This edition supersedes the Area Handbook for Bangladesh,
coauthored by Richard F. Nyrop, et alia, in 1975. Some parts of that
edition have been used in the preparation of the current book, and the
authors of Bangladesh: A Country Study are grateful for the
seminal work done by the earlier edition's authors.
Several individuals provided timely insight and assistance to the
authors. They included Lieutenant Colonel Russell Olson, United States
Army; Major James A. Dunn, Jr., United States Army; former diplomat
Archer Kent Blood; and Professor Harry W. Blair. The authors also wish
to thank various members of the staff of the Embassy of the People's
Republic of Bangladesh in Washington, D.C., especially Brigadier
Sharifuddin Ahmed, M. Tajul Islam, Mohammed Nazimuddin, and Obaedul Huq,
for useful comments and primary-source research materials. Bazlur Rahim
and Joyce L. Rahim provided and tabulated key statistical information,
respectively. Additionally, the staffs of the United States Embassy in
Dhaka, the Department of State, and the World Bank provided timely
economic data. Labanya Borra of the Library of Congress Descriptive
Cataloging Division assisted with some of the Bangla-language materials.
Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. Elizabeth
Park prepared the telecommunications sections in chapters 3 and 4.
Carolina E. Forrester checked the content of all of the maps used in the
book and reviewed the text of the section on geography. Thomas Collelo
provided substantive review of parts of the book. Tracy M. Coleman
performed numerous essential tasks, ranging from assistance on research
for the text, tables, and maps to word processing and proofreading.
Andrea Matles Savada reviewed the Bibliography and helped proofread
parts of the text and statistical tables. David P. Cabitto, Sandra K.
Cotugno, and Kimberly A. Lord prepared the graphics. Harriett R. Blood
assisted in the preparation of the maps. Helpful suggestions were made
by Richard F. Nyrop during his review of all parts of the book. Noelle
B. Beatty, Vincent Ercolano, Martha E. Hopkins, Marilyn L. Majeska, Ruth
Nieland, Evan A. Raynes, and Gage Ricard edited portions of the
manuscript. Izella Watson and Barbara Edgerton performed word
processing. Martha E. Hopkins managed editing and production of the
book. Andrea T. Merrill performed the final prepublication editorial
review, and Shirley Kessel of Communicators Connection prepared the
index. Sheryle O. Shears of the Library of Congress Composing Unit
prepared camera-ready copy, under the direction of Peggy Pixley. Those
who provided photographs and other illustrations have been acknowledged
in the illustration captions.
Bangladesh - Preface
Bangladesh: A Country Study supersedes the 1975 Area
Handbook for Bangladesh. Although much of what characterizes
Bangladesh--its status as one of the world's largest but poorest
countries and its corresponding need for international aid, its
susceptibility to severe natural disasters, and the optimism of its
people--has not changed in the years between publication of these two
books, a considerable number of major developments have occurred. Just
before the Area Handbook for Bangladesh went to press in 1975,
the founding father of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), and
several members of his family were assassinated. The ensuing years
brought two periods of transitional political instability, each followed
by relative stability under long-term military regimes. More than a year
passed after Mujib's death before Bangladesh Army chief of staff Ziaur
Rahman (Zia) emerged as chief martial law administrator in November
1976. Zia assumed the presidency in April 1977, but he, too, became the
victim of an assassination plot in May 1981. Army chief of staff Hussain
Muhammad Ershad, after considerable hesitation, assumed the position of
chief martial law administrator following a bloodless coup in March 1982
and became president in December 1983. By 1986 martial law had been
relaxed, and civilian control gradually replaced military rule
throughout all sectors of society. In 1988 Ershad continued to
consolidate his role as civilian ruler of Bangladesh by calling for
parliamentary elections and establishment of Islam as the state religion
of Bangladesh. Continual pressure from opposition political forces shook
the Ershad regime as the 1980s continued.
The authors of the 1975 work were examining a nation only slightly
more than three years old. In contrast, the authors of the new edition
have aimed to show the maturity Bangladesh has attained over nearly
twenty years of development. Despite the continual adversity faced by
Bangladeshis as they confront their historical development, difficult
climate, burgeoning population, and fractious political forces, a
national identity has emerged. Although the nation has much to
accomplish in order to meet the basic needs of its people, much has been
achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. Economic achievements have been made.
Persistent demands by the people for basic freedoms and political
expression have moved the country toward democratic rule. In
international forums, Bangladesh's representatives had taken strong
stands against injustice and in defense of their nation's sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
The transliteration of Bangla--the national language--varies widely
among Bangladeshi and foreign scholars. Common family names may be
transliterated in several ways, for example, Choudhury, Chaudri,
Chowdhury, and several other variants. Where it is known, the authors
have followed the spelling used by the individual. In other instances,
the authors have followed the form used by the Bangladesh government;
for example, the word national is transliterated as jatiyo,
although many American sources use the less phonetically accurate jatiya.
To the extent possible, the authors have used the place-names
established by the United States Board on Geographic Names, e.g., Dhaka
instead of Dacca.
A bibliography of works used in researching the book is included.
Whereas major sources of information are published in English, the
readers of this book, after referring to the English- and other
Western-language sources cited in the bibliography, may want to consult
Bangla- language sources, such as the daily newspapers Azad
(Free), Ittefaq (Unity), Sangbad (News), or Dainik
Bangla (Daily Bangla); periodicals, such as the weekly Bichitra
(Variety), Rahbar (Guide), or Sachitra Sandhani
(Seeing Through Pictures); or the armed forces journal Senani (Army).
Bangladesh - Historical Setting
For most of its history, the area known as Bangladesh was a political
backwater--an observer rather than a participant in the great political
and military events of the Indian subcontinent. Historians believe that Bengal, the area comprising present-day
Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal, was settled in about
1000 B.C. by Dravidian-speaking peoples who were later known as the
Bang. Their homeland bore various titles that reflected earlier tribal
names, such as Vanga, Banga, Bangala, Bangal, and Bengal.
The first great indigenous empire to spread over most of present-day
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was the Mauryan Empire (ca. 320-180
B.C.), whose most famous ruler was Asoka (ca. 273-232 B.C.). Although
the empire was well administered and politically integrated, little is
known of any reciprocal benefits between it and eastern Bengal. The
western part of Bengal, however, achieved some importance during the
Mauryan period because vessels sailed from its ports to Sri Lanka and
Southeast Asia. During the time of the Mauryan Empire, Buddhism came to
Bengal, and it was from there that Asoka's son, Mahinda, carried the
message of the Enlightened One to Sri Lanka. After the decline of the
Mauryan Empire the eastern portion of Bengal became the kingdom of
Samatata; although politically independent, it was a tributary state of
the Indian Gupta Empire (A.D. ca. 319-ca. 540).
The third great empire was the Harsha Empire (A.D. 606-47), which
drew Samatata into its loosely administered political structure. The
disunity following the demise of this short-lived empire allowed a
Buddhist chief named Gopala to seize power as the first ruler of the
Pala Dynasty (A.D. 750-1150). He and his successors provided Bengal with
stable government, security, and prosperity while spreading Buddhism
throughout the state and into neighboring territories. Trade and
influence were extensive under Pala leadership, as emissaries were sent
as far as Tibet and Sumatra.
The Senas, orthodox and militant Hindus, replaced the Buddhist Palas
as rulers of a united Bengal until the Turkish conquest in 1202. Opposed
to the Brahmanic Hinduism of the Senas with its rigid caste system, vast
numbers of Bengalis, especially those from the lower castes, would later
convert to Islam.
Bangladesh - ISLAMIZATION OF BENGAL, 1202-1757
The Turkish conquest of the subcontinent was a long, drawn-out
process covering several centuries. It began in Afghanistan with the
military forays of Mahmud of Ghazni in 1001. By the early thirteenth
century, Bengal fell to Turkish armies. The last major Hindu Sena ruler
was expelled from his capital at Nadia in western Bengal in 1202,
although lesser Sena rulers held sway for a short while after in eastern
Bengal.
Bengal was loosely associated with the Delhi Sultanate, established
in 1206, and paid a tribute in war elephants in order to maintain
autonomy. In 1341 Bengal became independent from Delhi, and Dhaka was
established as the seat of the governors of independent Bengal. Turks
ruled Bengal for several decades before the conquest of Dhaka by forces
of the Mughal emperor Akbar the Great (1556-1605) in 1576. Bengal
remained a Mughal province until the beginning of the decline of the
Mughal Empire in the eighteenth century.
Under the Mughals, the political integration of Bengal with the rest
of the subcontinent began, but Bengal was never truly subjugated. It was
always too remote from the center of government in Delhi. Because lines
of communications were poor, local governors found it easy to ignore
imperial directives and maintain their independence. Although Bengal
remained provincial, it was not isolated intellectually, and Bengali
religious leaders from the fifteenth century onward have been
influential throughout the subcontinent.
The Mughals in their heyday had a profound and lasting effect on
Bengal. When Akbar ascended the throne at Delhi, a road connecting
Bengal with Delhi was under construction and a postal service was being
planned as a step toward drawing Bengal into the operations of the
empire. Akbar implemented the present-day Bengali
calendar, and his son, Jahangir (1605-27), introduced
civil and military officials from outside Bengal who received rights to
collect taxes on land. The development of the zamindar
(tax collector and later landlord) class and its later
interaction with the British would have immense economic and social
implications for twentieth-century Bengal. Bengal was treated as the
"breadbasket of India" and, as the richest province in the
empire, was drained of its resources to maintain the Mughal army. The
Mughals, however, did not expend much energy protecting the countryside
or the capital from Arakanese or Portuguese pirates; in one year as many
as 40,000 Bengalis were seized by pirates to be sold as slaves, and
still the central government did not intervene. Local resistance to
imperial control forced the emperor to appoint powerful generals as
provincial governors. Yet, despite the insecurity of the Mughal regime,
Bengal prospered. Agriculture expanded, trade was encouraged, and Dhaka
became one of the centers of the textile trade in South Asia.
In 1704 the provincial capital of Bengal was moved from Dhaka to
Murshidabad. Although they continued to pay tribute to the Mughal court,
the governors became practically independent rulers after the death in
1707 of Aurangzeb, the last great Mughal emperor. The governors were
strong enough to fend off marauding Hindu Marathas from the Bombay area
during the eighteenth century. When the Mughal governor Alivardi died in
1756, he left the rule of Bengal to his grandson Siraj ud Daulah, who
would lose Bengal to the British the following year.
Bangladesh - EUROPEAN COLONIZATION, 1757-1857
Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the
foundations of British rule were effectively laid, the British
government showed increasing interest in the welfare of the people of
India, feeling the need to curb the greed, recklessness, and corrupt
activities of the private British East India Company. Beginning in 1773,
the British Parliament sought to regulate the company's administration.
By 1784 the company was made responsible to Parliament for its civil and
military affairs and was transformed into an instrument of British
foreign policy.
Some new measures introduced in the spirit of government intervention
clearly did not benefit the people of Bengal. The Permanent Settlement
(Landlease Act) of Lord Charles Cornwallis in 1793, which regulated the
activities of the British agents and imposed a system of revenue
collection and landownership, stands as a monument to the disastrous
effects of the good intentions of Parliament. The traditional system for
collecting land taxes involved the zamindars, who exercised the dual
function of revenue collectors and local magistrates. The British gave
the zamindars the status and rights of landlords, modeled mainly on the
British landed gentry and aristocracy. Under the new system the
revenue-collecting rights were often auctioned to the highest bidders,
whether or not they had any knowledge of rural conditions or the
managerial skills necessary to improve agriculture. Agriculture became a
matter of speculation among urban financiers, and the traditional
personal link between the resident zamindars and the peasants was
broken. Absentee landlordship became commonplace, and agricultural
development stagnated.
Most British subjects who had served with the British East India
Company until the end of the eighteenth century were content with making
profits and leaving the Indian social institutions untouched. A growing
number of Anglican and Baptist evangelicals in Britain, however, felt
that social institutions should be reformed. There was also the demand
in Britain, first articulated by member of Parliament and political
theorist Edmund Burke, that the company's government balance its
exploitative practices with concern for the welfare of the Indian
people. The influential utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and James
Mill stated that societies could be reformed by proper laws. Influenced
in part by these factors, British administrators in India embarked on a
series of social and administrative reforms that were not well received
by the conservative elements of Bengali society. Emphasis was placed on
the introduction of Western philosophy, technology, and institutions
rather than on the reconstruction of native institutions. The early
attempts by the British East India Company to encourage the use of
Sanskrit and Persian were abandoned in favor of Western science and
literature; elementary education was taught in the vernacular, but
higher education in English. The stated purpose of secular education was
to produce a class of Indians instilled with British cultural values.
Persian was replaced with English as the official language of the
government. A code of civil and criminal procedure was fashioned after
British legal formulas. In the field of social reforms, the British
suppressed what they considered to be inhumane practices, such as suttee
(self-immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands),
female infanticide, and human sacrifice.
British policy viewed colonies as suppliers of raw materials and
purchasers of manufactured goods. The British conquest of India
coincided with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, led by the
mechanization of the textile industry. As a result of the British policy
of dumping machine-made goods in the subcontinent, India's domestic
craft industries were thoroughly ruined, and its trade and commerce
collapsed. Eastern Bengal was particularly hard hit. Muslin cloth from
Dhaka had become popular in eighteenth-century Europe until British
muslin drove it off the market.
Bangladesh - THE UPRISING OF 1857
The uprising precipitated a dramatic reappraisal of British
policy--in effect a retreat from the reformist and evangelical zeal that
had accompanied the rapid territorial expansion of British rule. This
policy was codified in Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 delivered
to "The Princes, Chiefs, and Peoples of India." Formal
annexations of princely states virtually ceased, and the political
boundaries between British territories and the princely states became
frozen. By this time the British territories occupied about 60 percent
of the subcontinent, and some 562 princely states of varying size
occupied the remainder. The relationship the British maintained with the
princely states was governed by the principle of paramountcy, whereby
the princely states exercised sovereignty in their internal affairs but
relinquished their powers to conduct their external relations to
Britain, the paramount power. Britain assumed responsibility for the
defense of the princely states and reserved the right to intervene in
cases of maladministration or gross injustice.
Despite Queen Victoria's promise in 1858 that all subjects under the
British crown would be treated equally under the law, the revolt left a
legacy of mistrust between the ruler and the ruled. In the ensuing
years, the British often assumed a posture of racial arrogance as
"sahibs" who strove to remain aloof from "native
contamination." This attitude was perhaps best captured in Rudyard
Kipling's lament that Englishmen were destined to "take up the
white man's burden."
As a security precaution, the British increased the ratio of British
to Indian troops following the mutiny. In 1857 British India's armies
had had 45,000 Britons to 240,000 Indian troops. By 1863 this ratio had
changed to a "safer mix" of 65,000 British to 140,000 Indian
soldiers. In the aftermath of the revolt, which had begun among Bengalis
in the British Indian Army, the British formed an opinion, later refined
as a theory, that there were martial and nonmartial races in India. The
nonmartial races included the Bengalis; the martial included primarily
the Punjabis and the Pathans, who supported the British during the
revolt.
The transfer of control from the British East India Company to the
British crown accelerated the pace of development in India. A great
transformation took place in the economy in the late nineteenth century.
The British authorities quickly set out to improve inland transportation
and communications systems, primarily for strategic and administrative
reasons. By 1870 an extended network of railroads, coupled with the
removal of internal customs barriers and transit duties, opened up
interior markets to domestic and foreign trade and improved links
between what is now Bangladesh and Calcutta. India also found itself
within the orbit of worldwide markets, especially with the opening of
the Suez Canal in 1869. Foreign trade, though under virtual British
monopoly, was stimulated. India exported raw materials for world
markets, and the economy was quickly transformed into a colonial
agricultural arm of British industry.
Bangladesh - THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, 1857-1947
In 1906 the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) met in Dhaka for
the first time. The Muslim League used the occasion to declare its
support for the partition of Bengal and to proclaim its mission as a
"political association to protect and advance the political rights
and interests of the Mussalmans of India." The Muslim League
initially professed its loyalty to the British government and its
condemnation of the swadeshi movement. It was of an altogether
different nature from Congress. Congress claimed to fight for only
secular goals that represented Indian national aspirations regardless of
religious community. Yet despite its neutral stance on religion,
Congress encountered opposition from some leaders in the Muslim
community who objected to participation in Congress on the grounds that
the party was Hindu dominated. The Muslim League strictly represented
only the interests of the Muslim community. Both parties originally were
elitist, composed of intellectuals and the middle class, and lacked a
mass following until after 1930. The Muslim League looked to the British
for protection of Muslim minority rights and insisted on guarantees for
Muslim minority rights as the price of its participation with Congress
in the nationalist movement. In 1916 the two parties signed the
Congress-Muslim League Pact (often referred to as the Lucknow Pact), a
joint platform and call for national independence. The essence of the
alliance was the endorsement by the Muslim League of demands for
democratization in representation; Indianization of administration and
racial equality throughout India in return for acceptance by the
Congress of separate communal electorates (Muslims voted for and were
represented by Muslims, Sikhs voted for and were represented by Sikhs,
while the remainder of the population was termed "general" and
included mostly Hindus); a reserved quota of legislative seats for
Muslims; and the Muslim League's right to review any social legislation
affecting Muslims. The Lucknow Pact was a high-water mark of unity in
the nationalist cause, but it also endorsed a scheme that engendered
communal rather than national identity. The plan for separate
electorates for Muslims, first put into law by the Indian Councils Act
of 1909, was further strengthened and expanded by the India Act of 1919
(the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms).
World War I had a profound impact on the nationalist movement in
India. Congress enthusiastically supported the war effort in the hope
that Britain would reward Indian loyalty with political concessions,
perhaps independence, after the war. The Muslim League was more
ambivalent. Part of this ambivalence had to do with the concerns
expressed by Muslim writers over the fate of Turkey. The Balkan wars,
the Italo-Turkish War, and World War I were depicted in India as a
confrontation between Islam and Western imperialism. Because the sultan
of Turkey claimed to be the caliph (khilafa; literally,
successor of the Prophet) and therefore spiritual leader of the Islamic
community, many Muslims felt fervently that the dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire presaged the destruction of the last great Islamic power.
Muslims in India also were alarmed over reports that the Allied Powers
contemplated placing some of the holy places of Islam under non-Muslim
jurisdiction. In 1920 the Khilafat Movement was launched in response to
the news of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Khilafat
Movement combined Indian nationalism and pan-Islamic sentiment with
strong anti-British overtones.
For several years the Khilafat Movement replaced the Muslim League as
the major focus of Muslim activism. An agreement between the leaders of
the movement and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi, 1869-1948),
the leading figure in Congress, resulted in the joint advocacy of
self-rule for India on the one hand and agitation for the protection of
Islamic holy places and the restoration of the caliph of Turkey on the
other hand. The Khilafat Movement coincided with the inception of
Gandhi's call for satyagraha (truth force), a strategy of nonviolent
civil disobedience to British rule. The fusion of these two movements
was short lived, briefly giving the illusion of unity to India's
nationalist agitation.
In 1922 the Hindu-Muslim accord suffered a double blow when their
noncooperation movement miscarried and the Khilafat Movement foundered.
The outbreak of rioting, which had communal aspects in a number of
places, caused Gandhi to call off the joint noncooperation movement. The
Khilafat Movement lost its purpose when the postwar Turkish nationalists
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later known as Mustafa Kemal Atat�rk)
abolished the sultanate, proclaimed Turkey a secular republic, abolished
the religious office of the caliph, and sent the last of the Ottoman
ruling family into exile.
After the eclipse of the Hindu-Muslim accord, the spirit of communal
unity was never reestablished in the subcontinent. Congress took an
uncompromising stand on the territorial integrity of any proposed
postpartition India, downplaying communal differences and seriously
underestimating the intensity of Muslim minority fears that were to
strengthen the influence and power of the Muslim League. As late as 1938
Gandhi's deputy, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), said, "There is no
religious or cultural problem in India. What is called the religious or
communal problem is really a dispute among upper-class people for a
division of the spoils of office or a representation in a
legislature." Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, however, the fiery leader of the
untouchables (referred to in Gandhian terminology as
harijan--"children of God") described the twenty years
following 1920 as "Civil War between Hindus and Muslims,
interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace."
Bangladesh - Two Nations Concept, 1930-47
The political tumult in India during the late 1920s and the 1930s
produced the first articulations of a separate state as an expression of
Muslim consciousness. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938), an Islamic
revivalist poet and philosopher, discussed contemporary problems in his
presidential address to the Muslim League conference at Allahabad in
1930. He saw India as Asia in miniature, in which a unitary form of
government was inconceivable and community rather than territory was the
basis for identification. To Iqbal, communalism in its highest sense was
the key to the formation of a harmonious whole in India. Therefore, he
demanded the creation of a confederated India that would include a
Muslim state consisting of Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province,
Sind, and Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal
reiterated the claims of Muslims to be considered a nation "based
on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic
interests."
Iqbal gave no name to his projected state; that was done by Chaudhari
Rahmat Ali and a group of students at Cambridge University who issued a
pamphlet in 1933 entitled "Now or Never." They opposed the
idea of federation, denied that India was a single country, and demanded
partition into regions, the northwest receiving national status as
"Pakistan." They made up the name Pakistan by taking
the P from Punjab, A from Afghania (Rahmat's name for the North-West
Frontier Province), K from Kashmir, S from Sind, and Tan from
Baluchistan. (When written in Urdu, the word Pakistan has no
letter i between the k and the s.) The name
means "the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean."
There was a proliferation of articles on the theme of Pakistan
expressing the subjective conviction of nationhood, but there was no
coordination of political effort to achieve it. There was no reference
to Bengal.
In 1934 Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) took over the leadership of
the Muslim League, which was without a sense of mission and unable to
replace the Khilafat Movement, which had combined religion, nationalism,
and political adventure. Jinnah set about restoring a sense of purpose
to Muslims. He emphasized the "Two Nations" theory based on
the conflicting ideas and conceptions of Hinduism and Islam.
By the late 1930s, Jinnah was convinced of the need for a unifying
issue among Muslims, and the proposed state of Pakistan was the obvious
answer. In its convention on March 23, 1940, in Lahore, the Muslim
League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in the northwest and
the northeast of India should be grouped in "constituent states to
be autonomous and sovereign" and that no independence plan without
this provision would be acceptable to the Muslims. Federation was
rejected and, though confederation on common interests with the rest of
India was envisaged, partition was predicated as the final goal. The
Pakistan issue brought a positive goal to the Muslims and simplified the
task of political agitation. It was no longer necessary to remain
"yoked" to Hindus, and the amended wording of the Lahore
Resolution issued in 1940 called for a "unified Pakistan." It
would, however, be challenged by eastern Bengalis in later years.
After 1940 reconciliation between Congress and the Muslim League
became increasingly difficult. Muslim enthusiasm for Pakistan grew in
direct proportion to Hindu condemnation of it; the concept took on a
life of its own and became a reality in 1947.
During World War II, the Muslim League and Congress adopted different
attitudes toward the British government. When in 1939 the British
declared India at war without first consulting Indian politicians,
Muslim League politicians followed a course of limited cooperation with
the British. Officials who were members of Congress, however, resigned
from their offices. When in August 1942 Gandhi launched the
revolutionary "Quit India" movement against the British Raj,
Jinnah condemned it. The British government retaliated by arresting
about 60,000 individuals and outlawing Congress. Meanwhile, the Muslim
League stepped up its political activity. Communal passions rose, as did
the incidence of communal violence. Talks between Jinnah and Gandhi in
1944 proved as futile as did the negotiations between Gandhi and the
viceroy, Lord Archibald Wavell.
In July 1945 the Labour Party came to power in Britain with a vast
majority. Its choices in India were limited by the decline of British
power and the spread of Indian unrest, even to the armed services. Some
form of independence was the only alternative to forcible retention of
control over an unwilling dependency. The viceroy held discussions with
Indian leaders in Simla in 1945 in an attempt to decide what form an
interim government might take, but no agreement emerged.
New elections to provincial and central legislatures were ordered,
and a three-man British cabinet mission arrived to discuss plans for
India's self-government. Although the mission did not directly accept
plans for self-government, concessions were made by severely limiting
the power of the central government. An interim government composed of
the parties returned by the election was to start functioning
immediately, as was the newly elected Constituent Assembly.
Congress and the Muslim League emerged from the 1946 election as the
two dominant parties. The Muslim League's success in the election could
be gauged from its sweep of 90 percent of all Muslim seats in British
India--compared with a mere 4.5 percent in 1937 elections. The Muslim
League, like Congress, initially accepted the British cabinet mission
plan, despite grave reservations. Subsequent disputes between the
leaders of the two parties, however, led to mistrust and bitterness.
Jinnah demanded parity for the Muslim League in the interim government
and temporarily boycotted it when the demand was not met. Nehru
indiscreetly made statements that cast doubts on the sincerity of
Congress in accepting the cabinet mission plan. Each party disputed the
right of the other to appoint Muslim ministers.
When the viceroy proceeded to form an interim government without the
Muslim League, Jinnah called for demonstrations, or "direct
action," on August 16, 1946. Communal rioting on an unprecedented
scale broke out, especially in Bengal and Bihar; the massacre of Muslims
in Calcutta brought Gandhi to the scene. His efforts calmed fears in
Bengal, but the rioting spread to other provinces and continued into the
following year. Jinnah took the Muslim League into the government in an
attempt to prevent additional communal violence, but disagreement among
the ministers rendered the interim government ineffective. Over all
loomed the shadow of civil war.
In February 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed viceroy and
was given instructions to arrange for the transfer of power. After a
quick assessment of the Indian scene, Mountbatten said that "India
was a ship on fire in mid-ocean with ammunition in her hold."
Mountbatten was convinced that Congress would be willing to accept
partition as the price for stopping bloodshed and that Jinnah was
willing to accept a smaller Pakistan. Mountbatten obtained sanction from
London for the drastic action he proposed and then persuaded Indian
leaders to acquiesce in a general way to his plan.
On July 14, 1947, the British House of Commons passed the India
Independence Act, by which two independent dominions were created on the
subcontinent and the princely states were left to accede to either.
Throughout the summer of 1947, as communal violence mounted and drought
and floods racked the land, preparations for partition proceeded in
Delhi. The preparations were inadequate. A restructuring of the military
into two forces took place, as law and order broke down in different
parts of the country. Jinnah and Nehru tried unsuccessfully to quell the
passions that neither fully understood. Jinnah flew from Delhi to
Karachi on August 7 and took office seven days later as the first
governor general of the new Dominion of Pakistan.
Bangladesh - PAKISTAN PERIOD, 1947-71
Transition to Nationhood, 1947-58
Pakistan was born in bloodshed and came into existence on August 15,
1947, confronted by seemingly insurmountable problems. As many as 12
million people--Muslims leaving India for Pakistan, and Hindus and Sikhs
opting to move to India from the new state of Pakistan--had been
involved in the mass transfer of population between the two countries,
and perhaps 2 million refugees had died in the communal bloodbath that
had accompanied the migrations. Pakistan's boundaries were established
hastily without adequate regard for the new nation's economic viability.
Even the minimal requirements of a working central government--skilled
personnel, equipment, and a capital city with government buildings--were
missing. Until 1947 the East Wing of Pakistan, separated from the West
Wing by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory, had been heavily dependent
on Hindu management. Many Hindu Bengalis left for Calcutta after
partition, and their place, particularly in commerce, was taken mostly
by Muslims who had migrated from the Indian state of Bihar or by West
Pakistanis from Punjab.
After partition, Muslim banking shifted from Bombay to Karachi,
Pakistan's first capital. Much of the investment in East Pakistan came
from West Pakistani banks. Investment was concentrated in jute
production at a time when international demand was decreasing. The
largest jute processing factory in the world, at Narayanganj, an
industrial suburb of Dhaka, was owned by the Adamjee family from West
Pakistan. Because banking and financing were generally controlled by
West Pakistanis, discriminatory practices often resulted. Bengalis found
themselves excluded from the managerial level and from skilled labor.
West Pakistanis tended to favor Urdu-speaking Biharis (refugees from the
northern Indian state of Bihar living in East Pakistan), considering
them to be less prone to labor agitation than the Bengalis. This
preference became more pronounced after explosive labor clashes between
the Biharis and Bengalis at the Narayaganj jute mill in 1954.
Pakistan had a severe shortage of trained administrative personnel,
as most members of the preindependence Indian Civil Service were Hindus
or Sikhs who opted to belong to India at partition. Rarer still were
Muslim Bengalis who had any past administrative experience. As a result,
high-level posts in Dhaka, including that of governor general, were
usually filled by West Pakistanis or by refugees from India who had
adopted Pakistani citizenship.
