BORN IN A BLOODY REVOLUTION from French colonial rule, Algeria became
independent in 1962. The new nation was governed for more than
twenty-five years by two military figures--Houari Boumediene from 1965
until 1978 and Chadli Benjedid from 1979 until early 1992. Although both
presidents relied upon the armed forces for support, their regimes were
by no means military dictatorships. The military, however, was heavily
represented in the National Liberation Front (Front de Lib�ration
Nationale--FLN), the single party that controlled Algeria's socialist
state until 1989. Nonetheless, under Boumediene and Benjedid civilian
government institutions developed, and a multiparty parliamentary system
emerged in 1989.
To avert a likely election victory by the Islamic party, the Islamic
Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut--FIS), the minister of defense
led a coup in January 1992 that brought down the civilian government,
which was soon replaced by a High Council of State dominated by the
military. In the course of 1992 and 1993, the army and the police were
called upon to deal with armed uprisings by those groups who saw the
military takeover as cheating the Islamic movement of its popular
mandate. A crackdown against officials and organs of the FIS failed to
bring an end to the violence, which resulted in 600 deaths among the
security forces in the twelve months after the coup. Hundreds of
civilians, including Islamic demonstrators and some foreigners, were
also killed. The normal processes of government were paralyzed by the
tense internal situation, and the army struggled to contain the
uprising.
Security problems beyond the national borders, which had in the past
motivated the government, aided by the Soviet Union, to buildup the
military, had become less pressing by the early 1990s. Algeria's support
for a nationalist insurgency in the Western Sahara had collided with
Morocco's ambition to absorb the territory, but by 1993 the conflict
seemed to be winding down. A cooperation treaty in 1989 among the Maghrib states, incorporating security clauses intended to
prevent future military confrontation, reflected the more pacific
climate prevailing in the region.
Algeria has a large and reasonably well-equipped military to counter
foreign and domestic threats. The People's National Army (Arm�e
Nationale Populaire--ANP) include ground forces, an air force, navy, and
an air defense command. The National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie
Nationale), a paramilitary body, is used mainly as a police force in
rural areas. The army, in the process of being reorganized into four
divisions in 1993, also has numerous independent brigades and
battalions. Its antecedents were the conventional military units formed
in Morocco and Tunisia during the War of Independence from France. In
1993 the air force was equipped with about 193 combat aircraft and
fifty-eight armed helicopters. The navy consisted of a small fleet of
frigates, corvettes, and missile craft, together with two modern
submarines. Except for brief clashes with Morocco in 1976, the armed
forces have not been involved in hostilities against a foreign power.
Their combat capabilities in defense of the country has thus remained
untested.
The arms and equipment initially supplied by the Soviet Union were of
good quality, but some of the mat�riel had been in inventory for up to
two decades. Earlier shipments were later supplemented by more modern
tanks, armored vehicles, and missile launchers. Because of economic
dislocation and a scarcity of foreign exchange, Algeria in the early
1990s postponed the acquisition of more modern equipment. Instead, it
assigned priority to training and effective maintenance of existing
weapons. More than half the army's personnel strength consisted of
conscripts, some of whom were detailed to economic infrastructure
projects after basic training. However, since Chadli Benjedid's
introduction of market-oriented economic reforms in the late 1980s, the
army has curtailed its involvement in construction, agricultural, and
manufacturing activities.
Algeria - EXTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
Under Ahmed Ben Bella, independent Algeria's first president, the
government actively supported a host of anticolonial struggles
throughout Africa. Algeria became a leading contributor to the African
Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which
was designed to coordinate and aid African liberation movements. In 1963
the government provided training to 1,000 guerrillas from Mozambique,
South Africa, and Angola. More controversially, Ben Bella's government
also sponsored efforts to overthrow independent African governments that
were considered to be reactionary or too closely linked to former
colonial powers. Notably, during this time the Algerians supported
insurgencies against the governments of newly independent Congo (former
Belgian Congo, present-day Zaire), Niger, and Morocco. Ben Bella's
activism, however, was ineffectual in weakening the opponents at which
it was aimed. Critics charged that his stance was merely symbolic,
designed to enhance the president's prestige among the
"radical" bloc of African and Asian states and, by extension,
to bolster his political position within Algeria.
After Ben Bella's overthrow in 1965, the Boumediene government turned
its attention to domestic development issues and limited its direct
involvement in destabilizing foreign governments. As a matter of
principle, however, the new regime soon started assisting a number of
revolutionary groups and liberation movements and allowed their
representatives to operate in Algiers. These groups included liberation
movements opposed to the regimes in Portuguese Africa, Southern Rhodesia
(present-day Zimbabwe), South Africa, the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam), Israel, and others. International terrorists associated with
Italy's Red Brigade, the Federal Republic of Germany's (West Germany)
Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the Black Panthers, composed of radical
American blacks, were granted sanctuary and support. Aircraft hijackers
were allowed to land in Algeria and were often granted asylum until,
under international pressure, Boumediene abandoned the practice in 1978.
An important element of Algerian security policy has been the
leadership's attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinian
nationalists--attitudes that were underscored by Algeria's military
contributions during the June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.
Immediately after the 1967 conflict, the Algerians sent more than fifty
aircraft to Egypt to replace some of those lost in the war. Algeria also
reportedly sent small contingents of infantry and artillery to reinforce
the Egyptians. Algeria's contribution to the October 1973 War consisted
of a number of air force units that joined Egyptian forces on the Suez
front and two medical teams that were dispatched to the Syrian front.
Although the direct involvement of Algerian forces in these conflicts
was minimal, Algeria apparently drew important lessons from Arab
shortcomings against Israeli military power. Soon after the Arab defeat
in 1967, Boumediene inaugurated conscription. Later, the Arabs' initial
successes in the 1973 war using modern Soviet-supplied antiaircraft and
antitank missiles were believed to have influenced Boumediene's decision
to upgrade his armed forces with large purchases of sophisticated Soviet
weaponry.
Although several liberation movements were still permitted to
maintain offices in Algeria after Benjedid came to power in 1979, the
government was no longer a major sanctuary for terrorist groups
operating abroad. It drew a distinction between terrorism, which it
condemned, and violence on the part of national liberation movements,
which it considered possibly legitimate. Algeria, however, has refused
to sign international agreements intended to counter acts of terrorism.
In addition, a representative of the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal
Organization was allowed to remain in Algiers despite a number of
attacks against Arab and Western targets and against its Palestinian
opponents in Algeria. Representatives of two other terrorist groups--the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestine Liberation Front--appeared
on national television to rally popular support for Iraq after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Algeria continued to back the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), whose efforts against Israel had long been viewed by Algerians as
similar to the struggle against the French by their own revolutionaries.
Although Algeria, like other Arab countries, was unable (or unwilling)
to help the PLO resist the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982,
Benjedid's government allowed between 1,000 and 2,000 of the guerrillas
evacuated from Beirut to establish themselves in military camps in
Algeria. Algeria focused its main efforts on mediating among various
Palestinian factions rather than supporting a resumption of PLO military
activity.
Algeria - Security Problems with Neighboring States
In his efforts to shape a more pragmatic foreign policy, Benjedid
succeeded in moderating the stresses in the country's relationships with
the West. Concurrently, Algeria's concerns shifted to improving regional
stability, which had been disturbed by festering disputes with Morocco
and Libya. Reflective of improving relationships was the formation in
February 1989 of the Union of the Arab Maghrib (Union du Maghreb
Arabe--UMA), with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia as
members. The primary goal of the UMA was improved economic cohesion, but
the treaty also contained important security clauses. The signatories
affirmed that any aggression against one member would be considered as
aggression against the other member states. In an apparent allusion to
the Western Sahara conflict, member states pledged not to permit any
activity or organization on their territory that could endanger the
security or territorial integrity of another member state.
Relations between Algeria and Morocco had long been characterized by
rivalry and occasional hostility. Immediately after Algerian
independence, Morocco laid claim to stretches of southern and western
Algeria that had been under Moroccan sovereignty before the French
gained control over the area in the nineteenth century. In a series of
sharp engagements in the disputed territory in October 1963, the
professional Moroccan army consistently outperformed Algerian regulars
and local guerrillas. Although OAU-sponsored mediation ended the
fighting, the success of the Moroccans demonstrated the potential threat
to Algerian security in the event of a more serious dispute.
In addition to fighting over borders, the two countries each sought
primacy in the Maghrib. Their claims were rooted in part in ideology:
Morocco's claim to regional leadership derived from its centuries-old
national identity, whereas Algeria's stemmed from the prestige of
winning its War of Independence. The ideological differences between the
new socialist republic and the ancient kingdom were sharpened when,
almost immediately after independence, Ben Bella began to trumpet his
country's socialistrevolutionary doctrines and its opposition to
conservative governments such as Morocco's. Relations improved after
Boumediene came to power and as both countries concentrated on their
domestic problems. In 1972 a treaty was signed defining the
international border between them. The Moroccan government, however,
deferred its official ratification of the treaty. Following the mending
of differences over the Western Sahara question, Morocco's King Hassan
II finally ratified the border treaty in May 1989.
