AFTER THIRTEEN YEARS of guerrilla warfare, Angola finally escaped
from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, but with few of the resources
needed to govern an independent nation. When an effort to form a
coalition government comprising three liberation movements failed, a
civil war ensued. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(Movimento Popular de Liberta��o de Angola -- MPLA) emerged from the
civil war to proclaim a Marxist-Leninist one-party state. The strongest
of the disenfranchised movements, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (Uni�o Nacional para a Independ�ncia Total de
Angola -- UNITA), continued to battle for another thirteen years,
shifting the focus of its opposition from the colonial power to the MPLA
government. In late 1988, the social and economic disorder resulting
from a quarter-century of violence had a pervasive effect on both
individual lives and national politics.
Angola's 1975 Constitution, revised in 1976 and 1980, ratifies the
socialist revolution but also guarantees some rights of private
ownership. The ruling party, renamed the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de Liberta��o
de Angola-Partido de Trabalho--MPLA-PT) in 1977, claimed the power of
the state. Although formally subordinate to the party, the government
consolidated substantial power in its executive branch. The president
was head of the MPLA-PT, the government, the military, and most
important bodies within the party and the government. In his first nine
years in office (1979-88), President Jos� Eduardo dos Santos further
strengthened the presidency, broadening the influence of a small circle
of advisers and resisting pressure to concentrate more power within the
MPLA-PT. His primary goal was economic development rather than
ideological rigor, but at the same time dos Santos considered the
MPLA-PT the best vehicle for building a unified, prosperous nation.
Among the first actions taken by the MPLA-PT was its conversion into
a vanguard party to lead in the transformation to socialism. Throughout
the 1980s, the MPLA-PT faced the daunting task of mobilizing the
nation's peasants, most of whom were concerned with basic survival,
subsistence farming, and avoiding the destruction of the ongoing civil
war. Only a small minority of Angolans were party members, but even this
group was torn by internal disputes. Factional divisions were drawn
primarily along racial and ideological lines, but under dos Santos
influence within the MPLAPT gradually shifted from mesti�o to black African leadership and from party ideologues to
relative political moderates.
Mass organizations were affiliated with the party in accordance with
Marxist-Leninist dogma. In the face of continued insurgent warfare and
deteriorating living standards, however, many social leaders chafed at
party discipline and bureaucratic controls. Dos Santos worked to build
party loyalty and to respond to these tensions, primarily by attempting
to improve the material rewards of Marxist-Leninist state building. His
greatest obstacle, however, was the destabilizing effect of UNITA and
its South African sponsors; Angola's role as a victim of South Africa's
destructive regional policies was central to its international image
during the 1980s.
In December 1988, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba reached a
long-sought accord that promised to improve Luanda's relations with
Pretoria. The primary goals of the United States-brokered talks were to
end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and remove Cuba's
massive military presence from Angola. Vital economic assistance from
the United States was a corollary benefit of the peace process,
conditioned on Cuba's withdrawal and the MPLA-PT's rapprochement with
UNITA. Despite doubts about the intentions of all three parties to the
accord, international hopes for peace in southwestern Africa were high.
<>BACKGROUND
Political units in southwestern Africa evolved into complex
structures long before the arrival of the first Portuguese traveler,
Diogo C o, in 1483. The Bantu-speaking and Khoisan- speaking hunters the
Portuguese encountered were descendants of those who had peopled most of
the region for centuries. Pastoral and agricultural villages and
kingdoms had also arisen in the northern and central plateaus. One of
the largest of these, the Kongo Kingdom, provided the earliest
resistance to Portuguese domination. The Bakongo (people of Kongo) and their southern
neighbors, the Mbundu, used the advantage of their large population and
centralized organization to exploit their weaker neighbors for the
European slave trade.
To facilitate nineteenth-century policies emphasizing the extraction
of mineral and agricultural resources, colonial officials reorganized
villages and designed transportation routes to expedite marketing these
resources. Colonial policy also encouraged interracial marriage but
discouraged education among Africans, and the resulting racially and
culturally stratified population included people of mixed ancestry (mesti�os),
educated Angolans (assimilados who identified with Portuguese cultural values, and the
majority of the African population that remained uneducated and
unassimilated ind�genas. Opportunities for economic advancement were apportioned
according to racial stereotypes, and even in the 1960s schools were
admitting barely more than 2 percent of the school-age African
population each year.
Portugal resisted demands for political independence long after other
European colonial powers had relinquished direct control of their
African possessions. After unsuccessfully seeking support from the
United Nations (UN) in 1959, educated Luandans organized a number of
resistance groups based on ethnic and regional loyalties. By the
mid-1970s, four independence movements vied with one another for
leadership of the emerging nation.
The MPLA, established by mesti�os and educated workers in
Luanda, drew its support from urban areas and the Mbundu population that
surrounded the capital city. The Union of Peoples of Northern Angola
(Uni�o das Popula��es do Norte de Angola -- UPNA) was founded to
defend Bakongo interests. The UPNA soon dropped its northern emphasis
and became the Union of Angolan Peoples (Uni�o das Popula��es de
Angola -- UPA) in an attempt to broaden its ethnic constituency,
although it rebuffed consolidation attempts by other associations. The
UPA, in turn, formed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(Frente Nacional de Liberta��o de Angola -- FNLA) in 1962, when it
merged with other northern dissident groups.
A variety of interpretations of Marxist philosophy emerged during the
1950s and 1960s, a period when Western nations refused to pressure
Portugal (a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--NATO) to
upgrade political life in its colonies. The Portuguese Communist Party
(Partido Comunista Portugu�s--PCP) helped organize African students in
Lisbon and encouraged them to press for independence. A campaign of
arrests and forced exile crushed most Angolan nationalist leadership,
but in Portugal underground antifascist groups were gaining strength,
and Angolan liberation movements flourished. The MPLA established its
headquarters in L�opoldville, Belgian Congo (present-day Kinshasa,
Zaire), and in 1962, after a period of exile and imprisonment, Agostinho
Neto became head of the MPLA.
Neto, a physician, poet, and philosopher, strengthened the MPLA's
left-wing reputation with his rhetorical blend of socialist ideology and
humanist values. He also led the group in protests against enforced
cotton cultivation, discriminatory labor policies, and colonial rule in
general. MPLA and UPA leaders agreed to cooperate, but long-standing
animosities led members of these two groups to sabotage each other's
efforts. Within the MPLA, leadership factions opposed each other on
ideological grounds and policy issues, but with guidance from the Soviet
Union they resolved most of their disputes by concentrating power in
their high command. Soviet military assistance also increased in
response to the growing commitment to building a socialist state.
In April 1974, the Portuguese army overthrew the regime in Lisbon,
and its successor began dismantling Portugal's colonial empire. In
November 1974, Lisbon agreed to grant independence. However, after
centuries of colonial neglect, Angola's African population was poorly
prepared for self-government: there were few educated or trained leaders
and almost none with national experience. Angola's liberation armies
contested control of the new nation, and the coalition established by
the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 quickly disintegrated.
Events in Angola in 1975 were catastrophic. Major factors that
contributed to the violence that dogged Angola's political development
for over a decade were the incursions into northern Angola by the United
States-backed and Zairian-backed FNLA; an influx of Cuban advisers and,
later, troops providing the MPLA with training and combat support; South
African incursions in the south; UNITA attacks in the east and south,
some with direct troop support from Pretoria; and dramatic increases in
Soviet mat�riel and other assistance to the MPLA. Accounts of the
sequence of these critical events differed over the next decade and a
half, but most observers agreed that by the end of 1975 Angola was
effectively embroiled in a civil war and that growing Soviet, Cuban,
South African, and United States involvement in that war made peace
difficult to achieve.