One of the most divisive issues confronting Pakistan in its infancy
was the question of what the official language of the new state was to
be. Jinnah yielded to the demands of refugees from the Indian states of
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, who insisted that Urdu be Pakistan's official
language. Speakers of the languages of West Pakistan--Punjabi, Sindhi,
Pushtu, and Baluchi--were upset that their languages were given
second-class status. In East Pakistan, the dissatisfaction quickly
turned to violence. The Bengalis of East Pakistan constituted a majority
(an estimated 54 percent) of Pakistan's entire population. Their
language, Bangla (then commonly known as Bengali), shares with Urdu a
common Sanskritic-Persian ancestor, but the two languages have different
scripts and literary traditions.
Jinnah visited East Pakistan on only one occasion after independence,
shortly before his death in 1948. He announced in Dhaka that
"without one state language, no nation can remain solidly together
and function." Jinnah's views were not accepted by most East
Pakistanis, but perhaps in tribute to the founder of Pakistan, serious
resistance on this issue did not break out until after his death. On
February 22, 1952, a demonstration was carried out in Dhaka in which
students demanded equal status for Bangla. The police reacted by firing
on the crowd and killing two students. (A memorial, the Shaheed Minar,
was built later to commemorate the martyrs of the language movement.)
Two years after the incident, Bengali agitation effectively forced the
National Assembly to designate "Urdu and Bengali and such other
languages as may be declared" to be the official languages of
Pakistan.
What kept the new country together was the vision and forceful
personality of the founders of Pakistan: Jinnah, the governor general
popularly known as the Quaid i Azam (Supreme Leader); and Liaquat Ali
Khan (1895-1951), the first prime minister, popularly known as the Quaid
i Millet (Leader of the Community). The government machinery established
at independence was similar to the viceregal system that had prevailed
in the preindependence period and placed no formal limitations on
Jinnah's constitutional powers. In the 1970s in Bangladesh, another
autocrat, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, would enjoy much of the same prestige
and exemption from the normal rule of law.
When Jinnah died in September 1948, the seat of power shifted from
the governor general to the prime minister, Liaquat. Liaquat had
extensive experience in politics and enjoyed as a refugee from India the
additional benefit of not being too closely identified with any one
province of Pakistan. A moderate, Liaquat subscribed to the ideals of a
parliamentary, democratic, and secular state. Out of necessity he
considered the wishes of the country's religious spokesmen who
championed the cause of Pakistan as an Islamic state. He was seeking a
balance of Islam against secularism for a new constitution when he was
assassinated on October 16, 1951, by fanatics opposed to Liaquat's
refusal to wage war against India. With both Jinnah and Liaquat gone,
Pakistan faced an unstable period that would be resolved by military and
civil service intervention in political affairs. The first few turbulent
years after independence thus defined the enduring politico- military
culture of Pakistan.
The inability of the politicians to provide a stable government was
largely a result of their mutual suspicions. Loyalties tended to be
personal, ethnic, and provincial rather than national and issue
oriented. Provincialism was openly expressed in the deliberations of the
Constituent Assembly. In the Constituent Assembly frequent arguments
voiced the fear that the West Pakistani province of Punjab would
dominate the nation. An ineffective body, the Constituent Assembly took
almost nine years to draft a constitution, which for all practical
purposes was never put into effect.
Liaquat was succeeded as prime minister by a conservative Bengali,
Governor General Khwaja Nazimuddin. Former finance minister Ghulam
Mohammad, a Punjabi career civil servant, became governor general.
Ghulam Mohammad was dissatisfied with Nazimuddin's inability to deal
with Bengali agitation for provincial autonomy and worked to expand his
own power base. East Pakistan favored a high degree of autonomy, with
the central government controlling little more than foreign affairs,
defense, communications, and currency. In 1953 Ghulam Mohammad dismissed
Prime Minister Nazimuddin, established martial law in Punjab, and
imposed governor's rule (direct rule by the central government) in East
Pakistan. In 1954 he appointed his own "cabinet of talents."
Mohammad Ali Bogra, another conservative Bengali and previously
Pakistan's ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, was
named prime minister.
During September and October 1954 a chain of events culminated in a
confrontation between the governor general and the prime minister. Prime
Minister Bogra tried to limit the powers of Governor General Ghulam
Mohammad through hastily adopted amendments to the de facto
constitution, the Government of India Act of 1935. The governor general,
however, enlisted the tacit support of the army and civil service,
dissolved the Constituent Assembly, and then formed a new cabinet.
Bogra, a man without a personal following, remained prime minister but
without effective power. General Iskander Mirza, who had been a soldier
and civil servant, became minister of the interior; General Mohammad
Ayub Khan, the army commander, became minister of defense; and Choudhry
Mohammad Ali, former head of the civil service, remained minister of
finance. The main objective of the new government was to end disruptive
provincial politics and to provide the country with a new constitution.
The Federal Court, however, declared that a new Constituent Assembly
must be called. Ghulam Mohammad was unable to circumvent the order, and
the new Constituent Assembly, elected by the provincial assemblies, met
for the first time in July 1955. Bogra, who had little support in the
new assembly, fell in August and was replaced by Choudhry; Ghulam
Mohammad, plagued by poor health, was succeeded as governor general in
September 1955 by Mirza.
The second Constituent Assembly differed in composition from the
first. In East Pakistan, the Muslim League had been overwhelmingly
defeated in the 1954 provincial assembly elections by the United Front
coalition of Bengali regional parties anchored by Fazlul Haq's Krishak
Sramik Samajbadi Dal (Peasants and Workers Socialist Party) and the
Awami League (People's League) led by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy.
Rejection of West Pakistan's dominance over East Pakistan and the desire
for Bengali provincial autonomy were the main ingredients of the
coalition's twenty-one-point platform. The East Pakistani election and
the coalition's victory proved pyrrhic; Bengali factionalism surfaced
soon after the election and the United Front fell apart. From 1954 to
Ayub's assumption of power in 1958, the Krishak Sramik and the Awami
League waged a ceaseless battle for control of East Pakistan's
provincial government.
Prime Minister Choudhry induced the politicians to agree on a
constitution in 1956. In order to establish a better balance between the
west and east wings, the four provinces of West Pakistan were
amalgamated into one administrative unit. The 1956 constitution made
provisions for an Islamic state as embodied in its Directive of
Principles of State Policy, which defined methods of promoting Islamic
morality. The national parliament was to comprise one house of 300
members with equal representation from both the west and east wings.
The Awami League's Suhrawardy succeeded Choudhry as prime minister in
September 1956 and formed a coalition cabinet. He, like other Bengali
politicians, was chosen by the central government to serve as a symbol
of unity, but he failed to secure significant support from West
Pakistani power brokers. Although he had a good reputation in East
Pakistan and was respected for his prepartition association with Gandhi,
his strenuous efforts to gain greater provincial autonomy for East
Pakistan and a larger share of development funds for it were not well
received in West Pakistan. Suhrawardy's thirteen months in office came
to an end after he took a strong position against abrogation of the
existing "One Unit" government for all of West Pakistan in
favor of separate local governments for Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, and
the North-West Frontier Province. He thus lost much support from West
Pakistan's provincial politicians. He also used emergency powers to
prevent the formation of a Muslim League provincial government in West
Pakistan, thereby losing much Punjabi backing. Moreover, his open
advocacy of votes of confidence from the Constituent Assembly as the
proper means of forming governments aroused the suspicions of President
Mirza. In 1957 the president used his considerable influence to oust
Suhrawardy from the office of prime minister. The drift toward economic
decline and political chaos continued.
Bangladesh - The "Revolution" of Ayub Khan, 1958-66
In East Pakistan the political impasse culminated in 1958 in a
violent scuffle in the provincial assembly between members of the
opposition and the police force, in which the deputy speaker was fatally
injured and two ministers badly wounded. Uncomfortable with the workings
of parliamentary democracy, unruliness in the East Pakistani provincial
assembly elections and the threat of Baluch separatism in West Pakistan,
on October 7, 1958, Mirza issued a proclamation that abolished political
parties, abrogated the twoyear -old constitution, and placed the country
under martial law. Mirza announced that martial law would be a temporary
measure lasting only until a new constitution was drafted. On October
27, he swore in a twelve-member cabinet that included Ayub as prime
minister and three other generals in ministerial positions. Included
among the eight civilians was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a former university
lecturer and future leader of Pakistan. On the same day, the general
exiled Mirza to London because "the armed services and the people
demanded a clean break with the past." Until 1962, martial law
continued and Ayub purged a number of politicians and civil servants
from the government and replaced them with army officers. Ayub called
his regime a "revolution to clean up the mess of black marketing
and corruption."
The new constitution promulgated by Ayub in March 1962 vested all
executive authority of the republic in the president. As chief
executive, the president could appoint ministers without approval by the
legislature. There was no provision for a prime minister. There was a
provision for a National Assembly and two provincial assemblies, whose
members were to be chosen by the "Basic Democrats"--80,000
voters organized into a five-tier hierarchy, with each tier electing
officials to the next tier. Pakistan was declared a republic (without
being specifically an Islamic republic) but, in deference to the
religious scholars, the president was required to be a Muslim, and no law could
be passed that was contrary to the tenets of Islam.
The 1962 constitution made few concessions to Bengalis. It was,
instead, a document that buttressed centralized government under the
guise of "basic democracies" programs, gave legal support to
martial law, and turned parliamentary bodies into forums for debate.
Throughout the Ayub years, East Pakistan and West Pakistan grew farther
apart. The death of the Awami League's Suhrawardy in 1963 gave the
mercurial Sheikh Mujibur Rahman--commonly known as Mujib--the leadership
of East Pakistan's dominant party. Mujib, who as early as 1956 had
advocated the "liberation" of East Pakistan and had been
jailed in 1958 during the military coup, quickly and successfully
brought the issue of East Pakistan's movement for autonomy to the
forefront of the nation's politics.
During the years between 1960 and 1965, the annual rate of growth of
the gross domestic product per capita was 4.4 percent in West Pakistan
versus a poor 2.6 percent in East Pakistan. Furthermore, Bengali
politicians pushing for more autonomy complained that much of Pakistan's
export earnings were generated in East Pakistan by the export of Bengali
jute and tea. As late as 1960, approximately 70 percent of Pakistan's
export earnings originated in the East Wing, although this percentage
declined as international demand for jute dwindled. By the mid-1960s,
the East Wing was accounting for less than 60 percent of the nation's
export earnings, and by the time of Bangladesh's independence in 1971,
this percentage had dipped below 50 percent. This reality did not
dissuade Mujib from demanding in 1966 that separate foreign exchange
accounts be kept and that separate trade offices be opened overseas. By
the mid-1960s, West Pakistan was benefiting from Ayub's "Decade of
Progress," with its successful "green revolution" in
wheat, and from the expansion of markets for West Pakistani textiles,
while the East Pakistani standard of living remained at an abysmally low
level. Bengalis were also upset that West Pakistan, because it was the
seat of government, was the major beneficiary of foreign aid.
Bangladesh - Emerging Discontent, 1966-70
At a 1966 Lahore conference of both the eastern and the western
chapters of the Awami League, Mujib announced his controversial
six-point political and economic program for East Pakistani provincial
autonomy. He demanded that the government be federal and parliamentary
in nature, its members to be elected by universal adult suffrage with
legislative representation on the basis of population; that the federal
government have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense
only; that each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts;
that taxation would occur at the provincial level, with a federal
government funded by constitutionally guaranteed grants; that each
federal unit could control its own earning of foreign exchange; and that
each unit could raise its own militia or paramilitary forces.
Mujib's six points ran directly counter to President Ayub's plan for
greater national integration. Ayub's anxieties were shared by many West
Pakistanis, who feared that Mujib's plan would divide Pakistan by
encouraging ethnic and linguistic cleavages in West Pakistan, and would
leave East Pakistan, with its Bengali ethnic and linguistic unity, by
far the most populous and powerful of the federating units. Ayub
interpreted Mujib's demands as tantamount to a call for independence.
After pro-Mujib supporters rioted in a general strike in Dhaka, the
government arrested Mujib in January 1968.
Ayub suffered a number of setbacks in 1968. His health was poor, and
he was almost assassinated at a ceremony marking ten years of his rule.
Riots followed, and Bhutto was arrested as the instigator. At Dhaka a
tribunal that inquired into the activities of the already-interned Mujib
was arousing strong popular resentment against Ayub. A conference of
opposition leaders and the cancellation of the state of emergency (in
effect since 1965) came too late to conciliate the opposition. On
February 21, 1969, Ayub announced that he would not run in the next
presidential election in 1970. A state of near anarchy reigned with
protests and strikes throughout the country. The police appeared
helpless to control the mob violence, and the military stood aloof. At
length, on March 25 Ayub resigned and handed over the administration to
the commander in chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Once again the
country was placed under martial law. Yahya assumed the titles of chief
martial law administrator and president. He announced that he considered
himself to be a transitional leader whose task would be to restore order
and to conduct free elections for a new constituent assembly, which
would then draft a new constitution. He appointed a largely civilian
cabinet in August 1969 in preparation for the election, which was
scheduled to take place in December 1970. Yahya moved with dispatch to
settle two contentious issues by decree: the unpopular "One
Unit" of West Pakistan, which was created as a condition for the
1956 constitution, was ended; and East Pakistan was awarded 162 seats
out of the 300-member National Assembly. On November 12, 1970, a cyclone
devastated an area of almost 8,000 square kilometers of East Pakistan's
mid-coastal lowlands and its outlying islands in the Bay of Bengal. It
was perhaps the worst natural disaster of the area in centuries. As many
as 250,000 lives were lost. Two days after the cyclone hit, Yahya
arrived in Dhaka after a trip to Beijing, but he left a day later. His
seeming indifference to the plight of Bengali victims caused a great
deal of animosity. Opposition newspapers in Dhaka accused the Pakistani
government of impeding the efforts of international relief agencies and
of "gross neglect, callous inattention, and bitter
indifference." Mujib, who had been released from prison, lamented
that "West Pakistan has a bumper wheat crop, but the first shipment
of food grain to reach us is from abroad" and "that the
textile merchants have not given a yard of cloth for our shrouds."
"We have a large army," Mujib continued," but it is left
to the British Marines to bury our dead." In an unveiled threat to
the unity of Pakistan he added, "the feeling now pervades . . .
every village, home, and slum that we must rule ourselves. We must make
the decisions that matter. We will no longer suffer arbitrary rule by
bureaucrats, capitalists, and feudal interests of West Pakistan."
Yahya announced plans for a national election on December 7, 1970,
and urged voters to elect candidates who were committed to the integrity
and unity of Pakistan. The elections were the first in the history of
Pakistan in which voters were able to elect members of the National
Assembly directly. In a convincing demonstration of Bengali
dissatisfaction with the West Pakistani regime, the Awami League won all
but 2 of the 162 seats allotted East Pakistan in the National Assembly.
Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party came in a poor second nationally,
winning 81 out of the 138 West Pakistani seats in the National Assembly.
The Awami League's electoral victory promised it control of the
government, with Mujib as the country's prime minister, but the
inaugural assembly never met.
Yahya and Bhutto vehemently opposed Mujib's idea of a confederated
Pakistan. Mujib was adamant that the constitution be based on his
six-point program. Bhutto, meanwhile, pleaded for unity in Pakistan
under his leadership. As tensions mounted, Mujib suggested he become
prime minister of East Pakistan while Bhutto be made prime minister of
West Pakistan. It was this action that triggered mass civil disobedience
in East Pakistan. Mujib called for a general strike until the government
was given over to the "people's representatives." Tiring of
the interminable game of politics he was playing with the Bengali
leader, Yahya decided to ignore Mujib's demands and on March 1 postponed
indefinitely the convening of the National Assembly, which had been
scheduled for March 3. March 1 also was a portentous date, for on that
day Yahya named General Tikka Khan, who in later years was to earn the
dubious title "Butcher of Baluchistan" for his suppression of
Baluch separatists, as East Pakistan's military governor. The number of
West Pakistani troops entering East Pakistan had increased sharply in
the preceding weeks, climbing from a precrisis level of 25,000 to about
60,000, bringing the army close to a state of readiness. As tensions
rose, however, Yahya continued desperate negotiations with Mujib, flying
to Dhaka in mid-March. Talks between Yahya and Muhib were joined by
Bhutto but soon collapsed, and on March 23 Bengalis following Mujib's
lead defiantly celebrated "Resistance Day" in East Pakistan
instead of the traditional all-Pakistan "Republic Day." Yahya
decided to "solve" the problem of East Pakistan by repression.
On the evening of March 25 he flew back to Islamabad. The military
crackdown in East Pakistan began that same night.
Bangladesh - The War for Bangladeshi Independence, 1971
On March 25, the Pakistan Army launched a terror campaign calculated
to intimidate the Bengalis into submission. Within hours a wholesale
slaughter had commenced in Dhaka, with the heaviest attacks concentrated
on the University of Dhaka and the Hindu area of the old town.
Bangladeshis remember the date as a day of infamy and liberation. The
Pakistan Army came with hit lists and systematically killed several
hundred Bengalis. Mujib was captured and flown to West Pakistan for
incarceration.
To conceal what they were doing, the Pakistan Army corralled the
corps of foreign journalists at the International Hotel in Dhaka, seized
their notes, and expelled them the next day. One reporter who escaped
the censor net estimated that three battalions of troops--one armored,
one artillery, and one infantry--had attacked the virtually defenseless
city. Various informants, including missionaries and foreign journalists
who clandestinely returned to East Pakistan during the war, estimated
that by March 28 the loss of life reached 15,000. By the end of summer
as many as 300,000 people were thought to have lost their lives. Anthony
Mascarenhas in Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood estimates that
during the entire nine-month liberation struggle more than 1 million
Bengalis may have died at the hands of the Pakistan Army.
The West Pakistani press waged a vigorous but ultimately futile
campaign to counteract newspaper and radio accounts of wholesale
atrocities. One paper, the Morning News, even editorialized
that the armed forces were saving East Pakistanis from eventual Hindu
enslavement. The civil war was played down by the government-controlled
press as a minor insurrection quickly being brought under control.
After the tragic events of March, India became vocal in its
condemnation of Pakistan. An immense flood of East Pakistani refugees,
between 8 and 10 million according to various estimates, fled across the
border into the Indian state of West Bengal. In April an Indian
parliamentary resolution demanded that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
supply aid to the rebels in East Pakistan. She complied but declined to
recognize the provisional government of independent Bangladesh.
A propaganda war between Pakistan and India ensued in which Yahya
threatened war against India if that country made an attempt to seize
any part of Pakistan. Yahya also asserted that Pakistan could count on
its American and Chinese friends. At the same time, Pakistan tried to
ease the situation in the East Wing. Belatedly, it replaced Tikka, whose
military tactics had caused such havoc and human loss of life, with the
more restrained Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi. A moderate Bengali,
Abdul Malik, was installed as the civilian governor of East Pakistan.
These belated gestures of appeasement did not yield results or change
world opinion.
On December 4, 1971, the Indian Army, far superior in numbers and
equipment to that of Pakistan, executed a 3-pronged pincer movement on
Dhaka launched from the Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, and
Tripura, taking only 12 days to defeat the 90,000 Pakistani defenders.
The Pakistan Army was weakened by having to operate so far away from its
source of supply. The Indian Army, on the other hand, was aided by East
Pakistan's Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force), the freedom fighters who
managed to keep the Pakistan Army at bay in many areas.
Bangladesh - BIRTH OF BANGLADESH
Early Independence Period, 1971-72
The "independent, sovereign republic of Bangladesh" was
first proclaimed in a radio message broadcast from a captured station in
Chittagong on March 26, 1971. Two days later, the "Voice of
Independent Bangladesh" announced that a "Major Zia"
(actually Ziaur Rahman, later president of Bangladesh) would form a new
government with himself occupying the "presidency." Zia's
selfappointment was considered brash, especially by Mujib, who in
subsequent years would hold a grudge. Quickly realizing that his action
was unpopular, Zia yielded his "office" to the incarcerated
Mujib. The following month a provisional government was established in
Calcutta by a number of leading Awami League members who had escaped
from East Pakistan. On April 17, the "Mujibnagar" government
formally proclaimed independence and named Mujib as its president. On
December 6, India became the first nation to recognize the new
Bangladeshi government. When the West Pakistani surrender came ten days
later, the provisional government had some organization in place, but it
was not until December 22 that members of the new government arrived in
Dhaka, having been forced to heed the advice of the Indian military that
order must quickly be restored. Representatives of the Bangladeshi
government and the Mukti Bahini were absent from the ceremony of
surrender of the Pakistan Army to the Indian Army on December 16.
Bangladeshis considered this ceremony insulting, and it did much to sour
relations between Bangladesh and India.
At independence, Mujib was in jail in West Pakistan, where he had
been taken after his arrest on March 25. He had been convicted of
treason by a military court and sentenced to death. Yahya did not carry
out the sentence, perhaps as a result of pleas made by many foreign
governments. With the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka and the
Indian proclamation of a cease-fire on the western front, Yahya
relinquished power to a civilian government under Bhutto, who released
Mujib and permitted him to return to Dhaka via London and New Delhi.
On January 10, 1972, Mujib arrived in Dhaka to a tumultuous welcome.
Mujib first assumed the title of president but vacated that office two
days later to become the prime minister. Mujib pushed through a new
constitution that was modeled on the Indian Constitution. The
Constitution--adopted on November 4, 1972--stated that the new nation
was to have a prime minister appointed by the president and approved by
a single-house parliament. The Constitution enumerates a number of
principles on which Bangladesh is to be governed. These have come to be
known as the tenets of "Mujibism" (or "Mujibbad"),
which include the four pillars of nationalism, socialism, secularism,
and democracy. In the following years, however, Mujib discarded
everything Bangladesh theoretically represented: constitutionalism,
freedom of speech, rule of law, the right to dissent, and equal
opportunity of employment.
Bangladesh - Fall of the Bangabandhu, 1972-75
The country Mujib returned to was scarred by civil war. The number of
people killed, raped, or displaced could be only vaguely estimated. The
task of economic rehabilitation, specifically the immediate goal of food
distribution to a hungry populace, was frustrated by crippled
communications and transportation systems. The new nation faced many
other seemingly insurmountable problems inhibiting its reconstruction.
One of the most glaring was the breakdown of law and order. In the wake
of the war of independence, numerous bands of guerrillas still roamed
the countryside, fully armed and outside the control of the government.
Many fighters of the Mukti Bahini joined the Bangladesh Army and thus
could legally retain their weapons, but many others ignored Mujib's plea
that they surrender their weapons. Some armed groups took the law into
their own hands and set up territories under their own jurisdiction. In
time these challenges to central authority contributed to Mujib's
suspension of democracy.
Mujib had an unfailing attachment to those who participated in the
struggle for independence. He showed favoritism toward those comrades by
giving them appointments to the civil government and especially the
military. This shortsighted practice proved fatal. Mujib denied himself
the skill of many top-level officers formerly employed by the Pakistan
Civil Service. Bengali military officers who did not manage to escape
from West Pakistan during the war and those who remained at their posts
in East Pakistan were discriminated against throughout the Mujib years.
The "repatriates," who constituted about half of the army,
were denied promotions or choice posts; officers were assigned to
functionless jobs as "officers on special duty." Schooled in
the British tradition, most believed in the ideals of military
professionalism; to them the prospect of serving an individual rather
than an institution was reprehensible. Opposed to the repatriates were
the freedom fighters, most of whom offered their unquestioning support
for Mujib and in return were favored by him. A small number of them,
associated with the radical Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist
Party), even proposed that officers be elected to their posts in a
"people's army." From the ranks of the freedom fighters, Mujib
established the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force), whose
members took a personal pledge to Mujib and became, in effect, his
private army to which privileges and hard-to-get commodities were
lavishly given.
Despite substantial foreign aid, mostly from India and the Soviet
Union, food supplies were scarce, and there was rampant corruption and
black marketeering. This situation prompted Mujib to issue a warning
against hoarders and smugglers. Mujib backed up his threat by launching
a mass drive against hoarders and smugglers, backed by the Jatiyo Rakkhi
Bahini. The situation only temporarily buoyed the legitimate economy of
the country, as hoarding, black marketeering, and corruption in high
offices continued and became the hallmarks of the Mujib regime.
Mujib's economic policies also directly contributed to his country's
economic chaos. His large-scale nationalization of Bangladeshi
manufacturing and trading enterprises and international trading in
commodities strangled Bangladesh entrepreneurship in its infancy. The
enforced use of the Bangla language as a replacement for English at all
levels of government and education was yet another policy that increased
Bangladesh's isolation from the dynamics of the world economy.
Most Bangadeshis still revered the Bangabandhu at the time of the
first national elections held in 1973. Mujib was assured of victory, and
the Awami League won 282 out of 289 directly contested seats. After the
election, the economic and security situations began to deteriorate
rapidly, and Mujib's popularity suffered further as a result of what
many Bangladeshis came to regard as his close alliance with India.
Mujib's authoritarian personality and his paternalistic pronouncements
to "my country" and "my people" were not sufficient
to divert the people's attention from the miserable conditions of the
country. Widespread flooding and famine created severe hardship,
aggravated by growing law-and-order problems.
In January 1975, the Constitution was amended to make Mujib president
for five years and to give him full executive powers. The next month, in
a move that wiped out all opposition political parties, Mujib proclaimed
Bangladesh a one-party state, effectively abolishing the parliamentary
system. He renamed the Awami League the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami
League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and People's League) and required
all civilian government personnel to join the party. The fundamental
rights enumerated in the Constitution ceased to be observed, and
Bangladesh, in its infancy, was transformed into a personal
dictatorship.
On the morning of August 15, 1975, Mujib and several members of his
family were murdered in a coup engineered by a group of young army
officers, most of whom were majors. Some of the officers in the
"majors' plot" had a personal vendetta against Mujib, having
earlier been dismissed from the army. In a wider sense, the disaffected
officers and the several hundred troops they led represented the
grievances of the professionals in the military over their subordination
to the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini and Mujib's indifference to gross corruption
by his political subordinates and family members. By the time of his
assassination, Mujib's popularity had fallen precipitously, and his
death was lamented by surprisingly few.
The diplomatic status of Bangladesh changed overnight. One day after
Mujib's assassination President Bhutto of Pakistan announced that his
country would immediately recognize the new regime and offered a gift of
50,000 tons of rice in addition to a generous gift of clothing. India,
however, under the rule of Indira Gandhi, suffered a setback in its
relations with Bangladesh. The end of the Mujib period once again
brought serious bilateral differences to the fore. Many Bangladeshis,
although grateful for India's help against Pakistan during the struggle
for independence, thought Indian troops had lingered too long after the
Pakistan Army was defeated. Mujibist dissidents who continued to resist
central authority found shelter in India.
Bangladesh - Restoration of Military Rule, 1975-77
The assassins of Mujib arrested the three senior ranking officers in
Mujib's cabinet but installed as president the fourth in charge, a
long-time colleague of Mujib and minister of commerce, Khondakar
Mushtaque Ahmed. Mushtaque, a conservative member of the Awami League
(the name to which the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League reverted
after Mujib's death), was known to lean toward the West and to have been
troubled by Mujib's close ties with India. Many observers believed him
to have been a conspirator in Mujib's assassination. Even so, his role
in the new regime was circumscribed by the majors, who even moved into
the presidential palace with him. Mushtaque announced that parliamentary
democracy would be restored by February 1977, and he lifted Mujib's ban
on political parties. He instituted strong programs to reduce corrupt
practices and to restore efficiency and public confidence in the
government. He also ordered the transfer of all the equipment and assets
and most of the personnel of the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini to the army and
the eventual abolition of the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini. Mushtaque promised
to dissolve the authoritarian powers that Mujib had invested in the
office of the presidency, but the continuing unstable situation did not
improve enough to permit a significant degree of liberalization. In
order to keep Mujib supporters under control, Mushtaque declared himself
chief martial law administrator and set up a number of tribunals that
fell outside constitutional jurisdiction.
Despite the economic and political instability during the last years
of the Mujib regime, the memory of the Bangabandhu evoked strong
emotions among his loyalists. Many of these, especially former freedom
fighters now in the army, were deeply resentful of the majors. One of
these Mujib loyalists, Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, launched a successful
coup on November 3, 1975. Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem, who
had served Mujib in the Supreme Court, emerged as president. Musharraf
had himself promoted to major general, thereby replacing Chief of Staff
Zia.
In a public display orchestrated to show his loyalty to the slain
Mujib, Musharraf led a procession to Mujib's former residence. The
reaction to Musharraf's obvious dedication to Mujibist ideology and the
fear that he would renew the former leader's close ties with India
precipitated the collapse of the new regime. On November 7, agitators of
the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, a leftist but decidedly anti-Soviet and
anti-Indian movement, managed to incite troops at the Dhaka cantonment
against Musharraf, who was killed in a firefight. President Sayem became
chief martial law administrator, and the military service chiefs, most
significantly the army's Zia, became deputy chief martial law
administrators. Zia also took on the portfolios of finance, home
affairs, industry, and information, as well as becoming the army chief
of staff.
