultimate power deriving from the people. Both French and
Arabic were adopted as official languages, and
"Unity-Work-Progress" was adopted as the nation's motto. The
constitution authorized the office of president, Council of Ministers
(cabinet), National Advisory Council (Conseil National Consultatif--CNC,
an interim legislature), and national army. It placed overriding
authority for controlling all of these in the office of the president.
President
Article 2 of the Fundamental Law designated the president as head of
state and government. He was chairman of the Council of Ministers, with
a mandate to define the fundamental policy choices of the nation. The
president was the commander in chief of the armed forces and head of an
ostensibly civilian government. The Fundamental Law allowed the Command
Council of the Armed Forces of the North (Conseil de Commandement des
Forces Arm�es du Nord-- CCFAN) to select the president. Habr�
dissolved the CCFAN when he established the ruling party, UNIR, in 1984.
No succession procedures were in place after 1984, and most observers
expected Habr� to remain in office after the new constitution was
presented to the government in 1989.
The Fundamental Law authorized the president to legislate by decree,
and he often did so. He also appointed and dismissed ministers,
legislators, and high-level civil and military officials. Only the
president could initiate constitutional amendments; this procedure
required, however, consultation with both ministers and legislators.
The president's international authority included negotiating and
ratifying treaties and accords and guaranteeing Chad's observance of
them. He was technically required to consult with ministers and
legislators, but more often he simply notified them of his foreign
policy decisions.
Council of Ministers
The president and twenty-three appointed ministers formed the Council
of Ministers in 1988. The council's portfolios included agriculture and
rural development; civil service; commerce and industry; culture, youth,
and sports; defense national veterans, and war victims; education;
finance; food security and afflicted groups; foreign affairs;
information and civic orientation; interior; justice; labor; livestock
and rural water; mines and energy; planning and reconstruction; posts
and telecommunications; public health; public works, housing, and urban
development; social affairs and the promotion of women; state; tourism
and the environment; and transportation and civil aviation. The
president held the portfolio for defense. Only one woman served on the
Council of Ministers. Executive appointments were divided among most
regions of the country, although northerners dominated most organs of
government.
The general responsibility of the Council of Ministers was to carry
out the wishes of the president, although constitutional language
defined its task as overseeing national reconstruction, establishing a
democratic way of life, guaranteeing fundamental rights of individuals
and associations, and guaranteeing the effective participation of all
social classes in the managing of public affairs. The council was also
responsible for maintaining a national army, reorganizing the national
police, reorganizing public enterprises and parastatal, developing an
effective health care system, assisting victims of war, relaunching the
economy, reforming the school system, devising an investment code to
encourage domestic and foreign capital formation, reconstructing the
communication system, and regaining Chad's self-sufficiency in food.
Article 18 summarized ministerial responsibilities in foreign policy.
These responsibilities were to maintain friendship and cooperation with
all peaceful countries, to uphold the principles of the United Nations
(UN) and OAU, to support legitimate struggles by people under racial and
colonial domination, to combat all forms of expansionism, and to
practice nonalignment in foreign policymaking . Article 19 restricted
ministers from holding a second office in government, although many
government officials in 1988 also held office in UNIR.
National Advisory Council
The Fundamental Law formalized the institution of a weak legislative
branch of government. Thirty advisers, who served at the discretion of
the president, made up the CNC in 1988. Although they were authorized to
elect their own council president and two vice presidents, their mandate
was only to advise the president regarding states of emergency and war
and to consult with him regarding fundamental policy choices,
international agreements, budgetary allocations, and general plans for
political, social, and economic development. In practice, the CNC
supported presidential policy.
As of 1988, the people of Chad had no elected representatives at the
national level. The appointed CNC provided a formal structure for
representative government and policy deliberation, but it was entirely
subordinate to the executive branch. Legislators effected policy changes
only if the president agreed with them.
Regional Government
Throughout the 1980s, Chad was divided into fourteen prefectures.
Each was further subdivided into subprefectures, administrative posts,
and cantons. Most prefectures were divided into two to five
subprefectures; the total number of subprefectures was fifty-four.
Administrative posts and cantons were often organized around traditional
social units, especially in areas where an existing bureaucratic
structure could represent the state. In general, the national government
relied on traditional leaders to represent its authority in rural areas.
In many of these areas, civil servants could not maintain order, collect
taxes, or enforce government edicts without the cooperation of respected
local leaders.
