BRAZIL'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION from monarchy to de-mocracy has not been
smooth. Following independence in 1822, Brazil, unlike its South
American neighbors, adopted constitutional monarchy as its form of
government. The new nation retained a slave-based, plantation economy,
and political participation remained very limited. After the coronation
of Dom Pedro II (emperor, 1840-89) in 1840, a two-party system based on
the British model--with conservative and liberal parties and frequent
cabinet turnovers--evolved. Within this centralized unitary system, the
emperor appointed the governors, using his prerogatives under the
moderating power (poder moderador--see Glossary) granted by the
1824 constitution, and legislative elections were indirect. Brazil
enjoyed considerable political stability until the 1880s, when the
system proved incapable of accommodating military demands and pressure
to emancipate slaves.
Brazil patterned the constitution of what is now called the Old
Republic (1889-1930) on the United States constitution. However,
colonelism (coronelismo --see Glossary), a political system
based on economic power by large landowners in rural areas, persisted.
Under the new constitution of February 24, 1891, the president, National
Congress (Congresso Nacional; hereafter, Congress), state governors and
legislatures, and local officials were chosen through direct elections.
Following World War I, when Brazil began to undergo rural-urban and
agricultural-industrial transformations, its political system again was
unable to cope with the demands of the urban middle classes and
especially the working classes. The 1929 stock market crash further
exacerbated the volatile situation, and elites from the states of Rio
Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais staged a preemptive revolution and
deposed the old regime. As a result of the revolts of 1930, Get�lio
Dorneles Vargas became president (1930-1945, 1951- 54).
Violent clashes over conflicting ideologies of the left and the right
erupted in the streets of Brazil's major cities in the 1930s. Vargas
tried to strike a balance between the demands of labor and capital
following Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's Carta di Lavoro (see
Glossary) model established in the 1920s. The 1934 constitution
incorporated this model and thus began the politics of corporatism (see
Glossary) in Brazil. In close cooperation with the military, Vargas
pushed for import-substitution industrialization (see Glossary) and a
reduction of military forces under the command of state governments, in
favor of the Brazilian Armed Forces (For�as Armadas Brasileiras).
President Vargas closed Congress in 1937 and ruled as a dictator until
1945.
The 1945-64 period is known for its multiparty democratic politics,
and four presidents were elected freely in 1945, 1950, 1955, and 1960.
In the early 1960s, an explosive combination of slower economic growth,
rising inflation, populism, and nationalism produced political
instability and popular discontent. The major political parties lost
their hegemony, and labor unions accumulated great political influence
over the government of Jo�o Goulart (president, 1961-64).
The military seized power in April 1964 and began twenty-one years of
rule. Under its model of "relative democracy," Congress
remained open, but with greatly reduced powers. Regular elections were
held for Congress, state assemblies, and local offices. However,
presidential, gubernatorial, and some mayoral elections became indirect.
Political parties were allowed to operate, but with two forced
realignments. These were the replacement of the old multiparty system
with a two-party system in 1965 and a system of moderate pluralism, with
six (and later five) parties in 1980. The military regime employed
massive repression from 1969 through 1974.
After the "economic miracle" period (1967-74), Brazil
entered a "stagflation" phase concurrent with political
liberalization. During the military period, Brazilian society had become
70 percent urban; the economy had become industrialized, and more
manufactured goods than primary goods were exported; and about 55
percent of the population had registered to vote. Foreign policy
oscillated between alignment with the United States and pragmatic
independence. A transition to a civilian president took place in 1985.
From 1985 to 1997, Brazil experienced four distinct political models: a
return to the pre-1964 tradition of political bargaining, clientelism
(see Glossary), and economic nationalism under Jos� Sarney (president,
1985-90); neosocial liberalism with economic modernization under
Fernando Collor de Mello (president, 1990-92); an erratic personal style
of social nationalism under Itamar Franco (president, 1992-94); and a
consensus-style social-democratic and neoliberal coalition under
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (president, 1995- ).
Under heavy accusations of corruption, President Collor was impeached
in 1992. His vice president, Franco, used a pragmatic policy of
"muddling through," but in mid-1994 achieved great popularity
with the Real Plan (for value of the real (R$)--see
Glossary), a stabilization program authored by then Minister of Finance
Cardoso. In the 1994 election, Cardoso and the Brazilian Social
Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira--PSDB)
expounded a social-democratic model of modernization, while Luis In�cio
"Lula" da Silva of the Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores--PT) supported a reworked model of corporatist or
syndicalist socialism. The Real Plan was instrumental in the
election of Cardoso as president.
Cardoso was inaugurated as president on January 1, 1995. The
transition to the new government was nearly perfect. Cardoso had won an
outright victory in the first-round election. He had potentially strong
support blocs in the Chamber of Deputies (C�mara dos Deputados) and
Federal Senate (Senado Federal; hereafter, Senate). He had strong
support from a majority of the newly elected governors, including those
from the important states of Minas Gerais, S�o Paulo, and Rio de
Janeiro, which elected governors from the president's own PSDB.
Moreover, the December 1994 inflation rate was less than 1 percent;
unemployment was low; and popular expectations were extremely high.
Perhaps the most important task of the Cardoso government in 1995 was
to promote the reform of key sections of the 1988 constitution in order
to reduce the role of the state in the economy, reform the federal
bureaucracy, reorganize the social security system, rework federalist
relationships, overhaul the complicated tax system, and effect electoral
and party reforms to strengthen the representation of political parties.
The new Cardoso government initiated constitutional reform (which
requires a three-fifths majority of each house), but soon met with stiff
congressional resistance. Because of the 1996 municipal elections and
other political impediments, the other reforms--administrative, social
security, and fiscal--were stalled in Congress, awaiting passage in
1997.
<>Political Culture
Many aspects of Brazil's political system may be explained by its
political culture (see Glossary), the origins of which may be found in
traditional rural society during the colonial and independence periods
through 1930. This political culture evolved into three styles of
politics. Under the more traditional style of politics, coronelismo,
the local coronel (colonel), in alliance with other large
farmers, controlled the votes of rural workers and their families. The
local political chiefs in turn exchanged votes with politicians at the
state level in return for political appointments and public works in
their municipalities (munic�pios ).
As rural-urban migration increased after 1930, a transitional style
of clientelistic politics emerged in medium-size and large-size cities.
Under this system, neighborhood representatives of urban politicians
would help recent migrants resolve their problems in exchange for votes.
These representatives were usually from "clientele
professions," such as medical doctors, dentists, and pharmacists.
The third style of mass politics involved a direct populist appeal to
the voter by the politician, without formal intermediation by
clientelism or domination by coronelismo . Research in the
early 1990s revealed that in most cases voter decision making has been
influenced by a mixture of the second and third styles, as well as by
peer groups, opinion leaders, and television soap operas (telenovelas
).
Polling results since the early 1970s have revealed changing public
opinion concerning the relative merits of military government versus
democracy. For example, the proportion of Brazilians favorable to
military government decreased from 79 percent in 1972 to 36 percent in
1990. Moreover, 70 percent of Brazilians agreed in 1990 that the
government should not use troops against striking workers, as compared
with only 7 percent in 1972. In a March 1995 poll conducted by the
Datafolha agency, however, only 46 percent of Brazilians responded that
"democracy is always preferred over dictatorship," as compared
with 59 percent endorsing the same proposition in March 1993. The
relatively low crime rates during the military period may be a factor in
the shift in public opinion regarding democracy.
Brazil has a diversity of regional political cultures. Politics in
the states of the Northeast (Nordeste) and North (Norte) are much more
dependent on political benevolence from Bras�lia than are the states of
the South (Sul) and Southeast (Sudeste). Because Brazil's southernmost
state, Rio Grande do Sul, suffered three civil wars and was involved
frequently in political conflicts in the R�o de la Plata areas, its
population holds strong political loyalties. As a result, the Liberal
Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal--PFL) and the PSDB have very
limited penetration in Rio Grande do Sul. Both parties are considered
traitors: the PFL had splintered from the military regime's Democratic
Social Party (Partido Democr�tico Social--PDS) in 1984, and the PSDB
had broken from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do
Movimento Democr�tico Brasileiro--PMDB) in 1988.
In the Southeast state of Minas Gerais, politics is conducted in a
very cautious, calculated manner. Politicians there are known for their
ability to negotiate and cut bargains, and they have political
"adversaries" rather than enemies. In the western frontier
states, politics is constantly evolving, because of the continuous
inward migration from other regions. Most politicians and voters are
newcomers with no local political roots or traditions.
The Southeast states of Rio de Janeiro and S�o Paulo have received
large influxes of rural-urban and north-south migration since the 1950s.
Because of higher levels of industrialization, per capita income, labor
union membership, and education, the level of political consciousness is
higher in these states than in those to the north and west.
As a result of intense rural-urban migration since 1960, urban voters
have increased from fewer than 30 percent to more than 70 percent of the
population in 1994. In 1960 only 22 percent (15.5 million) of Brazil's
population was registered to vote; by 1994 more than 60 percent (nearly
95 million) of the population was enfranchised. The new migrants to
urban areas quickly enhanced their political consciousness through
television, increased schooling, and membership in new associations,
such as labor unions.
Brazil - Constitutional Framework
Brazil has had eight constitutions since independence in 1822,
beginning with the constitution of March 25, 1824. The republican
constitution promulgated on February 24, 1891, was very similar to the
United States constitution, containing separation of powers, checks and
balances, a bicameral legislature, federalism, and direct elections.
Concepts of corporatism and centralization from Italy and Portugal
influenced the 1934 and 1937 constitutions. The return to representative
democracy in 1945-46 produced a more balanced, liberal document, which
maintained a considerable role for the state in the nation's economy.
Military rule after 1964 forced an uneasy balance between "relative
democracy" and the "safeguards of a national security
state," reflected in the 1967 and 1969 constitutions.
After 1964 the government of Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castelo
Branco (president, 1964-67) issued four institutional acts and a series
of complementary acts and decrees that severely compromised the 1946
constitution. Outgoing President Castelo Branco also convoked a
lame-duck Congress in December 1966 and January 1967 to approve a new
constitution drafted by his legal team. The 1967 constitution removed
some important autocratic powers accorded the first military president.
This 1967 constitution soon became an anathema to the military, and
the government of General Arthur da Costa e Silva (president, 1967-69)
decreed the Fifth Institutional Act in December 1968, which allowed the
regime to close Congress and begin a third wave of political purges (cassa��es
). Before his incapacitating stroke in August 1969, Costa e Silva and
his vice president, Pedro Aleixo, had apparently begun drafting a new
constitution. The fourth military president, General Ernesto Geisel
(president, 1974-79), decreed the end of the Fifth Institutional Act in
January 1979.
In 1985, the first year of Jos� Sarney's term, Congress approved the
convocation of the National Constituent Assembly (Assembl�ia Nacional
Constituinte--ANC) to draft a new constitution. Elected on November 15,
1986, and seated in February 1987, the ANC adopted a "from
scratch" participatory methodology. Using this methodology, the ANC
divided itself into eight committees and twenty-four subcommittees to
draft respective sections of the document, and it held public hearings
on suggested content. After twenty months of deliberation and two rounds
of voting, the ANC produced the 1988 "citizen constitution,"
which was promulgated on October 5, 1988.
The majority party, the PMDB, was not united during the ANC. After
the drafting committee produced a "progressive" first draft,
the PMDB's center and right wings joined conservatives from other
parties to form the conservative coalition, the Big Center (Centr�o),
in December 1987, to alter the internal rules governing first-round
voting. The Big Center prevailed on some crucial votes, such as
maintaining the presidential system and making Sarney's presidential
term five years rather than four. However, plagued with absenteeism it
was defeated in other areas, such as the economic order.
The result is a mixed document with certain inconsistencies. Very
liberal in the section dealing with basic human rights, the constitution
also enhances "social rights," such as retirement after
thirty-five years of service, job stability for public employees, and
four months of paid maternity leave. It maintains a strong role for the
state in the economy and distinguishes between foreign and national
capital enterprises.
The ANC maintained the skewed representational plan favoring Brazil's
underdeveloped regions. It also created three very small states--Amap�,
Roraima, and Tocantins--with sixteen additional deputies and nine new
senators, while granting S�o Paulo ten more deputies. The states have
considerable autonomy in certain areas, such as maintaining state banks,
but the federal constitution is very centralized regarding election of
state officials, mandates, and government organization.
The ANC was able to pass many controversial articles using bland
wording and a final reference to "future regulation by ordinary
legislation." Some 300 areas of the new constitution were not
automatically applicable and awaited such "regulation" in
subsequent legislative sessions (1989-90, 1991-92, 1993-94, 1995-96, and
1997-98). Thus, the constitution is incomplete.
The first draft of the constitution was based on a mixed
parliamentary presidential model similar to that of Portugal and France,
but a crucial vote taken on March 22, 1988, reinstated the pure
presidential model. The redrafting to incorporate this major change was
incomplete, however, and several vestiges of the mixed parliamentary
system remained. Most notable was the provisional measure (medida
provis�ria --MP), a sort of temporary decree, which replaced the
presidential decree law. Whereas the decree law took effect only after
thirty days of inaction by the legislature, the MP takes effect
immediately. Although the MP ceased to exist after thirty days of
legislative inaction, the president could reissue it for successive
thirty-day periods. This power was formidable, especially for a
president not commanding an absolute majority in Congress. In early
1997, however, the Senate approved an amendment extending an MP's
validity from thirty to ninety days but prohibiting additional
extensions and the use of MPs to create ministries or other government
entities.
The 1988 constitution required each state to rewrite its constitution
within one year (during 1989) and each municipality to elaborate its
Organic Law (during 1990), which defines how it operates. In 1991 the
Federal District (Bras�lia) drafted its Organic Law, and the new states
of Amap�, Roraima, and Tocantins drafted their new constitutions.
ANC members agreed that a very detailed constitution would require
frequent revisions to keep pace with an ever-changing society and
economy. Thus, Article 3 of the transitional provisions provided that
after five years the Congress could be converted into a unicameral
assembly for constitutional revision, deliberating by absolute majority
instead of by the three-fifths margin in each house normally required
for the amendment process. In addition, Article 2 of the transitional
provisions called for a national plebiscite to decide on the form of
government (republic or constitutional monarchy) and the system of
government (presidential or parliamentary). A constitutional amendment
formally setting the plebiscite for April 21, 1992, passed the Chamber
of Deputies. However, in late 1991, during the second round of voting in
the Senate, President Collor intervened to ensure defeat, fearing
negative consequences for his already beleaguered government. The
plebiscite was finally held on April 21, 1993, and the presidential
republic was confirmed by a wide margin.