International recognition came slowly to the MPLA, which controlled
only the northern third of the nation by December 1975. A small number
of former Portuguese states and Soviet allies recognized the regime, and
Nigeria led the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in granting
recognition. The FNLA and UNITA attempted unsuccessfully to establish a
rival government in the Angolan town of Huambo, but no one outside
Angola recognized their regime. By the end of 1976, Angola was a member
of the UN and was recognized by most other African states, but its
domestic legitimacy remained in question.
MPLA leader Neto had avoided ideological labels during the struggle
for independence, although the MPLA never concealed the Marxist bias of
some of its members. Neto viewed Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy as a means
of unifying and organizing Angola's diverse society and of establishing
agricultural growth as the basis for economic development. He also hoped
to avoid disenfranchising urban workers or encouraging the growth of a
rural bourgeoisie, while maintaining crucial military support from the
Soviet Union and Cuba.
One of the MPLA's many slogans, "people's power" (poder
popular), had won broad support for the group before independence,
especially in Luanda, where neighborhood self-help groups were formed to
defend residents of poor and working-class neighborhoods against armed
banditry. This movement was quickly curtailed by the police, but
people's power remained a popular symbol of the demand for political
participation. After independence, despite constitutional guarantees of
people's power, the slogan became a symbol of unrealized expectations.
President Neto, despite his democratic ideals, quickly developed an
autocratic governing style. He introduced austerity measures and
productivity campaigns and countered the resulting popular discontent
with an array of security and intelligence operations.
Industrial workers, who were among the first to organize for people's
power, found their newly formed unions absorbed into the MPLA-controlled
National Union of Angolan Workers (Uni�o Nacional dos Trabalhadores
Angolanos--UNTA), and the party began to absorb other popular
organizations into the party structure. Students, laborers, and peasant
farmers agitated against what they perceived as a mesti�o-dominated
political elite, and this resentment, even within the ranks of the MPLA
itself, culminated in an abortive coup attempt led by the former
minister of interior, Nito Alves, in May 1977.
In the aftermath of the 1977 Nitista coup attempt, the MPLA redefined
the rules for party membership. After the First Party Congress in
December 1977 affirmed the Central Committee's decision to proclaim its
allegiance to Marxist-Leninist ideals, the MPLA officially became a
"workers' party" and added "-PT" (for "Partido
de Trabalho") to its acronym. In 1978 its leaders began a purge of
party cadres, announcing a "rectification campaign" to correct
policies that had allowed the Nitista factions and other
"demagogic" tendencies to develop. The MPLA-PT reduced its
numbers from more than 100,000 to about 31,000, dropping members the
party perceived as lacking dedication to the socialist revolution. Most
of those purged were farmers or educated mesti�os, especially
those whose attitudes were considered "petit bourgeois." Urban
workers, in contrast to rural peasants, were admitted to the MPLA-PT in
fairly large numbers.
By the end of the 1970s, the ruling party was smaller, more unified,
and more powerful, but it had lost standing in rural areas, and its
strongest support still came from those it was attempting to
purge--educated mesti�os and assimilados. Progress
was hampered by losses in membership, trade, and resources resulting
from emigration and nearly two decades of warfare. The MPLA-PT attempted
to impose austerity measures to cope with these losses, but in the
bitter atmosphere engendered by the purges of the late 1970s, these
policies further damaged MPLA-PT legitimacy. Pursuing the socialist
revolution was not particularly important in non-Mbundu rural areas, in
part because of the persistent impression that mesti�os
dominated the governing elite. National politicians claimed economic
privilege and allowed corruption to flourish in state institutions,
adding to the challenges faced by dos Santos, who became MPLA-PT leader
in 1979.
Angola - STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
The Constitution
Adopted in November 1975, independent Angola's first and only
Constitution dedicates the new republic to eliminating the vestiges of
Portuguese colonialism. The Constitution provides numerous guarantees of
individual freedom and prohibits discrimination based on color, race,
ethnic identity, sex, place of birth, religion, level of education, and
economic or social status. The Constitution also promises freedom of
expression and assembly.
Constitutional revisions in 1976 and 1980 more clearly establish the
national goal of a revolutionary socialist, one-party state. As revised,
the Constitution vests sovereignty in the Angolan people, guaranteed
through the representation of the party, and promises to implement
"people's power." It also emphasizes the preeminence of the
party as policy-making body and makes the government subordinate to it.
Government officials are responsible for implementing party policy.
Economic development is founded on socialist models of cooperative
ownership.
Other constitutional guarantees include health care, access to
education, and state assistance in childhood, motherhood, disability,
and old age. In return for these sweeping guarantees, each individual is
responsible for participating in the nation's defense, voting in
official elections, serving in public office if appointed or elected,
working (which is considered both a right and a duty), and generally
aiding in the socialist transformation.
Despite its strong socialist tone, the Constitution guarantees the
protection of private property and private business activity within
limits set by the state. National economic goals are to develop
agriculture and industry, establish just social relations in all sectors
of production, foster the growth of the public sector and cooperatives,
and implement a system of graduated direct taxation. Social goals
include combating illiteracy, promoting the development of education and
a national culture, and enforcing strict separation of church and state,
with official respect for all religions.
The Constitution also outlines Angola's defense policy. It explicitly
prohibits foreign military bases on Angolan soil or affiliation with any
foreign military organization. It institutionalizes the People's Armed
Forces for the Liberation of Angola (For�as Armadas Populares de
Liberta��o de Angola -- FAPLA) as the nation's army and assigns it
responsibility for defense and national reconstruction. Military
conscription applies to both men and women over the age of eighteen.
Angola - Executive Branch
In late 1988, the Council of Ministers comprised twenty-one ministers
and ministers of state. The seventeen ministerial portfolios included
agriculture, construction, defense, domestic and foreign trade,
education, finance, fisheries, foreign relations, health, industry,
interior, justice, labor and social security, petroleum and energy,
planning, state security, and transport and communications. Ministers
were empowered to prepare the national budget and to make laws by
decree, under authority designated by the national legislature, the
People's Assembly, but most of the ministers' time was spent
administering policy set by the MPLA-PT.
In February 1986, dos Santos appointed four ministers of state (who
came to be known as "superministers") and assigned them
responsibility for coordinating the activities of the Council of
Ministers. Their portfolios were for the productive sphere; economic and
social spheres; inspection and control; and town planning, housing, and
water. Twelve ministries were placed under superministry oversight; the
ministers of defense, foreign relations, interior, justice, and state
security continued to report directly to the president. This change was
part of an effort to coordinate policy, reduce overlapping
responsibilities, eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, and
bolster the government's reputation for efficiency in general. Most
ministers and three of the four ministers of state were also high
officials in the MPLA-PT, and their policy-making influence was
exercised through the party rather than through the government.
Defense and Security Council
In May 1986, the president appointed eight respected advisers to the
Defense and Security Council, including the ministers of defense,
interior, and state security; the ministers of state for the economic
and social spheres, inspection and control, and the productive sphere;
the FAPLA chief of the general staff; and the MPLA-PT Central Committee
secretary for ideology, information, and culture. The president chaired
the council and gave it a broad mandate, including oversight and
administration in military, economic, and diplomatic affairs. He
strengthened this authority during the council's first five years by
treating the council as an inner circle of close advisers. By 1988 the
Defense and Security Council and the Political Bureau, both chaired by
the president, were the most powerful decision-making bodies within the
government and party, respectively.