Administrators at each of these levels (prefects, subprefects,
administrators, and canton chiefs) were appointed by the president or
the minister of interior and remained in office until the president
dismissed them. Each prefect was assisted by a consultative council
composed of ten or more members nominated by the prefect and approved by
the minister of interior. Traditional leaders were often included, and
council protocol was sometimes based on local rank and status
distinctions.
During the 1960s, the government granted municipal status to nine
towns, based on their ability to finance their own budgets. These
municipalities generated most of their revenues through administrative
fees, fines, and taxes, and they organized communal work projects for
many city improvements. Their governing bodies were relatively
autonomous municipal councils, chosen by popular consensus or informal
elections. Each council, in turn, elected a mayor from its own ranks.
The official policy of autonomy for municipal councils was generally
overridden by the requirement that almost all council decisions be
ratified by the prefect or the minister of interior.
Judicial System
Chad's legal system was based on French civil law, modified according
to a variety of traditional and Islamic legal interpretations. In the
late 1980s, the civilian and military court systems overlapped at
several levels, an effect of Chad's years of warfare. Civilian justice
often deferred to the military system, and in some areas, military
courts--many of which were established by rebel armies during the late
1970s--were the only operating courts. In the 1980s, the government was
working to reassert civilian jurisdiction over these areas.
Chad's Supreme Court was abolished following the coup in 1975 and had
not been reestablished by 1988. The highest court in the land was the
Court of State Security, comprising eight justices, including both
civilians and military officers, all appointed by the president. In
addition, a court of appeals in N'Djamena reviewed decisions of lower
courts, and a special court of justice established in 1984 heard cases
involving the misappropriation of public funds.
Criminal courts convened in N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, and Ab�ch�,
and criminal judges traveled to other towns when necessary. In addition,
each of the fourteen prefectures had a magistrate's court, in which
civil cases and minor criminal cases were tried. In 1988 forty-three
justices of the peace served as courts of first resort in some areas.
Chad also had an unofficial but widely accepted system of Islamic
sharia courts in the north and east, which had operated for a century or
more. Most cases involved family obligations and religious teachings. In
other areas, traditional custom required family elders to mediate
disputes involving members of their descent group, i.e., men and women
related to them through sons and brothers. Civil courts often considered
traditional law and community sentiment in decisions, and the courts
sometimes sought the advice of local leaders in considering evidence and
rendering verdicts.
Chad - POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Factionalism
Chad's political environment in the 1980s was a fluid, changing
network, bearing the imprint of centuries of factional dynamics.
Traditional authority has generally been diffuse, rather than
concentrated in a single individual for an entire society. Clusters of
descent groups defined the society in many areas. Factions arose when
descent groups clashed, and strong leaders sought kin-group support in
confronting one another. Social norms focused on preventing conflict
through family law, religion, and authority relations, and a key feature
of factional strife was the reunion that eventually followed many
violent clashes.
As a result of these traditional beliefs and practices, many Chadians
viewed politics according to a segmentary model of descent group
fragmentation. They scorned the idea that national leaders, in fixed
terms of office, could demand loyalties, regardless of the issues
involved. From their perspective, centralizing power and authority
served to deny, rather than to implement, democratic principles. In
Chad, as in other faction-ridden political systems, opposition and
alliance were constantly recalculated, as costs and benefits to the
individual or kin-group were weighed. Politics were often blurred and
not defined in terms of distinct bipolar rivalries.
Factional fragmentation in Chad occurred in response to predictable
issues, such as France's postcolonial role, relations with Libya, the
value of negotiation versus armed confrontation, and ethnic and regional
balances of power. Rifts also resulted from basic disagreements over
policy decisions, forms of retaliation against rivals, and personality
clashes. Reconciliation often brought former rivals together in the face
of a more threatening opponent.
Factions assumed particular importance after independence because of
Chad's diverse ethnic groups, the traditional scorn for centralized
authority, the weak impact of central government policies in the north,
and the generally inadequate infrastructure that impeded communication
among regions. Most important, northern resentment found its expression
in numerous strong leaders--in effect, warlords--but instead of
organizing under a strong warlord to secede, factional armies in the
north sought to wrest control from the government and from each other.
Hissein Habr� is an example of a leader whose career has
demonstrated skill as a factional strategist. He entered politics after
returning from graduate study in France in 1971, but he abandoned his
original post in the Tombalbaye government to join the opposition
FROLINAT. In this organization, he had personality clashes with a number
of leaders, including FROLINAT's ideologue, Abba Siddick. In 1972 Habr�
formed an army of his own, allied with fellow northerner Goukouni
Oueddei, in opposition to Siddick. Habr� and Goukouni managed a fragile
alliance for more than three years, despite differences in style and
ability. Habr� negotiated a large ransom payment from Paris for French
hostages he and Goukouni kidnapped in 1974, but by the time the hostages
were released in 1977, Habr� and Goukouni had ended their alliance.