It was not long before Zia, with the backing of the military,
supplanted the elderly and frail Sayem. Zia postponed the presidential
elections and the parliamentary elections that Sayem had earlier
promised and made himself chief marital law administrator in November
1976.
Bangladesh - The Zia Regime and Its Aftermath, 1977-82
In the opinion of many observers, Zia, although ruthless with his
opponents, was the nation's best leader since independence. A dapper
military officer, he transformed himself into a charismatic and popular
political figure. Once described as having an air of "serene
hesitancy and assured authority," Zia had boundless energy and
spent much of his time traveling throughout the country. Zia preached
the "politics of hope," continually urging all Bangladeshis to
work harder and to produce more. Unlike Mujib, Zia utilized whatever
talent he could muster to spur on the economy, and he did not
discriminate, as Mujib had, against civil servants who had not fully
participated in the freedom struggle. Zia was a well-known figure who
first emerged nationally during the independence struggle. His "Z
Force" (Z for Zia) had been the first to announce the independence
of Bangladesh from a captured radio station in Chittagong.
Zia also tried to integrate the armed forces, giving repatriates a
status appropriate to their qualifications and seniority. This angered
some of the freedom fighters, who had rapidly reached high positions.
Zia deftly dealt with the problem officers by sending them on diplomatic
missions abroad. Zia made repatriate Major General Hussain Muhammad
Ershad the deputy army chief of staff. Having consolidated his position
in the army, Zia became president on April 21, 1977, when Sayem resigned
on the grounds of "ill health." Zia now held the dominant
positions in the country and seemed to be supported by a majority of
Bangladeshis.
In May 1977, with his power base increasingly secure, Zia drew on his
popularity to promote a nineteen-point political and economic program.
Zia focused on the need to boost Bangladeshi production, especially in
food and grains, and to integrate rural development through a variety of
programs, of which population planning was the most important. He heeded
the advice of international lending agencies and launched an ambitious
rural development program in 1977, which included a highly visible and
popular food-for-work program.
Fortified with his manifesto, Zia faced the electorate in a
referendum on his continuance in office. The results of what Zia called
his "exercise of the democratic franchise," showed that 88.5
percent of the electorate turned out and that 98.9 percent voted for
Zia. Although some doubts were cast on how fairly the referendum was
conducted, Zia was, nonetheless, a popular leader with an agenda most of
the country endorsed. Zia consciously tried to change the military
bearing of his government, eventually transferring most of the
portfolios held by military officers to civilians. Continuing the
process of giving his regime a nonmilitary appearance, in June 1977 he
chose as his vice president Supreme Court justice Abdus Sattar, a
civilian who had long been involved in Bengali politics.
One of the most important tasks Zia faced was to change the direction
of the country. Zia altered the Constitution's ideological statement on
the fundamental principles, in particular changing the Mujibist emphasis
on secularism to "complete trust and faith in almighty Allah."
While distancing Bangladesh from India, Zia sought to improve ties with
other Islamic nations. Throughout his regime, Zia pursued an active
foreign policy, and the legacy of his efforts continued to bear fruit in
the late 1980s. In 1980 Zia proposed a conference for the seven nations
of the subcontinent (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) to discuss the prospects for regional
cooperation in a number of fields. This initiative was successful in
August 1983 when the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was established.
Zia's administration reestablished public order, which had
deteriorated during the Mujib years. Special civil and military
tribunals dealt harshly with the multitudes of professional bandits,
smugglers, and guerrilla bands. A continuing problem with one of these
armed groups led by Kader "Tiger" Siddiqi, a one-time freedom
fighter and former enlisted man in the Pakistan Army, was eased when the
Janata Party came to power in India in early 1977. The new Indian prime
minister, Morarji Desai, discontinued the assistance and sanctuary that
Indira Gandhi's government had given to pro-Mujib rebels working against
the government.
President Zia's efforts to quiet the military--divided and
politicized since independence--were not entirely successful. In late
September 1977, Japanese Red Army terrorists hijacked a Japan Air Lines
airplane and forced it to land in Dhaka. On September 30, while the
attention of the government was riveted on this event, a mutiny broke
out in Bogra. Although the mutiny was quickly quelled on the night of
October 2, a second mutiny occurred in Dhaka. The mutineers
unsuccessfully attacked Zia's residence, captured Dhaka Radio for a
short time, and killed a number of air force officers at Dhaka
International Airport (present-day Zia International Airport), where
they were gathered for negotiations with the hijackers. The revolts,
which attracted worldwide coverage, were dismissed by the government as
a conflict between air force enlisted men and officers regarding pay and
service conditions. The army quickly put down the
rebellion, but the government was severely shaken. The government
intelligence network had clearly failed, and Zia promptly dismissed both
the military and the civilian intelligence chiefs. Three of the
aspirants to the army chief of staff post, at the time held by Zia, were
also removed; in 1981 one of them, Major General Muhammad Manzur Ahmed,
was to lead the coup that resulted in the assassination of Zia.
After the Dhaka mutiny, Zia continued with his plans for political
normalization, insisting on being called "president" rather
than "major general" and prohibiting his military colleagues
from holding both cabinet and military positions. In April 1978, Zia
announced that elections would be held to "pave the way to
democracy," adding that the Constitution would be amended to
provide for an independent judiciary as well as a "sovereign
parliament." Zia also lifted the ban on political parties. He was
supported by a "national front," whose main party was the
Jatiyo Ganatantrik Dal (National Democratic Party). As the candidate of
the Jatiyo Ganatantrik Dal-led Nationalist Front, Zia won
overwhelmingly, taking 76.7 percent of the vote against a front led by
General M.A.G. Osmany, the leader of the Mukti Bahini during the war.
Shortly after, Zia expanded the Jatiyo Ganatantrik Dal to include major
portions of the parties in the Nationalist Front. His new party was
named the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and was headed by Sattar.
Parliamentary elections followed in February 1979. After campaigning by
Zia, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won 207 of the 300 seats in
Parliament with about 44 percent of the vote.
Zia was assassinated in Chittagong on May 30, 1981, in a plot
allegedly masterminded by Major General Manzur, the army commander in
Chittagong. Manzur had earlier been chief of the general staff and had
been transferred to Chittagong in the aftermath of the October 1977
mutiny. He was scheduled for a new transfer to a noncommand position in
Dhaka and was reportedly disappointed over this. The army, under its
chief of staff, Major General Ershad, remained loyal to the Dhaka
government and quickly put down the rebellion, killing Manzur. In the
trials that followed, a sizable number of officers and enlisted men
received the death penalty for complicity.
After Zia's assassination, Vice President Sattar became acting
president and, as the Constitution stipulates, called for new elections
for president within 180 days. Although there was some speculation that
Zia's widow, Begum Khalida Ziaur Rahman, and Mujib's daughter, Sheikh
Hasina Wajed, would be candidates, Sattar ran against a number of
political unknowns in the November election and won the presidential
election with two-thirds of the vote.
Sattar was an elderly man who his critics thought to be ineffective,
but his greatest weakness, in the eyes of the military, was that he was
a civilian. Although Zia had downplayed his own military background,
given up his position of army chief of staff, and adopted civilian dress
and mannerisms, he maintained strong links with the armed services.
Immediately following the 1981 election, Ershad pushed Sattar for a
constitutional role for the military in the governance of the country.
After initial resistance, Sattar, faced with the prospect of a coup,
agreed to set up the National Security Council in January 1982 with the
president, vice president, and prime minister representing the civilian
side and the three service chiefs representing the military. In a last
attempt to limit the influence of the military, Sattar relieved a number
of military officers from duty in the government.
Sattar's decision to curtail military influence in the government
provoked an immediate response from Ershad. On March 24, 1982, Ershad
dismissed Sattar, dissolved the cabinet and the Parliament, and assumed
full powers under martial law. Echoing the words of many past military
leaders, Ershad announced that the military, as the only organized power
in the nation, had been forced to take over until elections could be
held.
Ershad almost immediately assumed the title of "president of the
ministers," or prime minister, but to many Bangladeshis he was a
usurper, one who overthrew a legitimately elected president and who
would reverse the slow liberalization of Bangladeshi politics--the
"politics of hope" begun earlier by Zia. The events of March
1982 reflected much of the tumultuous history of the country and, many
critics agreed, foreshadowed a turbulent future for the struggling
nation of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh - The Society and Its Environment
BANGLADESH IS NOTED for the remarkable ethnic and cultural
homogeneity of its population. Over 98 percent of its people are
Bengalis; the remainder are Biharis, or non-Bengali Muslims, and
indigenous tribal peoples. Bangladeshis are particularly proud of their
rich cultural and linguistic heritage because their independent nation
is partially the result of a powerful movement to uphold and preserve
their language and culture. Bangladeshis identify themselves closely
with Bangla, their national language.
One of the world's most densely populated nations, Bangladesh in the
1980s was caught in the vicious cycle of population expansion and
poverty. Although the rate of growth had declined marginally in recent
years, the rapid expansion of the population continued to be a
tremendous burden on the nation. With 82 percent of its people living in
the countryside, Bangladesh was also one of the most rural nations in
the Third World. The pace of urbanization in the late 1980s was slow,
and urban areas lacked adequate amenities and services to absorb even
those migrants who trekked from rural areas to the urban centers for
food and employment. Frequent natural disasters, such as coastal
cyclones and floods, killed thousands, and widespread malnutrition and
poor sanitation resulted in high mortality rates from a variety of
diseases.
In the late 1980s, poverty remained the most salient aspect of
Bangladeshi society. Although the disparity in income between different
segments of the society was not great, the incidence of poverty was
widespread; the proportion of the population in extreme poverty--those
unable to afford even enough food to live a reasonably active life--rose
from 43 percent in 1974 to 50 percent in the mid-1980s. The emerging
political elite, which constituted a very narrow social class compared
with the mass of peasants and urban poor, held the key to political
power, controlled all institutions, and enjoyed the greatest economic
gains. Urban in residence, fluent in English, and comfortable with
Western culture, they were perceived by many observers as socially and
culturally alienated from the masses. At the end of the 1980s,
Bangladeshi society continued to be in transition--not only from the
early days of independence but also from the colonial and Pakistani
periods as well--as new values gradually replaced traditional ones.
Nearly 83 percent Muslim, Bangladesh ranked third in Islamic
population worldwide, following Indonesia and Pakistan. Sunni Islam was
the dominant religion among Bangladeshis. Although loyalty to Islam was
deeply rooted, in many cases beliefs and observances in rural areas
tended to conflict with orthodox Islam. However, the country was
remarkably free of sectarian strife. For most believers Islam was
largely a matter of customary practice and mores. In the late twentieth
century fundamentalists were showing some organizational strength, but
in the late 1980s their numbers and influence were believed to be
limited. Promulgated in June 1988, the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution recognizes Islam as the state religion, but the full
implications of this measure were not apparent in the months following
its adoption. Hindus constituted the largest religious minority at 16
percent; other minorities included Buddhists and Christians.
Since its birth in 1971, Bangladesh has suffered through both natural
calamities and political upheavals. In July-September 1987, for example,
the country experienced its worst floods in more than thirty years, and
floods during the same period in 1988 were even more devastating. In
1987 more than US$250 million of the economic infrastructure was
destroyed, the main rice crop was severely damaged, and an estimated
1,800 lives were lost. The 1988 floods covered more than two-thirds of
the country, and more than 2,100 died from flooding and subsequent
disease. The country also underwent a period of political unrest
fomented by major opposition political parties. Enduring uncertainties
as the 1990s approached were bound to have an impact on social
development, especially in the areas of education, development of the
labor force, nutrition, and the building of infrastructure for adequate
health care and population control.
Bangladesh - GEOGRAPHY
The Land
The physiography of Bangladesh is characterized by two distinctive
features: a broad deltaic plain subject to frequent flooding, and a
small hilly region crossed by swiftly flowing rivers. The country has an
area of 144,000 square kilometers and extends 820 kilometers north to
south and 600 kilometers east to west. Bangladesh is bordered on the
west, north, and east by a 2,400-kilometer land frontier with India and,
in the southeast, by a short land and water frontier (193 kilometers)
with Burma. On the south is a highly irregular deltaic coastline of
about 600 kilometers, fissured by many rivers and streams flowing into
the Bay of Bengal. The territorial waters of Bangladesh extend 12
nautical miles, and the exclusive economic zone of the country is 200
nautical miles.
Roughly 80 percent of the landmass is made up of fertile alluvial
lowland called the Bangladesh Plain. The plain is part of the larger
Plain of Bengal, which is sometimes called the Lower Gangetic Plain.
Although altitudes up to 105 meters above sea level occur in the
northern part of the plain, most elevations are less than 10 meters
above sea level; elevations decrease in the coastal south, where the
terrain is generally at sea level. With such low elevations and numerous
rivers, water--and concomitant flooding--is a predominant physical
feature. About 10,000 square kilometers of the total area of Bangladesh
is covered with water, and larger areas are routinely flooded during the
monsoon season.
The only exceptions to Bangladesh's low elevations are the Chittagong
Hills in the southeast, the Low Hills of Sylhet in the northeast, and
highlands in the north and northwest. The Chittagong Hills constitute the only significant hill system
in the country and, in effect, are the western fringe of the northsouth
mountain ranges of Burma and eastern India. The Chittagong Hills rise
steeply to narrow ridge lines, generally no wider than 36 meters, 600 to
900 meters above sea level. At 1,046 meters, the highest elevation in
Bangladesh is found at Keokradong, in the southeastern part of the
hills. Fertile valleys lie between the hill lines, which generally run
north-south. West of the Chittagong Hills is a broad plain, cut by
rivers draining into the Bay of Bengal, that rises to a final chain of
low coastal hills, mostly below 200 meters, that attain a maximum
elevation of 350 meters. West of these hills is a narrow, wet coastal
plain located between the cities of Chittagong in the north and Cox's
Bazar in the south.
About 67 percent of Bangladesh's nonurban land is arable. Permanent
crops cover only 2 percent, meadows and pastures cover 4 percent, and
forests and woodland cover about 16 percent. The country produces large
quantities of quality timber, bamboo, and sugarcane. Bamboo grows in
almost all areas, but high-quality timber grows mostly in the highland
valleys. Rubber planting in the hilly regions of the country was
undertaken in the 1980s, and rubber extraction had started by the end of
the decade. A variety of wild animals are found in the forest areas,
such as in the Sundarbans on the southwest coast, which is the home of
the worldfamous Royal Bengal Tiger. The alluvial soils in the Bangladesh
Plain are generally fertile and are enriched with heavy silt deposits
carried downstream during the rainy season.
<>Climate
Bangladesh has a subtropical monsoon climate characterized by wide
seasonal variations in rainfall, moderately warm temperatures, and high
humidity. Regional climatic differences in this flat country are minor.
Three seasons are generally recognized: a hot, humid summer from March
to June; a cool, rainy monsoon season from June to October; and a cool,
dry winter from October to March. In general, maximum summer
temperatures range between 32�C and 38�C. April is the warmest month
in most parts of the country. January is the coldest month, when the
average temperature for most of the country is 10�C.
Winds are mostly from the north and northwest in the winter, blowing
gently at one to three kilometers per hour in northern and central areas
and three to six kilometers per hour near the coast. From March to May,
violent thunderstorms, called northwesters by local English speakers,
produce winds of up to sixty kilometers per hour. During the intense
storms of the early summer and late monsoon season, southerly winds of
more than 160 kilometers per hour cause waves to crest as high as 6
meters in the Bay of Bengal, which brings disastrous flooding to coastal
areas.
Heavy rainfall is characteristic of Bangladesh. With the exception of
the relatively dry western region of Rajshahi, where the annual rainfall
is about 160 centimeters, most parts of the country receive at least 200
centimeters of rainfall per year. Because of its location just south of the foothills of the
Himalayas, where monsoon winds turn west and northwest, the region of
Sylhet in northeastern Bangladesh receives the greatest average
precipitation. From 1977 to 1986, annual rainfall in that region ranged
between 328 and 478 centimeters per year. Average daily humidity ranged
from March lows of between 45 and 71 percent to July highs of between 84
and 92 percent, based on readings taken at selected stations nationwide
in 1986.
About 80 percent of Bangladesh's rain falls during the monsoon
season. The monsoons result from the contrasts between low and high air
pressure areas that result from differential heating of land and water.
During the hot months of April and May hot air rises over the Indian
subcontinent, creating low-pressure areas into which rush cooler,
moisture-bearing winds from the Indian Ocean. This is the southwest
monsoon, commencing in June and usually lasting through September.
Dividing against the Indian landmass, the monsoon flows in two branches,
one of which strikes western India. The other travels up the Bay of
Bengal and over eastern India and Bangladesh, crossing the plain to the
north and northeast before being turned to the west and northwest by the
foothills of the Himalayas.
Natural calamities, such as floods, tropical cyclones, tornadoes, and
tidal bores--destructive waves or floods caused by flood tides rushing
up estuaries--ravage the country, particularly the coastal belt, almost
every year. Between 1947 and 1988, thirteen severe cyclones hit
Bangladesh, causing enormous loss of life and property. In May 1985, for
example, a severe cyclonic storm packing 154 kilometer-per-hour winds
and waves 4 meters high swept into southeastern and southern Bangladesh,
killing more than 11,000 persons, damaging more than 94,000 houses,
killing some 135,000 head of livestock, and damaging nearly 400
kilometers of critically needed embankments. Annual monsoon flooding
results in the loss of human life, damage to property and communication
systems, and a shortage of drinking water, which leads to the spread of
disease. For example, in 1988 two-thirds of Bangladesh's sixty-four
districts experienced extensive flood damage in the wake of unusually
heavy rains that flooded the river systems. Millions were left homeless
and without potable water. Half of Dhaka, including the runways at the
Zia International Airport--an important transit point for disaster
relief supplies--was flooded. About 2 million tons of crops were
reported destroyed, and relief work was rendered even more challenging
than usual because the flood made transportation of any kind exceedingly
difficult.
There are no precautions against cyclones and tidal bores except
giving advance warning and providing safe public buildings where people
may take shelter. Adequate infrastructure and air transport facilities
that would ease the sufferings of the affected people had not been
established by the late 1980s. Efforts by the government under the Third
Five-Year Plan (1985-90) were directed toward accurate and timely
forecast capability through agrometeorology, marine meteorology,
oceanography, hydrometeorology, and seismology. Necessary expert
services, equipment, and training facilities were expected to be
developed under the United Nations Development Programme.
Bangladesh - River Systems
The rivers of Bangladesh mark both the physiography of the nation and
the life of the people. About 700 in number, these rivers generally flow
south. The larger rivers serve as the main source of water for
cultivation and as the principal arteries of commercial transportation.
Rivers also provide fish, an important source of protein. Flooding of
the rivers during the monsoon season causes enormous hardship and
hinders development, but fresh deposits of rich silt replenish the
fertile but overworked soil. The rivers also drain excess monsoon
rainfall into the Bay of Bengal. Thus, the great river system is at the
same time the country's principal resource and its greatest hazard.
The profusion of rivers can be divided into five major networks. The Jamuna-Brahmaputra is 292 kilometers long and extends from
northern Bangladesh to its confluence with the Padma. Originating as the
Yarlung Zangbo Jiang in China's Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet) and
flowing through India's state of Arunachal Pradesh, where it becomes
known as the Brahmaputra ("Son of Brahma"), it receives waters
from five major tributaries that total some 740 kilometers in length. At
the point where the Brahmaputra meets the Tista River in Bangladesh, it
becomes known as the Jamuna. The Jamuna is notorious for its shifting
subchannels and for the formation of fertile silt islands (chars).
No permanent settlements can exist along its banks.
The second system is the Padma-Ganges, which is divided into two
sections: a 258-kilometer segment, the Ganges, which extends from the
western border with India to its confluence with the Jamuna some 72
kilometers west of Dhaka, and a 126-kilometer segment, the Padma, which
runs from the Ganges-Jamuna confluence to where it joins the Meghna
River at Chandpur. The Padma-Ganges is the central part of a deltaic
river system with hundreds of rivers and streams--some 2,100 kilometers
in length--flowing generally east or west into the Padma.
The third network is the Surma-Meghna system, which courses from the
northeastern border with India to Chandpur, where it joins the Padma.
The Surma-Meghna, at 669 kilometers by itself the longest river in
Bangladesh, is formed by the union of six lesser rivers. Below the city
of Kalipur it is known as the Meghna. When the Padma and Meghna join
together, they form the fourth river system--the Padma-Meghna--which
flows 145 kilometers to the Bay of Bengal.
This mighty network of four river systems flowing through the
Bangladesh Plain drains an area of some 1.5 million square kilometers.
The numerous channels of the Padma-Meghna, its distributaries, and
smaller parallel rivers that flow into the Bay of Bengal are referred to
as the Mouths of the Ganges. Like the Jamuna, the Padma-Meghna and other
estuaries on the Bay of Bengal are also known for their many chars.
A fifth river system, unconnected to the other four, is the
Karnaphuli. Flowing through the region of Chittagong and the Chittagong
Hills, it cuts across the hills and runs rapidly downhill to the west
and southwest and then to the sea. The Feni, Karnaphuli, Sangu, and
Matamuhari--an aggregate of some 420 kilometers--are the main rivers in
the region. The port of Chittagong is situated on the banks of the
Karnaphuli. The Karnaphuli Reservoir and Karnaphuli Dam are located in
this area. The dam impounds the Karnaphuli River's waters in the
reservoir for the generation of hydroelectric power.
During the annual monsoon period, the rivers of Bangladesh flow at
about 140,000 cubic meters per second, but during the dry period they
diminish to 7,000 cubic meters per second. Because water is so vital to
agriculture, more than 60 percent of the net arable land, some 9.1
million hectares, is cultivated in the rainy season despite the
possibility of severe flooding, and nearly 40 percent of the land is
cultivated during the dry winter months. Water resources development has
responded to this "dual water regime" by providing flood
protection, drainage to prevent overflooding and waterlogging, and
irrigation facilities for the expansion of winter cultivation. Major
water control projects have been developed by the national government to
provide irrigation, flood control, drainage facilities, aids to river
navigation and road construction, and hydroelectric power. In addition,
thousands of tube wells and electric pumps are used for local
irrigation. Despite severe resource constraints, the government of
Bangladesh has made it a policy to try to bring additional areas under
irrigation without salinity intrusion.
Water resources management, including gravity flow irrigation, flood
control, and drainage, were largely the responsibility of the Bangladesh
Water Development Board. Other public sector institutions, such as the
Bangladesh Krishi Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Development Board, the
Bangladesh Bank, and the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation
were also responsible for promotion and development of minor irrigation
works in the private sector through government credit mechanisms.
Bangladesh - POPULATION
Population Structure and Settlement Patterns
In the 1980s, Bangladesh faced no greater problem than population
growth. Census data compiled in 1901 indicated a total of 29 million in
East Bengal, the region that became East Pakistan and eventually
Bangladesh. By 1951, four years after partition from India, East
Pakistan had 44 million people, a number that grew rapidly up to the
first postindependence census, taken in 1974, which reported the
national population at 71 million. The 1981 census reported a population
of 87 million and a 2.3 percent annual growth rate. Thus, in just 80
years, the population had tripled. In July 1988 the population, by then
the eighth largest in the world, stood at 109,963,551, and the average
annual growth rate was 2.6 percent. According to official estimates,
Bangladesh was expected to reach a population of more than 140 million
by the year 2000.
Bangladesh's population density provided further evidence of the
problems the nation faced. In 1901 an average of 216 persons inhabited
one square kilometer. By 1951 that number had increased to 312 per
square kilometer and, in 1988, reached 821. By the year 2000, population
density was projected to exceed 1,000 persons per square kilometer.
The crude birth rate per 1,000 population was 34.6 in 1981. This rate
remained unchanged in 1985, following a 20-year trend of decline since
1961, when it had stood at 47 per 1,000. The rural birth rate was higher
than birth rates in urban areas; in 1985 there were 36.3 births per
1,000 in the countryside versus 28 per 1,000 in urban areas. The crude
death rate per 1,000 population decreased from 40.7 in 1951 to 12 per
1,000 in 1985; the urban crude death rate was 8.3, and the rural crude
death rate was 12.9. The infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was
111.9 in 1985, a distinct improvement from as recently as 1982, when the
rate was 121.9. Life expectancy at birth was estimated at 55.1 years in
1986. Men and women have very similar life expectancies at 55.4 and 55,
respectively. With an average life expectancy of 58.8 years, urban
dwellers in 1986 were likely to live longer than their rural
counterparts (average life expectancy 54.8 years). The sex ratio of the
population in 1981 was 106 males to 100 females.
In the late 1980s, about 82 percent of the population of Bangladesh
(a total of 15.1 million households) resided in rural areas. With the
exception of parts of Sylhet and Rangamati regions, where settlements
occurred in nucleated or clustered patterns, the villages were scattered
collections of homesteads surrounded by trees. Continuous strings of
settlements along the roadside were also common in the southeastern part
of the country.
Until the 1980s, Bangladesh was the most rural nation in South Asia.
In 1931 only 27 out of every 1,000 persons were urban dwellers in what
is now Bangladesh. In 1931 Bangladesh had fifty towns; by 1951 the
country had eighty-nine towns, cities, and municipalities. During the
1980s, industrial development began to have a small effect on
urbanization. The 1974 census had put the urban population of Bangladesh
at 8.8 percent of the total; by 1988 that proportion had reached 18
percent and was projected to rise to 30 percent by the year 2000.
In 1981 only two cities, Dhaka and Chittagong, had more than 1
million residents. Seven other cities--Narayanganj, Khulna, Barisal,
Saidpur, Rajshahi, Mymensingh, and Comilla--each had more than 100,000
people. Of all the expanding cities, Dhaka, the national capital and the
principal seat of culture, had made the most gains in population,
growing from 335,928 in 1951 to 3.4 million in 1981. In the same period,
Chittagong had grown from 289,981 to 1.4 million. A majority of the
other urban areas each had between 20,000 and 50,000 people. These
relatively small towns had grown up in most cases as administrative
centers and geographically suitable localities for inland transportation
and commercial facilities. There was no particular concentration of
towns in any part of the country. In fact, the only large cities close
to each other were Dhaka and Narayanganj.
<>Migration
Bangladesh is noted for the ethnic homogeneity of its population.
Over 98 percent of the people are Bengalis, predominantly
Bangla-speaking peoples. People speaking Arabic, Persian, and Turkic
languages also have contributed to the ethnic characteristics of the
region.
A member of the Indo-European family of languages, Bangla (sometimes
called Bengali) is the official language of Bangladesh. Bangladeshis
closely identify themselves with their national language. Bangla has a
rich cultural heritage in literature, music, and poetry, and at least
two Bengali poets are well known in the West: Rabindranath Tagore, a
Hindu and a Nobel laureate; and Kazi Nazrul Islam, a Muslim known as the
"voice of Bengali nationalism and independence." Bangla has
been enriched by several regional dialects. The dialects of Sylhet,
Chittagong, and Noakhali have been strongly marked by Arab-Persian
influences. English, whose cultural influence seemed to have crested by
the late 1980s, remained nonetheless an important language in
Bangladesh.
Biharis, a group that included Urdu-speaking non-Bengali Muslim
refugees from Bihar and other parts of northern India, numbered about 1
million in 1971 but had decreased to around 600,000 by the late 1980s.
They once dominated the upper levels of Bengali society. Many also held
jobs on the railroads and in heavy industry. As such they stood to lose
from Bangladesh independence and sided with Pakistan during the 1971
war. Hundreds of thousands of Biharis were repatriated to Pakistan after
the war.
Bangladesh's tribal population consisted of 897,828 persons, just
over 1 percent of the total population, at the time of the 1981 census.
They lived primarily in the Chittagong Hills and in the regions of
Mymensingh, Sylhet, and Rajshahi. The majority of the tribal population
(778,425) lived in rural settings, where many practiced shifting
cultivation. Most tribal people were of SinoTibetan descent and had
distinctive Mongoloid features. They differed in their social
organization, marriage customs, birth and death rites, food, and other
social customs from the people of the rest of the country. They spoke
Tibeto-Burman languages. In the mid-1980s, the percentage distribution
of tribal population by religion was Hindu 24, Buddhist 44, Christian
13, and others 19.
The four largest tribes were the Chakmas, Marmas (or Maghs), Tipperas
(or Tipras), and Mros (or Moorangs). The tribes tended to intermingle
and could be distinguished from one another more by differences in their
dialect, dress, and customs than by tribal cohesion. Only the Chakmas
and Marmas displayed formal tribal organization, although all groups
contained distinct clans. By far the largest tribe, the Chakmas were of
mixed origin but reflected more Bengali influence than any other tribe.