The dispute over the Western Sahara had its origins in 1974 when
Morocco began maneuvering to annex the territory, which was then under
Spanish control and known as the Spanish Sahara. A series of Moroccan
diplomatic initiatives--climaxed by a march of 350,000 Moroccans across
the territory's northern border-- resulted in a treaty by which Spain
turned over the northern twothirds of the Western Sahara to Moroccan
administration and the rest to Mauritania. By mid1975 the Algerians were giving supplies, vehicles, and
light arms to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and R�o de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberaci�n de Saguia el Hamra y
R�o de Oro--Polisario). Polisario was the strongest of several
indigenous national liberation movements active in the Western Sahara.
Algerian authorities established refugee camps in the Tindouf area to
house large numbers of Saharans, popularly known as Sahrawis, who
abandoned the territory after the Moroccan takeover. Algeria thus became
the principal foreign supporter of the Polisario in its long-running
desert war to oppose Moroccan control of the disputed area.
Algeria gradually acquired a quantitative military superiority over
Morocco with the introduction of large amounts of modern weaponry,
mainly from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Algerians avoided direct
confrontation with the more experienced Moroccan troops. In January
1976, however, the Moroccans badly defeated two battalions of Algerian
troops and took prisoners in clashes inside the Western Sahara. After
that time, Algerian regulars did not venture into the Western Sahara
despite Moroccan claims to the contrary. For their part, the Moroccans
refrained from pursuing troops onto Algerian territory.
Initially, fighting in the Western Sahara featured attacks by the
Polisario's light mobile forces against isolated Moroccan outposts. By
1982, however, the struggle had shifted in Morocco's favor. Morocco
adopted a strategy of constructing fortified sand walls, mined and
equipped with electronic warning systems. Enclosing progressively larger
areas of the Sahara, Morocco was able to undercut Polisario's ability to
conduct hit-and-run attacks. The Moroccan military dominated the
battlefield, effectively coordinating its modern ground and air
firepower in spite of Algeria's deliveries of increasingly sophisticated
arms to the Polisario guerrillas.
The success of Morocco's military strategy was one factor in the
rapprochement between the two nations in 1988, following a twelve-year
hiatus in diplomatic relations precipitated by Algeria's recognition of
the Polisario government. Although Polisario was able to mount an
offensive against the sand wall in late 1989, breaking a truce that had
held for nearly a year, Algeria--preoccupied by its own internal
security problems--was no longer willing to devote enough arms and
support to keep the independence movement alive. Algeria still provided
refuge on its territory for about 10,000 guerrillas, but by the close of
1992 Polisario's military defeats had nearly ended the insurgency.
Algeria's resumption of diplomatic relations with Morocco,
accompanied by the opening of borders and a number of joint economic
initiatives, eased the security situation on its western flank.
Morocco's acceptance of the United Nations (UN) peace plan for the
Western Sahara and the conclusion of the UMA treaty in 1989 further
helped to abate remaining tensions.
Whereas Morocco had long been viewed as a potential threat, Muammar
al Qadhafi's Libya was regarded as somewhat more friendly. The
Algerian-Libyan security relationship was based on a common antipathy
for the Western-dominated economic order and deep hostility toward
Israel. This relationship, however, suffered several setbacks during the
1980s. In 1984 Morocco and Libya announced that they had secretly
negotiated an alliance. Although the alliance's effect was short-lived,
Algeria interpreted the agreement as upsetting the strategic balance in
the Maghrib. Libya's unilateral annexation of a section of neighboring
Chad and its military intervention in Chad hardened Algerian attitudes
toward Libya, as did the suspicion that Libya was linked to unrest
instigated by Islamist (also seen as fundamentalist) groups in Algeria.
Libya's subsequent participation in the UMA, however, appeared to lay a
foundation for more stable relationships with Algeria and the other
states of the region.
Algeria - Strategic Perspectives
Among Algeria's neighbors, only Morocco and Libya could be viewed as
potential military rivals. The active personnel strength of Morocco's
armed forces was greater than the strength of Algeria's force, but its
army was inferior in terms of armored vehicles and artillery. The
Moroccan combat air force of French and United States fighter aircraft
was smaller than the Sovietequipped Algerian air force. Libya's
equipment inventory--armor, artillery, and combat aircraft--was greater
than either Morocco's or Algeria's, but its ground forces were much
smaller. The Libyan navy was somewhat larger than that of Algeria.
Unusual geographic features present Algeria's military leadership
with special challenges in protecting the security of the country's
borders. In 1993 most of the population of approximately 27.4 million in
1993 was concentrated within 100 kilometers of the coast, with the
density diminishing rapidly from north to south. The vast, unpopulated
stretches of the Sahara Desert to the south would be difficult to defend
against a strong and determined adversary. Algeria's western flank south
of the Atlas Mountains would be especially vulnerable to a Moroccan
attack, inasmuch as Moroccan forces would benefit from shorter
communication and supply lines. Between B�char and Tindouf, the
strategic highway that roughly follows the Moroccan border could easily
be severed, thereby breaking Algeria's only ground link to the
mineral-rich Tindouf area and its connections with Western Sahara and
Mauritania. In the northwest, however, the Atlas Mountains would act as
a barrier discouraging invasion of the more populous parts of either
country by the other.
The problems facing Algeria in the west are duplicated in the
southeast, where the lengthy border area with Libya is isolated from the
remainder of the country. A tenuous link to the region is provided by a
road reaching the border town of Edjeleh, but it would be difficult to
mount a defense of this remote area in the face of Libya's superiority
in combat aircraft and armor.
In the far south, a trans-Saharan route branches before the border,
connecting Algeria to Mali and to Niger. Fortunately, in view of the
distances involved and the weak transport links, Algeria faces no
serious threat from either country. Algerian border police have expelled
nomadic Tuareg and black Africans who were refugees from the Sahel
drought or engaged in black-market trading. Demarcation agreements were
concluded with Mali and Niger in 1983.
Tunisia, with its small armed forces, has never presented a security
problem for Algeria. A twenty-year disagreement over the border
delineation with Tunisia was settled in 1983. Algeria and Tunisia have
generally united when faced with Libyan bellicosity. When in 1985
Tunisia came under pressure from Libya in the form of border troop
movements and violations of Tunisian air space, Algeria supported
Tunisia by moving its troops to the border area. Algeria also signed a
border agreement with Mauritania in 1985, after three years of
negotiation.
Algeria - DOMESTIC SECURITY CONCERNS
During the 1960s and 1970s, Ben Bella and Boumediene were primarily
concerned with threats to their leadership from other figures who had
been prominent in the struggle of the FLN against the French colonial
presence. During the War of Independence, the FLN had never been a truly
unified force; instead, it operated as a coalition of groups based on
different ideological, personality, or ethnoregional considerations. As
a result, first Ben Bella and then Boumediene were opposed by a range of
individuals with strong revolutionary credentials. When Boumediene
overthrew Ben Bella and assumed power in 1965, his tight grip on the
military enabled him to dominate the opposition elements. After the
abortive attempt in late 1967 by armed forces chief of staff Taher Zbiri
to depose him, Boumediene's control appeared to be complete, and the
opposition was forced either underground or abroad.
To maintain his hold on power, Boumediene relied heavily on the
security forces--particularly the intelligence service of the ANP known
as Military Security (S�curit� Militaire), which maintained strict
surveillance within and beyond the national boundaries of people whose
ideologies were considered questionable. All political organizations
outside the FLN were considered illegal because the FLN was defined as
representing all legitimate political tendencies. Open criticism of the
regime was not permitted, and violators were subject to arrest and
severe punishment. The murders in Europe of two former FLN leaders,
Belkacem Krim and Mohamed Khider, were blamed on Algerian security
forces. Many suspected that deaths of other well-known FLN personalities
were linked to vengeance exacted through the S�curit� Militaire.
Benjedid, having been designated the FLN nominee for president at an
FLN party congress in 1979, had greater legitimacy than his predecessors
because of the wide support he enjoyed from fellow military officers.
Reinforcing his position over time, he shunted his rivals and potential
rivals into minor positions or out of the ruling apparatus altogether.
By the mid1980s , the government felt confident enough to release from
prison or house arrest all political prisoners including Ben Bella, in
detention at the time Benjedid assumed office. Amnesties were also
granted to those, among them Zbiri, who had been involved in the plots
against Boumediene. Former FLN leaders living abroad were invited to
return home.
Algeria - Islamic Opposition
By the early 1980s, the Islamist movement provided a greater rallying
point for opposition elements than did secular leftists. Although Islam
was identified with the nationalist struggle against the French, the
Algerian government had controlled its practice since independence
through the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Superior Islamic
Council. The council maintained "official" mosques and paid
the salaries of imams (religious leaders). Beginning in 1979, however,
concurrent with the religious revolution that toppled the government of
Iran, large numbers of young people began to congregate at mosques that
operated beyond the control of the authorities. At prayer meetings,
imams not paid by the government preached in favor of a more egalitarian
society, against the arrogance of the rich, and for an end to corrupt
practices in government, business, and religion.
In a pattern of escalating violence during the early 1980s, religious
extremists became increasingly active, assaulting women in Western-style
dress, questioning the legitimacy of the "Marxist" Algerian
government, and calling for an Islamic republic that would use the Quran
as its constitution. After a brutal confrontation between Marxist and
Islamist demonstrators at the University of Algiers in November 1982,
the authorities rounded up and prosecuted for subversion students,
imams, and intellectuals linked with the Algerian Islamic Movement
headed by Mustapha Bouyali. Bouyali himself remained at large, forming a
guerrilla band that was involved in a number of clashes with security
forces. He was killed in early 1987, and his group was disbanded.