Angola - Legislative Branch
Background
During the 1960s, the MPLA established its headquarters at Kinshasa,
Zaire, and then at Lusaka, Zambia, and Brazzaville, Congo. The MPLA's
scattered bases and diverse constituent groups contributed to disunity
and disorganization, problems that were exacerbated by personal and
ideological differences among party leaders. The first serious split
occurred in 1973, when Daniel Chipenda led a rebellion, sometimes termed
the Eastern Revolt, in protest against the party's mesti�o-dominated
leadership and Soviet interference in Angolan affairs. Chipenda and his
followers were expelled from the MPLA, and many joined the
northern-based FNLA in 1975. Then in 1974, about seventy left-wing MPLA
supporters based in Brazzaville broke with Agostinho Neto. This
opposition movement became known as the Active Revolt. Shortly after
independence, a third split occurred within the party, culminating in
the 1977 coup attempt by Nito Alves. Later in 1977, the MPLA transformed
itself into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and launched a lengthy
rectification campaign to unify its membership, impose party discipline,
and streamline decision-making processes.
In 1980 Angola was governed by a new head of state under a newly
revised Constitution. The nation's first legislature, the People's
Assembly, served as a symbol of people's power, but state organs were
clearly subordinate to those of the party. Within the MPLA-PT, channels
for political participation were being narrowed. Both government and
party leaders established a hierarchy of organizations through which
they hoped to mobilize rural populations and broaden political support.
At the same time, MPLAPT leaders launched programs to impose party
discipline on the party's cadres and indoctrinate all segments of
society in their proper role in political development.
Overall goals were relatively easy to agree upon, but poverty and
insecurity exacerbated disagreements over specific strategies for
attaining these objectives. By the mid-1980s, the party had three major
goals--incorporating the population into the political process, imposing
party discipline on its cadres, and reconciling the diverse factions
that arose to dispute these efforts. Some MPLA-PT officials sought to
control political participation by regulating party membership and
strengthening discipline, while others believed the MPLA-PT had wasted
valuable resources in the self-perpetuating cycle of government
repression and popular dissent. President dos Santos sought to resolve
disputes that did not seem to threaten his office. However, much of the
MPLA-PT's political agenda, already impeded by civil war and regional
instability, was further obstructed by these intraparty disputes.
Angola - POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
In many Third World states, the president was the paramount leader,
and in this regard Angola was no exception. Its president, Jos� Eduardo
dos Santos, combined strong party loyalty with political pragmatism.
This loyalty had political and personal bases. Dos Santos owed much of
his success to the MPLA, which he had joined in 1962 at the age of
nineteen. The party sponsored his study at Baku University in the Soviet
Union from 1963 to 1970. In 1974 MPLA leader Neto appointed dos Santos
to the Central Committee, which elected him to its elite Political
Bureau; this group elected him to succeed Neto, who died in 1979. Dos
Santos traveled to the Soviet Union a few weeks later to confirm his
revolutionary agenda as president.
Dos Santos's loyalty to Marxism-Leninism was founded in his student
years in the Soviet Union, where he also married a Soviet citizen (who
later returned to her homeland). There, he developed his belief in the
vanguard party as the best strategy for mobilizing Angola's largely
rural population. At the same time, however, he professed belief in a
mixed economy, some degree of decentralization, an expanded private
sector, and Western investment. Like many African leaders, he did not
equate political eclecticism with internal contradiction, nor did he
view Angola's political posture as an invitation to Soviet domination.
Dos Santos did not embrace Marxism for its utopian appeal; his view
of Angolan society after the envisioned socialist transformation did not
lack internal conflict. Rather, he viewed Marxist-Leninist
organizational tenets as the most practical basis for mobilizing a
society in which the majority lacked economic and educational
opportunities. A small vanguard leadership, with proper motivation and
training, could guide the population through the early stages of
national development, in his view, and this approach could improve the
lives of more people than capitalist investment and profit making by a
small minority. During the 1980s, because trade with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe failed to develop and because Western technical
expertise appeared vital to Angola's development, dos Santos favored
improved political relations with the West as a step toward peace and
greater prosperity. Although he had scorned his predecessor's shift in
the same direction in the late 1970s, dos Santos denied that his move
signaled a weakening commitment to Marxism.
Despite his strong party loyalty, in the late 1980s dos Santos was
known as a political pragmatist. He sometimes spoke out against the
MPLA-PT's most extreme ideologues and took steps to limit their
influence. He openly criticized the results of the rectification
campaign of the late 1970s, which, in his view, had removed too many
loyal members from the party's rolls. He also recognized that the
campaign had alienated much of the nation's peasant majority, that they
remained indifferent toward party programs in the late 1980s, and that
they had not benefited from many MPLA-PT policies.
Political pragmatism was not to be confused with a liberal style of
governing. In response to security crises and public criticism, dos
Santos ordered arrests, detentions without trial, and occasional
executions. He concentrated power in his office and narrowed his circle
of close advisers. He enlarged the executive branch of government by
appointing new ministers of state to coordinate executive branch
activity and convinced the MPLA-PT Central Committee to entrust him with
emergency powers. Dos Santos also persuaded party leaders to empower him
to appoint regional military councils that had sweeping authority over
civilian and military affairs in unstable regions of the country and
that were answerable only to the president.
Dos Santos further consolidated his hold on executive authority in
April 1984 by establishing the Defense and Security Council. In 1985 he enlarged the party Central Committee
from sixty to ninety members and alternates, thus diluting the strength
of its staunch ideological faction.
Undermining potential opponents was not dos Santos's only motivation
for consolidating power within the executive branch of government. He
was also impatient with bureaucratic "red tape," even when
justified in the name of party discipline. Accordingly, the primary
qualification for his trusted advisers was a balance of competence,
efficiency, and loyalty. Rhetorical skills, which he generally lacked,
were not given particular priority; ideological purity was even less
important. His advice for economic recovery was summed up as
"produce, repair, and rehabilitate." The direct, relatively
nonideological governing style exemplified by this approach earned dos
Santos substantial respect and a few strong critics.
Economic and security crises worsened during the first nine years of
dos Santos's presidency, draining resources that might have been used to
improve living standards and education. The president rejected advice
from party ideologues, whose primary aim was to develop a sophisticated
Marxist-Leninist party apparatus. Rather than emphasize centralized
control and party discipline, dos Santos embraced a plan to decentralize
economic decision making in 1988. He then appointed Minister of Planning
Lopo do Nascimento to serve as commissioner of Hu�la Province in order
to implement this plan in a crucial region of the country.
The 1985 Second Party Congress assented to the president's growing
power by approving several of his choices for top government office as
party officials. Among these was Roberto de Almeida, a member of the
Defense and Security Council in his capacity as the MPLA-PT secretary
for ideology, information, and culture and one of dos Santos' close
advisers. Party leaders elected Almeida, a mesti�o, to both
the MPLA-PT Central Committee and the Political Bureau.
Demoted from the top ranks of the party were the leading ideologue, L�cio
L�ra, and veteran mesti�o leaders Paulo Jorge and Henrique
Carreira (nom de guerre Iko). The split between ideologues and political
moderates did not render the party immobile, in part because of dos
Santos's skill at using Angola's internal and external threats to unite
MPLA-PT factions. The everpresent UNITA insurgency provided a constant
reminder of the frailty of the nation's security.