The revision of the constitution scheduled for late 1993 and early
1994 took place, but with meager results. Factors hindering
constitutional revision included aftershocks from a congressional
financial scandal ("Budgetgate") exposed by the Congressional
Investigating Committee (Comiss�o Parlamentar de Inqu�rito--CPI); the
October 3, 1994, elections; strong pressure from nationalist and
corporatist groups in defense of state enterprises, job stability, and
national firms; and nonparticipatory methodology (see Glossary). As of
May 1994, the only major change to the constitution was to shorten the
presidential term from five to four years. The next attempt to
thoroughly revise the 1988 constitution was begun in February 1995, but
by the regular amendment process (three-fifths majority in both houses).
Some members would like to use the 1998 elections to again convoke (as
in 1987-88) a "constitutional revision Congress" in 1999, to
do a revision by a unicameral, absolute majority (see Constitutional
Reform, this ch.).
Brazil - Structure of Government
Executive-branch reorganizations are frequent in Brazil, as each
president seeks to impose his personal style and to incorporate
political bargains struck. President Sarney expanded the cabinet to a
record twenty-seven ministries. His successor, President Collor,
embarked on a massive reorganization, reducing the number of ministries
to twelve, abolishing many agencies, and firing some 80,000 federal
employees. In a reorganization of his cabinet in early 1992, Collor was
forced to dismember several ministries to create new positions in an
effort to enhance political support. President Franco again expanded the
cabinet to twenty-seven positions in October 1992.
In January 1995, President Cardoso installed a cabinet with
twenty-two ministers and the ministerial-rank chief of the Civil
Household of the Presidency and implemented several important changes
(see fig. 12). The Cardoso government charged the new head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with creating a ministry of defense by the end of 1995
(a target that was not met). It also granted three ministerial
positions--Planning, Civil Household, and Finance--superior status in
terms of coordinating and monitoring the other nineteen. In addition,
the government also created a Political Council (Conselho Pol�tico) to
coordinate major political strategy and policy decisions. The council
was composed of the presidents of the parties supporting the government.
Since Jo�o Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (president, 1979-85),
most presidents have attempted to reduce and streamline the executive
branch. President Sarney reorganized the Administrative Department of
Public Service (Departamento Administrativo do Servi�o P�blico--DASP),
created in the 1930s, into the Federal Administration Secretariat
(Secretaria de Administra��o Federal--SAF), which Presidents Collor
and Franco revamped. By 1994 the SAF had achieved moderate success in
consolidating the number of diverse public-service career structures and
salary differentials. Congress passed a new executive-branch civil
service law, the Single Judicial Regime (Regime Jur�dico �nico--RJU),
in December 1990. In addition to the large number of state enterprises
under government control, the executive branch also includes many
autonomous agencies and financial institutions, such as the Bank of
Brazil (Banco do Brasil) and the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econ�mico
Federal).
A president must be a native Brazilian over age thirty-five. From
1945 to 1979, presidents had five-year terms. Following President
Figueiredo's six-year term, the 1988 constitution again set the term at
five years, but the 1994 constitutional revision reduced the mandate to
four years. Although all of Brazil's constitutions since 1891 have
prohibited immediate reelection of presidents, governors, and mayors, in
June 1997 Congress approved an amendment allowing reelection. Thus,
President Cardoso and the twenty-seven governors may stand for
reelection in 1998, and the mayors elected in 1996 may be reelected in
2000.
The Brazilian president has the power to appoint some 48,000
confidence positions, of which only ambassadors, higher-court judges,
the solicitor general, and Central Bank directors must have Senate
approval. The president may also use the line-item veto, impound
appropriated funds, issue decrees and provisional measures, initiate
legislation, and enact laws.
Until 1964 the president and vice president were elected on separate
tickets, which produced incompatible duos in 1950 and 1960. When Vargas
committed suicide in 1954 and J�nio Quadros (president, January-August
1961) resigned in August 1961, the actions of their vice presidents
produced severe institutional crises, leading to their respective
ousters by military intervention. Since 1964 presidents and vice
presidents have been elected on a single ticket, indirectly until 1989
and by direct popular vote in 1989 and 1994; a second round takes place
if a majority is needed.
The return to civilian rule in 1985 occasioned important roles for
vice presidents. President-elect Tancredo de Almeida Neves died before
taking office, and his vice president, Jos� Sarney, was allowed to
complete his term. After President Collor was impeached in 1992, his
vice president, Itamar Franco, completed his mandate. In the event that
the president and vice president become incapacitated, the line of
succession falls sequentially to the president of the Chamber of
Deputies, the president of the Senate, and the president of the Federal
Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal--STF). If less than half of the
mandate has been completed, a supplementary election must be called
within ninety days. If more than half the mandate has been completed,
the Congress elects a new president and vice president within thirty
days.
Brazil - The Legislature
Brazil's national legislature is composed of the 513-member Chamber
of Deputies and the eighty-one-member Senate. Congress has a basic
four-year term, but senators serve for eight years. It meets from March
through June, and from August through December. The states have
unicameral legislatures elected simultaneously with Congress. The
municipalities have city councils with four-year terms; municipal
elections take place two years after state and national elections. Since
1930 Congress has been closed five times under authoritarian
intervention: November 1930 to December 1933; November 1937 to February
1946; November 1966; December 1968 to October 1969; and for fifteen days
in April 1977.
The 1988 constitution restored most of the powers and prerogatives
that Congress had lost during the military regime. Congress enjoys
administrative and fiscal autonomy, as well as full power over the
budget. Under certain circumstances, it may issue legislative decrees
not subject to presidential veto. An absolute majority secret vote in
Congress is required to override a presidential veto. Congress also has
a very important role in setting national, especially economic,
policies. For example, it must approve all international agreements,
including renegotiation of the foreign debt.
Legislators enjoy almost total parliamentary immunity, even for
capital crimes, such as homicide. Even if the respective chamber lifts
the legislator's immunity by an absolute majority secret vote, the
legislator retains the privilege of being tried by the STF. In December
1994, nearly 100 lawsuits (courts and prosecutors) sought to lift the
immunity of deputies and senators. However, the legislative esprit de
corps is so strong that only rarely does a case come to the floor for a
vote.
Since 1950 federal and state legislators have been elected at regular
four-year intervals. Senators must be at least thirty-five years old.
Each state has three seats, and one or two seats are elected alternately
every four years to eight-year terms. Election is by simple majority.
Since 1946 deputies have had four-year terms and must be at least
twenty-one years old. The 1946 constitution granted states with small
populations a minimum delegation of seven deputies; larger states
counted one additional deputy for every 150,000 inhabitants up to 3
million, and after that one for every 250,000. The small states imposed
this system to reverse the dominance of the two largest states (S�o
Paulo and Minas Gerais) in the Chamber of Deputies during the Old
Republic (1889-1930).
In 1970, at the height of the military oppression, the balance was
tipped in favor of the larger, more developed, urbanized states. State
delegations were calculated based on the size of the electorate, rather
than on population. The minimum delegation was reduced to three, and
most of the states in rural Brazil had their contingents cut in half.
These changes reduced the Chamber of Deputies to 310 deputies.
Ironically, this system helped the Brazilian Democratic Movement
(Movimento Democr�tico Brasileiro--MDB) elect a 44 percent minority in
1974; thus, in 1978 the military returned to calculations based on
population. The 1988 constitution gave Brazil's largest state, S�o
Paulo, seventy deputies, instead of the 115 it should have to be
proportionate to its population.
Election of federal and state deputies and city council members is by
proportional representation. Brazil uses one of the least-used variants
of proportional representation, the open-list system (the d'Hondt
method--see Glossary). Thus, there is virtually no conflict or
competition among parties in the elections. The conflict is concentrated
within each party or coalition list, and most deputies use their own
resources (which may be considerable, up to US$5 million for a federal
deputy) for campaigning. Therefore, they owe no loyalty to their party,
and change labels frequently after their election (see table 18,
Appendix). This produces very weak parties and low cohesion in Congress.
The Workers' Party is an exception to this rule.
Those holding office (elective or appointive) in the executive branch
who desire to become candidates for elective office must resign six
months before the election. This requirement precludes a minister,
governor, mayor, or state enterprise director from using the powers and
resources of the office to favor his or her election.
The Senate and Chamber of Deputies have legislative initiative. The
Senate and Chamber of Deputies have six and sixteen standing committees,
respectively, plus a joint budget committee. The 1988 constitution gives
the committees the power to approve or kill legislation.
To override a committee decision and bring the bill to the floor of
the appropriate house requires a petition signed by a certain number of
members. Once one house passes a bill, the other deliberates on it. If a
different version of the bill is passed, it returns to the original
house for a final vote on the differences. The internal rules of each
house allow members and party leaders certain prerogatives of
obstruction.
Party leaders distribute party quotas on committees proportionate to
the party's size. Committee presidencies are apportioned among the
parties on an annual rotational basis; thus, there are no longstanding
powerful committee chairs, as in the United States Congress. There are
no subcommittees, and legislative committees rarely conduct public
hearings.
When a matter is very serious, at least one-third of the respective
house or the full Congress may petition to initiate a CPI (Congressional
Investigating Committee). The CPIs have full subpoena and investigative
powers, such as the disclosure of bank, income tax, telephone, credit
card, and other records. A CPI produced the evidence used to impeach
President Collor in 1992 and uncovered the Budgetgate scandal of
1993-94.
Normally, the Chamber of Deputies has around 50 percent turnover at
each election. In 1990 this figure rose to nearly 60 percent; in 1994 it
returned to 54 percent. In years when two-thirds of the Senate stands
for election and gubernatorial seats are being contested, turnover can
also be high in the upper house (63 percent in 1994).
Senators tend to be older and have more established political
careers. Most have served as federal deputies, and many have been
governors. Deputies usually tend to have served in city councils, state
assemblies, and as state cabinet secretaries. In the first half of the
1990s, the proportion of deputies elected with no prior political
experience increased. In 1995 the largest contingents in the Chamber of
Deputies by occupation were businessmen, 32 percent; lawyers, 20
percent; medical doctors, 11 percent; engineers, 7 percent; labor
leaders, 6 percent; teachers, 5 percent; economists, 5 percent; public
servants, 3 percent; journalists, 3 percent; and administrators, 2
percent.
Each house elects its presiding officers (one president, two vice
presidents, four administrative secretaries, and four alternates) for
two-year terms. The 1987-88 ANC (National Constituent Assembly)
prohibited these legislative officers from being immediately reelected,
a prohibition initially imposed by the military to break up
"internal oligarchies." Traditionally, the largest party in
each house has the prerogative of electing the president, but the PMDB
(Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) was in such disarray in 1993 and
1995 that the Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal--PFL), the
second largest party, was able to build a coalition that elected the
Chamber of Deputies president. By negotiation the PMDB returned to the
Chamber presidency for the 1997-98 term, and the PFL won the Senate
presidency for the first time since 1985. The presiding officers
comprise an all-powerful Executive Board, which makes nearly all
important political, administrative, procedural, and agenda-setting
decisions. The Senate president is also the president of the Congress
and presides over joint sessions.
During the 1987-88 ANC, an informal group called the College of Party
Leaders developed. It became an important leadership group and was the
forum for decisive bargaining on crucial articles. This group has
gradually acquired more power (especially agenda-setting) to the
detriment of the formally elected officers, especially in the Chamber of
Deputies.
The political role of Congress began to increase even before the
demise of the military regime. In 1979 President Figueiredo took office
without the extraordinary powers of the Fifth Institutional Act. In the
1982 elections, the government party lost its absolute majority in the
Chamber of Deputies (see table 19, Appendix), and in 1983 the Chamber of
Deputies defeated Figueiredo's initial decree laws, including one on
social security.
Maximum political power accrued to Congress in 1985, when the vice
president-elect, Jos� Sarney (PMDB-Maranh�o), assumed the presidency
under less than auspicious circumstances. From March 1985 through
February 1986, Chamber of Deputies President Ulysses Guimar�es (PMDB-S�o
Paulo) and PMDB Senate floor leader Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PMDB-S�o
Paulo) more or less ruled with Sarney as informal "prime
ministers." Sarney, however, recovered considerable presidential
powers as a result of his cruzado (for value of the cruzado--see
Glossary) economic stabilization plan, which began on March 1, 1986.
Congress again assumed maximum power in 1992, when Brazil became the
first nation in the world to constitutionally impeach a sitting,
directly elected president.
The National Accounts Court (Tribunal de Contas da Uni�o--TCU) is
the external control and oversight arm of Congress. The TCU conducts
inspections, usually following newspaper expos�s or requests from
members of Congress, and audits the executive branch's annual accounts.
Until the 1988 constitution, the president, with Senate approval,
appointed members to the TCU. Retiring or defeated members of Congress
or friends of the president in need of a sinecure usually filled the
positions. With rare exceptions, TCU members have represented political
factions and groups, and their main role is to protect allies who have
been charged with corruption.
Under the 1988 constitution, recruitment criteria for the TCU became
more specific. The president, with Senate approval, appoints three of
the nine members. Two of the presidential appointees must be auditors or
federal prosecutors from the TCU and must be chosen from a three-name
list prepared by the TCU. Congress chooses the remaining six members.
Each state has a State Accounts Court (Tribunal de Contas dos
Estados--TCE), but only the cities of Rio de Janeiro and S�o Paulo have
a Municipal Accounts Court (Tribunal de Contas Municipais--TCM). The
accounts of all other municipalities are reviewed by their respective
TCE.
Brazil - The Judiciary
The judicial branch is composed of federal, state, and municipal
courts. By 1995 small-claims courts augmented some municipal courts.
Only appointments to the superior courts are political and therefore
subject to approval by the legislature. The minimum and maximum ages for
appointment to the superior courts are thirty-five and sixty-five;
mandatory retirement is at age seventy. These federal courts have no
chief justice or judge. The two-year presidency of each court is by
rotation and is based on respecting seniority.