Serious demonstrations to protest commodity shortages and high prices
broke out in Algiers, Oran, and other cities in October 1988. When the
police proved unable to curb the outbreak, troops supported by armored
vehicles assumed responsibility for security. Large demonstrations were
staged by Islamist groups inspired by the intifada, the
uprising of Palestinians against Israeli rule on the West Bank of the
Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip. It was estimated that more than 500
people were killed after ill-trained soldiers used automatic weapons
against the demonstrators. More than 3,500 demonstrators were arrested,
but most were released without charges before year's end. Allegations of
arbitrary arrest, unfair trials, mistreatment, and torture compounded
public anger against the government.
When Benjedid's reforms opened political life to wider public
participation, the FIS emerged in 1989 as the primary instrument of the
Islamic movement. The FIS achieved rapid success in local elections,
especially in the working-class districts of Algiers and other cities.
The FIS leaders, determined to remain a legitimate political party, did
not acknowledge links with Islamist groups dedicated to violence. The
party was banned in March 1992, however, and thousands of its officials
and supporters were arrested under the state of emergency. After that
time, the FIS appeared to have shifted to a policy of armed response,
declaring that the "state violence" of the authorities
justified recourse to "means other than dialogue." (Yared;
NYT8- 20-92; EIU 3/92))
Extremist branches of the Islamist movement engaged openly in
violence against government targets after the cancellation of the
elections. One of the most radical branches, Al Takfir wal Hijra
(Repentance and Holy Flight), originally consisted of about 500 Algerian
veterans of service in mujahidin (literally "holy
warriors" or freedom fighters) forces in Afghanistan. Their acts of
urban terrorism often were aimed against police and military posts in
order to gather weapons and to demonstrate the government's inability to
maintain control.
After the government's crackdown against the FIS in 1992, various
other activist Islamist organizations sprang up, with units operating in
groups of two to five, without apparent unified command. These groups,
difficult to distinguish from each other, targeted police posts,
courthouses and other public buildings, and selected public figures. In
some cases, assassination targets were announced in advance.
Officials did not ascribe the June 1992 assassination of the chairman
of the High Council of State, Mohamed Boudiaf, to terrorist groups,
although Islamic activists welcomed the action. The assassin, a junior
officer assigned to presidential security, was described as
"motivated by religious convictions."
The government interned at least 9,000 persons, many of them elected
FIS members of assemblies at the province (wilaya; pl., wilayat)
and commune levels, at camps in the Sahara during the spring of 1992.
Many of the urban terrorists waged guerrilla warfare from refuges in the
mountainous areas adjacent to large cities. Large-scale gendarmerie
actions hunted them down. Although the government claimed it had
neutralized most terrorist groups, more rigorous measures were imposed
in December 1992. These measures included a major sweep by 30,000 army
and police personnel directed at every entity connected with the FIS,
together with a strict curfew in Algiers and other localities.
After the banning of the FIS in Algeria, many FIS leaders escaped to
France, where they reportedly continued to recruit new fighters and
collect funds and supplies to pursue the armed struggle in Algeria. The
FIS, as a foreign political party, was prohibited from operating on
French soil; however, it was represented by the Algerian Brotherhood in
France set up by Algerian students. Previously, the Movement for
Democracy in Algeria of former President Ben Bella had used intimidation
and violence in seeking the support of Algerians resident in France, but
such intimidation was no longer considered necessary.
Algeria - Berber Separatism
The Berbers, who constitute about one-fifth of the Algerian
population, have resisted foreign influences since ancient times. They
fought against the Phoenicians, the Romans, the Ottoman Turks, and the
French after their 1830 occupation of Algeria. In the fighting between
1954 and 1962 against France, Berber men from the Kabylie region
participated in larger numbers than their share of the population
warranted.
Since independence the Berbers have maintained a strong ethnic
consciousness and a determination to preserve their distinctive cultural
identity and language. They have particularly objected to efforts to
force them to use Arabic; they regard these efforts as a form of Arab
imperialism. Except for a handful of individuals, they have not been
identified with the Islamist movement. In common with most other
Algerians, they are Sunni Muslims of the Maliki legal school. In 1980 Berber students, protesting that
their culture was being suppressed by the government's arabization
policies, launched mass demonstrations and a general strike. In the wake
of riots at Tizi Ouzou that resulted in a number of deaths and injuries,
the government agreed to the teaching of the Berber language as opposed
to classical Arabic at certain universities and promised to respect
Berber culture. Nevertheless, ten years later, in 1990, the Berbers were
again forced to rally in large numbers to protest a new language law
requiring total use of Arabic by 1997.
The Berber party, the Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces
Socialistes--FFS), gained twenty-five of the 231 contested seats in the
first round of the legislative elections of December 1991, all of these
in the Kabylie region. The FFS leadership did not approve of the
military's cancellation of the second stage of the elections. Although
strongly rejecting the FIS's demand that Islamic law be extended to all
facets of life, the FFS expressed confidence that it could prevail
against Islamist pressure.
Algeria - THE MILITARY HERITAGE
The People's National Army (Arm�e Nationale Populaire--ANP, known
until 1962 as the Army of National Liberation--Arm�e de Lib�ration
Nationale--ALN) stems from a long military tradition in Algerian
national life. Throughout their history, the peoples of North Africa
have demonstrated a decided martial prowess, particularly when called
upon to defend their independence. Berber tribesmen with a warlike
reputation resisted the spread of Carthaginian and Roman colonization
before the Christian era, and they struggled for more than a generation
against the seventhcentury Arab invaders who spread Islam to North
Africa by military conquests mounted as jihads, or holy wars.
Tension, crisis, resistance, dissidence, and revolution have
characterized Algeria's development, at times pitting Berbers against
Arabs and during other periods uniting them in opposition to a common
enemy. The people of the central Maghrib have also, on occasion, fought
on the side of their foreign rulers; during the 132 years of colonial
domination, the French augmented their pacification forces with Algerian
recruits. During World War I, about 173,000 Algerians conscripted into
service with the French army fought with valor against the Germans;
25,000 of the Algerians were killed in combat. Algeria also supplied
France with soldiers in World War II, providing the Free French with men
in the Italian campaign. The experience contributed to a growing
dissatisfaction with the French presence in Algeria that in 1954 erupted
in the eight-year struggle for independence.
At a meeting in 1954, the revolutionary leaders laid down the
structure of the ALN. The six military regions, known at that time as wilayat,
were subdivided into zones, areas, and sectors. Tactical units were
assigned, commanders appointed, and a system of military ranks adopted;
the designation of colonel was fixed as the highest officer grade.
In 1957 a coordinated campaign of strikes and violence in the cities
triggered a brutally effective counterinsurgency campaign by the French
that broke down FLN and ALN organizations inside Algeria, particularly
in urban areas. The military and civilian revolutionary leadership took
sanctuary in Tunisia and Morocco, leaving the "internal
ALN"--composed of guerrillas that operated under autonomous local
commanders--to continue the fight against the French. Largely unassisted
by the revolutionaries outside Algeria, these internal forces--with a
strong Berber component-- suffered heavily. They were never completely
destroyed, however, and their resistance succeeded in demoralizing the
French, whose forces numbered 500,000 at their peak.
The regular ALN units, formed in Tunisia and Morocco with the tacit
approval of the host countries, established bases near the Algeria
border. Unlike the internal forces, the "external" ALN had a
conventional organization and received training and modern equipment
from sympathetic foreign sources. Although estimates of its size varied,
a strength of 35,000 was claimed in 1960. Increasingly effective French
measures to seal the borders hampered efforts to convey arms and
supplies to the internal forces.
The external ALN was decisively defeated whenever it engaged the
French directly. Nevertheless, it emerged as a central element among
revolutionary forces, especially after the FLN leadership appointed
Colonel Boumediene as ALN chief of staff in early 1960. Well before
independence, regional factionalism and fierce personal rivalries raged
among FLN internal and external military leaders and civilian
politicians. Only six days before Algeria's formal independence on July
5, 1962, the civilian political faction controlling the Provisional
Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la R�publique
Alg�rienne--GPRA) dismissed Boumediene and the rest of the general
staff. Boumediene rejected their authority and instead supported the
candidacy of Ben Bella, one of the "historic chiefs" of the
War of Independence, against the GPRA. Boumediene led contingents of the
external ALN and friendly guerrillas eastward to Algiers, overcoming
resistance from other internal guerrilla leaders who felt that they had
earned the right to shape the course of the revolution. Joining Ben
Bella in the capital, Boumediene became minister of defense in the
government formed in September 1962.
Algeria - The Military and Boumediene
The failure of the GPRA to assert its supremacy over the external
army's general staff constituted a turning point in Algerian military
development. Thereafter, the political power of the ANP was firmly
established. Several groups--mostly former internal leaders and
politically motivated enemies of Boumediene- -sought to preserve the
Algerian armed forces' guerrilla traditions; they strongly opposed the
creation of a strong, centralized military power under Boumediene's
control. By contrast, according to Boumediene's philosophy, the security
of a modern state required a well-equipped armed force trained and
organized along conventional lines. The brief border war with Morocco in
1976, in which the conventional Moroccan army proved to be superior to
the ANP, underscored the need to convert the ANP into a unified modern
army.
The external forces were better organized, equipped, and trained and
were not fractured by local wilaya loyalties as were the
internal forces in the War of Independence. The internal guerrillas, who
may have numbered no more than 25,000 at any one time, had, however,
borne the brunt of the warfare. In addition, about 75,000 part-time
irregulars carried out sabotage, acted as guides, supplied intelligence,
and often took part in engagements near their own homes.