This arrangement did not last because Habr� clashed with Malloum
over regional and policy issues. Their confrontation allowed Goukouni to
seize the capital and declare himself head of state. As minister of
national defense, veterans, and war victims in Goukouni's regime, Habr�
continued to clash with his northern rival over policy, style, and,
increasingly, over Libyan involvement in Chad. Habr� fled N'Djamena
and, with French and United States support, returned to oust Goukouni as
head of state in June 1982.
Habr� decided he would form alliances only from a position of
strength, and he proceeded to defeat, intimidate, or co-opt a number of
rebel leaders. He then moved to end factional strife, curb the nation's
continuing violence, and extend the reach of government into the
countryside. As of 1988, he had been fairly successful in his dual
pursuit of national reunification and reconciliation. He had
consolidated his control of Chad's fractious population through both
military and political tactics, and, following the example of his
predecessors, he had strengthened the executive branch of government and
postponed democratic reforms. Habr�'s authoritarian rule outweighed the
nation's strong centrifugal tendencies, but just barely. He defeated
numerous rebel armies between 1983 and 1987, and as a result of these
clashes, the disarray among his opponents, and French financial
assistance, he won over most former opponents.
Among those groups that rallied to Habr�'s government was the Action
Committee of the Democratic Revolutionary Council (Comit� d'Action et
de Concertation du Conseil D�mocratique R�volutionnaire--CAC-CDR),
founded in 1984 as the intellectual wing of the opposition CDR. Under
the leadership of Mahamat Senoussi Khatir, it declared support for Habr�
in 1985. The People's Armed Forces (Forces Arm�es Populaires--FAP), a
former FROLINAT faction led by Goukouni, also declared support for Habr�
in October 1986, although Goukouni remained outside the country,
attempting to negotiate a dignified return. Goukouni's one-time vice
president and leader of the Chadian Armed Forces (Forces Arm�es
Tchadiennes-- FAT), Wadel Abdelkader Kamougu�, was Habr�'s minister of
agriculture and rural development in 1988. The Democratic Front of Chad
(Front D�mocratique du Tchad--FDT) was also won over by Habr�. The FDT
was a coalition of groups formed in Paris in 1985 in opposition to both
Goukouni and Habr�. Led by General Negu� Djogo, the FDT shifted its
support to Habr� later that year. Djogo became Habr�'s minister of
justice in early 1986 and was shifted to minister of transportation and
civil aviation in mid-1988. Two other former FDT leaders also joined the
government, one as minister of finance and the other as minister of
culture, youth, and sports.
Several factions of codos, or commandos, were also convinced
to rally to the government. Codos were southern rebel
formations nominally united under the leadership of Colonel Alphonse
Kotiga. Many of them declared their support for Habr� during 1985 and
1986. Other small groups also rallied to Habr�'s government in 1986 and
1987, including the Democratic and Popular National Assembly
(Rassemblement National D�mocratique et Populaire--RNDP) and the
Assembly for Unity and Chadian Democracy (Rassemblement pour l'Unit� et
la D�mocratie Tchadienne--RUDT).
A number of groups remained actively opposed to the government in
1988. Several of these formed a coalition, the Supreme Council of the
Revolution (Conseil Supr�me de la R�volution--CSR) in 1985. The CSR
included nominally united remnants of GUNT, which had controlled the
national government under Goukouni's leadership from 1979 to 1982.
Goukouni disappeared from the GUNT command while he negotiated
unsuccessfully to return to Chad on his own terms in 1987. In 1988 he
proclaimed his allegiance to Habr� but soon thereafter announced the
reorganization of the GUNT alliance under his command.
Another group in the CSR, the was founded in 1979 by Acyl Ahmat but
in 1988 led by Acheikh ibn Oumar. The CDR formed the core of Habr�'s
opposition in 1988, following military and political losses by GUNT.
Also opposed to the government in 1988 were the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Chad (Mouvement Populaire pour la Lib�ration du
Tchad--MPLT), which had broken away from FAP under Aboubakar Abdel
Rahmane's leadership, and its splinter group, the Western Armed Forces
(Forces Arm�es Occidentales--FAO); several factions of FROLINAT,
including those led by Hadjero Senoussi and Abdelkader Yacine; and the
Movement for the National Salvation of Chad (Mouvement pour le Salut
National du Tchad--MOSANAT), led by Boda Maldoun. MOSANAT, a
Hajerai-based organization, maintained its antigovernment stance through
several administrations. No remaining rebel army, by itself, posed an
immediate threat to Habr�'s regime.