The 1988 constitution produced five significant modifications in
Brazil's judicial system. First, it converted the old Federal Court of
Appeals (Tribunal Federal de Recursos--TFR) into the Superior Court of
Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justi�a--STJ). Second, it created an
intermediate-level Regional Federal Court (Tribunal Regional
Federal--TRF) system. Third, the federal general prosecutor was given a
two-year renewable term, subject to confirmation by the Senate, without
the possibility of removal by the president. Fourth, the STF (Federal
Supreme Court) can issue a warrant of injunction (mandado de injun��o
) to ensure rights guaranteed by the constitution but not regulated by
ordinary legislation. And fifth, the STF can decide on matters of
constitutionality without waiting for appeals to come through the
federal courts.
The judiciary came under criticism during the Collor and Franco
administrations. The STF was harshly criticized during the Collor
impeachment investigation and subsequent trials, particularly for the
slow pace of the trials. In late 1993, former president Collor's appeal
against the Senate's decision to strip his political rights for eight
years ended in a four-four tie in the STF. Three judges had disqualified
themselves: Collor's former foreign minister, Collor's first cousin, and
the STF president who had presided over the Senate impeachment trial.
Instead of throwing the case out after the tie vote, the STF called
three substitute judges from the STJ, who broke the tie against Collor.
In addition, executive-branch public employees (especially in the
armed forces) became discontented with the STF's utter disregard for
parity salary scales among the three branches and with government
austerity targets. To address these problems and to streamline the
judicial process, the 1993-94 attempt at constitutional revision
produced numerous proposals for reforming the judicial branch, including
an external control body, the Penal Code (1941), and the 1916 Civil Code
(revised in 1973). Significant reforms have yet to be enacted, however.
The need for judicial reform in general is widely recognized because the
current system is inefficient, with backlogs of cases and shortages of
judges. Cases are frequently dismissed because they are too old. Lawyers
contribute to backlogs by dragging out cases as long as possible because
they are paid based on the amount of time they spend on a case. In
addition, STF jurisprudence is not followed by lower courts. Some
corrupt judges delay certain cases so that they can be dismissed.
Vacancies on the bench are difficult to fill because of low pay and
highly competitive examinations that often eliminate 90 percent of
applicants.
Created in October 1890, the STF has eleven members appointed by the
president with Senate approval. The STF decides conflicts between the
executive and legislative branches, disputes among states, and disputes
between the federal government and states. In addition, it rules on
disputes involving foreign governments and extradition. The STF issues
decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws, acts, and procedures
of the executive and legislative branches, warrants of injunction, and
writs of habeas corpus. Further, it presents three-name lists for
certain judicial-branch nominations, and conducts trials of the
president, cabinet ministers, and congressional and judiciary members.
The president of the STF is third in the line of presidential succession
and would preside over an impeachment trial held by the Senate.
The TFR (Federal Court of Appeals) was created under the 1946
constitution. It initially had thirteen members but expanded to
twenty-seven members in 1979. In 1988 the TFR became the
thirty-three-member STJ (Superior Court of Justice). As the last court
of appeals for nonconstitutional questions, the STJ reviews decisions of
the TRFs (Regional Federal Courts) and tries governors and federal
judges. The president appoints its members with Senate approval on
rotation. One-third are picked from the ranks of TRF judges; one-third
from the ranks of State Supreme Court judges; and one-third from the
ranks of state and federal public prosecutors.
The 1988 constitution created five TRFs--Recife, Bras�lia, Rio de
Janeiro, S�o Paulo, and Porto Alegre. Each TRF must have at least six
judges, appointed by the president and approved by the Senate. One-fifth
must be from among lawyers or public prosecutors with at least ten years
of professional experience. Members must be at least thirty years of age
but no older than sixty-five.
Brazil's judicial system has a series of special courts, in addition
to the regular civil court system, covering the areas of military,
labor, and election affairs. The Superior Military Court (Superior
Tribunal Militar--STM), created in 1808 by Jo�o VI (king of Portugal,
1816-26), is the oldest superior court in Brazil. It is composed of
fifteen judges appointed by the president with Senate approval. Three
members must have the rank of admiral in the Brazilian Navy (Marinha do
Brasil), three must be general officers of the Brazilian Air Force (F�r�a
A�rea Brasileira--FAB), four must be army generals, and five must be
civilians. The latter must be over age thirty and under age sixty-five.
Two of the civilians are alternately chosen from among military justice
auditors and military court prosecutors; three are lawyers with noted
judicial knowledge and ten years of professional experience.
The STM has jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the
armed forces. It was also used extensively to try civilians accused of
crimes against "national security" during the military regime.
States also have military courts to try cases involving state Military
Police (Pol�cia Militar--PM). During the constitutional revision
process of 1995, proposals were made to close down such courts at the
state level. These proposals were renewed in 1997 after a series of
revolts and strikes by Military Police in several states.
The government of Get�lio Vargas created the Superior Electoral
Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral--TSE) in 1932 in an effort to end
election fraud and manipulation. The TSE has jurisdiction over all
aspects of elections and regulates the functioning of political parties.
Its powers include supervising party conventions and internal elections;
granting or canceling registration of parties; registering candidates
and certifying those elected; regulating and supervising party access to
free television and radio time during an election; and registering
voters. All states have a Regional Electoral Court (Tribunal Regional
Eleitoral--TRE); larger cities have municipal election judges, and
smaller towns have local election boards.
The TSE has seven members, each with a two-year mandate. By secret
ballot, the STF chooses three of its members to sit on the TSE, and the
STJ chooses two of its members. The president appoints, with Senate
approval, two lawyers from among a six-name list submitted by the STF.
The TSE elects its president and vice president from among the members
of the STF.
Since 1950 the TSE has made important decisions affecting Brazil's
political system. In 1950 and 1955, the TSE decided in favor of the
elections of presidents Get�lio Vargas (1951-54) and Juscelino
Kubitschek (1956-61) by simple rather than by absolute majorities. In
1980 the TSE denied the "magic" label of the Brazilian Labor
Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro--PTB) to the Leonel de Moura
Brizola faction, which was then forced to create the Democratic Labor
Party (Partido Democr�tico Trabalhista--PDT). In 1994 the TSE
prohibited noncandidates from appearing on the "free TV election
hour," thus barring former President Collor from participating in
the television campaign of the National Reconstruction Party (Partido da
Reconstru��o Nacional--PRN).
The system of labor courts was created by Get�lio Vargas in the
1930s to arbitrate labor-management disputes, which previously had been
settled by police action. The 1946 constitution created the Superior
Labor Court (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho--TST). Each state has a
Regional Labor Court (Tribunal Regional do Trabalho--TRT), although S�o
Paulo State has two TRTs, and each municipality has a set of labor
conciliation boards. The labor court system has jurisdiction over all
labor-related questions. It registers labor contracts, arbitrates
collective and individual labor disputes, recognizes official union
organizations, resolves salary questions, and decides the legality of
strikes.
The president appoints, with Senate approval, twenty-seven judges to
the TST. Seventeen of the judges--eleven career labor judges, three
labor lawyers, and three labor court prosecutors--receive lifetime terms
(to age seventy). Ten temporary judges are appointed from lists evenly
divided between the confederations of labor and management.
The Public Ministry is an important independent body in Brazil's
judicial system. Its principal component, the Office of the Solicitor
General of the Republic (Procuradoria Geral da Rep�blica--PGR), is
composed of several public prosecutors selected by public examination.
The PGR's headquarters is in Bras�lia, and it has branches in every
state. The PGR is charged with prosecuting those accused of federal
crimes, those accused of offending the president and his ministers, and
all federal officials and employees accused of crimes. Before 1988 the
president could appoint and dismiss the solicitor general at will. Under
the 1988 constitution, the solicitor general has a fixed, renewable
two-year term and is appointed by the president, with Senate approval,
among the career prosecutors.
The Office of the Federal Attorney General (Advocacia- Geral da Uni�o--AGU),
which was separated from the PGR by the 1988 constitution, defends the
federal government against lawsuits and provides legal counsel to the
executive branch. The AGU was organized and staffed under a provisional
measure (MP) issued by President Franco.
Each state has a State Supreme Court (Tribunal de Justi�a--TJ). The
governor, with approval by the State Assembly (Assembl�ia do Estado),
appoints the judges to the court. This court has the prerogative of
appointing special state circuit judges to deal with agrarian problems.
In addition, it is responsible for organizing and supervising the lower
state courts. Each state is divided into district courts (comarcas
).
Brazil - State and Local Governments
Since independence Brazil has oscillated between centralization and
state autonomy. During the empire (1822-89), Brazil had a centralized
constitutional monarchy and little state autonomy. The emperor exercised
the moderating power by appointing senators for life, presiding over a
Council of State, removing and transferring police and judicial
officials at will, and appointing provincial governors.
The Old Republic was established in 1889 in part because of state
demands for greater autonomy. Until 1930 the larger and more powerful
states enjoyed great autonomy under a federal system patterned after the
United States model, but the smaller and poorer states constantly
suffered interventions by the central government. "Young Turk"
lieutenants (tenentes ) rebelled against this system of state
oligarchies in the 1920s and were prominent in the initial modernization
strategies after the 1930 revolution. From 1930 to 1945, the national
government centralized control over state and local governments by
appointing governors, who in turn appointed all mayors. Except for the
brief period of 1933-37, the national government closed legislatures at
all levels. The 1946 constitution reestablished a more balanced
federalism, but maintained central control over industrial, financial,
labor, election, and development policies. In October 1965, the military
regime began curtailing the autonomy of the states once again. From 1966
through 1978, the central government appointed state governors and
mayors of state capitals and some 170 designated selected cities deemed
vital to "national security." Active-duty army colonels were
appointed as security chiefs in each state. As part of its
"liberalizing opening," the military regime allowed direct
elections for governors in 1982. In November 1985, President Sarney and
Congress allowed direct elections for mayors of state capitals and
selected cities deemed vital to "national security."
Until 1994 state governors and vice governors were elected to one
four-year term, taking office on January 1 following their election. In
1998 those elected in 1994 may seek one consecutive second term. State
deputies are also elected to four-year terms but are not restricted to
one term. Governors have state cabinets, and their executive branch is
organized in a manner similar to the federal executive branch. Likewise,
state assemblies organize their legislative process like that of
Congress. After 1988 state assemblies lost their salary autonomy; state
deputies may receive up to 75 percent of the salary of a federal deputy.
State governments are responsible for maintaining state highway
systems, low-cost housing programs, public infrastructure, telephone
companies, and transit police. Both state and municipal governments are
responsible for public primary and secondary schools and public
hospitals. Municipal governments are also responsible for water,
sewerage, and garbage services. State tax revenues are concentrated in
sales taxes. State governments are allowed to operate state financial
institutions, most of which are a constant problem for the Central Bank
because they run heavy deficits, especially in election years. In 1995
the Central Bank intervened in some of the state banks with the worst
deficits (S�o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Alagoas, and Mato Grosso) and
sought to privatize others. In October 1996, Brazil had 5,581
municipalities, of which more than 15 percent had populations under
5,000. The municipal taxing authority is concentrated on property and
service taxes.
Mayors and vice mayors must be at least twenty-one years of age and
are elected to one four-year term. Reelection is now permitted as of the
year 2000. City council members must be at least eighteen years of age
and are elected to renewable four-year terms under a proportional
representation system. From 1950 through 1970, municipal elections
coincided with general federal and state elections. Local officials
elected in 1970 were given two-year terms, so as to set local elections
two years out of phase with general elections (the next local elections
were held in 1972 and 1976). However, local officials elected in 1976
were given six-year terms to make municipal elections again coincide
with general elections in 1982, but in turn the latter also got six-year
terms to make local elections out of phase again (in 1988, 1992, and
1996).
Brazil - The Political Party System
Shortly after Brazil's independence, the first political groups
emerged with either pro-Brazilian or pro-Portuguese factions. During the
second empire period (1831-89), the Conservative and Liberal parties
alternated in power, and an embryonic Republican Party appeared in 1870.
During the Old Republic (1889-1930), sections of the Republican Party in
the larger states held political power. During the brief opening of
representative politics between 1934 and 1937, attempts were made to
organize national parties.
After 1945, when parties and elections again were permitted, local
factions in the interior that had been allied with the Vargas government
since 1930 organized the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democr�tico--PSD);
the pro-Vargas groups in urban areas organized the PTB (Brazilian Labor
Party); and all those opposed to Vargas initially formed the UDN
(National Democratic Union). The PSD elected the president and an
absolute majority to the 1946 Constituent Assembly. The Brazilian
Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro--PCB), led by Luis Carlos
Prestes, operated freely from 1945 through 1947, but the STF (Federal
Supreme Court) canceled its registry in early 1948.
By 1960 Congress had thirteen parties. Confronted with adverse
results in the direct gubernatorial elections of October 1965, President
Castelo Branco (1964-67) decreed the end of this multiparty system and
imposed a two-party system. His objective was to organize a strong
majority support party and a loyal opposition. Thus, the National
Renewal Alliance (Alian�a Renovadora Nacional--Arena) and the MDB
(Brazilian Democratic Movement) were born.
About 90 percent of the UDN, 50 percent of the PSD, and 15 percent of
the PTB joined Arena. Although it held an absolute majority in Congress
until its demise in 1979, Arena was plagued with regional and former
party factionalism. The MDB suffered from ideological factionalism
regarding the military government; the factions divided among the
authentics (those most strongly opposed to the military government), the
neo-authentics, and the moderates.
As a result of the voting trends of the 1974, 1976, and 1978
elections, which channeled protest votes to the MDB, General Golbery do
Couto e Silva, the architect of much of the regime's political evolution
from 1964 until his retirement in August 1981, called for a party
realignment to achieve broader political maneuvering space for the
government. A survey conducted among members of Congress in March 1979
showed that nearly three-fourths of Arena and two-thirds of the MDB
desired a multiparty system. In December 1979, Congress approved
government-sponsored legislation abolishing Arena and the MDB and
permitting moderate party pluralism.
Initially, the realignment strategy was successful. The MDB became
the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) but with half its 1979
size. Arena became the PDS (Democratic Social Party), and retained its
majority position. MDB moderates and Arena liberals organized the
government auxiliary Popular Party (Partido Popular--PP) led by Senator
Tancredo Neves and Deputy Magalh�es Pinto. Former deputy Ivette Vargas
and former governor Leonel Brizola resurrected the PTB; and the new,
more militant labor unions organized the Workers' Party.