Boumediene vigorously undertook to reduce, consolidate, reorganize,
and train the ANP's various elements. He purged most of the headstrong
former guerrilla commanders. He retained professionals of the external
army, as well as about 250 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
with experience in the French army. The new ANP absorbed about 10,000
members of the internal guerrilla units; Boumediene discharged the rest,
mostly Berbers. (OT 313; World Armies 10))
In spite of his association with Boumediene, Ben Bella moved to gain
control of the army in a series of efforts aimed at reducing the power
of the defense minister. The new constitution of 1963 assigned the
powers of commander in chief to Ben Bella as head of state. Three weeks
later, while Boumediene was in Moscow seeking arms, Ben Bella designated
former wilaya leader Colonel Taher Zbiri as military chief of
staff, further weakening the position of the minister of defense and the
ANP. Boumediene met these threats by forging alliances with FLN leaders
previously identified as his rivals. The coup d'�tat of June 19, 1965,
which brought Boumediene to power, demonstrated his success in that
Zbiri personally arrested Ben Bella. )
Closely identified with the Boumediene government after the 1965
coup, the ANP exercised its influence through the country's supreme
governing body, the Council of the Revolution. Of the council's
twenty-six original members, twenty-two were military men with wartime
or postwar service; twelve served at the time on the ANP general staff
or as commanders of military regions.
In response to a failed coup attempt by chief of staff Zbiri at the
end of 1967, Boumediene dissolved the general staff and solidified his
control over the ANP by assuming personally many staff responsibilities.
He excluded ANP leadership from day-to- day policy making but remained
close to the army commanders whose support he needed to maintain
political control.
Boumediene never considered himself a military professional, and he
and his top aides never appeared publicly in uniform. He asserted that
as a socialist state Algeria was not the instrument of a military regime
or an officer caste. Nonetheless, the ANP was the best-organized and
best-managed institution in the country, and many technically competent
and experienced military personnel entered ministries and parastatal
(partly governmentowned and partly privately owned) corporations as part
of the national economic elite.
Military management also undertook local civic-action and economic
development projects. This role gave regional military commanders powers
of patronage that further boosted their political influence. The
regional commanders became more influential in local affairs than the
governors of wilayat, who served under the Ministry of
Interior, Local Communities, and Tourism (hereafter Ministry of
Interior). The wilayat governors also frequently had military
backgrounds.
After Boumediene was incapacitated by a fatal illness in late 1978,
the Council of the Revolution assumed day-to-day political power on an
interim basis. Only eight members of the council remained from the
original twenty-six. Five were colonels; they included Chadli Benjedid,
who assumed responsibility for national defense matters. The nation's
senior military officer, Benjedid was viewed as the ANP's candidate to
replace Boumediene. He became president when the FLN Party Congress
became deadlocked over two more prominent candidates.
Benjedid's Council of Ministers included strong ANP representation.
Military men consistently made up half the membership of the FLN
Political Bureau. Indeed, one observer described the FLN as a
"screen" behind which the military exercised its influence as
the real foundation of the regime. Many officers served in civilian
posts; many observers believed, however, that their involvement in
national decision making reflected Benjedid's confidence in their
abilities and loyalty rather than an effort to impose direct military
control.
The ANP's favorable image, based on its role in the War of
Independence and in the creation of the postwar Algerian state, was
badly tarnished by the ruthless way in which it suppressed the strikes
and riots of "Black October" 1988. Troops deployed in the
center of Algiers and other cities fired indiscriminately, with little
regard for civilian casualties. Reacting to criticisms by human rights
activists at home and abroad, Benjedid purged a number of military
commanders and appointed younger, more professional officers with
personal loyalty to him. Soon thereafter, all senior army officers
resigned from the FLN Central Committee so as formally, if not actually,
to distance themselves from civilian politics.
As the threat of Islamic militancy became more acute, the power of
the army reemerged as the primary bulwark against religiously inspired
violence. The role of the armed forces was legitimated by a four-month
state of emergency declared after the May-June 1991 rioting. The
military high command felt that the government's political
liberalization measures and its lax attitude toward the Islamic threat
were mistaken. When the first round of national election results of
December 26, 1991, resulted in an overwhelming FIS victory, Benjedid was
forced to resign as president. A five-member High Council of State soon
assumed presidential powers. The council's only military representative
was the minister of defense, Major General Khaled Nezzar, but the
military exerted strong influence on the interim government. Troops and
armored vehicles were deployed in the cities, military checkpoints were
set up, and gatherings at mosques for political purposes were
prohibited. The regime declared a one-year state of emergency, banned
the FIS, and arrested thousands of its supporters. Convinced that the
stability of the nation was at stake, the army clearly intended to crush
the FIS. The militants' resort to terrorist attacks and the June 1992
assassination of Boudiaf, one of the original founders of the group that
became the FLN, hardened the attitude of the military. Nezzar declared
that the army would "conduct an implacable war until the total
eradication of armed Islamic extremists who have soiled their hands with
the blood of the defenders of order [is achieved]."
As 1992 drew to a close, the suppression of the Islamic political
movement by the ANP and police appeared to be outwardly effective,
although individual acts of violence continued. In spite of some
desertions and arms thefts by sympathizers in the military, senior
commanders asserted that the cohesion of the army was unaffected. The
military leaders maintained that they had deemed it necessary to
intervene only to head off an anarchic situation. Although the armed
forces could have assumed power directly during the turmoil of 1992,
they refrained from doing so. They continued to profess their intention
of returning to their basic mission of providing for the defense and
territorial integrity of the nation.
Algeria - THE ARMED FORCES
The armed forces consist of four branches: the army, the navy, the
air force, and air defense. They are augmented by the National
Gendarmerie, which comes under the Ministry of Interior. According to The
Military Balance, 1993-1994, the total strength of the active armed
forces in late 1993 was 121,700, including the army, 105,000; the navy,
6,700; and the air force, 10,000. Air defense manning levels are not
known but one source estimates them as 4,000, included within the air
force complement. The number of reserves is listed at 150,000, but their
state of readiness is not known.
Under the constitution, the president is supreme commander of all the
armed forces and is responsible for national defense. When Boumediene
deposed Ben Bella in 1965, he eliminated the national defense portfolio
to reinforce his own control over the ANP. In July 1990, Benjedid
revived the position, appointing Nezzar to head the ministry. Nezzar had
been chief of staff since he replaced Major General Abdallah Belhouchet
in 1988. Belhouchet, who until that time had been considered the most
important military figure after Benjedid, was dismissed as part of the
wholesale removal of senior officers after the 1988 riots. After
Benjedid's resignation as president in early 1992 and Nezzar's
appointment as sole military representative on the High Council of
State, the interim governing body, Nezzar was seen as the strong man of
the regime.
Under the constitution, the head of state can turn for advice on
national security matters to the High Security Council, which along with
the Council of Ministers, is required to give its consent to the
declaration of a state of emergency in the event the country faces
imminent danger to its institutions, its independence, or its
territorial integrity. The High Security Council must also be heard
prior to a declaration of war by the president. The security council's
members include the prime minister, the minister of national defense,
the chief of staff of the armed forces, the minister of interior (an
army officer), and the minister of justice. Upon Benjedid's resignation,
the High Security Council assembled to cancel the second round of the
general election and created the High Council of State to exercise
interim presidential powers.
During the 1980s, Benjedid took a number of measures to reorganize
the military high command so as to enhance the ANP's efficiency and
military effectiveness. In 1984, after promoting eight colonels to
become the first generals in independent Algeria, Benjedid announced the
establishment of an ANP general staff. Previously, the armed forces had
relied on the secretary general of the Ministry of National Defense to
coordinate staff activities. The previous secretary general of the
ministry, Major General Mustafa Benloucif, was named the first chief of
staff. Benloucif had risen quickly in the ANP and was also an alternate
member of the FLN Political Bureau. However, he was dismissed in 1986
without explanation; in 1992 the regime announced that Benloucif would
be tried for corruption and the embezzlement of US$11 million, which had
been transferred to European accounts.
The general staff had responsibility for operational planning for the
integrated armed forces, budgeting, information and communications,
logistics and administrative support, mobilization, and recruiting. It
was not, however, part of the regular chain of command. In practice, the
armed forces chief of staff dealt directly with the chiefs of the
service branches and with the commanders of the six military regions.
Along with Nezzar, the senior hierarchy of the armed forces included the
chief of staff, Abdelmalek Gu�naizia; the commander of the National
Gendarmerie, Abbas Ghezaiel; the chief of military security, Mohamed M�di�ne;
and the inspector general of the land forces, Tayeb Derradji. Minister
of Interior Larbi Belkheir, a major general who had been considered part
of the collective military leadership, was replaced by a civilian
minister after Boudiaf's assassination in mid-1992 and was no longer on
active service.
Algeria - Army
The army's personnel strength of 105,000 in late 1993 included 65,000
conscripts. The army's size nearly doubled after 1978, largely to
prepare for possible hostilities with Morocco over the Western Sahara.
After reaching a manpower strength of 120,000 in 1992 to deal with the
pressures of domestic disturbances, financial considerations required a
cutback in personnel. The army commander appointed in the spring of 1992
was Major General Khelifa Rahim, who also served as deputy chief of
staff of the armed forces.