Chad - National Union for Independence and Revolution
Habr�'s political support came primarily from northerners, the army
that brought him to power, and civilians who admired his tough stand on
such issues as opposition to Libyan interference in Chadian affairs. To
broaden his support, in 1984 he undertook a program to extend the reach
of government into rural areas, first by seeking the advice of the
nation's prefects. Southern prefects advised that in addition to
lingering animosity based on the early association of FAN with FROLINAT,
which had worked to oust the southern-based government of Tombalbaye, a
major concern in that region was the conduct of the army. The army had
become, in effect, an obstacle to security.
In 1984 Habr� dissolved the CCFAN and established a political party,
UNIR. Habr� retained broad power to control the party agenda, and he
appointed military officers to nine of the fourteen positions on the
party's Executive Bureau, which served as the primary liaison between
the party and the government. To placate the south, six posts were
allocated to southerners.
UNIR was designed primarily to mobilize and inspire popular
participation in government and to enable the president to control that
participation. Other important goals were to increase the civilian
emphasis in government and, finally, to achieve peace between north and
south. The party invoked national values such as brotherhood and
solidarity, individual respect, confidence, and "healthy criticism
and self-criticism." It also developed a repertoire of songs,
chants, and sayings intended to bolster these aims.
The eighty-member UNIR Central Committee was important in extending
the reach of the party throughout the nation. For this purpose, it
employed groups of about sixty agents (animateurs) and ten
organizers (encadreurs) in each prefecture to convert apathetic
and war-weary citizens into party activists. Militant UNIR recruiters
delivered public speeches on the need for unity, peace, and progress
through the party organization and for reduced Libyan influence in Chad.
They also helped recruit members to party affiliates, such as youth
groups, women's organizations, and trade associations.
The main political impact of UNIR by 1988 was to maintain a cadre of
elites on the periphery of the government. The party was successful at
orchestrating political displays but had not inspired widespread
loyalty. People generally remained skeptical of the ability of
government to improve their lives. Rural citizens in particular had seen
few benefits of national development and feared that the government's
inevitable urban bias would make life even harsher for them.
The party's effectiveness as a democratic forum was hampered by the
fact that the president controlled its agenda. UNIR provided very
limited opportunities for debating government policy and had little
patronage to dispense, except its own offices. It served primarily to
convey to the president a sense of popular opinion and to reassure him
that his government was not entirely out of touch with its constituency.
In this role, UNIR usurped much of the limited power of the interim
legislature, the CNC, and left the appointed legislators to act
primarily as bureaucratic housekeepers. Habr� reportedly intended to
allow for greater democratic participation at some time in the future,
but before doing so, he hoped to provide sufficient political
indoctrination to guarantee support for party aims.
In 1988 Habr� proclaimed his intention to convert UNIR into a
people's party, a "revolutionary vanguard," for the purpose of
grass-roots political mobilization. To begin this task, he created the
People's Revolutionary Militia (Milice Populaire de la R�volution--MPR),
but the MPR was not yet operational in mid-1988. As head of the UNIR
Executive Bureau, the president was to appoint the leader of the MPR and
control its agenda.
The MPR mandate was to reach people through the local party
organization in each of the nation's administrative divisions. This
structure--subdivided into groups, subgroups, sectors, and subsectors
corresponding to the nation's prefectures, subprefectures,
administrative posts, and cantons--was intended to provide UNIR with an
apparatus for enforcing its decisions and a forum for promoting its
programs. It would also augment the government's internal security
apparatus.
Chad - Political Style
During his first six years as president, Habr�'s style of governing
was essentially to juxtapose spheres of influence, including the Council
of Ministers, a few close advisers, and personal friends and relatives,
all of whom sought to influence presidential decision making. Habr� was
at the center of these spheres, each of which coalesced around his
agenda. His political strategy was based on a segmentary model that
exploited Chad's traditionally fluid, factional political dynamics.
Habr� understood factional dynamics on several levels, first as one
of the Toubou herdsmen among whom he was born and whose livelihood had
for centuries depended on manipulation of the social system to their
advantage, and as a Western-educated member of a small elite, whose
political longevity depended on his ability to broker alliances. Habr�
used this traditional and modern background in his efforts to craft a
stable nation out of a divided state torn by factional strife.