In May 1980, this pluralism became less moderate when, in a highly
political decision, the TSE (Superior Electoral Court) decided to give
the PTB label to Ivette Vargas instead of Brizola, who had much broader
organizational support within the party. Undaunted, Brizola immediately
organized the PDT (Democratic Labor Party) and, in 1982, was elected
governor of Rio de Janeiro, with twenty-three deputies versus Ivette
Vargas's thirteen (see table 19, Appendix). Because of the harsh 1982
election rules imposed by the Figueiredo government, the Popular Party
decided to dissolve itself and reincorporate with the PMDB, which
greatly strengthened the latter in many states, especially in Minas
Gerais and Paran�.
In 1985 Congress passed legislation easing the requirements for
organizing new parties; thus, the ANC (National Constituent Assembly)
seated eleven parties in 1987, nineteen in 1991, and eighteen in 1995.
With the exception of the Workers' Party, traditionally all Brazilian
political parties have been organized from the top down, with a compact
group of professional politicians making major decisions. The party
system suffered considerable fragmentation during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, especially because of an exodus from the largest
parties--PMDB and PFL (Liberal Front Party)--after 1988, similar to the
factionalization in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1987 the five largest
parties accounted for 92.8 percent of the Chamber of Deputies. In 1989
this figure fell to 70.1 percent, and in 1992 it fell further to 61.4
percent. However, after the 1994 elections a "reconcentration"
occurred, and by 1997 the five largest parties accounted for 83.6
percent.
In addition to strong internal cleavages, parties differ regionally.
The Popular Party was almost totally concentrated in Minas Gerais and
Rio de Janeiro. Initially, Brizola's PDT was concentrated in Rio de
Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul--the two states that had elected him in
the 1947-64 period--but later expanded to more states and elected three
governors in 1990 (see table 20, Appendix). The Workers' Party remains
concentrated in S�o Paulo but has expanded to other states in the South
and North. The PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) is highly
concentrated in Cear� and S�o Paulo. The PFL has always been
concentrated in the Northeast. In Rio Grande do Sul, the PFL and the
PSDB have very limited penetration (see Political Culture, this ch.).
Brazil - Major Parties in Congress
In 1995 eight political parties, constituting 89.7 percent of the
total membership of the Chamber of Deputies, were considered major
parties. Each held more than 5 percent of the Chamber. In 1997 the seven
significant parties totaled 92.6 percent.
Progressive Renewal Party
The Progressive Renewal Party (Partido Progressista Renovador--PPR)
was organized by the fusion of the PDS (Democratic Social Party) and the
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democr�tico Crist�o--PDC) in April
1993. After the Workers' Party, the PPR has the most consistent
ideology. It generally supports the interests of business and rural
landlords. It has a radical position in favor of privatization, economic
modernization, and reduction of the state's role in the economy. In 1994
the PPR elected three governors, two senators, and fifty-three federal
deputies. The PPR contributed one minister (health) to Cardoso's
cabinet, but the party does not automatically support government
positions in Congress. In 1995 Paulo Maluf remained the main leader of
the PPR, which attempted to form a bloc with the Progressive Party. In
mid-September 1995, Maluf merged the PPR with the Progressive Party to
form the Brazilian Progressive Party (Partido Progressista
Brasileiro--PPB).
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
The Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democr�tico
Brasileiro--MDB), the political opposition to the military regime, began
mobilizing national support in the late 1970s. Like the PTB (Brazilian
Labor Party) in the early 1960s, the MDB was on the verge of becoming a
mass political party when Congress dissolved it in 1979. The party
president, Deputy Ulysses Guimar�es, convinced the party to "add a
P to the MDB" to preserve the hard-fought opposition image.
The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democr�tico
Brasileiro--PMDB) won nine governorships in 1982 and elected Tancredo
Neves in the electoral college of January 1985 in alliance with the PFL.
The centrist PMDB advanced to become the "catch-all, rainbow"
party, electing a majority to the ANC (National Constituent Assembly),
and all but one governor in 1986. Overloaded with joiners (many of whom
migrated from the Arena/PDS), the PMDB acquired a more conservative
profile, provided a base for the Big Center in the ANC, and projected an
image of close collaboration with the Sarney government. These
tendencies provoked the exodus of the more progressive members, such as
the PSDB, in 1988. The party was less successful in the congressional
and gubernatorial elections in 1988 and 1990, but made a slight comeback
in the 1992 municipal elections.
In 1994 the PMDB's presidential candidate, former governor Orestes Qu�rcia,
placed fourth. Nevertheless, the PMDB managed to elect nine governors
and remained the largest party in Congress, electing fourteen senators
and 107 federal deputies. The PMDB had two important ministries
(transport and justice), plus the Secretariat of Regional Development
(now subordinate to the Ministry of Planning) in the Cardoso government.
With the defeat of Qu�rcia and the loss of S�o Paulo State, the party
has no coherent national leadership, and the support of its sizable
congressional delegation is uncertain. In 1997 the PMDB became the
second largest party in Congress, losing its first-rank position to the
PFL.
Liberal Front Party
A manifesto signed by three governors, ten senators, and sixty
federal deputies in December 1984 officially launched the center-right
Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal--PFL). In the January 15,
1985, electoral college, the PMDB-Liberal Front-PDS ticket of Tancredo
Neves and Jos� Sarney received the votes of 102 federal deputies,
fifteen senators, and fifty-one delegates still nominally affiliated
with the PDS. In 1985 the PFL became the second largest party in
Congress. It received a mere 8.8 percent of the votes in the municipal
elections of November 1985, but when Sarney was able to reform the
cabinet inherited from Tancredo Neves in February 1986, the PFL received
six ministries. In 1992 the PFL elected nearly 1,000 mayors, second only
to the PMDB.
Although the PFL is noted for its neoliberal ideology, it is always
predisposed to pragmatic bargaining, such as in 1994, when it abstained
from running its own presidential candidate and joined with the PSDB and
PTB. Although it elected only two governors, it remained the second
largest party in Congress, electing eleven senators and eighty-nine
federal deputies (57 percent from the Northeast), in addition to the
vice president. In Congress the PFL is known to have the most articulate
and cohesive delegation, on a par with the Workers' Party. As a Cardoso
coalition partner, the PFL received three ministries in 1995. It became
the first-ranked party in 1997.
Brazilian Labor Party
The Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro--PTB), a
pre-1964 leftist party, was resurrected as center-rightist in 1980. Two
factions--one led by Leonel Brizola and the other led by Ivette
Vargas--vied for leadership of the PTB. Although twenty of the
twenty-three federal deputies who originally joined the PTB were brizolistas
, Ivette Vargas was allied with General Golbery do Couto e Silva, chief
of Ernesto Geisel's Civil Household of the Presidency, who pressured the
TSE (Superior Electoral Court) to give the label to Vargas's
pro-government faction in May 1980.
The PTB elected thirteen deputies in 1982 and became the junior
member in a coalition with the PDS to give the latter a majority in the
Chamber of Deputies. In 1986 the PTB elected seventeen federal deputies,
and in 1990 it elected two governors, four senators, and thirty-eight
federal deputies. The party became a convenient election vehicle for
politicians without space in the larger parties.
In 1994 the PTB formed a coalition with the PFL and PSDB in support
of Cardoso's candidacy. In that election, the PTB elected one governor,
three senators, and thirty-one federal deputies--a slightly worse record
than in 1990. In 1995 the PTB remained loyal to its coalition with the
PSDB and PFL in support of the Cardoso government and occupied two
ministries.
Democratic Labor Party
Brizola founded the social democratic-oriented Democratic Labor Party
(Partido Democr�tico Trabalhista--PDT) in May 1980 after losing the PTB
label to Ivette Vargas. Over the ensuing fifteen years, many PDT members
migrated to other parties. In 1990 the PDT elected three governors
(Brizola included), five senators, and forty-seven federal deputies and
became the third largest party in Congress. In 1994 Brizola placed fifth
for president and was defeated by En�as Carneiro in Rio de Janeiro,
thus ending his forty-seven-year political career. The PDT elected only
two governors, four senators, and thirty-three federal deputies that
year.
Despite his massive defeat in 1994, Brizola refused to relinquish
personal control of the party and tried to impose a systematic
opposition posture on the congressional delegation, although the two PDT
governors favored a more flexible position vis-�-vis the Cardoso
government. Both the very dynamic governor of Paran�, Jaime Lerner, and
Dante de Oliveira, governor of Mato Grosso, left the PDT in 1997.
Workers' Party
The Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores--PT), the country's
first independent labor party, is a unique party in Brazil. Organized
externally (outside Congress) from the grassroots up and based on the
new trade unionism in S�o Paulo in 1979, the Workers' Party initially
did not want any professional politicians or students in its ranks.
However, to have a voice in Congress it accepted five deputies and one
senator into its ranks in early 1980. Since then the Workers' Party has
grown steadily, doubling its Chamber of Deputies delegation in 1982,
1986, and 1990, while tripling the number of its state deputies at each
election, except in 1994. It has also won mayorships in several cities,
including S�o Paulo (1988) (see Elections, 1988-96, this ch.).
The Workers' Party is divided into six factions along a left-right
continuum. The right consists of Radical Democracy (Democracia Radical),
which has a social-democratic orientation. The center consists of Unity
and Struggle (Unidade e Luta), Catholic militants, and members of the
right wing of Lula da Silva's former Articulation (Articula��o)
faction. The left consists of Option of the Left (Op��o de Esquerda),
which is divided into two subgroups--Hour of Truth (Hora da Verdade),
the dissident left wing of the former Articulation group, former
Stalinists, and Castroites; and Socialist Democracy (Democracia
Socialista), the largest Trotskyite group, which existed before the
Workers' Party. The extreme left consists of Workers' Party in the
Struggle (Na Luta PT), which is divided into two subgroups--Socialist
Force (For�a Socialista), whose members are former militants from
extreme left guerrilla groups from the 1960s: the People's Electoral
Movement (Movimento Eleitoral do Povo--MEP) and Popular Action (A��o
Popular--AP); and The Work (O Trabalho), consisting of Trotskyites from
two student movements of the 1970s--Freedom (Liberdade) and Struggle
(Luta).
Until 1993 Lula's moderate Articulation group had a large absolute
majority in the Workers' Party. This group conducted pragmatic
coalition-building in the 1990 and 1992 elections, which resulted in the
election of increasing numbers of deputies and city council members.
However, in 1993 the extreme left and left elected an absolute majority
(53 percent) of the national party directorate, took control, and
imposed stricter criteria for coalition-building at the state level. In
1995 and 1997, the Articulation faction was again elected to the party
presidency.
Brazilian Social Democracy Party
A center-left group of the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
organized the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira--PSDB) in June 1988. Many of these PMDB members
were associated with the Progressive Unity Movement (Movimento de
Unidade Progressista--MUP). They had become discontented with the
rainbow party, with the PMDB's participation in the conservative Big
Center during the National Constituent Assembly, and especially with the
politics of President Sarney. The principal leaders of the new party
were from S�o Paulo, including Senator Cardoso (PMDB floor leader in
the Senate).
The PSDB adopted a modernizing, social-democratic program and favored
a parliamentary system of government. In 1988 it became the third
largest delegation in Congress, although it elected only eighteen mayors
that year (including Belo Horizonte).
The PSDB occupied three ministries in the Franco cabinet, including
Senator Cardoso at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May 1993, Cardoso
moved to the Ministry of Finance, where he launched the Real
Plan for economic stabilization in March 1994. With other major parties
already engaged in different presidential alliances, the PSDB opted for
a coalition with the more conservative PFL and PTB in the 1994
elections. The adoption of the new Real currency and the
resulting near-zero inflation greatly boosted Cardoso's presidential
candidacy in July and August and guaranteed his first-round victory with
a margin of 54.3 percent on October 3. The PSDB also elected six
governors (including Cear�, Minas Gerais, S�o Paulo, and Rio de
Janeiro), nine senators, and sixty-two deputies, a much better
performance than in 1990 (see General Elections, 1994, this ch). The
Social Democrats occupied six ministries, including the powerful
ministries of Planning, Finance, and Civil Household of the Presidency,
in the Cardoso government.
Progressive Party
The Progressive Party (Partido Progressista--PP) grew out of the PTR
(Workers' Renewal Party). In 1990 the PTR and the Social Workers' Party
(Partido Social Trabalhista--PST) had elected just two federal deputies
each. The new Progressive Party had thirty-seven deputies in 1993, and
by 1994 had grown to forty-five, the fifth largest delegation in the
Chamber of Deputies. In 1995 the Progressive Party became leaderless,
with no clear political strategy. Thus, it merged with the PPR
(Progressive Renewal Party) to form the PPB (Brazilian Progressive
Party).
Brazil - Minor Parties in Congress
In 1995 eleven smaller parties were represented in Congress, of which
five are noteworthy.
Liberal Party
Deputy Alvaro Valle (PDS-Rio de Janeiro) founded the center-right
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PL) in 1985. Dubbed the businessman's
Workers' Party, the Liberal Party rapidly supplanted the Liberal Front
Party (Partido da Frente Liberal--PFL) in S�o Paulo. In the elections
of November 15, 1986, the Liberal Party secured seven seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and one in the Senate. It received 4.8 percent of
the national vote in 1990 and elected fifteen deputies. On taking their
seats in February 1991, the new Liberal Party deputies joined the
opposition bloc against Collor. In 1994 the Liberal Party elected no
governors, one senator, and thirteen deputies.
Party of National Reconstruction
Created in February 1989 by a takeover of the Youth Party as an
election vehicle for Collor's candidacy, the conservative Party of
National Reconstruction (Partido da Reconstru��o Nacional--PRN)
immediately received twenty deputies and two senators. After Collor's
election, the party increased its congressional delegation in 1990, but
had a dismal performance in the October 3 elections that year: forty
deputies and only 7 percent of the vote, and no governors. In 1994 the
party, reduced to four deputies and four senators, elected one federal
and two state deputies.
Brazilian Socialist Party
Resurrected in 1986 from the pre-1964 Socialist Party, the left-wing
Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro--PSB) elected
seven representatives to the ANC (National Constituent Assembly). It
joined the Brazilian Popular Front (Frente Brasil Popular--FBP)
coalition in 1989 in support of Lula, and again in 1994. With 2.3
percent of the national vote in 1990, the PSB elected eleven deputies,
including twice governor of Pernambuco Miguel Arraes, PSB president. The
PSB, which has a more pragmatic socialism than the Workers' Party,
contributed two ministers to Franco's cabinet. In 1994 the PSB elected
two governors (including Arraes), one senator, and fifteen federal
deputies.