Territorially, Algeria is divided into six numbered military regions,
each with headquarters located in a principal city or town. This system of territorial organization, adopted shortly after
independence, grew out of the wartime wilaya structure and the
postwar necessity of subduing antigovernment insurgencies that were
based in the various regions. Regional commanders control and administer
bases, logistics, and housing, as well as conscript training. Commanders
of army divisions and brigades, air force installations, and naval
forces report directly to the Ministry of National Defense and service
chiefs of staff on operational matters.
During the 1980s, most of the army's combat units were concentrated
in Military Region II (Oran) and to a lesser extent in Military Region
III (B�char). Adjacent to Morocco, region III straddles the main access
routes from that country and includes most of Algeria's hydrocarbon and
manufacturing industries. It is also near the troubled Western Sahara,
embracing territory previously claimed by Morocco.
Much of the internal disorder and violence associated with economic
distress and the Islamist movement has occurred in Military Region I
(Blida), which includes the capital of Algiers, and Military Region V
(Constantine). Army units have been strengthened in and near the cities
where attacks against the government and security forces have occurred.
Although regional commanders were originally all colonels, the
commanders of region I (Mohamed Djenouhat) and region V (Abdelhamid
Djouadi) were both promoted to major general in 1992. The two
southeastern jurisdictions--Military Region IV (Ouargla) and Military
Region VI (Tamanrasset)--are sparsely populated tracts of desert where a
limited number of combat troops carry out patrols and man small
outposts. The Ouargla region assumed a measure of strategic importance
after relations with Libya soured, but the military's main activities
there and in region VI are the construction and planting projects
undertaken by conscript forces.
Originally organized as independent infantry battalions, the ANP
decided in 1966, based on Soviet advice, to form four mechanized
divisions. However, logistical problems and the high cost of associated
heavy weaponry soon forced a reassessment of the plan. In 1992 the army
again began to reorganize on a divisional basis; hence some units have
been in a state of flux.
According to The Military Balance, 1993-1994, in 1993 the
army's main combat units consisted of two armored divisions, each with
three tank regiments and one mechanized regiment, and two mechanized
divisions, each with three mechanized regiments and one tank regiment.
Furthermore, in 1993 there were five motorized infantry brigades and one
airborne special forces brigade. Each infantry brigade consisted of four
infantry battalions and one tank battalion. In addition, in 1993 the
army had seven independent artillery battalions, five air defense
battalions, and four engineering battalions. The brigades had authorized
personnel levels of 3,500 men, but all units were believed to be
understrength.
Twelve companies of desert troops, each with about 400 men,
functioned as border guards. Originally these troops patrolled on
camels, but by the 1980s they relied extensively on light reconnaissance
vehicles. Two special riot units, said to number about 15,000 men, were
assigned to maintain civil order. In addition to other riot-control
equipment, they reportedly were armed with shotguns.
The army was well equipped with both older and more up-to- date
models of Soviet armor and artillery. In 1993 it had nearly 1,000 tanks,
including more than 600 T-62s and late-model T-72s. About 200 T-72s had
been delivered since 1990. Earlier versions of wheeled armored personnel
carriers (APCs), the Soviet BTR-50 and BTR-60, had been supplemented by
BMP-1 and BMP-2 tracked armored infantry fighting vehicles mounted with
73mm guns and a few with Sagger antitank missiles. The army's extensive
artillery inventory was headed by Soviet 122mm and 152mm self-propelled
howitzers. There were also more than 100 122mm, 140mm, and 240mm
multiple rocket launchers in the inventory. The principal antitank
weapons were the Soviet Sagger and the French Milan. In addition to a
variety of towed and self-propelled air defense guns, the army had
Soviet SA-8 and SA-9 vehicle-mounted surfaceto -air missiles (SAMs) and
SA-7 man-portable SAMs.
During the early years of the army's modernization in the 1960s and
1970s, thousands of ANP officers went to the Soviet Union for training.
Since then, Algeria has established its own military academies, although
Russian advisers were still attached to the ANP in 1993. Strategic and
tactical doctrine continues to be based on Russian models. Basic army
cadet training is conducted at the military academy at Cherchell, west
of Algiers, the site of a French interservices military school taken
over by the government in 1963. Officer candidates attend for three
years, generally followed by a year of specialized training before being
commissioned and assigned to field units. The Cherchell academy also
includes a staff college for advanced training of a limited number of
field-grade officers of all branches.
A number of other institutions are used to train army personnel.
Among these are the school for technical, administrative, and logistical
training at El Harrach, just southeast of Algiers; the school for
armored units at Batna; the school for artillery units at Telerghma near
Constantine; the school for infantry commandos at Biskra; the school for
communications technicians at Bougara, on the outskirts of Algiers; and
the school for desert cavalry units at Ouargla.
The army's NCOs are trained at Ksar el Boukhari, about 100 kilometers
south of Algiers, where they receive instruction in leadership,
principles of command and control, tactical deployment, and political
indoctrination. The NCOs are often used in command positions in smaller
tactical units.
Algeria - Air Force
The Algerian air force, as of 1993 under the command of Colonel
Mohamed Mokhtar Boutamine, has responsibility for defending the
country's air space, supporting ground forces, supplying military
transportation and cargo airlift, and carrying out land and maritime
reconnaissance. In late 1993, the air force was equipped with some 193
combat aircraft and more than fifty attack helicopters, flying from
about fifteen air bases. The service has expanded steadily since its
inception in 1962, when Egypt donated five MiG-15 jet fighters and
supplied a training mission. As more MiGs arrived, Algerian pilots were
sent to Syria and Egypt and later to the Soviet Union for flight
training. Others received flight training and technical schooling in
France. With the help of Soviet advisers, a pilot training school was
eventually established at Tafraoua near Oran. The Air Force Academy and
a technical training school are also located at the Tafraoua complex.
According to The Military Balance, 1993-1994, in 1993 air
force combat capabilities were built around three fighter/ground-attack
squadrons and eight interceptor squadrons equipped exclusively with
Soviet aircraft. The most advanced of these, although they had been in
the inventory for more than a decade, were fourteen MiG-25s and three
MiG-25Rs in a reconnaissance configuration. The fighter squadrons also
included ninety-five MiG-21s and twenty MiG-23s. The
fighter/ground-attack squadrons included forty MiG-23s and ten older
Su-24s. The basic weapon of the fighter aircraft was the
Soviet AA-2 (Atoll) and AA-6 air-to-air missiles.
The main pillar of the air force's transport capability in late 1993
was the fleet of sixteen Lockheed C-130 Hercules purchased from the
United States. These were supplemented by six Soviet An-12s of
comparable load capacity. Two Super King B-200s were outfitted for
maritime reconnaissance.
The helicopter fleet in late 1993 comprised five squadrons of heavy-
and medium-attack helicopters of Soviet manufacture, as well as a small
number of transport helicopters. Air defense was under a separate
command. It consisted of three brigades equipped with 85mm, 100mm, and
130mm (KS-12, KS-19, and KS-30) Soviet antiaircraft guns; and three SAM
regiments, one equipped with Soviet SA-3, SA-6, and SA-8 SAMs.
Algeria - Navy
With help principally from the Soviet Union, the Algerian Navy
underwent considerable enlargement and modernization during the 1980s.
Its ambition was to develop a fleet of well-armed vessels that would
enable it to deal with the Moroccan or Libyan fleet and permit Algeria
to project naval power beyond its own coastal waters. As of 1993, the
navy was reportedly interested in acquiring surplus vessels from West
European navies for patrolling its 320-kilometer exclusive economic
zone. These purchases, however, had not materialized by late 1993,
probably owing to financial constraints.
In 1993 the naval complement of officers, enlisted personnel, and
cadets was estimated at 6,700, with an additional 630 men in the coast
guard. The latter group is part of the Ministry of Interior, although
under the navy's operational control. All navy and coast guard personnel
are volunteers. Previously, the commanding officer of the navy had held
the rank of colonel; in 1992, however, a brigadier general, Chaabane
Ghodbane, was named to the post.
Algeria received its first two submarines, Romeo-class vessels, from
the Soviet Union in 1983. In 1987 and 1988, the country acquired two
Kilo-class submarines, quiet-running, highspeed vessels armed with both
torpedoes and mines, from the Soviet Union. The Romeos were retired for
use as training ships. Two additional Kilo-class submarines are
reportedly on order.
The largest surface vessels are three Soviet Koni-class frigates
commissioned between 1980 and 1985. With 1,440 tons displacement, each
frigate is armed with Gecko SAMs and four 76mm guns. Three Soviet
Nanuchka II-class corvettes of 850 tons were delivered between 1980 and
1982. They are armed with Gecko SAMs and four surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs). New diesel engines are reportedly being installed on
the corvettes after problems were experienced with the performance and
reliability of their propulsion mechanisms.
In addition to the larger combat vessels, in 1993 the naval forces
operated a number of fast-attack craft and some smaller units for
coastal patrols. They included eleven former Soviet Osa I- and Osa
II-class missile boats, each mounted with four Styx SSMs. The navy also
possessed twelve Kebir-class fast-attack craft, each mounted with a 76mm
gun. The coast guard was temporarily operating six of these. Designed by
Brooke Marine, the first two were built in Britain and the remainder
were assembled or built at Mers el Kebir with assistance from Vosper
Thornycroft.