That people were tired of war also contributed to Habr�'s political
successes in his first six years as president. A combination of
resignation and opportunism brought former opponents into alliance with
the president, who often was simply more tenacious than they were. To
most of these former opponents, Habr�'s authoritarian regime was
preferable to a return to civil war. Factional disputes were not always
resolved; sometimes they were submerged and could be expected to recur.
Habr�'s military style was characterized as smart, tough, and
decisive. Observers described him as a pragmatic military leader,
undeterred by bureaucratic and political niceties and undistracted by
sentiment, ideology, or foreign entanglements. Although he had a sizable
following among civilians, as of 1988 he still governed largely as a
military officer. He had not made the shift in style from supervising a
military bureaucracy, in which orders were given and obeyed, to
overseeing a civilian government that required broad consensus
formation. Political communication was generally one directional, from
the president down.
Habr� established a reputation for ignoring seniority in making
assignments, and, as a result, officers sometimes reported to their
juniors when working on specific projects. One military commander,
Hassane Djamouss, whose 1987 successes led to the rout of Libyan forces
from much of the north, became a well-known example of this feature of
Habr�'s style. Djamouss was a former minister of the civil service,
trained as a livestock technician, but correctly judged by Habr� to be
a master strategist.
Habr� also developed the reputation as a manager who set overall
goals for his subordinates and left the mechanics of accomplishing those
goals to lower-level managers. This decentralized responsibility and
decision-making authority accorded well with traditional values of
individualism held by many Chadian ethnic groups, and it had worked well
in many military settings. A by-product of this feature of Habr�'s
style was that officials with delegated responsibility commonly bypassed
bureaucratic regulations in order to accomplish their goal. Adhering to
the chain of command was not the measure of success in Chad's government
of the 1980s.
Habr� made several cautious attempts to bring peripheral ethnic
groups into the political process. Most high civilian and military
appointments were from his own or a closely related ethnic group, but he
appointed southerners and other non-Toubou civilians to several
executive and administrative positions, despite occasional bureaucratic
snarls that resulted from these attempts at national reconciliation.
Faced with internal threats to his regime, Habr�'s reaction was
essentially repressive. Political opponents were often imprisoned or had
their travel restricted. He broadened intelligence-gathering networks
within the military (in 1986, for example, in response to growing
opposition within the army) and expanded the power of the Presidential
Guard. At the same time, he believed in his own power to
"rehabilitate" and co-opt former opponents and was sometimes
successful in gaining a measure of their trust.
During its first nearly three decades of independence, Chad had a
strong president and weak state institutions, but it also enjoyed some
benefits of the weakness of the state. It had been spared much of the
flamboyant political posturing that was evident in a few more peaceful
and prosperous nations. Habr� had not squandered public resources on
grandiose monuments to himself, nor had he encouraged a sycophantic cult
of personality. Public office was not yet synonymous with extraordinary
wealth, and, as a result, public cynicism toward government in the 1980s
was surprisingly low.
Chad - Mass Media
Communication across Chad's troubled regional boundaries was
difficult in the late 1980s. Even telephone service was erratic and
subject to frequent interruption. Media development had been slowed by
security problems, infrastructural weakness, and general economic
disarray. During the 1980s, some UN assistance was earmarked for
improving print and broadcast media, but in a few cases, damaged
equipment was destroyed as soon as it was repaired, and in general
progress was slow.
In 1988 Chad's only radio station, Radiodiffusion Nationale
Tchadienne (RNT), was able to reach the entire country through
transmitters located at N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, and Ab�ch�. RNT's Voix
de la unit� et du progr�s (Voice of Unity and Progress) broadcast
news in French three times a day, as well as a variety of programs in
Chadian Arabic and several local languages. Estimates of the number of
radio receivers operating in Chad in the late 1980s ranged from 100,000
to 1 million. No television service was available, but in September 1988
France agreed to provide CFA F185 million to install a television
station at N'Djamena to reach the surrounding area.
Print media, too, were limited by their lack of capital and equipment
and by travel and communications difficulties. In 1988 the
government-owned Chadian Press Agency (Agence Tchadienne de Presse)
published a daily bulletin, Info-Tchad, in French, but its
circulation was only 1,500. The UNIR information office also published a
weekly newsletter, Al Watan, in French and Arabic. French
newspapers such as Le Monde were also available, and government
communiqu�s were circulated in most cities.
All media were owned and controlled by the government. Even the
underground publication of antigovernment views was relatively rare,
although Radio Barda� broadcast antigovernment views on behalf of
opposition groups, usually in Chadian Arabic. Chad's small journalistic
community looked forward to the improvement of nationwide media as a
means of educating and unifying the population.