Angola - MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS
Mass Organizations
Three mass organizations were affiliated with the MPLA-PT in
1988--the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement
(Juventude do Movimento Popular de Liberta��o de Angola -- JMPLA), the
Organization of Angolan Women (Organiza��o da Mulher Angolana--OMA),
and the UNTA. Each was founded as an anticolonial social movement during
the 1960s and transformed into a party affiliate when the MPLA-PT became
a vanguard party in 1977. Although these groups were formally
subordinate to the party in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine,
they continued to operate with relative autonomy. Strict party
ideologues objected to this independence and sometimes treated
organization leaders with contempt. The resulting tensions added to
public resentment of party discipline and became a political issue when
Neto accused leaders of the JMPLA, the OMA, and the UNTA of supporting
the Nitista coup attempt of 1977. Alves, the coup leader, had criticized
MPLA-PT leaders for bourgeois attitudes and racism, and many people in
these organizations supported Alves's allegations.
In the late 1970s, mass organizations became an important target of
the rectification campaign. Their role in society was redefined to
emphasize the dissemination of information about party policy and the
encouragement of participation in programs. Throughout most of the next
decade, MPLA-PT officials continued to criticize the lack of
coordination of organizational agenda with party needs. The mass
organizations became centers of public resentment of MPLA-PT controls,
but these groups were not yet effective at organizing or mobilizing
against MPLA-PT rule.
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement
The JMPLA was founded in 1962 and converted into a training ground
for MPLA-PT activists in 1977. It claimed a membership of 72,000, mostly
teenagers and students, in 1988. The JMPLA conducted military exercises
and political study groups, measuring success within the group primarily
by an individual's commitment to the socialist revolution. The Second
Congress of the JMPLA was held on April 14, 1987, a date that was also
celebrated as National Youth Day.
Despite the symbolic and practical importance of the political role
of the nation's youth, MPLA-PT officials generally had a derisive
attitude toward JMPLA leaders during the 1980s. At the MPLA-PT
congresses of 1980 and 1985, party officials criticized youth leaders
for their failure to encourage political activism. They also
remonstrated against youth group officials for the bourgeois attitudes,
materialism, and political apathy they detected among children and
teenagers. One measure of these problems was the continued urban influx
among young people, which impeded MPLA-PT efforts at rural mobilization.
MPLA-PT leaders assigned the JMPLA the task of guiding the national
children's organization, the Agostinho Neto Organization of Pioneers
(Organiza��o dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto--OPA). The goal of the OPA
was to educate all children in patriotic values, socialism, and the
importance of study, work, and scientific knowledge. Founded as the
Pioneers in 1975, the group took the name of the nation's first
president at its second conference in November 1979, following Neto's
death. JMPLA leaders generally viewed the OPA as a recruiting ground for
potential political activists.
National Union of Angolan Workers
The UNTA was organized in 1960 in the Belgian Congo (presentday
Zaire) to assist refugees and exiled MPLA members in their efforts to
maintain social contacts and find jobs. Managing the UNTA became more
difficult after independence. The UNTA headquarters was transferred to
Luanda, where the shortage of skilled workers and personnel for
management and training programs became immediately evident. UNTA
leaders worked to transform the group from an adjunct to a national
liberation army to a state labor union, but encouraged by the
"people's power" movement, many workers thought the MPLA
victory entitled them to assume control of their workplace. UNTA leaders
found that workers' rights were sometimes given a lower priority than
workers' obligations, and at times industrial workers found themselves
at odds with both the government and their own union leadership. These
tensions were exacerbated by the demands of militant workers who favored
more sweeping nationalization programs than those undertaken by the
government; some workers opposed any compensation of foreign owners.
During the early 1980s, Cuban advisers were assigned to bring
industrial workers into the MPLA-PT. With their Angolan counterparts in
the UNTA, Cuban shop stewards and union officials undertook educational
programs in technical and management training, labor discipline and
productivity, and socialist economics. Their overall goal was to impart
a sense of worker participation in the management of the state
economy--a difficult task in an environment characterized by warfare and
economic crisis. By late 1988, the Cubans had achieved mixed success.
Some of the UNTA's 600,000 members looked forward to the prosperity they
hoped to achieve through MPLA-PT policies; many others felt their links
to the government did little to improve their standard of living, and
they were relatively uncommitted to the construction of a socialist
state. UNTA officers did not aggressively represent worker interests
when they conflicted with those of the party, and the fear of labor
unrest became part of Angola's political context.
Organization of Angolan Women
The OMA was established in 1963 to mobilize support for the fledgling
MPLA. After independence, it became the primary route by which women
were incorporated in the political process. Its membership rose to 1.8
million in 1985 but dropped to less than 1.3 million in 1987. The group
attributed this decline to the regional destabilization and warfare that
displaced and destroyed families in rural areas, where more than
two-thirds of OMA members lived. In 1983 Ruth Neto, the former
president's sister, was elected secretary general of the OMA and head of
its fifty-three-member national committee. Neto was reelected secretary
general by the 596 delegates who attended the OMA's second nationwide
conference on March 2, 1988.
During the 1980s, the OMA established literacy programs and worked to
expand educational opportunities for women, and the government passed
new legislation outlawing gender discrimination in wages and working
conditions. MPLA-PT rhetoric emphasized equality between the sexes as a
prerequisite to a prosperous socialist state. At both the First Party
Congress and the Second Party Congress, the MPLA-PT Central Committee
extolled contributions made by women, but in 1988 only 10 percent of
MPLA-PT members were women, and the goal of equality remained distant.
Through the OMA, some women were employed in health and social service
organizations, serving refugees and rural families. More women were
finding jobs in teaching and professions from which they had been
excluded in the past, and a very small number occupied important places
in government and the MPLA-PT. However, most Angolan women were poor and
unemployed.
In addition to leading the OMA, Ruth Neto also served on the MPLA-PT
Central Committee and as secretary general of the PanAfrican Women's
Organization (PAWO), which had its headquarters in Luanda. The PAWO
helped sponsor Angola's annual celebration of Women's Day (August 9),
which was also attended by representatives from neighboring states and
liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia.
Angola - Interest Groups
Peasant Farmers
In the early 1970s, rural volunteers were the backbone of the MPLA
fighting forces, but after independence few peasant fighters were given
leadership positions in the party. In fact, most farmers were purged
from the party during the rectification campaign of the late 1970s for
their lack of political commitment or revolutionary zeal. Criteria for
party membership were stricter for farmers than for urban workers, and a
decade later MPLA-PT leaders generally conceded that the worker-peasant
alliance, on which the socialist transformation depended, had been
weakened by the rectification campaign. When debating the reasons for
this failure, some MPLA-PT members argued that their urban-based
leadership had ignored rural demands and implemented policies favoring
urban residents. Others claimed that the party had
allowed farmers to place their own interests above those of society and
that they were beginning to emerge as the rural bourgeoisie denounced by
Marxist-Leninist leaders in many countries.
Policies aimed at rural development in the early 1980s had called for
the establishment of state farms to improve productivity of basic
foodstuffs in the face of shortages in equipment and technical experts.
Cuban and Bulgarian farm managers were put in charge of most of these
farms. These advisers' objectives were to introduce the use of
mechanization and chemical fertilizers and to inculcate political
awareness. By the mid-1980s, however, the salaries of foreign technical
experts and the cost of new equipment far outweighed revenues generated
by these state enterprises, and the program was abandoned.