The fleet in 1993 boasted a modest amphibious capability, based on a
Polish LCT (landing craft, tank) and two larger British-built landing
ships acquired in 1983 and 1984. A maritime reconnaissance squadron with
two Super King 200Ts had been assigned to the navy, although the
squadron's personnel and aircraft came from the air force.
Algeria's naval academy at Tamentfoust near Algiers provides officer
training equivalent to that of the army and the air force academies. The
navy also operates a technical training school for its personnel at
Tamentfoust. Some higher-ranking naval officers have taken advantage of
training in France, Russia, and the United States. Principal naval bases
are located near Algiers, at Mers el Kebir, and Annaba.
In addition to sixteen Italian-built light patrol craft, the coast
guard in 1993 operated six Chinese patrol boats delivered in 1990; a
seventh was delivered in 1992. In carrying out its coast guard duties,
the navy coordinates its activities with elements of the Ministry of
Interior, with the customs and immigration services, and the national
police. Its goal is to prevent smuggling, the illegal entry of
undesirable aliens, and other offenses in order to ensure the security
of coastal areas.
Algeria - Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
Independent Algeria has never experienced difficulty in meeting its
military manpower needs. Its population is predominantly young.
According to United States government data, of an estimated population
in 1993 of 27.4 million, more than 6 million are males age fifteen to
forty-nine. Of these, an estimated 3.8 million are considered fit for
military service, and 293,000 reach the military age of nineteen
annually. Accordingly, basic manpower resources are more than adequate
to meet any foreseeable military needs.
Until mid-1967, the ANP relied entirely on volunteer manpower. Given
the plentiful supply of young men, the economic attraction of the army
compared with the difficulties of finding employment elsewhere, and the
absence of aversion to military service, the ANP would seem to be able
to depend on a voluntary system indefinitely. Algeria's commitment to
Arab nationalism, however, caused a rethinking of recruitment policies
after Arab forces were decisively defeated by Israel in the June 1967
War. By a 1968 decree, all Algerians were obligated to serve two years
upon reaching the age of nineteen. The objective of this national
service plan was to increase substantially the personnel strength of the
army and, at the same time, to train a youth corps for national
development. The first six months were to be spent in military training
with the ANP and the rest in social and economic projects managed by the
armed forces. National service was also intended to provide political
education and indoctrination in the revolutionary socialist program of
the government. As initially projected, an equal number of young men and
women were to be inducted. In practice, far fewer than the originally
intended numbers of men were called to duty, and the induction of women
was never implemented. Some women were accepted as ANP volunteers,
although fewer were serving in 1992 than in past years. Most of these
women were in the lower grades and were limited to the military health
service.
Conscription has remained in effect since 1969, although the period
of compulsory service has been reduced to eighteen months. Those young
men not conscripted by the end of the year in which they become eligible
can obtain a certificate attesting to their exemption from future
call-up so that they can continue their studies or work without further
distraction.
After the national service program was introduced, conscripts
generally were given civic-action assignments following their initial
military training period of six months. In some cases, opportunities
were offered for those with limited education to learn trades at various
vocational schools, often connected with civil engineering and
construction. Others learned to drive motor vehicles and to operate
construction equipment. National service provided a ready source of
workers for civic-action projects while freeing regular soldiers to
concentrate on other military missions. Beginning in the 1980s, however,
most conscripts appear to have been assigned to regular military units
to complete their eighteen-month service obligation, and fewer were
given nonmilitary assignments. Some conscripts, such as doctors who
deferred their military service until completing their education, were
allowed to fulfill their service obligation by occupying civilian posts
in their special fields in rural areas or small towns.
In 1993 the top echelon of the Algerian officer corps, mainly men in
their mid-fifties, included many veterans of the War of Independence.
Most had served in the external ALN, a few had been guerrilla officers
of the internal maquis (the French resistance during World War
II), and others had experience in the French army. Some, like Nezzar,
had served as NCOs with the French before defecting to the ALN.
The army's prestige--rooted in the revolutionary struggle against the
French--was dimmed by its excessive use of force to control the mass
demonstrations of 1988 and 1991. Most Algerian citizens were too young
to recall the achievements of senior officers in the fight for
independence. Moreover, much of the anger that had ignited
demonstrations among the civilian population was directed against
widespread corruption among highly placed officials. Although few of the
senior military had been directly implicated, they tended to be regarded
with the same suspicion as civilian officeholders.
Nevertheless, the newer military leadership was liberal in its
outlook, associating itself with the forward-looking managerial class
that welcomed the abandonment of the socialist experiment and favored
political democratization and the adoption of a free-market system.
Senior commanders were resolutely opposed to an Islamist-led state
because they feared it would mean an end to the modernization movement.
Younger officers came from all walks of life. Because of the ANP's
strict educational requirements, however, people raised in urban areas
with greater educational opportunities were more strongly represented
than those raised in rural Algeria. Generally, all officer candidates
were expected to be eighteen to twenty-three years of age, to have
completed twelve years of education and hold a baccalaureate
certificate, to be unmarried, and to be in good health. Competitive
written examinations were held for entry into the military academies.
Algeria - Conditions of Service
The general environment of Algerian military life has long been of
sufficiently high quality to make service in the ANP a reasonably
attractive alternative to the deteriorating conditions found in the
civilian sector. Most military personnel enjoy a higher standard of
dignity and comfort than the average civilian in an economy struggling
with unemployment and inflation. Food and pay compare favorably with
that found in the civil sector. Other advantages, such as medical care,
retirement benefits, and in-service training for later use in a civilian
career, also make military service attractive. In principle, the armed
forces do not constitute a privileged group insulated from the problems
afflicting Algerian society as a whole. Nevertheless, the system is
better organized and the standards of services provided tend to be
superior to those available in civilian life. In a possible allusion to
a decline of these standards, General Nezzar spoke of the
"Spartan" conditions of service life in discussing the
problems of the armed forces in 1992.
After independence the government realized that the loyalty and
morale of the armed forces were essential to its stability and from the
start allocated the largest share of the military budget for
personnel-related expenses: pay, allowances, rations, and clothing. The
ANP operated post exchange and commissary systems, built holiday camps
for dependents, and extended some opportunities for duty-free
purchasing. Members of the armed forces also benefited from a social
security program maintained by the ANP separately from the national
program maintained by the government.
A political commissariat, set up by Boumediene in 1963 and patterned
after similar groups in Soviet-type regimes, provided ideological
indoctrination and oversight of the armed forces. Its officers reported
directly to the FLN. The political commissariat provided political
supervision, operated its own training school, and assigned graduates to
all ANP units. Although apparently an influential agency in the 1970s, a
decade later the commissariat served mainly as an instrument to provide
goods and services to boost servicemen's morale.
In its earlier years, the ANP adopted a reserved and austere profile,
dedicated to the national goals, exemplary in its conduct, and modest in
its lifestyle. Differences between enlisted and officer pay, unlike
those in some of the older armies of the Middle East and North Africa,
did not reflect a class distinction in which a highly paid officer caste
was separated from a mass of conscripts by a wide chasm of pay and
privilege. Since the late 1970s, however, the officer corps has enjoyed
comfortable living quarters and recreational facilities; had easy access
to consumer goods, housing, and transportation; and been insulated from
the sometimes overbearing state bureaucracy.
The officer corps is not characterized by elaborate ceremony,
ostentatious attire, or an inflated rank structure. To maintain the
revolutionary tradition of equality, the military hierarchy was
deliberately limited to the rank of colonel. In 1984 this system was
modified when the ranks of brigadier general and major general were
created. A number of promotions in 1992 raised eight of some twenty
brigadier generals to major general. The result was that commanders of
similar rank often held vastly different command responsibilities.
Seasoned and competent officers with relatively low ranks often held
positions that in other armed forces would be associated with higher
ranks.
Algeria - THE DEFENSE BURDEN
Algerian military spending since independence has been relatively
restrained. Despite the influence of the military establishment, the
government on the whole has refrained from unduly favoring defense
interests over other sectors; on the contrary, it has attempted to avoid
burdensome military commitments. Algeria's outlays on its armed forces,
both in terms of share of gross national product and of total government budget devoted to defense, have been
well below those of its North African neighbors, Libya, Morocco, and
Tunisia.
The bulk of funding for the Ministry of National Defense is allocated
annually from the country's current budget. In addition, an unknown
amount is included in the country's capital budget. According to
official Algerian statistics, funds allocated to the ministry measured
in dinars remained relatively constant through the early 1970s. Although
this was a time when the country was still creating a professional
military establishment and was developing its air and naval services,
defense funding showed a substantial decline as a percentage of the
central government's current budget, reflecting the government's
preoccupation with domestic socioeconomic development.
By the mid-1970s, military spending began to rise as the country
sought to improve its defensive posture and to achieve a higher level of
military preparedness after the October 1973 War in the Middle East and
Morocco's moves to annex the Western Sahara. According to data compiled
by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), defense
expenditures continued to increase rapidly between 1978 and 1982, but
fell slightly as a percentage of the government's current budget from
14.1 percent in 1978 to 13.0 percent in 1982. Military expenditures
reached a high point in 1982, amounting to US$1.6 billion in constant
1991 dollars. Algeria's officially reported military expenditures
consisted entirely of recurring or operating expenditures; all or most
capital spending and overseas arms purchases were omitted from the
reported figures. The ACDA studies added estimates covering these
unreported items to the defense budget.