Brazilian Communist Party
In 1993 the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista
Brasileiro--PCB), in a stormy national convention led by its president,
Deputy Roberto Freire, removed Marxist-Leninist doctrine from the party
statutes and the hammer and sickle from its flag, and changed its name
to the PPS (Popular Socialist Party). The original PCB had been
organized in 1922. At Moscow's initiative, Luis Carlos Prestes took over
the PCB's leadership in the mid-1930s. Prestes presided over the party
until the early 1980s, when he was ousted by a renovated Euro-communist
faction that had tired of his Stalinist line. During its illegal period
(1948-85), the PCB was able to elect a few of its members under other
party labels. The PCB regained legal registry in 1985, elected three
representatives to the ANC in 1986, and again in 1990, always in
coalitions. Deputy Freire carried the PCB banner as candidate for
president in 1989, and became floor leader of the Franco government in
1992. In 1994 the PPS joined the FBP in support of Lula and elected one
senator (Freire) and only two federal deputies.
Communist Party of Brazil
The Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil--PC do B)
was created as an underground splinter from the PCB in 1958, following
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalinist atrocities.
The PC do B repudiated the new Moscow line and aligned itself with
Maoism. When the People's Republic of China began making economic
reforms in 1979, the PC do B aligned itself with Albania. When Albania
held its first free elections in 1992, the PC do B became nonaligned.
After the PC do B was legalized in 1985, under the leadership of former
deputy and former guerrilla Jo�o Amazonas, it elected more deputies in
1986 and 1990 than its arch rival, the PCB. The PC do B joined the FBP
in support of Lula in 1989 and 1994. The PC do B doubled its delegation
from five to ten federal deputies, representing nine states, in 1994.
This feat resulted from PC do B domination of student organizations in
most states and astute use of coalitions.
Brazil - Regional Strength of the Parties
The government's strategy of controlling the election of the first
civilian president in the 1985 electoral college almost received a
mortal blow on April 25, 1984. On that day, the diretas j�!
constitutional amendment, which called for direct elections for
president on November 15, 1984, came just twenty-two votes shy of the
necessary two-thirds majority (320 votes). In late June 1984, the
Liberal Front dissident group split from the military government's PDS
(Democratic Social Party) and joined the PMDB led by Governor Tancredo
Neves (Minas Gerais). In the second half of 1984, massive rallies
engulfed Brazil, as the Tancredo Neves-Sarney ticket consolidated its
300-vote margin over Paulo Maluf (PDS-S�o Paulo) in the January 1985
electoral college.
Sarney got his start in politics in his home state of Maranh�o in
the late 1950s as federal deputy in the progressive wing of the National
Democratic Union (Uni�o Democr�tica Nacional--UDN). A staunch
supporter of the 1964 revolution, he was able to defeat the PSD (Social
Democratic Party) political machine in direct elections for governor in
1965, and was elected senator by Arena (National Renewal Alliance) in
1970. The military government never quite accepted Sarney and vetoed his
attempts to return to the governorship in 1974 and 1978. He was also
passed over several times for the presidency of the Senate and for the
post of minister of justice in 1980. As a consolation prize, he became
president of the PDS. In 1984 Sarney was one of the dissident leaders of
the schism in the PDS, and he became Tancredo Neves's running mate.
Tancredo Neves took ill on the eve of his inauguration on March 14,
1985, and died on April 21. Sarney was first sworn in as vice president
and then acting president within a very loose interpretation of the
constitutional norms for presidential succession.
Deputy Ulysses Guimar�es had been elected president of the Chamber
of Deputies on February 1 and by right should have assumed the
presidency because neither Tancredo Neves nor Sarney had been
inaugurated. On the death of Tancredo Neves, a new indirect election
should have been called within ninety days. Guimar�es, perhaps sensing
that the military would not accept this scenario, graciously declined in
favor of Sarney.
Sarney's first year was very difficult. He was unprepared to assume
the presidency and was assisted immediately by General Ivan Souza
Mendes, director of the National Intelligence Service (Servi�o Nacional
de Informa��es--SNI). In effect, Brazil's government was an informal
parliamentary system during 1985, with Deputy Guimar�es and PMDB Senate
floor leader Fernando Henrique Cardoso acting as informal prime
ministers. The Sarney administration moved to consolidate representative
democracy in 1985: it legalized the two communist parties, the PCB and
the PC do B, allowed illiterates to vote, and called for direct
elections for mayors of all capital cities and "national
security" municipalities.
The PMDB performed poorly in the November 15, 1985, mayoral
elections, when former president J�nio Quadros of the PTB (Brazilian
Labor Party) narrowly defeated Cardoso for mayor of S�o Paulo. However,
Sarney recovered national prestige and high standing in the polls
following the introduction of the Cruzado Plan on February 28, 1986, and
began to consolidate his power as president. The PMDB became the great
"umbrella" party in the 1986 elections, leading a broad
coalition to victory in all states but Sergipe, and electing an absolute
majority in the ANC (National Constituent Assembly).
Rapid consolidation of democracy in Brazil after 1985 was in part
slowed by some of the concessions negotiated by Tancredo Neves with the
military to ensure their support. Tancredo Neves agreed that members of
the armed forces who had been expelled for subversion after 1964 would
not receive amnesty and reinstatement; that there would be no
independent, noncongressional Constituent Assembly; and that before the
new constitution was finished and promulgated, none of the authoritarian
decrees--National Security Law, antistrike law, repressive press law,
and limitations on Congress--would be canceled or modified.
By October 1988, Sarney, who was still a nominal member of the PMDB,
had grown very unpopular because of increasing inflation and allegations
of corruption. As a result, the PMDB lost many cities in the November
15, 1988, municipal elections--of the 100 largest cities, the party
dropped from seventy-seven to twenty mayors, but in 1992 elected
twenty-nine; in 1996 the number fell back to only sixteen (see table 21,
Appendix). In addition, impeachment proceedings were initiated against
Sarney on charges of corruption. The CPI (Congressional Investigating
Committee) reported in favor of impeachment, but the measure was not
transmitted to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies for deliberation.
During Sarney's presidency, Brazil suffered four austerity shock
plans and used three currencies. Thus, for the December 17, 1989,
runoff, voters selected the two presidential candidates who most
vociferously criticized the Sarney presidency--Collor (PRN) and Lula
(Workers' Party).
Brazil - Collor de Mello's Presidency, 1990-92
Collor created extremely high expectations that he could solve
Brazil's economic problems and that he could insert Brazil into the
international economic arena. With one "silver bullet," he
promised to rid Brazil of inflation, rampant corruption, and all maraj�s
(literally maharajahs, or do-nothing, corrupt high government
officials who draw huge salaries), while modernizing Brazil's economy
and society.
Collor's ambitious program began by confiscating some US$50 billion
in financial and bank assets from depositors and investors, thereby
plunging the country into recession. He set about "taking the state
apart," announcing that he would reduce the number of federal
civilian employees from nearly 1 million to 300,000. Further, he would
auction off government cars and housing in Bras�lia, sell all state
enterprises, and begin a program to consolidate or eliminate the myriad
of federal agencies. Collor's style of presidency was similar to that of
developed countries and included well-orchestrated public relations
campaigns and lavish entertaining.
Although he commanded a small minority bloc in Congress, Collor's
high ratings in the polls and excellent television communication skills
dissuaded many politicians from opposing his unusual proposals in an
election year. Unlike the Cruzado Plan, which had helped Collor's
election as governor of Alagoas in 1986, his 1990 stabilization plan did
not produce positive economic results before the November 15 elections.
Most of his allied gubernatorial candidates were defeated, and his
coalition remained a minority in Congress. As inflation increased in
1991, the government began to flounder, and the opposition was able to
thwart many of his proposals. Many of his initiatives in the
international arena came to naught.
In late 1991, Collor counterattacked in a media blitz, blaming
constitutional impediments for obstructing his modernization plan and
boldly proposing a broad constitutional reform package of sixteen
amendments. However, in March 1992, as new accusations of corruption
mounted daily, Collor fired almost his entire cabinet (except for the
military ministers and the ministers of health and education, who were
not politicians) and brought in older, more experienced politicians who
generally were considered "clean."
A month later, the president's younger brother, Pedro Collor,
unleashed his bombastic accusations regarding the modus operandi of the
corruption system, and on June 1, 1992, Congress installed the
impeachment CPI. President Collor, together with his adviser, Paulo C�sar
Farias, and other cronies from Alagoas, had taken office with a
"dynasty" strategy in mind. As described by Pedro Collor and
other CPI witnesses, the Collor-Farias administration centralized all
corruption, demanding 40 percent kickbacks for all government contracts
and special policy decisions. With a war chest accumulating at nearly
US$2 billion a year, they apparently expected to bribe their way into
power for the next twenty years. As the 1993-94 Budgetgate CPI revealed,
this conspiracy had numerous collaborators in Congress and the executive
branch. Because the 1992 impeachment CPI threatened to widen its
inquiry, the politicians decided to sacrifice Collor quickly to obscure
their own involvement.
Brazil - Franco's Presidency, 1992-94
Cardoso was inaugurated as president on January 1, 1995, under the
most auspicious circumstances. He had won an outright victory in the
first round of the election and had potentially strong support blocs in
the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. He had strong support from a
majority of the newly elected governors, including those from the
important states of Minas Gerais, S�o Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, which
had elected governors from the president's own PSDB. Further, the
December 1994 inflation rate was less than 1 percent, unemployment was
low, and popular expectations ratings were extremely high.
After his inauguration, Cardoso called the lame-duck Congress into
session in an attempt to pass important legislation not acted on in
1994. President Cardoso abolished the CEI, which had not yet finished
investigating corruption in the Franco administration, and transferred
its mission to the new Internal Control Secretariat (Secretaria de Contr�le
Interno--SCI). The Cardoso government pushed privatization and organized
the sale of the Rio D�ce Valley Company (Companhia Vale do Rio D�ce--CVRD),
one of the world's largest mining firms; the telecommunications system;
and the electricity sector.
In 1995 Congress enacted major constitutional reforms, including
economic deregulation, eliminating state monopolies, and changes in
election and party legislation. By July 1995, the lower house had passed
(and transmitted to the Senate) all five amendments dealing with the
economic area. The amendments reduced to varying degrees state-held
monopolies on coastal shipping, natural gas distribution,
telecommunications, and petroleum, and eliminated the distinction
between domestic and foreign firms in Article 171.
Perhaps the most important task of the Cardoso government in 1995 was
to promote the reform of key sections of the 1988 constitution in order
to reduce the role of the state in the economy, reform the federal
bureaucracy, reorganize the social security system, rework federalist
relationships, overhaul the complicated tax system, and effect electoral
and party reforms to strengthen the political representation of
political parties. In February 1995, the new Cardoso government moved
quickly to initiate constitutional reform by a three-fifths majority of
each house.
In the area of political reforms, Congress sought to improve Brazil's
very weak party system. Congress proposed establishing a mixed system,
prohibiting coalitions in proportional elections, establishing a minimum
representation threshold (5 percent), permitting immediate reelection to
executive office, imposing more rigid party fidelity norms, restricting
party access to television and radio time, and establishing stricter
regulations for campaign finance.
Brazil - Women in Politics
The women's suffrage movement began in Brazil in the early 1900s. As
in the United States, women were first fully enfranchised at the state
level. In 1927 in Rio Grande do Norte, the state election laws were
amended giving women the right to vote. A year later, Alzira Soriano was
elected mayor of Lajes, Santa Catarina State. Finally, the new national
election code, signed by President Vargas in 1932, allowed women to vote
in the May 1933 elections for the 1934 Constituent Assembly. Two women
were elected to that body.
Many women have been elected mayors. In 1985 Luiza Fontenelle
(Workers' Party) was the first woman elected in a state capital
(Fortaleza, Cear�). The most important elective office held by a woman
in Brazil was the mayorship of S�o Paulo, which Luiza Erundina
(Workers' Party) won in 1988.
Although women have become federal judges by public examination, none
has ever been appointed to Brazil's superior courts. In 1988 President
Sarney appointed the first woman to the National Accounting Court.
However, this appointment was more related to the appointee's notorious
journalist husband than to her judicial qualifications (see Gender, ch.
2).
By 1994 women constituted nearly half of the electorate. In August
1994, data from the TSE (Superior Electoral Court) showed that of
94,782,410 registered voters, 49.4 percent were women.
No women were elected to Congress in the 1946-51 period, but Get�lio
Vargas's niece, Ivette Vargas, was elected federal deputy from S�o
Paulo in 1950 at age twenty-three. Women continued to have minuscule
representation in Congress and in state assemblies until the political
opening (abertura ) in 1982, when nine women were elected to
the Chamber of Deputies, followed by twenty-six in 1986, twenty-three in
1990, and thirty-six in 1994. Among the latter, Vanessa Cunha (PSDB-Rio
de Janeiro) was the youngest federal deputy at age twenty-two. Among
state deputies, seventy-nine women were elected in 1994.
The first female senator assumed office in 1979 as an alternate on
the death of her predecessor. Since then a few women have been elected
to the Senate in successive elections. In 1994 fourteen women were
candidates for the Senate, and four were elected.
In 1996 Congress adopted a quota system (20 percent) for female
candidates for city council, and this policy increased the number of
women elected. In 1997 Congress extended the mechanism to the 1998
general elections.
Until 1994 no women had been elected governor in their own right.
When the governor of Acre resigned to run for the Senate in 1982,
Yolanda Fleming was appointed governor to serve out the last ten months
of the term. In 1994 eleven women ran for governor, and three made it
into the second-round runoff--Angela Amin (PPR--Santa Catarina), L�cia
V�nia of the Progressive Party, and Roseana Sarney (PFL-Maranh�o).
Sarney, a daughter of the former president, was elected by a very small
margin.