Unlike the other tribes, the Chakmas and Marmas generally lived in the
highland valleys. Most Chakmas were Buddhists, but some practiced
Hinduism or animism.
Of Burmese ancestry, the Marmas regarded Burma as the center of their
cultural life. Members of the Marma tribe disliked the more widely used
term Maghs, which had come to mean pirates. Although several
religions, including Islam, were represented among the Marmas, nearly
all of the Marmas were Buddhists.
The Tipperas were nearly all Hindus and accounted for virtually the
entire Hindu population of the Chittagong Hills. They had migrated
gradually from the northern Chittagong Hills. The northern Tipperas were
influenced by Bengali culture. A small southern section known as the
Mrungs showed considerably less Bengali influence.
The Mros, considered the original inhabitants of the Chittagong
Hills, lived on hilltops and often fortified their villages. They had no
written language of their own, but some could read the Burmese and
Bangla scripts. Most of them claimed to be Buddhists, but their
religious practices were largely animistic.
Tribal groups in other parts of the country included Santals in
Rajshahi and Dinajpur, and Khasis, Garos, and Khajons in Mymensingh and
Sylhet regions. Primarily poor peasants, these people all belonged to
groups in the adjoining tribal areas of India.
Bangladesh.
Family and kinship were the core of social life in Bangladesh. A
family group residing in a bari would function as the basic
unit of economic endeavor, landholding, and social identity. In the eyes
of rural people, the chula defined the effective household--an
extended family exploiting jointly held property and being fed from a
jointly operated kitchen. A bari might consist of one or more
such functional households, depending on the circumstances of family
relationship. Married sons generally lived in their parents' household
during the father's lifetime. Although sons usually built separate
houses for their nuclear families, they remained under their fathers'
authority, and wives under their mothers-in-law's authority. The death
of the father usually precipitated the separation of adult brothers into
their own households. Such a split generally caused little change in the
physical layout of the bari, however. Families at different
stages of the cycle would display different configurations of household
membership.
Patrilineal ties dominated the ideology of family life, but in
practice matrilineal ties were almost as important. Married women
provided especially important links between their husbands' brothers'
families. Brothers and sisters often visited their brothers' households,
which were in fact the households of their deceased fathers. By Islamic
law, women inherited a share of their fathers' property and thus
retained a claim on the often scanty fields worked by their brothers. By
not exercising this claim, however, they did their brothers the
important service of keeping the family lands in the patrilineal line
and thus ensured themselves a warm welcome and permanent place in their
brothers' homes.
Marriage is a civil contract rather than a religious sacrament in
Islam, and the parties to the contract represent the interests of
families rather than the direct personal interests of the prospective
spouses. In Bangladesh, parents ordinarily select spouses for their
children, although men frequently exercise some influence over the
choice of their spouses. In middle-class urban families men negotiate
their own marriages. Only in the most sophisticated elite class does a
woman participate in her own marriage arrangements. Marriage generally
is made between families of similar social standing, although a woman
might properly marry a man of somewhat higher status. Financial standing
came to outweigh family background in the late twentieth century in any
case. Often a person with a good job in a Middle Eastern country was
preferred over a person of highly regarded lineage.
Marriages are often preceded by extensive negotiations between the
families of the prospective bride and groom. One of the functions of the
marriage negotiations is to reduce any discrepancy in status through
financial arrangements. The groom's family ordinarily pledges the
traditional cash payment, or bride-price, part or all of which can be
deferred to fall due in case of divorce initiated by the husband or in
case the contract is otherwise broken. As in many Muslim countries, the
cash payment system provides women some protection against the summary
divorce permitted by Islam. Some families also adopt the Hindu custom of
providing a dowry for the bride.
Of the total population in 1981, an estimated 34 million were
married. A total of 19 million citizens of marriageable age were single
or had never married, 3 million were widowed, and 322,000 were divorced.
Although the majority of married men (10 million) had only one wife,
there were about 580,000 households, between 6 and 10 percent of all
marriages, in which a man had two or more wives.
Although the age at marriage appeared to be rising in the 1980s,
early marriage remained the rule even among the educated, and especially
among women. The mean age at marriage in 1981 for males was 23.9, and
for females 16.7. Women students frequently married in their late teens
and continued their studies in the households of their fathers-in-law.
Divorce, especially of young couples without children, was becoming
increasingly common in Bangladesh, with approximately one in six
marriages ending in this fashion in the 1980s.
Typical spouses knew each other only slightly, if at all, before
marriage. Although marriages between cousins and other more distant kin
occurred frequently, segregation of the sexes generally kept young men
and women of different households from knowing each other well. Marriage
functioned to ensure the continuity of families rather than to provide
companionship to individuals, and the new bride's relationship with her
mother-in-law was probably more important to her well-being than her
frequently impersonal relationship with her husband.
A woman began to gain respect and security in her husband's or
father-in-law's household only after giving birth to a son. Mothers
therefore cherished and indulged their sons, while daughters were
frequently more strictly disciplined and were assigned heavy household
chores from an early age. In many families the closest, most intimate,
and most enduring emotional relationship was that between mother and
son. The father was a more distant figure, worthy of formal respect, and
the son's wife might remain a virtual stranger for a long time after
marriage.
The practice of purdah (the traditional seclusion of women) varied
widely according to social milieu, but even in relatively sophisticated
urban circles the core of the institution, the segregation of the sexes,
persisted. In traditional circles, full purdah required the complete
seclusion of women from the onset of puberty. Within the home, women
inhabited private quarters that only male relatives or servants could
enter, and a woman properly avoided or treated with formal respect even
her father-in-law or her husband's older brother. Outside the home, a
woman in purdah wore a veil or an enveloping, concealing outer garment.
The trappings of full purdah required both a devotion to traditional
practice and the means to dispense with the labor of women in the
fields. For most rural families the importance of women's labor made
full seclusion impossible, although the idea remained. In some areas,
for example, women went unveiled within the confines of the para
or village but donned the veil or the outer garment for trips farther
from the community. In any case, contact with men outside the immediate
family was avoided.
The segregation of the sexes extended into social groups that had
rejected full purdah as a result of modern education. Although urban
women could enjoy more physical freedom than was traditional and the
opportunity to pursue a professional career, they moved in a different
social world from their husbands and often worked at their professions
in a specifically feminine milieu.
Bangladesh - Women's Role in Society
Available data on health, nutrition, education, and economic
performance indicated that in the 1980s the status of women in
Bangladesh remained considerably inferior to that of men. Women, in
custom and practice, remained subordinate to men in almost all aspects
of their lives; greater autonomy was the privilege of the rich or the
necessity of the very poor. Most women's lives remained centered on
their traditional roles, and they had limited access to markets,
productive services, education, health care, and local government. This
lack of opportunities contributed to high fertility patterns, which
diminished family well-being, contributed to the malnourishment and
generally poor health of children, and frustrated educational and other
national development goals. In fact, acute poverty at the margin
appeared to be hitting hardest at women. As long as women's access to
health care, education, and training remained limited, prospects for
improved productivity among the female population remained poor.
About 82 percent of women lived in rural areas in the late 1980s. The
majority of rural women, perhaps 70 percent, were in small cultivator,
tenant, and landless households; many worked as laborers part time or
seasonally, usually in post-harvest activities, and received payment in
kind or in meager cash wages. Another 20 percent, mostly in poor
landless households, depended on casual labor, gleaning, begging, and
other irregular sources of income; typically, their income was essential
to household survival. The remaining 10 percent of women were in
households mainly in the professional, trading, or large-scale
landowning categories, and they usually did not work outside the home.
The economic contribution of women was substantial but largely
unacknowledged. Women in rural areas were responsible for most of the
post-harvest work, which was done in the chula, and for keeping
livestock, poultry, and small gardens. Women in cities relied on
domestic and traditional jobs, but in the 1980s they increasingly worked
in manufacturing jobs, especially in the readymade garment industry.
Those with more education worked in government, health care, and
teaching, but their numbers remained very small. Continuing high rates
of population growth and the declining availability of work based in the
chula meant that more women sought employment outside the home.
Accordingly, the female labor force participation rate doubled between
1974 and 1984, when it reached nearly 8 percent. Female wage rates in
the 1980s were low, typically ranging between 20 and 30 percent of male
wage rates.
Bangladesh - Social Classes and Stratification
Society in Bangladesh in the 1980s, with the exception of the Hindu
caste system, was not rigidly stratified; rather, it was open, fluid,
and diffused, without a cohesive social organization and social
structure. Social class distinctions were mostly functional, however,
and there was considerable mobility among classes. Even the structure of
the Hindu caste system in Bangladesh was relatively loose because most
Hindus belonged to the lower castes.
Ostensibly, egalitarian principles of Islam were the basis of social
organization. Unlike in other regions of South Asia, the Hindu
caste-based social system had a very limited effect on Bangladeshi
Muslim social culture. Even the low-caste jolhas (weavers) had
improved their social standing since 1971. Although several
hierarchically arranged groups--such as the syeds (noble born)
and the sheikhs, or shaykhs (also noble born)--were
noticeable in Bangladesh Muslim society, there were no impenetrable
hereditary social distinctions. Rather, fairly permeable classes based
on wealth and political influence existed both in the cities and in the
villages.
Traditional Muslim class distinctions had little importance in
Bangladesh. The proscription against marriage between individuals of
high-born and low-born families, once an indicator of the social gap
between the two groups, had long ago disappeared; most matrimonial
alliances were based on wealth and power and not on the ties of family
distinction. Also, many so-called upper class families, because of their
traditional use of the Urdu language, had become alienated in
independent Bangladesh.
Although Hindu society is formally stratified into caste categories,
caste did not figure prominently in the Bangladeshi Hindu community.
About 75 percent of the Hindus in Bangladesh belonged to the lower
castes, notably namasudras (lesser cultivators), and the
remainder belonged primarily to outcaste or untouchable groups. Some
members of higher castes belonged to the middle or professional class,
but there was no Hindu upper class. With the increasing participation of
the Hindus in nontraditional professional mobility, the castes were able
to interact in wider political and socioeconomic arenas, which caused
some erosion of caste consciousness. Although there is no mobility
between Hindu castes, caste distinctions did not play as important a
role in Bangladesh as in they did in the Hindu-dominated Indian state of
West Bengal. Bangladeshi Hindus seemed to have become part of the
mainstream culture without surrendering their religious and cultural
distinctions.
Bangladesh - RELIGION
Tenets of Islam
In the Arabian town of Mecca in A.D. 610, the Prophet Muhammad
preached the first of a series of divine revelations. Muhammad, an
uncompromising monotheist, made himself unpopular with his fellow
Meccans, who benefitted from the town's thriving pilgrimage business and
numerous polytheist religious sites. Censured by Mecca's leaders, in 622
Muhammad and a group of his followers were invited to the town of
Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (from Madinat an Nabi, meaning
the Prophet's City), and made it the center of their activities. This
move, or hijra, marked the beginning of the Islamic era and of
Islam as a historical force. The Muslim calendar, based on a 354-day
lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued to preach,
eventually defeating his opponents in battle and consolidating the
temporal and spiritual leadership of Arabia before his death in 632.
After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled his divinely inspired
speeches in the Quran, the scripture of Islam. Other sayings and
teachings of Muhammad and the examples of his personal behavior became
the hadith. Together they form the Muslim's comprehensive guide
to spiritual, ethical, and social living.
The shahadah, or testimony, succinctly states the central belief of
Islam: "There is no god but God [Allah], and Muhammad is his
Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many
occasions; recital in full and unquestioning sincerity makes one a
Muslim. Islam means "submission to God," and he who submits is
a Muslim. The God whom Muhammad preached was not unknown to his
countrymen, for Allah is the Arabic word for God rather than a
particular name. Instead of introducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the
existence of the minor gods and spirits worshiped before his ministry.
Muhammad is called the "seal of the Prophets"; his
revelation is said to complete for all time the series of biblical
revelations received by the Jews and the Christians. Prophets and sages
of the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus
(Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa, respectively, in the Arabic Islamic canon) are
recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, reveres
as sacred only God's message, rejecting Christianity's deification of
the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, the Day of
Judgment, the general resurrection, heaven and hell, and the immortality
of the soul.
The duties of the Muslim, which form the "five pillars" of
the faith, are recitation of the shahadah (kalima in
Bangla), daily prayer (salat; in Bangla, namaj),
almsgiving (zakat; in Bangla, jakat), fasting (sawm;
in Bangla, roja), and pilgrimage (hajj). The devout
believer prays after purification through ritual oblations at dawn,
midday, mid-afternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections
and prostrations accompany the prayers that the worshiper recites while
facing Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at a mosque,
led by a prayer leader; on Fridays they are obliged to do so. Women may
attend public worship at mosques, where they are segregated from men,
although most women commonly pray at home. A special functionary, the
muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire community at the
appropriate hours; those out of earshot determine the prayer time from
the position of the sun. Public prayer is a conspicuous and widely
practiced aspect of Islam in Bangladesh.
Almsgiving consists of a variety of donations to the poor, debtors,
slaves, wayfarers, beggars, and charitable organizations. Once
obligatory, although not strictly a tax, almsgiving in modern times is
voluntary but usually expected.
The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period of
obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt of God's
revelation. During the month all but the sick, the weak, pregnant or
lactating women, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and
young children are enjoined, as appropriate to their state in life, from
eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse during daylight hours.
The wealthy usually do little or no work during this period, and some
businesses close for all or part of the day. Since the months of the
lunar calendar revolve through the solar year, Ramadan falls at various
seasons in different years. Summertime fasting imposes considerable
hardship on those who must do physical work. Id al Fitr, a feast
celebrated throughout the Islamic world, marks the end of the month of
fasting. Gifts, the wearing of new garments, exchanges of sweetmeats,
almsgiving, and visits to friends and relatives are some of the customs
of this great religious festival.
Islam dictates that at least once in his or her lifetime every Muslim
should, if possible, make the hajj to Mecca to participate in
special rites held there during the twelfth month of the Muslim
calendar. The Prophet instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic
custom to emphasize the significance of the sites associated with the
history of Abraham, the founder of monotheism and the father of the
Arabs through his son Ishmail (Ismail in the Arabic Islamic Canon). The
pilgrim, dressed in a white seamless garment, abstains from sexual
relations, shaving, haircutting, and nail-paring. Highlights of the
pilgrimage include kissing a sacred black stone; circumambulating the
Kaabah shrine (the sacred structure reportedly built by Abraham that
houses a stone sacred to Islam); running between the hills of Safa and
Marwa in imitation of Hagar, Ishmail's mother, during her travail in the
desert; and standing in prayer on the Plain of Arafat.
The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on
earth--the jihad--represents an additional duty of all Muslims. Although
this concept continues to be used to justify holy wars, modernist
Muslims see the jihad in a broader context of civic and personal action.
In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical conduct
that encourages generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect and that
forbids adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion,
blood, pork, and alcohol.
A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is neither
intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Those who lead prayers,
preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by virtue of their superior
knowledge and scholarship rather than any special powers or prerogatives
conferred by ordination.
During his lifetime, Muhammad was both spiritual and temporal leader
of the Muslim community. He established the concept of Islam as a total
and all-encompassing way of life for both individuals and society.
Muslims believe that God revealed to Muhammad the rules governing decent
behavior. It is therefore incumbent on the individual to live in the
manner prescribed by revealed law and on the community to perfect human
society on earth according to the holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no
distinction between religion and state. Religious and secular life
merge, as do religious and secular law. In keeping with this conception
of society, all Muslims traditionally have been subject to religious
law.
Bangladesh - Early Developments in Islam
After Muhammad's death in A.D. 632 the leaders of the Muslim
community chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his
earliest followers, to succeed him as caliph (from khilafa;
literally, successor of the Prophet). At that time, some persons favored
Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his daughter Fatima, but Ali
and his supporters recognized the community's choice. The next two
caliphs, Umar and Uthman, enjoyed the recognition of the entire
community, although Uthman was murdered. When Ali finally succeeded to
the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name
of his kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war Ali moved his capital
to Kufa (present-day Karbala in Iraq), where a short time later he too
was assassinated.
Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates
and the period in which the entire Islamic community recognized a single
caliph. Muawiyah then proclaimed himself caliph of Damascus. Ali's
supporters, however, refused to recognize Muawiyah or his line, the
Umayyad caliphs; they withdrew in the first great schism of Islam and
established a dissident faction known as the Shias (or Shiites), from
Shiat Ali (Party of Ali) in support of the claims of Ali's line to the
caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction of
Islam, the Sunnis, claims to follow the orthodox teaching and example of
Muhammad as embodied in the Sunna, the traditions of the Prophet. The
Sunni majority was further developed into four schools of law: Maliki,
Hanafi, Shafii, and Hanbali. All four are equally orthodox, but Sunnis
in one country usually follow only one school.
Originally political in nature, the difference between the Sunni and
Shia interpretations took on theological and metaphysical overtones.
Ali's two sons, killed in the wars following the schisms, became
martyred heroes to Shia Islam and repositories of the claims of Ali's
line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis retained the
doctrine of leadership by consensus. Despite these differences, reputed
descent from the Prophet still carries great social and religious
prestige throughout the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the Shia doctrine of
rule by divine right grew more firmly established, and disagreements
over which of several pretenders had the truer claim to the mystical
power of Ali precipitated further schisms. Some Shia groups developed
doctrines of divine leadership, including a belief in hidden but
divinely chosen leaders. The Shia creed, for example, proclaims:
"There is no god but God: Muhammad is the Prophet of God, and Ali
is the Saint of God."
Bangladesh - Islam in Bangladesh
The wholesale conversion to Islam of the population of what was to
become Bangladesh began in the thirteenth century and continued for
hundreds of years. Conversion was generally collective
rather than individual, although individual Hindus who became outcastes
or who were ostracized for any reason often became Muslims. Islamic
egalitarianism, especially the ideals of equality, brotherhood, and
social justice, attracted numerous Buddhists and lower caste Hindus.
Muslim missionaries and mystics, some of whom were subsequently regarded
as saints (usually known as pirs in Bangladesh) and who
wandered about in villages and towns, were responsible for many
conversions.
Most Muslims in Bangladesh are Sunnis, but there is a small Shia
community. Most of those who are Shia reside in urban areas. Although
these Shias are few in number, Shia observance commemorating the
martyrdom of Ali's sons, Hasan and Husayn, is widely observed by the
nation's Sunnis.
The tradition of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism appeared very
early in Islam and became essentially a popular movement emphasizing
love of God rather than fear of God. Sufism stresses a direct,
unstructured, personal devotion to God in place of the ritualistic,
outward observance of the faith. An important belief in the Sufi
tradition is that the average believer may use spiritual guides in his
pursuit of the truth. These guides--friends of God or saints--are
commonly called fakirs or pirs. In Bangladesh the term pir
is more commonly used and combines the meanings of teacher and saint. In
Islam there has been a perennial tension between the ulama--Muslim
scholars--and the Sufis; each group advocates its method as the
preferred path to salvation. There also have been periodic efforts to
reconcile the two approaches. Throughout the centuries many gifted
scholars and numerous poets have been inspired by Sufi ideas even though
they were not actually adherents.
Sufi masters were the single most important factor in South Asian
conversions to Islam, particularly in what is now Bangladesh. Most
Bangladeshi Muslims are influenced to some degree by Sufism, although
this influence often involves only occasional consultation or
celebration rather than formal affiliation. Both fakirs and pirs
are familiar figures on the village scene, and in some areas the shrines
of saints almost outnumber the mosques. In some regions the terms fakir
and pir are used interchangeably, but in general the former
connotes an itinerant holy man and the latter an established murshid,
a holy man who has achieved a higher spiritual level than a fakir and
who has a larger following.
Ever since Sufism became a popular movement, pious men of outstanding
personality reputed to have gifts of miraculous powers have found
disciples (murids) flocking to them. The disciple can be a kind
of lay associate earning his living in secular occupations, consulting
the pir or murshid at times, participating in
religious ceremonies, and making contributions to the support of the murshid.
In addition, he may be initiated into a brotherhood that pledges its
devotion to the murshid, lives in close association with him,
and engages in pious exercises intended to bring about mystical
enlightenment.
The Qadiri, Naqshbandi, and Chishti orders were among the most
widespread Sufi orders in Bangladesh in the late 1980s. The beliefs and
practices of the first two are quite close to those of orthodox Islam;
the third, founded in Ajmer, India, is peculiar to the subcontinent and
has a number of unorthodox practices, such as the use of music in its
liturgy. Its ranks have included many musicians and poets.
Pirs do not attain their office through consensus and do not
normally function as community representatives. The villager may expect
a pir to advise him and offer inspiration but would not expect
him to lead communal prayers or deliver the weekly sermon at the local
mosque. Some pirs, however, are known to have taken an active
interest in politics either by running for public office or by
supporting other candidates. For example, Pir Hafizi Huzur ran as a
candidate for president in the 1986 election. The pirs of
Atroshi and Sarsina apparently also exerted some political influence.
Their visitors have included presidents and cabinet ministers.
Although a formal organization of ordained priests has no basis in
Islam, a variety of functionaries perform many of the duties
conventionally associated with a clergy and serve, in effect, as
priests. One group, known collectively as the ulama, has traditionally
provided the orthodox leadership of the community. The ulama
unofficially interpret and administer religious law. Their authority
rests on their knowledge of sharia, the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence
that grew up in the centuries following the Prophet's death.
The members of the ulama include maulvis, imams, and mullahs. The first two titles are accorded to those
who have received special training in Islamic theology and law. A maulvi
has pursued higher studies in a madrasa, a school of religious
education attached to a mosque. Additional study on the graduate level leads
to the title maulana.
Villagers call on the mullah for prayers, advice on points of
religious practice, and performance of marriage and funeral ceremonies.
More often they come to him for a variety of services far from the
purview of orthodox Islam. The mullah may be a source for amulets,
talismans, and charms for the remedying of everything from snakebite to
sexual impotence. These objects are also purported to provide protection
from evil spirits and bring good fortune. Many villagers have implicit
faith in such cures for disease and appear to benefit from them. Some
mullahs derive a significant portion of their income from sales of such
items.
In Bangladesh, where a modified Anglo-Indian civil and criminal legal
system operates, there are no official sharia courts. Most Muslim marriages, however, are presided over by the qazi,
a traditional Muslim judge whose advice is also sought on matters of
personal law, such as inheritance, divorce, and the administration of
religious endowments (waqfs).
In the late 1980s, the ulama of Bangladesh still perceived their
function as that of teaching and preserving the Islamic way of life in
the face of outside challenges, especially from modern sociopolitical
ideas based on Christianity or communism. Any effort at modernization
was perceived as a threat to core religious values and institutions;
therefore, the ulama as a class was opposed to any compromise in matters
of sharia. Many members of the ulama favored the establishment of an
Islamic theocracy in Bangladesh and were deeply involved in political
activism through several political parties. Most members of the ulama
were also engaged in carrying on the tabliqh (preaching
movement), an effort that focuses on the true sociopolitical ideals of
Islam and unequivocally discards all un-Islamic accretions. Tabliqh
attracted many college and university graduates, who found the movement
emotionally fulfilling and a practical way to deal with Bangladesh's
endemic sociopolitical malaise.
A number of Islamic practices are particular to South Asia, and
several of them have been subject to reforms over the years. For
example, the anniversary of the death of a pir is observed
annually. Popular belief holds that this anniversary is an especially
propitious time for seeking the intercession of the pir. Large
numbers of the faithful attend anniversary ceremonies, which are festive
occasions enjoyed by the followers of the pir as well as
orthodox Muslims. The ceremonies are quite similar in form and content
to many Hindu festivals. Several nineteenth- and twentieth-century
fundamentalist reform movements, aimed at ridding Islam of all
extraneous encroachments, railed against these and similar practices.
Nevertheless, the practice of pir worship continued unabated in
the 1980s.
Nonorthodox interpretations of Islamic beliefs and practices pervaded
popular religion in Bangladesh in the 1980s. Hindu influences can be
seen in the practice of illuminating the house for the celebration of
Shabi Barat (Festival of the Bestowal of Fate), a custom derived from
the Hindu practices at Diwali (Festival of Lights). Rituals to exorcise
evil spirits (jinni) from possessed persons also incorporated Hindu
influence. Often, villagers would fail to distinguish between Hindu and
Muslim shrines. For example, shrines called satyapir, which dot
rural Bangladesh, are devoted to a Hindu-Muslim synthesis known as
Olabibi, the deity for the cure of cholera. This synthesis is an
intriguing superimposition of the Hindu concept of divine consort on the
stern monotheistic perception of Allah.
Post-1971 regimes sought to increase the role of the government in
the religious life of the people. The Ministry of Religious Affairs
provided support, financial assistance, and endowments to religious
institutions, including mosques and community prayer grounds (idgahs).
The organization of annual pilgrimages to Mecca also came under the
auspices of the ministry because of limits on the number of pilgrims
admitted by the government of Saudi Arabia and the restrictive foreign
exchange regulations of the government of Bangladesh. The ministry also
directed the policy and the program of the Islamic Foundation, which was
responsible for organizing and supporting research and publications on
Islamic subjects. The foundation also maintained the Bayt al Mukarram
(National Mosque), and organized the training of imams. Some 18,000
imams were scheduled for training once the government completed
establishment of a national network of Islamic cultural centers and
mosque libraries. Under the patronage of the Islamic Foundation, an
encyclopedia of Islam in the Bangla language was being compiled in the
late 1980s.
Another step toward further government involvement in religious life
was taken in 1984 when the semiofficial Zakat Fund Committee was
established under the chairmanship of the president of Bangladesh. The
committee solicited annual zakat contributions on a voluntary
basis. The revenue so generated was to be spent on orphanages, schools,
children's hospitals, and other charitable institutions and projects.
Commercial banks and other financial institutions were encouraged to
contribute to the fund. Through these measures the government sought
closer ties with religious establishments within the country and with
Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
Although Islam played a significant role in the life and culture of
the people, religion did not dominate national politics because Islam
was not the central component of national identity. When in June 1988 an
"Islamic way of life" was proclaimed for Bangladesh by
constitutional amendment, very little attention was paid outside the
intellectual class to the meaning and impact of such an important
national commitment. Most observers believed that the declaration of
Islam as the state religion might have a significant impact on national
life, however. Aside from arousing the suspicion of the non-Islamic
minorities, it could accelerate the proliferation of religious parties
at both the national and the local levels, thereby exacerbating tension
and conflict between secular and religious politicians. Unrest of this
nature was reported on some college campuses soon after the amendment
was promulgated.
Bangladesh - Hinduism
Unlike Islam, Hinduism lacks a single authoritative scripture and a
historically known founder. In a sense Hinduism is a synthesis of the
religious expression of the people of South Asia and an anonymous
expression of their worldview and cosmology, rather than the
articulation of a particular creed. The term Hinduism applies
to a large number of diverse beliefs and practices. Although religion
can best be understood in a regional context, the caste system, beliefs,
rituals, and festivals of the Hindus in Bangladesh -- about 16 percent
of the population--are peculiarly Bengali.
A distinction has sometimes been made between the religion of the
"great tradition" and the popular religion of the "little
tradition." The great (or Sanskritic) tradition, sometimes called
Brahmanism, developed under the leadership of Hinduism's highest caste
group, the Brahmans, who as the traditional priests, teachers, and
astrologers enjoy numerous social privileges. The great tradition
preserves refined and abstract philosophical concepts that exhibit very
little regional variation. At this level, there is emphasis on unity in
diversity and a pervasive attitude of relativism.
Hindu philosophy recognizes the Absolute (Brahma) as eternal,
unbounded by time, space, and causality and consisting of pure
existence, consciousness, and bliss. The highest goal is release (moksha)
from the cycle of birth and rebirth and the union of the individualized
soul (atman) with Brahma. To attain this goal, a person may
follow one of several methods or paths of discipline depending on his or
her own temperament or capacity. The first of these paths is known as
the way of works (karma marga). Followed by most Hindus, it
calls for disinterested right action--the performance of one's caste
duties and service to others--without personal involvement in the
consequences of action. The way of knowledge (jnana marga)
stresses union by eliminating ignorance; mental error rather than moral
transgression is considered the root of human misery and evil. The way
of devotion (bhakti marga) advocates union by love; its essence
is a complete and passionate faith in a personal deity.
For most of its adherents, Hinduism encompasses a variety of
devotions and sects that center on one or more of the great gods and are
expressed at least partly in a regional context. The great tradition
recognizes a trinity of gods, who are actually forms of absolute
Brahman: Brahma the creator, Vishnu the preserver, and Shiva the
destroyer. Brahma receives little notice; everyday devotion tends to
center on the worship of Vishnu and Shiva (known by a variety of names)
and their countless respective consorts.