Many farmers reverted to subsistence agriculture in the face of the
spreading UNITA insurgency and what they often perceived as government
neglect. Convincing them to produce surplus crops for markets presented
formidable problems for party leaders. UNITA forces sometimes claimed
crops even before they were harvested, and urban traders seldom ventured
into insecure rural areas. Even if a farmer were able to sell surplus
crops, the official price was often unrealistically low, and few
consumer goods were available in rural markets even for those with cash.
In response to the apparent intransigence of some rural Angolans, the
MPLA-PT attempted another strategy for mobilizing political support by
creating farmers' cooperatives and organizing them into unions to
provide channels of communication between farmers and party leaders. In
late 1988, these unions represented only a small percentage of the rural
population, but some party leaders still expected them to succeed. Rural
resentment of the urban-based MPLA-PT leadership was still fairly
widespread, however, and this resentment contributed to the success of
UNITA in Angola's southern and eastern provinces.
Traditional Elites
In the late 1980s, President dos Santos was working to strengthen his
support among the nation's traditional leaders. Every few weeks, he
would invite delegations of provincial and local-level representatives
to meet with him, and Angop would headline these meetings with "the
chiefs." Their discussions focused on regional economic and social
concerns and served the important political purpose of demonstrating the
government's desire to avoid confrontation and to secure support in
rural areas.
The MPLA had a neutral relationship with traditional elites before
independence, in part because the urban-based party had little contact
with ethnic group leaders, whose following was strongest in rural areas.
After independence, in its determination to improve the national economy
and infrastructure, the MPLA called on people to rise above ethnic and
regional loyalties, labeling them impediments to progress in the class
struggle. Early MPLA rhetoric also condemned many religious practices,
including local African religions. Such policies provoked the contempt
of some traditional leaders.
Crises were dampened somewhat by the party's often confrontational
relationship with the civil service during the early 1970s. Civil
servants, as representatives of the colonial regime, had often clashed
with traditional leaders or had otherwise subverted their authority. The
MPLA, in contrast, condemned the elitist attitudes of bureaucrats who
were employed by the colonial regime, thus gaining support from
traditional rulers. At the same time, however, the party drew much of
its support from the petite bourgeoisie it condemned so loudly, and much
of the civil service remained intact after independence.
By 1980 MPLA-PT efforts to consolidate support in outlying regions
were evident. Party officials appointed ethnic group leaders to
participate in or lead local party committees in many areas. Merging
traditional and modern leadership roles helped strengthen support among
rural peasants who would have otherwise remained on the periphery of
national politics. Although success was limited to a few areas, this
program allowed dos Santos to maintain a balance between national and
regional interests. Even some party ideologues, initially inclined
toward strict interpretations of Marxist-Leninist dogma, voiced the
belief that populist elements might be appropriate for a Marxist regime
in an African context.
Religious Communities
The MPLA-PT maintained a cautious attitude toward religion in the
late 1980s, in contrast to its determination in the late 1970s to purge
churchgoers from the party. A 1980 Ministry of Justice decree required
all religious institutions to register with the government. As of 1987,
eleven Protestant institutions were legally recognized: the Assembly of
God, the Baptist Convention of Angola, the Baptist Evangelical Church of
Angola, the Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical
Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of South-West Angola, the Our
Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World (Kimbanquist), the Reformed
Evangelical Church of Angola, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the
Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, and the United Methodist Church. Roberto de Almeida, the MPLA-PT Central Committee secretary
for ideology, information, and culture, admonished church leaders not to
perpetuate oppressive or elitist attitudes, and he specifically warned
that the churches would not be allowed to take a neutral stance in the
battle against opponents of the MPLA-PT regime.
The official attitude toward religion reflected the ideological split
in the party leadership. Staunch party ideologues, who had purged almost
all churchgoers during the rectification campaign of the late 1970s,
opposed leniency toward anyone claiming or recognizing moral authority
outside the regime. But as they had done in regard to traditional
leaders, the president and his close associates weighed the balance
between ideological purity and political necessity and soon moderated
their antireligious stance. Political opposition had not coalesced
around religious leaders, and, in general, the fear of religious
opposition was weakening in the late 1980s.
Employing Marxist-Leninist diatribes against the oppression of the
working class, only the most strident ideologues in the MPLA-PT
maintained their opposition to religion. The Roman Catholic Church was
still strongly identified with the colonial oppressor, and Protestant
missionaries were sometimes condemned for having supported colonial
practices. More serious in the government's view in the late 1980s was
the use by its foremost opponent, Jonas Savimbi, of the issue of
religion to recruit members and support for his UNITA insurgency.
Savimbi's Church of Christ in the Bush had become an effective religious
affiliate of UNITA, maintaining schools, clinics, and training programs.
Small religious sects were annoying to MPLA-PT officials. The ruling
party suspected such groups of having foreign sponsors or of being used
by opponents of the regime. To the government, the sects' relative
independence from world religions was a gauge of their potential for
political independence as well. Watch Tower and Seventh-Day Adventist
sects were suspect, but they were not perceived as serious political
threats. However, the Jehovah's Witnesses were banned entirely in 1978
because of their proscription on military service.
During the late 1980s, security officials considered the small Our
Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World to be a threat to the regime,
despite the fact that the Mtokoists, as they were known, were not
particularly interested in national politics. Their founder, Simon Mtoko
(also known as Sim�o Toco), had been expelled from Angola by the
Portuguese in 1950 for preaching adherence to African cultural values.
He returned to Angola in 1974 but soon clashed with MPLA leaders over
the regime's authority over individual beliefs. He opposed the party's
Marxist rhetoric on cultural grounds until his death in 1984. After his
death, officials feared the group would splinter into dissident
factions. The church was legally recognized in 1988 even though
Mtokoists clashed with police in 1987 and 1988, resulting in arrests and
some casualties.
Angola - POLITICAL OPPOSITION
After thirteen years of national independence, Angola's armed forces,
FAPLA, remained pitted against UNITA in a civil war that had erupted out
of the preindependence rivalry among liberation armies. The FNLA and the
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a
Liberta��o do Enclave de Cabinda--FLEC) lost popular support during
the first decade of independence, and, as a result, in 1988 UNITA
remained the only serious internal threat to the dos Santos regime. Few
Angolans expected either UNITA or government forces to achieve a
military victory, but the political impact of the UNITA insurgency was
substantial nonetheless.
Jonas Savimbi established UNITA in 1966. Leading a group of dissident
members from the northern coalition that included the FNLA, he
established a rival liberation movement that sought to avoid domination
by Holden Roberto and his Bakongo followers. UNITA recruits from Savimbi's Ovimbundu
homeland and from among the Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), Lunda,
Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela), and other southern Angolan societies
sought to preserve elements of their own cultures. Some southerners also maintained
centuries-old legacies of distrust toward northern ethnic groups,
including the Bakongo and the Mbundu.
Savimbi's legitimacy as a dissident leader was acquired in part
through the reputation of his grandfather, who had led the Ovimbundu
state of Ndulu in protest against Portuguese rule in the early twentieth
century. From his father, Savimbi acquired membership and belief in the
United Church of Christ, which organized Ovimbundu villages into
networks to assist in mission operations under colonial rule. One of
these networks formed the Council of Evangelical Churches, a
pan-Ovimbundu umbrella organization that united more than 100,000 people
in south-central Angola. They were served by mission schools, training
centers, and clinics, with near-autonomy from colonial controls. Local
leaders, who staffed some of these establishments, voiced their demands
for greater political freedom, and colonial authorities moved to
suppress the Council of Evangelical Churches as pressures for
independence mounted in the 1960s.