In 1994 women became candidates for vice president for the first
time. The PMDB chose Iris Rezende, wife of the Goi�s governor, to be
Orestes Qu�rcia's running mate. Although Rezende, a Protestant, had
never held a formal political office, she was very active in politics
while first lady of Goi�s. With her candidacy, the PMDB hoped to
attract the growing number of Protestant voters. Not to be outdone, the
PPR chose Gard�nia Gon�alves from Maranh�o as a running mate for
Senator Esperidi�o Amin. Gon�alves's husband had been a governor and
senator from Maranh�o, in opposition to the Sarney group, and in 1992
she was elected mayor of the capital city, S�o Lu�s.
Figueiredo (president, 1979-85) was the first president to name a
woman to a cabinet position--Professor Esther Figueiredo Ferraz (no
relation to the president) as minister of education and culture. His
successors also appointed female cabinet ministers, the most famous of
whom was Z�lia Cardoso de Melo, President Collor's minister of economy.
President Franco's cabinet included three women. President Cardoso
appointed one woman during his first year in office, but she was
replaced by a man in 1996.
Brazil - The Electoral System
Since independence Brazil has experimented with almost every possible
electoral system: single and multimember districts, and proportional
representation with various formulas. Only the so-called mixed systems
are yet to be tried. Election day is always a national holiday. Until
1965 national and state elections were held on October 3, but the
military moved the date to November 15 (Day of the Republic, a military
holiday). The constitution of 1988 reestablished October 3 (ninety days
before the inauguration of executive-branch elected officials) for the
first round of voting, and November 15 for runoff elections when needed.
As of 1998, first-round elections will be held on the first Sunday in
October and runoff second rounds on the last Sunday of October.
Brazilian election laws are very complex and detailed. The law
requires that all candidates who hold executive positions resign six
months before the election (see The Legislature, this ch.). No
"write-in" candidacies are allowed; only candidates officially
presented by a registered political party may participate. Parties
choose their candidates in municipal, state, or national conventions.
Although the legislation does not recognize party primaries officially,
on occasion they have been used informally.
Voting is considered both a right and a duty in Brazil; thus,
registration and voting are compulsory between the ages of eighteen and
seventy. Illiterates vote, but their voting registration card identifies
their status, and they sign the voting list with a fingerprint on
election day. The 1988 constitution lowered the voting age, permitting
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to vote on a voluntary basis. In 1994
these young voters (who cannot legally drink or drive) totaled 2,132,190
(2.2 percent of the electorate). For these reasons, turnouts for all
elections in Brazil are very high, usually more than 85 percent. At
certain times, voters have cast blank and void ballots as a means of
protest, especially in 1970, when military oppression was at its height.
Before 1966 individual paper ballots were used for each office, and
the voter placed the appropriate set in an envelope, which was inserted
into the ballot box. Since 1966 unified single ballots have been used
for simultaneous elections. In 1996 fifty-one of Brazil's largest cities
used a new electronic voting machine with great success. In 1998 some 90
million voters will use this new technique, which may become a hot
export item. For majority elections, candidates' names are listed in
random order, and the voter must mark the respective box. For
proportional elections, the voter can write the name or identification
(ID) number of the candidate, or write the symbol or ID number of the
party preference. There is no alternative to making a straight party
vote for all offices on the ballot. This procedure is extremely
complicated for voters with little schooling. In elections in the first
half of the 1990s, many voted for one or two executive offices and left
the rest of the ballot blank.
Before Congress adopted Law No. 8,713 in September 1993, there were
few restrictions on campaign finances. Businesses and labor unions could
not make political contributions. Individual persons could contribute to
parties, but not to individual candidates. Parties were required to
submit their accounting to the TSE (Superior Electoral Court),
countersigned by each other. In 1994 contributions from individual
businesses (but not labor unions) were legalized, and electoral bonus (b�nus
eleitoral ) receipts were issued to contributors, who have often
used them to evade taxes.
In 1994 Law No. 8,713 also required parties and candidates to submit
to the electoral courts detailed balance sheets listing contributors and
expenses. These reports were made public and hastily analyzed by the
press. Cardoso's presidential campaign listed expenses of nearly R$32
million, about one real per vote, and contributions from banks,
large construction firms, and businesses.
Brazil has four types of majority elections: the president,
governors, and mayors are elected by absolute majorities; senators, by
simple majorities. In elections for president, governors, and mayors of
cities with more than 200,000 voters, a runoff is required between the
top two candidates if no one receives an absolute majority in the first
round (50 percent plus at least one vote). The president, governors, and
mayors have their respective vice president, vice governors, and vice
mayors, who are elected on unified slates.
The May 1994 constitutional revision reducing the presidential term
from five to four years unified the terms of the president, state
governors, and Congress. State and national elections are scheduled for
1998 and 2002, two years out of phase with municipal elections, which
are set for 1996 and 2000.
Three senators are elected by simple majority to represent each of
the twenty-six states and the Federal District. They are elected to
alternating eight-year terms: one seat will be contested in 1998 and the
other two in 2002. Each senator has an alternate elected on a unified
ticket, usually from another party in the coalition. If the senator
elected takes leave, dies, resigns, or is expelled, the alternate takes
over.
Brazil uses an open-list d'Hondt proportional representation system
to elect federal and state deputies and city council members. Each party
or coalition selects its list of candidates, which is registered with
the respective Electoral Court in June. Coalition partners lose their
identity and compete in a single "basket" of votes. Coalitions
are very important for proportional representation elections in Brazil.
In 1962 nearly 50 percent of federal deputies were elected through
coalitions. With the surge of new parties created after 1985, coalitions
again appeared in the 1986, 1990, and 1996 elections. These coalitions
accounted for nearly 90 percent of those elected.
In proportional representation elections, voters have the option of
making a party vote. Usually, however, the proportional representation
campaigns are so individualized (many candidates never mention their
party label in their propaganda) that the party vote is very small (8
percent in 1994). An exception is the Workers' Party, which received 33
percent of its votes for federal deputy as party votes in 1994.
Brazil - The Presidential Election of 1989
The 1994 elections were significant because the presidential election
coincided with the general elections for governor, senator, and federal
and state deputy for the first time since 1950. It was expected that a
strong presidential showing would have strong coattails (see Glossary)
at the state level. However, many thought that election results proved
otherwise. Coalition-building was generally inconsistent between the
national and state levels, because local political animosities and
affinities were so diverse from state to state that none of the
presidential coalitions could cover all the possible combinations. Among
the major parties, the PFL, PTB (Brazilian Labor Party), and Progressive
Party decided not to field separate presidential candidates. The PMDB,
PDT (Democratic Labor Party), PPR (Progressive Renewal Party), Workers'
Party, and PSDB decided to run their own candidates. Four minor
parties--the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PL), National Order
Redefinition Party (Partido da Redefini��o da Ordem Nacional--Prona),
PRN (Party of National Reconstruction), and Social Christian Party
(Partido Social Crist�o--PSC)--also nominated candidates.
Despite opposition from a minority, the PMDB nominated former S�o
Paulo governor Orestes Qu�rcia as its presidential candidate. The PDT
again nominated Leonel Brizola. Lula's Workers' Party articulated a
broad coalition on the left, including the Brazilian Socialist Party
(Partido Socialista Brasileiro--PSB), Popular Socialist Party (Partido
Popular Socialista--PPS), PC do B (Communist Party of Brazil), and Green
Party (Partido Verde--PV). However, Marxist wings of the Workers' Party,
having gained control of the party's Executive Committee, imposed a
difficult, radical platform on the campaign.
Cardoso had become minister of finance in May 1993 and had assembled
the same PSDB economic team that had formulated the Cruzado Plan in
1986. This time, however, the team put together a stabilization plan
that included the components missing in 1986. The hope was that the
initiative would boost Cardoso's potential candidacy into the second
round. In February 1994, Congress approved the Real Value Units
(Unidades Reais de Valor--URVs; see real (R$) in Glossary)
Stabilization Plan, which gave the minister of finance almost absolute
power to impound or reallocate budgeted funds, reduce the fiscal
deficit, and conduct a rescheduling of the foreign debt.
The impact of the Real Plan on the preference polls was even
more dramatic than PSDB strategists had imagined. They had thought that,
at best, if the plan were a success, Cardoso might pull even with Lula
by the end of August, thus guaranteeing a second round in November.
However, Cardoso surpassed Lula in the Datafolha firm's presidential
preference poll results at the end of July by successfully branding the
Workers' Party as against the Real Plan and for inflation.
Cardoso went on to win the election outright on the first round with
54.3 percent of the valid votes cast (44.1 percent of the total vote,
including blank and null ballots) (see table 25, Appendix). Lula placed
second with 27.0 percent. Cardoso's PSDB-PFL-PTB coalition received
additional support from the PMDB and PPR, which abandoned their
candidates and climbed aboard the Cardoso bandwagon. In addition to
electing the president and a majority of the governors, the Center
coalition returned substantial majorities to Congress.
The social-liberal alliance, the Big Center, that elected Cardoso on
the first round enjoyed only moderate presidential coattails at the
state level (see table 26, Appendix). The PSDB-PFL-PTB alliance elected
nine (33 percent) governors, twenty-four of fifty-four (44 percent)
senators up for election, 182 of 513 (35 percent) federal deputies, and
324 of 1,045 (31 percent) state deputies. Cardoso placed first in every
state except the Federal District (Bras�lia) and Rio Grande do Sul.
Lula surpassed Cardoso in the Federal District and Rio Grande do Sul,
where his coattails pulled the Workers' Party gubernatorial candidates
into the second round.
The 1994 gubernatorial election was the fourth in a series of direct
elections for governor since their reinstatement in 1982. Compared with
1990, the PSDB had the best performance of all parties in 1994. The PSDB
was formed hastily in June 1988, and in 1990 elected only one governor
(Cear�). In 1994 the PSDB won six governorships, including Minas
Gerais, S�o Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. These three states account for
nearly 60 percent of Brazil's gross national product (GNP--see Glossary)
and tax base. Certainly, presidential coattails and the Real
Plan were important factors in these three second-round victories.
Brizola's PDT lost the three states won in 1990, but in 1994 elected the
governors of Paran� (Jaime Lerner) and Mato Grosso (Dante de Oliveira),
both on the first round. The Workers' Party made it into the second
round in three states and won in two: Bras�lia and Esp�rito Santo. The
two victories gave the Workers' Party a chance to demonstrate how it
would manage a state government. The party had already elected mayors in
major cities (S�o Paulo, Porto Alegre, and Belo Horizonte) in 1988 and
1992.
Of the fifty-four Senate seats up for election in 1994, only nine
incumbents were reelected. Six of the twenty-seven senators elected in
1990 were replaced by their respective alternates (five were elected to
other offices and one died). Thus, in 1995 fifty-one of the eighty-one
senators were new, although five of the latter had served in the Senate
before 1990. The PMDB, PFL, and PSDB continued to have the largest
upper-house delegations; and the PFL made substantial gains (see table
27, Appendix). The most significant change was the advance of the left.
From only two senators in 1991, this group increased to seven (five from
the Workers' Party). The PPS, the former PCB (Brazilian Communist
Party), elected its first senator (Roberto Freire) since Lu�s Carlos
Prestes was elected in 1945.
The Chamber of Deputies was enlarged in 1995 with the expansion of
the S�o Paulo State delegation from sixty to seventy as mandated by the
1988 constitution. Turnover in the lower house in 1995 (275 new deputies
out of 513, or 53.6 percent) was slightly lower than that in 1991. As in
1991, the Chamber of Deputies in 1995 continued to have two larger
parties (PMDB and PFL) and six middle-sized parties. By electing
deputies in all five regions of Brazil, these eight parties, as well as
the PC do B, have a more national representation.
Voter turnout was lower in 1994 (82.2 percent) than in 1989 (88.1
percent), and blank and null votes were more frequent in 1994 than in
1989. These differences may have resulted in part from the fact that the
1994 election was more complicated, with two ballots and six offices.
Brazil - Interest Group Politics
Brazil has very intense and diversified interest groups. Before 1964
the most visible were labor unions, student organizations, and business
groups, which exercised their pressures more on Congress than on the
executive branch. During the military period, especially from 1969 to
1974, interest groups continued to operate but almost exclusively vis-�-vis
the executive branch. In 1983, when it became apparent that a political
transition would take place, Congress again became the focal point of
interest groups. The most explicit example of this trend was the ANC
(National Constituent Assembly), when literally thousands of
lobbyists--one researcher catalogued 121 noninstitutional
groups--descended on Bras�lia.
Interest Groups
Government institutions lobby the executive and legislative branches
through their legislative liaisons and employee associations. The
president's office maintains a Subsecretariat for Congressional
Relations. State enterprise employee associations, such as those of the
Brazilian Petroleum Corporation (Petr�leo Brasileiro S.A.--Petrobr�s)
and the Brazilian Electric Power Company, Inc. (Centrais El�tricas
Brasileiras S.A.--Eletrobr�s), have very active lobbying organizations,
as do federal employees. All states and many large cities maintain
permanent representation offices in Bras�lia. Although strictly
prohibited, military officers exerted heavy pressure on the government
for better salaries in 1992-94 through protest marches by military
families.
In 1983 the Interunion Parliamentary Advisory Department
(Departamento Intersindical de Assessorial Parlamentar--DIAP) was
founded to coordinate and unify the lobbying efforts of the labor
movement. The DIAP represented 517 unions, nine confederations, and one
central federation in 1992. The DIAP soon proved highly efficient in
monitoring legislative activities, publishing profiles of the
performance of congressional members, and identifying friends and
enemies of workers. In the 1991-94 period, the party leadership's
manipulations attempted to thwart DIAP monitoring by floor voting, and
very few roll-call votes were taken during that session.
Since the 1930s, business groups have been organized into umbrella
federations at the state level and confederations at the national level,
such as the S�o Paulo State Federation of Industries (Federa��o das
Ind�strias do Estado de S�o Paulo--FIESP) and the National
Confederation of Industry (Confedera��o Nacional das Ind�strias--CNI).
Other businesses are organized as national associations by sector: the
Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Companies (Associa��o
Brasileira das Empresas de R�dio e Televis�o--ABERT), the Brazilian
Electro-Electronic Industry Association (Associa��o Brasileira da Ind�stria
Eletro-Eletr�nica--ABINEE), and the Brazilian Aluminum Association
(Associa��o Brasileira de Alum�nio--ABAL). Business groups mounted a
very efficient lobbying operation in support of the Big Center during
the ANC.