The worship of Shiva has generally found adherents among the higher
castes in Bangladesh. Worship of Vishnu more explicitly cuts across
caste lines by teaching the fundamental oneness of humankind in spirit.
Vishnu worship in Bengal expresses the union of the male and female
principles in a tradition of love and devotion. This form of Hindu
belief and the Sufi tradition of Islam have influenced and interacted
with each other in Bengal. Both were popular mystical movements
emphasizing the personal relationship of religious leader and disciple
instead of the dry stereotypes of the Brahmans or the ulama. As in
Bengali Islamic practice, worship of Vishnu frequently occurs in a small
devotional society (samaj). Both use the language of earthly
love to express communion with the divine. In both traditions, the
Bangla language is the vehicle of a large corpus of erotic and mystical
literature of great beauty and emotional impact.
On the level of the little tradition, Hinduism admits worship of
spirits and godlings of rivers, mountains, vegetation, animals, stones,
or disease. Ritual bathing, vows, and pilgrimages to sacred rivers,
mountains, shrines, and cities are important practices. An ordinary
Hindu will worship at the shrines of Muslim pirs, without being
concerned with the religion to which that place is supposed to be
affiliated. Hindus revere many holy men and ascetics conspicuous for
their bodily mortifications. Some people believe they attain spiritual
benefit merely by looking at a great holy man.
Hindu ethics generally center on the principle of ahimsa, noninjury
to living creatures--especially the cow, which is held sacred. The
principle is expressed in almost universally observed rules against
eating beef. By no means are all Hindus vegetarians, but abstinence from
all kinds of meat is regarded as a "higher" virtue. High-caste
Bangladeshi Hindus, unlike their counterparts elsewhere in South Asia,
ordinarily eat fish.
Common among Hindus is the acceptance of the caste system as the
structure of society. For virtually all Hindus, even those in revolt
against some aspects of the system, caste is taken for granted as the
way of life. To be considered Hindu, a group must identify itself in
some way as a unit in the caste hierarchy. One cannot join a caste; one
is born into it and lives, marries, and dies in it.
Hindus in Bangladesh in the late 1980s were almost evenly distributed
in all regions, with concentrations in Khulna, Jessore, Dinajpur,
Faridpur, and Barisal. The contributions of Hindus in arts and letters
were far in excess of their numerical strength. In politics, they had
traditionally supported the liberal and secular ideology of the Awami
League (People's League). Hindu institutions and places of worship
received assistance through the Bangladesh Hindu Kalyan Trust
(Bangladesh Hindu Welfare Trust), which was sponsored by the Ministry of
Religious Affairs. Government-sponsored television and radio also
broadcast readings and interpretations of Hindu scriptures and prayers.
Bangladesh - Buddhism
In the 1981 census only 19.7 percent of the total population was
counted as literate. The literacy rate was 17 percent in rural areas and
35 percent in urban areas. The urban-rural gap shrank slightly between
1961 and 1981, primarily because of the influx of rural Bangladeshis to
urban areas. The adult literacy rate in 1988 remained about equal to the
1981 level, officially given as 29 percent but possibly lower. The
education system also had had a discriminatory effect on the education
of women in a basically patriarchal society. The female literacy rate in
1981 (13.2 percent) was about half the literacy rate among men (26
percent) nationally. The gap was even greater in rural areas, where 11.2
percent women and 23 percent of men were literate. (In 1988 the literacy
rate was 18 percent for women and 39 percent for men.) The national
school attendance rate in 1982 was 58.9 percent for ages 5 to 9; 20.9
percent for ages 10 to 14; and 1.9 percent for ages 15 to 24. The
estimated 1988 student-teacher ratio was fifty-four to one in primary
schools, twenty-seven to one in secondary schools, and thirteen to one
in universities. Approximately 10 million students of all ages attended
school in 1981.
The base of the school system was five years of primary education.
The government reported a total of nearly 44,000 primary schools
enrolling nearly 44 million students in 1986. Recognizing the importance
of increasing enrollments and improving quality, the government made
universal primary education a major objective of its educational
development plans, which focused on increasing access to school,
improving teacher training, and revising the primary school curricula.
As a result, the share of primary education by the mid-1980s increased
to about 50 percent of the public education expenditure. Although
enrollment in the entry class rose over time, the ability of the primary
education sector to retain students in school and increase the literacy
rate did not match government goals. Throughout the system a high annual
dropout rate of 20 percent existed in 1988. Studies suggested that no
more than 10 to 15 percent of those attending primary schools retained a
permanent ability to read and write. The Third Five-Year Plan (1985-90)
envisaged reducing the rural-urban gap in education, establishing
facilities for the enrollment of 70 percent of children of
primary-school age, and placing emphasis on keeping children in school
longer.
Bangladesh had 8,790 secondary schools with 2.7 million students in
1986. Secondary education was divided into two levels. The five years of
lower secondary (grades six through ten) concluded with a secondary
school certificate examination. Students who passed this examination
proceeded to two years of higher secondary or intermediate training,
which culminated in a higher secondary school examination after grade
twelve. Higher secondary school was viewed as preparation for college
rather than as the conclusion of high school. Development efforts in the
late 1980s included programs to provide low-cost vocational education to
the rural populace. Efforts also focused on the establishment of science
teaching facilities in rural schools, as compulsory science courses were
introduced at the secondary level. The government also had provided
training for science teachers and supplies of scientific equipment. In
spite of many difficulties over the years, the number of both secondary
schools and students, particularly females, increased steadily. For
example, whereas there were 7,786 secondary schools for boys and 1,159
for girls in 1977, the number of boys' schools had decreased to 7,511
while girls' schools had increased to 1,282 by 1986. The number of
students increased as well. In 1977 there were 1.3 million boys and
450,000 girls in secondary schools; by 1986 there were 1.9 million boys
and 804,000 girls. Enrollment in technical and vocational schools
increased in a similar manner. Secondary education for the most part was
private but was heavily subsidized by the state budget. Nationalization
of private schools was a standing government policy.
Development of the education system depended largely on the supply of
trained teachers. In 1986 about 20 percent of the estimated 190,000
primary-school teachers were adequately trained; at the secondary-school
level, only 30 percent of the teachers were trained. Contributing to the
shortage of trained teachers was the low socioeconomic standing of
educators. The social image of teachers had been gradually eroded,
making it difficult to recruit young graduates to the profession. The
high proportion of poorly trained teachers led to lower standards of
instruction. Despite these problems, the number of secondary-school
teachers increased from 83,955 in 1977 to 99,016 in 1986, according to
government figures.
In 1986 there were forty-nine primary-school teacher training
institutes and ten secondary-school teacher training colleges. In
addition to regular degree, diploma, and certificate programs, various
crash programs and correspondence courses also were available. The
Bangladesh Institute of Distance Education also had started an
experimental program of teacher training under the auspices of Rajshahi
University.
At the postsecondary level in 1986, there were 7 universities, 758
general colleges, and 50 professional (medical, dental, engineering, and
law) colleges. More than 25 percent of the colleges were government
managed; the rest were private but received substantial government
grants. The private colleges were gradually being nationalized. In the
1980s, emphasis was being placed on the development of science teaching
facilities in nongovernment colleges. Twelve government colleges were
selected to offer graduate courses during the Third Five-Year Plan.
In addition to four general-curriculum universities--the University
of Dhaka, Rajshahi University, Chittagong University, and Jahangir Nagar
University--there were the University of Engineering and Technology in
Dhaka, the Agricultural University in Mymensingh, and the Islamic
University in Tongi (near Dhaka). The total enrollment in the 7
universities in 1986 was estimated at 27,487, of which 80 percent were
male. Universities were selfgoverning entities with 95 percent of their
total expenditures paid through government block grants. The University
Grants Commission, created in 1973, coordinated the funding and
activities of the universities. A large number of scholarships and
stipends were offered to students in education institutions at all
levels.
The number of college students increased from 238,580 in 1980 to
603,915 in 1986, according to government statistics. During that period,
female enrollment increased from 29,000 to 115,000. Qualitative
improvement, enrollment stabilization, interuniversity rationalization
of departments, and controlled expansion were some of the government
objectives for college education in the mid- and late 1980s.
Curricula in nongovernment institutions of higher education focused
mostly on the humanities and social sciences. Many government colleges
and universities, however, offered advanced courses in natural,
physical, and biological sciences. Sophisticated courses in language and
literature, philosophy and philology, fine arts, and folk culture also
were offered at the universities. Advanced research degrees, including
doctorates, were offered in several disciplines of science, the arts,
the humanities, and the social sciences. Faculty members at the
government colleges and universities were usually well qualified, but
research facilities were limited.
To remove the heavy bias toward liberal arts education, greater
attention was being focused in the late 1980s on technical education,
which received the third highest allocation, after primary and secondary
education, in the Third Five-Year Plan. In addition to four engineering
colleges, Bangladesh had eighteen polytechnic institutes, four law
colleges, two agricultural colleges, a graphic arts institute, an
institute of glass and ceramics, a textile college, a college of leather
technology, sixteen commercial institutes, and fifty-four vocational
institutes in 1986. The nation also had ten medical colleges and one
dental college, offering both graduate and postgraduate training. In
addition, there were twenty-one nursing institutes, a music college, and
a college of physical education.
Because secondary and higher education benefited the small middle and
upper classes and because the government defrayed a portion of the costs
of private higher institutions through grants, the poor in effect
subsidized the education of the affluent. This situation was most
evident at the university level, where about 15 percent of the education
budget was devoted to less than 0.5 percent of the student population.
The technical education sector, which experienced some growth in the
late 1980s, nevertheless failed to provide the numbers and kinds of
personnel required for economic development. Most university training
also failed to equip its recipients with marketable professional skills.
Bangladesh - Religious Education
Communicable diseases were the major health hazards in the 1980s.
Poor nutrition and sanitation fostered the spread of infections.
Infectious diseases--cholera, dysentery, diarrhea, measles, diphtheria,
pertussis, tetanus, and poliomyelitis--and parasitic diseases such as
malaria, filariasis, and helminthiasis-- were responsible for widespread
illness and numerous deaths. Although not reported among government
statistics, tuberculosis was believed to be an increasingly serious
health problem, with 90,000 deaths and 110,000 new cases occurring
annually. Disease in the late 1980s was most prevalent in rural areas;
treatment was more readily available in the cities. A mid-1980s survey
indicated that deaths due to diarrheal diseases, malnutrition, and
pneumonia accounted for 16.3 percent, 13.1 percent, and 10.8 percent of
all deaths, respectively. The percentages for other diseases were as
follows: prematurity and birth injury (8.6 percent), cardiovascular
accidents (4.5 percent), tetanus (4.4 percent), pulmonary tuberculosis
(3.3 percent), measles (2.7 percent), and other causes (36.3 percent).
Young children suffered disproportionately from diseases, and they
accounted for 40 percent of deaths annually. Major killers of young
children were severe diarrhea and neonatal tetanus caused by unsanitary
treatment of the umbilicus. Until the mid-1980s, only 3 percent of
Bangladeshi children received immunization against common infectious
diseases. Consequently, potentially avoidable illnesses like tetanus,
pertussis, and measles accounted for nearly half of infant deaths and
more than a third of childhood deaths.
By the late 1980s, a massive immunization program had eliminated
smallpox, and highly effective treatments had contained cholera.
Malaria, however, once thought to have been eradicated, again had became
a major health problem by 1988. The ongoing malaria control program
needed to be strengthened by improving indigenous scientific knowledge
of the disease and by spraying wider areas with effective chemicals.
Several national and international research facilities were involved in
disease control research.
Noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases,
mental illness, gastrointestinal disorders, cancer, rheumatoid
arthritis, respiratory disease, and urogenital diseases were increasing
in frequency in the 1980s. Cases of vitamin A deficiency causing night
blindness and xerophthalmia, iron deficiency anemia, iodine deficiency,
protein-calories deficiency, and marasmus also were on the increase.
Although no incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)
had been reported in Bangladesh through mid-1988, the National Committee
on AIDS was formed in April 1986. The committee drew up a short-term
action plan that called for public awareness programs, augmented
laboratory facilities, training of relevant personnel, publication of
informational booklets, and health education programs.
Before the mid-1980s, disease control programs focused mainly on
Western-style curative services, but the emphasis was shifting in the
late 1980s toward a larger role for prevention. The government's main
preventive health program--the Universal Immunization Program--was
initiated in 1986 with the assistance of the World Health Organization
and the United Nations Children's Fund in eight pilot subdistricts. The government aimed to provide protection
through immunization against six major diseases for children under two
years of age and to vaccinate women of childbearing age against tetanus.
The program helped to increase the rate of full immunization of children
below 1 year of age from less than 3 percent to 36.5 percent, and of
children between 12 and 24 months from less than 3 percent to 55.8
percent.
In the case of maternal health care, a national program to train and
supervise traditional birth attendants (dhais) was started in
1987. In addition, a long-range program to improve maternal and neonatal
care, which addressed issues of health care delivery and referral on a
national scale, was approved in 1987. The government in 1988 upgraded
its nutrition policy-making capacity by creating the National Nutrition
Council, but planning and implementation of specific programs remained
insufficient. Other programs with nutrition implications include
food-for-work, "vulnerable-group feeding," and vitamin A
distribution programs.
Alternative systems of medicine, including the traditional Hindu ayurvedic
medical system based largely on homeopathy and naturopathy, the Muslim unani
(so-called "Greek" medicine) herbal medical practice, and
Western allopathic medicine were available. For most villagers, the most
accessible medical practitioner was the village curer (kobiraj).
It is estimated that 70 percent of the rural population did not have
access to modern medical facilities in the late 1980s.
Bangladesh - Health Care Facilities
The Ministry of Health and Family Planning was responsible for
developing, coordinating, and implementing the national health and
mother-and-child health care programs. Population control also was
within the purview of the ministry. The government's policy objectives in the
health care sector were to provide a minimum level of health care
services for all, primarily through the construction of health
facilities in rural areas and the training of health care workers. The
strategy of universal health care by the year 2000 had become accepted,
and government efforts toward infrastructure development included the
widespread construction of rural hospitals, dispensaries, and clinics
for outpatient care. Program implementation, however, was limited by
severe financial constraints, insufficient program management and
supervision, personnel shortages, inadequate staff performance, and
insufficient numbers of buildings, equipment, and supplies.
In the late 1980s, government health care facilities in rural areas
consisted of subdistrict health centers, union-level health and family
welfare centers, and rural dispensaries. A subdistrict health center in
the mid-1980s typically had a thirty-one-bed hospital, an outpatient
service, and a home-service unit staffed with field workers. Some of the
services, however, were largely nonoperative because of staffing
problems and a lack of support services. Health services in urban areas
also were inadequate, and their coverage seemed to be deteriorating. In
many urban areas, nongovernment organizations provide the bulk of urban
health care services. Programming and priorities of the nongovernment
organizations were at best loosely coordinated.
A union-level health and family welfare center provided the first
contact between the people and the health care system and was the
nucleus of primary health care delivery. As of 1985 there were 341
functional subdistrict health centers, 1,275 rural dispensaries (to be
converted to union-level health and family welfare centers), and 1,054
union-level health and family welfare centers. The total number of
hospital beds at the subdistrict level and below was 8,100.
District hospitals and some infectious-disease and specialized
hospitals constituted the second level of referral for health care. In
the mid-1980s, there were 14 general hospitals (with capacities ranging
from 100 to 150 beds), 43 general district hospitals (50 beds each), 12
tuberculosis hospitals (20 to 120 beds each), and 1 mental hospital (400
beds). Besides these, there were thirty-eight urban outpatient clinics,
forty-four tuberculosis clinics, and twenty-three school health clinics.
Ten medical college hospitals and eight postgraduate specialized
institutes with attached hospitals constituted the third level of health
care.
In the mid-1980s, of the country's 21,637 hospital beds, about 85
percent belonged to the government health services. There was only about
one hospital bed for every 3,600 people. In spite of government plans,
the gap between rural and urban areas in the availability of medical
facilities and personnel remained wide. During the monsoon season and
other recurrent natural disasters, the already meager services for the
rural population were severely disrupted.
Bangladesh - Medical Education and Training
Economic Policy and Planning
After West Pakistani owners of industrial enterprises fled in 1971,
the government of Bangladesh seized their plants as abandoned
properties. The government suddenly found itself managing and operating
more than 300 medium- and large-scale industrial plants, which
represented nearly 90 percent of the value of all such enterprises in
the new nation. It organized public corporations to oversee the major
industries: jute, textiles, sugar, steel, paper and paperboard,
fertilizer, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, engineering and shipbuilding,
minerals, oil and gas, food and allied products, and forest products.
With government control over major industries and massive inputs of
foreign aid, the economy gradually returned to the levels of the late
1960s, but it was still among the world's poorest and least developed
countries.
The main government institution responsible for coordinating national
rehabilitation and development was the Planning Commission. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the first president of Bangladesh, led the
formation of the national-level Planning Commission, which prepared
plans that directed economic priorities for five-year periods. The First
Five-Year Plan covered the period July 1973 to June 1978. It was
succeeded by a two-year plan, covering the period July 1978 to June
1980, which was followed by a year-long hiatus. The Second Five-Year
Plan (1981-85) and the Third Five-Year Plan (1985-90) put the planning
process back on track. The broad objectives of the Third Five-Year Plan
were to reduce poverty, bring down the rate of population growth to 1.8
percent annually, increase exports by 5.9 percent and domestic savings
by 10 percent, attain self-sufficiency in food production, and realize
an annual growth of the gross domestic product of 5.4 percent. These ambitious goals went well beyond the
previous actual performance of the economy.
Five-year plans are financed through the development, or capital
budget, which was separate from the government's revenue, or
administrative, budget. The Third Five-Year Plan envisaged a total
outlay of more than US$12 billion, approximately 65 percent of which was
destined for public sector projects. About 55 percent of the needed
funds were to come from foreign sources, including private investment,
the aid programs of international financial institutions, and bilateral
donor nations. Foreign commitments in the early and mid-1980s were
around US$1.7 billion per year (exclusive of external private
investment, which in any case was not significant). The portion of the
development budget to come from domestic sources (45 percent)
represented a substantial increase from the 15 to 20 percent of earlier
development budgets.
The Planning Commission translates the multiyear development plan
into public investment through the Annual Development Programme. The
commission also ensures that public programs and policies are in
conformity with its long-term strategy through its project approval
process and through its advisory position on the country's highest
economic decision-making bodies, the National Economic Council and its
Executive Committee. The National Economic Council in the late 1980s was
chaired by the president of Bangladesh and included all government
ministers plus the governor of the Bangladesh Bank and the deputy
chairman and members of the Planning Commission. The Executive Committee
of the National Economic Council made most of the decisions on major
development projects and development issues in general. The committee
included the ministers of key economic sectors (finance, planning,
industries, commerce, and public works) and, according to the agenda,
any other sectors concerned. A third organization involved in the
planning mechanism is the Project Evaluation Committee, which monitors
the progress of five-year-plan programs.
Bangladesh - Government Budget Process
Revenue Budget
The annual budget is prepared by the Ministry of Finance and
presented to Parliament for approval each year, except during periods of
martial law, when the budget has been announced by the martial law
administration. It is divided into a revenue budget and a development
budget, on both the receipts and the expenditures sides.
The revenue budget pays for the normal functioning of the government
and is intended to be fully financed from domestically generated
sources. The fiscal year 1988 revenue budget was based on anticipated receipts of about
US$1.6 billion, or approximately Tk48.9 billion. Expenditures were to be US$1.5 billion, leaving a surplus of
US$130 million for development. The previous year a revenue surplus of
US$246 million was applied to the development budget.
Tax revenues, almost half of them from customs duties, accounted for
about 80 percent of revenue receipts. Excise duties and sales taxes also
were important, each producing more revenue than taxes on income, which
yielded only about US$150 million according to the revised budget in FY
1985. That amount represented less than US$2 per capita income tax. The
largest part of the nontax revenue--making up 20 percent of the revenue
budget in the late 1980s--came from the nationalized sector of the
economy, including industrial enterprises, banks, and insurance
companies.
Even by the standards of developing countries, Bangladesh's ratio of
taxes to GDP, and of direct tax revenue to total tax revenue, was very
low. In 1984 taxes amounted to only 8.1 percent of GDP, just half the
percentage for India, less than half the average for 82 other developing
countries, and far below the average of 29.7 percent for the developed
countries. Similarly, the 20.1 percent of tax revenue coming from direct
taxation was one of the lowest in the world (the average for developing
countries was 29.3 percent, for industrialized countries 34.2 percent).
Most of the population was exempted from direct taxation because its
income fell below the poverty line; the cost of collection probably
would have exceeded the revenue potential. For higher incomes, the
system provided incentives for savings and investment, rather than
seeking to maximize tax revenue. The central government operated on
revenue of less than US$20 per person.
The expenditures side of the revenue budget put the largest single
block of funds into education, totaling 17.3 percent of the FY 1988
budget. Defense spending took 17.2 percent of the budget; if
expenditures for paramilitary forces and the police are added to the
portion for defense, the figure rises to nearly 23.8 percent of the
budget. Debt service, general administration, and health, population,
and social planning each accounted for about 20 percent of expenditures.
Bangladesh - Development Budget
Despite its early concentration on developing a socialist economy,
the government became increasingly open to private investment. The 1974
New Investment Policy restored certain rights to private and foreign
investors. In December 1975, President Ziaur Rahman promulgated the
Revised Investment Policy, which allowed greater private sector activity
and authorized joint ventures with public sector corporations in a
number of previously reserved areas, provided that the government
retained 51 percent ownership. The Dhaka Stock Exchange was reactivated
in 1976, and the Bangladesh Investment Corporation was established the
same year to provide financing for bridge construction and underwriting
facilities to the private sector. Investment ceilings for private
industry were abolished in 1978. Then, in 1980, the government
delineated a more liberal attitude toward foreign direct investment in
the Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act. Growth of
investment nonetheless remained slow, and industry was still dominated
by relatively inefficient public enterprises and governed by an
elaborate system of administrative controls.
In June 1982, the new government of Hussain Muhammad Ershad
introduced its own New Industrial Policy, calling for a significant
increase in private sector activity and denationalization of selected
public sector enterprises. The government transferred 650 industrial
enterprises to private hands, leaving only 160 under public ownership.
In 1986 the government announced a comprehensive revision of its
industrial policy, setting out objectives and strategies to accelerate
the pace of industrialization. The policy also emphasized private and
foreign investment in high technology, export-oriented, and
labor-intensive industries. The revised policy increased the number of
sectors open to private investment, liberalized the tariff structure,
reduced quantitative import restrictions, and furthered privatization of
state-managed enterprises.
The role of the public sector in the late 1980s was limited to seven
fields: arms, ammunition, and sensitive defense equipment; electrical
power generation, transmission, and distribution; management and
exploitation of reserved forests; telecommunications; air, water, and
railroad transportation; atomic energy; and currency note printing and
coin minting. In addition, public sector involvement was still possible,
alone or jointly with private participants, in projects where investment
was not forthcoming from the private sector. The only consistent
moneymakers among public sector industrial corporations were the
Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (Tk248 crore in FY1986; for value of
the crore, the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (Tk18.7
crore), and the Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation
(Tk5.8 crore).
In 1987 an amendment to the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises
(Nationalisation) Ordinance was adopted, providing the legal basis for
plans to sell up to 49 percent of government shares in remaining
nationalized enterprises. The fact that the government would retain the
majority was understood by some as a political gesture to workers and
entrenched management opposed to privatization.
An export processing zone was established officially at the port city
of Chittagong in 1980. But because of political controversy and
indecision surrounding the project from the moment it was proposed, the
Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority did not actually begin
functioning until March 1983, when a program of inducements was offered
to investors opening up enterprises. Zone enterprises enjoyed a tax
holiday of 5 years (10 years for pioneer industries), subsequent rebate
of 50 percent of income tax on export sales, freedom from duties on both
imports and exports, and guaranteed full repatriation of profits and
capital. Additional export processing zones were contemplated for Khulna
and Dhaka.
Bangladesh - Bilateral Investment
The banking system at independence consisted of two branch offices of
the former State Bank of Pakistan and seventeen large commercial banks,
two of which were controlled by Bangladeshi interests and three by
foreigners other than West Pakistanis. There were fourteen smaller
commercial banks. Virtually all banking services were concentrated in
urban areas. The newly independent government immediately designated the
Dhaka branch of the State Bank of Pakistan as the central bank and
renamed it the Bangladesh Bank. The bank was responsible for regulating
currency, controlling credit and monetary policy, and administering
exchange control and the official foreign exchange reserves. The
Bangladesh government initially nationalized the entire domestic banking
system and proceeded to reorganize and rename the various banks.
Foreign-owned banks were permitted to continue doing business in
Bangladesh. The insurance business was also nationalized and became a
source of potential investment funds. Cooperative credit systems and
postal savings offices handled service to small individual and rural
accounts. The new banking system succeeded in establishing reasonably
efficient procedures for managing credit and foreign exchange. The
primary function of the credit system throughout the 1970s was to
finance trade and the public sector, which together absorbed 75 percent
of total advances.
The government's encouragement during the late 1970s and early 1980s
of agricultural development and private industry brought changes in
lending strategies. Managed by the Bangladesh Krishi Bank, a specialized
agricultural banking institution, lending to farmers and fishermen
dramatically expanded. The number of rural bank branches doubled between
1977 and 1985, to more than 3,330. Denationalization and private
industrial growth led the Bangladesh Bank and the World Bank to focus
their lending on the emerging private manufacturing sector. Scheduled
bank advances to private agriculture, as a percentage of sectoral GDP,
rose from 2 percent in FY 1979 to 11 percent in FY 1987, while advances
to private manufacturing rose from 13 percent to 53 percent.
The transformation of finance priorities has brought with it problems
in administration. No sound project-appraisal system was in place to
identify viable borrowers and projects. Lending institutions did not
have adequate autonomy to choose borrowers and projects and were often
instructed by the political authorities. In addition, the incentive
system for the banks stressed disbursements rather than recoveries, and
the accounting and debt collection systems were inadequate to deal with
the problems of loan recovery. It became more common for borrowers to
default on loans than to repay them; the lending system was simply
disbursing grant assistance to private individuals who qualified for
loans more for political than for economic reasons. The rate of recovery
on agricultural loans was only 27 percent in FY 1986, and the rate on
industrial loans was even worse. As a result of this poor showing, major
donors applied pressure to induce the government and banks to take
firmer action to strengthen internal bank management and credit
discipline. As a consequence, recovery rates began to improve in 1987.
The National Commission on Money, Credit, and Banking recommended broad
structural changes in Bangladesh's system of financial intermediation
early in 1987, many of which were built into a three-year compensatory
financing facility signed by Bangladesh with the IMF in February 1987.
One major exception to the management problems of Bangladeshi banks
was the Grameen Bank, begun as a government project in 1976 and
established in 1983 as an independent bank. In the late 1980s, the bank
continued to provide financial resources to the poor on reasonable terms
and to generate productive self-employment without external assistance.
Its customers were landless persons who took small loans for all types
of economic activities, including housing. About 70 percent of the
borrowers were women, who were otherwise not much represented in
institutional finance. Collective rural enterprises also could borrow
from the Grameen Bank for investments in tube wells, rice and oil mills,
and power looms and for leasing land for joint cultivation. The average
loan by the Grameen Bank in the mid-1980s was around Tk2,000 (US$65),
and the maximum was just Tk18,000 (for construction of a tin-roof
house). Repayment terms were 4 percent for rural housing and 8.5 percent
for normal lending operations.
The Grameen Bank extended collateral-free loans to 200,000 landless
people in its first 10 years. Most of its customers had never dealt with
formal lending institutions before. The most remarkable accomplishment
was the phenomenal recovery rate; amid the prevailing pattern of bad
debts throughout the Bangladeshi banking system, only 4 percent of
Grameen Bank loans were overdue. The bank had from the outset applied a
specialized system of intensive credit supervision that set it apart
from others. Its success, though still on a rather small scale, provided
hope that it could continue to grow and that it could be replicated or
adapted to other development-related priorities. The Grameen Bank was
expanding rapidly, planning to have 500 branches throughout the country
by the late 1980s.
Beginning in late 1985, the government pursued a tight monetary
policy aimed at limiting the growth of domestic private credit and
government borrowing from the banking system. The policy was largely
successful in reducing the growth of the money supply and total domestic
credit. Net credit to the government actually declined in FY 1986. The
problem of credit recovery remained a threat to monetary stability,
responsible for serious resource misallocation and harsh inequities.
Although the government had begun effective measures to improve
financial discipline, the draconian contraction of credit availability
contained the risk of inadvertently discouraging new economic activity.