Chad - FOREIGN RELATIONS
Chad lacked established channels for foreign policy debate in the
late 1980s. Few people were accustomed to formulating or expressing
foreign policy concerns beyond the desire for peace and an end to
foreign intervention. As a result, Chad's foreign policy reflected its
colonial past, economic and military needs, and the quest for national
sovereignty. Habr�'s overall plan for reinforcing national sovereignty
was to eliminate Libyan intervention in the north, to reduce the
nation's dependence on France, and, eventually, to proclaim a democratic
state of Chad. Consistent with its liberal economy and relatively small
public sector, Chad's foreign policy was pro-Western in the 1980s, but
the basis for this orientation was rooted in its dependence on Western
military assistance and foreign aid and investment, rather than on
popular concern about superpower rivalries. Habr� maintained in 1988
that the spread of communism posed a threat to Africa, but he intended,
nonetheless, to assert Chad's nonalignment and autonomy from the West
once peace with its neighbors was established.
After independence, Chad's importance in Africa increased, although
its new stature derived more from its weaknesses than its strengths. It
struggled to establish and maintain sovereignty within its boundaries,
as Libya claimed a portion of northern Chad. Numerous dissidents within
Chad considered Libyan domination preferable to Habr�'s administration
of the 1980s or continued dependence on France. Some neighboring states
hoped Chad would solve its internal problems and serve as a buffer
against Libyan advances into the Sahel, pacify its warring rebel armies, and avoid destabilizing
their regimes. Other neighboring states, especially Libya and Nigeria,
hoped to exploit Chad's mineral wealth, and most of Chad's Arab
neighbors saw it as a potential ally in the effort to weaken Western
influence on the continent.
Libya and France were the key power brokers in Chad. Chad's relations
with these two nations were interrelated throughout the 1980s,
complementing one another in many instances. France's ties with its
former colony were rooted in historical, economic, political, and
security issues. Libya's long-standing ties with Chad, conversely, had
cultural, ethnic, and religious bases--less important to governments but
more so to many people in northern Chad. France and Libya also
formulated policies toward Chad in the context of their own ambivalent
relationship. France imported Libyan oil at favorable prices and
assisted Libya's burgeoning military institutions yet faced the dilemma
of arming both sides in the dispute over the Aozou Strip.
Within this foreign relations triangle, Chad's national leaders
confronted many of the foreign policy issues that plagued the entire
continent in the 1980s--the legacy of arbitrary colonial boundaries, the
perceived need for strong armies to defend them, continuing postcolonial
dependence, questions regarding the role of Islam in a secular state,
and the problem of establishing African forms of democracy under these
conditions. Viewed in this light, Chad's political environment was a
microcosm of Africa's international concerns.
Chad - Relations with France
Chad's relations with Libya, arising out of centuries of ethnic,
religious, and commercial ties, were more complex than those with
France. Under French and Italian colonial domination, respectively, Chad
and Libya had diverged in orientation and development. But even after
Chad's independence in 1960, many northerners still identified more
closely with people in Libya than with the southern-dominated government
in N'Djamena. After seizing power in 1969, Libyan head of state Qadhaafi
reasserted Libya's claim to the Aozou Strip, a 100,000-square-kilometer
portion of northern Chad that included the small town of Aozou. Libya
based its claim on one of several preindependence agreements regarding
colonial boundaries, and it bolstered these claims by stationing troops
in the Aozou Strip beginning in 1972. (Maps printed in Libya after 1975
included the Aozou Strip within Libya.)
Qadhaafi's desire to annex the Aozou Strip grew out of an array of
concerns, including the region's reported mineral wealth. He also hoped
to establish a friendly government in Chad and to extend Islamic
influence into the Sahel through Chad and Sudan, with the eventual aim
of a Central African Islamic empire.
A complex set of symbolic interests also underlay Libya's pursuit of
territory and influence in the Sahel. Qadhaafi's anticolonial and
antiimperialist rhetoric vacillated between attacks on the United States
and a campaign focused on the postcolonial European presence in Africa.
He hoped to weaken Chad's ties with the West and thereby reduce Africa's
incorporation into the Western-dominated nation-state system. Forcing
the revision of one of the colonially devised boundaries affirmed by the
OAU in 1963 was a step in this direction--one that seemed possible in
the context of the troubled nation of Chad, which OAU members dubbed the
continent's "weakest link."
Qadhaafi attempted alliances with a number of antigovernment rebel
leaders in Chad during the 1970s, including Goukouni, Siddick, Acyl
Ahmat (a Chadian of Arab descent), and Kamougu�, a southerner. Goukouni
and Acyl were most sympathetic to Qadhaafi's regional ambitions, but
these two men clashed in 1979, leading Acyl to form the CDR. After
Acyl's death in 1982, Libyan support swung strongly to Goukouni's GUNT.