Professional groups, such as associations of medical doctors,
lawyers, pharmacists, and engineers, are usually more active regarding
the regulation of their professions, but occasionally attempt to
influence more generalized economic and social legislation. Since the
1970s, there has been a steady growth of urban social movements and
groups concerned with issues such as the prevention and treatment of
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), racial prejudice, consumer
rights, ecology, the homeless, Indians, mortgages, street children, and
tenants. As a result, there has been a parallel growth of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Some NGOs are considered
aggregative, such as the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic
Analysis (Instituto Brasileiro de An�lise Social e Econ�mica--IBASE)
in Rio de Janeiro, or the Institute of Socioeconomic Studies (Instituto
de Estudos S�cio-Econ�micos--Inesc) in Bras�lia. Some are more
issue-focused, such as the Center for Indian Rights (N�cleo de Direitos
Ind�genos--NDI) in Bras�lia, or SOS Atlantic Forest (SOS Mata Atl�ntica)
in Rio de Janeiro.
Religious groups are also important. The Roman Catholic Church acts
officially through the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (Confer�ncia
Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil--CNBB). However, it has an unofficial far
right wing in the Brazilian Association of Tradition, Family, and
Property (Sociedade Brasileira de Defesa da Tradi��o, Fam�lia e
Propriedade--TFP), and an unofficial left wing of liberation theology
linked to the Ecclesiastical Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiais de
Base--CEBs) (see Glossary). The center and left had always elected the
president and general secretary of the CNBB since its inception.
However, in May 1995 conservative Prime Bishop-Cardinal Lucas Moreira
Neves was elected president of the CNBB, a consequence of Pope John Paul
II's consistent appointment of conservative bishops in Brazil. The
Protestants have their Order of Evangelical Ministers (Ordem dos
Ministros Evang�licos--OME) and Political Action Evangelical Group
(Grupo Evang�lico de A��o Pol�tica--GEAP).
The Lobbying Process
Three basic styles of lobbying are found in Bras�lia: the interest
group sends its own representatives to Bras�lia, when the legislative
agenda warrants; the interest group has its own representatives
permanently installed in Bras�lia; or the group contracts with
lobbyists in Bras�lia to represent its interests. Professional
lobbyists systematically monitor the activities of Congress and the
executive branch regarding legislative agendas and procedures. Visits by
groups and individual interests to strategic members of Congress are
organized frequently. In some cases, the deputies' geographical vote
profiles for the last election within their state are analyzed for the
client. When the interest group has a large membership, bus caravans to
Bras�lia are organized to pressure Congress or the executive branch.
As in many legislatures, the Brazilian Congress also has inside
lobbyists; that is, Chamber of Deputies or Senate staff, and some
members themselves (the so-called single-issue deputy or senator).
Because staff are very important to the legislative process, they are
cultivated assiduously by lobbyists, and many become sensitive to (or
eventually agents for) certain interest groups. In response to these
pressures, the Chamber of Deputies Research Staff Association began
preparing a Code of Ethics in 1993.
Campaign contributions are local and are an integral part of the
lobbying process. The Ministry of Finance issues electoral bonus
receipts for campaign contributions. Many contributing businesses,
however, have used these receipts to evade taxes by providing
documentation for their bogus records, known as their caixa dois
(second set of books). Several bills have been introduced to address
this problem, but no legislation had been passed by early 1997. The
Chamber of Deputies allows groups to receive lobbying credentials. In
the 1991-92 session, thirty-nine groups (twenty-eight business groups)
received credentials, in addition to all ministries and sixteen other
public-sector agencies. The Senate does not offer credentials.
<"media.htm">The Media
In 1993, 333 daily newspapers had a total circulation of about 2.5
million. Magazines sold 222 million copies in 1993 (1.47 per
inhabitant), down 32 percent from 1991. Although per capita newspaper
circulation and readership is very low in Brazil, research has shown
that print media have considerable influence on politics because of very
competent investigative reporting and expos�s, influence among
"opinion leaders," and influence on other media. Of the five
national newspapers--O Estado de S�o Paulo , Folha de S�o
Paulo , Gazeta Mercantil , O Globo , and Jornal
do Brasil --members of Congress regarded Gazeta Mercantil
as the least biased paper, according to a May 1995 survey.
Radio and especially television exert a tremendous direct influence
over the voting behavior of the vast majority of Brazilians. When the
TSE (Superior Electoral Court) completed a massive computerized voter
registration before the 1986 elections, it classified 70 percent of
those registered as "illiterate or semi-illiterate." Brazilian
television has an insidious influence on these nearly 60 million voters.
Political subplots are cleverly woven into television soap operas (telenovelas
) and situation comedies to jaundice public opinion about certain
political groups and types of politicians. Biased news coverage of
political campaigns is commonplace.
Most foreign policy strategies and decisions originate within
Itamaraty. A senior diplomat always occupies the position of foreign
affairs adviser within the president's office, and diplomats occupy
similar liaison positions in key ministries. Since the 1980s, Itamaraty,
in response to the growing complexity of foreign policy issues, has
established new divisions dealing with export promotion, environmental
affairs, science and technology, and human rights. Itamaraty also
established the International Relations Research Institute (Instituto
das Pesquisas das Rela��es Internacionais--IPRI) as part of the
Alexandre Gusm�o Foundation, which functions as a think tank and
conference center and publishes foreign policy studies.
The Senate and Chamber of Deputies each have foreign affairs standing
committees. Under the 1988 constitution, the Senate expanded its treaty
approval prerogative to include all international financial agreements,
such as negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see
Glossary) and international banks, which in the past had been the
exclusive prerogative of the executive branch (see The Military in the
Amazon, ch. 5). The Congress also has involved itself in major
government contracts with foreign companies, such as the contract with
Raytheon for an Amazon surveillance system.
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Ag�ncia Brasileira de Cooperac�o--ABC),
a foreign aid agency formally established in the late 1980s, coordinates
all international technical cooperation and assistance received by
Brazil from foreign donors (often, but not always, within the context of
bilateral agreements). For example, in the absence of a United
States-Brazil bilateral agreement, United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) programs in Brazil are not coordinated
through the ABC. The ABC also coordinates Brazilian international
technical cooperation and assistance directed to other countries, mostly
through South-South relationships conducted by Brazilian government
agencies, universities, and NGOs.
At times other agencies may take the lead in foreign policy decision
making. For example, in June 1995 the economic sector, led by the
Ministry of Planning, made the initial decision to impose quotas on
imported automobiles. This decision provoked a crisis within the Common
Market of the South (Mercado Comum do Sul--Mercosul; see
Glossary)--because Argentine automobile exports to Brazil would have
been affected. Itamaraty intervened, and a solution was negotiated
excepting Mercosul from the rigors of the measure.
The military had the final say on foreign policy during the 1964-85
period, when foreign policy was decided frequently within the National
Security Council (Conselho de Seguran�a Nacional--CSN). Since then the
military occasionally has exercised some influence. When the United
Nations (UN) requested Brazilian troops for a peacekeeping force in
Namibia during the delicate, pre-election phase of transition in 1991,
Itamaraty was favorable, but the army vetoed the initiative. The reverse
occurred in 1995. After a successful peacekeeping mission in Mozambique
in 1993-94, the army, in search of new missions, approved sending a
battalion to the peacekeeping operation in Angola. However, for reasons
of economic austerity the ministries of Planning and Finance delayed the
appropriation until 1996.
Brazil - Multilateral Relations
Brazil's relations with Africa date from the beginning of the slave
trade in the seventeenth century. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, many former slaves had returned to West Africa and had become
prosperous merchants and entrepreneurs, and regular shipping lines and
commerce flourished from Bahia. After 1945 Brazil maintained a
low-profile position in the anticolonialism debate in the UN, but
supported the positions of Portugal, Belgium, France, and Britain. In
1961 President J�nio Quadros's new independent foreign policy made some
timid advances in favor of independence for the remaining colonies in
Africa. During the Goulart period (1961-64), Brazil took contradictory
positions, especially regarding Portugal. Brazil's main contacts with
the newly independent nations of West Africa involved price-fixing
attempts within the International Coffee Organization. The Castelo
Branco administration (1964-67) sent two commercial missions to Africa,
the Costa e Silva administration (1967-69) opened an embassy in Abidjan
(C�te d'Ivoire) and one in Kinshasa (Zaire).
Nonetheless, the opening to Africa really began during the presidency
of Em�lio Garrastaz� M�dici (1969-74). In November 1972, Foreign
Minister M�rio Gibson Barbosa visited nine West African countries. In
1973 Brazil voted in favor of anticolonialism measures in the UN. This
vote and follow-up trade missions resulted in numerous bilateral
agreements and Brazil's participation in the ADB (African Development
Bank). South African companies made considerable investments in Brazil,
especially in mining. Brazil's exports to Africa jumped from US$90.4
million in 1972 to US$1.96 billion in 1981, and its imports from
US$152.9 million to US$1.98 billion.
Brazil's opening to Africa was consolidated during the Geisel period
(1974-79), which coincided with the emancipation of the five Portuguese
colonies in Africa. Brazil recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau
and Cape Verde in July 1974, before it was conceded by Portugal. In
November 1975, Brazil became the first Western nation to recognize the
independence of Angola, under the revolutionary government of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de
Liberta��o de Angola--MPLA), and to establish an embassy in Luanda.
Brazil's stance caused much consternation for the United States because
the MPLA government in Angola was socialist and dependent on the
communist bloc and Cuba at that time. That same month, Brazil
established relations with the government in Mozambique because of its
strategic importance in southern East Africa and the Indian Ocean.
Within the context of the Cold War and Brazil's anticommunist military
government, this decision was a bold move on the part of the Geisel
government. However, Brazil placed considerable importance on
establishing relations with African countries. It was hard hit by the
1973-74 petroleum crisis and desired access to West African oil exports
in particular. The petrodollars thus earned were used to buy Brazilian
exports of manufactured goods through Petrobr�s International Trade,
Inc. (Petrobr�s Com�rcio Internacional S.A.--Interbr�s).
Over the next twenty years, Brazil established very close relations
with the lusophone or Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (Paises
Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portugu�sa--PALOPs). In addition to Angola
and Mozambique, these included S�o Tom� e Pr�ncipe, Cabo Verde, and
Guinea-Bissau. The Rio Grande do Sul Airline (Via��o A�rea
Rio-Grandense do Sul--Varig) established regular flights to Lagos,
Nigeria; Abidjan; Luanda, Angola; and Maputo, Mozambique. However, in
the early 1990s flights were suspended to Lagos (to control drug
traffic) and Maputo. President Figueiredo (1974-85) was the first
Brazilian president to visit Africa (five countries in November 1983).
Brazilian construction companies undertook hydroelectric and
infrastructure projects, and Petrobr�s signed risk contracts for oil
exploration.
By 1986 Brazil had twenty-two embassies in the region, and President
Sarney continued the expansion of relations with Africa, visiting Cape
Verde in 1986 and Angola in 1989. African heads of state from Algeria,
Zaire, Cape Verde, and Mozambique, as well as Sam Nujoma of the South
West African People's Organization (SWAPO), also visited Bras�lia. By
1985 commerce between Africa and Brazil had grown to US$3.3 billion.
In the context of the independence of Namibia in 1990, the UN
requested a Brazilian battalion to participate in peacekeeping
operations, but Brazil refused, saying that the army was not prepared
and the government lacked resources for such a venture. However, when
the UN asked for Brazilian army and police participants in peacekeeping
operations during the October 1994 election in Mozambique, the Itamar
Franco government was quick to oblige. In 1995 the Cardoso government
sent a full engineering battalion to Angola to participate in UN
operations (minesweeping and infrastructure rebuilding). In 1996
President Cardoso made a short visit to Angola en route to a longer
state visit to South Africa.
Brazil - Asia
Before 1960 Brazil maintained diplomatic relations with three Asian
nations: Japan, India, and Nationalist China (Taiwan). In that year,
Brazil established ties with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). In August 1961, President Quadros sent his vice
president, Jo�o Goulart, to the People's Republic of China as head of a
commercial delegation. In August 1974, Brazil broke relations with
Taiwan and established full relations with China, four years before the
United States. The Nationalist diplomats were evicted unceremoniously
from the Chinese embassy in Bras�lia to make way for the new tenants.
In the 1970s and 1980s, relations with Asia expanded to ten embassies
in Bras�lia. Because of the growing importance of the newly
industrialized countries in the Pacific Basin, Brazil installed a
legation in Singapore. Although not a major trading partner, India
became an important South-South ally in international forums, such as
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), GATT, and the Group
of 77 (G-77).
With its gradual economic opening to the West, mainland China has
become an important trading partner for Brazil since the 1980s. Petrobr�s
began oil exploration under risk contract, and engineering services were
contracted for mining and hydroelectric ventures. In addition, the
Chinese have purchased large quantities of Brazilian iron ore and steel
plate.
However, Japan has received the highest priority within the region.
Brazil established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1897. The first
Japanese immigrants arrived in Brazil in 1908, as the S�o Paulo coffee
planters sought alternative free labor after the abolition of slavery in
1888. This influx of Japanese immigrants continued until 1934, when the
new constitution limited foreign immigration to 2 percent of the past
fifty years. Diplomatic relations broke off during World War II, but
resumed in 1952. Some 100 years after the first waves of immigration,
Brazilians of Japanese descent constitute one of the largest ethnic
segments of Brazil's population.
In the 1960s, Japan began to invest heavily in various sectors in
Brazil, including mining, steel, aluminum, telecommunications,
manufacturing, and agricultural ventures (the latter in the Central
Highlands plateau region and the Amazon). In return, Japan imported
large quantities of iron, other nonferrous ores, unfinished steel and
aluminum products, and soybeans and other agricultural products.
In the 1980s, with cycles of recession and decreasing employment
opportunities in Brazil, a reverse immigration flux began; some 200,000
Brazilians of Japanese descent traveled to Japan in search of jobs.
Their monthly remittances to their families remaining in Brazil have
become an important item in bilateral commerce.
In 1992 Japanese companies invested US$1.4 billion in Brazil in the
areas of telecommunications, capital goods, mining, and metallurgy. The
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has sponsored many rural
colonization projects in Brazil since the 1950s. In 1995 JICA was using
Brazilian technicians and installations to train people from developing
countries in Latin America and Africa in industrial job training,
community development, education, and so forth.