Foreign exchange reserves at the end of FY 1986 were US$476 million,
equivalent to slightly more than 2 months worth of imports. This
represented a 20-percent increase of reserves over the previous year,
largely the result of higher remittances by Bangladeshi workers abroad.
The country also reduced imports by about 10 percent to US$2.4 billion.
Because of Bangladesh's status as a least developed country receiving
concessional loans, private creditors accounted for only about 6 percent
of outstanding public debt. The external public debt was US$6.4 billion,
and annual debt service payments were US$467 million at the end of FY
1986.
Bangladesh - FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Test Case for Development
Independent Bangladesh, from the beginning, has been regarded as a
test case for development by economists, policymakers, and program
administrators of donor countries and international financial
institutions. Interest in the area predated political independence, as
East Pakistan represented the world's most extreme case of population
growth outstripping resources. Because Pakistan was a single country,
project design and approval processes occurred at the national level.
West Pakistan, also poor, appropriated most commodity aid, capital, and
technical and project assistance. The people of East Pakistan considered
the attention they received to be inadequate and inequitable.
In October 1974, the Bangladesh Aid Group was established under the
aegis of the World Bank, with twenty-six participating governments and
institutions. Commitments of the aid group were US$551 million in FY
1974 and US$1.2 billion the following year. Aid to Bangladesh has
remained at a high level since the consortium came into existence,
although with substantial fluctuations in new commitments from year to
year. After the high initial commitments, the figure fell to US$964
million in FY 1976 and to US$744 million the following year, before
turning upward again. Fiscal year 1979 was another breakthrough period,
with new commitments of nearly US$1.8 billion, a figure surpassed 3
years later when the level reached US$1.9 billion, the all-time high
through FY 1987.
In the 1980s, the value of food aid declined to around 11 to 18
percent of new aid commitments, most of it given on a grant basis.
Commodity aid--about 25 percent of aid commitments to Bangladesh --
included key items for increasing productivity, such as fertilizer,
cement, steel, pumps, and other equipment. Project assistance accounted
for more than 50 percent of new commitments. This form of aid was
preferred by the largest donors because their funds are put to work in
well-defined ways that can be related to policy objectives. From the
beginning, the Bangladesh government has been unable to use project
funds at the same rate as they are authorized. As a result, a pipeline
of authorized but undisbursed project funds has grown bigger every year.
The undisbursed project assistance pipeline was expected to exceed US$5
billion in 1988 and to continue to grow after that. Not until the 1990s
at the earliest could Bangladesh hope to begin reducing the backlog of
undisbursed funds.
Disbursement figures did not account for Bangladeshi repayments of
principal and interest on previous loans. In FY 1986, for example,
Bangladesh paid out US$117 million against principal and US$72 million
in interest in connection with earlier aid disbursements. Thus the gross
US$1.3 billion in disbursement of foreign aid that year netted an inflow
of US$1.1 billion. Although these funds were equal to almost 10 percent
of Bangladesh's GDP, they averaged only about US$12 per person, hardly a
scale to bring about dramatic improvement in the economy's performance.
Because much of the funding for the development budget in the
mid-1980s was financed by external donors, the Bangladesh government had
to attract financing for high-priority sectors and projects.
Coordination was carried on at all times between the government and
individual donors, but the keynote each year was a meeting organized by
the World Bank as leader of the Bangladesh Aid Group. At these meetings
Bangladesh's finance minister presented his government's development
plans for the coming year and sought pledges from the major donors for
as much of the Annual Development Programme as possible. The donors also
made presentations at the meeting, including assessments of the
performance of the Bangladesh economy in general and of the development
plans of the government in particular, as background to their views on
the realism and appropriateness of the priorities adopted in the
five-year plan. These meetings, alternating between Washington and
Paris, were the formal culmination of a process that went on year-round.
In the late 1980s, the main coordination point with foreign donors was
the External Resources Division of the Ministry of Finance, which
monitored development projects and administrative and management aspects
of planning.
Bangladesh - Aid Dependence
The United States aid program to independent Bangladesh began even
before the United States formally established diplomatic relations with
the new nation in April 1972. Large quantities of emergency food aid
were sent to help cope with the postwar famine situation. Project
assistance through the United States Agency for International
Development (AID) began in 1973 with a major program of reconstruction
and infrastructure rehabilitation. In the course of time, that emphasis
evolved into economic development focused primarily on three broad
sectors: improved soil fertility, food security, and increased off-farm
employment. By September 1987, United States assistance totaled US$2.8
billion. The United States was the most important donor until the early
1980s when Japanese aid reached similar levels.
Food aid has been a mainstay of the AID program. Through 1987 the
United States provided more than 6.5 million tons of wheat, more than 1
million tons of rice, and some 350,000 tons of edible oil. Since 1979
all such aid has been on a grant basis. The Public Law 480 (PL-480)
program of food and other agricultural commodity assistance has
accounted for half of the dollar value of United States government aid
over the years. In the mid-1980s, the PL-480 program ranged from US$85
million to US$110 million per year. In FY 1986, a high year, the United
States provided 586,000 tons of wheat, 63,000 tons of rice, almost
25,000 tons of edible oil, and 58,000 bales of cotton. Commercially
procured quantities of those commodities by Bangladesh in that period
included 1.12 million tons of wheat, 34,000 tons of rice, 146,000 tons
of edible oil, and 179,000 bales of raw cotton.
The PL-480 program fit into an overall development strategy to
increase agricultural production and provide rural employment. Thus the
wheat provided under Title II in the late 1980s was part of
food-for-work programs, providing payment to workers who upgraded local
footpaths and seasonal roads. The sales proceeds of supplemental PL-480
shipments financed a program of bridge and culvert construction on these
food for work roads.
The commodities shipped under the larger PL-480 Title III program in
the mid-1980s provided support to domestic food production and ensured
that food was available to the most nutritionally disadvantaged
population. Local currency generated from sales financed agricultural
research, irrigation, and employment--projects essential to the
Bangladesh government's goal of national food self-sufficiency--and
increased personal incomes, thereby effectively increasing demand for
food.
Other than food aid, the dollar value of United States development
assistance stabilized between US$75 million and US$85 million annually
in the mid-1980s and declined to US$58.5 million for FY 1988, largely
because of general pressures on the United States budget for foreign
development programs. The long-term trend remained intact, with the cash
value of United States assistance about evenly divided between food aid
and project assistance.
As the "largest poorest" country, and because its
government has been hospitable to foreign assistance, Bangladesh has
been chosen by several of the so-called richer smaller countries as a
country of concentration for their own efforts. Thus, in addition to the
programs of Britain, Japan, and West Germany, significant aid programs
were initiated by Canada, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Australia, and others, in which each country concentrated on areas where
it possessed special expertise.
In the mid-1980s, a number of these donor countries--calling
themselves "the like-minded donors"--jointly studied the trend
of development assistance in Bangladesh. They concluded that the quality
of life in Bangladesh was declining for the vast rural majority, and
they faulted the way the Bangladesh government determined and
administered its development priorities and the way the aid donors
organized and carried out their own assistance programs. They presented
a report to the Bangladesh Aid Group in 1986 suggesting changes in
emphasis in favor of greater concentration on programs responsive to the
deepest needs of the poor: better health care, better nutrition, greater
literacy, a more effective approach to family planning, and greater
economic opportunities for poor and landless farmers and for women.
Although the analysis and conclusions engendered some controversy, the
report influenced the direction of aid efforts by the entire Bangladesh
Aid Group, including the most important donor and the group's founder,
the World Bank.
Economic assistance has come to Bangladesh through the Soviet Union
and East European countries and through oil-producing members of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Much of the aid from these
donors has taken the form of construction, equipment, and training.
Moscow committed US$132 million for aid to Bangladesh immediately after
independence, but disbursement proved to be very slow. In subsequent
years, the Soviets figured prominently in power generation, and as of
the end of 1987 the Soviet Union appeared to have agreed to extend more
aid for power generation, transmission, and distribution and also for
oil exploration.
Although relatively modest in monetary terms, the assistance of
private voluntary organizations from the United States and elsewhere has
also been important. They have offered assistance on a grant basis in
fields where return-on-investment criteria cannot be applied, such as
emergency relief, medical services, and basic education. In addition,
because of their modest scale and insulation from international
politics, these organizations can sometimes venture into activities with
a high degree of social experimentation, sometimes producing models to
be replicated on a larger scale by official development assistance.
Aside from such well-known secular organizations as the International
Red Cross and CARE, most of the private voluntary organizations had
religious affiliations.
Bangladesh - AGRICULTURE
Structure of Agricultural Production
Despite progress toward greater industrialization, in the late 1980s
agriculture still accounted for nearly 50 percent of the value of
Bangladesh's GDP. Approximately 82 percent of the country's population
lived in rural areas, virtually all of them making their living
exclusively or substantially from agriculture. Domestic production increased at a relatively
steady rate in the years following independence, but not fast enough to
close the gap created by the continued rapid growth in population.
According to official statistics, the real value of all crops and of
agricultural production rose every year in the 1980s, but except for a
6.1-percent surge in FY 1981, the gains did not exceed 3.8 percent, and
in 3 of the years it was less than 1 percent. The goal of food
self-sufficiency by 1990 was asserted as part of the Third Five-Year
Plan, but it could be achieved only under optimal conditions. Bangladesh
was still importing an average of 2 million tons of food grains each
year to meet minimum needs for the subsistence of the population. Most
of the imports were on a grant or concessional basis from the United
States, the World Food Programme, or other food aid donors.
The agricultural year begins in late February, when the weather is
dry and getting warmer. Over a period of several weeks each field is
plowed three or four times; using a wooden plow and two oxen, one man
can plow 0.02 hectares in an eight-to ten-hour workday. In addition to
plowing, field preparation for irrigation involves construction and
maintenance of plot boundaries half a meter high, using earth and weeds
from the field. These boundaries also serve to retain water in the plots
when the rains come a few months later. Traditional methods of
irrigation include pitcher, swing basket, and a hollowed-out log fixed
on a pivot and fitted with a counterbalance. These methods have a
natural grace and beauty and are still practiced in rural areas
throughout Bangladesh. They offer the dual advantages of depending
entirely on locally available materials and on human power for their
operation. In those rural areas where electricity is available, tube
wells with electric pumps are becoming an important irrigation device.
Absolute production has increased, and there has been an impressive
diversification into a wide variety of seeds and new crops, such as
wheat and vegetables. In fact, the patterns of agriculture have been
virtually transformed. A previously self-contained and self-reliant
subsistence economy has given way to one dependent on inputs, credit,
markets, and administrative support from outside. But the price has been
high--literally--and in the late 1980s was getting higher. Abu Muhammad
Shajaat Ali, in his study of the agricultural village of Shyampur,
describes the local economy as a "near-saturated
agroecosystem." Continued population pressure has led in many areas
to increases in output- per-unit area, but at very high rates of
diminishing returns to inputs.
Shyampur exemplified the transformation going on in parts of the
rural countryside affected by a modern market economy. The income of
farmers in Shyampur, because of its proximity to Dhaka's high-demand
urban markets, was greater than in more typical villages of Bangladesh.
According to Ali, 31 percent of Shyampur's families in 1980 had a farm
income greater than US$278 (Tk7,500) per year; 40 percent earned between
US$93 and US$278; and the remaining 29 percent earned less than US$93.
Eighty-four percent of farmers were also engaged for at least 100 days
per year in off- farm work in small businesses or industrial
occupations, with 70 percent of them earning between US$75 and US$295
and 23 percent receiving more than that. Virtually all of this
employment was for males. As of 1980, it was rare for village females to
be employed outside the household. The work they did in raising poultry,
cultivating kitchen gardens, husking paddy, collecting fuel, and
assisting neighboring families was not figured into calculations of
income.
The ownership of agricultural land remained one of the most difficult
problems in the Bangladesh countryside. During British rule, elite large
landowners, many of them absentee landowners, owned most of the land in
East Bengal. After 1947 new laws abolished large estates and set limits
on the amount of land one person could own. Many big Hindu landlords
moved to India, but the wealthy Muslims who bought up their holdings
became a new landlord elite. Legal ceilings on landownership resulted in
little extra land for distribution to the poor because landlords
arranged ways to vest ownership in the names of relatives. As a result,
in most villages a few families controlled enough land to live
comfortably and market a surplus for cash, while a large percentage of
families had either no land or not enough to support themselves. Studies
have suggested that in the mid-1980s the richest 10 percent of the
village population controlled between 25 and 50 percent of the land,
while the bottom 60 percent of the population controlled less than 25
percent. The disparities between the richest and poorest villagers
appeared to be widening over time. The large number of landless or
nearly landless peasants reduced the average landholding to only less
than one hectare, down more than a third since 1971. Because Islamic
inheritance law as practiced in Bangladesh calls for equal division of
assets among all the sons, the large population increases led to
increased fragmentation of landholdings and further impoverishment.
Inheritance, purchase, and sale left the land of many families
subdivided into a number of separate plots located in different areas of
the village.
The ready availability of large numbers of poor laborers and the
fragmented character of many landholdings has perpetuated a labor-
intensive style of agriculture and unequal tenancy relations. At least a
third of the households in most villages rent land. The renting
households range from those without any land of their own to those
middle-level peasants who try to supplement the produce grown on their
own land with income from produce grown on additional land.
Sharecropping is the most common form of tenancy agreement. Traditional
sharecropping arrangements heavily favored the landlord over the
sharecropper, with a fifty-fifty split of the produce and the tenant
providing all inputs of labor and fertilizer. After decades of rural
agitation, the 1984 Land Reforms Ordinance finally established the rule
of three shares--one-third of the produce for the owner, one-third for
the sharecropper, and one-third split according to the costs of
cultivation. Poor peasants who could not obtain land as tenants had to
work as agricultural laborers or find nonagricultural jobs. The 1984
Agricultural Labour Ordinance set the minimum daily wage for
agricultural labor at 3.28 kilograms of rice or its cash equivalent.
Employers who broke this rule could be brought to village courts and
forced to pay compensation twice the amount of back wages. However,
because village courts were dominated by landowners, there was still
little official redress for the grievances of agricultural laborers. In
fact, the structure of rural land control kept a great deal of power in
the hands of relatively small groups of landlords.
The Comilla Model, which began in 1959, has been the most successful
and influential example of cooperative agricultural development in
Bangladesh. Projects in Comilla District provided more modern
technologies to farmers: low-lift water pumps; low-cost hand-dug
six-inch tube wells; pilot research on adapting thirty- five-horsepower
tractors for rice cultivation; new crop and animal varieties; testing
and introduction of such inputs as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and
high-yield varieties of seeds; and new storage and processing
technology. These innovations attracted resources to local rural
institutions, against the prevailing urban orientation of the leadership
elite. They provided some counterweight to the trend of ambitious
village people seeking to leave the countryside in favor of the cities
or foreign countries. Comilla, which received substantial assistance
from Michigan State University and the Ford Foundation, remains a widely
admired accomplishment, and the Bangladesh Academy of Rural Development,
which gave broad dissemination to published reports on Comilla's
progress, is world-renowned because of it.
<>Food Crops
Rice
Jute
The importance of one cash crop overshadows all else as the source of
Bangladesh's export earnings. Bangladesh is the world's largest producer
of jute, a fibrous substance used in making burlap, sacks, mats, rope
and twine, and carpet backing. Jute is sold on the international market
either raw or in the form of manufactured goods. This so-called
"golden fiber" is cultivated on the same land as rice; thus
each season farmers must decide which crop to plant.
During the colonial period, when East Bengal was used by the British
to produce primary goods for processing elsewhere, raw jute was the main
product. Calcutta became the manufacturing center where jute was
transformed into twine and rope, sacking material, and carpet backing.
The partition of British India in 1947 put an international boundary
between the source of the basic commodity and the manufacturing center
and imposed a great burden on Pakistan to compensate for the disruption
of the industry that was its greatest source of foreign earnings.
Between 1947 and 1971 jute mills were constructed in East Pakistan, but
industrialization proceeded slowly.
In the 1960s, petroleum-based synthetics entered the market,
competing with jute for practically all of its uses. The upheavals
culminating in the emergence of independent Bangladesh drove many
traditional buyers of jute to shift to synthetics. World trade in jute
and jute goods declined absolutely from 1.8 million tons in 1970 to 1.5
million tons in 1982. Despite some major year-to-year swings, prices
fell precipitously through the mid-1980s. Prices were too low to cover
the costs of production, but the government nonetheless deemed it
essential to subsidize growers and industry and ensure the continued
existence of as large a foreign market as possible. Ironically,
Bangladesh's indispendable foreigh exchange earner was thus itself a
drain on the economy.
There have been enormous year-to-year fluctuations both of producer
prices and of production. An extreme example occurred between FY 1984
and FY 1986. Carry-over stocks had been run down since the previous
production surge in FY 1980, and serious floods in 1984 resulted in
unanticipated production losses. The price doubled to US$600 per ton at
the export level, which triggered the traditional response of farmers;
they planted much more of their land in jute, and between one year and
the next production rose more than 50 percent, from 5.1 million bales in
FY 1985 to 8.6 million bales the following year. History proved true to
itself yet again when export prices then fell by 50 percent at the
export level and by more than 30 percent at the farm-gate level. The
drop would have been even greater had the government not intervened. It
bought 30 percent of the crop through the Bangladesh Jute Corporation
and persuaded private mills to buy more raw jute than justified by their
own projections of demand.
Jute is a highly labor-intensive crop, much more so than rice, but
the yield per hectare is also higher than is generally achieved for
rice. When the farm-gate price for jute is 50 percent higher than the
price for rice, farmers respond by planting more land in jute at the
expense of rice. With the expansion of irrigation facilities in the
1980s, the economic incentives to stick with rice have increased, but
there may be scope for increasing jute production by substituting it for
the low-yield broadcast aus rice grown on unirrigated land
during the same season as jute.
The fact that jute production is so labor intensive has played to
Bangladesh's strength, given the country's large rural underemployment.
Because wage rates in Bangladesh have been lower than in other
jute-producing countries and because Bangladesh has the ideal growing
conditions for jute, the country has benefited from encouraging its
production even when world price and demand projections have offered
bleak prospects. High as Bangladesh's share of world trade has been--in
1985 it amounted to 77 percent of all raw jute trade and 45 percent of
jute goods--there are realistic possibilities for expanding the share
still further. The World Bank has estimated that Bangladesh's share
could rise to 84 percent for raw jute and 55 percent for manufactures.
Jute production appeared in the late 1980s to be an essential part of
the long-term development plan because, for all the troubles and
struggles associated with its planting and marketing, no alternative
activity offered any promise of being more profitable.
Many economists believe the key to preservation of the viability of
jute as an international commodity lies in maintaining price and supply
stability. That has proved a difficult task. Of thirty major primary
commodities traded internationally, only about six have as much price
and supply instability as jute. Demand is highly sensitive to price
increases, but not nearly as sensitive to decreases; once a portion of
the market is lost to synthetics, it is very difficult to win it back
through price competition. For example, in FY 1986 export sales remained
low despite a 35-percent decline in export prices; the fall in world oil
prices had also resulted in declines in the prices of polypropylene
substitutes for jute as well, and most buyers that had switched to
synthetics chose not to return to jute. In the late 1980s, there was
nothing in the offing to arrest the trend of several decades of
decreasing global demand for jute and declines in the value of jute
relative to the goods Bangladesh must import to meet the basic needs of
a desperately poor economy.
The government has an ongoing responsibility to monitor the jute
situation, to intervene when necessary, and to preserve the economic
viability of the commodity responsible for one-third of the nation's
foreign trade earnings. It sets floor prices and becomes the buyer of
last resort. In 1986 buffer-stock operations were extended through the
Bangladesh Jute Corporation and resulted in the government's buying 30
percent of the entire crop. These stocks then become available for use
by the government-owned Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation or for sale to
private mills or overseas customers. But in this case, the limitations
of this government tool were demonstrated the next year, when the jute
crop was of normal volume but the price of raw jute fell a further 35
percent, to the lowest levels in a decade. The government could not
arrest the decline because its financial resources and storage capacity
were already stretched to the breaking point.
Some hope for a better future has been placed in cooperation among
jute-producing countries through the International Jute Organization,
based in Dhaka. Member countries in 1988 were the producing countries of
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, and Thailand and more than
twenty consuming countries, including the United States. The goals of
the fledgling International Jute Organization were appropriately modest
to begin with, centering on better dissemination of basic information,
coordination of agricultural and industrial research and of economic
studies, and steps toward coordination of marketing. It remained to be
seen in mid-1988 whether this poorly financed new organization,
representing the first feeble effort at a coordinated approach to the
problems of jute, would be effective in arresting its long decline as an
important international commodity.
Bangladesh - Forestry Products
THE QUEST FOR REPRESENTATIVE government has been an important feature
of the history of Bangladesh. The independence struggle of the eastern
Bengali peoples against the British, partition from India in 1947, and
secession from Pakistan in 1971 set the stage for the people of
Bangladesh to create a democratic political system. The Constitution, as
it was initially promulgated in 1972, embodied the democratic yearnings
of the long struggle for independence and guaranteed human rights and
political freedoms within a system of checks and balances similar to
those existing in the British and United States governments. But later
events ended these hopes. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), hero of the
1971 war of independence, amended the Constitution and assumed
dictatorial powers. His successors, most of whom were military men who
seized power during various times of trouble, also ruled through
autocratic means. As a result, successive regimes established
single-party systems representing military interests, with the leader
wielding almost absolute power.
Yet the struggle for democracy was still alive in Bangladesh as of
the late 1980s. The single-party system of the 1970s and 1980s was
unable to satisfy the varied political movements and interest groups of
the nation. Opposition parties--although they represented conflicting
views and were as unwilling as the ruling regime to share
power--remained a vital force that commanded the loyalties of a large
proportion of the population.
Socialist and communist parties, centrist parties representing the
policies of defunct regimes, and conservative Islamic parties-- each
with a completely different vision of the path that Bangladesh should
follow but united in their opposition to the rule of President Hussain
Muhammad Ershad--all vied for power in the late 1980s. Their refusal to
participate in parliamentary politics under Ershad, who had seized power
in 1982, relegated the opposition to illegal activities and
demonstrations on campuses and in the streets that periodically brought
economic life to a standstill in urban areas. The ineffectiveness and
confrontational position of the opposition only strengthened the
regime's hold over Parliament and the civil service and allowed the
military to continue its strong autocratic rule.
Remarkably, the policies of Bangladesh's autocratic military rulers
have been characterized by a commitment to democratic ideals and an
adherence to the Constitution. Ershad seized power in the name of the
Constitution, and he sought to legitimize his position by claiming that
he brought stability to the country in order to guarantee democratic
freedom. One of Ershad's most significant moves toward democracy was the
establishment of a system of local elections that allowed voters to
choose members of local representative councils. In the short term, this
democratic reform allowed local elites to control government patronage,
and it also made them docile supporters of the regime. Nevertheless, by
the late 1980s the local councils had become training grounds for new
political leaders and forums for democratic competition throughout the
nation.
Bangladesh has pursued a neutralist policy in international relations
in a continuing effort to secure economic aid from every possible
foreign source. Bangladesh in 1988 was one of the few countries in the
world on good terms with both the United States and the Soviet Union and
their allies and with China, the Islamic world, and most Third World
nations. Bangladesh has played an active role in the United Nations
(UN), the Nonaligned Movement, and other international groupings, and it
was the driving force behind the establishment of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, which offered promise for economic
cooperation. Bangladesh was neutral, but it was forceful on a number of
international issues. The Cambodian, Palestinian, and South African
issues have elicited strong stands from Dhaka, and complicated bilateral
problems with India have invoked intense displays of hostility and
national pride among Bangladeshis in the years since independence.
<>STRUCTURE OF
GOVERNMENT
Constitution
Constitution
The Constitution of Bangladesh has formed the basis for the nation's
political organization since it was adopted on November 4, 1972. Many
abrupt political changes have caused suspension of the Constitution and
have led to amendments in almost every section, including the total
revision of some major provisions. It is notable, however, that every
regime that came to power since 1972 has couched major administrative
changes in terms of the Constitution and has attempted to legitimize
changes by legally amending this basic document.
According to the Constitution, the state has a positive role to play
in reorganizing society in order to create a free and equal citizenry
and provide for the welfare of all. The government is required to ensure
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, and social
security for the people. The government must also build socialism by
implementing programs to "remove social and economic
inequality" and "ensure the equitable distribution of wealth
among citizens." These far-reaching goals represented the
viewpoints of many members of the 1972 Constituent Assembly and the
early Awami League (People's League) government, who were deeply
influenced by socialist ideology. Another sector of public
opinion, however, has always viewed private property and private
enterprise as the heart of social and economic development. This
viewpoint is also part of the constitutional principles of state policy,
which equally recognize state, cooperative, and private forms of
ownership. The Constitution thus mandates a high degree of state
involvement in the establishment of socialism, although it explicitly
preserves a private property system. In practice, the Constitution has
supported a wide range of government policies, ranging from those of the
nationalized, interventionist state of Mujib's time to the increasing
deregulation and reliance on market forces under presidents Ziaur Rahman
(Zia) and Ershad.
The framers of the Constitution, after emerging from a period of
intense repression under Pakistan, took great pains to outline the
fundamental rights of citizens even before describing the government's
structure. According to the section on fundamental rights, all men and
women are equal before the law, without discrimination based on
religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. The Constitution also
guarantees the right to assemble, hold public meetings, and form unions.
Freedom of speech and of the press are ensured. Persons who have been
arrested must be informed of the charges made against them, and they
must be brought before a magistrate within twenty-four hours. The
Constitution, however, adds that these guarantees are subject to
"any reasonable restrictions imposed by law," leaving open the
possibility of an administrative decision to revoke fundamental rights.
Furthermore, there is a provision for "preventive detention"
of up to six months. Those being held under preventive detention do not
have the right to know the charges made against them, nor to appear
before a magistrate, and a legal advisory board may extend this form of
detention after seeing the detainee. The Constitution does not define
the circumstances or the level of authority necessary for the revocation
of constitutional guarantees or for the enforcement of preventive
detention. During the many occasions of civil disorder or public protest
that have marked Bangladeshi political life, the incumbent
administration has often found it useful to suspend rights or jail
opponents without trial in accordance with the Constitution.
The Islamic religion was the driving force behind the creation of
Pakistan, and it has remained an important component of Bangladeshi
ideology. The Constitution as originally framed in 1972 explicitly
described the government of Bangladesh as "secular," but in
1977 an executive proclamation made three changes in wording that did
away with this legacy. The proclamation deleted "secular" and
inserted a phrase stating that a fundamental state principle is
"absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah." The phrase bismillah
ar rahman ar rahim (in the name of Allah, the beneficent, the
merciful) was inserted before the preamble of the Constitution. Another
clause states that the government should "preserve and strengthen
fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic
solidarity." These changes in terminology reflected an overt state
policy aimed at strengthening Islamic culture and religious institutions
as central symbols of nationalism and at reinforcing international ties
with other Islamic nations, including wealthy Arab oil-producing
countries. Domestically, state support for Islam, including recognition
of Islam as the state religion in the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution in June 1988, has not led to official persecution of other
religions. Despite agitation by Jamaat e Islami (Congregation of Islam)
and other conservative parties, there was no official implementation of
sharia (Islamic law) as of mid-1988.
The Constitution is patterned closely on the British and United
States models inasmuch as it includes provisions for independent
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. When it
first came into effect, the Constitution established a Britishstyle
executive, with a prime minister appointed from a parliamentary majority
as the effective authority under a titular president. In 1975 the Fourth
Amendment implemented "Mujibism" (named for Mujib), mandating
a single national party and giving the president effective authority,
subject to the advice of a prime minister. The later governments of Zia
and Ershad preserved the powers of the presidency and strengthened the
office of the chief executive through amendments and their personal
control of the highest office in the land. Because of this concentration
of power in individual leaders, the Bangladeshi Constitution gives much
greater authority to the executive branch than does the United States
Constitution. In fact, the legislature and the courts have few
constitutional avenues for checking presidential power, while the
executive has many tools for dominating the other branches of the
government.
Bangladesh - Legislature
The legislative branch of the government is a unicameral Parliament,
or Jatiyo Sangsad (House of the People), which makes the laws for the
nation. Members of Parliament, who must be at least twenty-five years
old, are directly elected from territorial constituencies. Parliament
sits for a maximum of five years, must meet at least twice a year, and
must meet less than thirty days after election results are declared. The
president calls Parliament into session. The assembly elects a speaker
and a deputy speaker, who chair parliamentary activities. Parliament
also appoints a standing committee, a special committee, a secretariat,
and an ombudsman.