By mid-1988 Qadhaafi appeared more willing to come to an agreement
with Habr� than to continue to support Qadhaafi's fractious allies, who
had suffered losses at Habr�'s hands. Chadian and Libyan foreign
ministers met in August 1988, and the two governments agreed to further
talks. At the same time, Libyan troops remained in the Aozou Strip, and
its future status was uncertain.
Chad - Relations with Nigeria and Sudan
Within the complex and changing foreign relations triangle comprising
Chad, France, and Libya, the large nations of Nigeria and Sudan were
also important actors. Nigeria considered France its primary rival in
its attempt to chart the course of West Africa's political development.
Its generally paternalistic relations with Chad intensified after the
coup that ousted President Tombalbaye in 1975. After that, limiting
Libyan expansion while avoiding direct clashes with Libyan troops also
became important goals. Nigeria sponsored talks among Chad's rival
factions in 1979 and promoted a little-known civil servant, Mahmat Shawa
Lol, as a compromise head of a coalition government. Lol's perceived
status as a Nigerian puppet contributed to mounting opposition during
his short term as president in 1979.
The two nations forged stronger ties during the 1980s. Hoping to
benefit commercially and diplomatically by expanding regional trade
relations, Nigeria replaced France as Chad's major source of export
revenues. Bilateral trade agreements involved Chadian exports of
livestock, dried fish, and chemicals and imports of Nigerian foodstuffs
and manufactured goods. Both governments also recognized the potential
value of the large informal trade sector across their borders, which
neither country regulated. In addition, Nigerian industry and commerce
employed several thousand Chadians workers.
Chad's relationship with Nigeria was not without its strains,
however. Beginning in the late 1970s, clashes occurred around Lake Chad,
where both countries hoped to exploit oil reserves. Both also sought to
defuse these confrontations, first by establishing joint patrols and a
commission to demarcate the boundary across the lake more clearly. Then
in the early 1980s, the low level of Lake Chad brought a series of tiny
islands into view, leading to further disputes and disrupting
long-standing informal trade networks.
This relationship was also complicated by Nigeria's own instability
in the north, generated by rising Islamic fundamentalism. Thousands of
casualties occurred as the result of violent clashes in Nigeria
throughout the 1980s. Most religious violence was domestic in origin,
but Nigerian police arrested a few Libyans, and Nigerian apprehension of
Libyan infiltration through Chad intensified.
Nigeria's 1983 economic austerity campaign also produced strains with
neighboring states, including Chad. Nigeria expelled several hundred
thousand foreign workers, mostly from its oil industry, which faced
drastic cuts as a result of declining world oil prices. At least 30,000
of those expelled were Chadians. Despite these strains, however,
Nigerians had assisted in the halting process of achieving stability in
Chad, and both nations reaffirmed their intention to maintain close
ties.
Sudan, Chad's neighbor to the east, responded to Chad's conflict with
Libya based on its own regional, ethnic, and cultural tensions. In
Sudan, the Islamic northern region had generally dominated the
non-Muslim south. Sudan's ties with Libya, although cautious during the
1970s, warmed during the 1980s, strengthening N'Djamena's fears of
insurgency from the east.
The populations of eastern Chad and western Sudan established social
and religious ties long before either nation's independence, and these
remained strong despite disputes between governments. Herdsmen in both
countries freely crossed the 950-kilometer border, seeking pastureland
and water sources as they had for centuries. Muslims in eastern Chad
often traveled through Sudan on the hajj, or annual pilgrimage to Mecca,
and many young people from eastern Chad studied at Islamic schools in
Sudan. In addition, Sudan's cotton plantations employed an estimated
500,000 Chadian workers in 1978.
At the same time, the basis for political enmity between these two
nations was set in the early 1960s, when Chad's southern bias in
government offended many Sudanese Muslims. Sudan allowed FROLINAT rebels
to organize, train, and establish bases in western Sudan and to conduct
raids into Chad from Sudan's Darfur Province. Refugees from both
countries fled across their mutual border.
Following the coup that ousted Tombalbaye in 1975, relations between
presidents Jaafar an Numayri and Malloum were surprisingly cordial, in
part because both nations feared Libyan destabilization. Sudan sponsored
talks among Chad's rebel army leaders in the late 1970s and urged
Malloum to incorporate them into his government. (Numayri promoted the
talents and intelligence of Habr�, in particular, and persuaded Malloum
to appoint Habr� to political office in 1978.) These ties were strained
in part because of Numayri's warming relations with Libyan leader
Qadhaafi.