ACDA's statistics indicated that military spending as a percentage of
central government expenditures continued to decline after 1982,
reaching a low of 6.3 percent in 1985, before rising again to nearly 10
percent in 1988. Military expenditures remained at 3 to 4 percent of GNP
during most of the 1980s, but tapered off sharply to under 2 percent in
1991. Military expenditures per capita were US$50 annually in 1989 and
US$28 in 1991. This sum was comparable to Morocco's expenditures,
whereas Libya, with a much smaller population and an unusually large
military sector financed by oil exports, spent US$613 per capita in
1991. A separate study, World Military and Social Expenditures
by Ruth Leger Sivard, found that Algeria's military expenditures were
proportionately lower than the average of all the countries of North
Africa.
Algeria has no significant arms industry, and therefore valuable
foreign exchange must be devoted to the purchase of imported weapons
systems. To some extent, defense costs are offset by the contribution of
the military to the civilian economy. Under both Boumediene and
Benjedid, the government stressed the role of the armed forces in
national development. Soldiers carried out public works projects that
were often managed by officers. This aspect of the ANP's mission was
emphasized in Article 82 of the 1976 constitution: "The People's
National Army, instrument of the revolution, participates in the
development of the country and in the construction of socialism."
When a new constitution was adopted in 1989, the army's role was defined
in a narrower traditional form as that of safeguarding national
territory.
During the War of Independence, the FLN initiated a number of
projects designed to achieve for the military a degree of
selfsufficiency in producing food and other basic supplies. For example,
at least fifty large farms were taken from French settlers and converted
to army cooperatives after the war ended in 1962. These projects
supplied some of the ANP's needs and the military also profited from
sales on the civilian market. The army was also involved in
manufacturing and construction enterprises. Much of the construction and
surfacing of a major road across the Sahara to the Niger border was the
responsibility of the army, as was a notable planting project, the barrage
vert, or green wall of trees, aimed at limiting the spread of the
Sahara.
The army, furthermore, built low-income housing projects as well as
barracks and housing for its own personnel. Since 1989, however, the
army has discontinued civilian construction activities and a number of
military enterprises. Some of these enterprises, including a brickworks,
a wood-processing plant, and a poultry-raising business, have been
transferred to public or private companies. Only certain road and
railroad projects of a strategic nature have been retained.
Algeria - FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
In spite of periodic reports that Algeria was negotiating with
European manufacturers to produce weapons systems under license, the
country continues to depend heavily on outsiders to supply the ANP. From
independence through the 1980s, Algeria's most important supplier
remained the Soviet Union. It was estimated that nearly 90 percent of
the equipment in the ANP inventory in 1993 was of Soviet origin.
Algerian leaders have frequently stated their desire to diversify their
sources of arms and to obtain access to up-to-date Western equipment,
but the country's straitened economic circumstances have precluded a
major shift to purchases from the West.
At independence the newly created ANP was using equipment from
various sources. Some small arms had been delivered to the ALN during
the war from China, Egypt, and other countries. The new force also
benefited from some military supplies turned over by the French forces
as they left the country and from Egypt's assistance to the air unit.
Overall, however, the military was very poorly equipped; it lacked the
heavy weapons associated with a modern military establishment.
Overtures to Western nations by Ben Bella and Boumediene resulted in
lukewarm responses or, at best, offers on terms the Algerians considered
too stringent. The French government of Charles de Gaulle, in
particular, was reluctant to supply heavy items on concessional terms to
the country it had so recently fought. The Soviet Union extended Algeria
its first military credit, equivalent to about US$100 million, following
an urgent visit by Boumediene to Moscow in late 1963 after a setback in
the border war with Morocco. Soviet heavy arms and equipment soon began
flowing into the country. After the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the
Soviet Union stepped up arms deliveries and extended additional credits.
Moroccan moves to annex the Western Sahara apparently provided a
catalyst for further arms purchases. In 1980 the Soviet Union agreed to
deliver an estimated US$3.5 billion in arms through 1985. Another
agreement was signed in 1986 for a further US$2 billion in arms. These
sales were on a credit basis highly favorable to Algeria, with repayment
over an extended period at low interest rates. Nevertheless, Algeria was
unwilling to enter into a close military relationship with the Soviet
Union. It refused the Soviet Union basing rights at the large naval
installation at Mers el Kebir, which the French had handed over in 1968,
and the holding of joint military exercises.
Algeria received some of the most modern Soviet-made arms during the
1975 to 1985 period. The ANP was one of the first armies outside Eastern
Europe to be equipped with the T-72 tank. It also received the BMP-1 and
BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle, MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighter aircraft,
Mi-24 attack helicopters, modern rapid-firing artillery, and SA-2 and
SA-3 air defense missiles. Although these were the "export"
versions of various models, which lacked the capabilities of those in
first-line Soviet units, they represented high-quality weaponry.
The Soviet Union also provided extensive training to ANP personnel.
Between late 1963 and 1985, more than 3,500 officers and enlisted
personnel received technical instruction in the Soviet Union. The number
of Soviet military advisers assigned to Algeria to train and guide ANP
personnel in the use of Soviet equipment as well as in tactical
operations is estimated to have reached a high of 3,000, although by
1993 the number of Russians had fallen below 500.
During the 1980s, Algerian officials evinced a growing interest in
ending the Soviet Union's almost complete monopoly in the sale of arms.
The Benjedid government sought to practice strict nonalignment in its
relations with the superpowers. The Algerians were impressed by the
superior performance of Western equipment used by the Israelis during
the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and by the more comprehensive training and
support packages Western suppliers provided to their customers.
Nonetheless, few negotiations with Western countries were actually
consummated, presumably because of Algeria's tight budgetary and
foreign-exchange limitations.
Available data reflected the continued predominance of the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe as sources of weaponry. According to ACDA, of a
total of US$3,820 million in arms imports during the period 1981 to
1985, about US$3,200 million originated in the Soviet Union, US$170
million in the United States (primarily C- 130 transport aircraft),
US$100 million in France, US$160 million in Britain, and US$160 million
in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). During the period
1985 to 1989, Algerian arms imports totaled US$3,260 million, of which
US$2,700 million originated in the Soviet Union, US$430 million in other
East European nations, US$50 million in the United States, US$40 million
in Britain, and US$20 million in France. Deliveries reached a peak of
US$1,400 million in 1981, representing 12.4 percent of all imports. By
1989 arms deliveries were down to US$600 million, only 6.8 percent of
total imports and continued to full sharply in 1990 and 1991.
Under a set of agreements signed in 1963 and 1967, French military
advisers maintained a permanent presence in Algeria after independence.
A number of places at the French military academy at St. Cyr and the
French gendarmerie school at Melun were allotted to Algerians. In 1969
about 340 French officers and NCOs were detached to work with the
training services of the ANP. Relations chilled, however, after France
escalated its military support for Morocco during the Western Sahara
conflict; by 1981 only about twenty French advisers remained in Algeria.
The administration of the socialist Fran�ois Mitterrand, who was
elected president of France in 1981, was thought to be more attuned to
Algerian interests than previous French governments had been. The French
government increased the number of places in French military schools for
Algerian cadets and extended additional credits. Algeria bought Panhard
armored personnel carriers for the gendarmerie and Milan antitank
missiles, but more extensive purchases, notably a national
command-and-control radar network, failed to materialize.
From independence through the early 1980s, the ANP had purchased
relatively small amounts of less sensitive military equipment from the
United States such as several executive transport aircraft and unarmed
primary trainers. Beginning in 1981, as part of a rapprochement that was
kindled by Algeria's role as an intermediary in the release of the
American hostages in Iran, Algerian requests for more sensitive military
equipment were reviewed more favorably. In addition to the Lockheed
C-130 transport aircraft, the United States furnished telecommunications
equipment and military trucks during this period.
All of these sales were conducted on a commercial basis, and all of
the equipment was classified as nonlethal. During Benjedid's 1985 visit
to the United States, however, Washington approved Algeria's eligibility
to purchase general defense equipment under the conditions of the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Algerian arms requests were
examined on a case-by- case basis. Direct purchases under FMS were
minimal. They amounted to only US$2.2 million in fiscal year (FY) 1991
and were estimated to reach only $1 million in FY 1992 and FY 1993,
although commercial transactions were somewhat larger. Since 1985, the
United States Department of Defense has provided a small annual grant
under the International Military Education and Training Program to
provide professional military development courses and technical training
for Algerian officers in leadership positions or deemed to be potential
leaders.
Algeria purchased two tank landing ships from Britain in the early
1980s. In addition, the British undertook a joint project with the
Algerian navy for the delivery of twelve fast-attack craft armed with
Italian Otomat missiles. The first two of the attack craft were built in
Britain, and ten others were built or assembled at the Mers el Kebir
shipyard with British technical assistance.
Algeria has purchased some patrol craft from China, but there has
been little other evidence of military cooperation between the two
countries since the War of Independence. In 1991 it was disclosed that
the Chinese were assisting in the construction of a nuclear reactor at
Ain Oussera, about 140 kilometers south of Algiers. Subsequent reports
stated that Iraq had sent scientists and some uranium to Algeria.
Algerians asserted that the reactor was intended to produce only
radioactive isotopes for medical research and to generate electric
power. However, the secrecy surrounding the program, which had been
initiated in 1986, raised suspicions. Algeria is not a signatory to the
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, having rejected it on the principle
that Algeria should not have to renounce a nuclear weapons program when
other nations could continue with theirs. Algeria subsequently agreed to
inspection of the site by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Algeria - INTERNAL SECURITY
Military Security is the principal and most effective intelligence
service in the country. Its chief in 1993, General Mohamed M�di�ne,
was believed to number among the more influential officers of the ANP.
