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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
Despite the fact that Qadhafi has established an elaborate and
complex system of overlapping institutions to foster public
representation and "direct democracy," the Libyan regime in 1987
was still controlled by a small group of powerful men. Although no
official leadership hierarchy delineated the relative power of
these top leaders, Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi was de facto chief of
state without holding such a title. He remained the primary
decision maker and continued to act as the supreme commander of the
armed forces, the Leader of the Revolution, and its founding father
and foremost theoretician. Dr. Miftah al Usta Umar, Secretary of
the General People's Congress, theoretically served as the chief of
state. Abdel Salaam Jallud continued to be identified as Libya's
number two man, despite doubts raised by his three-month stay in
Syria. His return to Libya in early March 1987, however, indicated
that rumors of a rift with Qadhafi were exaggerated.
The most recent government shuffle, taking place in early March
1987, entailed the replacement of Jadallah Azzuz at Talhi as
Secretary General of the General People's Committee (a position
corresponding to prime minister). His successor, Umar al Muntasir,
who served previously as secretary of industries, was little known
outside Libya. The Libyan news agency JANA announced that Talhi had
replaced Kamal Hassan Mansur as secretary of foreign liaison
(corresponding to foreign minister).
Outside the formal government or cabinet structure, the most
important figures of the Libyan regime, in addition to Jallud,
included Armed Forces Chief of Staff Abu Bakr Yunis, Inspector
General of the Armed Forces Mustafa Kharrubi, and Colonel Khuwayldi
al Hamidi, head of the "shock force" of the revolutionary
committees tasked with suppressing political dissent. All of these
men were among the twelve founders of the Free Officers Movement,
whose members seized power in September 1969. And, following the
purges in the aftermath of a 1975 coup attempt, they were the only
original members of the original twelve Free Officers Movement who
remained in power. The cohesion of this inner core has continued
with little or no sign of conflict or dissension.
Prominent among the revolutionary committees' young radicals
was Musa Kusa, who was in charge of the International Revolutionary
Committee (sometimes called the Libyan World Center for Resistance
to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reaction, and Fascism). Qadhafi's
cousin, Ahmad Qadhafadam, played a prominent role in actions
against "stray dogs," i.e., Libyans opposed to Qadhafi who were
outside the country and were targets for assassination. Finally,
Khalifa Hunaysh headed the presidential guard, a group that
safeguarded Qadhafi.
The regime faced tumultuous internal crises in 1987. The
military establishment was disgruntled and demoralized by the war
in Chad, economic problems were exacerbated by the world oil glut,
and disputes among certain key regime figures threatened to erode
Qadhafi's personal power base
(see Growth and Structure of the Economy
, ch. 3;
State of Internal Security
, ch. 5). A rift between
Colonel Hassan Ishkal (also seen as Eshkal), military commander of
the oil-rich central region and a long-time friend of Qadhafi, and
Hunaysh, culminated in Ishkal's death under mysterious
circumstances in Tripoli on November 24, 1986. Although the facts
were not definitively established, foreign observers believed that
Ishkal, who was Qadhafi's cousin, was killed by supporters of
Khanish. Significantly, both men were members of Qadhafi's tribe--
the Qadhafadam--upon which Qadhafi has relied increasingly in
recent years. But after the daily newspaper Jamahiriyah
vehemently criticized the Qadhafadam tribe, the Libyan leader
decided to distance himself from his kin. Foreign observers
believed that unless intratribal conflicts were kept within
manageable limits, yet another crucial base of Qadhafi's support
would be eroded. The question arose as to how many domestic
interest groups the regime could afford to alienate before it was
left with no support.
Unlike many leaders, who, when confronted by mounting threats
to regime stability, adopted a conservative and cautious approach
to consolidate their grip on power, Qadhafi met threats with
further changes. Qadhafi had often launched new domestic or foreign
political initiatives to distract attention from domestic crises,
and in view of this record, further political change came as no
surprise. On November 3, 1986, Az Zahf al Akhdar (The Green
March), the mouthpiece of the revolutionary committees, carried
a long article, probably written by Qadhafi, which surprisingly
argued the urgent need to form a new political party. In an
astonishing assertion, the article indicated that such a new
political party would replace the people's congresses. According to
the article, the people's congresses should be "crushed" because of
"exploitation, stealing, monopoly, haughtiness, domination,
favoritism, tribalism, reactionism, and corruption" among the
masses, which they represented. The statement was apparently
motivated by recognition of the need to purge the GPC and the
people's congresses of elements who voiced their opposition to some
of Qadhafi's policies.
In the opinion of informed observers, Qadhafi's practical
political decision making contradicted his political theories. For
ideological reasons, he genuinely wanted the masses to evolve into
a self-governing polity. For pragmatic reasons, however, he vetoed
popular policies with which he disagreed, using the rationale that
he was protecting the people from "opportunists" and
"counterrevolutionaries." However, such paternalistic intervention
contravened the very political process Qadhafi advocated by
preventing the masses from reaching the stage of true self-
reliance, Qadhafi's ostensible goal.