As violence in Chad increased between 1979 and 1982, Sudan faced its
own internal rebellion, and relations deteriorated after Numayri was
ousted in 1983. In 1988 Habr� assailed Sudan for allowing Libyan troops
to be stationed along Chad's border and for continuing to allow assaults
on Chadian territory from Sudan.
Chad - Relations with Other African States
Chad maintained generally close ties with its other African
neighbors, but the primary base of these ties were Chad's economic and
security needs, together with other governments' concerns for regional
stability. Overall, African states sought to protect their own
interests--to isolate or contain Chad's continuing violence without
becoming involved militarily. As France was attempting to transfer more
responsibility to former colonies and subregional powers, francophone
African leaders urged each other and the former colonial power to
increase assistance to Chad. Each side partially succeeded.
African states had other reasons for ambivalence toward Chad in
addition to their own security concerns. Chad's long-standing unrest,
border conflicts, overall instability, and poverty contributed to its
image as a relatively unimportant ally. It underwent frequent shifts in
government; from 1979 to 1982, it was not always clear who was in
charge. In 1982 Chad's new president, Habr�, appeared to some African
heads of state to be a Pariseducated northerner with aristocratic
pretensions, who had not done enough to win their support.
Because of Chad's landlocked status and limited air transport
service, Cameroon was an important neighbor and ally throughout most of
the 1970s and 1980s. Imports and exports were shipped between Yaound�
and N'Djamena by rail and road, as were military and food assistance
shipments. Cameroon became an increasingly important trading partner
during the 1980s, following unsuccessful attempts in the 1970s to
conclude multilateral trade agreements with Congo and Central African
Republic. In 1987 Cameroon was Chad's third largest source of imports
after France and the United States, and Cameroon purchased Chadian
cotton and agricultural products.
The Cameroonian town of Kouss�ri had been an important supply center
and refuge for Chadians during the worst violence of the late 1970s.
The population of the town increased from 10,000 to 100,000 in 1979 and
1980. Cameroon's government urged France to increase assistance to stem
Libyan advances because officials feared direct confrontation with
Libyan troops and the influx of weapons and refugees from Chad.
Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko was one of President Habr�'s most
consistent allies in Central Africa. Even before Habr� seized power in
1982, Mobutu's desire to lead Africa's pro-Western, antiQadhaafi efforts
and to compete with Nigeria as a subregional power had led him to
provide military training and troops for the IAF in Chad.
Chad's relations with Central African Republic were not cordial, but
the two nations were generally on good terms. Central African Republic
controlled another important access route, and the two nations had
concluded a number of agreements regarding trade, transportation, and
communication. Chad's President Tombalbaye had clashed with the former
president of Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, over the
establishment of a central African customs union in the late 1960s,
however, leading Tombalbaye to close their common border. After this
occurrence, Central African Republic remained fairly aloof from Chad's
economic and security problems. Some Chadian refugees crossed into
Central African Republic during the 1980s, but Bangui's major concern
was preventing Chad's ongoing turmoil from spreading across its southern
border.
Niger and Chad shared a number of common features of postindependence
political development, but these two landlocked, poor nations were
unable to contribute noticeably to each other's progress. The
inhabitants of their northern provinces--primarily Tuareg in Niger and
Toubou groups in Chad--were both referred to by Libyan leader Qadhaafi
as his ethnic constituents, and both nations complained of Libyan
insurgence in these mineral-rich areas. At the same time, important
segments of both societies supported Qadhaafi's goal of establishing a
Central African Islamic empire. Both nations also shared the dual
heritage of Muslim and Christian influences and regional economic
inequities, and both found themselves overshadowed by Nigeria's wealth
and large population.
Chad had become one of Africa's intractable dilemmas in the 1970s,
confounding leaders who sought peace and prosperity for the continent as
a whole. Chad's conflict with Libya became symbolic of the OAU's
frustrated attempts to impose a coherent framework on Africa, and it
defied the OAU resolution to uphold colonially imposed boundaries and
settle inter-African disputes peacefully. The OAU formed a series of ad
hoc committees to mediate the ChadLibya dispute, and in 1988 the six
committee members--Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and
Senegal--succeeded in bringing together foreign ministers from Chad and
Libya to pursue diplomatic recognition and peace talks. The committee
also requested written documentation of each side's claims to the Aozou
Strip in the hope of finding a legal channel for curbing violence there.
Chad - Relations with the United States