The territory in southeastern Angola controlled by UNITA in the late
1980s included part of the area that had been administered by the
Council of Evangelical Churches before independence. Here, many people supported Savimbi's struggle against the
MPLA-PT as an extension of the long struggle for Ovimbundu, not Angolan,
nationhood. UNITA-run schools and clinics operated with the same
autonomy from Luandan bureaucratic control as their mission-sponsored
counterparts had before independence.
Ethnic loyalties remained strong in the southeast and other
UNITA-controlled areas of rural Angola. Class solidarity, in comparison,
was an almost meaningless abstraction. Savimbi was able to portray the
class-conscious MPLA-PT in Luanda in terms that contrasted sharply with
models of leadership among the Ovimbundu and other central and southern
Angolan peoples. He described party leaders as a racially stratified
elite, dominated by Soviet and Cuban advisers who also provided arms to
suppress the population. The MPLA-PT's early assaults on organized
religion reinforced this image. Many rural Angolans were also keenly
aware that the party elite in Luanda lived at a much higher standard
than did Savimbi's commanders in the bush. And they carefully noted that
people in rural areas under MPLA-PT control still lived in poverty and
that the government bureaucracy was notoriously inefficient and corrupt.
UNITA's regimented leadership, in turn, presented itself as the
protector of rural African interests against outsiders. Through
Savimbi's skilled public relations efforts, his organization became
known as a local peasant uprising, fighting for political and religious
freedom. Savimbi had no headquarters in other countries and took pride
in the humble life-style of his command in Jamba, well within UNITA-held
territory. On this basis, he won some support in the south and east,
gained volunteers for UNITA forces, and slowed government efforts to
extend MPLA-PT control into the countryside. In the late 1980s, however,
international human rights organizations accused UNITA of human rights
abuses, charging that UNITA was intimidating civilians to force them to
support UNITA or to withhold support for the MPLA-PT.
For the government, the ever-present threat of the UNITA insurgency
served a number of useful purposes. It helped rally support for party
unity in the capital and surrounding areas. The government was able to
capitalize on the reputation for brutality that grew up around some
UNITA commanders and the destruction of rural resources by UNITA forces.
Young amputees in Luanda and other towns provided a constant reminder of
the several thousand land mines left in rural farmland by Savimbi's
troops. UNITA activity also provided an immediate example of the party
ideologues' stereotype of destabilization sponsored by international
capitalist forces. These forces were, in turn, embodied in the regional
enemy, South Africa. The UNITA insurgency also enabled the MPLA-PT
government to justify the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola,
and it helped maintain international interest in Angola's political
difficulties.
The regional accord reached in December 1988 by Angolan, South
African, and Cuban negotiators did not address Angola's internal
violence, but in informal discussions among the participants,
alternatives were suggested for ending the conflict. Western negotiators
pressured the MPLA-PT to bring UNITA officials into the government, and
even within the party, many people hoped that UNITA
representatives--excluding Savimbi--would be reconciled with the dos
Santos government. Savimbi, in turn, offered to recognize dos Santos's
leadership on the condition that free elections, as promised by the 1975
Alvor Agreement, would take place after the withdrawal of Cuban troops.
Angola - MASS MEDIA
The government nationalized all print and broadcast media in 1976,
and as of late 1988 the government and party still controlled almost all
the news media. Angola's official news agency, Angop, distributed about
8,000 issues of the government newsletter, Di�rio de Rep�blica,
and 40,000 copies of Jornal de Angola daily in Luanda and other
urban areas under FAPLA control. Both publications were in Portuguese.
International press operations in Luanda included Agence France-Presse,
Cuba's Prensa Latina, Xinhua (New China) News Agency, and several Soviet
and East European agency offices.
Under the scrutiny of the MPLA-PT, the media were limited to
disseminating official policy without critical comment or opposing
viewpoints. The Angolan Journalists' Union, which proclaimed the right
to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitution, nonetheless
worked closely with the MPLA-PT and pressured writers to adhere to
government guidelines. Views differing slightly from official
perceptions were published in the UNTA monthly newsletter, O Voz do
Trabalhador, despite active censorship.
R�dio Nacional de Angola was the largest of eighteen mediumwave and
short-wave stations operating throughout the country. Radio broadcasts
were in Portuguese and vernacular languages, and there were an estimated
435,000 receivers in 1988. In the late 1980s, people in central and
southern Angola also received opposition radio broadcasts from the Voice
of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, operated by UNITA in Portuguese,
English, and local vernaculars. Limited television service in Portuguese
became available in Luanda and surrounding areas in 1976, but by 1988
there were only about 40,500 television sets in the country.
Angop maintained a cooperative relationship with the Soviet news
agency, TASS, and Angola was active in international efforts to
improve coordination among nonaligned nations in the field of
communications. Information ministers and news agency representatives
from several Third World nations were scheduled to hold their fifth
conference in Luanda in June 1989--their first meeting since 1985, when
they met in Havana. The Angop delegation was to serve as host of the
1989 conference, and Angolan information officials in the government and
party were to chair the organization from 1989 to 1992.
Angola was also a leader among Portuguese-speaking nations of Africa.
Students from these nations attended the Interstate Journalism School in
Luanda, which opened May 23, 1987, with support from the Yugoslav news
agency, Tanyug. In September 1987, journalists from these five Lusophone
nations held their third conference in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. A major
goal of this group was to coordinate cultural development based on their
common language, but an important secondary goal was to demonstrate
support for Angola in its confrontation with South Africa. By 1990 they
hoped to celebrate the Pan-African News Agency's opening of a Portuguese
desk in Luanda.
Angola - FOREIGN RELATIONS
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Policy Making
Angola's foreign relations reflected the ambivalence of its formal
commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its dependence on Western investment
and trade. Overall policy goals were to resolve this dual dependence--to
achieve regional and domestic peace, reduce the need for foreign
military assistance, enhance economic selfsufficiency through
diversified trade relations, and establish Angola as a strong socialist
state. MPLA-PT politicians described Angola's goal as geopolitical
nonalignment, but throughout most of the 1980s Angola's foreign policy
had a pronounced pro-Soviet bias.
Two groups within the MPLA-PT and one council within the executive
branch vied for influence over foreign policy, all under the direct
authority of the president. Formal responsibility for foreign policy
programs lay with the MPLA-PT Central Committee. Within this committee,
the nine members of the Secretariat and the five others who were members
of the Political Bureau wielded decisive influence. The Political
Bureau, in its role as guardian of the revolution, usually succeeded in
setting the Central Committee agenda.
During the 1980s, as head of both the party and the government, dos
Santos strengthened the security role of the executive branch of
government, thereby weakening the control of the Central Committee and
Political Bureau. To accomplish this redistribution of power, in 1984 he
created the Defense and Security Council as an executive advisory body,
and he appointed to this council the six most influential ministers, the
FAPLA chief of the general staff, and the Central Committee secretary
for ideology, information, and culture. The mandate of this council was
to review and coordinate the implementation of security-related policy
efforts among ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was more
concerned with diplomatic and economic affairs than with security
matters.
Southern Africa's regional conflict determined much of Angola's
foreign policy direction during the 1980s. Negotiations to end South
Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia succeeded in linking Namibian
independence to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Cuban
presence and that of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and
African National Congress (ANC) bases in Angola bolstered Pretoria's
claims of a Soviet-sponsored onslaught against the apartheid state. On
the grounds that an independent Namibia would enlarge the territory
available to Pretoria's enemies and make South Africa's borders even
more vulnerable, South Africa maintained possession of Namibia, which it
had held since World War I. Pretoria launched incursions into Angola
throughout most of the 1980s and supported Savimbi's UNITA forces as
they extended their control throughout eastern Angola.