Parliament debates and votes on legislative bills. Decisions are
decided by a majority vote of the 300 members, with the presiding
officer abstaining from voting except to break a tie. A quorum is sixty
members. If Parliament passes a nonmoney bill, it goes to the president;
if he disapproves of the bill, he may return it to Parliament within
fifteen days for renewed debate. If Parliament again passes the bill, it
becomes law. If the president does not return a bill to Parliament
within fifteen days, it automatically becomes law. All money bills
require a presidential recommendation before they can be introduced for
debate in Parliament. Parliament has the ability to reject the national
budget or to delay implementation. It is therefore in the best interests
of the executive as well as the entire nation that budgets submitted to
Parliament should be designed to please the majority of its members. The
legislature is thus a potentially powerful force for enacting laws over
the objections of the president or for blocking presidential financial
initiatives. In practice, however, because most members of Parliament
have been affiliated with the president's party, the legislature has
typically served the interests of the president.
The Bangladeshi and British parliaments have accommodated political
parties in a similar manner. After elections, a single political party
or a coalition of parties must form a government-- that is, they must
form a block of votes within Parliament that guarantees the passage of
bills they may introduce. Once a parliamentary majority is formed, the
president chooses the majority leader as prime minister and appoints
other members of the majority as cabinet ministers. Parliament can
function for a full five-year term if a single party or coalition can
continue to guarantee a majority. If, however, opposition members
attract enough votes to block a bill, the president can dissolve
Parliament and call for new elections. In order to prevent widespread
bribing of members, or the constant defection of members from one party
to another, the Constitution declares that party members who abstain,
vote against their party, or absent themselves lose their seats
immediately. In practice, whenever Parliament has been in session, a
single party affiliated with the president has been able to command a
solid majority.
Bangladesh - Presidency
The government operates courts in the regions, districts, and
subdistricts that make up the local administrative system. The judges in these courts are appointed
by the president through the Ministry of Law and Justice or the Ministry
of Home Affairs. Most cases heard by the court system originate at the
district level, although the newer subdistrict courts experienced an
increased caseload in the late 1980s. Upon appeal, cases may go up to
the Supreme Court, but litigation may be very slow; in 1987 there were
29 Supreme Court judges dealing with 21,600 pending cases. The Supreme
Court, as of June 1988, had permanent benches--called the High Court
Division-- in Dhaka, Comilla, Rangpur, Barisal, Sylhet, Chittagong, and
Jessore. It hears appeals from district courts and may also judge
original cases. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Dhaka
reviews appeals of judgment by the High Court Division. The judges of
both divisions are appointed by the president.
At the grass-roots level, the judicial system begins with village
courts. An aggreived party may make an official petition, which requires
a fee, to the chairman of the union council (the administrative division
above the village), who may call a session of the village court with
himself as chairman and two other judges nominated by each of the
parties to the dispute. The parties may question the impartiality of the
chairman and have him replaced. The majority of cases end at the village
court level, which is inexpensive and which hands down judgments that
reflect local opinion and power alignments. There are occasions,
however, when the union council chairman may reject an official petition
to constitute a village court or when one party desires a higher
opinion. In these cases, the dispute goes to a government court at the
subdistrict level. Cases may wind their way up from district courts to
permanent benches of the High Court Division. Once cases leave the
village courts, they become expensive affairs that may last for years,
and few citizens have the financial resources to fund a lengthy court
battle.
Rapid political changes in independent Bangladesh have compromised
the court system. The Constitution originally stated that the president
could remove members of the Supreme Court only if two-thirds of
Parliament approved, but the Proclamation (Amendment) Order of 1977
included a clause that eliminated the need for parliamentary
involvement. The clause set up the Supreme Judicial Council, consisting
of the chief justice and the next two senior judges. The council may
determine that a judge is not "capable of properly performing the
functions of his office" or is "guilty of gross
misconduct." On their advice, the president may remove any judge.
In addition, executive action has completely eliminated judicial
authority for long periods. For example, under martial law regulations
enacted in 1982, the Supreme Court lost jurisdiction over the protection
of fundamental rights, and all courts operated under provisions of law
promulgated by the chief martial law administrator; special and summary
martial law courts handed down judgments that were not subject to review
by the Supreme Court or any other court. Furthermore, the Fifth
Amendment and the Seventh Amendment placed martial law proclamations and
judgments outside the review of the court system. In these ways, the
courts have been forced to serve the interests of the ruling regime,
rather than standing as an independent branch of government.
Bangladesh - Civil Service
The implementation of government policies and projects is the duty of
the Bangladesh Civil Service, a corps of trained administrators who form
the nation's most influential group of civilians. The importance of the
bureaucracy dates back to the colonial period, when the Indian Civil
Service provided an elite, educated, and dedicated body of professional
administrators. After the partition of India in 1947, when almost all
administrative organs had to be created afresh, both East Pakistan and
West Pakistan heavily relied on the managerial expertise of professional
managers from the old Indian Civil Service. When Bangladesh became
independent in 1971, the members of the civil service who joined the new
nation brought with them the heritage of the colonial system. This
heritage included administrative competence, which proved invaluable in
running a young Bangladesh, and an expectation by the elite of benefits
and power.
In mid-1988 the civil service was composed of twenty-eight separate
services. There were twenty grades, with promotion to higher grades
based on merit and seniority, dependent on annual confidential reports
filed by the individuals' supervisors. Recruitment to the civil service
occurred through open competition within a quota system. Forty percent
of all new positions were allotted on the basis of merit; 30 percent
were reserved for former freedom fighters (Mukti
Bahini), and 20 percent were allotted to women. The
quotas were distributed among districts on the basis of population.
Eligibility depended on an entrance examination, which included English,
Bangla, and mathematics sections, plus a personal interview. The Public
Services Commission, as mandated by the Constitution, conducted the
examinations for the civil service. The recruitment system attempted to
eliminate the entrenched power of the old elites and to decrease the
bias that favored candidates from wealthy, urban families. Although in
the late 1980s it appeared that the new rules for recruitment and
promotion might widen the backgrounds of civil service personnel and
their supervisors, the older, senior members of the service continued to
dominate the administration.
Since independence, membership in the civil service has been one of
the most desirable careers in the country. For senior civil servants,
benefits included government housing at a standard rate of 7.5 percent
of base salary, transportation, medical care, and a pension. Equally
important were the prestige and influence that accompanied an
administrative career. For example, there was great power in directing a
division of a ministerial secretariat in Dhaka, or one of its attached
departments, subordinate offices, or autonomous bodies. Positions in the
countryside were less popular, but the long tradition of bureaucratic
elitism and subservience to government officials made the local
administrator of the civil service an influential person in the
community. In the late 1980s, the centralization of power and influence
within the civil service remained one of the prime targets of
administrative changes designed to decentralize politics and economic
development throughout Bangladesh.
Bangladesh - Local Administration
During the early British period, when modified versions of Mughal
(1526-1858) and earlier administrations were adopted, the closest the
government came to the rural society was the zamindar, an administrator
with concurrent judicial functions, who ensured revenue flows from the
localities to the central government and handled a wide variety of
official business. Government from the top down was the general rule for
the Indian Civil Service and later the Pakistani and early Bangladeshi
civil services. After 1971 the government of Bangladesh saw the benefits
of involving more people in democratic decision-making and development
programs, but the progress of reform was slow. In 1959 General Mohammad
Ayub Khan's government inaugurated a "basic democracies"
program designed to involve villagers in development programs, with
direct elections to union councils and indirect elections to bodies
serving larger administrative units. Mujib's government held elections
for union councils, but the coup of 1975 prevented their effective
functioning. In 1980 Zia's government announced the Self-Sufficient
Village Government Plan, but this project ended when Zia was
assassinated in 1981. In 1982 Ershad appointed the Committee for
Administrative Reorganization/Reforms, which led to the establishment of
the National Implementation Committee for Administrative Reorganization.
These bodies built a comprehensive plan for administrative
decentralization based on the subdistrict.
Bangladesh is divided into four main territorial divisions. In the
late 1980s, the four divisions were divided into twenty-one regions, and
the regions were subdivided into sixty-four districts (zilas).
Below the district level, there were further urban and rural
subdivisions. Urban areas include four municipal corporations (Dhaka,
Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna, each of which included several
municipalities), eightyseven municipalities (pourashavas) and
thirty townships (thanas). The four divisions had the same name
as the four municipal corporations. The countryside had 460 subdistricts
upazilas, which were further divided into 4,401 unions (the
rough equivalent of an urban ward); these, in turn, contained 60,315 mouzas
(groups of two or more villages--about 20 percent of the total) and
single villages (about 80 percent of the total). A further subdivision,
equivalent to the rural mouza, was the mahalla, which
was found in urban areas. Each mouza or mahalla, the
size of which was determined by census data-gathering techniques,
contained about 250 households. An average village in the late 1980s
contained 1,300 to 1,400 people. An average union contained about 15
villages and a population of about 20,000, and an average subdistrict
had 8 to 10 unions with about 200,000 people.
Throughout its history, one of the main challenges to the Bangladeshi
government has been finding ways to involve people in democratic
politics at every administrative level.
According to the decentralization plan in effect in mid-1988, each
rural mouza had its own council (parishad) of elected
representatives chosen by local voters (persons aged eighteen and over).
At the next administrative level, the chairmen of the union councils
were directly elected by voters within their jurisdictions. The
remaining members of the union council were chosen by the mouza
councils, with each member of the union council representing three or
four villages. The chairmen of the union councils formed the voting
membership of the council at the subdistrict level, along with three
appointed women and another appointed member, usually a former freedom
fighter. The chairman of the subdistrict council was directly elected by
subdistrict voters. Thus the people had a direct electoral role at the
village level, and they had a voice in choosing influential chairmen at
the union and subdistrict levels. In the late 1980s, plans called for
the expansion of representation at the district level, and the
controversial District Council (Zila Parishad) Bill of 1987 was the
first step in this direction. By mid-1988, however, these plans had not
been implemented; the region and division levels remained administrative
units of the civil service and had no political significance.
Local participatory politics met the civil service in the subdistrict
council. In the late 1980s, the chief government official in charge of
local projects and development efforts was the subdistrict project
management (upazila nirbahi) officer, who directed a
staff of about 250 technical and administrative officers. Nirbahi
officers were part of the staff appointed by central authorities in
Dhaka, and they received their pay, benefits, and promotion from the
civil service. Their direct supervisors, however, were the subdistrict
council chairmen. The subdistrict councils, through their chairmen, were
expected to make plans for public works and development projects within
their own territories, spend allocated government funds, and direct the
development activities of nirbahi officers and their staff. Nirbahi
officers and other subdistrict technical personnel were allowed to
participate in subdistrict council meetings, but only as nonvoting
members. Civil service members, heirs of a long tradition of elite
government, took orders from subdistrict council chairmen because the
latter wrote the annual evaluations of nirbahi officers which
served as the basis for promotion within the civil service. In this way,
elected representatives of the people at the local level exercised
direct control over civil servants and government projects in their own
area.
In the late 1980s, the administrative apparatus at the urban level
was comprised of a governing council with an elected chairman, elected
commissioners (no more than 10 percent of whom were women), and several
ex officio members. A mayor and deputy mayors were elected from among
the council members.
The decentralization scheme implemented under Ershad's government was
the most ambitious attempt in the history of Bangladesh to bring
responsible government to the local level. The system officially began
with elections in 1983 for four-year terms to union councils and with
elections in 1984 for three-year terms to subdistrict councils. However,
there were major problems with this scheme of decentralized
administration. First, the electoral system tended to represent only the
wealthiest and most influential members of society. These persons made
decisions that strengthened their own patronage networks and influence
at the local level; the poorest strata in society had little direct
voice in elected committees. Second, the subdistrict councils were
designed to create and implement development activities in their areas,
but they were typically slow to draft five-year plans or carry through
broad-based development efforts. Most of their projects emphasized
construction or public works, (e.g., school buildings or irrigation
canals, and they sometimes neglected the personnel and training
components necessary for social involvement. Third, civil service
members have long lacked respect for local politicians, looking to their
own advancement from their supervisors in Dhaka. They have often been
slow to cooperate with elected members of local committees. For example,
although the subdistrict council chairman was responsible for writing
the nirbahi officer's annual evaluation, the officer was
expected to submit the evaluation form to the subdistrict council
chairman, and in many cases these forms did not appear, thus preventing
the chairmen from exercising control. Finally, the entire system of
decentralized politics was viewed by opposition politicians as a
patronage network designed to attract local elites to the party of the
regime in power. Observers tended to conclude that instead of furthering
decentralized democracy, the system only strengthened the national party
controlled from Dhaka.
Bangladesh - THE ERSHAD PERIOD
Achieving Stability, 1982-83
On March 24, 1982, the army chief of staff, Lieutenant General
Hussain Muhammad Ershad, seized control of the government in a military
coup. He proclaimed martial law, made himself chief martial law
administrator, and dismantled the structures of democratic government
that the administration of the late president Zia had carefully built
during the previous five years. Ershad suspended the Constitution,
disbanded Parliament, prohibited all political activities, and deprived
the president, vice president, and cabinet ministers of their offices.
Three days after the coup, Supreme Court justice Abdul Fazal Muhammad
Ahsanuddin Chowdhury became interim president. Ershad became chief
minister of a new cabinet, and by December 1983 he had officially taken
over the presidency. He declared that he expected a return to democratic
rule in about two years. In fact, martial law lasted until November
1986.
Ershad cited as reasons for his coup the growing corruption and
inefficiency of the civilian government dominated by the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party. After the assassination of President Zia as part of a
local military rebellion in Chittagong in May 1981, the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party fell into conflicting factions that could not be
controlled by Zia's successor, President Abdus Sattar. Without Zia at
the helm, the powerful leaders of the military distrusted Sattar's
civilian government. Thus, because the major political forces in the
country could not cooperate with each other, there was no resistance to
Ershad's takeover. After establishing control of the country, he had
three main priorities for bringing political chaos to an end and for
governing Bangladesh. His goals were to act against corruption and
reorganize the administrative apparatus in order to implement overdue
reforms, stand as a strong centralizing force while keeping his civilian
opponents at bay, and placate the military so as to prevent further coup
attempts. Through mid-1988 Ershad proved remarkably capable at
accomplishing these goals, and he had become the longest ruling
political leader in the history of independent Bangladesh.
During his tenure as chief martial law administrator, Ershad divided
the country into five martial law zones, each headed by a handpicked
senior army officer. Twenty-four special and summary martial law courts
directly involved the military in local administration. Although the
civilian court system continued to function, violations of martial law
ordinances were handled by these extraconstitutional martial law
tribunals, where active-duty military officers met in secret sessions to
try cases ranging from violations of press censorship to vaguely defined
"antisocial activities." Those convicted of political crimes
had no right of appeal, and defendants were tried in absentia. Martial
law deprived the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over the protection
of fundamental rights, and criticism of martial law was punishable by up
to seven years' imprisonment.
Ershad moved forcibly to end corruption and reorganize the
government. Several hundred politicians, including six former cabinet
ministers, were jailed on charges of corruption. Ershad announced that
one of his highest priorities was a reorganization of the government in
order to decentralize decision making and development projects. In order
to outline procedures for this decentralization project, he appointed
the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reforms, which
instituted sweeping changes in local administration. The Land Reforms
Ordinance of 1984 granted important rights to tenants for the first time
in the history of Bangladesh, and a new plan for the divestment of
government industries promised to move the country away from socialism.
Ershad built on Zia's earlier platform of advocating an increased role
for Islam in the culture and politics of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh - Emerging Opposition, 1983-86
Ershad had a clear political stage for about a year after the coup
because of his severe repression of opposition parties and because of
intense factional fighting within all major political groupings. By early 1983, however, a pattern of
confrontation politics had emerged. This pattern dominated the public
life of Bangladesh until the late 1980s. Paradoxically, the government's
Islamic policies provided a common cause for the first large anti-Ershad
demonstrations. A proposed education program was designed to introduce
English and Arabic as compulsory subjects in primary and secondary
schools. This touched sensitive nationalist nerves, especially among
university students, who saw it as a threat to the Bangla language. Several of Ershad's speeches favoring
a stronger Islamic movement provoked riots on university campuses, which
escalated into battles between students and police on February 14 and
15, 1983. Although the government imposed a curfew and closed the
universities, the student movement stirred the opposition into more
unified coalitions.
Dozens of political parties existed in Bangladesh during the 1980s,
but the two major opposition parties to Ershad's rule were the Awami
League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The Awami League, which originated in 1949 and
emerged preeminent at the beginning of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's era,
gradually united around the leadership of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, Mujib's
eldest daughter. A fifteen-party
alliance led by the Awami League began to act in unison during 1983. The
leadership of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party fell to Begum Khaleda
Zia, the widow of President Zia, and the party became the center of a
seven-party alliance distinct from the one led by the Awami League. The
two major alliances distrusted each other intensely, but they formed the
heart of a larger thirty-two-party front, comprising socialist,
communist, and Islamic groups, called the Movement for the Restoration
of Democracy. This movement adopted a five-point program demanding an
end to martial law, restoration of fundamental rights, parliamentary
elections, release of political prisoners, and the trial of persons
responsible for police brutality in the February student protests. The
opposition alliances successfully engineered two general strikes in
November 1983, the second resulting in widespread violence and hundreds
of casualties among demonstrators and security personnel.
Political events for the next several years revolved around attempts
by the Ershad government to move from a military dictatorship to a
civilian government with the cooperation of the political opposition.
Ershad's program called for local elections at the union and subdistrict
levels, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections, while a
national party supporting the government would integrate all political
groups in the same way the Bangladesh Nationalist Party had functioned
during Zia's regime. Ershad relaxed the ban on political activities in
January 1984 and repeatedly called for dialogue with opposition parties,
but the major opposition alliances adamantly refused to cooperate while
martial law remained in effect. The government held elections for union
and municipal councils between December 1983 and February 1984, but
repeated public demonstrations by opposition parties forced the
cancellation of subdistrict and parliamentary elections. A rising
crescendo of violence and civil disobedience led Ershad to reimpose
harsh martial law restrictions in March 1985 and to put under house
arrest Hasina, Khaleda Zia, and other opposition leaders. The
government-sponsored party, Jana Dal (People's Party), had been formed
in November 1983, but it had little chance to become organized before
the new ban on political activity went into effect.
In 1985 the government went ahead with a "civilianization"
program without the participation of the opposition parties. With
martial law being fully enforced, a referendum was held on March 21,
asking voters: "Do you support the policies of President Ershad,
and do you want him to continue to run this administration until a
civilian government is formed through elections?" The official
count of "yes" votes amounted to 32,539,264, while
"no" votes totaled 1,290,217. The opposition had organized a
general strike on referendum day and subsequently claimed that the
results were fraudulent. In May the government conducted subdistrict
council elections. Run on a nonparty, nationwide basis, the elections
featured 2,300 candidates competing for 458 seats as council chairmen.
Keen local contests occurred amid widespread violence and claims of
fraud by the opposition. After these elections, the government released
Hasina, Khaleda Zia, and the other opposition leaders from house arrest,
and on October 1 it canceled the ban on indoor meetings and rallies of
political parties. Meanwhile, the pro-government Jana Dal became the
leading component of the new Jatiyo Party (National Party), which
featured members who had played prominent roles in Ershad's cabinet. By
late 1985, the stage had been set for parliamentary elections. Despite
constant opposition party pressure, Ershad's regime had used its control
over the government and the military to maneuver the country toward
civilian rule.
Bangladesh - Relaxation of Martial Law, 1986-87
In March 1986, Ershad removed military commanders from key civil
posts and abolished martial law offices and more than 150 military
courts in an attempt to ease martial law restrictions. Because these
moves satisfied some of the demands of the opposition, an eight-party
alliance comprising the Awami League and some smaller parties agreed to
participate in parliamentary elections. However, the seven-party
alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted the May 1986
elections, and according to the opposition parties the elections were
marred by extensive fraud, including overt support for Jatiyo Party
candidates by Ershad and other government officials, theft of ballot
boxes, and beatings of opposition party workers. Official figures
claimed the turnout at the polls was between 45 and 50 percent of the
electorate, but other observers estimated that only 10 to 30 percent
participated. The elections gave the Jatiyo Party an absolute majority
of 153 seats in Parliament; its close ally, the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal
(National Socialist Party), took 7 seats. The Awami League gained
seventy-six seats, the Jamaat e Islami took ten seats, and a number of
smaller parties and independents won a total of fifty-four seats. All
thirty seats reserved for women went to supporters of the Jatiyo Party,
giving Ershad's supporters a comfortable majority.
With Parliament under his control, Ershad proceeded with plans for a
presidential election. He resigned as army chief of staff in August 1986
but remained chief martial law administrator and commander in chief of
the armed forces. He officially joined the Jatiyo Party in September,
was elected its chairman, and became the party's candidate for
president. The opposition parties did everything in their power to block
these moves, claiming that the trappings of a democratic process were a
sham while martial law was in effect. Awami League members of Parliament
refused to attend its opening session, and in July Parliament adjourned
for an indefinite period. Leftist parties and the alliances led by the
Awami League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and Jamaat e Islami
boycotted the elections and organized widespread demonstrations, leading
to the jailing of many opposition leaders and the house arrest of Hasina
and Khaleda Zia. Yet the opposition's tactics did not prevent the
successful completion of the presidential election in October. Ershad
easily defeated 11 other candidates, officially obtaining 22 million
votes (84 percent) of the electorate. Opposition parties again claimed
that the election results were fraudulent, and they asserted that only 3
percent of the electorate had cast ballots.
Firmly in control of a civilian government as well as the military
establishment, Ershad took steps to legitimize his rule of the previous
four years. He summoned Parliament into session on November 10, 1986, to
consider a seventh amendment to the Constitution, which would ratify his
assumption of power in 1982 and all subsequent actions of his martial
law administration. The opposition again took to the streets in protest.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamaat e Islami, and a leftist
five-party alliance led a general strike on November 10. The Awami
League, demanding the lifting of martial law, boycotted Parliament and
instead held a "parallel parliament" on the stairs of
Parliament House. Inside, the 223 representatives present for the
session voted unanimously in favor of the Seventh Amendment, and hours
later Ershad announced in a national address the withdrawal of martial
law and the full restoration of the Constitution. Prime Minister Mizanur
Rahman Chowdhury proclaimed these events a "glorious chapter,"
but Hasina described them as a "black chapter" in Bangladesh's
history.
In early 1987, it appeared that Ershad had outmaneuvered his
opponents and made the transition to a civilian leadership. The
opposition was in disarray. By the time Awami League had decided to
participate in Parliament in 1986, its coalition had shrunk from fifteen
to eight parties. As a result, it had lost any opportunities it might
have had for immediate cooperation with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
and other parties, and it forfeited its claims to moral leadership in
the fight against Ershad's regime. The rift between the Awami League and
other opposition parties widened during the first half of 1987. For
example, the newspapers were full of reports of the insults exchanged
between Hasina and other opposition leaders. Ershad took advantage of
the situation by convening Parliament in June to consider measures to
consolidate his regime further. The most controversial measure was the
District Council (Zila Parishad) Bill. This act expanded representative
government by allowing elected representatives (members of Parliament
and chairmen of subdistrict and municipality councils) to sit on
district councils, but it also made provision for members of the
military to participate as nonvoting members. The opposition viewed this
move as an attempt to install the armed forces in the administration of
the country on a permanent basis, thus favoring Ershad and his military
supporters. The furor raised by the District Council (Zila Parishad)
Bill grew into a storm that reunited the opposition and seriously
destabilized Ershad's government from mid-1987 to mid-1988.
Bangladesh - More Opposition Pressure
Opposition alliances began public protests against the District
Council Amendment Bill in June 1987. The five-party alliance implemented
a half-day general strike in Dhaka on June 23. A week later, another
half-day general strike supported by the parliamentary opposition
paralyzed most cities and towns. Nevertheless, on July 12, 1987, the
Jatiyo Party majority in Parliament passed the bill. Two days of strikes
and public demonstrations followed. Ershad, responding to opposition
pressure, sent the bill back to Parliament for
"reconsideration." The opposition, realizing that its disunity
would allow Ershad to strengthen his hold over the country, intensified
its street demonstrations, and its leaders made moves toward greater
cooperation against the government. The opposition parties called for
Ershad's immediate resignation and new elections under a caretaker
government. On July 24, the longest general strike in Bangladesh's
history, a 54-hour campaign led by the Workers-Employees United Council
(Sramik Karmachari Oikkiya Parishad), ended after 11 people were killed
and 700 injured in street violence between demonstrators and security
forces. In October the Workers-Employees United Council led another
lengthy strike. The strike lasted for forty-eight hours and ended on
October 21.
By the fall of 1987, political events had come to a head. Extensive
flooding from heavy monsoon season rains led to widespread misery in the
countryside and intense criticism of the government's relief efforts. Hasina and Khaleda Zia met on October 28, signaling a new
phase of cooperation between the two leading opposition coalitions. A
liaison committee of the eight-, seven-, and five-party alliances was
formed to coordinate the moves of the opposition. The "final
showdown," known as the Siege of Dhaka, occurred between November
10 and 12, when the opposition parties brought thousands of supporters
into the streets. The government was well prepared for the
confrontation, arresting Hasina, Khaleda Zia, and other leaders and
sending thousands of security personnel into urban areas to control
demonstrations.
Extensive security measures prevented a complete breakdown of public
order, and after a week Dhaka was again under control. However,
continuing agitation prevented a return to normal life throughout the
country, leading Ershad to declare a state of emergency, with familiar
restrictions on civil rights, on November 27. The opposition's tactics
had shaken the government, but street violence and civil disobedience
proved unable to dislodge Ershad's regime.
On December 6, 1987, Ershad dissolved Parliament, which had not met
since July. According to the Constitution, he was required to arrange
for new elections within ninety days. Also scheduled for early 1988 were
elections for union councils and for municipal officials in Dhaka,
Chittagong, Khulna, and Rajshahi. These elections were occasions for
further public agitation by the political opposition. In early January,
five smaller parties joined the opposition coalition, which then
implemented a two-day general strike on January 20 and 21. Another
general strike occurred on February 6, coinciding with the last date for
filing nominations for the municipal elections. On February 13 and 14,
following the union council elections, the opposition held another
general strike. None of these actions prevented the government from
implementing its election plans, but they kept the nation in a state of
constant protest; the opposition may have hoped that Ershad's supporters
in the military would eventually view him as a political liability and
force him to resign.
The elections for union councils on February 10, 1988, were
particularly hard fought, and they became a major security problem for
the government. There were 115,000 candidates vying for 44,000 positions
at 20,000 polling stations throughout the country. Widespread violence
marred the elections. The official count listed 85 dead and about 500
injured, although opposition figures claimed 150 had been killed and up
to 8,000 had been wounded in street battles between demonstrators and
security forces. Election violence forced re-voting at 5,500 polling
centers in early April, bringing another round of violence that left 4
dead and 100 more injured.
After the union council elections, the government deployed numerous
police and paramilitary personnel and army troops for the parliamentary
elections held on March 3, 1988. Schools were closed March 1-5, and a
public holiday was declared during the two days before the elections.
The Awami League's eight-party coalition, the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party's seven-party coalition, the leftist five-party coalition, and
Jamaat e Islami led a general opposition boycott. There were 1,168
candidates competing for the 300 seats. The Jatiyo Party won 251 seats,
and the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, a close ally of the Jatiyo Party in the
preceding Parliament, won 21 seats. Other small parties and independents
took only 27 seats. The opposition again claimed a very small voter
turnout in these elections--about 1 percent--while the government
claimed a 50 percent turnout.
Ershad's style of democracy--which did not include the participation
of the opposition--had weathered a long political storm. On April 12,
1988, he lifted the state of emergency, and Parliament duly convened on
April 25 amid another general strike. Ershad took the occasion of his
opening speech to Parliament to advocate Islam as the state religion.
This call grew from Ershad's long-term commitment to Islam as an
integral part of state ideology, but it also brought his party's
position closer to that of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamaat e
Islami, and smaller fundamentalist parties. Again Ershad appeared to be
making overtures for a reconciliation with part of the opposition. On
June 7, 1988, Parliament, dominated by the Jatiyo Party, passed the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, making Islam the state religion
and setting up six permanent high court benches outside Dhaka. The
parliamentary opposition voted against the measure, and a general strike
paralyzed Dhaka.
After six years in power, Ershad could look back on a series of major
personal achievements. He had reconciled differences in the armed forces
and prevented further military coups, efficiently managed international
diplomacy and aid programs, and guided the country through a period of
modest economic growth. He served as chief executive of Bangladesh for a
longer period than any leader since independence and, in doing so,
brought a sense of stability to the nation. However, Ershad had also
kept opposition politicians from sharing power, and although he
engineered the change from direct military rule to a civilian
government, he made no progress in reconciling the political opposition
to his regime. Despite the trappings of a democratic system, the
government remained a structure for one-man rule, with a packed
Parliament, a handpicked judicial system, and questionable election
practices. The opposition conducted its politics in the streets and
refused to grant any legitimacy to Ershad. Stability depended on
Ershad's personal survival and his ability to keep street politics under
control.