After Boumediene took power in 1965, he relied on Military Security to
strengthen his control over the ANP during the difficult process of
amalgamating "external" and "internal" ALN
personnel, some of whom were of questionable loyalty. Military Security
became the dominant security service in the 1970s, responsible to the
head of state for monitoring and maintaining files on all potential
sources of opposition to the national leadership.
Although theoretically bound by the same legal restrictions as the S�ret�
and gendarmerie, Military Security is less circumscribed in its
operations. Frequent cases of incommunicado detention of suspects have
been ascribed mainly to Military Security. An important role in the area
of national security was later assumed by the General Delegation for
Documentation and Security (Del�gation G�n�rale de Documentation et S�ret�--DGDS)
as the principal civilian apparatus for conducting foreign intelligence
and countering internal subversion. The security services are believed
to infiltrate Islamist groups, to employ paid informers for monitoring
opposition movements, and to practice extensive telephone surveillance
without prior court authorization as required by law. During and after
the riots of October 1988, widely published accounts told of torture and
other human rights abuses of detainees. Both Military Security and the
DGDS were implicated in the brutal treatment of detainees to obtain
confessions or extract information on clandestine political activists.
Government officials have acknowledged that individual cases of improper
behavior by security forces occurred but stressed that torture was not
sanctioned and that evidence of it would be investigated.
In September 1990, Benjedid announced the dissolution of the DGDS
after criticism of its repressive role in the 1988 riots. The
dissolution coincided with other government reforms to remove barriers
to individual liberties. Informed sources believed, however, that this
action did not represent an end to domestic intelligence operations but
rather a transfer of DGDS functions to other security bodies. Surveying
the intelligence picture in August 1992, the French periodical Jeune
Afrique concluded that Military Security, with its abundant
documentation on the leadership and organization of the violent Islamist
groups, remained the senior intelligence body concerned with internal
security. Other intelligence groups include a Coordinating Directorate
of Territorial Security, an Antiterrorist Detachment, and a working
group of the High Council of State charged with political and security
matters. The precise functions and jurisdictions of these bodies remain
fluid, according to Jeune Afrique.
Algeria - Criminal Justice System
Ordinary criminal cases are heard in the regular civil court system
by judges appointed by the Ministry of Justice through an independent
board. Criminal cases are heard in forty-eight provincial courts, which
have jurisdiction over more serious crimes as well as appellate
jurisdiction over lower courts in local tribunals (tribunaux),
which have original jurisdiction for less serious offenses. According to
the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1992, the judiciary is generally independent
of executive or military control, except in cases involving security or
public order. During the period of martial law in 1991 and the state of
emergency in 1992, this independence was largely circumvented.
In December 1992, special antiterrorist courts with civilian judges
were established to try crimes specifically relating to terrorism.
According to the Department of State, these courts are believed to have
been formed so that the government might have greater influence over the
outcome of security-related criminal cases. A State Security Court,
which had previously tried cases involving endangerment of national
security, had been abolished in 1989 as part of Benjedid's political
reform program. Muslim sharia law predominated in local courts but there
were no Islamic courts as such. Military courts dealt with offenses by
military personnel and all types of espionage cases. During the 1991
state of emergency, about 700 persons were tried in military courts
whose jurisdictions had been widened to include acts endangering
national security. The trials of seven FIS leaders in 1992 were among
those heard by military courts. Some of the rights normally accorded in
civil courts were ignored or circumscribed in the military courts.
Defendants in civil courts usually have full access to counsel who
can function freely without governmental interference. The Algerian Bar
Association provides pro bono legal services to defendants
unable to pay for their own lawyer. In connection with criminal
investigations, detention for questioning normally cannot exceed
forty-eight hours, but an antiterrorist law issued in 1992 permits
prearraignment detentions of up to twelve days.
Detainees must be informed immediately of the nature of charges
against them. Once charged, a person can be held under pretrial
detention indefinitely while the case is being investigated. No bail
system exists, but provisional liberty may be granted if the detainee
can demonstrate availability at all stages of the inquiry. Lawyers are
entitled to have access to their clients at all times under visual
supervision of a guard. Defendants have the right to confront witnesses
and present evidence. Trials are public, and defendants have the right
of appeal.
Prior to the civil unrest of 1991 and 1992, the government had
introduced political reforms that liberalized the justice system with
respect to actions deemed to threaten internal security. Previously,
citizens could be arrested for expressing views critical of or different
from those of the government, for disturbing the public order, for
associating with illegal organizations, or, in extreme cases, for
threatening state security. The new constitution of 1989 provides the
right to form political parties and civic associations and to strike,
and strengthens the right of freedom of expression and opinion.
Nevertheless, under legislation introduced in 1990, persons convicted of
publishing information endangering state security or national unity can
be sentenced for a term of up to ten years. Criticizing Islam or another
revealed religion can bring a penalty of up to three years'
imprisonment.
According to Amnesty International, more than 100 persons were under
sentence of death at the close of 1992. At least twenty-six Islamists
were sentenced to death after the banning of the FIS in 1992, but no
executions were actually carried out in 1992. More than 100 civilians
and supporters of Islamic opposition groups were killed by security
forces during 1992, and more than 1,000 people were in detention at the
end of 1992 according to government sources.
The principal leaders of the FIS arrested in 1991--Abbassi Madani and
Ali Benhadj--were tried by a military court in mid1992 for fomenting
rebellion against the state. They could have been given the death
sentence, but government prosecutors asked for life imprisonment. The
court's sentence of twelve years was lighter than expected. Its leniency
was construed as having been dictated by the government in an effort to
ease tensions and improve the atmosphere for possible reconciliation
with more moderate Islamic factions.
In 1987, reversing its previous policy, the government officially
recognized a human rights group, the Algerian League of Human Rights.
Legal status was subsequently accorded to the Committee Against Torture,
which investigated allegations of government torture, as well as to a
number of other human rights organizations. They have been permitted to
lobby, publicize their findings, and publish reports on the treatment of
detainees.
Under the 1991 state of emergency and the 1992 martial law decrees
that gave military and security authorities wide latitude to enforce
public order, large numbers of Islamists were detained. The government
acknowledged that it detained 9,000 persons at eight desert camps
without formal charges in 1992. By the end of the year, 1,000 were still
held in four remaining camps, despite government plans to close them
down. FIS leaders claimed that the number of those rounded up by the
government had actually reached 30,000.
Algeria - Prison Conditions
The prison system is operated as a separate function of the Ministry
of Justice. The system includes many facilities established and operated
by the French during their rule. Persons convicted of lesser crimes are
sent to provincial civil prisons. Those found guilty of more serious
crimes, including murder, kidnapping, or rape, which carry a potential
death sentence, serve time in one of three penitentiaries. Persons
convicted of treason, terrorism, and other crimes against the state are
also sent to the penitentiaries.
According to the United States Department of State, conditions in
both types of institutions range from primitive to modern. Conditions in
the penitentiaries are said to be worse than in the more numerous civil
prisons. At El Harrach, the main prison in Algiers, prisoners are often
crowded together, and sanitary facilities are poor. Inmates at other
prisons, especially those in outlying areas, are thought to live under
better conditions. Prisoners are segregated according to the seriousness
of their crimes and the length of their sentences.
Medical care is described as rudimentary in most cases, although a
local doctor under contract visits each prison regularly to treat sick
prisoners. Seriously ill prisoners are sent to local hospitals. Inmates
of civil prisons can receive visits from their families once a week. It
is more difficult to visit prisoners held in penitentiaries. Conjugal
visits are sometimes permitted at the discretion of local prison
authorities. The prison diet is described as bland and starchy. Visiting
families may bring food to augment the inadequate prison fare.
Detainees in the Saharan security camps have been forced to contend
with extreme heat, poor food, inadequate bedding, and overcrowding. Next
of kin often have not been notified about inmates' detention, and many
detainees have been released near the camps without transportation home.
A medical team under the auspices of the Algerian League of Human Rights
found no evidence of torture in the detention camps, however. The United
States Department of State has observed that in 1992 there were fewer
reports of torture and brutal treatment than in prior years. The
government has responded to concerns that have been raised about
conditions in prisons and desert internment camps by organizations such
as Amnesty International and has promised to remind military commanders
of their responsibility to safeguard the rights of internees.
Most of the data on the strength and equipment of the armed forces
are based on The Military Balance, 1993-1994, and on Jane's
Fighting Ships, 1992-93. Little detailed information has been
disclosed by Algerian authorities on the structure and performance
standards of the service branches. The role of the military in the
political crisis of 1991-92 has been analyzed by several authorities,
including Guy Mandron in Jane's Intelligence Review and John P.
Entelis and Lisa J. Arone in Middle East Policy. Numerous
articles in the French periodical, Jeune Afrique, have followed
the efforts of the security forces to maintain order against violence by
Islamic radicals.
Alastair Horne's A Savage War of Peace is a balanced and
comprehensive account of the military and political aspects of the
Algerian War of Independence. The functioning of the criminal justice
system and the record of the police and the gendarmerie in the struggle
against Islamic-inspired dissidence are summarized in the United States
Department of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices and in annual reports by Amnesty International.