The MPLA-PT pursued its grass-roots campaign to mobilize peasant
support, and UNITA sought to capitalize on the fear of communism to
enhance its popularity outside rural Ovimbundu areas. Many Angolans
accepted MPLA-PT condemnations of the West but balanced them against the
fact that Western oil companies in Cabinda provided vital revenues and
foreign exchange and the fact that the United States purchased much of
Angola's oil. Moreover, in one of Africa's many ironies that arose from
balancing the dual quest for political sovereignty and economic
development, Cuban and Angolan troops guarded American and other Western
companies against attack by South African commandos or UNITA forces
(which were receiving United States assistance).
Angola - Regional Politics
On December 22, 1988, after eight years of negotiations, Angola,
Cuba, and South Africa concluded a regional accord that provided for the
removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In a series of talks mediated by
the United States, the three parties agreed to link Namibian
independence from South African rule to a staged withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola. Both processes were to begin in 1989. Cuban troops
were to move north of the fifteenth parallel, away from the Namibian
border, by August 1, 1989. All Cuban troops were to be withdrawn from
Angolan territory by July 1, 1991.
The December 1988 regional accords did not attempt to resolve the
ongoing conflict between Angolan forces and UNITA. Rather, it addressed
the 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 435, which called for South
African withdrawal and free elections in Namibia and prohibited further
South African incursions into Angola. The United States promised
continued support for UNITA until a negotiated truce and power-sharing
arrangement were accomplished.
The December 1988 regional accords created a joint commission of
representatives from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the United States, and
the Soviet Union to resolve conflicts that threatened to disrupt its
implementation. However, immediate responsibility for the accord lay
primarily with the UN, which still required an enabling resolution by
the Security Council, a funding resolution by the General Assembly, and
a concrete logistical plan for member states to establish and maintain a
Namibian peacekeeping force as part of the UN Transition Assistance
Group (UNTAG) called for by Resolution 435.
Angola's participation in the regional accords was pragmatic. The
accords promised overall gains, but not without costs. They entailed the
eventual loss of Cuban military support for the MPLAPT but countered
this with the possible benefits of improved relations with South
Africa--primarily an end to South Africansupported insurgency. The
accords also suggested possible benefits from improved regional trade,
membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and loans
for development purposes. President dos Santos intended to reduce
Angola's share of the cost of the Cuban presence, to reduce social
tensions in areas where Cuban military units were stationed, and to
weaken UNITA's argument that the MPLA-PT had allowed an occupation force
to install itself in Angola. The MPLA-PT also hoped to gain a friendly
SWAPO government in neighboring Namibia and an end to sanctuary for
UNITA forces in Namibian territory. (This goal was complicated by the
fact that Ovambo populations in southern Angola and Namibia provided the
core of SWAPO, and, at the same time, many Ovambo people supported
UNITA.)
As the first Cuban troops planned to withdraw from Angola, most
parties to the accords still feared that it might fail. Angolan leaders
worried that the UNITA insurgency would intensify in the face of the
Cuban withdrawal; that UNITA leaders might find new sources of external
assistance, possibly channeled through Zaire; and that South African
incursions into Angola might recur on the grounds that ANC or SWAPO
bases remained active in southern Angola. South African negotiators
expressed the fear that the Cuban troop withdrawal, which could not be
accurately verified, might not be complete; that Cuban troops might move
into Zambia or other neighboring states, only to return to Angola in
response to UNITA activity; or that SWAPO activity in Namibia might
prompt new South African assaults on Namibian and Angolan territory.
SWAPO negotiators, in turn, feared that South Africa or some of
Namibia's 70,000 whites might block the elections guaranteed by UN
Resolution 435, possibly bringing South African forces back into Namibia
and scuttling the entire accords. These and other apprehensions were
evident in late 1988, but substantial hope remained that all regional
leaders supported the peace process and would work toward its
implementation.
Angola - Relations with Other African States
Angola was wary of attempts at African solidarity during its first
years of independence, an attitude that gave way to a more activist role
in southern Africa during the 1980s. President Neto rejected an offer of
an OAU peacekeeping force in 1975, suspecting that OAU leaders would
urge a negotiated settlement with UNITA. Neto also declined other
efforts to find African solutions to Angola's instability and reduce the
Soviet and Cuban role in the region. A decade later, Angola had become a
leader among front-line states (the others were Botswana, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) seeking Western pressure to end regional
destablization by Pretoria. Luanda also coordinated efforts by the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to reduce
the front-line states' economic dependence on South Africa.
Angola's relations were generally good with other African states that
accepted its Marxist policies and strained with states that harbored or
supported rebel forces opposed to the MPLA-PT. The most consistent
rhetorical support for the MPLA-PT came from other former Portuguese
states in Africa (Cape Verde, S�o Tom� and Pr�ncipe, Guinea-Bissau,
and Mozambique).
Nigeria, which led the OAU in recognizing the MPLA-PT regime in 1975,
went on to seek a leadership role in the campaign against South Africa's
domination of the region, but Nigeria never forged very close ties with
Angola. Nigeria's own economic difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s, its
close relations with the West, and other cultural and political
differences prevented Luanda and Lagos from forming a strong alliance.
Zaire's relations with Angola were unstable during the 1970s and
1980s. Zairian regular army units supported the FNLA in the years before
and just after Angolan independence, and Angola harbored anti-Zairian
rebels, who twice invaded Zaire's Shaba Province (formerly Katanga
Province). But Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko and President Neto
reached a rapprochement before Neto's death in 1979, and Zaire curtailed
direct opposition to the MPLAPT . Nonetheless, throughout most of the
1980s UNITA operated freely across Zaire's southwestern border, and
Western support for UNITA was channeled through Zaire. Complicating relations between these
two nations were the numerous ethnic groups whose homelands had been
divided by the boundary between Zaire and Angola a century earlier. The
Bakongo, Lunda, Chokwe, and many smaller groups maintained long-standing
cultural, economic, and religious ties with relatives in neighboring
states. These ties often extended to support for antigovernment rebels.
Zambia, which had officially ousted UNITA bands from its western
region in 1976, voiced strong support for the MPLA-PT at the same time
that it turned a blind eye to financial and logistical support for UNITA
by Zambian citizens. Without official approval, but also without
interference, UNITA forces continued to train in Zambia's western
region. Lusaka's ambivalence toward Angola during the 1980s took into
account the possibility of an eventual UNITA role in the government in
Luanda. Both Zambia and Zaire had an interest in seeing an end to
Angola's civil war because the flow of refugees from Angola had reached
several hundred thousand by the mid-1980s. Peace would also enable
Zambia and Zaire to upgrade the Benguela Railway as an alternative to
South African transport systems.
Elsewhere in the region, relations with Angola varied. Strained
relations arose at times with Congo, where both FNLA and Cabindan rebels
had close cultural ties and some semi-official encouragement. Senegal,
Togo, Malawi, and Somalia were among the relatively conservative African
states that provided material support to UNITA during the 1980s.
Throughout most of the decade, UNITA also received financial assistance
from several North African states, including Morocco, Tunisia, and
Egypt, and these governments (along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia)
pressured their African trading partners and client states to limit
their support of the MPLA-PT.