Bangladesh - POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Local Elites
For the vast majority of Bangladeshis, politics revolves around the
institutions of the village or the union of neighboring villages.
Traditionally, the main base for political influence in rural areas has
been landownership. During the British colonial period, zamindars
controlled huge estates as if they were their personal kingdoms. With
the abolition of zamindar tenure in 1950, a new local elite of rich
Muslim peasants developed. The members of the new elite owned far less
land than the zamindars had once possessed, but they were able to feed
their families well, sell surplus produce, send their children to
school, and form new links with the bureaucracy of East Pakistan and
later Bangladesh. Amid the large majority of poor and generally
illiterate peasants, well-to-do farmers formed a new rural leadership
that dominated local affairs.
Village society is often divided into a number of factions that
follow the lines of kinship. At the center of each faction is a family
that owns more land than most of the other villagers. In the colonial
and Pakistani periods, local leaders were old men, but the trend since
independence is for younger men to head factions as well. The heart of
the local elder's authority is his control over land and the ability to
provide land or employment to poorer villagers, who are often his kin.
Land control may be an ancient prerogative, stretching back to the
zamindars, or it may be the result of gradual purchases since
independence. A village may have only one faction, but typically there
will be several factions within the village, each competing for
influence over villagers and struggling for resources from local
administrative and development offices.
The leaders of local factions exercise their influence in village
courts and as managers of village affairs with other administrative
units. The traditional means for resolving local disputes is through the
village court, which comprises leaders of village factions and other
members of union councils. Throughout Bangladesh, village courts address
the vast majority of disputes, but it is rare for the courts to decide
in favor of a poor peasant over a rich peasant, or for the weaker
faction over the stronger. The relative security of village leaders
makes it possible for some of their children to attend secondary
schools, or even colleges or universities; some factions also base much
of their authority on their knowledge of sharia. Education is much
esteemed in Bangladesh, and degrees are tickets to highly prized
government positions or to urban jobs that give the involved families a
cosmopolitan outlook. These contacts outside the village include
necessary links with bureaucratic institutions that ultimately bring
economic aid and patronage jobs to the village. In these ways, the
factional leadership of the village provides vital links to the
development process, while retaining its traditional position at the top
of village society.
Local leaders who control land, people, and education also tend to
control the disbursement of rural credit and development funds through
their positions in union and subdistrict government. Studies of the
leadership of union council members have demonstrated this dominance of
local elites over rural political and economic life. Among the chairmen
of union councils in 1984, over 60 percent owned more than 3 hectares of
land, with an average of almost 8 hectares. Sixty percent were primarily
engaged in agriculture, 30 percent were businessmen, and 75 percent had
a marketable surplus each year. Eighty percent had incomes greater than
TK40,000 per year, and 50 percent had incomes greater than Tk100,000.
Almost all union council leaders took part in village courts as judges,
and most were heavily involved in the support of local mosques and madrasa
(religious school attached to a mosque) committees. For victorious
campaigns for union council chairmanships, winners spent an average of
more than Tk1 million in 1978; most of them mobilized at least 25 people
for their campaigns, and 20 percent mobilized between 200 and 2,000
supporters. In 1978 only 7 percent of the chairmen of union councils had
college degrees, but the percentage of graduates had increased to 50
percent by 1984.
Political elites were more varied in urban environments. The
metropolitan areas of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, and Rajshahi had large
numbers of conflicting constituencies and political machines linked to
national parties. In smaller cities and towns serving as district and
subdistrict administrative centers, some leaders emerged directly from
the local social system, whereas others became politically established
as a result of their professional activities. Members of the government
bureaucracy and the military, for example, form an important part of a
district town's leadership, but they typically have roots, and
connections to land, in other parts of the country. Members of the
permanent local elite, such as businessmen, union leaders, lawyers, or
religious figures, are more concerned with strictly local issues and
have strong support from family networks stretching into the nearby
countryside. One of the outstanding characteristics of the urban
leadership is its relatively short history. In the late 1980s, it was
clear that many had emerged from middle-class or rich peasant
backgrounds since 1947 or, in many cases, since 1971. Most retained
close links with their rural relatives, either locally or elsewhere.
Urban elites included professional politicians of national parties, and
the entire social group that made up the urban leadership--military,
professional, administrative, religious, and business
personnel--interacted in a hotbed of national politics.
Bangladesh - The National Party
One of the most salient characteristics of Bangladeshi politics has
been the drive toward the concentration of power in a single party
headed by a strong executive. This process began in 1975 when the Awami
League, even with a huge mandate from the people, proved incapable of
governing the country, prompting Mujib to form a monolithic national
party, the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants,
Workers, and People's League). After Zia consolidated his military
dictatorship, he formed his own Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which took
control of Parliament and attracted opportunistic politicians from the
opposition to a strong, centrist platform. Ershad's regime followed
Zia's model, with martial law succeeded by the formation of a centrist
party-- the Jatiyo Party--and the orchestration of a civilian government
supporting a strong executive. Each time a new
national party came to power, it banished the opposition into illegal
status or manipulated the administrative machinery for its own
advantage, driving the opposition into the streets. Parliamentary
elections mirrored this process. The Awami League, which was dominant in
the early 1970s, progressively moved to the periphery of the electoral
process in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, despite continuing
support for its programs from large segments of the population. The same
fate was in store for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which thrived
while Zia lived but was reduced to boycotting the electoral process
after 1981. The Jatiyo Party, created by Ershad and his colleagues,
became stronger over time as it attracted increasing numbers of
politicians. This process continued into the late 1980s because the
strong executive, who controlled the country's administration, media,
and security forces, was able to keep opposition parties off balance
with a "carrot and stick" strategy.
The party in power periodically offered attractive government posts
to opposition leaders in return for political loyalty or neutrality.
During the presidencies of Zia and Ershad, the number of cabinet
positions steadily expanded, as potentially influential politicians
received rewards for cooperating with the party in power. Before
elections, or at about the time of major parliamentary votes, newspapers
have carried stories about entire labor unions or blocs of opposition
workers who joined the president's party. Reverse currents were observed
in the mid-1980s, as individual leaders fell from favor and lost their
cabinet posts or else left the national party to form their own
political factions, but the overall trend was toward a steady increase
in the membership and influence of the dominant party.
Ershad, following the example of Zia's Self-Sufficient Village
Government Plan, used administrative decentralization to allocate
resources to the grass-roots level, bypassing the local opposition party
apparatus and providing a strong incentive for leaders at the village
level to support his party. This strategy isolated the opposition
parties in urban areas, while the national party disbursed patronage in
rural areas. The local elites were opportunistic, changing their
affiliations in order to obtain the largest amount of aid for their
constituencies. A study of union council chairmen after the 1984
elections revealed that 38 percent had changed party affiliations within
the previous 10 years; 53 percent supported the Jana Dal, which had been
in existence for 12 months, while only 19 percent supported the Awami
League and 8 percent backed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. In the
1985 subdistrict elections, after the Jana Dal had existed for 2 years,
207 of 460 chairmen supported Ershad's party, and the Jana Dal exercised
political control over 44 percent of the nation's districts. This was
notable progress for a party with a program essentially the same as that
of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (the party in total control only
five years earlier), which controlled only 34 (7.4 percent) of the
subdistrict chairmanships. The Awami League, which had dominated the
nation 10 years earlier, controlled only 53 (11.5 percent) of the
chairmanships.
Military support has been a crucial component of the success of the
national party. In the 1970s, observers were unwilling to predict the
actions of the military because it was torn by internal divisions
between freedom fighters and returnees from West Pakistan, political
groups of the far left and the right, and factional infighting among
leftist factions. Zia moved to stabilize the military through a purge of
unreliable personnel, more than 1,100 of whom were executed, and through
steady progress in professionalizing the services, incorporating
elements from both freedom fighters and returnees. The strong trend
under Zia and Ershad away from the Awami League and the Soviet Union
decreased communist and Maoist influences, which had been very strong
during the 1970s. By the 1980s, it appeared that military officers were
the most interested in adequate financial support for the armed forces
and limitation of civilian political turmoil. The slow expansion of the
military and the opportunity for military leaders to gain administrative
positions under Ershad convinced potential military rivals that he
represented their interests. Ershad at first followed up on his promises
to include the military in civil administration through legislative
means, but when he later backed away from the District Council Bill,
there were no major stirrings within the military. A more difficult
challenge was the Siege of Dhaka in late 1987, with massive street
violence, but again the military did not act. Apparently, Ershad and his
Jatiyo Party were able to keep political disorder within bounds
acceptable to the military leadership.
Bangladesh - Party Politics
One of the most effective means for the ruling political party to
control the nation was through manipulation of the news media. In the
1980s, the government's National Broadcasting Authority monopolized
telecommunications within the country. Thus the party that controlled
the government effectively decided the content of the country's
broadcasts. Until the early 1980s, the government also ran a number of
daily and weekly newspapers. Such newspapers printed the ruling party's
version of the news. As part of Ershad's policy of divesting
government-owned properties, however, these official sources of
propaganda were removed from government control, thus ending a legacy
left over from the Mujib period. Each major political party in the late
1980s had one or more newspapers that supported it, and each used its
own newspapers to publish its official views.
Bengali society has the longest tradition of freedom of the press in
South Asia, and its dozens of weekly and daily newspapers, press
associations, and publishers guarantee that almost any opinion finds
expression. Ruling regimes have countered this independence by
exercising press censorship. Repression of the media has varied from
banning certain publications for extended periods of time to officially
pressuring publishers to regulate the content of news articles. For
example, the English-language Bangladesh Observer was banned
for three months in 1987, and the weekly Banglar Bani (Bengal's
Message) was banned through much of 1987 and 1988. The weekly Joyjatra
(Victory March) was banned in February 1988 for publishing
"objectionable comments" referring to the possibility of
Ershad's resignation. In 1988 the government closed the Dainik
Khabor (Daily News) for ten weeks under the Special Powers Act of
1974 because the newspaper had released an article with a map making
Bangladesh look like part of India, thus inflicting "injury to the
independence and sovereignty of the country." In addition, the
operations of the British Broadcasting Corporation were banned under the
Special Powers Act from December 14, 1987, to May 2, 1988, and one of
its correspondents was jailed for allegedly having manufactured
"continuing hostile and tendentious propaganda."
Bangladeshi journalists are unionized, and they sometimes strike back
at government censorship. During the 1988 parliamentary elections,
journalists staged a walkout to protest attempts by the government's
Press Information Department to restrict news and photographic coverage
of election violence and opposition demonstrations. The continuing
struggle between the press and the government regularly kept at least
six newspapers on the list of banned publications in the late 1980s.
With a 29-percent literacy rate, newspapers and journals are not
widely read in Bangladesh. For example, despite the publication of 62
daily newspapers, only 22 percent of all urban households in 1982
reported regularly reading them; a dismal 2.5 percent was reported for
rural areas.
Both Radio Bangladesh and Bangladesh Television were established in
1971, and both came under state control in 1972. In 1984 they merged to
form the National Broadcasting Authority. In 1988 the twelve home
service stations and twelve FM stations of Radio Bangladesh offered a
total of eighty-five hours of daily programming. Radio Bangladesh also
transmitted to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Western
Europe via its shortwave station at Dhaka. Seven and one-half hours of
daily programming were broadcast in six languages: Bangla, English,
Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, and Nepali. The television service operated two
channels, with eight and one-half hours of daily programming, relayed by
twelve stations for reception throughout the country. However, outside
Dhaka the number of television sets was very small, and television was
not yet a significant medium when compared with radio, press, and
word-of-mouth communications. Statistics from the early 1980s indicated
that about 29 percent of the country's urban households had radios, and
only 6.7 percent had television sets. In the countryside, broadcast
communications were even less available: 13 percent of all rural
households had radios, and only 0.2 percent had televisions.
Bangladesh - FOREIGN POLICY
India
Relations between Bangladesh and India have often been difficult.
There was considerable hostility on both sides of the border when East
Pakistan was established in 1947 in the midst of intense communal
struggles among various ethnic groups. As part of Pakistan, East
Pakistan was at war with India in 1947 and 1948 and again in 1965.
During the 1971 war of independence, Bangladeshi freedom fighters were
aided by India, but the country's distrust of its giant neighbor
reemerged as soon as the fighting ended. In general, a considerable body
of Bangladeshi public opinion has viewed India as a bully, throwing its
weight around and threatening the sovereignty of its smaller neighbors.
The fact that the two nations are so closely intertwined--with 2,400
kilometers of border, common river systems, and numerous transborder
cultural or economic contacts--has provided numerous opportunities for
bilateral disputes that often reinforce Bangladeshi fears. Conversely,
the fact that the two countries are so closely interconnected has
sometimes forced them to come to terms with each other, and as of
mid-1988 bilateral problems had not escalated into a major armed
conflict. Indeed, relations between Bangladesh and India have been
diplomatically proper, with a trend toward increasing cordiality and
cooperation over time.
Mujib's government, which lasted from 1971 to 1975, owed a large debt
to India for aid to Bangladesh during its independence struggle, and
relations were initially positive. In March 1972, the Indo-Bangladeshi
Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship, and Peace pledged each nation to
consultations if either were attacked. This was an important safeguard
for the new nation, but critics have pointed out that the treaty does
not specify the external threats to either nation, suggesting the
possibility that India could use the treaty as an excuse for
intervention in Bangladesh. The series of coups that replaced Mujib's
government brought bilateral relations to their lowest level and led
many Bangladeshis to fear Indian intervention. The Indian government,
then controlled by Indira Gandhi's Indian National Congress, looked with
misgivings on the anti-Indian and anti-Soviet stance of the new military
regimes. For several years, pro-Mujib guerrilla forces operating along
the Indian border reportedly received covert support from Indian
sources. In 1977, however, Gandhi's government fell, the new Janata
Party leadership took a more accommodating stance toward Bangladesh, and
Zia's government stabilized. Indian forces cooperated with the
Bangladesh military in disarming Bangladeshi rebels in the summer of
1977, and a number of bilateral agreements were signed shortly
thereafter. When Gandhi again became prime minister in 1979, she
continued a policy of accommodation with Zia's regime. Subsequently, she
recognized Ershad's government, and she met with Ershad in October 1982.
After Gandhi's assassination in 1984, her son and successor as prime
minister, Rajiv Gandhi, encouraged cooperative agreements with
Bangladesh and enjoyed a good relationship with Ershad.
Events during the 1980s suggested the prospect of a new era in
Indo-Bangladeshi relations. In 1981 both countries drew up the
Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation. In 1982 the first
meeting of the Joint Economic Commission was held, and in 1987 the
bilateral Cultural and Exchange Programme was renewed for two years. A
bilateral trade pact was extended from 1986 until October 1989. In
addition, an inland trade and transit protocol, allowing Indian vessels
to pass through Bangladesh, exemplified a maturing cooperative
relationship, necessitated by Bangladesh's geographical position. The
original protocol was signed in November 1972, renewed in 1984, and
extended in 1986 on a quarterly basis. The agreement was later
renegotiated and, according to its provisions, stayed effective until
October 1989. India agreed to pay transit charges and port fees, while
Bangladesh agreed to maintain its own waterways. The ability of both
governments to compromise on economic issues boded well for the
possibility of future bilateral agreements.
Despite considerable progress in expanding contacts between the two
countries, a number of serious issues concerning river waters and
borders continued to stir up anti-Indian emotions in Bangladesh during
the late 1980s. These issues involved national honor and
sovereignty--strongly charged topics in both nations--and progress
toward resolving them was extremely slow. Every delay in resolving
bilateral problems provided fuel for a steady stream of anti-Indian
editorials in the Bangladeshi press and for statements by political
parties of all persuasions condemning Indian foreign policy. The most
difficult long-term bilateral problems revolved around water disputes.
These problems surfaced during the 1950s and 1960s, when the major
Indian port of Calcutta on the Hooghli River experienced siltation
problems. The Indian government decided that the solution was to divert
the Ganges River water into the Hooghli River during the dry season,
from January to June, in order to flush out the accumulating silt. By
1974 the Indians had built a major barrage, or dam, across the Ganges at
Farakka, near the Bangladeshi border. Before the Farakka Barrage went
into operation, the Bangladeshi government repeatedly expressed concern
that the diversion would adversely affect water resources along the
course of the Ganges through Bangladesh. After the Farakka Barrage began
operating in 1975, dry-season water levels dropped precipitously in
western Bangladesh, and studies showed that salinized water from the
Indian Ocean was creeping inland. In 1976, despite Indian opposition,
Bangladesh managed to place the dispute on the agenda of the UN General
Assembly; this strategy resulted in a consensus statement in which both
parties agreed to resolve the issue according to international law.
A bilateral agreement signed in 1977 set up a schedule for sharing
the dry-season flow of water controlled by the Farakka Barrage, and it
arranged for continuing consultations by the Joint Rivers Commission.
The mandate of the commission was to monitor the water availability and
needs of the two countries and to study proposals for a more
comprehensive plan for water control in Bangladesh and northeast India.
A Bangladeshi proposal concentrated on the enormous potential of
untapped rivers in Nepal; dams there, it was argued, could provide
adequate hydroelectric power well into the twenty-first century and
regulate water levels throughout northeastern India and Bangladesh. The
Indian proposal concentrated on controlling the wild Brahmaputra River
and called for a major canal to divert water from the Brahmaputra to the
Ganges, west of the Farakka Barrage; this, the Indians claimed, would
help to regulate water levels throughout Bangladesh. India was slow to
involve Nepal in what it viewed as a bilateral issue, while Bangladesh
refused to agree to the construction of a large canal that would
obliterate valuable land and dislocate hundreds of thousands of people.
In the absence of an agreement on a comprehensive plan, the two nations
were forced to renew previous agreements on the flow of the Ganges at
Farakka for periods of six months or two years at a time. In 1986,
however, Indian negotiators invited Nepali officials to tripartite
planning conferences, opening up the possibility of a future agreement.
Water-sharing disputes have arisen with regard to other rivers as
well. India has constructed and operated on the Tista River a barrage
similar to the one on the Ganges. India and Bangladesh drew up interim
agreements on the sharing of Tista River waters beginning in July 1983.
These agreements were renewed in 1985 and 1987, without a final
allocation of waters to either party.
In 1974 the borders between India and Bangladesh were settled in a
treaty that became the Third Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution.
Since that time, questions over small pieces of territory not covered by
the 1974 treaty--such as silt-formed islands (chars) that have
emerged in frontier waters and Bangladeshi enclaves accessible only from
India--have grown into minor military confrontations.
In the late 1980s, the unauthorized movement of people across
Indo-Bangladeshi borders continued to cause tensions. In 1979 two days
of communal rioting in the Indian state of West Bengal forced 20,000
Indian Muslims to flee into Kushtia District in Bangladesh. Although
they were later repatriated, the incident rekindled transborder communal
hatreds. During the 1980s, attempts by Bangladesh military and
paramilitary forces to pacify tribal groups in the Chittagong Hills
forced thousands of Chakmas to flee into Indian territory. Bangladesh
accused India of sheltering tribal guerrilla forces and preventing the
voluntary return of the Chakmas. India, in turn, accused Bangladesh of
harboring guerrilla bands of the Tripura National Volunteers, a
secessionist organization fighting for independence from India. A more
significant long-term movement of people across the Indo-Bangladeshi
border has involved thousands of Bangladeshis who have illegally moved
to neighboring Indian states in search of land and employment. By 1982
the steady influx of Bangla speakers sparked a major ethnic backlash in
the Indian state of Assam, leading to the slaughter of thousands of
non-Assamese. In order to placate Assamese public opinion, the
governments of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi promised to stem illegal
immigration, and in order to do so India constructed barbed-wire fencing
along the Indo-Bangladeshi border in the area. The fence was seen as an
outrage among the Bangladeshi public, and the government of Bangladesh
has made repeated protests to the Indian government over the matter.
Bangladesh - Pakistan
Pakistan was hostile to Bangladesh in the early 1970s, but by 1974 it
was apparent that the new nation would stand on its own, and in February
Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. Diplomatic relations were established in
January 1976, followed by the reestablishment of communications and
transportation links later in the year. As Bangladesh subsequently
adopted a cooler stance toward India, began to move closer to China and
the West, and stressed its Islamic cultural heritage, its interests
became increasingly similar to those of Pakistan.
Throughout the 1980s, Bangladesh consistently supported Pakistan's
policy of opposing Soviet actions in Afghanistan. In 1983 Pakistan's
foreign minister signaled the end of an era of animosity when he visited
Bangladesh's National Martyrs' Monument at Savar, near Dhaka, which
commemorates those killed by Pakistan's armed forces during the war of
independence. Pakistan's president Mohammad Zia ul Haq later presented
Ershad with the country's highest civil award during the Bangladeshi
president's visit to Islamabad in 1986.
After the establishment of diplomatic ties, Bangladesh and Pakistan
entered into a wide variety of bilateral agreements. A 1979 cultural
agreement arranged for the exchange of teachers, scholars, musicians,
folklore troupes, art works, films, and books. Joint economic,
commercial, and technical pacts signed after 1978 provided for the
exchange of major exports of both countries: jute and tea from
Bangladesh, and cotton and cloth from Pakistan.
Two major areas of disagreement remained between Bangladesh and
Pakistan as of mid-1988, and both stemmed from the dislocations
resulting from the independence struggle. The first issue concerned the
finances of united Pakistan. After the war, Bangladesh claimed that it
deserved a share of the US$4 billion worth of preindependence exchange,
bank credit, and movable assets protected in West Pakistan during the
war. In a 1975 agreement, Bangladesh accepted half of Pakistan's
pre-1971 external debt, but assetsharing issues remained unresolved. The
second issue concerned the emigration of large numbers of people, mostly
Biharis (non-Bengali Muslims), to Pakistan. After the war, the
International Red Cross registered nearly 540,000 people who wanted to
emigrate to Pakistan. By 1982 about 127,000 had been repatriated,
leaving about 250,000 people still demanding repatriation. Thousands of
people who desired to emigrate lived in poor conditions in so-called
"Pakistani Relief Camps," where they received monthly food
allotments. In 1985 there was some progress in this area when Zia ul Haq
agreed to accept the "stranded Pakistanis." In 1986 Pakistan
arranged for their immigration as soon as Ribatat al Alam al Islami
(Union of the Islamic World), a voluntary organization based in Saudi
Arabia, could mobilize sufficient funds.
Bangladesh - China and Other Asian Nations
In the immediate aftermath of the war of independence, the Muslim
nations of the world mourned the blow to the sundered Pakistan, an
avowedly Islamic state. For several years thereafter, Pakistan
threatened to cut off diplomatic relations with nations that recognized
Bangladesh, thus discouraging other Muslim states from helping the new
nation. Mujib's socialist policies were not in tune with the viewpoints
of most Muslim states, especially the conservative Arab states of the
Middle East. Malaysia and Indonesia recognized Bangladesh in 1972, and
after Pakistan did so in 1974, other Muslim countries eventually granted
recognition and provided aid. The growing role of Islam in Bangladesh,
symbolized by the adoption in 1988 of a constitutional amendment
recognizing it as the state religion, indicated a major effort to widen
ties with the Islamic world.
Bilateral ties between Bangladesh and the oil-rich Arab states were
becoming increasingly important in the mid- and late 1980s. These ties
had both economic and political components. The Arab states, especially
Saudi Arabia, had become a growing source of development funds (mostly
loans) since 1975, with much of the aid channeled into Islamic education
and culture. The Saudis donated money for the construction of an Islamic
university, mosques, and other religious centers, and Bangladesh
exported labor to several Middle Eastern countries.
Politically, Bangladesh supported the international policies of the
Islamic nations of the Middle East. For example, Bangladesh strongly
condemned Israeli policies and favored the creation of a Palestinian
state. It supported the Palestine Liberation Organization under the
leadership of Yasir Arafat, whose visit to Bangladesh in 1987 elicited a
warm welcome from Ershad and other major government figures, as well as
favorable press coverage. In 1987 the government reported that 8,000
Bangladeshi youths had volunteered to fight for the Palestine Liberation
Organization. The government of Bangladesh, however, had made no
official moves to send arms or personnel to Palestine as of mid-1988.
Bangladesh has expanded its ties with the worldwide Islamic community
through the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a group of
forty-five Muslim countries and eleven other nations with Muslim
minorities. Bangladesh became a member of the conference in February
1974 and thereafter played a prominent role in setting up economic
programs. The sixth annual meeting of the Islamic Development Bank and
the Islamic Finance Ministers' Conference were held in Dhaka in 1985. In
addition, Ershad attended the 1987 meeting of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference in Kuwait, where nineteen Bangladeshi economic
initiatives were accepted as joint ventures. Bangladesh was also part of
a three-member committee trying to mediate an end to the Iran-Iraq War,
and Ershad made several trips to the Middle East in an attempt to
achieve peace.
Bangladesh - The Superpowers
After Pakistan and China entered into friendlier relations with
Bangladesh in 1974, the way was open for its admission into the UN in
September of that year. In 1978 Bangladesh was elected to a twoyear term
on the Security Council, and during this period it took strong stands,
reiterated on many occasions, concerning Vietnam's involvement in
Cambodia, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Israeli policies in the
Middle East, the Iran-Iraq War, and apartheid in South Africa.
Bangladesh was elected as a member of the Security Council's Human
Rights Commission in 1985 and as president of the forty-first session of
the UN General Assembly (1986-87). In 1987 Ershad received the UN
Population Award on behalf of his government.
Before its formal admission into the UN, Bangladesh had been admitted
to all of its specialized agencies, and after formally joining the world
body, it adopted a high profile in these agencies. The Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) has operated projects in Bangladesh since
1975, in areas ranging from irrigation to rubber production to mangrove
afforestation. Bangladesh became a member of the forty-nine-member FAO
Council in 1977, served on the FAO's Finance Committee from 1975 to
1979, and has participated in a number of FAO commissions. It was
elected vice chairman of the FAO in November 1987. Representatives of
Bangladesh also have participated in various specialized UN conferences.
Bangladesh joined the Commonwealth of Nations in 1972--a move that
prompted Pakistan to withdraw from the organization--and has remained
prominent at its meetings ever since. Along with other South Asian
members of the Commonwealth, Bangladesh has used its meetings to push
for sanctions against apartheid and South African's occupation of
Namibia, and it has even offered military training facilities to
anti-South African guerrillas.
Keenly aware of his nation's economic problems and observing the
benefits of regional economic cooperation in Western Europe, Zia began
to seek opportunities for multilateral development among the nations of
South Asia in 1977. In 1981 the foreign secretaries of the seven nations
of South Asia met in Sri Lanka to set up the basic framework of a
regional development organization that was formally founded in New Delhi
in August 1983. With continuous effort by Bangladeshi diplomats, these
preliminary steps culminated in December 1986 in the first summit
conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), which was convened in Dhaka. The choice of this site was in
recognition of Bangladesh's crucial role in forming the SAARC.
Subsequent summits in Bangalore, India, in 1986 and in Kathmandu, Nepal,
in 1987 established the SAARC as a functioning international body.
The agenda of the SAARC specifically removes bilateral issues and
political programs from the organization's debates, confining committee
and summit discussions to areas where member nations may find common
ground for achieving mutual economic benefit. However, no large-scale
economic projects had emerged from SAARC discussions as of mid-1988.
Because many of the most difficult economic problems in South Asia
involve long-standing political differences at the bilateral level (for
example, Bangladesh's Ganges water dispute with India), the SAARC has
not been an effective mechanism for solving problems. Nevertheless,
through the mid- and late 1980s, the SAARC's summits have provided its
members with a forum in which to exchange ideas and positions and
discuss bilateral issues.
Bangladesh's presence in the Nonaligned Movement has provided it with
an international reputation as a voice of moderation and compromise.
Bangladesh's prime minister, Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, was elected vice
chairman of the Nonaligned Movement summit held in Havana in 1986. This
international reputation served Bangladesh well in courting the goodwill
of potentially hostile neighbors and attracting economic aid from donor
countries with diverse political systems. Although the Ershad regime was
politically repugnant to many opposition leaders and was looked at
critically by some foreign governments, the regime had brought a new
sense of stability to Bangladesh as it made a tenuous transition to
civilian rule in the late 1980s.
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CITATION: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. The Country Studies Series. Published 1988-1999.
Please note: This text comes from the Country Studies Program, formerly the Army Area Handbook Program. The Country Studies Series presents a description and analysis of the historical setting and the social, economic, political, and national security systems and institutions of countries throughout the world.
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