In mid-1995 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signaled a desire for
closer trade relations with Brazil, thus eliminating Thailand as
middleman. President General Le Duc Anh visited Brazil and the Brazilian
foreign minister visited Vietnam in the second half of 1995. Brazil's
opening to Vietnam was made within the context of Brazil's general
Southeast Asian strategy and its view that Vietnam may soon become an
"Asian Tiger."
Brazil - United States
The United States was the first nation to establish a consulate in
Brazil in 1808, following the transfer of the Portuguese royal court to
Rio de Janeiro and the subsequent opening of the ports to foreign ships.
However, it was not until after World War II that the United States
became Brazil's number-one trading partner and foreign investor. After
1945 United States-Brazil relations took on five basic dimensions:
promoting and protecting United States investments in and exports to
Brazil; promoting Brazil's exports of primary goods or products (see
Glossary) and supporting Brazil's industrialization policies; garnering
Brazil's support for United States policy positions in the hemisphere
and in other world forums; promoting Brazil's emergence as a
middle-level world power in Latin America and the developing world; and
showcasing Brazil's successful independent foreign policy and autonomous
development strategy among its peers in the developing world.
During the presidency of Enrico Gaspar Dutra (1946-51), Brazil's
foreign policy was aligned closely with that of the United States.
Brazil outlawed the PCB (Brazilian Communist Party) in 1947 and broke
off relations with the Soviet Union. Vargas's return to power in 1951
signaled a cooling of relations. Vargas blamed the United States for his
ouster in 1945 and appealed to Brazilian nationalism, which was growing
in many sectors, including the armed forces. The Korean War and the
European recovery were then high United States priorities. Brazil was
not at the time threatened by communism, and United States arms sale
policies equated formerly pro-Axis Argentina with Brazil. Brazil's
foreign policy of actively promoting its agricultural exports, whose
terms of trade (see Glossary) were diminishing, ran counter to United
States interests. The establishment of the Petrobr�s oil monopoly in
1953 crowned these nationalist sentiments and was hailed as an economic
declaration of independence from United States oil companies. These
sentiments were further fanned by charges of United States involvement
in Vargas's ouster and suicide in August 1954. His suicide note blamed
"international economic and financial groups."
President Kubitschek (1956-61) improved relations with the United
States, while strengthening relations with Latin America and Europe, and
exploring market possibilities in Eastern Europe. His industrial
development policy attracted huge direct investments by foreign capital,
much from the United States. He proposed an ambitious plan for United
States development aid to Latin America in 1958 (Operation Panamerica).
The outgoing administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower found the
plan of no interest, but the administration of President John F. Kennedy
appropriated funds in 1961 for the Alliance for Progress (see Glossary).
Relations again cooled slightly after President Quadros announced his
new independent foreign policy in January 1961. Quadros also made
overtures to Cuba and decorated Cuban revolutionary Ernesto
"Che" Guevara with Brazil's highest honor.
Severe economic problems, political and economic nationalism, union
populism, and strained relations with the United States frustrated
President Goulart, eventually causing his overthrow in 1964. Before
assuming the presidency, Goulart was known for having been a Vargas prot�g�
and for being pro-Fidel Castro, procommunist, and antiforeign capital.
However, during the first parliamentary period (September 1961 to
February 1963) of his presidency, Goulart tried to maintain close
relations with the United States by naming strongly pro-United States
Roberto Campos as ambassador in Washington and Deputy Santiago Dantas as
minister of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, certain domestic and foreign
policy issues clouded this relationship. First, Goulart's
brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, then governor of Rio Grande do Sul,
insisted on expropriation of foreign-owned public utilities (electric
power and telephones), and nationalists in Congress pushed for zero or
minimum compensation. Second, Brazil joined Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Ecuador, and Mexico in abstaining from a final vote on an OAS resolution
expelling Cuba from that organization. Third, in August 1962, Congress
approved a more restrictive law governing profit remittances, and new
foreign investments dwindled to almost zero in early 1964.
In late 1963, Washington, alarmed that Brazil might become a hostile,
nonaligned power like Egypt, reduced foreign aid to Brazil. The exact
United States role in the March 31, 1964, military coup that overthrew
Goulart remains controversial. However, the United States immediately
recognized the new interim government (before Goulart had even fled
Brazilian territory); a United States naval task force anchored close to
the port of Vit�ria; the United States made an immediate large loan to
the new Castelo Branco government (1964-67); and the new military
president adopted a policy of total alignment with the United States.
The Castelo Branco regime broke off relations with Cuba (while
enhancing them with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); purged or
exiled leftists and alleged communists; adopted a more discreet position
in the UN vis-�-vis Portuguese colonialism; duly compensated
expropriated foreign capital investments; passed a new profit
remittances law; and sent a 1,200-man battalion as part of the
Interamerican Peace Force to the Dominican Republic in 1965. Brazilian
foreign policy centered on combating subversion and contributing to the
collective security of the hemisphere. Brazil ranked third after Vietnam
and India as recipients of United States aid; it received US$2 billion
from 1964 to 1970. Nonetheless, Castelo Branco's all-out support for
United States policies only served to increase anti-Americanism rather
than to lessen it.
Divergence and some hostility characterized relations during the
Costa e Silva period (1967-69). Brazil perceived that United States
leadership in the global struggle was faltering because of the winding
down in Vietnam, making it more difficult for Brazil to support United
States positions in world forums. In 1969 the Richard M. Nixon
administration assumed a low-profile policy with Latin America.
Washington provided less economic aid and fewer arms shipments to Brazil
and sharply reduced its military mission in Brazil (from 200 in 1968 to
sixty in 1971).
Although Costa e Silva did not turn to economic nationalism and the
climate for foreign investments remained generally favorable, Brazil
asserted its independence in other ways. It withdrew support from the
Interamerican Peace Force, declined to sign the NPT (Non-Proliferation
Treaty), tried to organize a Latin American nuclear community, assumed a
leadership role in the nonaligned G-77, and increased Soviet-Brazilian
trade. Nevertheless, Costa e Silva paid a state visit to Washington in
1967, and in 1969 Brazil sided with the United States against the
nationalization of oil properties by the Peruvian military government.
The M�dici and Geisel governments (1969-79) generally followed the
same course of increasingly independent foreign policy combined with
friendly relations with the United States. Brazil sought to pursue its
own advantages by leaving open its nuclear options, greatly expanding
trade with the Eastern Bloc, recognizing the Beijing government four
years before the United States normalized relations with mainland China,
and asserting a 322-kilometer maritime zone (always referred to by
Brazilians as "200 miles") contrary to United States policy
and fishing interests.
Brazil's policies emphasized North-South issues over the East-West
conflict. Brazil took the lead in organizing commodity cartels (coffee,
sugar, and cocoa). In 1975 Brazil voted for the UN resolution equating
Zionism with racism and did not condemn the Soviet and Cuban
intervention in Angola.
The Nixon administration remained basically sympathetic to Brazilian
hopes for growth and world power status, and considered Brazil to be one
of the developing world nations most sympathetic to the United States.
In February 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ant�nio Azeredo da Silveira signed a memorandum of
understanding that the two powers would consult on all issues of mutual
concern and would hold semiannual meetings of foreign ministers. Brazil
had signed similar agreements with Britain, France, and Italy in 1975.
Only Brazil and Saudi Arabia, aside from the major Western allies, had
such an agreement with the United States. Although these agreements had
no great practical consequences, they indicated a changed United States
policy of wooing Brazil.
The Carter administration marked a definite cooling of United
States-Brazil relations. The confrontation involved two very sensitive
issues--human rights and nuclear proliferation. In 1967 Brazil had
signed a contract with Westinghouse to build a 626-megawatt nuclear
power station at Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro State, to be completed
in 1977. In 1973-74 the petroleum crisis jolted Brazil into a
high-priority policy of seeking alternative energy sources (hydro,
solar, alcohol, biogas, Bolivian natural gas, and nuclear). However, the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission renounced its guarantee of
delivery of enriched uranium, casting doubts on the value of nuclear
cooperation with the United States, which had prohibited Westinghouse
from constructing enrichment and reprocessing plants in Brazil.
Brazil, desiring independent control of the full cycle from ore to
kilowatts, signed a broad nuclear agreement with West Germany in June
1975. It involved furnishing technology and equipment for eight nuclear
power plants, plus enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Despite
safeguard provisions, some thought this agreement opened the door for
Brazil to construct nuclear weapons, if desired. The Ford administration
reacted only mildly to the agreement, but from his first day in office,
President Carter sought to prevent its implementation.
In 1975 the United States Congress mandated that the Department of
State produce a general report on human rights performance by all
recipients of United States military assistance. The section of the
report dealing with Brazil noted some improvements and described
violations as mildly as possible. This report might have gone unnoticed
if the United States Embassy had not delivered a copy to the Foreign
Office in Bras�lia just hours before its release in Washington. This
gesture, intended as a courtesy, was interpreted as an intolerable
interference in Brazil's internal affairs. The next day, Brazil
renounced the United States-Brazil Military Assistance Agreement, which
had been in effect since 1952, and some military nationalists pushed for
breaking diplomatic relations. Formal relations between the two military
organizations have still not been reestablished.
The Reagan administration made ostensible gestures to improve
relations with Brazil. A former military attach� to Brazil during the
1964 coup, retired General Vernon Walters was dispatched to Bras�lia to
express United States concern over the Cuban-supported guerrilla
movement in El Salvador and to request support and assistance. Brazil
listened politely, but then refused to join the military governments of
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in support of the Salvadoran government.
Moreover, it increased trade credits to Nicaragua and signed several
large trade agreements with the Soviet Union.
In the early 1980s, tension in United States-Brazil relations
centered on economic questions. Retaliation for unfair trade practices
loomed on the horizon and threatened Brazilian exports of steel, orange
juice, commuter aircraft, frozen chickens, shoes, and textiles. The
United States criticized Brazil for its trade restrictions and unfair
practices (in the area of pharmaceutical patents and restrictions on
United States computer giants), and for its US$5 billion trade surplus
with the United States. Brazil replied that it needed desperately to
maintain large balance of payments surpluses to meet its foreign debt
obligations.
When President Sarney took office in March 1985, political issues,
such as Brazil's arms exports to Libya and Iran, again surfaced.
Brazil's foreign debt moratorium and its refusal to sign the NPT caused
the United States Congress to put Brazil on its mandated blacklist,
thereby restricting Brazil's access to certain United States
technologies (see Nuclear Programs, ch. 6). On taking office in March
1990, President Collor sought a quick rapprochement with the United
States in order to begin an aggressive policy of inserting Brazil into
the world economy and placing it at the negotiating table of world
powers. Collor concluded a nonproliferation agreement with Argentina,
which was registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna. He moved to deactivate Brazil's autonomous nuclear project and
the nuclear submarine project, as well as the air-to-air Piranha missile
project. He also gained congressional approval for eliminating the
market reserve on computer products and beginning tariff reductions.
Collor abolished the National Intelligence Service (Servi�o Nacional de
Informa��es--SNI) and the National Security Council (CSN), and
fashioned a Strategic Affairs Secretariat (Secretaria de Assuntos Estrat�gicos--SAE)
with a civilian head. However, after a year in office the Collor
government concluded that these overtures had been in vain. Reciprocity
by the United States was not forthcoming, and Brazilian policies
reverted to a more pragmatic, independent approach.
The Franco administration maintained an even more independent stance
and reacted coolly to proposals by the Clinton administration for a
Latin American free-trade zone. Brazil pushed ahead with its Satellite
Launch Vehicle (Ve�culo Lan�ador de Sat�lite--VLS) program, based in
Alc�ntara, Maranh�o. Because Brazil wants to participate in the very
lucrative satellite launching market, it had consistently refused, until
October 1995, to sign the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime),
which it believed restricted developing nations from attaining access to
this technology. In June 1995, the Israeli military attach� in Bras�lia
denounced Brazil for continuing sales of Astros II surface-to-surface
missile launchers and heavy bombs to Libya, despite UN embargoes. In
October 1995, after continuous pressure from the United States, Brazil
finally met the conditions to join the MTCR and was accepted as a
member. Brazil joined the MTCR because it was necessary to gain access
to crucial rocket technology to finalize the VLS IV and to ensure that
it would become operational in 1997.
Relations with the Cardoso government in 1995-97 were good. Cardoso
made a very successful trip to Washington and New York in April 1995,
and the Clinton administration was very enthusiastic regarding the
passage of constitutional amendments that open the Brazilian economy to
increased international participation. The United States was especially
pleased with the break-up of state monopolies in the petroleum and
telecommunications sectors. However, the United States called for
increased efforts to stem international drug smuggling across Brazil's
territory from Andean neighbors, and better coordination between the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Brazilian
authorities. In April 1995, Bras�lia and Washington signed a new
cooperation agreement.
Related to the problem of surveillance of drug smuggling across the
Amazon region was the controversial Amazon Region Surveillance System
(Sistema de Vigil�ncia da Amaz�nia--Sivam) contract. In the 1970s and
1980s, Brazil had installed three air surveillance and traffic control
systems in the South (Sul), Southeast, and Northeast, purchased from
Thomson CSF, the French electronics manufacturer. In the 1990s, several
international consortiums, including Thomson CSF, hotly contested the
proposed Sivam contract (worth US$1.5 billion). A timely visit by United
States Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown in June 1994 heavily influenced
the decision, and two days after his departure, the Brazilian government
decided in favor of a consortium led by the American firm Raytheon,
instead of Thomson CSF. United States incentives included very favorable
Export-Import Bank financing and assurance that Raytheon would
participate in the privatization of the Brazilian Aeronautics Company
(Empresa Brasileira Aeron�utica--Embraer), which never happened.
In 1995, before the final signing of the contracts with Raytheon,
Brazil's Congress, under pressure from environmental groups and the
governors of the Amazon region, decided to review the decision process
and contract details. Under intense pressure from the United States
Embassy in Bras�lia, however, the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of
Deputies finally approved the plan in May 1995, over protests from the
governors from the Amazon region.
In response to United States criticism over its unfair trade
practices and its failure to protect intellectual property rights,
Brazil finally signed a new patent protection law in March 1996. The new
law includes protection for pharmaceutical patents and contains a
"pipeline" mechanism. The United States also looks to Brazil
to fulfill its longstanding commitments to enact legislation on computer
software and semiconductor layout design, and to introduce amendments to
its copyright laws.