Despite these shortcomings, however, it seemed clear that the
basic goal of direct democracy had been achieved to some extent.
Certainly, most Libyans were better represented than they had been
under the monarchy. By the late 1980s, there were many
opportunities for the populace to participate in the political
process and to influence the planning and regulations that affected
their daily life. On occasion, the populace have succeeded in
revising or changing national policy. For example, faced with the
strong opposition of the 1984 GPC, Qadhafi conceded that military
training of women would not require women to move away from home.
In addition, "people's power" did provide for some genuine debate
and consultation on most local and many regional matters. The
jamahiriya system gave people experience in the exercise of
responsibility that had largely been denied them in the past, if
only because Qadhafi, whether or not by choice, did not wield
absolute dictatorial power.
Qadhafi's power and his ability to veto citizens' wishes was
circumscribed to some extent by the General Secretariat, which
challenged his views. Moreover, Qadhafi's frequent resignations did
not gain him many concessions from his colleagues. As Raymond
Hinnebusch pointed out, the fact that Qadhafi felt the need to
resort to such measures or threats indicated that policy decisions
were taken by a majority vote and that Qadhafi could be defied.
Although popular participation and self-representation in
Libya's government have increased, there are clearly limits to how
much control citizens can ultimately exert over their government.
On the one hand, Qadhafi has set limits to the extent of dissent he
will permit. Qadhafi created the revolutionary committees
specifically to counteract growing people's power. And, just as the
Chinese Cultural Revolution degenerated into chaos because of the
excesses of the Red Guards, Libya's own Cultural Revolution, in its
quest to remold society according to Qadhafi's idiosyncratic vision
of a pure Islam, may culminate in similar disruptions and
upheavals. As of late 1987, however, the Libyan case had been far
less radical, with markedly less violence. On the other hand, the
implementation of the direct democracy is predicated on the
assumption of sustained political interest and sound judgment that
may be unrealistic for many of the citizenry. For example, women's
participation in the political system was still at a low level in
1987, despite official encouragement of their participation.
Nevertheless, as a unique type of direct popular democracy, the
jamahiriya experiment was not likely to be of more than fleeting
interest for policy makers, political theorists, and, those
concerned with Third World development. Lillian Craig Harris
suggested that although Qadhafi's utopian and simplistic The
Green Book will not survive his tenure, the fact that he has so
radically changed the Libyan political order indicates that at
least some vestiges of his philosophy will endure indefinitely.
Although the ideal of greater public participation in
government through direct democracy had appeal as a theory, Qadhafi
was not been able to implement it practically; therefore, Libya's
extremely complicated and inefficient system of government was not
likely to be emulated. One reason for the incredible, and growing,
complexity of the Libyan political system was that new structures
were frequently superimposed on already existing ones without the
elimination or even simplification of the existing structures. As
a result of blurred lines of authority and responsibility, problems
of cooperation and coordination between different parts of
institutions have arisen. In the late 1970s, for instance, there
were tensions between the ASU and the popular committees. Later, in
the 1980s, friction developed between the revolutionary committees
on the one hand and the army and people's congresses on the other.
In view of the extremely rapid pace of political and socioeconomic
change, it seemed evident that the jamahiriya system needed
time to mature.
Qadhafi's revolutionary transformations have outpaced
government institution-building and the citizen's political
absorptive capacity, causing widespread reaction and rejection of
his plans. The GPC in 1977 rejected Qadhafi's plan to dismantle the
government (the presidency, the cabinet, and other political and
administrative structures). The 1983 GPC called for more moderate
changes at a slower rate. Similarly, the 1984 GPC rejected
Qadhafi's proposals to enlist women in the armed forces, to revise
the law to give women equal rights in divorce, and to abolish
elementary schools in favor of parental tutoring. As of April 1987,
the second and third of these proposals appeared to have been put
aside while a compromise was worked out regarding the highly
controversial issue of women's military training in locations far
from home.
The preceding examples underline the resilience of traditions
and traditional culture, including Islamic values and teachings
(see Religious Life
, ch. 2). Much to Qadhafi's chagrin, various
aspects of traditional culture have proved to be too deeply rooted
to permit the elite to sweep them aside easily. Therefore,
Qadhafi's impatience at what he considers an unduly slow pace of
change will probably continue for a long time. From this
standpoint, the whole edifice of political and socioeconomic change
wrought by the Libyan revolutionary elite under the guidance of
Qadhafi still appears rather fragile. The post-Qadhafi era may go
in directions very different from, and at odds with, at least some
of the basic ideological features espoused by the previous elite.
The real challenge facing Qadhafi was whether he could transform
his revolution from above into a truly broad-based and popular mass
revolution.
Data as of 1987
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