Angola - Communist Nations
The Soviet Union supported the MPLA-PT as a liberation movement
before independence and formalized its relationship with the MPLAPT
government through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and a series
of military agreements beginning in 1975. Once it became clear that the
MPLA-PT could, with Cuban support, remain in power, the Soviet Union
provided economic and technical assistance and granted Angola
most-favored-nation status.
The support of the Soviet Union and its allies included diplomatic
representations at the UN and in other international forums, military
hardware and advisers, and more direct military support in the face of
South African incursions into Angola. Civilian technical assistance
extended to hydroelectric projects, bridge building and road building,
agriculture, fisheries, public health, and a variety of educational
projects. Technical assistance was often channeled through joint
projects with a third country-- for example, the Capanda hydroelectric
project entailed cooperation between the Soviet Union and Brazil.
Soviet-Angolan relations were strained at times during the 1980s,
however, in part because Angola sought to upgrade diplomatic ties with
the United States. Soviet leadership factions were divided over their
nation's future role in Africa, and some Soviet negotiators objected to
dos Santos's concessions to the United States on the issue of
"linkage." The region's intractable political problems, and
the cost of maintaining Cuban troop support and equipping the MPLA-PT,
weakened the Soviet commitment to the building of a Marxist-Leninist
state in Angola.
Angolan leaders, in turn, complained about Soviet neglect--low levels
of assistance, poor-quality personnel and mat�riel, and inadequate
responses to complaints. Angola shared the cost of the Cuban military
presence and sought to reduce these expenses, in part because many
Angolan citizens felt the immediate drain on economic resources and
rising tensions in areas occupied by Cuban troops. Moreover, dos Santos
complained that the Soviet Union dealt with Angola
opportunistically--purchasing Angolan coffee at low prices and
reexporting it at a substantial profit, overfishing in Angolan waters,
and driving up local food prices.
For the first decade after independence, trade with communist states
was not significant, but in the late 1980s dos Santos sought expanded
economic ties with the Soviet Union, China, and Czechoslovakia and other
nations of Eastern Europe as the MPLA-PT attempted to diversify its
economic relations and reduce its dependence on the West. In October
1986, Angola signed a cooperative agreement with the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA), a consortium dedicated to
economic cooperation among the Soviet Union and its allies.
As part of the Comecon agreement, Soviet support for Angolan
educational and training programs was increased. In 1987 approximately
1,800 Angolan students attended institutions of higher education in the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also provided about 100 lecturers to
Agostinho Neto University in Luanda, and a variety of Soviet-sponsored
training programs operated in Angola, most with Cuban instructors.
Approximately 4,000 Angolans studied at the international school on
Cuba's renowned Isle of Youth. More Angolan students were scheduled to
attend the Union of Young Communists' School in Havana in 1989.
Czechoslovakia granted scholarships to forty-four Angolan students in
1987, and during that year Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany) also provided training for about 150 Angolan
industrial workers.
Cuba's presence in Angola was more complex than it appeared to
outsiders who viewed the Soviet Union's Third World clients as little
more than surrogates for their powerful patron. The initiative in
placing Cuban troops in Angola in the mid-1970s was taken by President
Fidel Castro as part of his avowed mission of "Cuban
internationalism." Facing widespread unemployment at home, young
Cuban men were urged to serve in the military overseas as their
patriotic duty, and veterans enjoyed great prestige on their return.
Castro also raised the possibility of a Cuban resettlement scheme in
southern Angola, and several hundred Cubans received Angolan citizenship
during the 1980s. Cuban immigration increased sharply in 1988. In
addition to military support, Cuba provided Angola with several thousand
teachers, physicians, and civilian laborers for construction,
agriculture, and industry. Angolan dependence on Cuban medical personnel
was so complete that during the 1980s Spanish became known as the
language of medicine.
China's relations with Angola were complicated by Beijing's
opposition to both Soviet and United States policies toward Africa.
China supported the FNLA and UNITA after the MPLA seized power in
Angola, and China provided military support to Zaire when Zairian troops
clashed with Angolan forces along their common border in the late 1970s.
China nonetheless took the initiative in improving relations with the
MPLA-PT during the 1980s. The two states established diplomatic ties in
1983.
Angola - United States and Western Europe
Angola's relations with the United States were ambivalent. The United
States aided the FNLA and UNITA before independence. During most of
1976, the United States blocked Angola's admission to the UN, and in
late 1988 the two nations still lacked diplomatic ties. United States
representatives pressured Luanda to reduce its military reliance on Cuba
and the Soviet Union, made necessary in part by United States and South
African opposition to the MPLA-PT and support for UNITA. In 1988
Angola's government news agency quoted Minister of Foreign Relations
Afonso Van D�nem (nom de guerre Mbinda) as saying the United States had
a "Cuban psychosis" that prevented it from engaging in talks
about Namibia and Angola. Nevertheless, after the December 1988 regional
accords to end the Cuban military presence in Angola, United States
officials offered to normalize relations with Angola on the condition
that an internal settlement of the civil war with UNITA be reached.
Political and diplomatic differences between the United States and
Angola were generally mitigated by close economic ties. American oil
companies operating in Cabinda provided a substantial portion of
Angola's export earnings and foreign exchange, and this relationship
continued despite political pressures on these companies to reduce their
holdings in Cabinda in the mid-1980s. The divergence of private economic
interests from United States diplomatic policy was complicated by
differences of opinion among American policymakers. By means of the
Clark Amendment, from 1975 to 1985 the United States Congress prohibited
aid to UNITA and slowed covert attempts to circumvent this legislation.
After the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, however, trade between
Angola and the United States continued to increase, and Cuban and
Angolan troops attempted to prevent sabotage against United States
interests by UNITA and South African commandos.
Western Europe, like the United States, feared the implications of a
strong Soviet client state in southern Africa, but in general European
relations with the MPLA-PT were based on economic interests rather than
ideology. France and Portugal maintained good relations with the MPLA-PT
at the same time that they provided financial assistance for UNITA and
allowed UNITA representatives to operate freely in their capitals.
Portugal was Angola's leading trading partner throughout most of the
1980s, and Brazil, another Lusophone state, strengthened economic ties
with Angola during this period.
* * *
John A. Marcum's two-volume series, The Angolan Revolution,
analyzes historical trends in Angolan politics and society from the
early colonial struggle through the early years of independence. Marcum
also views the postwar environment and its political implications in
"Angola: Twenty-five Years of War," and he analyzes obstacles
to the socialist transformation in "The People's Republic of
Angola." Keith Somerville's Angola: Politics, Economics, and
Society provides an extensive discussion of Angola's variant of
Marxism-Leninism and raises the question of its implications for the
rural majority of Angolan people. Kenneth W. Grundy's "The Angolan
Puzzle" assesses Angolan prospects for peace in 1987 in the context
of the regional struggle.
Gerald J. Bender analyzes Angola's contemporary predicament from a
historical perspective in "American Policy Toward Angola" and
"The Continuing Crisis in Angola." Catherine V. Scott, in
"Socialism and the `Soft State' in Africa," compares 1980s
political developments in these two Marxist states in southern Africa.
Tony Hodges's Angola to the 1990s, essentially an economic
analysis, also contains insight into political trends. Fred Bridgland's
"The Future of Angola" and Jonas Savimbi provide
critical views of MPLA-PT rule, while Fola Soremekun's chapter on Angola
in The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy, edited by
Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, and Angola's Political Economy
by M.R. Bhagavan view Angola's 1980s leadership from a more favorable
perspective.
